the happy life intended for man by nature as one lived in accordance
with virtue, and, in his Politics, he describes the role that politics
and the political community must play in bringing about the virtuous
life in the citizenry.
The Politics also provides analysis of the kinds of political
community that existed in his time and shows where and how these
cities fall short of the ideal community of virtuous citizens.
Although in some ways we have clearly moved beyond his thought (for
example, his belief in the inferiority of women and his approval of
slavery in at least some circumstances), there remains much in
Aristotle's philosophy that is valuable today.
In particular, his views on the connection between the well-being of
the political community and that of the citizens who make it up, his
belief that citizens must actively participate in politics if they are
to be happy and virtuous, and his analysis of what causes and prevents
revolution within political communities have been a source of
inspiration for many contemporary theorists, especially those unhappy
with the liberal political philosophy promoted by thinkers such as
John Locke and John Stuart Mill.
1. Biography and History
Aristotle's life was primarily that of a scholar. However, like the
other ancient philosophers, it was not the stereotypical ivory tower
existence. His father was court physician to Amyntas III of Macedon,
so Aristotle grew up in a royal household. Aristotle also knew Philip
of Macedon (son of Amyntas III) and there is a tradition that says
Aristotle tutored Philip's son Alexander, who would later be called
"the Great" after expanding the Macedonian Empire all the way to what
is now India. Clearly, Aristotle had significant firsthand experience
with politics, though scholars disagree about how much influence, if
any, this experience had on Aristotle's thought. There is certainly no
evidence that Alexander's subsequent career was much influenced by
Aristotle's teaching, which is uniformly critical of war and conquest
as goals for human beings and which praises the intellectual,
contemplative lifestyle. It is noteworthy that although Aristotle
praises the politically active life, he spent most of his own life in
Athens, where he was not a citizen and would not have been allowed to
participate directly in politics (although of course anyone who wrote
as extensively and well about politics as Aristotle did was likely to
be politically influential).
Aristotle studied under Plato at Plato's Academy in Athens, and
eventually opened a school of his own (the Lyceum) there. As a
scholar, Aristotle had a wide range of interests. He wrote about
meteorology, biology, physics, poetry, logic, rhetoric, and politics
and ethics, among other subjects. His writings on many of these
interests remained definitive for almost two millennia. They remained,
and remain, so valuable in part because of the comprehensiveness of
his efforts. For example, in order to understand political phenomena,
he had his students collect information on the political organization
and history of 158 different cities. The Politics makes frequent
reference to political events and institutions from many of these
cities, drawing on his students' research. Aristotle's theories about
the best ethical and political life are drawn from substantial amounts
of empirical research. These studies, and in particular the
Constitution of Athens, will be discussed in more detail below (Who
Should Rule?). The question of how these writings should be unified
into a consistent whole (if that is even possible) is an open one and
beyond the scope of this article. This article will not attempt to
organize all of Aristotle's work into a coherent whole, but will draw
on different texts as they are necessary to complete one version of
Aristotle's view of politics.
2. The Texts
The most important text for understanding Aristotle's political
philosophy, not surprisingly, is the Politics. However, it is also
important to read Nicomachean Ethics in order to fully understand
Aristotle's political project. This is because Aristotle believed that
ethics and politics were closely linked, and that in fact the ethical
and virtuous life is only available to someone who participates in
politics, while moral education is the main purpose of the political
community. As he says in Nicomachean Ethics at 1099b30, "The end [or
goal] of politics is the best of ends; and the main concern of
politics is to engender a certain character in the citizens and to
make them good and disposed to perform noble actions." Most people
living today in Western societies like the United States, Canada,
Germany, or Australia would disagree with both parts of that
statement. We are likely to regard politics (and politicians) as
aiming at ignoble, selfish ends, such as wealth and power, rather than
the "best end", and many people regard the idea that politics is or
should be primarily concerned with creating a particular moral
character in citizens as a dangerous intrusion on individual freedom,
in large part because we do not agree about what the "best end" is. In
fact, what people in Western societies generally ask from politics and
the government is that they keep each of us safe from other people
(through the provision of police and military forces) so that each of
us can choose and pursue our own ends, whatever they may be. This has
been the case in Western political philosophy at least since John
Locke. Development of individual character is left up to the
individual, with help from family, religion, and other
non-governmental institutions. More will be said about this later, but
the reader should keep in mind that this is an important way in which
our political and ethical beliefs are not Aristotle's. The reader is
also cautioned against immediately concluding from this that Ar
istotle was wrong and we are right. This may be so, but it is
important to understand why, and the contrast between Aristotle's
beliefs and ours can help to bring the strengths and weaknesses of our
own beliefs into greater clarity.
The reference above to "Nicomachean Ethics at 1099b30″ makes use of
what is called Bekker pagination. This refers to the location of
beginning of the cited text in the edition of Aristotle's works
produced by Immanuel Bekker in Berlin in 1831 (in this case, it begins
on page 1099, column b, line 30). Scholars make use of this system for
all of Aristotle's works except the Constitution of Athens (which was
not rediscovered until after 1831) and fragmentary works in order to
be able to refer to the same point in Aristotle's work regardless of
which edition, translation, or language they happen to be working
with. This entry will make use of the Bekker pagination system, and
will also follow tradition and refer to Nicomachean Ethics as simply
Ethics. (There is also a Eudemian Ethics which is almost certainly by
Aristotle (and which shares three of the ten books of the Nicomachean
Ethics) and a work on ethics titled Magna Moralia which has been
attributed to him but which most scholars now believe is not his work.
Regardless, most scholars believe that the Nicomachean Ethics is
Aristotle's fullest and most mature expression of his ethical theory).
The translation is that of Martin Ostwald; see the bibliography for
full information. In addition to the texts listed above, the student
with an interest in Aristotle's political theory may also wish to read
the Rhetoric, which includes observations on ethics and politics in
the context of teaching the reader how to be a more effective speaker,
and the Constitution of Athens, a work attributed to Aristotle, but
which may be by one of his students, which describes the political
history of the city of Athens.
3. Challenges of the Texts
Any honest attempt to summarize and describe Aristotle's political
philosophy must include an acknowledgment that there is no consensus
on many of the most important aspects of that philosophy. Some of the
reasons for this should be mentioned from the outset.
One set of reasons has to do with the text itself and the transmission
of the text from Aristotle's time to ours. The first thing that can
lead to disagreement over Aristotle's beliefs is the fact that the
Politics andEthics are believed by many scholars to be his lecture
notes, for lectures which were intended to be heard only by his own
students. (Aristotle did write for general audiences on these
subjects, probably in dialogue form, but only a few fragments of those
writings remain). This is also one reason why many students have
difficulty reading his work: no teacher's lecture notes ever make
complete sense to anyone else (their meaning can even elude their
author at times). Many topics in the texts are discussed less fully
than we would like, and many things are ambiguous which we wish were
more straightforward. But if Aristotle was lecturing from these
writings, he could have taken care of these problems on the fly as he
lectured, since presumably he knew what he meant, or he could have
responded to requests for clarification or elaboration from his
students.
Secondly, most people who read Aristotle are not reading him in the
original Attic Greek but are instead reading translations. This leads
to further disagreement, because different authors translate Aristotle
differently, and the way in which a particular word is translated can
be very significant for the text as a whole. There is no way to
definitively settle the question of what Aristotle "really meant to
say" in using a particular word or phrase.
Third, the Aristotelian texts we have are not the originals, but
copies, and every time a text gets copied errors creep in (words,
sentences, or paragraphs can get left out, words can be changed into
new words, and so forth). For example, imagine someone writing the
sentence "Ronald Reagan was the lastcompetent president of the United
States." It is copied by hand, and the person making the copy
accidentally writes (or assumes that the author must have written)
"Ronald Reagan was the leastcompetent president of the United States."
If the original is then destroyed, so that only the copy remains,
future generations will read a sentence that means almost exactly the
opposite of what the author intended. It may be clear from the context
that a word has been changed, but then again it may not, and there is
always hesitation in changing the text as we have it. In addition,
although nowadays it is unacceptable to modify someone else's work
without clearly denoting the changes, this is a relatively recent
development and there are portions of Aristotle's texts which scholars
believe were added by later writers. This, too, complicates our
understanding of Aristotle.
Finally, there are a number of controversies related to the text of
the Politics in particular. These controversies cannot be discussed
here, but should be mentioned. For more detail consult the works
listed in the "Suggestions for further reading" below. First, there is
disagreement about whether the books of the Politics are in the order
that Aristotle intended. Carnes Lord and others have argued based on a
variety of textual evidence that books 7 and 8 were intended by
Aristotle to follow book 3. Rearranging the text in this way would
have the effect of joining the early discussion of the origins of
political life and the city, and the nature of political justice, with
the discussion of the ideal city and the education appropriate for it,
while leaving together books 4-6 which are primarily concerned with
existing varieties of regimes and how they are preserved and destroyed
and moving them to the conclusion of the book. Second, some authors,
notably Werner Jaeger, have argued that the different focus and
orientation of the different portions of the Politics is a result of
Aristotle writing them at different times, reflecting his changing
interests and orientation towards Plato's teachings. The argument is
that at first Aristotle stuck very closely to the attitudes and ideas
of his teacher Plato, and only later developed his own more empirical
approach. Thus any difficulties that there may be in integrating the
different parts of the Politicsarise from the fact that they were not
meant to be integrated and were written at different times and with
different purposes. Third, the Politics as we have it appears to be
incomplete; Book 6 ends in the middle of a sentence and Book 8 in the
middle of a discussion. There are also several places in the
Politicswhere Aristotle promises to consider a topic further later but
does not do so in the text as we have i t (for example, at the end of
Book II, Chapter 8). It is possible that Aristotle never finished
writing it; more likely there is material missing as a result of
damage to the scrolls on which it was written. The extent and content
of any missing material is a matter of scholarly debate.
Fortunately, the beginning student of Aristotle will not need to
concern themselves much with these problems. It is, however, important
to get a quality translation of the text, which provides an
introduction, footnotes, a glossary, and a bibliography, so that the
reader is aware of places where, for example, there seems to be
something missing from the text, or a word can have more than one
meaning, or there are other textual issues. These will not always be
the cheapest or most widely available translations, but it is
important to get one of them, from a library if need be. Several
suggested editions are listed at the end of this article.
4. Politics and Ethics
In Book Six of the Ethics Aristotle says that all knowledge can be
classified into three categories: theoretical knowledge, practical
knowledge, and productive knowledge. Put simply, these kinds of
knowledge are distinguished by their aims: theoretical knowledge aims
at contemplation, productive knowledge aims at creation, and practical
knowledge aims at action. Theoretical knowledge involves the study of
truth for its own sake; it is knowledge about things that are
unchanging and eternal, and includes things like the principles of
logic, physics, and mathematics (at the end of the Ethics Aristotle
says that the most excellent human life is one lived in pursuit of
this type of knowledge, because this knowledge brings us closest to
the divine). The productive and practical sciences, in contrast,
address our daily needs as human beings, and have to do with things
that can and do change. Productive knowledge means, roughly, know-how;
the knowledge of how to make a table or a house or a pair of shoes or
how to write a tragedy would be examples of this kind of knowledge.
This entry is concerned with practical knowledge, which is the
knowledge of how to live and act. According to Aristotle, it is the
possession and use of practical knowledge that makes it possible to
live a good life. Ethics and politics, which are the practical
sciences, deal with human beings as moral agents. Ethics is primarily
about the actions of human beings as individuals, and politics is
about the actions of human beings in communities, although it is
important to remember that for Aristotle the two are closely linked
and each influences the other.
The fact that ethics and politics are kinds of practical knowledge has
several important consequences. First, it means that Aristotle
believes that mere abstract knowledge of ethics and politics is
worthless. Practical knowledge is only useful if we act on it; we must
act appropriately if we are to be moral. He says at Ethics 1103b25:
"The purpose of the present study [of morality] is not, as it is in
other inquiries, the attainment of theoretical knowledge: we are not
conducting this inquiry in order to know what virtue is, but in order
to become good, else there would be no advantage in studying it."
Second, according to Aristotle, only some people can beneficially
study politics. Aristotle believes that women and slaves (or at least
those who are slaves by nature) can never benefit from the study of
politics, and also should not be allowed to participate in politics,
about which more will be said later. But there is also a limitation on
political study based on age, as a result of the connection between
politics and experience: "A young man is not equipped to be a student
of politics; for he has no experience in the actions which life
demands of him, and these actions form the basis and subject matter of
the discussion" (Ethics 1095a2). Aristotle adds that young men will
usually act on the basis of their emotions, rather than according to
reason, and since acting on practical knowledge requires the use of
reason, young men are unequipped to study politics for this reason
too. So the study of politics will only be useful to those who have
the experience and the mental discipline to benefit from it, and for
Aristotle this would have been a relatively small percentage of the
population of a city. Even in Athens, the most democratic city in
Greece, no more than 15 percent of the population was ever allowed the
benefits of citizenship, including political participation. Athenian
citizenship was limited to adult males who were not slaves and who had
one parent who was an Athenian citizen (sometimes citizenship was
further restricted to require both parents to be Athenian citizens).
Aristotle does not think this percentage should be increased – if
anything, it should be decreased.
Third, Aristotle distinguishes between practical and theoretical
knowledge in terms of the level of precision that can be attained when
studying them. Political and moral knowledge does not have the same
degree of precision or certainty as mathematics. Aristotle says at
Ethics 1094b14: "Problems of what is noble and just, which politics
examines, present so much variety and irregularity that some people
believe that they exist only by convention and not by
nature….Therefore, in a discussion of such subjects, which has to
start with a basis of this kind, we must be satisfied to indicate the
truth with a rough and general sketch: when the subject and the basis
of a discussion consist of matters that hold good only as a general
rule, but not always, the conclusions reached must be of the same
order." Aristotle does not believe that the noble and the just exist
only by convention, any more than, say, the principles of geometry do.
However, the principles of geometry are fixed and unchanging. The
definition of a point, or a line, or a plane, can be given precisely,
and once this definition is known, it is fixed and unchanging for
everyone. However, the definition of something like justice can only
be known generally; there is no fixed and unchanging definition that
will always be correct. This means that unlike philosophers such as
Hobbes and Kant, Aristotle does not and in fact cannot give us a fixed
set of rules to be followed when ethical and political decisions must
be made. Instead he tries to make his students the kind of men who,
when confronted with any particular ethical or political decision,
will know the correct thing to do, will understand why it is the
correct choice, and will choose to do it for that reason. Such a man
will know the general rules to be followed, but will also know when
and why to deviate from those rules. (I will use "man" and "men" when
referring to citizens so that the reader keeps in mind that Aristotle,
and the Greeks generally, excluded women from political part
icipation. In fact it is not until the mid-19th century that organized
attempts to gain the right to vote for women really get underway, and
even today in the 21st century there are still many countries which
deny women the right to vote or participate in political life).
5. The Importance of Telos
I have already noted the connection between ethics and politics in
Aristotle's thought. The concept that most clearly links the two is
that which Aristotle called telos. A discussion of this concept and
its importance will help the reader make sense of what follows.
Aristotle himself discusses it in Book II, Chapter 3 of the Physics
and Book I, Chapter 3 of the Metaphysics.
The word telos means something like purpose, or goal, or final end.
According to Aristotle, everything has a purpose or final end. If we
want to understand what something is, it must be understood in terms
of that end, which we can discover through careful study. It is
perhaps easiest to understand what a telos is by looking first at
objects created by human beings. Consider a knife. If you wanted to
describe a knife, you would talk about its size, and its shape, and
what it is made out of, among other things. But Aristotle believes
that you would also, as part of your description, have to say that it
is made to cut things. And when you did, you would be describing its
telos. The knife's purpose, or reason for existing, is to cut things.
And Aristotle would say that unless you included that telos in your
description, you wouldn't really have described – or understood – the
knife. This is true not only of things made by humans, but of plants
and animals as well. If you were to fully describe an acorn, you would
include in your description that it will become an oak tree in the
natural course of things – so acorns too have a telos. Suppose you
were to describe an animal, like a thoroughbred foal. You would talk
about its size, say it has four legs and hair, and a tail. Eventually
you would say that it is meant to run fast. This is the horse's telos,
or purpose. If nothing thwarts that purpose, the young horse will
indeed become a fast runner.
Here we are not primarily concerned with the telos of a knife or an
acorn or a foal. What concerns us is the telos of a human being. Just
like everything else that is alive, human beings have a telos. What is
it that human beings are meant by nature to become in the way that
knives are meant to cut, acorns are meant to become oak trees, and
thoroughbred ponies are meant to become race horses? According to
Aristotle, we are meant to become happy. This is nice to hear,
although it isn't all that useful. After all, people find happiness in
many different ways. However, Aristotle says that living happily
requires living a life of virtue. Someone who is not living a life
that is virtuous, or morally good, is also not living a happy life, no
matter what they might think. They are like a knife that will not cut,
an oak tree that is diseased and stunted, or a racehorse that cannot
run. In fact they are worse, since they have chosen the life they lead
in a way that a knife or an acorn or a horse cannot.
Someone who does live according to virtue, who chooses to do the right
thing because it is the right thing to do, is living a life that
flourishes; to borrow a phrase, they are being all that they can be by
using all of their human capacities to their fullest. The most
important of these capacities is logos - a word that means "speech"
and also means "reason" (it gives us the English word "logic"). Human
beings alone have the ability to speak, and Aristotle says that we
have been given that ability by nature so that we can speak and reason
with each other to discover what is right and wrong, what is good and
bad, and what is just and unjust.
Note that human beings discover these things rather than creating
them. We do not get to decide what is right and wrong, but we do get
to decide whether we will do what is right or what is wrong, and this
is the most important decision we make in life. So too is the happy
life: we do not get to decide what really makes us happy, although we
do decide whether or not to pursue the happy life. And this is an
ongoing decision. It is not made once and for all, but must be made
over and over again as we live our lives. Aristotle believes that it
is not easy to be virtuous, and he knows that becoming virtuous can
only happen under the right conditions. Just as an acorn can only
fulfill its telos if there is sufficient light, the right kind of
soil, and enough water (among other things), and a horse can only
fulfill its telos if there is sufficient food and room to run (again,
among other things), an individual can only fulfill their telos and be
a moral and happy human being within a well constructed political
community. The community brings about virtue through education and
through laws which prescribe certain actions and prohibit others.
And here we see the link between ethics and politics in a different
light: the role of politics is to provide an environment in which
people can live fully human, ethical, and happy lives, and this is the
kind of life which makes it possible for someone to participate in
politics in the correct way. As Aristotle says at Ethics1103a30: "We
become just by the practice of just actions, self-controlled by
exercising self-control, and courageous by performing acts of
courage….Lawgivers make the citizens good by inculcating [good] habits
in them, and this is the aim of every lawgiver; if he does not succeed
in doing that, his legislation is a failure. It is in this that a good
constitution differs from a bad one." This is not a view that would be
found in political science textbooks today, but for Aristotle it is
the central concern of the study of politics: how can we discover and
put into practice the political institutions that will develop virtue
in the citizens to the greatest possible extent?
6. The Text of the Politics
Having laid out the groundwork for Aristotle's thought, we are now in
a position to look more closely at the text of the Politics. The
translation we will use is that of Carnes Lord, which can be found in
the list of suggested readings. This discussion is by no means
complete; there is much of interest and value in Aristotle's political
writings that will not be considered here. Again, the reader is
encouraged to investigate the list of suggested readings. However, the
main topics and problems of Aristotle's work will be included. The
discussion will, to the extent possible, follow the organization of
the Politics.
7. The Politics, Book I
a. The Purpose of the City
Aristotle begins the Politics by defining its subject, the city or
political partnership. Doing so requires him to explain the purpose of
the city. (The Greek word for city is polis, which is the word that
gives us English words like "politics" and "policy"). Aristotle says
that "It is clear that all partnerships aim at some good, and that the
partnership that is most authoritative of all and embraces all the
others does so particularly, and aims at the most authoritative good
of all. This is what is called the city or the political partnership"
(1252a3) (See also III.12). In Greece in Aristotle's time the
important political entities were cities, which controlled surrounding
territories that were farmed. It is important to remember that the
city was not subordinate to a state or nation, the way that cities are
today; it was sovereign over the territory that it controlled. To
convey this, some translations use the word "city-state" in place of
the world "polis." Although none of us today lives in a polis , we
should not be too quick to dismiss Aristotle's observations on the way
of life of the polis as irrelevant to our own political partnerships.
Notice that Aristotle does not define the political community in the
way that we generally would, by the laws that it follows or by the
group that holds power or as an entity controlling a particular
territory. Instead he defines it as a partnership. The citizens of a
political community are partners, and as with any other partnership
they pursue a common good. In the case of the city it is the most
authoritative or highest good. The most authoritative and highest good
of all, for Aristotle, is the virtue and happiness of the citizens,
and the purpose of the city is to make it possible for the citizens to
achieve this virtue and happiness. When discussing the ideal city, he
says "[A] city is excellent, at any rate, by its citizens' – those
sharing in the regime – being excellent; and in our case all the
citizens share in the regime" (1332a34). In achieving the virtue that
is individual excellence, each of them will fulfill his telos. Indeed,
it is the shared pursuit of virtue that makes a city a city.
As I have already noted at the beginning of this text, he says in the
Ethics at 1099b30: "The end of politics is the best of ends; and the
main concern of politics is to engender a certain character in the
citizens and to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions."
As has been mentioned, most people today would not see this as the
main concern of politics, or even a legitimate concern. Certainly
almost everyone wants to see law-abiding citizens, but it is
questionable that changing the citizens' character or making them
morally good is part of what government should do. Doing so would
require far more governmental control over citizens than most people
in Western societies are willing to allow.
Having seen Aristotle's definition of the city and its purpose, we
then get an example of Aristotle's usual method of discussing
political topics. He begins by examining opinions which are "generally
accepted," which means, as he says in the Topics at 100b21, "are
accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers – i.e.
by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of
them" on the grounds that any such opinions are likely to have at
least some truth to them. These opinions (the Greek word isendoxa),
however, are not completely true. They must be systematically examined
and modified by scholars of politics before the truths that are part
of these opinions are revealed. Because Aristotle uses this method of
examining the opinions of others to arrive at truth, the reader must
be careful to pay attention to whether a particular argument or belief
is Aristotle's or not. In many cases he is setting out an argument in
order to challenge it. It can be difficult to tell when Aristotle is
arguing in his own voice and when he is considering the opinions of
others, but the reader must carefully make this distinction if they
are to understand Aristotle's teachings. (It has also been suggested
that Aristotle's method should be seen as an example of how political
discussion ought to be conducted: a variety of viewpoints and
arguments are presented, and the final decision is arrived at through
a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of these viewpoints
and arguments). For a further discussion of Aristotle's methodology,
see his discussion of reasoning in general and dialectical reasoning
in particular in the Topics. Further examples of his approach can be
found in Ethics I.4 and VII.1.
In this case, Aristotle takes up the popular opinion that political
rule is really the same as other kinds of rule: that of kings over
their subjects, of fathers over their wives and children, and of
masters over their slaves. This opinion, he says, is mistaken. In
fact, each of these kinds of rule is different. To see why, we must
consider how the city comes into being, and it is to this that
Aristotle next turns in Book I, Chapter 2.
b. How the City Comes Into Being
Here Aristotle tells the story of how cities have historically come
into being. The first partnerships among human beings would have been
between "persons who cannot exist without one another" (1252a27).
There are two pairs of people for whom this is the case. One pair is
that of male and female, for the sake of reproduction. This seems
reasonable enough to the modern reader. The other pair, however, is
that of "the naturally ruling and ruled, on account of preservation"
(1252a30). Here Aristotle is referring to slavery. By "preservation"
he means that the naturally ruling master and naturally ruled slave
need each other if they are to preserve themselves; slavery is a kind
of partnership which benefits both master and slave. We will see how
later. For now, he simply says that these pairs of people come
together and form a household, which exists for the purpose of meeting
the needs of daily life (such as food, shelter, clothing, and so
forth). The family is only large enough to provide for the bare
necessities of life, sustaining its members' lives and allowing for
the reproduction of the species.
Over time, the family expands, and as it does it will come into
contact with other families. Eventually a number of such families
combine and form a village. Villages are better than families because
they are more self-sufficient. Because villages are larger than
families, people can specialize in a wider array of tasks and can
develop skills in things like cooking, medicine, building, soldiering,
and so forth which they could not develop in a smaller group. So the
residents of a village will live more comfortable lives, with access
to more goods and services, than those who only live in families.
The significant change in human communities, however, comes when a
number of villages combine to form a city. A city is not just a big
village, but is fundamentally different: "The partnership arising from
[the union of] several villages that is complete is the city. It
reaches a level of full self-sufficiency, so to speak; and while
coming into being for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of
living well" (1252b27). Although the founders of cities create them
for the sake of more comfortable lives, cities are unique in making it
possible for people to live well. Today we tend to think of "living
well" as living a life of comfort, family satisfaction, and
professional success, surrounded by nice things. But this is not what
Aristotle means by "living well". As we have seen, for Aristotle
"living well" means leading a life of happiness and virtue, and by so
doing fulfilling one's telos. Life in the city, in Aristotle's view,
is therefore necessary for anyone who wishes to be completely human.
(His particular concern is with the free men who are citizens). "He
who is without a city through nature rather than chance is either a
mean sort or superior to man," Aristotle says (1253a3), and adds "One
who is incapable of participating or who is in need of nothing through
being self-sufficient is no part of a city, and so is either a beast
or a god" (1253a27). Humans are not capable of becoming gods, but they
are capable of becoming beasts, and in fact the worst kind of beasts:
"For just as man is the best of the animals when completed, when
separated from law and adjudication he is the worst of all" (1253a30).
Outside of the context of life in a properly constructed city, human
happiness and well-being is impossible. Even here at the very
beginning of the Politics Aristotle is showing the link between ethics
and politics and the importance of a well-constructed city in making
it possible for the citizens to live well.
There is therefore a sense in which the city "is prior by nature to
the household and to each of us" (1253a19). He compares the
individual's relationship with the city to the relationship of a part
of the body to the whole body. The destruction of the whole body would
also mean the destruction of each of its parts; "if the whole [body]
is destroyed there will not be a foot or a hand" (1253a20). And just
as a hand is not able to survive without being attached to a
functioning body, so too an individual cannot survive without being
attached to a city. Presumably Aristotle also means to imply that the
reverse is not true; a body can survive the loss of a foot or a hand,
although not without consequence. Thus the individual needs the city
more than the city needs any of its individual citizens; as Aristotle
says in Book 8 before beginning his discussion of the desirable
education for the city's children, "one ought not even consider that a
citizen belongs to himself, but rather that all belong to the city;
for each individual is a part of the city" (1337a26).
If the history that he has described is correct, Aristotle points out,
then the city is natural, and not purely an artificial human
construction, since we have established that the first partnerships
which make up the family are driven by natural impulses: "Every city,
therefore, exists by nature, if such also are the first partnerships.
For the city is their end….[T]he city belongs among the things that
exist by nature, and…man is by nature a political animal"
(1252b30-1253a3). From the very first partnerships of male and female
and master and slave, nature has been aiming at the creation of
cities, because cities are necessary for human beings to express their
capacities and virtues at their best, thus fulfilling their potential
and moving towards such perfection as is possible for human beings.
While most people today would not agree that nature has a plan for
individual human beings, a particular community, or humanity as a
whole (although many people would ascribe such a plan to a god or
gods), Aristotle believes that nature does indeed have such a plan,
and human beings have unique attributes that when properly used make
it possible for us to fulfill that plan. What are those attributes?
c. Man, the Political Animal
That man is much more a political animal than any kind of bee or
any herd animal is clear. For, as we assert, nature does nothing in
vain, and man alone among the animals has speech….[S]peech serves to
reveal the advantageous and the harmful and hence also the just and
unjust. For it is peculiar to man as compared to the other animals
that he alone has a perception of good and bad and just and unjust and
other things of this sort; and partnership in these things is what
makes a household and a city (1253a8).
Like bees and herd animals, human beings live together in groups.
Unlike bees or herd animals, humans have the capacity for speech – or,
in the Greek, logos. As we have seen, logos means not only speech but
also reason. Here the linkage between speech and reason is clear: the
purpose of speech, a purpose assigned to men by nature, is to reveal
what is advantageous and harmful, and by doing so to reveal what is
good and bad, just and unjust. This knowledge makes it possible for
human beings to live together, and at the same time makes it possible
for us to pursue justice as part of the virtuous lives we are meant to
live. Other animals living in groups, such as bees, goats, and cows,
do not have the ability to speak or to reason as Aristotle uses those
terms. Of course, they do not need this ability. They are able to live
together without determining what is just and unjust or creating laws
to enforce justice among themselves. Human beings, for better or
worse, cannot do this.
Although nature brings us together – we are by nature political
animals – nature alone does not give us all of what we need to live
together: "[T]here is in everyone by nature an impulse toward this
sort of partnership. And yet the one who first constituted [a city] is
responsible for the greatest of goods" [1253a29]. We must figure out
how to live together for ourselves through the use of reason and
speech, discovering justice and creating laws that make it possible
for human community to survive and for the individuals in it to live
virtuous lives. A group of people that has done this is a city: "[The
virtue of] justice is a thing belonging to the city. For adjudication
is an arrangement of the political partnership, and adjudication is
judgment as to what is just" (1253a38). And in discovering and living
according to the right laws, acting with justice and exercising the
virtues that allow human society to function, we make possible not
only the success of the political community but also the flourishing
of our own individual virtue and happiness. Without the city and its
justice, human beings are the worst of animals, just as we are the
best when we are completed by the right kind of life in the city. And
it is the pursuit of virtue rather than the pursuit of wealth or
security or safety or military strength that is the most important
element of a city: "The political partnership must be regarded,
therefore, as being for the sake of noble actions, not for the sake of
living together" (1281a1).
d. Slavery
Having described the basic parts of the city, Aristotle returns in
Chapter 3 of Book I to a discussion of the household, beginning with
the matter of slavery, including the question of whether slavery is
just (and hence an acceptable institution) or not. This, for most
contemporary readers is one of the two most offensive portions of
Aristotle's moral and political thought (the other is his treatment of
women, about which more will be said below). For most people today, of
course, the answer to this is obvious: slavery is not just, and in
fact is one of the greatest injustices and moral crimes that it is
possible to commit. (Although it is not widely known, there are still
large numbers of people held in slavery throughout the world at the
beginning of the 21st century. It is easy to believe that people in
the "modern world" have put a great deal of moral distance between
themselves and the less enlightened people in the past, but it is also
easy to overestimate that distance).
In Aristotle's time most people – at least the ones that were not
themselves slaves – would also have believed that this question had an
obvious answer, if they had asked the question at all: of course
slavery is just. Virtually every ancient Mediterranean culture had
some form of the institution of slavery. Slaves were usually of two
kinds: either they had at one point been defeated in war, and the fact
that they had been defeated meant that they were inferior and meant to
serve, or else they were the children of slaves, in which case their
inferiority was clear from their inferior parentage. Aristotle himself
says that the sort of war that involves hunting "those human beings
who are naturally suited to be ruled but [are] unwilling…[is] by
nature just" (1256b25). What is more, the economies of the Greek
city-states rested on slavery, and without slaves (and women) to do
the productive labor, there could be no leisure for men to engage in
more intellectual lifestyles. The greatness of Athenian plays,
architecture, sculpture, and philosophy could not have been achieved
without the institution of slavery. Therefore, as a practical matter,
regardless of the arguments for or against it, slavery was not going
to be abolished in the Greek world. Aristotle's willingness to
consider the justice of slavery, however we might see it, was in fact
progressive for the time. It is perhaps also worth noting that
Aristotle's will specified that his slaves should be freed upon his
death. This is not to excuse Aristotle or those of his time who
supported slavery, but it should be kept in mind so as to give
Aristotle a fair hearing.
Before considering Aristotle's ultimate position on the justness of
slavery – for who, and under what circumstances, slavery is
appropriate – it must be pointed out that there is a great deal of
disagreement about what that position is. That Aristotle believes
slavery to be just and good for both master and slave in some
circumstances is undeniable. That he believes that some people who are
currently enslaved are not being held in slavery according to justice
is also undeniable (this would apparently also mean that there are
people who should be enslaved but currently are not). How we might
tell which people belong in which group, and what Aristotle believes
the consequences of his beliefs about slavery ought to be, are more
difficult problems.
Remember that in his discussion of the household, Aristotle has said
that slavery serves the interest of both the master and the slave. Now
he tells us why: "those who are as different [from other men] as the
soul from the body or man from beast – and they are in this state if
their work is the use of the body, and if this is the best that can
come from them – are slaves by nature….For he is a slave by nature who
is capable of belonging to another – which is also why he belongs to
another – and who participates in reason only to the extent of
perceiving it, but does not have it" (1254b16-23). Notice again the
importance of logos – reason and speech. Those who are slaves by
nature do not have the full ability to reason. (Obviously they are not
completely helpless or unable to reason; in the case of slaves
captured in war, for example, the slaves were able to sustain their
lives into adulthood and organize themselves into military forces.
Aristotle also promises a discussion of "why it is better to hold out
freedom as a reward for all slaves" (1330a30) which is not in the
Politics as we have it, but if slaves were not capable of reasoning
well enough to stay alive it would not be a good thing to free them).
They are incapable of fully governing their own lives, and require
other people to tell them what to do. Such people should be set to
labor by the people who have the ability to reason fully and order
their own lives. Labor is their proper use; Aristotle refers to slaves
as "living tools" at I.4. Slaves get the guidance and instructions
that they must have to live, and in return they provide the master
with the benefits of their physical labor, not least of which is the
free time that makes it possible for the master to engage in politics
and philosophy.
One of the themes running through Aristotle's thought that most people
would reject today is the idea that a life of labor is demeaning and
degrading, so that those who must work for a living are not able to be
as virtuous as those who do not have to do such work. Indeed,
Aristotle says that when the master can do so he avoids labor even to
the extent of avoiding the oversight of those who must engage in it:
"[F]or those to whom it is open not to be bothered with such things
[i.e. managing slaves], an overseer assumes this prerogative, while
they themselves engage in politics or philosophy" (1255b35).
This would seem to legitimate slavery, and yet there are two
significant problems.
First, Aristotle points out that although nature would like us to be
able to differentiate between who is meant to be a slave and who is
meant to be a master by making the difference in reasoning capacity
visible in their outward appearances, it frequently does not do so. We
cannot look at people's souls and distinguish those who are meant to
rule from those who are meant to be ruled – and this will also cause
problems when Aristotle turns to the question of who has a just claim
to rule in the city.
Second, in Chapter Six, Aristotle points out that not everyone
currently held in slavery is in fact a slave by nature. The argument
that those who are captured in war are inferior in virtue cannot, as
far as Aristotle is concerned, be sustained, and the idea that the
children of slaves are meant to be slaves is also wrong: "[T]hey claim
that from the good should come someone good, just as from a human
being comes from a human being and a beast from beasts. But while
nature wishes to do this, it is often unable to" (1255b3). We are left
with the position that while some people are indeed slaves by nature,
and that slavery is good for them, it is extremely difficult to find
out who these people are, and that therefore it is not the case that
slavery is automatically just either for people taken in war or for
children of slaves, though sometimes it is (1256b23). In saying this,
Aristotle was undermining the legitimacy of the two most significant
sources of slaves. If Aristotle's personal life is relevant, while he
himself owned slaves, he was said to have freed them upon his death.
Whether this makes Aristotle's position on slavery more acceptable or
less so is left to the reader to decide.
In Chapter 8 of Book I Aristotle says that since we have been talking
about household possessions such as slaves we might as well continue
this discussion. The discussion turns to "expertise in household
management." The Greek word for "household" is oikos, and it is the
source of our word "economics." In Aristotle's day almost all
productive labor took place within the household, unlike today, in
modern capitalist societies, when it mostly takes place in factories,
offices, and other places specifically developed for such activity.
Aristotle uses the discussion of household management to make a
distinction between expertise in managing a household and expertise in
business. The former, Aristotle says, is important both for the
household and the city; we must have supplies available of the things
that are necessary for life, such as food, clothing, and so forth, and
because the household is natural so too is the science of household
management, the job of which is to maintain the household. The latter,
however, is potentially dangerous. This, obviously, is another major
difference between Aristotle and contemporary Western societies, which
respect and admire business expertise, and encourage many of our
citizens to acquire and develop such expertise. For Aristotle,
however, expertise in business is not natural, but "arises rather
through a certain experience and art" (1257a5). It is on account of
expertise in business that "there is held to be no limit to wealth and
possessions" (1257a1). This is a problem because some people are led
to pursue wealth without limit, and the choice of such a life, while
superficially very attractive, does not lead to virtue and real
happiness. It leads some people to "proceed on the supposition that
they should either preserve or increase without limit their property
in money. The cause of this state is that they are serious about
living, but not about living well; and since that desire of theirs is
without limit, they also desire what is productive of unlimited
things" (1257b38).
Aristotle does not entirely condemn wealth – it is necessary for
maintaining the household and for providing the opportunity to develop
one's virtue. For example, generosity is one of the virtues listed in
the Ethics, but it is impossible to be generous unless one has
possessions to give away. But Aristotle strongly believes that we must
not lose sight of the fact that wealth is to be pursued for the sake
of living a virtuous life, which is what it means to live well, rather
than for its own sake. (So at 1258b1 he agrees with those who object
to the lending of money for interest, upon which virtually the entire
modern global economy is based). Someone who places primary importance
on money and the bodily satisfactions that it can buy is not engaged
in developing their virtue and has chosen a life which, however it may
seem from the outside or to the person living it, is not a life of
true happiness.
This is still another difference between Aristotle and contemporary
Western societies. For many if not most people in such societies, the
pursuit of wealth without limit is seen as not only acceptable but
even admirable. At the same time, many people reject the emphasis
Aristotle places on the importance of political participation. Many
liberal democracies fail to get even half of their potential voters to
cast a ballot at election time, and jury duty, especially in the
United States, is often looked on as a burden and waste of time,
rather than a necessary public service that citizens should willingly
perform. In Chapter 11, Aristotle notes that there is a lot more to be
said about enterprise in business, but "to spend much time on such
things is crude" (1258b35). Aristotle believes that we ought to be
more concerned with other matters; moneymaking is beneath the
attention of the virtuous man. (In this Aristotle is in agreement with
the common opinion of Athenian aristocrats). He concludes this
discussion with a story about Thales the philosopher using his
knowledge of astronomy to make a great deal of money, "thus showing
how easy it is for philosophers to become wealthy if they so wish, but
it is not this they are serious about" (1259a16). Their intellectual
powers, which could be turned to wealth, are being used in other,
better ways to develop their humanity.
In the course of discussing the various ways of life open to human
beings, Aristotle notes that "If, then, nature makes nothing that is
incomplete or purposeless, nature must necessarily have made all of
these [i.e. all plants and animals] for the sake of human beings"
(1256b21). Though not a directly political statement, it does
emphasize Aristotle's belief that there are many hierarchies in
nature, as well as his belief that those who are lower in the natural
hierarchy should be under the command of those who are higher.
e. Women
In Chapter 12, after the discussion of business expertise has been
completed, Aristotle returns to the subject of household rule, and
takes up the question of the proper forms of rule over women and
children. As with the master's rule over the slave, and humanity's
rule over plants and other animals, Aristotle defines these kinds of
rule in terms of natural hierarchies: "[T]he male, unless constituted
in some respect contrary to nature, is by nature more expert at
leading than the female, and the elder and complete than the younger
and incomplete" (1259a41). This means that it is natural for the male
to rule: "[T]he relation of male to female is by nature a relation of
superior to inferior and ruler to ruled" (1245b12). And just as with
the rule of the master over the slave, the difference here is one of
reason: "The slave is wholly lacking the deliberative element; the
female has it but it lacks authority; the child has it but it is
incomplete" (1260a11).
There is a great deal of scholarly debate about what the phrase "lacks
authority" means in this context. Aristotle does not elaborate on it.
Some have suggested that it means not that women's reason is inferior
to that of men but that women lack the ability to make men do what
they want, either because of some innate psychological characteristic
(they are not aggressive and/or assertive enough) or because of the
prevailing culture in Greece at the time. Others suggest that it means
that women's emotions are ultimately more influential in determining
their behavior than reason is so that reason lacks authority over what
a woman does. This question cannot be settled here. I will simply
point out the vicious circle in which women were trapped in ancient
Greece (and still are in many cultures). The Greeks believed that
women are inferior to men (or at least those Greeks who wrote
philosophy, plays, speeches, and so forth did. These people, of
course, were all men. What Greek women thought of this belief is
impossible to say). This belief means that women are denied access to
certain areas of life (such as politics). Denying them access to these
spheres means that they fail to develop the knowledge and skills to
become proficient in them. This lack of knowledge and skills then
becomes evidence to reinforce the original belief that they are
inferior.
What else does Aristotle have to say about the rule of men over women?
He says that the rule of the male over the female and that of the
father over children are different in form from the rule of masters
over slaves. Aristotle places the rule of male over female in the
household in the context of the husband over the wife (female children
who had not yet been married would have been ruled by their father.
Marriage for girls in Athens typically took place at the age of
thirteen or fourteen). Aristotle says at 1259a40 that the wife is to
be ruled in political fashion. We have not yet seen what political
rule looks like, but here Aristotle notes several of its important
features, one of which is that it usually involves "alternation in
ruling and being ruled" (1259b2), and another is that it involves rule
among those who "tend by their nature to be on an equal footing and to
differ in nothing" (1259b5). In this case, however, the husband does
not alternate rule with the wife but instead always rules. Apparently
the husband is to treat his wife as an equal to the degree that it is
possible to do so, but must retain ultimate control over household
decisions.
Women have their own role in the household, preserving what the man
acquires. However, women do not participate in politics, since their
reason lacks the authority that would allow them to do so, and in
order to properly fulfill this role the wife must pursue her own
telos. This is not the same as that of a man, but as with a man nature
intends her to achieve virtues of the kind that are available to her:
"It is thus evident that…the moderation of a woman and a man is not
the same, nor their courage or justice…but that there is a ruling and
a serving courage, and similarly with the other virtues" (1260a19).
Unfortunately Aristotle has very little to say about what women's
virtues look like, how they are to be achieved, or how women should be
educated. But it is clear that Aristotle believes that as with the
master's superiority to the slave, the man's superiority to a woman is
dictated by nature and cannot be overcome by human laws, customs, or
beliefs.
Aristotle concludes the discussion of household rule, and the first
book of the Politics, by stating that the discussion here is not
complete and "must necessarily be addressed in the [discourses]
connected with the regimes" (1260a11). This is the case because both
women and children "must necessarily be educated looking to the
regime, at least if it makes any difference with a view to the city's
being excellent that both its children and its women are excellent.
But it necessarily makes a difference…" (1260a14). "Regime" is one of
the ways to translate the Greek word politeia, which is also often
translated as "constitution" or "political system." Although there is
some controversy about how best to translate this word, I will use the
word "regime" throughout this article. The reader should keep in mind
that if the word "constitution" is used this does not mean a written
constitution of the sort that most contemporary nation-states employ.
Instead, Aristotle uses politeia (however it is translated) to mean
the way the state is organized, what offices there are, who is
eligible to hold them, how they are selected, and so forth. All of
these things depend on the group that holds political power in the
city. For example, sometimes power is held by one man who rules in the
interest of the city as a whole; this is the kind of regime called
monarchy. If power is held by the wealthy who rule for their own
benefit, then the regime is an oligarchy.
We will have much more to say later on the topic of regimes. Here
Aristotle is introducing another important idea which he will develop
later: the idea that the people living under a regime, including the
women and children, must be taught to believe in the principles that
underlie that regime. (In Book II, Chapter 9, Aristotle severely
criticizes the Spartan regime for its failure to properly educate the
Spartan women and shows the negative consequences this has had for the
Spartan regime). For a monarchy to last, for example, the people must
believe in the rightness of monarchical rule and the principles which
justify it. Therefore it is important for the monarch to teach the
people these principles and beliefs. In Books IV-VI Aristotle develops
in much more detail what the principles of the different regimes are,
and the Politics concludes with a discussion of the kind of education
that the best regime ought to provide its citizens.
8. The Politics, Book II
"Cities…that are held to be in a fine condition" In Book II, Aristotle
changes his focus from the household to the consideration of regimes
that are "in use in some of the cities that are said to be well
managed and any others spoken about by certain persons that are held
to be in a fine condition" (1260a30). This examination of existing
cities must be done both in order to find out what those cities do
properly, so that their successes can be imitated, and to find out
what they do improperly so that we can learn from their mistakes. This
study and the use of the knowledge it brings remains one of the
important tasks of political science. Merely imitating an existing
regime, no matter how excellent its reputation, is not sufficient.
This is the case "because those regimes now available are in fact not
in a fine condition" (1260a34). In order to create a better regime we
must study the imperfect ones found in the real world. He will do this
again on a more theoretical level in Books IV-VI. We should also
examine the ideal regimes proposed by other thinkers. As it turns out,
however fine these regimes are in theory, they cannot be put into
practice, and this is obviously reason enough not to adopt them.
Nevertheless, the ideas of other thinkers can assist us in our search
for knowledge. Keep in mind that the practical sciences are not about
knowledge for its own sake: unless we put this knowledge to use in
order to improve the citizens and the city, the study engaged in by
political science is pointless. We will not consider all the details
of the different regimes Aristotle describes, but some of them are
important enough to examine here.
a. What Kind of Partnership Is a City?
Aristotle begins his exploration of these regimes with the question of
the degree to which the citizens in a regime should be partners.
Recall that he opened the Politics with the statement that the city is
a partnership, and in fact the most authoritative partnership. The
citizens of a particular city clearly share something, because it is
sharing that makes a partnership. Consider some examples of
partnerships: business partners share a desire for wealth;
philosophers share a desire for knowledge; drinking companions share a
desire for entertainment; the members of a hockey team share a desire
to win their game.
So what is it that citizens share? This is an important question for
Aristotle, and he chooses to answer this question in the context of
Socrates' imagined community in Plato's dialogue The Republic.
Aristotle has already said that the regime is a partnership in
adjudication and justice. But is it enough that the people of a city
have a shared understanding of what justice means and what the laws
require, or is the political community a partnership in more than
these things? Today the answer would probably be that these things are
sufficient – a group of people sharing territory and laws is not far
from how most people would define the modern state. In the Republic,
Socrates argues that the city should be unified to the greatest degree
possible. The citizens, or at least those in the ruling class, ought
to share everything, including property, women, and children. There
should be no private families and no private property. But this,
according to Aristotle, is too much sharing. While the city is clearly
a kind of unity, it is a unity that must derive from a multitude.
Human beings are unavoidably different, and this difference, as we saw
earlier, is the reason cities were formed in the first place, because
difference within the city allows for specialization and greater
self-sufficiency. Cities are preserved not by complete unity and
similarity but by "reciprocal equality," and this principle is
especially important in cities where "persons are free and equal." In
such cities "all cannot rule at the same time, but each rules for a
year or according to some other arrangement or period of time. In this
way, then, it results that all rule…" (1261a30). This topic, the
alternation of rule in cities where the citizens are free and equal,
is an important part of Aristotle's thought, and we will return to it
later.
There would be another drawback to creating a city in which everything
is held in common. Aristotle notes that people value and care for what
is their own: "What belongs in common to the most people is accorded
the least care: they take thought for their own things above all, and
less about things common, or only so much as falls to each
individually" (1261b32). (Contemporary social scientists call this a
problem of "collective goods"). Therefore to hold women and property
in common, as Socrates proposes, would be a mistake. It would weaken
attachments to other people and to the common property of the city,
and this would lead to each individual assuming that someone else
would care for the children and property, with the end result being
that no one would. For a modern example, many people who would not
throw trash on their own front yard or damage their own furniture will
litter in a public park and destroy the furniture in a rented
apartment or dorm room. Some in Aristotle's time (and since) have
suggested that holding property in common will lead to an end to
conflict in the city. This may at first seem wise, since the unequal
distribution of property in a political community is, Aristotle
believes, one of the causes of injustice in the city and ultimately of
civil war. But in fact it is not the lack of common property that
leads to conflict; instead, Aristotle blames human depravity
(1263b20). And in order to deal with human depravity, what is needed
is to moderate human desires, which can be done among those
"adequately educated by the laws" (1266b31). Inequality of property
leads to problems because the common people desire wealth without
limit (1267b3); if this desire can be moderated, so too can the
problems that arise from it. Aristotle also includes here the clam
that the citizens making up the elite engage in conflict because of
inequality of honors (1266b38). In other words, they engage in
conflict with the other citizens because of their desire for an
unequal share of honor, which leads them to treat the many with
condescension and arrogance. Holding property in common, Aristotle
notes, will not remove the desire for honor as a source of conflict.
b. Existing Cities: Sparta, Crete, Carthage
In Chapters 9-11 of Book II, Aristotle considers existing cities that
are held to be excellent: Sparta in Chapter 9, Crete in Chapter 10,
and Carthage (which, notably, was not a Greek city) in Chapter 11. It
is noteworthy that when Athens is considered following this discussion
(in Chapter 12), Aristotle takes a critical view and seems to suggest
that the city has declined since the time of Solon. Aristotle does not
anywhere in his writings suggest that Athens is the ideal city or even
the best existing city. It is easy to assume the opposite, and many
have done so, but there is no basis for this assumption. We will not
examine the particulars of Aristotle's view of each of these cities.
However, two important points should be noted here. One general point
that Aristotle makes when considering existing regimes is that when
considering whether a particular piece of legislation is good or not,
it must be compared not only to the best possible set of arrangements
but also the set of arrangements that actually prevails in the city.
If a law does not fit well with the principles of the regime, although
it may be an excellent law in the abstract, the people will not
believe in it or support it and as a result it will be ineffective or
actually harmful (1269a31). The other is that Aristotle is critical of
the Spartans because of their belief that the most important virtue to
develop and the one that the city must teach its citizens is the kind
of virtue that allows them to make war successfully. But war is not
itself an end or a good thing; war is for the sake of peace, and the
inability of the Spartans to live virtuously in times of peace has led
to their downfall. (See also Book VII, Chapter 2, where Aristotle
notes the hypocrisy of a city whose citizens seek justice among
themselves but "care nothing about justice towards others" (1324b35)
and Book VII, Chapter 15).
9. The Politics, Book III
a. Who Is the Citizen?
In Book III, Aristotle takes a different approach to understanding the
city. Again he takes up the question of what the city actually is, but
here his method is to understand the parts that make up the city: the
citizens. "Thus who ought to be called a citizen and what the citizen
is must be investigated" (1274b41). For Americans today this is a
legal question: anyone born in the United States or born to American
citizens abroad is automatically a citizen. Other people can become
citizens by following the correct legal procedures for doing so.
However, this rule is not acceptable for Aristotle, since slaves are
born in the same cities as free men but that does not make them
citizens. For Aristotle, there is more to citizenship than living in a
particular place or sharing in economic activity or being ruled under
the same laws. Instead, citizenship for Aristotle is a kind of
activity: "The citizen in an unqualified sense is defined by no other
thing so much as by sharing in decision and office" (1275a22). Later
he says that "Whoever is entitled to participate in an office
involving deliberation or decision is, we can now say, a citizen in
this city; and the city is the multitude of such persons that is
adequate with a view to a self-sufficient life, to speak simply"
(1275b17). And this citizen is a citizen "above all in a democracy; he
may, but will not necessarily, be a citizen in the others" (1275b4).
We have yet to talk about what a democracy is, but when we do, this
point will be important to defining it properly. When Aristotle talks
about participation, he means that each citizen should participate
directly in the assembly – not by voting for representatives – and
should willingly serve on juries to help uphold the laws. Note again
the contrast with modern Western nation-states where there are very
few opportunities to participate directly in politics and most people
struggle to avoid serving on juries.
Participation in deliberation and decision making means that the
citizen is part of a group that discusses the advantageous and the
harmful, the good and bad, and the just and unjust, and then passes
laws and reaches judicial decisions based on this deliberative
process. This process requires that each citizen consider the various
possible courses of action on their merits and discuss these options
with his fellow citizens. By doing so the citizen is engaging in
reason and speech and is therefore fulfilling his telos, engaged in
the process that enables him to achieve the virtuous and happy life.
In regimes where the citizens are similar and equal by nature – which
in practice is all of them – all citizens should be allowed to
participate in politics, though not all at once. They must take turns,
ruling and being ruled in turn. Note that this means that citizenship
is not just a set of privileges, it is also a set of duties. The
citizen has certain freedoms that non-citizens do not have, but he
also has obligations (political participation and military service)
that they do not have. We will see shortly why Aristotle believed that
the cities existing at the time did not in fact follow this principle
of ruling and being ruled in turn.
b. The Good Citizen and the Good Man
Before looking more closely at democracy and the other kinds of
regimes, there are still several important questions to be discussed
in Book III. One of the most important of these from Aristotle's point
of view is in Chapter 4. Here he asks the question of "whether the
virtue of the good man and the excellent citizen is to be regarded as
the same or as not the same" (1276b15). This is a question that seems
strange, or at least irrelevant, to most people today. The good
citizen today is asked to follow the laws, pay taxes, and possibly
serve on juries; these are all good things the good man (or woman)
would do, so that the good citizen is seen as being more or less
subsumed into the category of the good person. For Aristotle, however,
this is not the case. We have already seen Aristotle's definition of
the good man: the one who pursues his telos, living a life in
accordance with virtue and finding happiness by doing so. What is
Aristotle's definition of the good citizen?
Aristotle has already told us that if the regime is going to endure it
must educate all the citizens in such a way that they support the kind
of regime that it is and the principles that legitimate it. Because
there are several different types of regime (six, to be specific,
which will be considered in more detail shortly), there are several
different types of good citizen. Good citizens must have the type of
virtue that preserves the partnership and the regime: "[A]lthough
citizens are dissimilar, preservation of the partnership is their
task, and the regime is [this] partnership; hence the virtue of the
citizen must necessarily be with a view to the regime. If, then, there
are indeed several forms of regime, it is clear that it is not
possible for the virtue of the excellent citizen to be single, or
complete virtue" (1276b27).
There is only one situation in which the virtue of the good citizen
and excellent man are the same, and this is when the citizens are
living in a city that is under the ideal regime: "In the case of the
best regime, [the citizen] is one who is capable of and intentionally
chooses being ruled and ruling with a view to the life in accordance
with virtue" (1284a1). Aristotle does not fully describe this regime
until Book VII. For those of us not living in the ideal regime, the
ideal citizen is one who follows the laws and supports the principles
of the regime, whatever that regime is. That this may well require us
to act differently than the good man would act and to believe things
that the good man knows to be false is one of the unfortunate
tragedies of political life.
There is another element to determining who the good citizen is, and
it is one that we today would not support. For Aristotle, remember,
politics is about developing the virtue of the citizens and making it
possible for them to live a life of virtue. We have already seen that
women and slaves are not capable of living this kind of life, although
each of these groups has its own kind of virtue to pursue. But there
is another group that is incapable of citizenship leading to virtue,
and Aristotle calls this group "the vulgar". These are the people who
must work for a living. Such people lack the leisure time necessary
for political participation and the study of philosophy: "it is
impossible to pursue the things of virtue when one lives the life of a
vulgar person or a laborer" (1278a20). They are necessary for the city
to exist – someone must build the houses, make the shoes, and so forth
– but in the ideal city they would play no part in political life
because their necessary tasks prevent them from developing their minds
and taking an active part in ruling the city. Their existence, like
those of the slaves and the women, is for the benefit of the free male
citizens. Aristotle makes this point several times in the Politics:
see, for example, VII.9 and VIII.2 for discussions of the importance
of avoiding the lifestyle of the vulgar if one wants to achieve
virtue, and I.13 and III.4, where those who work with their hands are
labeled as kinds of slaves.
The citizens, therefore, are those men who are "similar in stock and
free," (1277b8) and rule over such men by those who are their equals
is political rule, which is different from the rule of masters over
slaves, men over women, and parents over children. This is one of
Aristotle's most important points: "[W]hen [the regime] is established
in accordance with equality and similarity among the citizens, [the
citizens] claim to merit ruling in turn" (1279a8). Throughout the
remainder of the Politics he returns to this point to remind us of the
distinction between a good regime and a bad regime. The correct regime
of polity, highlighted in Book IV, is under political rule, while
deviant regimes are those which are ruled as though a master was
ruling over slaves. But this is wrong: "For in the case of persons
similar by nature, justice and merit must necessarily be the same
according to nature; and so if it is harmful for their bodies if
unequal persons have equal sustenance and clothing, it is so also [for
their souls if they are equal] in what pertains to honors, and
similarly therefore if equal persons have what is unequal" (1287a12).
c. Who Should Rule?
This brings us to perhaps the most contentious of political questions:
how should the regime be organized? Another way of putting this is:
who should rule? In Books IV-VI Aristotle explores this question by
looking at the kinds of regimes that actually existed in the Greek
world and answering the question of who actually does rule. By closely
examining regimes that actually exist, we can draw conclusions about
the merits and drawbacks of each. Like political scientists today, he
studied the particular political phenomena of his time in order to
draw larger conclusions about how regimes and political institutions
work and how they should work. As has been mentioned above, in order
to do this, he sent his students throughout Greece to collect
information on the regimes and histories of the Greek cities, and he
uses this information throughout the Politics to provide examples that
support his arguments. (According to Diogenes Laertius, histories and
descriptions of the regimes of 158 cities were written, but only one
of these has come down to the present: the Constitution of Athens
mentioned above).
Another way he used this data was to create a typology of regimes that
was so successful that it ended up being used until the time of
Machiavelli nearly 2000 years later. He used two criteria to sort the
regimes into six categories.
The first criterion that is used to distinguish among different kinds
of regimes is the number of those ruling: one man, a few men, or the
many. The second is perhaps a little more unexpected: do those in
power, however many they are, rule only in their own interest or do
they rule in the interest of all the citizens? "[T]hose regimes which
look to the common advantage are correct regimes according to what is
unqualifiedly just, while those which look only to the advantage of
the rulers are errant, and are all deviations from the correct
regimes; for they involve mastery, but the city is a partnership of
free persons" (1279a16).
Having established these as the relevant criteria, in Book III Chapter
7 Aristotle sets out the six kinds of regimes. The correct regimes are
monarchy (rule by one man for the common good), aristocracy (rule by a
few for the common good), and polity (rule by the many for the common
good); the flawed or deviant regimes are tyranny (rule by one man in
his own interest), oligarchy (rule by the few in their own interest),
and democracy (rule by the many in their own interest). Aristotle
later ranks them in order of goodness, with monarchy the best,
aristocracy the next best, then polity, democracy, oligarchy, and
tyranny (1289a38). People in Western societies are used to thinking of
democracy as a good form of government – maybe the only good form of
government – but Aristotle considers it one of the flawed regimes
(although it is the least bad of the three) and you should keep that
in mind in his discussion of it. You should also keep in mind that by
the "common good" Aristotle means the common good of the citizens, and
not necessarily all the residents of the city. The women, slaves, and
manual laborers are in the city for the good of the citizens.
Almost immediately after this typology is created, Aristotle clarifies
it: the real distinction between oligarchy and democracy is in fact
the distinction between whether the wealthy or the poor rule
(1279b39), not whether the many or the few rule. Since it is always
the case that the poor are many while the wealthy are few, it looks
like it is the number of the rulers rather than their wealth which
distinguishes the two kinds of regimes (he elaborates on this in
IV.4). All cities have these two groups, the many poor and the few
wealthy, and Aristotle was well aware that it was the conflict between
these two groups that caused political instability in the cities, even
leading to civil wars (Thucydides describes this in his History of the
Peloponnesian War, and the Constitution of Athens also discusses the
consequences of this conflict). Aristotle therefore spends a great
deal of time discussing these two regimes and the problem of political
instability, and we will focus on this problem as well.
First, however, let us briefly consider with Aristotle one other valid
claim to rule. Those who are most virtuous have, Aristotle says, the
strongest claim of all to rule. If the city exists for the sake of
developing virtue in the citizens, then those who have the most virtue
are the most fit to rule; they will rule best, and on behalf of all
the citizens, establishing laws that lead others to virtue. However,
if one man or a few men of exceptional virtue exist in the regime, we
will be outside of politics: "If there is one person so outstanding by
his excess of virtue – or a number of persons, though not enough to
provide a full complement for the city – that the virtue of all the
others and their political capacity is not commensurable…such persons
can no longer be regarded as part of the city" (1284a4). It would be
wrong for the other people in the city to claim the right to rule over
them or share rule with them, just as it would be wrong for people to
claim the right to share power with Zeus. The proper thing would be to
obey them (1284b28). But this situation is extremely unlikely
(1287b40). Instead, cities will be made up of people who are similar
and equal, which leads to problems of its own.
The most pervasive of these is that oligarchs and democrats each
advance a claim to political power based on justice. For Aristotle,
justice dictates that equal people should get equal things, and
unequal people should get unequal things. If, for example, two
students turn in essays of identical quality, they should each get the
same grade. Their work is equal, and so the reward should be too. If
they turn in essays of different quality, they should get different
grades which reflect the differences in their work. But the standards
used for grading papers are reasonably straightforward, and the
consequences of this judgment are not that important, relatively
speaking – they certainly are not worth fighting and dying for. But
the stakes are raised when we ask how we should judge the question of
who should rule, for the standards here are not straightforward and
disagreement over the answer to this question frequently does lead men
(and women) to fight and die.
What does justice require when political power is being distributed?
Aristotle says that both groups – the oligarchs and democrats – offer
judgments about this, but neither of them gets it right, because "the
judgment concerns themselves, and most people are bad judges
concerning their own things" (1280a14). (This was the political
problem that was of most concern to the authors of the United States
Constitution: given that people are self-interested and ambitious, who
can be trusted with power? Their answer differs from Aristotle's, but
it is worth pointing out the persistence of the problem and the
difficulty of solving it). The oligarchs assert that their greater
wealth entitles them to greater power, which means that they alone
should rule, while the democrats say that the fact that all are
equally free entitles each citizen to an equal share of political
power (which, because most people are poor, means that in effect the
poor rule). If the oligarchs' claim seems ridiculous, you should keep
in mind that the American colonies had property qualifications for
voting; those who could not prove a certain level of wealth were not
allowed to vote. And poll taxes, which required people to pay a tax in
order to vote and therefore kept many poor citizens (including almost
all African-Americans) from voting, were not eliminated in the United
States until the mid-20th century. At any rate, each of these claims
to rule, Aristotle says, is partially correct but partially wrong. We
will consider the nature of democracy and oligarchy shortly.
Aristotle also in Book III argues for a principle that has become one
of the bedrock principles of liberal democracy: we ought, to the
extent possible, allow the law to rule. "One who asks the law to rule,
therefore, is held to be asking god and intellect alone to rule, while
one who asks man adds the beast. Desire is a thing of this sort; and
spiritedness perverts rulers and the best men. Hence law is intellect
without appetite" (1287a28). This is not to say that the law is
unbiased. It will reflect the bias of the regime, as it must, because
the law reinforces the principles of the regime and helps educate the
citizens in those principles so that they will support the regime. But
in any particular case, the law, having been established in advance,
is impartial, whereas a human judge will find it hard to resist
judging in his own interest, according to his own desires and
appetites, which can easily lead to injustice. Also, if this kind of
power is left in the hands of men rather than with the laws, there
will be a desperate struggle to control these offices and their
benefits, and this will be another cause of civil war. So whatever
regime is in power should, to the extent possible, allow the laws to
rule. Ruling in accordance with one's wishes at any particular time is
one of the hallmarks of tyranny (it is the same way masters rule over
slaves), and it is also, Aristotle says, typical of a certain kind of
democracy, which rules by decree rather than according to settled
laws. In these cases we are no longer dealing with politics at all,
"For where the laws do not rule there is no regime" (1292b30). There
are masters and slaves, but there are no citizens.
10. The Politics, Book IV
a. Polity: The Best Practical Regime
In Book IV Aristotle continues to think about existing regimes and
their limitations, focusing on the question: what is the best possible
regime? This is another aspect of political science that is still
practiced today, as Aristotle combines a theory about how regimes
ought to be with his analysis of how regimes really are in practice in
order to prescribe changes to those regimes that will bring them more
closely in line with the ideal. It is in Book VII that Aristotle
describes the regime that would be absolutely the best, if we could
have everything the way we wanted it; here he is considering the best
regime that we can create given the kinds of human beings and
circumstances that cities today find themselves forced to deal with,
"For one should study not only the best regime but also the regime
that is [the best] possible, and similarly also the regime that is
easier and more attainable for all" (1288b37).
Aristotle also provides advice for those that want to preserve any of
the existing kinds of regime, even the defective ones, showing a kind
of hard-headed realism that is often overlooked in his writings. In
order to do this, he provides a higher level of detail about the
varieties of the different regimes than he has previously given us.
There are a number of different varieties of democracy and oligarchy
because cities are made up of a number of different groups of people,
and the regime will be different depending on which of these groups
happens to be most authoritative. For example, a democracy that is
based on the farming element will be different than a democracy that
is based on the element that is engaged in commerce, and similarly
there are different kinds of oligarchies. We do not need to consider
these in detail except to note that Aristotle holds to his position
that in either a democracy or an oligarchy it is best if the law rules
rather than the people possessing power. In the case of democracy it
is best if the farmers rule, because farmers will not have the time to
attend the assembly, so they will stay away and will let the laws rule
(VI.4).
It is, however, important to consider polity in some detail, and this
is the kind of regime to which Aristotle next turns his attention.
"Simply speaking, polity is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy"
(1293a32). Remember that polity is one of the correct regimes, and it
occurs when the many rule in the interest of the political community
as a whole. The problem with democracy as the rule of the many is that
in a democracy the many rule in their own interest; they exploit the
wealthy and deny them political power. But a democracy in which the
interests of the wealthy were taken into account and protected by the
laws would be ruling in the interest of the community as a whole, and
it is this that Aristotle believes is the best practical regime. The
ideal regime to be described in Book VII is the regime that we would
pray for if the gods would grant us our wishes and we could create a
city from scratch, having everything exactly the way we would want it.
But when we are dealing with cities that already exist, their
circumstances limit what kind of regime we can reasonably expect to
create. Creating a polity is a difficult thing to do, and although he
provides many examples of democracies and oligarchies Aristotle does
not give any examples of existing polities or of polities that have
existed in the past.
One of the important elements of creating a polity is to combine the
institutions of a democracy with those of an oligarchy. For example,
in a democracy, citizens are paid to serve on juries, while in an
oligarchy, rich people are fined if they do not. In a polity, both of
these approaches are used, with the poor being paid to serve and the
rich fined for not serving. In this way, both groups will serve on
juries and power will be shared. There are several ways to mix
oligarchy and democracy, but "The defining principle of a good mixture
of democracy and oligarchy is that it should be possible for the same
polity to be spoken of as either a democracy or an oligarchy"
(1294b14). The regime must be said to be both – and neither – a
democracy and an oligarchy, and it will be preserved "because none of
the parts of the city generally would wish to have another regime"
(1294b38).
b. The Importance of the Middle Class
In addition to combining elements from the institutions of democracy
and oligarchy, the person wishing to create a lasting polity must pay
attention to the economic situation in the city. In Book II of the
EthicsAristotle famously establishes the principle that virtue is a
mean between two extremes. For example, a soldier who flees before a
battle is guilty of the vice of cowardice, while one who charges the
enemy singlehandedly, breaking ranks and getting himself killed for no
reason, is guilty of the vice of foolhardiness. The soldier who
practices the virtue of courage is the one who faces the enemy, moves
forward with the rest of the troops in good order, and fights bravely.
Courage, then, is a mean between the extremes of cowardice and
foolhardiness. The person who has it neither flees from the enemy nor
engages in a suicidal and pointless attack but faces the enemy bravely
and attacks in the right way.
Aristotle draws a parallel between virtue in individuals and virtue in
cities. The city, he says, has three parts: the rich, the poor, and
the middle class. Today we would probably believe that it is the rich
people who are the most fortunate of those three groups, but this is
not Aristotle's position. He says: "[I]t is evident that in the case
of the goods of fortune as well a middling possession is the best of
all. For [a man of moderate wealth] is readiest to obey reason, while
for one who is [very wealthy or very poor] it is difficult to follow
reason. The former sort tend to become arrogant and base on a grand
scale, the latter malicious and base in petty ways; and acts of
injustice are committed either through arrogance or through malice"
(1295b4). A political community that has extremes of wealth and
poverty "is a city not of free persons but of slaves and masters, the
ones consumed by envy, the others by contempt. Nothing is further
removed from affection and from a political partnership" (1295b22).
People in the middle class are free from the arrogance that
characterizes the rich and the envy that characterizes the poor. And,
since members of this class are similar and equal in wealth, they are
likely to regard one another as similar and equal generally, and to be
willing to rule and be ruled in turn, neither demanding to rule at all
times as the wealthy do or trying to avoid ruling as the poor do from
their lack of resources. "Thus it is the greatest good fortune for
those who are engaged in politics to have a middling and sufficient
property, because where some possess very many things and others
nothing, either [rule of] the people in its extreme form must come
into being, or unmixed oligarchy, or – as a result of both of these
excesses – tyranny. For tyranny arises from the most headstrong sort
of democracy and from oligarchy, but much less often from the middling
sorts [of regime] and those close to them" (1295b39).
There can be an enduring polity only when the middle class is able
either to rule on its own or in conjunction with either of the other
two groups, for in this way it can moderate their excesses: "Where the
multitude of middling persons predominates either over both of the
extremities together or over one alone, there a lasting polity is
capable of existing" (1296b38). Unfortunately, Aristotle says, this
state of affairs almost never exists. Instead, whichever group, rich
or poor, is able to achieve power conducts affairs to suit itself
rather than considering the interests of the other group: "whichever
of the two succeeds in dominating its opponents does not establish a
regime that is common or equal, but they grasp for preeminence in the
regime as the prize of victory" (1296a29). And as a result, neither
group seeks equality but instead each tries to dominate the other,
believing that it is the only way to avoid being dominated in turn.
This is a recipe for instability, conflict, and ultimately civil war,
rather than a lasting regime. For the polity (or any other regime) to
last, "the part of the city that wants the regime to continue must be
superior to the part not wanting this" in quality and quantity
(1296b16). He repeats this in Book V, calling it the "great
principle": "keep watch to ensure that that the multitude wanting the
regime is superior to that not wanting it" (1309b16), and in Book VI
he discusses how this can be arranged procedurally (VI.3).
The remainder of Book IV focuses on the kinds of authority and offices
in the city and how these can be distributed in democratic or
oligarchic fashion. We do not need to concern ourselves with these
details, but it does show that Aristotle is concerned with particular
kinds of flawed regimes and how they can best operate and function in
addition to his interest in the best practical government and the best
government generally.
11. The Politics, Book V
a. Conflict between the Rich and the Poor
In Book V Aristotle turns his attention to how regimes can be
preserved and how they are destroyed. Since we have seen what kind of
regime a polity is, and how it can be made to endure, we are already
in a position to see what is wrong with regimes which do not adopt the
principles of a polity. We have already seen the claims of the few
rich and the many poor to rule. The former believe that because they
are greater in material wealth they should also be greater in
political power, while the latter claim that because all citizens are
equally free political power should also be equally distributed, which
allows the many poor to rule because of their superior numbers. Both
groups are partially correct, but neither is entirely correct, "And it
is for this reason that, when either [group] does not share in the
regime on the basis of the conception it happens to have, they engage
in factional conflict" which can lead to civil war (1301a37). While
the virtuous also have a claim to rule, the very fact that they are
virtuous leads them to avoid factional conflict. They are also too
small a group to be politically consequential: "[T]hose who are
outstanding in virtue do not engage in factional conflict to speak of;
for they are few against many" (1304b4). Therefore, the conflict that
matters is the one between the rich and poor, and as we have seen,
whichever group gets the upper hand will arrange things for its own
benefit and in order to harm the other group. The fact that each of
these groups ignores the common good and seeks only its own interest
is why both oligarchy and democracy are flawed regimes. It is also
ultimately self-destructive to try to put either kind of regime into
practice: "Yet to have everywhere an arrangement that is based simply
on one or the other of these sorts of equality is a poor thing. This
is evident from the result: none of these sorts of regimes is lasting"
(1302a3). On the other hand, "[O]ne should not consider as
characteristic of popular rule or of oligarchy something tha t will
make the city democratically or oligarchically run to the greatest
extent possible, but something that will do so for the longest period
of time" (1320a1). Democracy tends to be more stable than oligarchy,
because democracies only have a conflict between rich and poor, while
oligarchies also have conflicts within the ruling group of oligarchs
to hold power. In addition, democracy is closer to polity than
oligarchy is, and this contributes to its greater stability. And this
is an important goal; the more moderate a regime is, the longer it is
likely to remain in place.
Why does factional conflict arise? Aristotle turns to this question in
Chapter 2. He says: "The lesser engage in factional conflict in order
to be equal; those who are equal, in order to be greater" (1302a29).
What are the things in which the lesser seek to be equal and the equal
to be greater? "As for the things over which they engage in factional
conflict, these are profit and honor and their opposites….They are
stirred up further by arrogance, by fear, by preeminence, by contempt,
by disproportionate growth, by electioneering, by underestimation, by
[neglect of] small things, and by dissimilarity" (1302a33). Aristotle
describes each of these in more detail. We will not examine them
closely, but it is worth observing that Aristotle regards campaigning
for office as a potentially dangerous source of conflict. If the city
is arranged in such a way that either of the major factions feels that
it is being wronged by the other, there are many things that can
trigger conflict and even civil war; the regime is inherently
unstable. We see again the importance of maintaining a regime which
all of the groups in the city wish to see continue.
Aristotle says of democracies that "[D]emocracies undergo revolution
particularly on account of the wanton behavior of the popular leaders"
(1304b20). Such leaders will harass the property owners, causing them
to unify against the democracy, and they will also stir up the poor
against the rich in order to maintain themselves in power. This leads
to conflict between the two groups and civil war. Aristotle cites a
number of historical examples of this. Oligarchies undergo revolution
primarily "when they treat the multitude unjustly. Any leader is then
adequate [to effect revolution]" (1305a29). Revolution in oligarchical
regimes can also come about from competition within the oligarchy,
when not all of the oligarchs have a share in the offices. In this
case those without power will engage in revolution not to change the
regime but to change those who are ruling.
b. How to Preserve Regimes
However, despite all the dangers to the regimes, and the unavoidable
risk that any particular regime will be overthrown, Aristotle does
have advice regarding the preservation of regimes. In part, of course,
we learn how to preserve the regimes by learning what causes
revolutions and then avoiding those causes, so Aristotle has already
given us useful advice for the preservation of regimes. But he has
more advice to offer: "In well-blended regimes, then, one should watch
out to ensure there are no transgressions of the laws, and above all
be on guard against small ones" (1307b29). Note, again, the importance
of letting the laws rule.
It is also important in every regime "to have the laws and management
of the rest arranged in such a way that it is impossible to profit
from the offices….The many do not chafe as much at being kept away
from ruling – they are even glad if someone leaves them the leisure
for their private affairs – as they do when they suppose that their
rulers are stealing common [funds]; then it pains them both not to
share in the prerogatives and not to share in the profits" (1308b32).
And, again, it is beneficial if the group that does not have political
power is allowed to share in it to the greatest extent possible,
though it should not be allowed to hold the authoritative offices
(such as general, treasurer, and so forth). Such men must be chosen
extremely carefully: "Those who are going to rule in the authoritative
offices ought to have three things: first, affection for the
established regime; next, a very great capacity for the work involved
in rule; third, virtue and justice – in each regime the sort that is
relative to the regime…" (1309a33). It is difficult to find all three
of these in many men, but it is important for the regime to make use
of the men with these qualities to the greatest degree possible, or
else the regime will be harmed, either by sedition, incompetence, or
corruption. Aristotle also reminds us of the importance of the
middling element for maintaining the regime and making it
long-lasting; instead of hostility between the oligarchs and
democrats, whichever group has power should be certain always to
behave benevolently and justly to the other group (1309b18).
"But the greatest of all the things that have been mentioned with a
view to making regimes lasting – though it is now slighted by all – is
education relative to the regimes. For there is no benefit in the most
beneficial laws, even when these have been approved by all those
engaging in politics, if they are not going to be habituated and
educated in the regime – if the laws are popular, in a popular spirit,
if oligarchic, in an oligarchic spirit" (1310a13). This does not mean
that the people living in a democracy should be educated to believe
that oligarchs are enemies of the regime, to be oppressed as much as
possible and treated unjustly, nor does it mean that the wealthy under
an oligarchy should be educated to believe that the poor are to be
treated with arrogance and contempt. Instead it means being educated
in the principles of moderate democracy and moderate oligarchy, so
that the regime will be long-lasting and avoid revolution.
In the remainder of Book V Aristotle discusses monarchy and tyranny
and what preserves and destroys these types of regimes. Here Aristotle
is not discussing the kind of monarchies with which most people today
are familiar, involving hereditary descent of royal power, usually
from father to son. A monarch in Aristotle's sense is one who rules
because he is superior to all other citizens in virtue. Monarchy
therefore involves individual rule on the basis of merit for the good
of the whole city, and the monarch because of his virtue is uniquely
well qualified to determine what that means. The tyrant, on the other
hand, rules solely for his own benefit and pleasure. Monarchy,
therefore, involving the rule of the best man over all, is the best
kind of regime, while tyranny, which is essentially the rule of a
master over a regime in which all are slaves, is the worst kind of
regime, and in fact is really no kind of regime at all. Aristotle
lists the particular ways in which both monarchy and tyranny are
changed and preserved. We do not need to spend much time on these, for
Aristotle says that in his time "there are many persons who are
similar, with none of them so outstanding as to match the extent and
the claim to merit of the office" that would be required for the rule
of one man on the basis of exceptional virtue that characterizes
monarchy (1313a5), and tyranny is inherently extremely short lived and
clearly without value. However, those wishing to preserve either of
these kinds of regimes are advised, as oligarchs and democrats have
been, to pursue moderation, diminishing the degree of their power in
order to extend its duration.
12. The Politics, Book VI
a. Varieties of Democracy
Most of Book VI is concerned with the varieties of democracy, although
Aristotle also revisits the varieties of oligarchy. Some of this
discussion has to do with the various ways in which the offices, laws,
and duties can be arranged. This part of the discussion we will pass
over. However, Aristotle also includes a discussion of the animating
principle of democracy, which is freedom: "It is customarily said that
only in this sort of regime do [men] share in freedom, for, so it is
asserted, every democracy aims at this" (1317a40). In modern liberal
democracies, of course, the ability of all to share in freedom and for
each citizen to live as one wants is considered one of the regime's
strengths. However, keep in mind that Aristotle believes that human
life has a telos and that the political community should provide
education and laws that will lead to people pursuing and achieving
this telos. Given that this is the case, a regime that allows people
to do whatever they want is in fact flawed, for it is not guiding them
in the direction of the good life.
b. The Best Kind of Democracy
He also explains which of the varieties of democracy is the best. In
Chapter 4, we discover that the best sort of democracy is the one made
up of farmers: "The best people is the farming sort, so that it is
possible also to create [the best] democracy wherever the multitude
lives from farming or herding. For on account of not having much
property it is lacking in leisure, and so is unable to hold frequent
assemblies. Because they do not have the necessary things, they spend
their time at work and do not desire the things of others; indeed,
working is more pleasant to them than engaging in politics and ruling,
where there are not great spoils to be gotten from office" (1318b9).
This is a reason why the authoritative offices can be in the hands of
the wealthy, as long as the people retain control of auditing and
adjudication: "Those who govern themselves in this way must
necessarily be finely governed. The offices will always be in the
hands of the best persons, the people being willing and not envious of
the respectable, while the arrangement is satisfactory for the
respectable and notable. These will not be ruled by others who are
their inferiors, and they will rule justly by the fact that others
have authority over the audits" (1318b33). By "adjudication" Aristotle
means that the many should be certain that juries should be made up of
men from their ranks, so that the laws will be enforced with a
democratic spirit and the rich will not be able to use their wealth to
put themselves above the law. By "authority over the audits" Aristotle
refers to an institution which provided that those who held office had
to provide an accounting of their activities at regular intervals:
where the city's funds came from, where they went, what actions they
took, and so forth. They were liable to prosecution if they were found
to have engaged in wrongdoing or mismanagement, and the fear of this
prosecution, Aristotle says, will keep them honest and ensure that
they act according to the wishes of the democracy.
So we see again that the institutions and laws of a city are
important, but equally important is the moral character of the
citizens. It is only the character of the farming population that
makes the arrangements Aristotle describes possible: "The other sorts
of multitude out of which the remaining sorts of democracy are
constituted are almost all much meaner than these: their way of life
is a mean one, with no task involving virtue among the things that
occupy the multitude of human beings who are vulgar persons and
merchants or the multitude of laborers" (1319a24). And while Aristotle
does not say it here, of course a regime organized in this way, giving
a share of power to the wealthy and to the poor, under the rule of
law, in the interest of everyone, would in fact be a polity more than
it would be a democracy.
c. The Role of Wealth in a Democracy
In Chapter 5 of Book VI he offers further advice that would move the
city in the direction of polity when he discusses how wealth should be
handled in a democracy. Many democracies offer pay for serving in the
assembly or on juries so that the poor will be able to attend.
Aristotle advises minimizing the number of trials and length of
service on juries so that the cost will not be too much of a burden on
the wealthy where there are not sources of revenue from outside the
city (Athens, for example, received revenue from nearby silver mines,
worked by slaves). Where such revenues exist, he criticizes the
existing practice of distributing surpluses to the poor in the form of
cash payments, which the poor citizens will take while demanding more.
However, poverty is a genuine problem in a democracy: "[O]ne who is
genuinely of the popular sort (i.e. a supporter of democracy) should
see to it that the multitude is not overly poor, for this is the
reason for democracy being depraved" (1320a33). Instead the surplus
should be allowed to accumulate until enough is available to give the
poor enough money to acquire land or start a trade. And even if there
is no external surplus, "[N]otables who are refined and sensible will
divide the poor among themselves and provide them with a start in
pursuing some work" (1320b8). It seems somewhat unusual for Aristotle
to be advocating a form of welfare, but that is what he is doing, on
the grounds that poverty is harmful to the character of the poor and
this harms the community as a whole by undermining its stability.
13. The Politics, Book VII
a. The Best Regime and the Best Men
It is in Book VII that Aristotle describes the regime that is best
without qualification. This differs from the discussion of the best
regime in Book IV because in Book IV Aristotle's concern was the best
practical regime, meaning one that it would be possible to bring about
from the material provided by existing regimes. Here, however, his
interest is in the best regime given the opportunity to create
everything just as we would want it. It is "the city that is to be
constituted on the basis of what one would pray for" (1325b35). As
would be expected, he explicitly ties it to the question of the best
way of life: "Concerning the best regime, one who is going to
undertake the investigation appropriate to it must necessarily discuss
first what the most choiceworthy way of life is. As long as this is
unclear, the best regime must necessarily be unclear as well…"
(1323a14). We have already discussed the best way of life, as well as
the fact that most people do not pursue it: "For [men] consider any
amount of virtue to be adequate, but wealth, goods, power, reputation,
and all such things they seek to excess without limit" (1323a35). This
is, as we have said more than once, a mistake: "Living happily…is
available to those who have to excess the adornments of character and
mind but behave moderately in respect to the external acquisition of
good things" (1323b1). And what is true for the individual is also
true for the city. Therefore "the best city is happy and acts nobly.
It is impossible to act nobly without acting [to achieve] noble
things; but there is no noble deed either of a man or of a city that
is separate from virtue and prudence. The courage, justice, and
prudence of a city have the same power and form as those human beings
share in individually who are called just, prudent, and sound."
(1324b30). The best city, like any other city, must educate its
citizens to support its principles. The difference between this city
and other cities is that the principles that it teaches its citizens
are the correct principles for living the good life. It is here, and
nowhere else, that the excellent man and the good citizen are the
same.
b. Characteristics of the Best City
What would be the characteristics of the best city we could imagine?
First of all, we want the city to be the right size. Many people,
Aristotle says, are confused about what this means. They assume that
the bigger the city is, the better it will be. But this is wrong. It
is certainly true that the city must be large enough to defend itself
and to be self-sufficient, but "This too, at any rate, is evident from
the facts: that it is difficult – perhaps impossible – for a city that
is too populous to be well managed" (1326a26). So the right size for
the city is a moderate one; it is the one that enables it to perform
its function of creating virtuous citizens properly. "[T]he [city]
that is made up of too few persons is not self-sufficient, though the
city is a self-sufficient thing, while the one that is made up of too
many persons is with respect to the necessary things self-sufficient
like a nation, but is not a city; for it is not easy for a regime to
be present" (1326b3). There is an additional problem in a regime that
is too large: "With a view to judgment concerning the just things and
with a view to distributing offices on the basis of merit, the
citizens must necessarily be familiar with one another's qualities;
where this does not happen to be the case, what is connected with the
offices and with judging must necessarily be carried on poorly"
(1326b13).
The size of the territory is also an important element of the ideal
regime, and it too must be tailored to the purpose of the regime.
Aristotle says "[the territory should be] large enough so that the
inhabitants are able to live at leisure in liberal fashion and at the
same time with moderation" (1326b29). Again Aristotle's main concern
is with life at peace, not life at war. On the other hand, the city
and its territory should be such as to afford its inhabitants
advantages in times of war; "it ought to be difficult for enemies to
enter, but readily exited by [the citizens] themselves," and not so
big that it cannot be "readily surveyable" because only such a
territory is "readily defended" (1326b41). It should be laid out in
such a way as to be readily defensible (Book VII, Chapters 11-12). It
should also be defensible by sea, since proper sea access is part of a
good city. Ideally the city will (like Athens) have a port that is
several miles away from the city itself, so that contact with
foreigners can be regulated. It should also be in the right
geographical location.
Aristotle believed that geography was an important factor in
determining the characteristics of the people living in a certain
area. He thought that the Greeks had the good traits of both the
Europeans (spiritedness) and Asians (souls endowed with art and
thought) because of the Greek climate (1327b23). While the harsh
climate to the north made Europeans hardy and resilient, as well as
resistant to being ruled (although Aristotle did not know about the
Vikings, they are perhaps the best example of what he is talking
about), and the climate of what he called Asia and we now call the
Middle East produced a surplus of food that allowed the men the
leisure to engage in intellectual and artistic endeavors while robbing
them of spiritedness, the Greeks had the best of both worlds: "[I]t is
both spirited and endowed with thought, and hence both remains free
and governs itself in the best manner and at the same time is capable
of ruling all…" (1327b29).
However, despite the necessary attention to military issues, when we
consider the ideal city, the principles which we have already
elaborated about the nature of the citizens remain central. Even in
the ideal city, constructed to meet the conditions for which we would
pray, the need for certain tasks, such as farming and laboring, will
remain. Therefore there will also be the need for people to do these
tasks. But such people should not be citizens, for (as we have
discussed) they will lack the leisure and the intellect to participate
in governing the city. They are not really even part of the city:
"Hence while cities need possessions, possessions are no part of the
city. Many animate things (i.e. slaves and laborers) are part of
possessions. But the city is a partnership of similar persons, for the
sake of a life that is the best possible" (1328a33). The citizens
cannot be merchants, laborers, or farmers, "for there is a need for
leisure both with a view to the creation of virtue and with a view to
political activities" (1329a1). So all the people living in the city
who are not citizens are there for the benefit of the citizens. Any
goals, wishes, or desires that they might have are irrelevant; in
Kant's terms, they are treated as means rather than ends.
Those that live the lives of leisure that are open to citizens because
of the labor performed by the non-citizens (again, including the
women) are all similar to one another, and therefore the appropriate
political arrangement for them is "in similar fashion to participate
in ruling and being ruled in turn. For equality is the same thing [as
justice] for persons who are similar, and it is difficult for a regime
to last if its constitution is contrary to justice" (1332b25). These
citizens will only be able to rule and be ruled in turn if they have
had the proper upbringing, and this is the last major topic that
Aristotle takes up in the Politics. Most cities make the mistake of
neglecting education altogether, leaving it up to fathers to decide
whether they will educate their sons at all, and if so what subject
matter will be covered and how it will be taught. Some cities have in
fact paid attention to the importance of the proper education of the
young, training them in the virtues of the regime. Unfortunately,
these regimes have taught them the wrong things. Aristotle is
particularly concerned with Sparta here; the Spartans devoted great
effort to bringing up their sons to believe that the virtues related
to war were the only ones that mattered in life. They were successful;
but because war is not the ultimate good, their education was not
good. (Recall that the Spartan education was also flawed because it
neglected the women entirely).
It is important for the person devising the ideal city to learn from
this mistake. Such cities do not last unless they constantly remain at
war (which is not an end in itself; no one pursues war for its own
sake). Aristotle says "Most cities of this sort preserve themselves
when at war, but once having acquired [imperial] rule they come to
ruin; they lose their edge, like iron, when they remain at peace. The
reason is that the legislator has not educated them to be capable of
being at leisure" (1334a6). The proper education must be instilled
from the earliest stages of life, and even before; Aristotle tells us
the ages that are appropriate for marriage (37 for men, 18 for women)
in order to bring about children of the finest quality, and insists on
the importance of a healthful regimen for pregnant women, specifying
that they take sufficient food and remain physically active. He also
says that abortion is the appropriate solution when the population
threatens to grow too large (1335b24).
14. The Politics, Book VIII
a. The Education of the Young
Book VIII is primarily concerned with the kind of education that the
children of the citizens should receive. That this is a crucial topic
for Aristotle is clear from its first sentence: "That the legislator
must, therefore, make the education of the young his object above all
would be disputed by no one" (1337a10). It is so important that it
cannot be left to individual families, as was the custom in Greece.
Instead, "Since there is a single end for the city as a whole, it is
evident that education must necessarily be one and the same for all,
and that the superintendence of it should be common and not on a
private basis….For common things the training too should be made
common" (1337a21). The importance of a common education shaping each
citizen so as to enable him to serve the common good of the city
recalls the discussion of how the city is prior to the individual in
Book I Chapter 2; as has been quoted already in the discussion above,
"one ought not even consider that a citizen belongs to himself, but
rather that all belong to the city; for each individual is a part of
the city" (1337a26).
He elaborates on the content of this education, noting that it should
involve the body as well as the mind. Aristotle includes physical
education, reading and writing, drawing, and music as subjects which
the young potential citizens must learn. The aim of this education is
not productive or theoretical knowledge. Instead it is meant to teach
the young potential citizens practical knowledge – the kind of
knowledge that each of them will need to fulfill his telos and perform
his duties as a citizen. Learning the subjects that fall under the
heading of productive knowledge, such as how to make shoes, would be
degrading to the citizen. Learning the subjects that would fall under
the heading of theoretical knowledge would be beyond the ability of
most of the citizens, and is not necessary to them as citizens.
15. References and Further Reading
The list below is not intended to be comprehensive. It is limited to
works published from 1962 to 2002. Most of these have their own
bibliographies and suggested reading lists, and the reader is
encouraged to take advantage of these.
Translations of Aristotle
* Barnes, Jonathan, ed. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The
Revised Oxford Translation. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1984. Two volumes.
o The standard edition of Aristotle's complete works.
* Irwin, Terence, and Gail Fine, eds. Aristotle: Introductory
Readings. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996
o As the title suggests, this book includes excerpts from
Aristotle's writings. Understanding any of Aristotle's texts means
reading it in its entirety, but if you want a book by your side to
check cross-references from whichever of his texts you are reading
(for example, if the editor of the edition of the Politics you are
reading refers to the Ethics), this one should do the trick.
* Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated and edited by Roger
Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
o This translation lacks the scholarly and critical
apparatus of the Rowe translation but is still a fine choice.
* Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated and edited by Terry
Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999.
* Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated and with an
introduction by Martin Ostwald. New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1962.
o The translation used in preparing this entry. A good basic
translation.
* Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated and with an
introduction by David Ross. Revised by J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.
o Updated and revised version of a classic translation from
1925. See also Ross' book on Aristotle below.
* Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translation and historical
introduction by Christopher Rowe; philosophical introduction and
commentary by Sarah Broadie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
o A very thorough introduction and commentary are included
with this translation of theEthics. A good choice for the beginning
student – but remember that the introduction and commentary are not
meant to substitute for actually reading the text!
* Aristotle. The Politics. Translated and with an introduction by
Carnes Lord. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
o The translation used in preparing this entry. A useful
introduction and very thorough notes, identifying names, places, and
terms with which the reader may not be familiar.
* Aristotle. The Politics. Translated by C.D.C. Reeve.
Indianapolis : Hackett Publishing, 1998.
* Aristotle. The Politics of Aristotle. Translated by Peter
Simpson. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
* Aristotle. The Politics and The Constitution of Athens. Edited
by Stephen Everson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
o If you're looking for The Constitution of Athens this is a
good place to go – and with thePolitics in the same book it's easy to
compare the two books to each other. However, the texts are lacking in
footnotes, which is a particular problem with the Constitution since
it records Athenian history. So, for example, on page 237 we learn
that during the rule of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens the rulers chose
"ten colleagues to govern the Peiraeus," without any indication that
the Peiraeus was the Athenian harbor and its surrounding community,
five miles from the city (it is also the setting of Plato's Republic).
It would help to have names, places, and concepts defined and
explained through footnotes for the beginning student. The more
advanced student may wish to consult the four volumes on the Politics
in the Oxford University Press's Clarendon Aristotle Series. Volume I,
covering Books I and II of the Politics, is by Trevor Saunders; Volume
II, on Books III and IV, is by Richard Robinson; Volume III, on Books
V and VI, is by David Keyt, and Volume IV, on Books VII and VIII, is
by Richard Kraut.
* Aristotle. The Rhetoric. In George A. Kennedy, Aristotle On
Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse.Translated and with an
introduction by George A. Kennedy. New York: Oxford University Press,
1991.
o The Rhetoric includes observations on politics and ethics
in the context of teaching the reader how to become a rhetorician.
Whether or not this requires the student to behave ethically is a
matter of some debate. Speaking well in public settings was crucial to
attaining political success in the Athenian democracy (and is still
valuable today) and much of Aristotle's practical advice remains
useful.
Secondary literature – general works on Aristotle
* Ackrill, J. L. Aristotle the Philosopher. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1981.
* Adler, Mortimer. Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made
Easy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978.
o This is probably the easiest-to-read exposition of
Aristotle available; Adler says that it is aimed at "everybody – of
any age, from twelve or fourteen years upward." Obviously the author
has had to make some sacrifices in the areas of detail and complexity
to accomplish this, and anyone who has spent any time at all with
Aristotle will probably wish to start elsewhere. Nevertheless, the
author succeeds to a very great degree in delivering on the promise of
the subtitle, expressing the basics of Aristotle's thought in simple
language using common examples and straightforward descriptions.
* Barnes, Jonathan. Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
* Barnes, Jonathan, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
o "The Companion is intended for philosophical readers who
are new to Aristotle," Barnes writes in the Introduction, and the book
delivers. Chapter Seven, by D.S. Hutchinson, covers Aristotle's
ethical theory; Chapter Eight, by C.C.W. Taylor, his political theory.
Barnes himself writes the first chapter on Aristotle's life and work,
as well as an excellent introduction which includes an explanation of
why no book (or, I would add, encyclopedia article) can substitute for
reading the original Aristotelian texts. It also includes the
following: "Plato had an influence second only to Aristotle…. But
Plato's philosophical views are mostly false, and for the most part
they are evidently false; his arguments are mostly bad, and for the
most part they are evidently bad." If those remarks provoke any kind
of emotional or intellectual response in you, you may as well give up:
you are on the way to being a student of philosophy.
* Guthrie, W.K.C. Aristotle: An Encounter. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981.
o Volume 6 of his six volume Cambridge History of Ancient
Greek Philosophy written between 1962 and 1981.
* Robinson, Timothy A. Aristotle in Outline. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., 1995.
o Another short (125 pages) introduction to Aristotle's
thought, with three sections: Wisdom and Science, Aristotle's Ethics,
and Politics. It would be an excellent choice for the beginning
student or anyone who just wants to be introduced to Aristotle's
philosophy. Robinson is sympathetic to Aristotle but also to his
readers, keeping things easy to read while at the same time offering
enough detail about Aristotle's doctrines to illuminate his entire
system and making the interconnections among the various elements of
Aristotle's system clear.
* Ross, Sir David. Aristotle. With an introduction by John L.
Ackrill. Sixth edition. London: Routledge, 1995.
o This is a classic in the field, now in its sixth edition,
having first been published in 1923. Not many books can stay useful
for eighty years. "It is not an elementary introduction for the
absolute beginner," the introduction says, and that seems right to me,
but neither does it require the reader to be an expert. It covers all
of Aristotle's work, with chapters on Logic, Philosophy of Nature,
Biology, Psychology, Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric and
Poetics.
* Thompson, Garrett and Marshall Missner. On Aristotle. Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth, 2000.
o Another short (100 page) overview of Aristotle's thought
that is too short to be adequate for any one topic (Chapter Nine,
Aristotle's view of politics, is less than six pages long) but might
be useful for the new student of Aristotle interested in a brief look
at the breadth of Aristotle's interests. The book by Barnes included
above is to be preferred.
Secondary literature – books on Aristotle's Politics
* Keyt, David, and Fred Miller, eds. A Companion to Aristotle's
Politics. London: Blackwell, 1991.
* Kraut, Richard. Aristotle: Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
o An exceptional work of scholarship. Detailed, insightful,
and as close to being comprehensive as anyone is likely to get in one
book. The text is clearly broken down by topic and sub-topic, and the
bibliography will help steer the Aristotle student in the right
direction for future research. Kraut also notes other authors who
disagree with his interpretation and why he believes they are wrong;
this too is helpful for further research. Highly recommended.
* Miller, Fred. Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle's
Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
* Mulgan, R.G. Aristotle's Political Theory: An Introduction for
Students of Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.
o Mulgan's book "is intended for students of political
theory who are meeting the Politics for the first time and in an
English translation." It is divided into subjects rather than
following the topics in the order discussed in the Politics as this
article has done, with footnotes to the relevant passages in
Aristotle's texts. It is nicely detailed and offers excellent
discussions (and criticisms) of Aristotle's thought.
* Simpson, Peter. A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of
Aristotle. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
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