tenuous and fraught with much debate. It seems fairly obvious that we
gain something meaningful from experiences and interactions with works
of art. It does not seem so obvious whether or not the experiences we
have with art can produce propositional knowledge that is constituted
by true justified belief. In what follows I will give some historical
background on the debate and flesh out some of the important issues
surrounding the question "(What) can we learn from art?"
1. Introduction
While engaging objects aesthetically is both a perceptual and
emotionally laden activity, it is also fundamentally cognitive. As
such, aesthetic engagement is wedded to a number of epistemological
concerns. For example, we commonly claim to know things about art, and
we respect what critics say about various genres of art. We say that
we thought the play was good or bad, that the emotions it produced
were warranted, justified, manipulative, or appropriate. People
commonly claim that they learn from art, that art changes their
perception of the world, and that art has an impact on the way that
they see and make sense of the world. It is also widely believed that
works of art, especially good works of art, can engender beliefs about
the world and can, in turn, provide knowledge about the world. But
what is it exactly that we can know about art? What is it precisely
that art can teach us? Is there any sort of propositional content that
art can provide which resembles the content that we claim to need for
other kinds of knowledge claims? These are the sorts of questions that
frame the debate about whether, and in what sense, art is cognitive.
2. Plato and Aristotle
The question whether or not we can learn from art goes as far back as
Plato, as he warned about the dangers of indulging in both mimetic and
narrative representations of the world and of human actions. The
ensuing debate has endured in the contemporary philosophical
literature and has spurred the further question of how we can learn
from art. The arguments both for and against the notion that we can
learn from art have developed as well. The debate is not any less
complicated than it was historically, nor is it any closer to being
resolved.
There are two extreme positions that one could take in answer to the
question, "Can we learn from art?" Either we can, and do, learn from
art, or we cannot in any meaningful sense attain knowledge that is
non-propositional. Those who argue that we can learn from art
generally argue that our engagement with art arouses certain emotions
or activities that are able to facilitate or produce knowledge. They
would argue that there is some aspect of the artwork which can help to
produce greater understanding of the world around us. Art is thus seen
as a source of insight and awareness that cannot be put into
propositional language; but it can help us to see the world in a new
or different way.
Those who deny that we can learn from art often argue that there can
be no knowledge that is not propositionally-based knowledge. Jerome
Stolnitz, for example, claims in a 1992 article that art does not and
cannot contribute to knowledge primarily because it does not generate
any sort of truths. Those who argue this line want to defend the
notion that since art cannot provide facts or generate arguments, then
we cannot learn from it. Further, those who believe we cannot learn
from art argue that art cannot be understood as a source of knowledge
because it is not productive of knowledge, taken in the traditional
sense of justified true belief. Art does not have propositional
content that can be learned in a traditional way, even though it can
been seen to have effects that promote knowledge and that can either
encourage or undermine the development of understanding. Art can thus
be rejected as a source of knowledge because it does not provide true
beliefs, and because it does not and cannot justify the beliefs that
it does convey. Both extremes agree that if art can be seen as a
source of knowledge, the only way that it could possibly fulfill such
a function would be if that knowledge reflected something essential to
art's nature and value.
Plato points out in the Republic (595-601) that it is possible to make
a representation of something without having knowledge of the thing
represented. Painters represent cobblers when the painters have no
knowledge of shoemaking themselves, and poets write about beauty and
courage without necessarily having any clear knowledge of these
virtues. Only philosophers, the lovers of wisdom, and especially those
who strive to intuit the Forms and employ abstract reasoning, can
really have knowledge of these virtues. Artists mislead their viewers
into thinking that knowledge lies in the represented (mimetic) object.
Plato's concern in the Republic extends to the literary arts in
particular, which are created with the express purpose to move us
emotionally in such a way that one's character could be corrupted
(605-608). The more one indulges in emotions aroused by
representation, according to Plato, the more likely one is to suffer
the effects of an unbalanced soul, and ultimately the development of a
bad character.
Aristotle agreed with Plato that art could indeed influence the
development of one's moral character. While Plato thought that we can
learn from art and that it is detrimental to one's character, however,
Aristotle argued that indulging in the same mimetic emotions that
Plato warned us of can actually benefit one's character by producing
an emotional catharsis (Poetics 1449b24-29). By purging the tragic
emotions in particular, Aristotle held, one has a better chance of
being more rational in everyday life. Thus, while both philosophers
believed that we learn from art, one (Plato) argued that the knowledge
gained was detrimental while the other (Aristotle) argued that it was
beneficial.
3. Rationalists, Empiricists, and Romantics
Continuing with the line of argument Aristotle began, all the way
through the Renaissance and beyond, philosophers have defended the
notion that we can learn from art, and that poetry and fiction engage
the emotions in a helpful, rather than detrimental, way. The Romantics
dealt with this question in a manner that the earlier rationalists and
empiricists did not. The rationalists rejected the idea that the
imagination could be considered a source of knowledge, with Descartes
going so far as to dismiss what he called "the blundering
constructions of the imagination." Returning to the ideals of Plato,
the rationalists strictly employed a knowledge requirement involving
justified true belief. Empiricist epistemology too is particularly
unhelpful when it comes to explaining how we might gain justified
knowledge from fictional or representational situations. For it seems
impossible to learn actual things from fictional situations.
The Romantics provided the real beginnings of an argument against the
passive accounts of knowledge for which the empiricists argued.
Romantic epistemology emphasizes the role of the imagination in
addition to (or over) reason. This allowed for the notion that there
is not merely one right way to know, and that there is not only one
right way to view, experience, understand, and construct the world.
The Romantics adopted three main tenets concerning the relationship
between literature (and art more generally) and truth. The first
denied that there is any one point of view from which Truth can be
determined. The second began to question the Augustinian conviction
that art and literature, like science, should concern only general
features of nature. The third tenet, which the Romantics developed
more fully, concerned the notion of transcendence, especially in
association with growth. Natural science is able to describe the
physical world, but only from a single point of view (Harrison 1998).
Art and literature can describe the world in a myriad of ways,
transcending experience of the physical world into the emotional and
even the supernatural. Although art does not record truths about the
world in the same way that science does, it can give insight into the
different ways that we understand the world and with different degrees
of accuracy. It is those degrees of accuracy that continue to be
called into question.
4. Knowledge Claims about the Arts
David Novitz (1998) points out that there are three basic kinds of
knowledge claims we can make about the arts, all of which are
distinguished by their objects. The first concerns what we claim to
know or believe about the art object itself and whatever imaginary or
fictional worlds might be connected to that object. For example, I can
claim to know things about the way the light reflects in Monet's Water
Lilies. I can also claim to know things about Anna Karenina's
relationships with her husband and with her lover, Vronsky. Beyond
this, we may feel justified in our pity for Anna, because of the way
Tolstoy's novel presents her story. Can my knowledge of Anna be
meaningful, however, or be considered knowledge at all in the
traditional sense (justified true belief) if Anna Karenina is a
non-referring name? Further, how can one's interpretation of her
situation be any more legitimate than anyone else's? Can single
interpretations hold value over time and across cultures? Without the
propositional content used to legitimize the standard analysis of
knowledge, it seems that the knowledge claims we have about the
content of an artwork will never have the same kind of validity.
Whether or not that same kind of validity is required also needs to be
called into question.
The second kind of knowledge claim we can make about art concerns what
we know or believe to be an appropriate or warranted emotional
response to the artwork. We often believe that works of art are only
properly understood if we have a certain kind of emotional response to
them. One problem here, of course, concerns how it is that we know
what kind of response is appropriate to a particular work. On occasion
we talk to friends about a response they had to a particular work of
art that was manifestly different from the one we had. How is it
possible to judge which response is more appropriate or justified?
Even suggesting that one should respond as if a novel, for example,
were to be taken as an account of true events, with responses
following as if the events depicted therein were actually happening or
had happened, does not solve the problem. For one thing, not all
emotional responses to real events are taken as equally justified. For
another, most novels are not meant to be taken as true (despite the
"report model" of emotive response [see Matravers 1997]). The fact
that we do respond emotively to art, and to fiction in particular,
would seem to indicate that there is something in the artwork that is
worth responding to, even if it is not the same thing possessed by the
objects we respond to outside the art world.
The third kind of knowledge claim we can have about art concerns the
sort of information art can provide about the world. That is, how is
it that we can gain real knowledge from fictional or non-real events
or activities? It is widely accepted that art does, in fact, convey
important insight into the way we order and understand the world. It
is also widely acknowledged that art gives a certain degree of meaning
to our lives. Art, and literature in particular, can elicit new
beliefs and even new knowledge about the world. But the concern is
this: fiction is not produced in a way that is reflective of the world
as it actually is. It might be quite dangerous, in fact, for one to
obtain knowledge about human affairs only from fiction. For example,
it could be downright unhealthy for me to get my sense of what it is
like to be in love from romance novels alone.
We can easily be experientially misled by art. The so-called empathic
beliefs, those we gain from experiencing art, should be based on and
enhanced by our broader experience of the world and should not arise
independently of our other beliefs. But here the problem of
justification returns. That is, if the empathic beliefs we gain from
our experience of art actually coincide with our experience of the
real world, then they can pass as empathic knowledge (that is, beliefs
become true and justified when they are connected to other justified
beliefs). The problem is that often the emotions and beliefs that we
adopt empathically turn out to be temporary, since they are not
grounded in concrete experience. Can the experience we have with a
work of art be confirming in and of itself, or must there be another,
external authority to make the experience, or at least the knowledge
gained from the experience, legitimate? It seems that much of what we
learn about the world does come from art, and thus the justificatory
claims to knowledge must be reconsidered.
The propositional theory of knowledge holds that one must have
justified true belief in the content of a proposition in order to have
knowledge. This appears reasonable under normal circumstances, but
seems not to work at all in the case of art. It seems odd, in fact, to
hold that in order to show that one has learned from a work of
fiction, one must show that the work has propositional content of a
general or philosophical nature, or that it provides experience that
cannot be gained in any other way. If we can learn from art, we must
be able to do so in a manner that diverges from the traditional notion
of justified true belief, but that still holds some sort of legitimate
ground.
What kind of justification is needed to ground these potential
knowledge claims that art provides? First of all, we must be at least
somewhat aware of what the new knowledge consists of. Moreover, one's
engagement with the artwork should provide at least some degree of
justification (e.g., I feel pity for Anna Karenina because she is in
an unfortunate set of circumstances that she feels she has no control
over. I am justified in my emotional response to her if I can see that
she is in a truly pitiable situation). It is important to distinguish
learning from art from merely being affected or influenced by it, or
even from being challenged by it. Accounts of knowledge provided by
art should be able to identify clearly what it is about the artwork
itself, qua artwork, which prompts knowledge. A cognitivist account in
particular will require first that the content of the work be
specifiable (what is it we learn?); second, that the demands for
justification be respected; and third, that these accounts appeal
directly to aesthetic experience (Freeland 1997).
5. Art and Moral Knowledge
It would seem that there is indeed something about the content of an
artwork that can be said to be knowledge-producing. But how can that
be so? The artist himself or herself is not the ultimate authority
here, since his/her knowledge or expertise is not necessarily directly
transferred into the artwork. Furthermore, even if it were capable of
being transferred clearly, it is not always the case that observers
will interpret the meaning or significance of a work of art in any
standard way. What the artist knows and how others experience his/her
art are not directly related enough to justify epistemic legitimacy.
It also seems unjustified to assume that there are intrinsic features
of an artwork that are always clearly identifiable. So the knowledge
we gain from art has more to do with the relationship between the art
object and the consumer than anything else.
Another way we might argue for the possibility of gaining knowledge
from art is by rejecting the justified true belief account of
knowledge. There might be more than one way to know, in other words,
and more than one way to learn. One of the most common alternative
suggestions concerning the knowledge that art elicits is that it is
moral knowledge that we gain. These arguments are based primarily of
the presumption that art, and literature especially, can provide
experiential and emotional stimulation, and that moral knowledge is
not simply propositional in nature. It has been objected, however,
that such stimulation is not equal to the propositional content that
more traditional forms of knowledge can provide.
Eileen John (2001) identifies two arguments for the claim that moral
knowledge can be gained from art. The first argument stresses the
capacity of art to give us examples of, and exercise in, certain
morally pertinent activities. Thus, we come across circumstances and
situations in art and literature that we might not otherwise come
across in our daily lives. If we simulate our own reactions to the
situations the work presents us with, we have an idea of how we might
respond or how we would feel (see especially Kendall Walton's theory
of Make-Believe and Simulation Theory). On this view, works of art can
provide us with simulated or "off-line" emotional responses that could
not be achieved otherwise.
The second argument is based on the assumption that we can acquire
specific substantive moral knowledge from art. That is, works of art
are taken to possess the ability to give us imaginative and epistemic
access to certain kinds of experiences relevant to moral knowledge and
judgment. Not only can we respond emotionally to particular moral
situations presented through artworks; we cannot help but find
ourselves morally outraged or saddened by the plights of certain
fictional characters.
6. Additional Objections
Noël Carroll (2002) lays out three additional objections to the
suggestion that art can provide knowledge. The first objection he
calls the "banality argument": the idea that "the significant truths
that many claim art and literature may afford—that is, general truths
about life, usually of an implied nature (as opposed to what is 'true
in the fiction')—are in the main, trivial." Compared to the knowledge
we are able to obtain from propositional statements and arguments, the
kind of things works of literature are can point out are so obvious as
to be useless. Carroll continues by stating that "art and knowledge
are not sources of moral knowledge, but, at best, occasions for
activating antecedently possessed knowledge." The best it seems that
art and literature can do is to point out things we already know and
believe.
The second objection Carroll outlines against the notion that we can
learn from art is what he calls the "no-evidence argument." This
focuses on the fact that not only is anything we gain from art and
literature banal, but for any knowledge to be legitimate, it needs to
be warranted and must be supported by evidence. Few artworks, however,
supply any evidence at all in defense of a particular view. One of the
reasons interpretations seem to legitimately vary so widely is
precisely due to this lack of solid evidence. Moreover, fiction is not
a reliable source of evidence when it comes to literature and other
arts.
Carroll calls the third objection the "no-argument argument." As he
explains, "it maintains that even if artworks contained or implied
general truths, neither the artworks themselves nor the critical
discourse that surrounds them engages in argument, analysis, and
debate in defense of the alleged truths." If artworks do indeed
suggest any sort of knowledge, Carroll points out, it can only be
suggested or implied but never argued for or defended. Furthermore,
the critical discourse that surrounds artworks is not generally
focused on arguing for or against any of the claims made in the
artwork itself.
7. Conclusion
The fact that we do respond to works of art, and that we commonly
believe we can and do learn from such works, is not enough to justify
that learning actually occurs. However, it is enough to make us
examine our presuppositions about what constitutes knowledge, and
perhaps may lead us to reconceive knowledge in such a way that we may
eventually come to understand how it can be gained
non-propositionally.
8. References and Further Reading
* Bender, John. "Art as a Source of Knowledge: Linking Analytic
Aesthetics and Epistemology." In Contemporary Philosophy of Art, ed.
John Bender and Gene Blocker. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1993.
* Carroll, Noël. "Art, Narrative, and Moral Understanding." In
Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, ed. Jerrold
Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
* Carroll, Noël. "Moderate Moralism." British Journal of
Aesthetics 36 (1996): 223-38.
* Carroll, Noël. "The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral
Knowledge." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60.1 (Winter
2002): 3-26.
* Diffey, T.J. "What Can We Learn From Art?" Australasian Journal
of Philosophy 73 (1995): 202-11.
* Freeland, Cynthia. "Art and Moral Knowledge." Philosophical
Topics 25.1 (Spring 1997): 11-36.
* Graham, Gordon. "Value and the Visual Arts." Journal of
Aesthetic Education 28 (1994): 1-14.
* Graham, Gordon. "Learning From Art." British Journal of
Aesthetics 35 (1995): 26-37.
* Harrison, Bernard. "Literature and Cognition." In Encyclopedia
of Aesthetics, ed. Michael Kelly. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998.
* John, Eileen. "Reading Fiction and Conceptual Knowledge:
Philosophical Thought in Literary Context." Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism 56 (1998): 331-48.
* John, Eileen. "Art and Knowledge." The Routledge Companion to
Aesthetics, eds. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes. London:
Routledge, 2001.
* Feagin, Susan. "Paintings and Their Places." Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 73.2 (1995): 260-68.
* Kieran, Matthew. "Art, Imagination, and the Cultivation of
Morals." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54 (1996): 337-51.
* Lamarque, Peter and Stein Olsen. Truth, Fiction, and Literature.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
* Matravers, Derek. "The Report Model versus the Perceptual
Model." In Emotion and the Arts, eds. Mette Hjort and Sue Laver.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 78-92.
* Novitz, David. "Aesthetics and Epistemology." In Encyclopedia of
Aesthetics, ed. Michael Kelly. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
* Nussbaum, Martha. Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and
Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
* Nussbaum, Martha. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and
Public Life. Boston: Beacon Press, 1995.
* Reid, Louis Arnaud. "Art and Knowledge." British Journal of
Aesthetics 25 (1985): 115-24.
* Robinson, Jennifer. "L'Education Sentimentale." Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 73 (1995): 212-26.
* Stolnitz, Jerome. "On the Cognitive Triviality of Art." British
Journal of Aesthetics 32 (July 1992): 191-200.
* Walton, Kendall. Mimesis as Make Believe: On the Foundations of
the Representational Arts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.
* Wilson, Catherine. "Literature and Knowledge." Philosophy 58
(1983): 489-96.
* Young, James O. Art and Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2001.
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