activity separate from the general province of empirical science. His
interest in science is not best described as a philosophy of science
but as a set of reflections on the nature of science that is pursued
with the same empirical spirit that animates scientific inquiry.
Quine's philosophy should then be seen as a systematic attempt to
understand science from within the resources of science itself. This
project investigates both the epistemological and ontological
dimensions of scientific theorizing. Quine's epistemological concern
is to examine our successful acquisition of scientific theories, while
his ontological interests focus on the further logical regimentation
of that theory. He thus advocates what is more famously known as
'naturalized epistemology', which consists of his attempt to provide
an improved scientific explanation of how we have developed elaborate
scientific theories on the basis of meager sensory input. Quine
further argues that the most general features of reality can be
examined through the use of formal logic by clarifying what objects we
must acknowledge as real given our acceptance of an overarching
systematic view of the world. In pursuing these issues, Quine
reformulates and thus transforms these philosophical concerns
according to those standards of clarity, empirical adequacy, and
utility that he takes as central to the explanatory power of empirical
science. While few philosophers have adopted Quine's strict standards
or accepted the details of his respective positions, the general
empirical reconfiguration of philosophy and philosophy of science
recommended by his naturalism has been very influential. This article
provides an overview of Quine's naturalistic conception of philosophy,
and elaborates on its examination of the epistemological and
ontological elements of scientific practice.
1. Naturalism
One central theme from the history of Western thought concerns the
relationship between philosophy and science. Philosophy is often
depicted as providing a set of general conditions that somehow support
or validate the various claims made in the formal and empirical
sciences. So, Plato describes how geometry helps equip philosophers
with rational insight into a supersensible realm of ideas or forms – a
superior level of reality that shapes how the world looks in ordinary
sensory perception. In a related way, Descartes argues that inner
reflection of the mind's contents and activities reveals indubitable
truths that form the basis of the emerging modern scientific
worldview. Lastly, Kant argues for the active structuring role of
human reason in making possible experience and scientific knowledge.
Such examples highlight a prominent historical self-understanding of
philosophy and its relation to science, in which philosophy offers
general truths that in some way serve to justify, ground, or support
the specific results of scientific inquiry. On this general picture,
philosophy is not conceived as a science, but as distinct from
experience and experiment and further providing a priori resources
that constitute a secure foundation for scientific claims. The
empiricist tradition in philosophy, stretching from Locke to Russell,
with its view that all substantial knowledge finds its source in
experience, provides a useful contrast to this a priori conception of
philosophy. Empiricists have been more sympathetic with the idea of
aligning philosophy more closely to science, but there remained a
problem concerning the nature of logical and mathematical knowledge,
which did not appear to depend on experience. Rudolf Carnap's logical
empiricism with its use of the analytic-synthetic distinction is often
presented as responding to this specific epistemological challenge
(see Quine 1995a; for dissenting views see Richardson 1998, Friedman
2006). Statements such as "All bachelors are unmarried" were deemed
analytic and were true in virtue of the meaning of the words used,
whereas synthetic claims such as "Some bachelors are over six feet
tall," are determined true by the meaning of their terms and through
experience.
Analytic statements, including logical and mathematical claims,
provide no substantial knowledge about the world but merely report the
conventional use of certain terms within a language. Analytic
statements do not then make any claims about the world, but are the
product of the specific way we construct a language. With the a priori
(now thought of as analytic) character of logic and mathematics
depicted in such terms, it does not constitute a separate type of
knowledge, and does then conflict with the empiricist commitment that
all knowledge has its source in experience. Carnap further conceived
of philosophy as concerned with the analysis of the formal linguistic
structure of scientific claims. Philosophy then focuses on the
analytic framework of scientific language, and finds its place as a
kind of subdiscipline within the formal sciences, while still distinct
from the empirical sciences (see Carnap 1935).
Quine's view of philosophical inquiry breaks decisively with the a
priori conception of philosophy's relation to science as seen in
Plato, Descartes and Kant. Although he finds himself more in sympathy
with the empiricist tradition (this is especially true with regard to
both Russell's and Carnap's distinctive attempts to make philosophy
more scientific), he also rejects what he sees as its attempt to
preserve the a priori status of logic and mathematics through the
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements (1981, 67-72).
The basic conception of philosophy and philosophical practice that
informs his discussion of science is commonly know as naturalism, a
view that recommends the "abandonment of the goal of a first
philosophy prior to natural science" (1981, 67), which further
involves a "readiness to see philosophy as natural science trained
upon itself and permitted free use of scientific findings" (1981, 85)
and lastly, recognizes that "…it is within science itself, and not in
some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described"
(1981, 21).
These remarks indicate that Quine rejects the view that philosophy
maintains some distinctive perspective, or type of knowledge that
distinguishes it from science, and which could further serve as a
independent standpoint from which to critically assess or ground the
methods and procedures found in science. Consequently, he recommends
the pursuit of philosophical issues from within the available
resources of the empirical sciences themselves.
So, for example, the philosophical treatment of scientific knowledge
does not proceed from a perspective different in kind from the very
knowledge that is under examination.
Here, Quine often appeals to Neurath's metaphor of science as a boat,
where changes need to be made piece by piece while we stay afloat, and
not when docked at port. He further emphasizes that both the
philosopher and scientist are in the same boat (1960, 3; 1981, 72,
178). The Quinean philosopher then begins from within the ongoing
system of knowledge provided by science, and proceeds to use science
in order to understand science. In laying out these various points,
Quine offers few remarks concerning the nature of science or why he
thinks that it should be given such priority with regard to
philosophical investigations. This is because, in part, his use of the
term "science" applies quite broadly referring not simply to the
'hard' or natural sciences, but also including psychology, economics,
sociology, and even history (Quine 1995, 19; also see Quine 1997). But
a more substantive reason centers on his view that all knowledge
strives to provide a true understanding of the world and is then
responsive to observation as the ultimate test of its claims. Once we
view this as the shared pursuit of human knowledge, and couple it with
Quine's broad use of 'science,' then any attempt to gain such an
understanding can be thought of as proceeding in a general scientific
spirit. Quine then attaches scientific status to any statement that
makes a contribution, no matter how slight, to a theory that can be
tested through prediction (1992, 20).
These points gain some support from Quine's general view of what one
commentator has called "the seamlessness of knowledge" (Hylton 2007,
8-9). This seamlessness of our overall system of knowledge emphasizes
how all knowledge claims are on par without any significant breaks or
gaps between them. There are not, then, on this view, different
distinctive types of knowledge that may be responsive to divergence
standards of evidence. Quine views human knowledge as one
all-encompassing system of belief, which is accepted, rejected, or
modified according to how well it accommodates and explains what is
observed. He sometimes makes this point by highlighting the
'continuity' between the claims of common-sense and those of more
advanced science, where all attempts at making true claims are viewed
as continuous in the general sense of being responsive to the same
standards of evidence and testability that are the hallmark of
scientific knowledge (1976b, 233). Most significantly, this results in
Quine's rejection of any a priori element to human knowledge. This
point received its most sophisticated modern formulation with Carnap's
use of the analytic-synthetic distinction. By rejecting any sharp
distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, Quine is led to the
further denial of any type of knowledge that is categorically distinct
from that found in our system of empirical knowledge (for details, see
Quine 1951; Hylton 2007, 48-80). We can also note that this view of
knowledge serves to reinforce Quine's view of philosophy as more or
less identical with the philosophical examination of scientific
practice.
Not surprisingly then, Quine views science as our most successful
attempt at acquiring knowledge. Accordingly, if philosophical work is
to contribute to human knowledge it must locate its concerns within
this ongoing attempt to acquire successful knowledge of the world, and
aspire to the very same scientific standards of clarity, utility and
explanation. From this perspective, philosophical reflection cannot
simply rely on the uncritical use of our everyday terms but will need
to propose new ways of formulating its concerns based on the rigorous
standards found in the sciences. Given the kind of standards that
Quine emphasizes as conducive to philosophical progress and to the
advancement of knowledge, it is perhaps not surprising to learn that
much of the vocabulary used in philosophy does not meet his standards.
He would then reject it as insufficiently clear for the purposes of
his naturalistic conception of philosophy and as incapable of
advancing our understanding of the issues it discusses (see Hylton
2007, 11; Quine 1981, 184-6; 1987). It is perhaps here that Quine's
basic attitude to philosophical concerns most clearly departs from
other philosophical approaches.
One example of this tendency in Quine's thought is found with the
concept of 'knowledge' itself. While our everyday use of the term is
unobjectionable, Quine thinks that it is too vague to meet the
scientific demands of his theory of knowledge because it does not
admit of clear and sharp boundaries. For example, it remains unclear
how much evidence is needed for someone to 'know' something, or how
much certainty is required for a belief to count as case of genuine
knowledge (Quine 1987). Progress in the theory of knowledge cannot
then be achieved if we continue to use such concepts as knowledge or
evidence within the formulation of our problems and solutions. Given
the more technical uses required of his scientific approach to
knowledge Quine thinks it better to use expressions such as "our
system of the world" or "our theory." These expressions are
sufficiently clear, or can be made so, to address the questions that
matter while placing aside those concepts, and the concerns they
generate, which would forestall any attempt at increased
understanding.
This attitude can also be seen with Quine's interest in ontological
questions. Here he examines our system of scientific knowledge in
order to further clarify how it might be best formulated, if it can be
further simplified, and to make more explicit its basic ontological
commitments. The interest here remains philosophical in the sense of
being concerned with determining what general categories are needed to
clearly specify what kinds of objects our scientific theory takes to
be real. While such concerns are more abstract than the more focused
empirical studies of the natural sciences, Quine does not take them to
be distinct from such scientific questions:
What distinguishes between the ontological philosopher's concerns
and …[zoology, botany, and physics] is only breadth of categories.
Given physical objects in general, the natural scientist is the man to
decide about wombats and unicorns. Given classes…it is the
mathematician to say whether in particular there are any even prime
numbers…On the other hand it is the scrutiny of this uncritical
acceptance of the realm of physical objects itself, or of classes,
etc., that devolves upon ontology. (Quine 1960, 275)
General worries about ontology are then of a piece with specific
scientific decisions about whether electrons or quarks exist; they are
simply more general in their philosophical scrutiny of the broad
categories needed to do justice to this specific acceptance of
electrons or quarks. In carrying out these concerns, Quine requires
that our scientific theory fit within the framework of first-order
logic, have an ontology of physical objects and sets, and further meet
the standards of physicalism (although Quine advocates a nonstandard
use of the term "physicalism") (see Hylton 2007, 324). In pursuing
this logical 'regimentation' of our theory, Quine appeals to criteria
that many philosophers have found to overly restrictive for
calibrating human knowledge. Yet he thinks that it is only through
such standards that we can clarify what we must acknowledge as real
given our acceptance of that theory. To settle for less rigorous
standards would obscure what our knowledge tells us about what
ultimately exists.
The need to reformulate our philosophical concerns in this way
highlights an important feature of Quine's attitude to theoretical
progress in science. Advances are often achieved through the
recognition that our questions themselves cannot be successfully
addressed because of the vagueness of the concepts employed. The
proper response here is to recognize that our concepts are failing us,
and to then search for better formulations that yield fruitful
explanations of the phenomena under investigation. If as a result,
some philosophical problems need to be dropped in favor of scientific
formulations that hold the promise of increased understanding, then
Quine would claim so much the worse for those old problems and their
formulations. This itself represents a kind of scientific progress.
Quine thinks that those philosophical problems most worth considering
are those that can be clarified according to these scientific
standards (see Hylton 2007, 11-12; Kemp 2006, 151-164). He is then
impressed with the fact that scientific progress is often achieved by
the dropping of the relevant terms, concepts, issues or distinctions
that lead to the type of problems that hinder the growth of knowledge.
2. Naturalized Epistemology
Quine's extension of this general perspective into the study of human
knowledge results in his famous naturalization of epistemology, where
the philosophical treatment of knowledge is presented as a scientific
account of how humans have developed a systematic scientific
understanding of the world. Here is how Quine conceives his core
epistemological project:
The business of naturalized epistemology, for me, is an improved
understanding of the chains of causation and implication that connect
the bombardment of our surfaces, at one extreme, with our scientific
output at the other. (1995c, 349)
It is rational reconstruction of the individual's and/or the
[human] race's actual acquisition of a responsible theory of the
external world. It would address the question how we, physical
denizens of the physical world, can have projected our scientific
theory of that whole world from our meager contacts with it: from the
mere impacts of rays and particles on our surfaces and a few odds and
ends such as the strain of walking uphill. (1995a, 16)
A naturalized conception of human knowledge seeks to provide an
improved scientific account of the connections between the activation
of our sensory surfaces and our theoretical discourse about the world.
Put succinctly, Quine seeks to elucidate how cognitive discourse about
the world is systematically related to sensory stimulation. Because he
rejects the epistemological search for some independent philosophical
validation of scientific inquiry, Quine's own project presupposes and
thus uses whatever scientific resources he thinks are relevant to
understanding human knowledge (1992, 19).
So, Quine takes the traditional problem of the epistemology of
empirical knowledge and interprets it in exclusively scientific terms.
From this viewpoint, epistemological problems need to be reformulated
according to those standards of clarity, evidence and explanation that
are found in science. This explains Quine's use of the various
technical terms that form part of his project, such as "observation
sentence," "neural intake," and others. These are all chosen for their
perceived ability to adhere to the methodological dictates of
empirical science. The usual philosophical concepts of "experience,"
"sense data," and "the external world" are too unclear to advance the
type of scientific understanding and explanation promoted by Quine's
naturalized conception of epistemology. He replaces them with
scientifically acceptable counterparts in the form of "stimulations,"
"the triggering of sensory receptors" and "observation sentence."
Perhaps his most significant move in this direction is the rejection
of any conception of observation as something empirically 'given' that
grounds or justifies our knowledge. Here, he follows Russell and
Popper and rejects induction as providing confirmation of our theories
through an appeal to pure observation (see Lugg 2006). Instead, Quine
examines how knowledge emerges from our responses to sensory
stimulation and how observation sentences (sentences we are disposed
to accept or reject simply on the basis of stimulation) are related to
these responses. Quine thinks that science itself tells us that our
information about the world comes through the impingement of energy on
our sensory surfaces resulting in the stimulation of our nerve endings
(1992, 19). This empirical fact stands as a scientific vindication of
empiricism, and it forms the basis for Quine's further reflections on
the nature of natural knowledge. Philosophers have generally been
skeptical about the possibility of accounting for human knowledge in
such austere scientific terms, most notably, without any use of the
concepts of knowledge, meaning' and understanding. Quine's response to
such skepticism consists of his attempt to sketch the details of this
naturalistic account and thus demonstrate how it is possible to make
sense of human knowledge and our use of cognitive language in such
strict scientific terms. He then endeavors to show that we can pursue
such an account without presupposing any mentalistic concepts (see
Hylton 2007, 94-5).
In doing so, he provides a genetic account describing how humans have
come to learn cognitive language. To bring out the epistemological
significance of such an account he draws a parallel between the
learning of cognitive language and the evidential support for a
scientific theory:
The channels by which, having learned observation sentences, we
acquire theoretical language, are the very same channels by which
observation lends evidence to scientific theory…We see, then, a
strategy for investigating the relation of evidential support, between
observation and scientific theory. We can adopt a genetic approach,
studying how theoretical language is learned. For the evidential
relation is virtually enacted, it would seem, in the learning. This
genetic strategy is attractive because the learning of language goes
on in the world and is open to scientific study. It is a strategy for
the scientific study of scientific method and evidence. (Quine 1975a,
75-6)
On Quine's account, for a sentence to be considered cognitive it must
be connected in some way to sentences that are answerable to sensory
stimulation. It is through the learning of language that such
connections are forged, since the child must learn to use sentences in
response to sensory stimulation. The link between language and the
world is described in terms of sentences causally tied to neural
input, and is essential to both the learning of language and the
responsiveness of theory to evidence (see Hylton 2007, 95).
Quine's emphasis on language learning and causal conditioning has been
at times sharply criticized as overly behaviorist in orientation
(Searle 1987). It is then important to clarify the extent of this
behaviorist commitment. (For further details see Gibson 2004.)
Importantly, Quine dismisses any definition of behaviorism that limits
it to conditioned response, and explains "What matters, as I see it,
is just the insistence upon couching all criteria in observation
terms" (1976a, 58). From his perspective behaviorism is a crucial
methodological requirement resulting from the need for observable
evidence, which facilitates the prediction and testing of hypotheses,
and is also mandated by sound empirical method. He further explains
how this "disciplines data, not explanation" and that to account for
any appreciable language learning beyond the present observable scene
requires a significant innate endowment: "Behaviorism welcomes
genetics, neurology and innate endowments" (2000d, 417). Even if the
processes involved in the learning of observation sentences should
turn out to be unlike classical conditioning, this still would not,
Quine emphasizes, be a refutation of behaviorism (Quine 1976a, 57).
His use of the term is solely concerned with the establishment of the
observable evidence required by empirical method. Quine's behaviorism
is not then some odd a priori assumption, nor a straightforward
empirical thesis, but stands as the name for an approach to language
learning which signals Quine's commitment to the evidential and
methodological requirements of his naturalism. His understanding of
what is required with such a commitment results in his use of this
behaviorist stance when examining language and the nature of human
knowledge.
Quine's genetic account then utilizes this methodological requirement
to consider how the human child, subject to various forms of sensory
stimulation, could come to acquire a theory of the world. He takes
knowledge itself to be embodied within our language, so the
examination of how this language is learned will enable us to better
understand how the causal relations between observation sentences and
sensory stimulation yield evidence for our scientific theory.
Beginning with our basic cognitive vocabulary, we see that the child
starts by making basic, primitive responses to sensory stimulation,
and through the encouragement and discouragement of others, more
sophisticated language and knowledge gradually emerges. In describing
the various steps the child would take, Quine continues to emphasis
the importance of observation sentences, which are those expressions
that children learn through direct association with neural input
(Quine 1995a, 22-25).
Observation sentences are an important subset of occasion sentences,
sentences that are true or false on different occasions, with the
additional requirement that they command an individual's assent or
dissent outright on the specific occasion of the relevant stimulation
(Quine 1992, 3). The significance of observation sentences cannot be
overemphasized, because they serve as the final objective checkpoint
of science. It is through the utterance of an observation sentence
that one provides the prediction that tests a hypothesis implied by
our scientific theory. It is the requirement that neural input prompt
the verdict outright, without further reflection, which makes the
observation sentence the final checkpoint. The further requirement of
intersubjectivity, unlike the report of a pain or feeling, indicates
that the observation sentence yields the same response from all
linguistically competent members of the community, revealing the
source of the objective nature of science.
We can then imagine the child being conditioned to utter certain
observation sentences in response to neural input, such as "milk,"
when encountering the necessary stimulus. Over time children learn to
assent and dissent, learning to assent to a sentence when stimulated
in a way that would have caused them to utter that expression
themselves, and to dissent when stimulated in a way that would not
cause the utterance of this sentence. Quine emphasizes how such
observation sentences, "Milk," "Dog," "Red" and "It's raining" should
be treated as wholes or holophrastically; each expression, whether
containing one word or more, is conditioned as a whole to stimulation,
and not as containing component words: "Each is simply an expression
learned intact by association with stimulation and, derivatively,
similar stimulations" (Quine 1984, 15). Each such observation sentence
becomes associated with a range of perceptually similar neural intakes
through conditioning. Quine defines perceptual similarity as a
relation between an individual's neural intake, testable through the
reinforcement and extinction of the individual's responses. He
explains that perceptual similarity "is the basis of all learning, all
habit formation, all expectation by induction from past experience;
for we are innately disposed to expect similar events to have sequels
that are similar to each other" (Quine 1995b, 253).
The relation between neural input and observation sentences is then
understood in terms of conditioned response and subjective standards
of perceptual similarity. However, there remains a lingering
difficulty only resolved in some of Quine's last writings in
epistemology (see Quine 1995a, 1996, 2000a). Simply put, the problem
concerns bridging "the gap between the privacy of our neural intake
and the publicity of our testimony" (2000e, 409). Consider the
surrounding environment of two interlocutors, what we might call the
distal scene. Observation sentences tend to report this distal scene,
and our agreement on what we see is registered with such verbal
reports. Once we consider the causal chain from distal objects to our
neural input we realize that all we share is this distal cause of our
utterance; that is, we both utter "rabbit" in the presence of rabbits,
but our perspectives on the scene are different, and there is no
homology (shared neural structure) between our nerve endings. Despite
this neural diversity we end up associating the same words with the
same object, and the problem then is: "How is this distal harmony
across proximal heterogeneity to be explained?" (Quine 2000e, 407).
Quine's answer involves what he calls a "preestablished harmony of
standards of perceptual similarity" (1996). He begins with his
familiar emphasis on each individual's subjective similarity standards
and their central role in learning. Each bit of neural intake is
similar to another more than it is to others, allowing us to notice
differences as well as similarities. However, such perceptual
similarities are private between us, and we share no receptors, nor
are they homologous, but we still end up agreeing on the passing show.
I utter "rabbit," and you agree; in this case my neural intake was
perceptually similar to earlier ones, as was your current 'rabbity'
intake. What explains this convergence is a preestablished harmony
between our similarity scales. Generally, when two events produce
neural intakes that are perceptually similar for me, they also tend to
be perceptually similar for you. Some of these similarity metrics must
be innate, since learning cannot get started without them. Quine then
concludes that our perceptual similarity standards are in part innate,
and are in preestablished harmony. This harmony is further explained
through natural selection:
There is survival value in successful induction, successful
expectation: it expedites our elusion of predators and our pursuit of
prey. Natural selection, then, has favored similarity standards that
mesh relatively well with the succession of natural events…It…explains
the preestablished harmony: the standards are largely fixed in the
genes of the race, the species" (2000b, 2).
Our ability to successfully engage in primitive induction or
expectation, as well as successfully communicate with each other about
the distal scene, is revealed as dependent on this harmony of our
subjective standards of perceptual similarity. Natural selection
accounts for this through its shaping of our ancestor's perceptual
standards into a partial conformity with our own shared environment.
It is through such biological origins that sensory connections between
language and the world were forged, further establishing the
responsiveness to observation of our later more advanced scientific
pronouncements.
3. Theory, Evidence and Underdetermination
In addition to his interest in the acquisition of scientific
knowledge, Quine also reflects on our theory as a more or less
finished product and considers in a more general way the nature of the
relationship between this theory and its evidence:
Within this baffling tangle of relations between our sensory
stimulation and our scientific theory of the world, there is a segment
that we can gratefully separate out and clarify without pursuing
neurology, psychology, psycholinguistics, genetics, or history. It is
the part where theory is tested by prediction. It is the relation of
evidential support, and its essentials can be schematized by means of
little more than logical analysis. (Quine 1992, 1-2)
Examining the logical links between our scientific statements and
their connection to observation reveals that as a matter of strict
logical implication our theory can be seen to imply its evidence
(Quine 1975b). For example, what our scientific theory tells us about
the physical composition of metal indicates that it will expand when
heated. It then follows from our theory that if we heat a piece of
metal this will result in its expansion. The claims made by our
scientific theory imply that under certain conditions, specific
observations will follow, and such observations count as evidence for
the theory being on the right track. When such an implied hypothesis
happens as expected (the metal expands) then our confidence in the
original hypothesis increases and we provisionally include it within
our backlog of theory. But when this hypothesis fails in its
predictions, it has been falsified, and the theory requires further
revision. These revisions must prevent the false implication but
continue to imply the correct claims of our previously unrevised
theory. This indicates that in general Quine accepts the
hypothetico-deductive method that many philosophers have emphasized as
central to scientific inquiry, and further endorses Karl Popper's view
that observation only serves to falsify our hypotheses and never
confirms them (1992, 12-16).
However, there remains an issue concerning the nature of the evidence
that is implied by our theory. More specifically, we might ask what
plays the role of evidence within Quine's naturalized account of
knowledge (see Davidson 1983)? Given Quine's naturalized account of
knowledge, his answer must be in line with scientific practice.
Although, he has at times claimed that observation sentences should be
seen as evidence, they cannot measure up to this naturalist standard
(1969a). This is because observation sentences are also occasion
sentences where their truth-value can vary, while our theory and its
implications (if true) would be true once and for all. There then
appears to be no direct inferential connection between our theoretical
statements and observation sentences (Quine 1975b).
In order to better capture scientific practice, Quine then introduces
what he calls "observation categoricals" to help bridge this
inferential gap between theory and evidence. An observation
categorical is a hypothetical expression that links two observation
sentences where the first specifies some experimental conditions and
the second suggests what will follow from such conditions. In other
words, they express the general expectation that whenever one
observation sentence holds, the other will also (Quine 1995a, 25).
Simple examples might include: "When it rains, it pours" or "Where
there is smoke, there is fire." For Quine, these constructions
highlight the way in which evidence for a respective hypothesis is to
be found: "The scientist deduces from his hypotheses that a certain
observable situation should bring about another observable situation;
then he realizes the one situation and watches for the other. Evidence
for or against his set of hypotheses ensues, however inconclusive"
(2000c, 411).
The observable consequences predicted by the observation categorical
are offered in the form of observation sentences that are directly
conditioned to sensory stimulation, and in this way remain answerable
to observation and evidence as Quine conceives it. But the categorical
itself is an eternal sentence (true or false once and for all) implied
by our background theory, and if true can be incorporated into our
theory (1981, 26). Experimental method then remains the source of
justification for our beliefs: "Where I do find justification of
science and evidence of truth is…in successful prediction of
observations…" (Quine 2000c, 412). The scientist is justified in his
belief that whenever X then Y because it has been provisionally
supported by an experiment that has yielded the predicted
consequences. Concerns over justification and evidence acquire
paradigm expression in the experimental situation, with the
endorsement of specific hypotheses stemming from their fulfilled
prediction as described in observation categoricals.
Quine then takes our scientific theory of the world to imply its
evidence, now seen as consisting of a set of observation categoricals.
But he explains how the reverse does not hold, since no group of
observation categoricals will logically imply our theory (Quine 1975b,
228). This fact further suggests that more than one theory might be
compatible with the evidence, that is, imply the same group of
observation categoricals. This conclusion is usually referred to as
the underdetermination of theory by evidence – the view that our
choice of theory is not wholly determined by the evidence. Quine
thinks that this general thesis acquires some support from his
holistic view of theories, where theoretical statements fail to imply
any observation categoricals in isolation from one another, but must
be taken together as a larger group if they are to have empirical
implications. It is then because of Quine's claim that there is a
significant degree of empirical looseness of fit between theories and
their evidence, that the evidence cannot uniquely determine one single
theory. And this opens up the possibility that several theories may be
compatible with that evidence.
Although such considerations lend some plausibility to the
underdetermination thesis, Quine argues that once we attempt to
further clarify this thesis, it is revealed as not as intuitively
plausible as it originally appeared. The basic problem stems from the
consequence suggested by the thesis, namely, that if we have an
overall global theory, then there is also another empirically
equivalent alternative theory. The trouble then consists of making
sense of what "alternative" might mean in this context (1975b,
230-241). Quine wonders if there is way of making sense of such
alternatives that rule out trivial cases, leaving us an interesting
formulation of the basic thesis. He invokes the idea of translation
between theories to highlight their distinctness, where we claim that
our global theory has an alternative that is empirically equivalent
but which cannot be translated sentence by sentence into our theory.
These theories differ in the predicates they use within their
respective languages. A trivial example is given by switching two
terms, "molecule" and "electron," that do not appear in any
observation sentence. These two theories would then be empirically
equivalent since they imply the same observation sentences, but they
say different things because one assigns certain properties to
molecules, while the other denies them and attributes them to
electrons (Quine 1981, 28-9). Successfully translating one to the
other would then require a systematic conversion of one into the
other. The underdetermination thesis that emerges from these remarks
"asserts that our system of the world is bound to have empirically
equivalent alternatives that are not reconcilable by reconstrual of
predicates" (Quine 1975b, 242). Quine thinks it remains an open
question whether this situation could arise. But, he does endorse the
possibility that we might uncover empirically equivalent theories that
we see no way to successfully reconcile through translation (1992, 97;
see Hylton 2007, 189-196).
Quine's discussion of issues involving the justification of
theoretical statements stands in sharp contrast to the common
criticism that his naturalized epistemology eliminates any normative
concern with justification. The standard reference for this criticism
is found with Kim (1993), who argues that Quine's naturalized account
of knowledge asks us to "set aside the entire framework of
justification-centered epistemology" replacing it with " a purely
descriptive, causal-nomological science of human cognition" (224).
With his explicit appeal to the resources of natural science, Kim
takes Quine's epistemological program as only describing how we have
arrived at our current beliefs, and as incapable of accounting for the
rational basis of these beliefs, or providing any recommendations
concerning what beliefs we should accept or reject. He concludes that
Quinean naturalized epistemology results in a radical rejection of the
traditional normative project of epistemology.
Quine's emphasis on the causal connections between our sensory
surfaces and the statements of advanced science forms one element of
his attempt to clarify the evidential support of science but one that
does not explicitly address Kim's normative concern. That is, it does
not deal with questions of justification, or reasons for belief, and
consequently does not establish those standards needed for the
evaluation of our beliefs. Moreover, Quine would agree that sensory
stimulation is incapable of dealing with normative concerns involving
evidence, since this causal source of 'information' does not justify
our beliefs, because we are unaware of our sensory input and cannot
then infer anything from it. This agreement is partly obscured with
Quine's occasional use of "evidence" in summary statements of his
position. However, this concept is not clear enough to be used within
the more precise scientific formulations required of Quine's
naturalized account of knowledge. By concentrating on "the
causal-nomological" element of Quine's view, and finding there no
evident interest in the issue of justification, Kim concludes that
naturalized epistemology eschews any such concern. But this mistakenly
takes Quine's description of the causal chains from stimulus to
science as all that would remain of epistemology after it has been
situated within the empirical constraints of natural science. Quine
thinks that concerns over justification find their most explicit
expression in experimental contexts, when specific hypotheses lead to
their fulfilled prediction. These predicted expectations are captured
with his use of observation categoricals that serve to bridge the
inferential gap between observation sentences and the more advanced
pronouncements of our scientific theory.
This view of justification is also in accord with Kim's insistence
that epistemology indicate the conditions beliefs must satisfy to be
considered justified. It further indicates which beliefs we have a
rational responsibility to hold and those we do not. Through his
appeal to experimental method and the claim that hypotheses are
justified through the successful prediction of observational
consequences, Quine indicates that these hypotheses are to be accepted
while others that fail to lead to their respective predictions are
not. Rather than reject normative epistemology, Quine's theory of
knowledge provides an account of the normative that is tempered by
scientific resources and empirical methods. The result is a view of
justification that remains capable of addressing those justificatory
concerns that Kim sees as fundamental to the traditional normative
project of epistemology. This suggests that the central normative
issue that divides Quine and his critics does not involve the question
of whether individual claims are justified but rather centers on his
more fundamental denial of any general evaluative perspective on
science from some external philosophical vantage point. For more on
these issues see Gregory 2008, Johnsen 2005, Roth 1999, and Sinclair
2004, 2007.
4. Ontology, Explication and the Regimentation of Theory
Quine's concern with science or with our overarching "scientific
theory of the world" is not confined to the acquisition and evidential
support of this theory, but also considers the question of its further
ontological commitments. Here, he is interested in what the world is
like in its most general structural features, and in further
clarifying what our scientific theory tells us about this ontological
structure (Quine 1960, 161). Such concerns indicate a philosophical
task for the naturalist philosopher: a detailed consideration of how
our scientific theory might be organized and systematized. This, as we
will see, results in Quine's attempt to further simply this theory and
in the process help to clarify what sorts of objects we must
acknowledge as real given our acceptance of this theory.
In carrying out this systemization of our theory Quine speaks of its
"regimentation," in which the theory is to be cast in a logically
clear and rigorous language (1960, 157). The results of this
regimentation further lead to ontological reduction, in which we
appeal to various logical techniques to demonstrate that our theory
does not commit us to the existence of certain kinds of things that it
may, at first glance, appear to (Hylton 2007, 245). The overall aims
of regimentation are to make our theory clearer, more precise and
systematic. Quine takes this drive towards greater systematization as
central to the improvement of human knowledge generally. It is
precisely these further systematic refinements to our knowledge that
helps it move beyond the claims of commonsense to more sophisticated
science (Quine 1976b, 233-234). By injecting greater system into the
precise examination of evidence the scientist is able to take positive
steps beyond commonsense understanding. Quine views the philosophical
concerns that motivate his use of logical regimentation as a
straightforward continuation of the scientific effort to impose
greater system upon our theory (see Hylton 2007, 232-233). The
scientist is interested in organizing and clarifying some specific
area of a theory, such as biology or chemistry, in order to provide a
better understanding of that part of human knowledge and further lay
the groundwork for future progress in that area. The philosophical aim
here is, not surprisingly, broader and more abstract than that of the
empirical scientist, but the motivation and result is the same (Quine
1960, 275-276). These ontological interests are another example of the
way Quine conceives of philosophy as continuous with the aims and
motives of scientific inquiry.
Quine is concerned with making explicit the ontological claims that
our theory requires us to accept. In other words, what kinds of
objects must we accept as real, given our commitment to this theory
(Hylton 2007, 236). In pursuing such issues, he thinks that our
ordinary language or system of concepts fails to make explicit the
nature of such ontological commitments, because it fails to definitely
pick out objects. When dealing with various ontological concerns, we
cannot then simply "read them off" our ordinary use of terms and
concepts:
The common man's ontology is vague and untidy in two ways. It
takes in many purported objects that are vaguely or inadequately
defined. But also, what is more significant, it is vague in its scope;
we cannot even tell in general which of these vague things to ascribe
to a man's ontology at all, which things to count him as assuming…It
is only our somewhat regimented and sophisticated language of science
that has evolved in such a way as really to raise ontological
questions. (Quine 1979, 276)
It is only once we have cast our knowledge of the world into a
regimented notation that it then makes sense to ask about what it
claims to exist. However, there are various logical methods and
techniques available for this logical calibration or regimentation. We
must then choose a method, and base this choice on that method which
does the best job at helping us systematize our theory. Quine argues
that the best way to regiment our theory is to formulate it within the
terms set by the syntax of classical first order logic. Setting up our
theory within such syntactical forms will, he thinks, provide the best
way of simplifying and clarifying this theory (see Hylton 2007, 252).
Quine's general concern with clearly and explicitly capturing the
nature of our theory's ontological commitments is then intimately
connected with his attempt to regiment our scientific theory into the
syntax of modern logic.
One important way that regimentation helps with the simplification and
clarification of our theory is through helping us avoid nagging
philosophical problems by 'resolving' them. Again, this claim needs to
be measured against problematic features of ordinary language use.
Ordinary language contains idioms and constructions that lead to
puzzling questions or paradoxes. For example, to meaningfully speak
about some thing not existing, seems to require that there is in fact
such an object to talk about. But following Russell, Quine shows how
such expressions can be rewritten within a formal language using
quantifiers and bound variables (for more details see Quine 1948,
1-19; Hylton 2007, 280-297). The meaningfulness of such expressions is
then understood within the resources of a formal language and does not
further require that there exist objects such as a round square, or
Pegasus, in order for us to speak meaningful of there being no round
square, nor Pegasus.
For such reasons, Quine thinks that we can avoid these idioms and
constructions and, in turn, sidestep the philosophical puzzlement that
accompanies them. This reflects his attitude to progress in philosophy
and science, where serious philosophical work is concerned with
science or our general systematic structure of human knowledge. The
simplification of this theory demonstrates how to avoid puzzling and
irresolvable questions that have been part of historical philosophical
concerns. Scientific work can than move forward without any
distraction from such potential philosophical impediments to progress
(Hylton 2007, 244). Quine explains that "problems are dissolved in the
important sense of being shown to be purely verbal, and purely verbal
in the important sense of arising from usages that can be avoided in
favor of ones that engender no such problems" (1960, 261). It should
be stressed that Quine does not think that all philosophical problems
can be dissolved in this way. His point here is to emphasize that
philosophical worries often derive from the vagueness of the terms
employed, rather than from a discovery of a genuine issue that needs
to be addressed. This itself is revealed once we adopt a proper
scientific attitude to the problem, further demonstrating that it is
unreal and should placed aside.
We have seen that Quine takes the ontological claims of our theory as
only becoming clear relative to some form of logical regimentation.
However, at first glance, it appears as if our ordinary discourse
comes with ontological commitments. The subject of a given sentence
seems to correspond to an object, suggesting that accepting such a
sentence is to commit oneself to the existence of that object. It is
possible that given our choice of a regimented language, this
commitment may remain, or we may be able to do without it, since the
sentence can be logically recalibrated without any reference to such
an object. This second case is one of ontological reduction, where we
have demonstrated how the commitment to the existence of an object
does not need to be taken as a real commitment (Hylton 2007, 246;
Quine 1960, 257-262).
Quine illustrates this point with his discussion of the definition of
an ordered pair. Within set theory, the definition of set is
indifferent to the order of its members. The set consisting of my
coffee cup and my copy of Word and Object is the same set as that made
up of my copy of Word and Object and my coffee cup. There are times,
however, when this order makes a difference and we need to specify
which member of a set comes first and which comes second. To do so we
introduce an entity called an "ordered pair." For example to define
the relation of fatherhood, we would introduce the ordered pair of
<Abraham, Isaac> where the first member is male and the second is a
child of the first. The father relation can then be defined as the set
of all ordered pairs of this kind (Quine 1960, 257). Ordered pairs
need to be subject to one fundamental postulate: that the ordered pair
consisting of a and b is identical to the ordered pair consisting of x
and y if and only if a = x and b = y (Gustafsson 2006, 60; Hylton
2007, 247). Now, the ontological issue concerns the apparent need to
be committed to an extra entity called 'ordered pair' of which this
postulate is true or whether we can define this construction using
only the conceptual resources within our existing theory, that is,
within set theory. It turns out that we do not need to assume the
existence of such entities, since there are, at least, two ways to use
set theory to define ordered pairs (for details, see Gustaffsson 2006,
60-65; Hylton 2007, 247). The above postulate can then be translated
via a theorem of set theory using one of these proposed definitions.
When our explanatory needs require a more precise specification of the
order of a set's members, we are able to meet this demand by simply
using the resources of our existing theory. The justification for
making such theoretical maneuvers and using these definitions, is
found with the demands of overall utility and convenience; we can
address our explanatory interests by using the existing resources of
set theory while avoiding assumptions and entities that we do not
need. For Quine, it does not matter that there are several definitions
of ordered pair available, nor that they make different claims about
what ordered pairs 'really' are. Any definition that is capable of
fulfilling the basic postulate is deemed acceptable for his
theoretical purposes (Gustaffsson 2006, 61; Hylton 2007, 247-8).
Simply put, what these definitions then show is that we can proceed
with our explanatory interests without ordered pairs. Despite his
focus on this relatively technical point internal to set theory, Quine
suggests that we draw a general philosophical moral:
This construction is paradigmatic of what we are most typically up
to when in a philosophical sprit we offer an "analysis" or
"explication" of some hitherto inadequately formulated "idea" or
expression.… We fix on the particular functions of the unclear
expression that make it worth troubling about, and then devise a
substitute, clear and couched in terms to our liking, that fills those
functions. Beyond those conditions of partial agreement, dictated by
our interests and purposes, any traits of the explicans come under the
head of "don't-cares" (Quine 1960, 258-259).
This definition or explication of 'ordered pair' has this broader
ontological significance because the technical issues that motivate it
are here viewed as simply a basic part of what it means to address
such ontological questions. Due to the inherent vagueness of our
ordinary discourse, Quine views ontology itself to be largely an
artificial enterprise, which is inseparable from the very sort of
logical techniques and regimentation we have discussed (Hylton 2004,
128). The study of ontology requires addressing those technical issues
that answer the explanatory needs of convenience, simplicity and
overall considerations of utility. For Quine, any serious attempt at
clarifying our ontological commitments will then involve the technical
considerations found in this explication of the ordered pair.
This definition or explication has resulted in our proceeding without
assuming the existence of ordered pairs. There then remains a general
question concerning whether such ontological reductions explain or
eliminate the entity under consideration. Given Quine's general
attitude to ontological issues, we might expect that he recognizes no
sharp difference here between explication and elimination. If the
definition results in a rejection of certain uses of a term, then we
may be more inclined to view this as a rejection of the entity in
question. But if these uses are still recognized as important in
different contexts, we may favor the explication of the term rather
than its elimination. Given the artificial nature of the ontological
enterprise, these are largely rhetorical differences that do not admit
of sharp boundaries (Quine 1960, 261).
This is perhaps best seen with Quine's view of the disagreement within
the philosophy of mind between identity theorists and so-called
eliminative materialists (see Gustaffsson 2006). Despite a lack of
neurophysical detail, Quine thinks that we still can provide an
explication of the mental that shows how to proceed without the
positing of mental entities. If one grants that each mental state has
a corresponding bodily state, then we can simply assign mental
predicates to states of the physical body, thus bypassing any need to
assign the mental to some non-bodily substance. John's pain is not
located in some mind that is in a state of pain, but we instead take
the predicate "is feeling pain" as applicable directly to John's body.
In this way we get rid of all reference to mental entities and appeal
to mental predicates as applying only to physical things, in this case
John's body (Gustaffsson 2006, 66). As in the case of ordered pairs,
we have a definition that leads to ontological reduction, and we might
be inclined to ask whether this reduction explains what mental states
really are, or eliminates then completely from our ontology.
Quine's attitude here is the same as before; a proper scientific
regimentation of discourse about minds demonstrates how to proceed
without the positing of mental entities. But the further question of
whether this identifies the mental with the physical or eliminates the
mental is shown to be merely a rhetorical difference. It is only
through our choice of a logical framework, a regimented language, that
we are capable of settling the question of what identity criteria are
available. Once this has been decided we can recognize that scientific
discourse about minds does not require a commitment to mental
entities. However, this reveals that there are no further objective
facts characterized within this formally regimented language that
settles the question of the identification or elimination of the
mental (see Gustaffsson 2006, 67-68; Quine 1960, 265). We have shown
how our commitment to physicalism is compatible with the explanatory
need to posit mental states, but how we might further describe this
outcome is merely a choice between which way of talking we like best
(Quine 1995a, 86).
5. Physicalism, Instrumentalism, and Realism
With regard to Quine's general attitude within ontology we have seen
his insistence on clarity, utility, ontological reduction, and the
general simplicity and sparseness of our theoretical commitments.
These features coupled with Quine's early flirtation with nominalism
might lead one to conclude that his philosophy be characterized as
"nominalist" (Quine 1946, Quine and Goodman 1947). However, this
conclusion does not follow. Much of our theorizing uses abstract
objects, including for example, mathematics objects such as numbers
and functions, which in turn form a crucial part of the overall
structure of the sciences. Without abstract objects we would be unable
to accommodate mathematics within our overall system of knowledge, and
so would deprive ourselves of such knowledge within natural science.
Moreover, ordinary statements such as "I own two cars," appeal to the
idea of a type of object, which we may most readily understand in
terms of abstract entities (See Hylton 2007, 302-303). Quine is then
driven to accept abstract entities, by stressing the overwhelming
theoretical and structural reasons for including them into our
ontology. It is important to note that no experiment or fulfilled
prediction settles this or any other ontological issue (Quine 1960,
276). Rather, the reality of abstract objects gains indirect support
through the structural benefits they provide our theory in our ongoing
attempt to formulate testable hypotheses.
Quine further clarifies the status and role of such abstract objects
through an appeal to sets as the only type of abstract object
required. Most significantly, he thinks it is possible to demonstrate
how various mathematical entities can be defined using only sets. The
use of sets then allows us to preserve the importance of mathematics
and its crucial role within the language of natural science, while
admitting only one type of abstract object into our ontology.
When Quine's general ontological viewpoint is characterized as
physicalist, we must note its endorsement of physical objects, and
abstract objects. This use of "physicalism" is nonstandard, as the
term is sometimes equated with materialism (only physical things
exist), and as explicitly rejecting the existence of abstract objects
(see Hylton 2007, 310). Quine further formulates his physicalism as
the view that there is no difference without a physical difference.
That is, nothing happens in the world without a redistribution of
microphysical states (Quine 1981, 98). Importantly, this does not
result in a strict form of reductive physicalism, where, for example,
we might claim that a particular type of physical event occurs when
someone thinks about their vacation in Mexico. Rather, Quine advocates
a form of what is often called "nonreductive physicalism," in which
various vocabularies, including intentional descriptions, cannot be
reduced to the language of physics, but that each particular mental
event can be identified with a specific physical event. He takes the
general significance of this form of physicalism as stemming from the
fact that it is physics, as the fundamental science, which aims for
the full coverage of all events in the universe:
…nothing happens in the world, not the flutter of the eyelid, not
the flicker of a thought, without some redistribution of microphysical
states…If the physicist suspected that there was any event that did
not consist in the redistribution of the elementary states allowed for
in his physical theory, he would seek a way of supplementing his
theory. Full coverage in this sense is the very business of physics,
and only of physics. (Quine 1981, 98)
It falls to physics to account for all actions and events within its
universal and exceptionless laws. The importance that Quine assigns to
his physicalism is based on the plausible empirical assumption that
there is an adequate physical theory to be found along the lines he
suggests (Hylton 2007, 315-316). While physics remains incomplete, it
nonetheless provides us with a coherent unified theory with great
explanatory power. It is reasonable to believe that, as the details of
physical theory are further worked out, the resulting theory will
remain a natural extension and continuation of the current physical
understanding at hand.
Quine further emphasizes what he describes as a "robust" realism about
the objects posited by our overarching theory of world. This realism
remains grounded in his naturalistic conception of philosophy, where
it is science itself that describes and identifies the most basic
features of reality. He emphasizes the way human knowledge is a means
for the prediction of observation or, more technically, of sensory
stimulation:
Our talk of external things, our very notion of things, is just a
conceptual apparatus that helps us foresee and control the triggering
of our sensory receptors in the light of previous triggering of
sensory receptors. The triggering, first and last, is all that we have
to go on. (1981, 1)
This view of knowledge appears to suggest that theories are only
instruments, and then conflict with the realist stance Quine further
affirms of the objects posited by our scientific theories (Hylton
2007, 18-22). If knowledge is simply viewed as a way of predicting
stimulation, then why should we take the further step and proclaim
that the objects it claims to tell us about really exist? The basic
critical point here claims that despite Quine's professed realism his
view of theories and their relations to sensory stimulation prevent
him from taking the things described as real.
This point is reinforced with Quine's emphasis on what he calls
"Ontological Relativity" (Quine 1969b). Suppose we have provided a
fully regimented scientific theory in which all of our ontological
commitments are now completely transparent. Quine argues that there
remains more than one way to interpret such commitments. We can
provide a different interpretation of its predicates, and this will
give a corresponding change in the ontological commitments of the
theory. For example, instead of claiming that x is a dog, we could say
that x is a certain temporal stage of a dog. Here, the predicates
assigned to the objects of the theory have changed, but the overall
structure of the theory remains the same; and its empirical content,
that is, its implied observations, also remain unchanged (see Hylton
2004, 115-150). But what the theory tells us is real has changed.
Quine thinks it is important that the structure of our theory is built
up to accommodate sensory experience, but that the objects used to
carry this out can vary. Once again, this may seem to conflict with
his further commitment to a realism about the objects posited by our
theory. More specifically, in spite of his emphasis on viewing objects
as theoretical posits, and how they can vary with no impact on implied
observation, he still affirms the reality of the objects posited by
our theory. He himself thinks that this represents no serious
conflict, and that the key reconciliation of these elements is found
with his naturalism (1981, 21). It will then be useful to briefly
examine why Quine thinks his naturalism can reconcile the
instrumentalist and realist elements of his philosophy of science.
Standard forms of instrumentalism take scientific theories to be
instruments for making predictions but view the objects or entities
named within such theories as merely useful fictions. They are not
claimed to be real, but are simply posited in order to help us make
successful predictions. Sometimes this view claims that everyday
objects like tables and chairs are real and that the posited
non-observable fictions of the theory help us understand the
observable behavior of such real objects. Other times it takes all of
these objects, including chairs and tables as useful fictions. Either
way, such positions rely on a distinction between types or levels of
reality, in which one class of objects is depicted as somehow less
real than the other, and such objects are then just simple posits for
organizing our experience of things (see Hylton 2007, 18-20).
Importantly, Quine's epistemological and ontological views do not
permit any such contrast. He does not think that we can take our
sensory stimulations as real while at the same time viewing physical
objects as mere fictions. For Quine, sensory stimulations are physical
objects and we then need to view them as on par with all other
physical objects. But this is a basic corollary of his naturalistic
stance in philosophy. Quine's naturalism emphasizes that we always
begin within our ongoing theory of world, which takes for granted both
the existence of the physical world and our knowledge of that world.
There is then no neutral, pre-theoretical position that would provide
us with access to some other standard of reality. He rejects the claim
that in philosophical inquiry we can appeal to a standard of reality
that is different from the one we use when we distinguish, for
example, a real pool of water from a mere mirage (Hylton 2007, 20).
What we have available is our ordinary knowledge of things, where
further modifications of this knowledge may lead through a process of
internal development. Consequently, we lack any superior standard of
reality other than that found within our general overarching
systematic theory of world. Stated somewhat differently, it is only by
means of our developing theory of the world that we have any coherent
way of distinguishing what is real from what is not real.
This represents, once again, a rejection of any philosophical
perspective that is independent of the general philosophical (and
scientific) task of establishing the best theory available for the
predicting and making sense of our sensory stimulation. We select
scientific theories that best predict sensory input, but, in contrast
with the instrumentalist, cannot simply rest with prediction, and are
further committed to affirming the reality of the objects described by
the theory.
Quine's naturalism reconciles the instrumentalist and realist elements
of his view by affirming that epistemological and ontological
commitments go hand in hand. There is no conflict between our
recognition that knowledge is a human-made artifact designed to
accommodate observation and our further acceptance of the reality of
those objects discussed by that knowledge (Hylton 2007, 22). We can
study how we have constructed our knowledge of the world, while at the
same time taking for granted the theory we are trying to make sense of
with its realistic acceptance of objects, sets, nerve endings, and
human beings. Quine's naturalism then claims that the study of human
knowledge takes place within the theory it studies and presupposes the
reality of the objects discussed in that theory. There is, as he
remarks, "no first philosophy prior to natural science" (Quine 1981,
67).
6. Quine's Influence
Few philosophers have been willing to adopt Quine's strict standards
nor have they accepted all the details of his respective views.
Nevertheless, his influence has been widespread, and its importance
can be measured in several different ways.
From the standpoint of the development of philosophy in America,
Quine's early training in logic and his later promotion of themes from
logical empiricist philosophy helped set the stage for the emergence
of what would be called "analytic philosophy." Quine saw the
importance of logical empiricism within its marshaling of logical
techniques in philosophy, and this would then prove central for his
later explicit development of a scientific, naturalist conception of
philosophy, which rejected any epistemologically significant
understanding of the a priori. His emphasis on the technical,
scientific aspects of philosophy fed into the increasing pressure for
professionalization in philosophy. In the aftermath of the Second
World War, Quine's understanding of the discipline prevailed, with
conceptions of scientific philosophy and various forms of scientific
naturalism reaffirming the model of the professional philosopher as
empirical technician, rather than as moral and social visionary (for
more details see Isaac 2005, 205-234).
Quine's most explicit philosophical influence is then to be found in
his empirical reconfiguration of philosophy, and its suggestion that
philosophical inquiry must be intimately tied to empirical scientific
work. Following Quine's emphasis on naturalized epistemology, many
analytic philosophers have proceeded to 'naturalize' various areas of
philosophical inquiry. Such projects emphasize the importance of a
greater alignment between philosophy and the empirical sciences, while
raising suspicions about many traditional projects in philosophy that
trade in objects (such as minds, propositions, meanings, and norms)
that are hard to locate in the natural world. Although Quine's
philosophy does not engage in any detailed way with empirical results,
his work can be usefully viewed as a general model for how
philosophical issues can be interpreted scientifically. It is not
surprising to see recent trends in naturalistic philosophy making a
more explicit appeal to work in psychology, evolutionary biology,
neuroscience, and the cognitive sciences. For some examples, see
Churchland 1987 and Kornblith 1994.
The idea that philosophy should be informed by work in the sciences
may seem hard to resist. The impressive successes found in modern
science make it a compelling example of how to pattern our ongoing
attempts to advance human knowledge. Moreover, in the face of
scientific prestige and progress, philosophers have faced the
difficult question of articulating what they still can contribute to
the progress of human knowledge. The inconclusiveness of philosophical
speculation has led many philosophers to offer varying ways of making
philosophy more scientific in the hopes of partaking in scientific
progress. This assimilation of philosophical problems or concerns to
science may then help philosophy regain some measure of epistemic
respect, and intellectual authority, by adopting a more modest but at
least legitimate place alongside, or within, science.
But how we are to understand this relationship between philosophy and
science is not unproblematic. Quine's attempt to situate philosophical
inquiry within the confines of empirical science is one pointed and
forceful way of thinking about this relationship. His key contribution
to our understanding of science does not consist in providing a
philosophy of science, but in showing how philosophical concerns can
be conceived as scientific. Here, it is useful to further reflect on
his specific attempt to bring strict scientific standards to bear on
key philosophical issues and problems. Given the ongoing importance of
addressing such metaphilosophical worries about the status of
philosophy in relation to science, Quine's view remains useful as a
resource, even if many philosophers remain reluctant to adopt his
general strategy or its detailed reconstructions of philosophical
problems.
7. Quine's Critics
Searle's criticism of Quine's behaviorism was discussed above. One
other important critical response to Quine's specific rendering of the
philosophy-science relationship is found with the work of Michael
Friedman (1997, 2001). Quine's naturalism, with its rejection of any
form of a priori knowledge, results in a holistic picture of human
knowledge as one large web of belief touching experience only at its
edges. Friedman argues that this picture fails to account for a more
subtle interaction between the exact and natural sciences, and as a
result, cannot properly make sense of their historical development.
Friedman's alternative picture involves a dynamical system of beliefs,
concepts, and principles that can be distinguished into three main
elements or levels. There is an evolving system of empirical
scientific concepts and principles, a system of mathematical concepts
and principles that make possible the framing of empirical science and
its precise experimental testing, and lastly a system of philosophical
concepts and principles that serve during times of scientific
revolution as a source of suggestions for choosing one scientific
framework rather than another (Friedman 1997, 18-9; 2001). All of
these three systematic levels are constantly changing and interact
with each other, but each plays a distinctive role within the general
framework of scientific knowledge. For example, consider the
revolutionary scientific changes of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Here, the guiding aim was a precise mathematical
description of natural phenomena using an atomistic theory of matter
that explained natural changes as the result of movement and impact of
tiny particles. This guiding ideal requires the use of mathematics to
achieve precise results that can then be subjected to exact
experimental tests. Here, we have a distinctive contribution at the
mathematical level, where this forms the necessary backdrop to
empirical testing within the natural sciences. But this achievement
lacked the mathematical and empirical resources needed for its
successful completion and was sustained by distinct philosophical
contributions. It is here that Descartes' system of natural
philosophy, with its careful revision and reorganization of
philosophical concepts derived from scholastic philosophy that
distinctive philosophical contributions helped to promote this new
scientific ideal (Friedman 1997, 14, 16-7).
Although Friedman's account agrees with Quine that none of our beliefs
are forever immune from revision, it further diverges from Quinean
naturalism in two fundamental ways. First, it highlights a modified
Kantian view of the way mathematical concepts and principles stand as
a priori conditions that make possible both the very framing of
empirical scientific principles and their experimental testing.
Second, it highlights a distinct role for philosophy in relation to
science, when it suggests that during deep conceptual revolutions in
science, a separate level of philosophical ideas and concepts can be
offered as resources for sustaining a new scientific framework.
Adopting Quine's general assimilation of philosophy to empirical
science obscures the constitutive a priori role mathematics plays in
the formulation of empirical scientific principles, Friedman argues,
and further ignores the distinctive role philosophy plays in relation
to science during scientific revolutions. Friedman's alternative
conception of the relations between philosophy, mathematics and
empirical science suggests a more complicated interaction than seen
with Quine's naturalism, one that arguably is needed if we are to
fully understand the historical development of the sciences and
philosophy's contribution to that process.
8. References and Further Reading
a. Primary Sources
* Quine, W.V. 1946. Nominalism. In Confessions of a Confirmed
Extensionalist and Other Essays (2008b). Edited by Dagfinn Føllesdal
and Douglas B. Quine. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
o An early unpublished presentation on the merits and limits
of nominalism.
* Quine, W.V. 1948. On What There Is. In From a Logical Point of
View (1981). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
o An early discussion of ontological issues, where Quine
uses Russell's theory of descriptions and offers a criterion for
ontological commitment.
* Quine, W.V. 1951. Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review
60: 20-43.
o Famously criticizes the tenability of the
analytic-synthetic distinction.
* Quine, W.V. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge: MIT Press.
o His magnum opus dealing with core issues in language,
epistemology, and ontology.
* Quine, W.V. 1969a. Epistemology Naturalized. In Ontological
Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
o The classic statement of Quine's naturalized epistemology.
* Quine, W.V. 1969b. Ontological Relativity. In Ontological
Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
o Discussion concerning how ontology is relative to theory choice.
* Quine, W.V. 1975a. The Nature of Natural Knowledge. In Mind and
Language. Edited by Samuel Guttenplan. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reprinted in Quine 2008b.
o Overview of Quine's naturalistic account of human knowledge.
* Quine. W.V. 1975b. On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the
World. Erkenntnis 9: 313-328. Reprinted in Quine 2008b.
o Discusses the nature and intelligibility of the
underdetermination thesis.
* Quine, W. V. 1976a. Linguistics and Philosophy. In The Ways of
Paradox and other Essays, Enlarged edition. New York: Random House.
o Further clarifies the extent of Quine's use of behaviorism.
* Quine, W.V. 1976b. The Scope and Language of Science. In The
Ways of Paradox and other Essays, Enlarged edition. New York: Random
House.
o Overview of Quine's philosophical attitude to scientific
knowledge and the logical calibration of scientific language.
* Quine, W. V. 1979. Facts of the Matter. In Essays on the
Philosophy of W.V. Quine. Edited by Robert Shahan and Chris Swoyer.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Reprinted in Quine 2008b.
o Discusses Quine's approach to knowledge and its connection
to ontology.
* Quine, W.V. 1981. Theories and Things. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
o Useful collection of essays and responses to critics.
* Quine, W.V. 1984. Sticks and Stones; or, the Ins and Outs of
Existence. In On Nature. Edited by Leroy Rouner. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press. Reprinted in Quine 2008a.
o Another useful overview of Quine's naturalized account of
knowledge and ontology.
* Quine, W. V. 1987. Quiddities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
o Quine's philosophical dictionary.
* Quine, W.V. 1992. Pursuit of Truth (2nd Edition). Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
o Later concise overview of Quine's interlocking views on
meaning, knowledge, and ontology.
* Quine, W.V. 1995a. From Stimulus to Science. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
o Quine's last book where he situates his view in relation
to the history of empiricism and summarizes his mature standpoint on
various philosophical issues.
* Quine, W.V. 1995b. Naturalism; Or, Living Within One's Means.
Dialectica 49: 251-61. Reprinted in Quine 2008b.
o Later summary statement of Quine's naturalist conception
of philosophy.
* Quine, W.V. 1995c. Reactions. In On Quine: New Essays. Edited by
Paolo Leonardi and Marco Santambrogio. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. Reprinted in Quine 2008b.
o Quine's response to a set of essays on his work. He
clarifies his position on a variety of different topics including
epistemology, ontology, mathematics and logic.
* Quine, W.V. 1996. Progress on Two Fronts. The Journal of
Philosophy 93: 159-63. Reprinted in Quine 2008b.
o Important short article discussing the perceptual harmony
of similarity standards.
* Quine, W.V. 1997. Response to Haack. Revue Internationale de
Philosophie 51: 571-2. Reprinted in Quine 2008b.
o Responds to Haack's questions concerning Quine's use of
"science," his discussion of evidence versus method, and other related
issues.
* Quine, W.V. 2000a. Three Networks: Similarity, Implication, and
Membership. In The Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of
Philosophy Volume VI: Analytic Philosophy and Logic. Edited by Akihiro
Kahamori. Reprinted in Quine 2008b.
o Quine's last public presentation briefly discussing his
use of perceptual harmony.
* Quine, W.V. 2000b. I, You and It: An Epistemological Triangle.
In Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Edited by Alex
Orenstein and Petr Kotatko. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
o Concise statement of Quine's later amendments to his epistemology.
* Quine, W.V. 2000c. Response to Lehrer. In Knowledge, Language
and Logic: Questions for Quine. Edited by Alex Orenstein and Petr
Kotatko. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Reprinted in Quine 2008a.
o Brief discussion of Quine's view of evidence and justification.
* Quine, W. V. 2000d. Response to Segal. In Knowledge, Language
and Logic: Questions for Quine. Edited by Alex Orenstein and Petr
Kotatko. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
o Brief clarification of Quine's use of behaviorism.
* Quine, W. V. 2000e. Response to Szuba. In Knowledge, Language
and Logic: Questions for Quine. Edited by Alex Orenstein and Petr
Kotatko. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
o Discusses the perceptual harmony of our similarity standards.
* Quine, W. V. 2008a. Quine in Dialogue. Edited by Dagfinn
Føllesdal and Douglas B. Quine. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
o Useful collection of Quine's interviews, book reviews and
responses to other philosophers.
* Quine, W. V. 2008b. Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist
and Other Essays. Edited by Dagfinn Føllesdal and Douglas B. Quine.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
o Quine's main articles from his last three decades and
important unpublished writings.
* Quine, W. V. and Nelson Goodman. 1947. Steps Toward a
Constructive Nominalism. Journal of Symbolic Logic 12: 97-122.
o Early attempt with Goodman to develop a nominalist program
in philosophy.
b. Secondary Sources
* Carnap, Rudolf. 1935. Philosophy and Logical Syntax. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
o Introductory presentation of Carnap's use of the
analytic-synthetic distinction and his conception of philosophy as
concerned with the logical syntax of language.
* Churchland, Patricia. 1987. Epistemology in the Age of
Neuroscience. The Journal of Philosophy 84: 544-553.
o Short article discussing some applications of work in
neuroscience to issues in epistemology.
* Davidson, Donald. 2001. A Coherence Theory of Truth and
Knowledge. In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
o Questions Quine's use of sensory stimulation as evidence.
* Friedman, Michael. 1997. Philosophical Naturalism. Proceedings
and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 71:7-21.
o Argues that Quine's holistic picture of human knowledge
cannot account for the historical development and interaction of the
mathematical and natural sciences.
* Friedman, Michael. 2001. Dynamics of Reason. Stanford: CLSI Publications.
o Defends a modified Kantian view of a priori principles in
opposition to Quine's naturalism.
* Friedman, Michael. 2006. Carnap and Quine: Twentieth-Century
Echoes of Kant and Hume. Philosophical Topics 34: 35-58.
o Describes the philosophical development of these two
thinkers and their debates by contrasting Carnap's Kantian affinities
with Quine's Humean sympathies.
* Gibson, Roger. ed. 2004. The Cambridge Companion to Quine.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
o A set of important essays on Quine's philosophy written by
distinguished scholars.
* Gibson, Roger. 2004. Quine's Behaviorism cum Empiricism. In The
Cambridge Companion to Quine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
o A careful overview detailing the nature of Quine's
behaviorist commitment.
* Gustafsson, Martin. 2006. Quine on Explication and Elimination.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36: 57-70.
o Insightful discussion of Quine's conception of explication
and its role in ontological reduction.
* Gregory, Paul. 2008. Quine's Naturalism: Language, Knowledge and
the Subject. Continuum Press.
o A new interpretation and defense of Quine's naturalized
conception of knowledge.
* Hylton, Peter. 2004. Quine on Reference and Ontology. In The
Cambridge Companion to Quine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
o Overview of Quine's ontological views and their relation
to objective reference.
* Hylton, Peter. 2007. Quine. New York: Routledge.
o The most careful, detailed scholarship on Quine's work available.
* Isaac, Joel. 2005. W. V. Quine and the Origins of Analytic
Philosophy in America. Modern Intellectual History 2: 205-234.
o An important historical treatment of Quine's influence on
the rise of analytic philosophy in America.
* Johnsen, Bredo. 2005. How to Read "Epistemology Naturalized".
The Journal of Philosophy 102: 78-93.
o An important discussion arguing that Quine never abandoned
normative epistemology.
* Kemp, Gary. 2006. Quine: A Guide for the Perplexed. New York: Continuum.
o An introductory survey of Quine's views especially useful
for first-time readers of Quine's philosophy.
* Kim, Jaegwon. 1993. "What is 'Naturalized Epistemology'?" In
Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
o Argues that Quine abandons normative epistemology.
* Kornblith, Hilary. ed. 1994. Naturalizing Epistemology, (2nd
Edition). Cambridge: MIT Press.
o Important collection of articles exploring the interface
between psychology and epistemology.
* Lugg, Andrew. 2006. Russell as Precursor of Quine. Bertrand
Russell Society Quarterly 128- 129: 9-21.
o Defends Quine's reading of Russell as a naturalized epistemologist.
* Richardson, Alan. 1998. Carnap's Construction of the World.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
o Offers a revisionist reading of Carnap's philosophy
emphasizing its neoKantian origins.
* Roth, Paul. 1999. The Epistemology of 'Epistemology
Naturalized'. Dialectica 53: 87-109.
o A careful reappraisal of Quine's argument in "Epistemology
Naturalized."
* Searle, John. 1987. Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First
Person. The Journal of Philosophy 84:23-147.
o Pointed criticism of Quine's behaviorist approach to
meaning and knowledge.
* Sinclair, Robert. 2004. When Naturalized Epistemology Turns
Normative: Kim on the Failures of Quinean Epistemology. Southwest
Philosophy Review 20: 53-67.
o A Quinean reply to Kim's claim that naturalized
epistemology cannot address the normative demands of justification.
* Sinclair, Robert. 2007. Quine's Naturalized Epistemology and the
Third Dogma of Empiricism. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 45:
455-472.
o Defends Quine's naturalized account of knowledge and
evidence against Davidson's criticisms.
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