the chief proponent of Vishishtādvaita, which is one of the three main
forms of the Orthodox Hindu philosophical school, Vedānta. As the
prime philosopher of the Vishishtādvaita tradition, Rāmānuja is one of
the Indian philosophical tradition's most important and influential
figures. He was the first Indian philosopher to provide a systematic
theistic interpretation of the philosophy of the Vedas, and is famous
for arguing for the epistemic and soteriological significance of
bhakti, or devotion to a personal God. Unlike many of his
contemporaries, Rāmānuja defended the reality of a plurality of
individual persons, qualities, values and objects while affirming the
substantial unity of all. On some accounts, Rāmānuja's influence on
popular Hindu practice is so vast that his system forms the basis for
popular Hindu philosophy. His two main philosophical writings (the
Shrī Bhāshya and Vedārthasangraha) are amongst the best examples of
rigorous and energetic argumentation in any philosophical tradition,
and they are masterpieces of Indian scholastic philosophy.
1. Ramanuja's Life and Works
On traditional accounts, Ramanuja lived the unusually long life of 120
years (twice the average lifespan at the time), from 1017 to 1137 AD,
though recent scholarship places his life between 1077 to 1157 AD,
with a life of 80 years (Carman p.27). He was born in the Southern,
Tamil speaking region of India, in the small township of Shri
Perumbudur on the outskirts of modern day Chennai (Madras) into a
family that hailed from a subclass of Brahmins (the Hindu priestly
caste) known for their scholarship and learning in the Vedas. His
family was likely bilingual, fluent in both the local vernacular
(Tamil) and the language of scholarship (Sanskrit). From a young age
he is reputed to have displayed a prodigious intellect and liberal
attitudes towards caste. At this time he became friendly with a local,
saintly Sudra (member of the servile caste) by the name of Kancipurna,
whose occupation it was to perform services for the local temple idol
of the Hindu deity Vishnu. Ramanuja admired Kancipurna's piety and
devotion to Vishnu and sought Kancipurna as his guru-much to the
horror of Kancipurna who regarded Ramanuja's humility before him as an
affront to caste propriety.
Shortly after being married in his teenage years, and after his father
passed away, Ramanuja and his family moved to the neighboring city of
Kancipuram. There Ramanuja found his first formal teacher,
Yadavaprakasha, who was an accomplished professor of the form of the
Vedanta philosophy that was in vogue at the time-a form of Vedanta
that has strong affinities to Shankara's Absolute Idealistic Monism
(Advaita Vedanta) but was also close to the
Difference-and-non-difference view (Bhedabheda Vedanta). ("Vedanta"
means the 'end of the Vedas' and refers to the philosophy expressed in
the end portion of the Vedas, also known as the Upanishads, and
encoded in the cryptic summary by Badharayana called the Vedanta Sutra
or Brahma Sutra. The perennial questions of Vedanta are: what is the
nature of Brahman, or the Ultimate, and what is the relationship
between the multiplicity of individuals to this Ultimate. Vedanta
comprises one of the six orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy.)
At first Yadavaprakasha was thrilled to receive a talented and
intelligent student of the likes of Ramanuja. But disagreements
between the two, on the proper interpretation of the Upanishads, soon
broke out. Yadavaprakasha favored an amoral, impersonal, non-theistic
interpretation of the Upanishads. Ramanuja, in contrast, favored a
theistic interpretation of the Upanishads that placed a premium on the
aesthetic and moral excellences of Brahman. Yadavaprakasha found
Ramanuja's skill at offering alternative interpretations threatening
both to his authority and the popularity of his philosophy. He thus
hatched a plan, with some of his other students, to murder Ramanuja
while on a pilgrimage. Ramanuja however got word of the plan from his
classmate and cousin (Govinda) and escaped from the pilgrimage with
his life. Ramanuja (surprisingly) did not make public his knowledge of
the failed assassination attempt and resumed classes with
Yadavaprakasha when he returned to Kancipuram. Yadavaprakasha for his
part did not reveal his complicity in the plot to take Ramanuja's
life, and feigned happiness at continuing to be his teacher. Not too
long afterwards, however, Yadavaprakasha ordered Ramanuja to leave his
school, after a final disagreement on the interpretation of scripture
occurred.
Without a teacher, Ramanuja returned dejected to his childhood mentor,
Kancipurna, who assured him that a teacher would come his way. For the
time being, Kancipurna instructed Ramanuja to help him in his manual
service to the temple idol of Vishnu.
At the same time Yamuna, the spiritual head of the fledgling Tamil
Vaishnava (Vishnu worshiping) community, was near the end of his life
and in search of a successor. This community, known as the Shri
Vaishnava Sampradaya, was formed around the memory of the Four
Thousand Tamil Verses (Nalayira Divya Prabhandam) of twelve Tamil
Vaishnava saints (Alvars), renowned for their devotional poetry on
Vishnu. While it had a modest popular base, it lacked a formal and
legitimizing articulation in the Sanskrit academic community. Though a
competent and accomplished philosopher in his own right who authored
the impressive Siddhi Trayam, Yamuna came into the fold too late in
his life to fully articulate the philosophy of Shri Vaishnavas to the
pan-Indian academic community. He thus held out the hope that Ramanuja
would, amongst other things, take up the task of articulating the
philosophical ethos of the tradition that had been entrusted to him,
in the form of a formal, Sanskrit commentary on the Brahma Sutra (the
cryptic summary of the philosophical purport of the Upanishads). Upon
finding out that Ramanuja had been freed from ties to Yadavaprakasha,
and had returned to the company of Kancipurna (himself a member of
Yamuna's Shri Vaishnava community) Yamuna was overjoyed and sent word
to Ramanuja to come and take up the post as his successor. Yamuna
however died just before Ramanuja could reach him, and once again
Ramanuja found himself without the teacher he had been searching for.
After Ramanuja had gained his composure, he made his way over to the
crowd centered on Yamuna's new corpse. He noted that three fingers of
Yamuna's were curled. Yamuna's senior disciples explained to Ramanuja
that they likely represented three wishes of Yamuna, one of which
being that a commentary on the Brahma Sutra should be written. When
Ramanuja pledged to try to fulfill those wishes, the fingers uncurled.
The crowd took this as a sign that Ramanuja was the heir apparent of
Yamuna. Ramanuja was however vexed at the local temple idol of Vishnu
for not even allowing him a brief meeting with Yamuna, and would not
formally join the community for nearly a year.
When Ramanuja did decide to formally join the Shri Vaishnava fold,
Yamuna's senior disciple, Mahapurna, supervised his initiation. For a
matter of six months, Ramanuja had found himself the teacher he was
looking for in the form of Mahapurna. Under Mahapurna, Ramanuja
learned the verses of the Tamil Vaishnava saints. However, his
learning under Mahapurna came to an abrupt end when Ramanuja's wife
picked a fight with Mahapurna's wife, on the premise that the latter
was a member of a lower Brahminic subcaste. Upon hearing this, the
hurt Mahapurna and his wife departed from Ramanuja's company without
notice. Ramanuja, once again lost his teacher. But this was not the
first time that Ramanuja's wife had interfered with his spiritual
development.
At an earlier point, Ramanuja had invited his childhood mentor,
Kancipurna, for a meal. Ramanuja had hoped to partake of Kancipurna's
leavings as a sacrament. However, Kancipurna arrived early in absence
of Ramanuja. Ramanuja's wife fed Kancipurna, sent him off, and
ritually purified the dining area, by, amongst other things,
discarding Kancipurna's leftovers.
Having lost the benefits of a teacher twice over as a result of his
wife's caste-pretensions, Ramanuja was incensed. He thus sent his wife
back to her natal home, and promptly became a renounciate (sannyasin).
He earned the title "king of ascetics (yatiraja) from the temple deity
of Vishnu speaking through Kancipurna at this point.
Ramanuja's separation from his wife and his initiation into the order
of ascetics marks the beginning of his career as an independent and
self-assured philosopher. He traveled around India and participated in
public debates with exponents of rival philosophies. Many of the
philosophers that Ramanuja defeated became prominent disciples in his
fold. Ramanuja standardized and reformed temple worship in those
Vaishnava temples that he gained control over (often through winning
debates with the custodians of the temple). To this day his
instructions are the norm of Shri Vaishnava temple and home worship in
India and abroad.
The Shri Vaishnava tradition is unanimous in holding that Ramanuja
authored nine, and only nine, works: all in Sanskrit. While Ramanuja
is reported by the writings of his disciples to have lectured in Tamil
on the verses of the Tamil Vaishnava saints, he left no writings on
their work, and no explicit mention of them in his writings. At first
glance, this seems remarkable, given that the Divya Prabhandam is
regarded by the Shri Vaishnava tradition, as the Tamil equivalent of
the Vedas. However, Ramanuja's silence on the Alvars in his Sanskrit
writings may have been a result of his aim as philosopher to not
preach to the converted, but to articulate his philosophy to the
pan-Indian academic community.
Ramanuja's first work was likely the Vedarthasangraha ('Summary of the
Meaning of the Vedas'). It sets out Ramanuja's philosophy, which is
theistic (it affirms a morally perfect, omniscient and omnipotent God)
and realistic (it affirms the existence and reality of a plurality of
qualities, persons and objects). This work is referred to several
times in Ramanuja's magnum opus, his commentary on the Brahma Sutra,
the Shri Bhashya (also known as his Brahma Sutra Bhashya). This is the
work that Ramanuja is best known by outside of the Shri Vaishnava
tradition. In addition to this large commentary on the Brahma Sutra,
Ramanuja apparently wrote two more shorter commentaries: Vedantapida,
and Vedantasara. Aside from the Vedarthasangraha and Shri Bhashya,
Ramanuja's most important philosophic work is a commentary on the
Bhagavad Gita (Bhagavad Gita Bhashya). In addition to these
philosophic works, Ramanuja is held by tradition to have written three
prose hymns called collectively the Gadya Traya, which include the
Sharanagati Gadya, Shriranga Gadya and the Vaikuntha Gadya). The
Sharanagati Gadya is a dialogue between Ramanuja and the Hindu deities
Shri (Lakshmi) and Narayana (Vishnu) (which jointly comprise God, or
Brahman, for Ramanuja) in which Ramanuja surrenders himself before God
and petitions Vishnu, through Lakshmi, for his Grace. Vishnu and
Lakshmi, for their part, respond favorably to Ramanuja's act of
surrender. The Shriranga Gadya is a prayer of surrender to the feet of
Ranganatha. (This is Vishnu in his repose on the many headed serpent
Adiœesa -'ancient servant,' 'ancient residue,' or 'primeval matter'-
on the milk ocean.) The Vaikuntha Gadya describes in great detail the
eternal realm of Vishnu, called Vaikuntha, on which one should
meditate in order to gain liberation. Finally Ramanuja is held to have
authored a manual of daily worship called the Nityagrantha.
The authenticity of all but the three large works attributed to
Ramanuja – Shri Bhashya, Vedarthasangraha and the Bhagavad Gita
Bhashya – have come into question in recent times. The argument
against the authenticity of these texts appears to be a minority
position amongst scholars. With respect to the two smaller
commentaries on the Brahma Sutra, it has been argued that they must be
inauthentic, because it seems unlikely that Ramanuja would himself
have bothered to take the time to abridge his larger commentary, the
Shri Bhashya (cf. Buitenen p.32). With respect to the short religious
works attributed to Ramanuja, it has been argued that they present
doctrines that go beyond those that are found in his major
commentaries (cf. Lester p.279).
2. Ramanuja's Cosmology and Metaphysics
a. Background
Subsequent tradition has applied the label "Vishishtadvaita" to the
philosophy of Ramanuja. It is meant to contrast his philosophy from
leading competing views, such as Advaita (Non-Dualist), Bhedabheda
(Difference-and-non-difference) and Dvaita (Dualist) Vedanta. The term
"Vishishtadvaita" is often translated as 'Qualified Non-Dualism.' An
alternative, and more informative, translation is "Non-duality of the
qualified whole," or perhaps 'Non-duality with qualifications." The
label attempts to mark out Ramanuja's effort to affirm the unity of
the many, without giving up on the reality of distinct persons,
qualities, universals, or aesthetic and moral values.
Where all versions of Vedanta intersect is in their effort to provide
a consistent and defendable interpretation of the Brahma Sutra, on
philosophical and hermeneutic grounds. Given the common textual bases,
there are certain doctrinal invariances amongst the various
sub-schools of Vedanta.
In accordance with the Upanishads, the various schools of Vedanta hold
that there is an ultimate entity, called Brahman, which also is
referred to by scripture as "Atma" ("Self"). The Vedanta schools
recognize, in accordance with the Upanishads, that Brahman plays a key
role in the organization of the universe. Attainment of Brahman by an
individual constitutes its highest good: soteriological liberation or
moksha.
The chief areas of disagreement amongst the various schools of Vedanta
are on the nature and ontological status of individual selves, objects
of cognition and Brahman, as well as the relevance and importance of
ethics or duty (dharma) to the good life.
Ramanuja's foils in the articulation of his philosophy are two forms
of Vedanta that were not clearly distinguished during his day: these
are the Bhedabheda view, and the Advaita philosophy. Both these views
take a similar stance on the relationship of an individual's
subjectivity and Brahman: on both accounts, the conscious principle of
the individual is of a piece with Brahman. In the case of Advaita
Vedanta, the consciousness of an individual is regarded as numerically
identical with the consciousness of Brahman. On this view, the
psychological ego or sense of individuality is something distinct from
consciousness: it is its object. The Bhedabheda view similarly asserts
the numerical identity of an individual's consciousness and Brahman,
but it emphasizes that this identity is counteracted by a separating
off, or differentiating effort, on the part of Brahman to
compartmentalize itself and mysteriously constitute the world of
plurality and difference. On this view, the individual ego is
constituted by Brahman. According to the versions of Bhedabheda and
Advaita that Ramanuja was acquainted with, mere knowledge of one's
identity with Brahman is sufficient to bring about liberation; works,
such as ritual and moral obligations, can at best play a preparatory
role in bringing an individual to the state of being desirous for
liberation, but they have no intrinsic value. Corollaries of these
views are the position that consciousness, and not plurality, is
metaphysically fundamental; that consciousness does not require
objects for its existence; that belief in plurality consists in the
uncritical acceptance of ordinary experience; and that dialectical
reasoning can yield substantive knowledge with practical import. On
many fronts (on the reality of universals, particulars, and moral
values) both the Bhedabheda Advaita schools are classic forms of
anti-realism.
Students of Ramanuja's thought may wish to know whom Ramanuja is
arguing against. In all likely hood, it is his former teacher,
Yadavaprakasha. However, Ramanuja does not attribute the Advaita or
Bhedabheda views to any particular philosopher. Rather, these views
are voiced by the opponent, or the ubiquitous purvapaksin, everywhere
in Indian philosophy, expressing the views to be criticized.
Ramanuja's arguments that he presents against his opponent are of
roughly three varieties. Some are negative, and focus on philosophical
problems of the opponent's view. Some are positive, and concern
arguing for theses that Ramanuja wishes to defend. And some arguments
are hermeneutic. This last category of arguments combines criticism
and positive philosophical argument, but it centers on the proper
interpretation of the Vedas.
b. Negative Philosophical Criticisms of Bhedabheda and Advaita Vedanta
i. Logical Criticism
Ramanuja criticizes many of the arguments of the Bhedabheda and
Advaita views on logical grounds. These schools employed dialectical
arguments that conclude on the basis of logical puzzles that arise in
accounting for distinctions and difference in perception that
difference (which includes the idea of a distinct quality) is an
unintelligible notion. From such considerations, these philosophers
would typically conclude that only undifferentiated consciousness is
the real (Brahman). Ramanuja at many points in the Shri Bhashya and
the Vedarthasangraha attempts to argue against such views by an
argument ad absurdum. Particularly, Ramanuja argues that the arguments
presented by the Bhedabheda and Advaita Vedantins lead to intolerable
contradictions and further conclusions that go against common sense.
At one point he suggests that those who would make such arguments are
"no better than a man who would claim that his own mother never had
any children" (Shri Bhashya, I.i.1. "Great Siddhanta" p.44).
ii. Argument from Epistemology
Ramanuja argues that the epistemic considerations that his opponents
adduce for their positions undercut their own views. The philosophers
that Ramanuja takes aim at argue that all means of cognition involve
error. Ramanuja argues that if this is so, it follows that we could
never know that all cognition involves error, for such putative
knowledge would itself involve an erroneous cognition, and hence not
qualify as genuine knowledge. If Ramanuja's opponents view is correct,
then it follows that some cognitions are not erroneous. But this is
exactly what the disputed conclusion rules out (Shri Bhashya, I.i.1.
"Great Siddhanta" pp.74-78).
c. Substantive Theses
i. Intentionality of Consciousness
While the previous two strategies that Ramanuja employs in his
criticism of the Bhedabheda and Advaita views are largely negative,
and involve criticizing these views on formal grounds, Ramanuja also
defends philosophical theses that these two schools rule out. The most
important of these theses is the view that consciousness is always
consciousness of some object distinguished by a characteristic (cf.
Shri Bhashya, I.i.1. "Great Siddhanta" p.53 and "Great Purvapaksa"
p.32). This is the doctrine known as "dharmabhutajnana" in the
Vishishtadvaita tradition (Shrinivasadisa VII.2). It implies the view
that all epistemic states, be it consciousness or perception, are
intentional or object oriented. If it is the case that even
consciousness requires an object for its existence, it follows that
there can be no such thing as pure consciousness apart from difference
(such as qualities, properties and objects of consciousness). Thus, on
this account, if consciousness exists, it follows that difference and
plurality does as well. With this one thesis, and against the backdrop
of Vedantic idealism, Ramanuja is able to generate one limb of his
organismic cosmology.
ii. Consciousness is a Property of Something
Another important substantive philosophical thesis that Ramanuja
defends is that consciousness is itself a property. To modern readers,
this may seem to be a trivial point. However, it is central to the
project of Ramanuja's opponents that Brahman is the only reality, and
it is a reality devoid of distinctions or qualities. Ramanuja's
opponents are happy to affirm that certain things can be said of
Brahman, for instance, that it is (as affirmed in the Taittitriya
Upanishad II.i.1.) truth (satyam) knowledge (jnanam) and infinite
(anantam). However, they take the stand that these are not properties
of Brahman, but the very being of Brahman (Shri Bhashya, I.i.1. "Great
Purvapaksa" p.29). Ramanuja, in contrast, defends the view that such
attributions bring attention to the reality of Brahman's qualities
(cf. Shri Bhashya, I.i.1. "Great Purvapaksa" p.28).
iii. Individuals are Real
A third and important substantive thesis that Ramanuja defends is the
reality of the individual. According to Advaita Vedanta (and the
Bhedabheda view to a lesser extent), the individual person, in
contradistinction to other persons, is an illusion (maya) that comes
about by nescience (avidya). Ramanuja argues that the very idea that
something can be ignorant presumes that there is an individual capable
of being ignorant. For all Vedantins affirm that Brahman is of the
nature of consciousness and knowledge. Hence, to say that Brahman is
ignorant is absurd. If anything is subject to ignorance, it must be an
individual other than Brahman. However, if this is so, then ignorance
cannot be brought into explain the existence of individuals, for it
presumes the existence of an individual capable of being ignorant.
Ramanuja's positive view is thus that there are, indeed, distinct
individuals, many who are under the spell of ignorance. However, their
individuality is ontologically and logically prior to their ignorance
(Shri Bhashya, I.i.1. "Great Siddhanta" p.103)
d. Hermeneutic Criticism
All Vedanta philosophies must turn to the Vedas, and particularly the
Upanishads, for scriptural grounding. Hence, in criticizing his fellow
Vedantins, Ramanuja makes use of arguments that concern the proper
interpretation of scripture.
i. Vedas as Doctrinally Unified Corpus
According to Ramanuja, his opponents have failed to arrive at an
interpretation of the Vedas based on all Vedic texts. Rather, they
emphasize some passages that support a monistic interpretation, and
ignore those passages that either presume or emphasize plurality.
Ramanuja notes that his opponents hold to the view that those Vedic
texts that come later in the corpus are to be emphasized (the fact
that they come later is presumed, on this account, to show that they
contain the more advanced and esoteric teachings) (Shri Bhashya,
I.i.1. "Great Purvapaksa" p.27). These, more than other portions of
the Vedas, emphasize the oneness of reality with Brahman. Ramanuja
argues that even these portions of the Vedas presume and affirm
plurality. Even if it were not the case that these portions of the
Vedas mentioned plurality, we would have to take all the Vedas on par
for Ramanuja. According to Ramanuja, one cannot attempt to give
interpretations of isolated portions of the Vedas. Rather, one must
take the Vedas as one unified corpus, aiming at the expression of a
single doctrine (cf. Shri Bhashya pp.92-3, I.i.1. "Great Siddhanta").
Hence, any tenable interpretation of the philosophy of the Vedas must
not only affirm the reality of plurality, but also the importance of
ritual and moral obligations (dharma), for these are spoken about at
length in the earlier portions of the Vedas.
ii. "Tat tvam asi" and Co-ordinate Predication
Even if the Vedic corpus as a whole is taken to present a single
doctrine, Ramanuja is still left with the task of accounting for how
the seemingly monistic portions of the Upanishads are consistent with
the reality of a plurality of distinct individuals. To overcome this
hermeneutic hurdle, Ramanuja introduces the doctrine of
samanadhikaranya, sometimes translated as "co-ordinate predication" or
"the principle of grammatical coordination" but literally meaning
'several things in a common substrate.' The etymology of the word
suggests an ontological doctrine. However, Ramanuja means to employ it
as a semantic doctrine. According to Ramanuja, "The experts on such
matters define it thus: `The signification of an identical entity by
several terms [shabda] which are applied to that entity on different
grounds is co-ordinate predication" (Vedarthasangraha §24).
In both the Shri Bhashya and the Vedarthasangraha, Ramanuja draws a
distinction between the object denoted by a term, and the quality that
it can be identified in connection with. The possibility of using
various terms with the same denotation but with different qualitative
content is what Ramanuja calls "co-ordinate predication."
The doctrine that Ramanuja advances under the heading of co-ordinate
predication strikingly anticipates the Fregean distinction between
sense and reference. In the writings of Ramanuja, the doctrine is used
to interpret monistic passages of the Vedas in a manner that affirms
both the unity of the thing designated, via the coreferentiality of
the various terms, while affirming that the various terms bring to the
sentence an emphasis on distinct properties of the unitary thing so
identified. With respect to the famous formula "that thou art" (tat
tvam asi) from the Chandyogai Upanishad (which Advaitins quote as
support for the absolute identity of the individual's self with
Brahman), Ramanuja understands the indexicals "that" and "thou" as
signifying an underlying unity, while containing distinct qualitative
content. Hence, "that" in this context, brings to fore the quality of
the underlying substantial unity of all individuals in Brahman, while
"thou" emphasize that we, as individuals, are qualities or
distinctions in this underlying unity (Shri Bhashya, I.i.1. "Great
Siddhanta" pp.129-39).
iii. Brahman and Atman
Even if the doctrine of co-ordinate predication is granted, there is
yet another hermeneutic hurdle for Ramanuja to contend with: this is
the Upanishadic equation of Brahman (the Ultimate) with Atma (or
Self). If the Ultimate and the Self are one, then it would seem that
there is no room for the existence of a plurality of individual
persons. The problem might be solved by denying that "Atma" means
self, but this would be to stipulate a meaning for the word "Atma"
that it does not have in Sanskrit or Vedic. Ramanuja's solution to
this problem is the cosmological doctrine of sharira and shariri (body
and soul), or shesha and sheshin (dependant and dependant upon).
According to Ramanuja, Brahman is the Self of all. However, this is
not because our individual personhood is identical with the personhood
of Brahman, but because we, along with all individuals, constitute
modes or qualities of the body of Brahman. Thus, Brahman stands to all
others as the soul or mind stands to its body. The metaphysical model
that Ramanuja thus argues for is at once cosmological in nature, and
organic. All individuals are Brahman by virtue of constituting its
body, but all individuals retain an identity in contradistinction to
other parts of Brahman, particularly the soul of Brahman.
In accordance with much of the monism of Upanishadic passages,
Ramanuja maintains that there is a way in which the individual self
(jiva, or jivatma) is identical with the Ultimate Self (Atma or
Paramatma). This is in our natures. According to Ramanuja, each jiva
shares with Brahman an essential nature of being a knower. However,
due to beginningless past actions (karma) our true nature (as being
knowers and dependants upon Brahman) are obscured from us. Moreover,
our sharing this nature in no way implies that we have the same
relationship to other things (Shri Bhashya, I.i.1. "Great Siddhanta"
pp.99-102). In other words, our likeness in one respect with Brahman
does not imply that we ourselves are either omnipotent, omniscient or
all good.
3. Ramanuja's Theism
In contrast to preceding commentators on the Brahma Sutra, Ramanuja's
version of Vedanta is explicitly theistic. Brahman as Atman (the
Highest Self of all) is the union of two deities: Vishnu, or Narayana,
and His Consort Shri, or Lakshmi. (In Hinduism, Vishnu is the God who
upholds and preserves all things, while Lakshmi is the Goddess of
prosperity.) The unity of both the father (Vishnu) and mother
(Lakshmi) element in Brahman is essential to Ramanuja. It is a
consequence of the view that Brahman is ubhayalingam, or having both
sexes: this accounts for Brahman's creative potency. According to
Ramanuja, Brahman (considered as the Atman) is antagonistic to all
evil lacks all faults (papam, heya, mala or dosha), and is comprised
of innumerable auspicious qualities (kalyanaguna): these auspicious
qualities are both moral and aesthetic (Vedarthasangraha §§ 2, 6, 9,
19, 92, 112, 147, 161, 163, 198, 234, Shri Bhashya, I.i.1. pp.5, 80,
89, 92, 94, 125, 132, 133, 136, 144, I.i.2. p. 157, I.i.4. p.201,
Bhagavad Gita Bhashya I. Intro, IX.34, to name just a few
references-Ramanuja never tires or speaking of God's excellences.).
The highest Self (Atma) stands to all other persons as their parent,
on Ramanuja's account. However, Ramanuja, like many Vedantins, does
not subscribe to the Medieval Christian doctrine of creation ex
nihilo: Brahman does not create individual persons, or basic,
non-relational qualities for that matter, for these are eternal
features of its Body. Brahman does engage in a form of creation, which
consists in granting individual persons the fruits of their desires
(whatever they are). The result of this dispensation is the
organization of the elements comprising Brahman's body into the cosmos
(Shri Bhashya, I.i.1. "Great Siddhanta" p.124)
4. Ramanuja's Soteriology
On Ramanuja's account, our greatest good consists of being ever aware
of our true nature (as modes of Brahman) and of being aware of the
nature of Brahman. When all impediments to this awareness are removed,
the individual attains moksha (liberation). Knowledge of Brahman
consists in liberation, for Ramanuja, mainly because of the character
of Brahman. He writes:
Entities other than Brahman can be objects of such cognitions of
the nature of joy only to a finite extent and for limited duration.
But Brahman is such that cognizing of him is an infinite and abiding
joy. It is for this reason that the shruti [scripture] says, `Brahman
is bliss' (Taittitriya Upanishad II.6.) Since the form of cognition as
joy is determined by its object, Brahman itself is joy.
(Vedarthasangraha §241)
Ramanuja is explicit in holding that theoretical knowledge of
Brahman's nature will not suffice to procure liberation (Shri Bhashya,
I.i.1. "Small Siddhanta" pp.13-14). Our embodied state places
psychological constraints upon us that must be nullified. The remedy
to be employed, for Ramanuja, is what he calls, after the Bhagavad
Gita, bhakti yoga, or the discipline of devotion or worship. This type
of yoga is comprised of two essential elements: (a) an attendance to
one's duties with a deontological sense that they are the things that
ought to be done for their own sake, and not for their consequences
(also known as karma yoga), and (b) the constant worship of Brahman,
particularly in the form of offering all of the fruits of one's labor
to Brahman. These features of bhakti yoga serve two complimentary
purposes. First, they counteract past undesirable actions (karmas)
whose residual effects impede a full appreciation of reality.
Secondly, they inculcate subservience before Brahman. This is valuable
for Ramanuja, for service to God, on his account, is constitutive of
an unbroken appreciation of Brahman's nature.
5. Ramanuja's Epistemology
Epistemic concerns figure centrally in Ramanuja's arguments, and his
diagnosis of the state of bondage (samsara), or non-liberation. Like
many Indian philosophers, Ramanuja holds that liberation comes about
by the cessation of nescience (Shri Bhashya, I.i.1. "Small Siddhanta"
p.12). However, unlike many of his contemporaries, Ramanuja does not
believe that reason is an independent means of knowledge, capable of
dispelling ignorance.
a. Perception
Ramanuja holds a position that is similar to naïve empiricism.
According to naïve empiricism, the only knowledge that one can have is
knowledge that one has gained by one's own experience. Ramanuja's view
is like naïve empiricism, in so far as his intentional account of the
nature of all epistemic states (dharmabhutajnana) leads him to the
view that all genuine or first-rate knowledge (jnana) consists in a
perceptual relationship between a knower and an object of
knowledge-knowledge de re-and not between a believer and a sentence or
proposition-knowledge de dicto. Unlike some proponents of naïve
empiricism, Ramanuja does not think that it suffices to intermittently
have an acquaintance with objects of knowledge. Knowledge (jnana) only
occurs when there is direct perception of an object. Unlike proper
empiricists, Ramanuja does not restrict knowledge to that which can be
gathered from the senses. The individual self (jiva) on Ramanuja's
account is also capable of having a direct vision of transcendent
entities, like Brahman. Yet, the character of the epistemic state in
which one is acquainted with Brahman is a type of perception for
Ramanuja.
b. Scripture
Because of Ramanuja's perceptual conception of knowledge, he does not
regard acquaintance with scripture (shruti) as anything more than
knowledge of the sentence meaning of scripture (cf. Shri Bhashya,
I.i.1. "Small Siddhanta" pp.13-14). Yet, like many of his fellow
Vedantins, Ramanuja regards scripture (shruti) as a pramana, or a
means of knowledge. shruti, or the revealed literature, consists of a
very specific corpus of texts: the Vedas. (If Ramanuja believed that
the Divya Prabhandam authored by the Tamil Vaishnava saints is the
Tamil equivalent of the Vedas, then he would have held these to also
be within the purview of shruti). Scripture is an important source of
knowledge, for Ramanuja, for it is the only place that we can learn of
our moral obligations (dharma) and what our liberation consists in
(moksha). On the basis of the validity of scripture, several texts
gain a derivative authority. These texts are smriti (remembered)
texts, which include the law books (dharmashastras) of eminent
figures, and seemingly sacred texts like the Bhagavad Gita. On the
question of the justification of taking scripture seriously, Ramanuja
holds that none can be given. Scripture is self-justifying. Scripture,
for its part, can lead people to have cognitions of independent
entities, such as Brahman, after providing them directions to perceive
Brahman: without it one would never know what to look for. However,
sensuous perception cannot vouch for the veracity of its contents, nor
can reason independently provide a rational proof of its veracity.
Having followed scripture's dictates, one will eventually have proof
of its validity (Shri Bhashya I.i.4. p.175) (direct perceptual contact
with objects such as Brahman). However, prior to embarking on the
journey outlined in scripture, it must be taken on faith alone. Thus,
on the position of the validity of scripture, Ramanuja is a fideist
(see Shri Bhashya I.i.3. for Ramanuja's classic criticism of natural
theology pp.162-74). (Some critics are apt to think that Ramanuja is
correct on the ungroundability of the validity of scripture on either
sensuous perception or reason, but that this impossibility makes
Ramanuja's whole philosophy implausible.)
While according scripture great weight, Ramanuja shows his preference
for common sense by tempering his interpretations of scripture in
light of ordinary, sensuous experience. Contrary to the dialectically
minded philosophers of his day, Ramanuja presumes in his defense of
Vishishtadvaita in the Shri Bhashya (I.i.1.) that scriptural
interpretation must accord with ordinary experience.
c. Bhakti
Ramanuja's unique contribution to Indian epistemology is the view that
bhakti, or devotion, is itself an epistemic state. We have noted that,
for Ramanuja, knowledge of Brahman consists in directly perceiving it.
When bhakti takes firm root in an individual, it turns into
parabhakti, which is the highest order of bhakti. In all cases,
however, bhakti is a direct awareness of Brahman's nature, and thus
constitutes a type of knowledge (jnana) (Vedarthasangraha §238). The
perceptual character of bhakti is sometimes obscured by Ramanuja's
synonyms for this state. He sometimes calls it meditation or worship
(upasana). However, he also insists that it is a kind of seeing, which
has the character of direct perception (pratyakshata or sakshatkara)
(cf. Shri Bhashya, I.i.1. "Small Purvapaksha" pp.15-7).
d. Error
Ramanuja's object oriented account of knowledge has the problem of
accounting for error. If knowledge corresponds to objects, what do
false beliefs correspond to: mental objects? His response anticipates
Bertrand Russell's account of error in On Denoting, which does away
with ersatz objects in the explanation of error. According to
Ramanuja, erroneous experiences, like dream states, are real, and they
can be genuine objects of knowledge (as in the statement 'I dreamt
last night' or 'I am dreaming'). However, the objects that the
experience claims to be about are absent in false cognitions. This
absence of the proper objects of knowledge explains the erroneousness
of beliefs in them (Shri Bhashya I.i.1. "Great Siddhanta" p.78). Thus,
on Ramanuja's account, mistaking mother of pearl for a piece of silver
does not consist in mistakenly seeing something silver in color, but
in the mistaken cognition that the object perceived is a piece of
silver.
6. Ramanuja's Ethics
Ramanuja's ethics divides into his views on substantive matters, and
metaethical issues.
a. Substantive Ethics
Ramanuja's substantive ethics in turn has two sources. Like other
orthodox Hindu thinkers, Ramanuja holds that the primary source of
moral knowledge is the Vedas. This is particularly true of the earlier
portion of the Vedas, which sets forth prescribed and optional works
(karmas) that constitute dharma. The importance of dharma, derived
from the Vedas, is stressed in all three of Ramanuja's major works.
Like other orthodox Hindu thinkers, Ramanuja also holds that the
venerable tradition, or smriti literature, supplements the Vedic
texts' account of dharma. The most important of the smriti texts, for
Ramanuja, is the Bhagavad Gita.
The Gita emphasizes the importance of adopting a deontological
attitude (concern for duty for duty's sake and not for its
consequences) in order to perfect the execution of prescribed duties,
particular to one's place in society. But the Gita also emphasizes the
importance of certain virtues. The Gita praises being a friend (mitra)
and showing compassion (karuna) to all creatures (Bhagavad Gita
XII.13), and enumerates ahimsa, or non-injury, as one of the virtues
essential to having jnana, or gnosis (Bhagavad Gita XIII.7-11).
On what is to be done when the requirements of virtues conflict with
prescribed duties, Ramanuja is uncompromising. For Ramanuja, dharma,
as set forth in the Vedas, is inviolable. This puts Ramanuja in the
awkward position of having to defend the propriety of animal
sacrifices, sanctioned and prescribed in the earlier portion of the
Vedas. Shri Vaishnava Brahmins, as a rule, are vegetarians. Ramanuja
was, in all likelihood, himself a vegetarian. However, his general
inclination to positively endorse the Bhagavad Gita's disavowal of
animal cruelty did not stop him from affirming the propriety of animal
sacrifices. In this respect, Ramanuja agrees with his Advaitin
predecessor, Shankara, who held that while violence in general is
evil, ritual slaughter is not any ordinary act of violence: because it
is sanctioned by the Vedas, it cannot be evil (Shankara, Brahma Sutra
Bhashya, III.i.25). Ramanuja however goes further and argues that
ritual slaughter is not only not evil; it is also not really a form of
violence. Rather, it is a healing act like a physician's procedure,
which causes temporary pain but is ultimately to the benefit of the
patient. The sacrificed animal, on Ramanuja's account, is more than
compensated in the next life for being ritually slaughtered (Shri
Bhashya, III.i.25. pp.599-600).
b. Foundations of Ethics
Ramanuja's metaethical comments concern the ground and validity of
morality. Ramanuja seems to have always presumed that morality is
intrinsically valuable. The intrinsic merit of God Himself, on
Ramanuja's account, is tied to His moral excellences. Given that God
has nothing to gain by being moral, the value of morality, at least in
God's case, cannot be instrumental. However, for all other creatures,
morality, or dharma, has an instrumental value: it helps counteract
consequences of past karmas. Importantly, it is also the easy way to
propitiate God. Ramanuja notes that, in theory, it is possible to
achieve liberation through mental efforts alone. However, this is only
a theoretical possibility, and is in reality impossible for creatures
like us. jnana yoga, or mental disciplines geared towards achieving
liberation by solely meditating upon the Self (and not availing
oneself of ancillary aids, like attendance to one's duties) is
difficult and likely to lead to error. Karma yoga, or attendance to
one's duties, on the other hand, is easy for our duties are those
obligations suited to our capacities and nature (Ramanuja Gita
Bhashya, XVIII.47 p.583). Morality, on Ramanuja's account, has both
intrinsic and instrumental value. This account of the instrumental
value of our obligations also contains, within it, the seeds of an
account of the validity of our obligations: our obligations are those
appropriate acts that are suited to us to perform. Thus, morality is
not simply a law imposed from outside, on Ramanuja's account, but the
best mode of action, given our personal natures. However, because of
our context, we are unable to determine what is best for us,
independently of scripture. Hence, our reliance on scripture to tell
us our duties leads to the appearance that dharma is a law imposed on
us from outside.
Dharma (duty or morality) is of the utmost importance for Ramanuja. It
thus might seem ironic that the Bhagavad Gita itself advises us to
give up our dharmas. At the very end of the work, after the importance
and benefits of living the virtuous life are extolled, Krishna (the
incarnation of Vishnu delivering a sermon in the Bhagavad Gita)
advises us to 'give up all dharmas' and seek refuge in Him alone
(Bhagavad Gita XVIII.66). Ramanuja offers two interpretations of this
verse: (1) it can be taken as implying that we are to abandon the
sense of agency that is incompatible with our cosmological dependence
upon God, or (2), it can be taken as implying that we ought to give up
recourse to expiatory rituals (sometime called "dharmas") to nullify
the effects of past actions. Neither interpretation allows for
abandoning our prescribed obligations (Ramanuja, Bhagavad Gita Bhashya
XVIII.66, p.599). Ramanuja's views contrast sharply with the views of
the Advaita Vedantin Shankara, who argues that morality (dharma) for
the seeker of liberation (moksha) is an evil, for it ensnares a person
in things of the world (Shankara, Bhagavad Gita Bhashya, IV:21
pp.202-203).
7. Interpreting Ramanuja: the Northern and Southern Schools and the
Authenticity of the Gadyas
Within two centuries after Ramanuja, the Shri Vaishnava tradition
split into two separate sub-traditions. Both schools claim to have the
authority of Ramanuja in support of their views. These traditions are
the Northern or Vadakalai school, and the Southern or Tenkalai school.
The respective founding figures of these schools are Vedanta Deshika
and Manavalamamuni, two of many eminent Shri Vaishnava scholars to
follow Ramanuja. One manner in which the Northern and Southern schools
differ is with respect to the importance that the Vedas are to play in
the devotees life: the Northern school holds that Vedic observances
are essential to proper Shri Vaishnava practices, while the Southern
school emphasises the importance of emulating the examples of the
twelve Alvars. Most importantly, the two schools differ on the
relationship between divine grace and individual effort. Both schools
agree that Grace is necessary for liberation, but they disagree as to
the conditions under which Grace is dispensed. According to the
Northern school, Grace is conditional on the effort of the individual.
Liberation, on this view, is a cooperative effort between God and the
aspirant. According to the Southern school, Grace is dispensed freely.
Liberation, on this view, is the sole responsibility of God. (On some
accounts, the two schools can also be defined with respect to eighteen
points of difference. See Govindacarya for one of the few but
regrettably unbalanced accounts of this controversy).
Both schools agree that the intercession of Grace is tied to the
devotee performing the spiritual act of sharanagati or
prapatti-surrender before God. The act of prapatti, or the formal
surrender to God, with the understanding that one has no other refuge,
is central to Shri Vaishnava cultic life. However, Northern and
Southern schools differ with respect to what is to follow. For the
Southern school, a one-time act of prapatti is sufficient. Subsequent
lapses in devotion or attitude do not alter God's disposition to save
the individual. However, for the Northern school, lapses on the part
of the devotee require a fresh commitment on the part of the
individual to surrender before God, in addition to constant effort on
the part of the individual to attend to their moral duties in the
spirit of bhakti yoga.
The controversy between the two schools could be circumvented if it
could be shown that the very doctrine of sharanagati or prapatti is
foreign to the thought of Ramanuja. This is what some recent scholars
have attempted to show. Robert C. Lester, following the arguments of
the Vadakalai Shri Vaishnava scholar, Agnihothram Ramanuja
Thatachariar of Kumbakonam, argues that the doctrine of sharanagati or
prapatti, at the heart of latter day Shri Vaishnava controversy, is
only found in the Sharanagati Gadya and the Shriranga Gadya, and are
absent from Ramanuja's main philosophic works. On this basis, Lester
argues that the Gadyas (specifically the Sharanagati Gadya and
Shriranga Gadya) and the doctrine of sharanagati or prapatti are
spurious.
According to this argument, the Gadyas present, for the first time,
the view that surrendering to God constitutes a unique means of
gaining liberation. And, moreover, Lester argues that this idea is
foreign to the arguments that Ramanuja presents in the Shri Bhashya,
the Vedarthasangraha and the Gita Bhashya. These works are unanimous
in stressing the role of bhakti as both the beginning and end of
liberation.
In defence of the authenticity of the Gadyas, one might argue that the
very idea of bhakti contains with in it the notion of sharanagati-that
to love or be devoted to God is to surrender oneself to God. However,
Lester argues that the notion of bhakti promulgated in the three main
works of Ramanuja is distinct from the notion of prapatti or
sharanagati in the Gadyas. First, the Sharanagati Gadya makes it clear
that the devotee is seeking God, not out of love, but out of
desperation, with the request that God grant the devotee bhakti, and
the favour of being eternally in His service. Sharanagati or prapatti
thus constitutes an act that is logically distinct from what is
involved in bhakti, which is the steady remembrance of God, and
attendance to one's duties in a spirit of sacrifice. Secondly, the
Gadyas have suggested to many that the act of surrendering to God is
sufficient to procure liberation. The critic persuaded by Lester's
view holds that such a view is nowhere to be found in Ramanuja's three
main works.
In response to Lester's arguments, one might take a holistic stance:
the import of the Gadyas and Ramanuja's larger works must be assessed
together. This is the stand that has been traditionally adopted by
Shri Vaishnavas of both schools. If this approach is adopted, one is
likely to read Ramanuja's account of bhakti as implying an implicit
understanding of our dependence and helplessness before God (a view
shared by both the Northern and Southern schools), and one may also
regard the Gadyas as not putting forth the radical notion that the act
of surrender is sufficient for liberation (this, however, is what the
Southern school appears to be committed to). With respect to
Ramanuja's main works, there is clear textual evidence that he
regarded individuals as impotent, apart from God (cf. Shri Bhashya,
II.i.34. pp.478-9). As noted, on Ramanuja's account, God's role as
creator is to grant us the fruits of our desires. Without God actually
acting on our behalf to simulate a world in which it seems as if we
are doers, we would be nothing but isolated persons with many desires,
and largely incorrect beliefs, cut off from our peers, with no way to
work through our predilections. God's creative role, on this account,
serves the purpose of bridging the gap between ourselves and the rest
of reality. On this picture of the human condition, it is quite clear
that we as individuals are literally helpless, but for the creative
dispensation of God.
Another response to Lester's argument is to invoke Ramanuja's own
doctrine of co-ordinate predication, while defending the view that
Ramanuja in his main works holds that prapatti is sufficient for
liberation. Ramanuja in the Vedarthasangraha writes:
The heart of the whole shastra [body of authoritative texts] is
this: The individual selves are essentially of the nature of pure
knowledge, devoid of restriction and limitation. They get covered up
by nescience in the shape of karma. The consequence is that the scope
and breadth of their knowledge is curtailed in accordance with their
karma. They get embodied in the multifarious varieties of bodies from
[the deity] Brahma down to, the lowest species. Their knowledge is
limited in accordance with their specific embodiment. They are deluded
into identification with their bodies. In accordance with them they
become subject to joys and sorrows, which, in essence constitute what
is termed "the river of transmigratory existence" [samsara]. For these
individual selves, so lost in samsara, there is no way of
emancipation, other than surrender to the supreme Lord
[bhagavatprapattimanthrena]. For the purpose of inculcating that sole
way of emancipation, the first truth to be taught by the shastra is
that the individual souls are not intrinsically divided into several
kinds, like gods, men, etc., and that they are fundamentally alike and
are equal in having knowledge as their essential nature. The essential
nature of the individual self is such that it is wholly subservient
and instrumental to God and therefore God is its inner self. The
nature of the supreme Being is unique, on, account of his absolute
perfection and absolute antithesis to everything that is evil. God is
the ocean of countless, infinitely excellent attributes. The shastras
further assert that all sentient and non sentient entities are
sustained and operated by the supreme Being. Therefore, the Supreme is
the ultimate self of all. They teach meditation along with its
accessory conditions as the means for attaining him. (Vedarthasangraha
§99, my italics)
It is noteworthy that while Ramanuja avails himself of the notion that
surrendering to God is the only way to emancipation, he is also clear
to emphasise that disciplines such as "meditation" and accessory
conditions are essential to attaining liberation. One might argue,
thus, that Ramanuja did hold that prapatti or sharanagati are the
"only" way to liberation, but this way is not substantially distinct
from the way of bhakti yoga. Rather, "bhakti" and "prapatti" are
distinct qualities that qualify one path. On this interpretation,
Ramanuja is assuming that the reader will appreciate the phenomenon of
co-ordinate predication, which is the putative semantic phenomenon
that Ramanuja appeals to elsewhere to argue that all individuals are
Brahman, while being essentially distinct modes or attributes of
Brahman, and not identical to the totality of Brahman. In this way,
prapatti and bhakti both denote the same path, but they emphasize
different points along the path.
8. Conclusion: Ramanuja's Place in the History of Indian Philosophy
Ramanuja stands in the Indian philosophical tradition as one of its
most important figures. He is the first thinker in this tradition to
provide a systematic theistic interpretation of the import of the
Vedas. His uncompromising stand on the side of common sense and moral
realism stands as a striking contrast to stereotyped accounts of
Indian philosophical thought as otherworldly and amoral. And while his
significance in the history of Indian philosophy may be under
appreciated, his greater influence on the character and form of
popular Hinduism may also be under-recognized, despite the fact that
he is regarded as a saint in many parts of Southern India. According
to Karl Potter, "…Ramanuja's tradition can be said to represent one of
the main arteries through which philosophy reached down to the masses,
and it may be that Vishishtadvaita is today the most powerful
philosophy in India in terms of numbers of adherents, whether they
know themselves by that label or not" (Potter p.253). Whether Potter
is correct or not, Ramanuja is an Indian philosopher who defended the
symbiosis of the spiritual, moral and practically earnest life.
9. References and Further Readings
a. Primary Sources
* (Page number references for Ramanuja's Shri Bhashya are to the
English translation.)
* Ramanuja (acarya) (11th Century). Shri Bhashyam (Critical
Edition). Melkote: Academy of Sanskrit Research, 1985.
* Ramanuja (acarya) (11th Century). Shri Ramanuja Gita Bhashya
(Bhagavad Gita Bhashya.) Trans. and Ed. Svami Adidevananda. Madras:
Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1991.
* Ramanuja (acarya) (11th Century). Shrimad Bhagavad Ramanuja
Granthamala. (Complete works.) Ed. Prativadi Bhayankara
Annangaracharya. Kancheepuram: available at Granthamala Karyalaya,
1974.
* Ramanuja (acarya) (11th Century). Vedanta Sutras with the
Commentary of Ramanuja (Shri Bhashya). Trans. (English) George
Thibaut. Sacred Books of the East. Vol. 48. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1996.
* Ramanuja (acarya) (11th Century).Vedarthasamgraha
(Vedarthasangraha). Trans. and Ed. S.S. Ragavachar. Mysore: Shri
RamaKrishna Ashrama, 1968.
* Russell, Bertrand (20th Century). "On Denoting." Mind 14.56
(1905): 479-93.
* Shankara (acarya) (9th Century). Bhagavadgita with the
Commentary of Shankaracarya (Bhagavad Gita Bhashya). Trans. and Ed.
Swami Gambhirananda. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1991.
* Shankara (acarya) (9th Century). Brahma Sutra Bhashya. Trans.
Swami Gambhirananda. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1983.
* Shrinivasadasa (17th Century). Yatidramatadipika. Trans. Svami
Adidevananda. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1978.
* Yamuna (acarya) (11th Century). Sri Yamunacharya's Siddhi
Trayam. Trans. K. Shrinivasacharya. Ed. R. Ramanujachari: N.p., 1970.
b. Secondary Sources on Ramanuja
* Buitenen, J. A. B. van. "Introduction." Trans. J. A. B. van
Buitenen. Ramanuja's Vedarthasangraha. Ed. J. A. B. van Buitenen. 1st
, reprint. ed. Pune: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research
Institute, 1956. viii, 316.
* Carman, John B. The Theology of Ramanuja; an Essay in
Interreligious Understanding. Yale Publications in Religion, 18. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.
* Govindacarya, A. "The Astadasa-Bedas, or the Eighteen Points of
Doctrinal Differences Between the Tengalais (Southerners) and the
Vadagalais (Northerners) of the Vishishtadvaita Vaishnava School,
South India." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain
and Ireland (1910): 1103-12.
* Lester, Robert C. "Ramanuja and Shri Vaishnavism: the Concept of
Prapatti or Sharanagati." History of Religion 5.2 (1966): 266-82.
* Potter, Karl H. Presuppositions of India's Philosophies.
Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1963.
* Tapasyananda. Bhakti Schools of Vedanta. Madras: Ramakrishna Math, 1990.
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