Ethical Criticism of Art

Traditionally, there were two opposing philosophical positions taken
with respect to the legitimacy of the ethical evaluation of art:
'moralism' and 'autonomism', where moralism is the view that the
aesthetic value of art should be determined by, or reduced to, its
moral value, while autonomism holds that it is inappropriate to apply
moral categories to art; they should be evaluated by 'aesthetic'
standards alone. Recent work on the ethical criticism of art has
proposed several new positions; more moderate versions of autonomism
and moralism which lie between the two extremes described above. The
issue has now become not one of whether moral evaluations of art works
are appropriate, but rather, whether they should be described as
aesthetic evaluations. The contemporary debate focuses on narrative
art, which is seen as having unique features to which ethical
criticism is particularly pertinent. Attempts have been made to
simplify the issue of the ethical criticism of art by distancing
peripheral issues such as causal claims about the effects of art on
its audience and censorship. However, there is still considerable
interest in the possibility of certain narrative artworks having the
potential to play an important role in moral education. The debate
over the ethical criticism of art therefore highlights some of the
central reasons why we value narrative art, as well as questioning the
scope, or the parameters, of our concept of the aesthetic.

1. Introduction

'Ethical criticism' refers to the inclusion of an ethical component in
the interpretation and evaluation of art. The two traditional opposing
positions taken with respect to ethical criticism are 'autonomism' and
'moralism'. The former claims that ethical criticism is never
legitimate since moral and aesthetic value are autonomous, while the
latter reduces aesthetic value to moral value. The extreme versions of
autonomism and moralism, their appeal and their flaws, are discussed
in section two.

In recent years, debate over ethical criticism has resurfaced, partly
through the Ethical Criticism Symposium featured in Philosophy and
Literature in 1997-8, which is discussed in the final section of this
article, since it bears on the consideration of the causal thesis that
certain literature can have positive moral effects on its audience. A
second arm of the ethical criticism debate saw several more moderate,
and more plausible, positions proposed. These are 'moderate
autonomism', 'moderate moralism' and 'ethicism'. In this body of
literature too, the focus was on narrative art. What is at issue in
the current debate is whether the realm of aesthetic value should be
taken to include the moral value of narrative art (a) never, (b) only
sometimes when an artwork displays moral features (merits or defects),
or (c) whenever an artwork displays moral features (merits or
defects). Due to differences between the modes of expression and
content matter of the different art forms, it seems likely that what
is true of the ethical criticism of narrative art, which often deals
explicitly with human affairs and morality, may not be true of
abstract art forms such as music and some fine arts and dance. Such
art forms would require separate consideration and this is something
which has not thus far been undertaken in the philosophical
literature.

Section 3 considers the debate between moderate autonomism, defended
by Anderson and Dean, and Noel Carroll's moderate moralism, examining
Carroll's reasons for arguing that at least sometimes the moral
features of narrative artworks are also aesthetic features. Section 4
introduces Berys Gaut's 'ethicism', and examines the contention, made
primarily by Anderson and Dean, that moderate moralism and ethicism
are one and the same position. This claim is shown to be false, and
the two positions are clearly distinguished. Much of the recent debate
over ethical criticism – that is the debate between moderate
autonomism, moderate moralism and ethicism – focusses on the flaws in
the specific arguments presented for moderate moralism and ethicism.
In fact, the central issue in the debate over ethical criticism, which
is somewhat masked by the details, is how broadly the aesthetic should
be defined. While the extreme positions, radical autonomism and
radical moralism define the aesthetic most narrowly, the position
which defines the aesthetic most broadly and inclusively is ethicism.
2. Radical Autonomism and Radical Moralism

There are two extreme positions traditionally taken with respect to
the relationship between art and morality; one is autonomism, or
aestheticism, which is the view that it is inappropriate to apply
moral categories to artworks, and that only aesthetic categories are
relevant, while at the other end of the scale is moralism, the view
that aesthetic objects should be judged wholly or centrally with
respect to moral standards or values. Both autonomism and moralism are
widely recognised to be problematic, as they are based on inadequate
conceptions of art and aesthetic value.

Radical Moralism is the view that the aesthetic value of an artwork is
determined by its moral value. The most extreme version of this
position reduces all aesthetic value to moral value. Proponents of
radical moralism include Tolstoy, who, arguing against definitions of
art that equated art with beauty, said: "The inaccuracy of all these
definitions arises from the fact that in them all … the object
considered is the pleasure art may give, and not the purpose it may
serve in the life of man and of humanity." Tolstoy emphasised the
moral significance of art in society as essential to the (aesthetic)
value of art. Social reductionism, such as the 'popular aesthetic'
endorsed by Pierre Bourdieu, Roger Taylor and others, is also a
version of radical moralism. Radical moralism has been widely
criticised for ignoring certain fundamental aspects of aesthetic
value, such as formal features. The radical moralist will have some
difficulty explaining how art can be distinguished from other cultural
products, including such things as political speeches, due to their
failure to include in their criteria for making judgments about
aesthetic value anything that is a unique feature of art.

Autonomism and aestheticism are essentially the same position. The
label 'autonomism' captures the fact that this position holds that
aesthetic value is autonomous from other kinds of value, such as moral
value. The label 'aestheticism' captures the fact that the position
emphasises the importance of focussing on theaesthetic, that is, the
pure aesthetic, features of artworks. Pure aesthetic qualities may
include formal features and beauty or, for some autonomists, formal
features only. It is important to note that formalism and autonomism
are not identical positions, although advocates of formalism will tend
to be autonomists. Formalism, rejected earlier, is the view that the
proper way to respond to art is to respond to its formal features or,
in other words, that the aesthetic value of an artwork is determined
solely by its formal features. A formalist, such as Clive Bell, would
not include beauty as something we should respond to in art, but those
formalists who do include beauty regard it as something that is
determined by the formal features the artwork possesses.

"Aestheticism' is perhaps the more appropriate label for the extreme
position subscribed to by the aesthete – that aesthetic value is the
highest of all values. Interestingly, although the aesthete might not
be interested in defending their position, any attempt to do so would
likely involve appeals to moral standards; that is, they would have to
give a justification for their view that one should take on a
predominantly aesthetic attitude in life in terms of moral value. For
example, Richard Posner, in 'Against Ethical Criticism', appears to
identify himself as an aesthete, but, ironically, an aesthete who
wants to provide a moral justification for his position: "The
aesthetic outlook is a moral outlook, one that stresses the values of
openness, detachment, hedonism, curiosity, tolerance, the cultivation
of the self, and the preservation of a private sphere – in short, the
values of liberal individualism."(1997, p. 2) Aestheticism, in it's
most extreme form, could almost be seen as a version of radical
moralism. In any case, both positions are equally reductive with
respect to the scope of aesthetic value.

However, 'aestheticism' does not always refer to the extreme position,
and the terms 'autonomism' and 'aestheticism' can be used
interchangeably. Autonomism has become the predominant term used in
recent literature, most likely because it does capture the notion that
aesthetic value is held to be an autonomous realm of value by those
who subscribe to any version of this position. Radical Autonomism is
the view that the proper way to respond to art is to respond only to
the pure aesthetic qualities, or what is 'in the work itself'; while
to bring moral values, or other social values, to bear on art is a
mistake. The radical autonomist's motto is 'art for art's sake'. Oscar
Wilde is an example of a radical autonomist. He wrote in the Preface
to The Picture of Dorien Gray: "…to art's subject matter we should be
more or less indifferent," and "Life is the solvent that breaks up
art, the enemy that lays waste her house." Wilde's statements on the
topic of and and morality are those of an autonomist, although the
subject matter of his own work dealt explicitly with moral issues. His
position appears to have been not that literary art can't deal with
moral issues as part of its subject matter, but simply that they are
irrelevant to the aesthetic value of the art, and should not influence
the audience's, or critic's, aesthetic response to the work. An
autonomist position such as this is based on a narrow understanding of
the aesthetic value of art, which values the way in which the subject
matter of such art is represented (which may include formal features
and beauty), but not the subject matter itself (which may include
moral features). However, autonomism, while purporting to give
aesthetic value primacy, neglects many of the potential ways in which
art can have aesthetic value. Such a view ignores the fact that
certain art forms are culturally embedded, and, as such, are
inextricably bound up with important social values, such as moral
value.

Noel Carroll explains the appeal of radical autonomism with reference
to the "common denominator argument"; that is, the argument that it is
only those features common to all art that are the essential defining
features of art, and it is only these features that should properly be
regarded as being within the realm of the aesthetic. (See 'Moderate
Moralism', BJA, 36:3, 1996) As Carroll points out, the fact that
radical autonomists have a ready answer to the questions -What are the
unique and essential features common to all art? – or – What are the
defining features of art? – is a central reason for the appeal of
their position. This feature of autonomism appears to provide a
straightforward way of distinguishing art from non-art, as well as
providing specific grounds upon which to defend the objectivity of
aesthetic value. A further reason autonomism initially seems intuitive
is that it is difficult to see how moral considerations could be
pertinent across whole art forms, such as music, and abstract art of
various kinds.(p. 226) The above reasons make radical autonomism an
attractive position, but its narrow construal of the aesthetic is too
narrow to adequately account for the aesthetic value of certain art
forms, or particular artworks. Besides, as was discussed earlier,
attempting to define art in terms of essential criteria common to all
artworks is not a promising strategy; the nature of art defies such
restrictions. Carroll argues that "we can challenge [the radical
autonomist's] appeal to the nature of art with appeals to the natures
of specific art forms or genres which, given what they are, warrant at
least additional criteria of evaluation to supplement whatever the
autonomist claims is the common denominator of aesthetic evaluation."
(p. 227)

What Carroll specifically has in mind is the role our moral
understanding plays in our appreciation of narrative art. Carroll
claims that narrative artworks are always incomplete, and that a
certain amount of information has to be filled in by the reader or
audience in order to make the work intelligible. This includes
information which must be supplied by our moral understanding. He
says: "…it is vastly improbable that there could be any substantial
narrative of human affairs, especially a narrative artwork, that did
not rely upon activating the moral powers of readers, viewers and
listeners. Even modernist novels that appear to eschew 'morality'
typically do so in order to challenge bourgeois morality and to enlist
the reader in sharing their ethical disdain for it." (p. 228) Examples
of works which require the input of our moral understanding in order
to make the narrative intelligible include Jane Austin's Emma, George
Elliot's Middlemarch, and (ironically) Oscar Wilde's The Picture of
Dorian Gray.
3. Moderate Autonomism and Moderate Moralism
a. Moderate Autonomism

Moderate autonomism, defended by J. Anderson and J. Dean, is a more
plausible position than radical autonomism; it recognises that moral
merits or defects can feature in the content of certain art forms and
that sometimes moral judgments of artworks are pertinent. However,
moderate autonomism is still an autonomist position in the sense that
it maintains that the aesthetic value and the moral value of artworks
are autonomous. According to moderate autonomism: "an artwork will
never be aesthetically better in virtue of its moral strengths, and
will never be worse because of its moral defects. / On a strict
reading of moderate autonomism, one of its decisive claims is that
defective moral understanding never counts against the aesthetic merit
of a work. An artwork may invite an audience to entertain a defective
moral perspective and this will not detract from its aesthetic
value."(Carroll, 1996, p. 232) It is this central claim that both
Carroll and Gaut argue against.
b. Moderate Moralism

Moderate autonomism stands in opposition to 'Moderate moralism':
"[Moderate moralism] contends that some works of art may be evaluated
morally (contra radical autonomism) and that sometimes the moral
defects and/or merits of a work may figure in the aesthetic evaluation
of the work." (p. 236) The crucial difference between moderate
autonomism and moderate moralism, then, is that while both agree that
moral judgments can be legitimately made about certain artworks,
moderate moralists contend that sometimes such judgments are aesthetic
evaluations, while moderate autonomists hold that moral judgments
about works of art are always outside the realm of the aesthetic. On
the one hand, Anderson and Dean say, "some of the knowledge that art
brings home to us may be moral knowledge. All this is granted when we
agree that art is properly subject to moral evaluation. But why is
this value aesthetic value?" (Anderson & Dean p. 160) On the other
hand, Carroll says, "Moderate autonomists overlook the degree to which
moral presuppositions play a structural role in the design of many
artworks."(Carroll 1996 p. 233) Carroll does not suggest that this is
the only way in which moral features may contribute to a work's
aesthetic value; a more general account of this is described in the
following section.
c. Moderate Autonomism vs Moderate Moralism

What is really at issue in the debate over ethical criticism is how
broadly we define the aesthetic. But this is not simply arbitrary –
what in fact are the boundaries of the aesthetic? Carroll aims to
show, with reference to specific examples, that there are actual cases
where a narrow construal of the aesthetic, such as the one adopted by
moderate autonomists, is an inadequate way of understanding that
work's aesthetic value, and an inadequate way of understanding how we
appreciate such artworks qua artworks. Even if moderate moralism is
not the best way to explain the moral value of narrative artworks,
Carroll is wise to turn to critical analysis of actual examples to
support his argument, for this is where we can most clearly see the
problems with moderate autonomism.

The central argument for moderate moralism (hereafter MM) is described
as the 'Common Reason Argument.' Having first argued that many
narrative artworks are incomplete in ways that require us to use our
moral understanding in order to comprehend the work, Carroll then
argues, with reference to examples, that because of this fact about
narrative artworks, it is sometimes the case that a moral defect in a
work will also be an aesthetic defect since it prevents us from fully
engaging with that work. In other words, Carroll argues that in some
cases the reason a work is morally flawed is the same reason the work
is aesthetically flawed, and so in these cases the judgment that the
work is morally flawed is also an aesthetic evaluation of that work.
(Anderson & Dean, 1998, pp. 156-7) Mary Devereaux's analysis ofTriumph
of the Will provides an excellent example of this. (See her article
'Beauty and Evil' in Levinson,Aesthetics & Ethics, 1998). According to
Devereaux, Triumph of the Will is morally problematic because it
presents the Nazi regime as appealing. Although a morally sensitive
audience might be able to appreciate some of the formal features
exhibited in the film, such as the innovative camera work, such an
audience would be unable to fully engage with the film due to an
inability to accept the film's central vision, that is, the
glorification of Hitler and the Nazi regime. If the audience is unable
to fully engage with the film's central vision, this, according to
Carroll's MM, will count as an aesthetic defect in the film (because
the magnitude of our aesthetic experience will be limited by our
inability to fully engage with the film's central theme). So, the very
feature that makes the film morally defective is also one of most
significant aesthetic defects in the film. Hence, the moral
defectiveness and the aesthetic defectiveness are due to a common
reason in this particular case.

In their argument against MM, Anderson and Dean construct two
arguments, a 'moral defect argument' and an 'aesthetic defect
argument', which, together, they take to represent the 'common reason
argument.' The two arguments are presented as follows:

The Moral Defect Argument

1. The perspective of the work in question is immoral.
2. Therefore, the work 'invites us to share [this morally]
defective perspective' (In one case we are invited to find an evil
person sympathetic; in the other case, we are invited to find gruesome
acts humorous.)
3. Any work which invites us to share a morally defective
perspective is, itself, morally defective.
4. Therefore, the work in question is morally defective

The Aesthetic Defect Argument

1. The perspective of the work in question is immoral.
2. The immorality portrayed subverts the possibility of uptake.
(In the case of the tragedy, the response of pity is precluded; in the
case of the satire the savouring of parody is precluded.)
3. Any work which subverts its own genre is aesthetically defective.
4. Therefore, the work in question is aesthetically defective.
(pp. 156-7)

Anderson and Dean focus their objection to MM on the fact that the one
premise the moral defect argument and the aesthetic defect argument
share (1) is not sufficient to establish either moral defectiveness or
aesthetic defectiveness.(p. 157) This may be so, but Carroll responds
to this by pointing out the common reason doesn't need to be a
sufficient reason. There may be other reasons that contribute to both
the aesthetic evaluation and the moral evaluation of artworks, but in
some cases these two groups of reasons overlap; where a reason is
common to both groups, and is a central, if not sufficient, reason for
both the conclusion that a work is morally defective, and the
conclusion that the work is aesthetically defective. As Carroll puts
it in his response to Anderson and Dean:

But why suppose that the relevant sense of reason here is
sufficient reason? Admittedly a number of factors will contribute to
the moral defectiveness and the aesthetic defectiveness of the work in
question. The moderate moralist need only contend that among the
complex of factors that account for the moral defectiveness of the
artwork in question, on the one hand, and the complex of factors that
explain the aesthetic defectiveness of the artwork, on the other hand,
the evil perspective of the artwork will play a central, though
perhaps not sufficient, explanatory role in both. (Carroll, 1998a,
p423)

Carroll's response to Anderson and Dean's objection is convincing.
There seems no reason to object to MM simply because the common reason
shared the aesthetic defect argument and the moral defect argument is
not a sufficient reason in either case.

Anderson and Dean eschew specific examples in their defense of MA,
saying: 'because of the complexity of particular cases, we have taken
pains not to rest our case on the examination of them." (A&D, 1998, p.
164). Since MM holds that moral judgments about artworks can be
aesthetic evaluations in some cases, it is only necessary to show that
the reason a work is morally defective is the same as the reason that
work is aesthetically defective in a few actual cases in order to
support MM. Carroll does give us some convincing examples, and
Anderson and Dean do not show why Carroll is wrong in these particular
cases. Given that there are at least some cases, such as Devereaux's
analysis of Triumph of the Will, in which it has been convincingly
shown that the reason a work is morally meritorious or defective is
the same reason that work is aesthetically meritorious or defective,
it follows that moderate autonomism is false.
4. Moderate Moralism and Ethicism
a. Distinguishing Moderate Moralism from Ethicism

As previously mentioned, 'moderate moralism' holds that: "some works
of art may be evaluated morally (contra radical autonomism) and that
sometimes themoral defects and/or merits of a work may figure in the
aesthetic evaluation of the work." (Carroll, 1996, p. 236, my italics)
'Ethicism' holds that: "the ethical assessment of attitudes manifested
by works of art is a legitimate aspect of the aesthetic evaluation of
those works, such that, if a work manifests ethically reprehensible
attitudes, it is to that extent aesthetically defective, and if a work
manifest ethically commendable attitudes, it is to that extent
aesthetically meritorious." (See Berys Gaut's 'The Ethical Criticism
of Art' in Levinson, 1998, p. 182)

Anderson and Dean claim that MM and ethicism are 'similar, if not
identical' (A&D, 1998, p. 157). They must mean that the positions are
similar or identical in terms of scope, since Carroll and Gaut's
arguments clearly differ in detail. However, they are incorrect about
this. The inclusion of 'sometimes' in Carroll's statement of his
position indicates that MM is a weaker position than ethicism – since
there is no such qualification in Gaut's statement of ethicism. As
Carroll himself says, in his reply to Anderson and Dean: "…my case is
more limited in scope than Gaut's. Gaut seems willing to consider
virtually every moral defect in a work of art an aesthetic defect,
whereas I defend a far weaker claim – namely that sometimes a moral
defect in an artwork can count as an aesthetic defect…" (Carroll,
1998a p. 419)

If we look at Gaut's arguments for ethicism, it is clear how ethicism
differs from MM in scope, as well as simply in detail. The argument
for ethicism runs as follows (this is taken directly from "The Ethical
Criticism of Art," but I have numbered each step in the argument):

1. A work's manifestation of an attitude is a matter of the
work's prescribing certain responses toward the events described.
2. If those responses are unmerited, because unethical, we have
reason not to respond in the way prescribed.
3. Our having reason not to respond in the way prescribed is a
failure of the work.
4. What responses the work prescribes is of aesthetic relevance.
5. So the fact that we have reason not to respond in the way
prescribed is an aesthetic failure of the work, that is to say, is an
aesthetic defect.
6. So a work's manifestation of ethically bad attitudes is an
aesthetic defect in it.
7. Mutatis mutandis, a parallel argument shows that a work's
manifestation of ethically commendable attitudes is an aesthetic merit
in it, since we have reason to adopt a prescribed response that is
ethically commendable.
8. So Ethicism is true. (Gaut, in Levinson, 2000, pp. 195-6)

Notice that this argument, in particular step (2), commit Gaut to the
thesis that whenever a narrative artwork displays moral features,
either merits or defects, these will always impact on the aesthetic
value of that work to some degree. Certain flaws in Gaut's argument
have been identified by Anderson and Dean and by Carroll. The most
significant of these will be examined a little later.

Early in his article, Gaut explicitly outlines the scope of ethicism.
It is important to note that "ethicism does not entail the casual
thesis that good art ethically improves people," nor the reverse
claim; that bad art corrupts.(p. 184) Gaut describes "the ethicist
principle [as] a pro tanto one: it holds that a work is aesthetically
meritorious (or defective) insofar as it manifests ethically admirable
(or reprehensible) attitudes. (The claim could also be put like this:
manifesting ethically admirable attitudes counts towardthe aesthetic
merit of a work, and manifesting ethically reprehensible attitudes
counts against its aesthetic merit.) (p. 182) There is an additional
qualification, that, "the ethicist does not hold that manifesting
ethically commendable attitudes is a necessary condition for a work to
be aesthetically good: there can be good, even great, works of art
that are ethically flawed. . . .Nor does the ethicist thesis hold that
manifesting ethically good attitudes is a sufficient condition for a
work to be aesthetically good." (pp. 182-3) Gaut explains that "the
ethicist can deny these necessity and sufficiency claims, because she
holds that there are a plurality of aesthetic values, of which the
ethical values of artworks are but a single kind," and he suggests "we
… need to make an all-things-considered judgment, balancing these
aesthetic merits and demerits against one another to determine whether
the work is, all things considered, good."(p. 183) It is these
features of ethicism – its recognition of a plurality of aesthetic
qualities of which moral features are one kind and its commitment to
an all-things-considered judgment of aesthetic value – which make
ethicism a better way of understanding how the moral features of
artworks impact on their aesthetic value than MM. Ethicism does not
claim that every artwork, or even every narrative artwork, does
contain moral features, only that when they do, these impact on the
aesthetic value of the works to some extent.

As previously noted, not only do the arguments for MM and ethicism
differ in scope, but they also differ in detail; and in the detail of
each arguments there are possible flaws. A possible difficulty with MM
– a difficulty that Oliver Conolly identifies – lies in its reliance
on the notion of an'ideal', or 'morally sensitive' audience – the
normative element in MM. (See Conolly, 'Ethicism & Moderate Moralism,
BJA, 40:3, 2000)

Carroll wants to make clear that his 'ideal sensitive viewer' is not
one who simply makes "whatever the work has to offer inaccessible to
himself because it at first offends their moral sensibilities". He
explains that "the reluctance that the moderate moralist has in mind
is not that the ideally sensitive audience member voluntarily puts on
the brakes; rather, it is that he can't depress the accelerator
because it is jammed. He tries, but fails. And he fails because there
is something wrong with the structure of the artwork. It has not been
designed properly on its own terms." (Carroll, 2000, p. 378) This
appears to avoid the objection that 'morally sensitive audiences' will
simply impose their own moral views on artworks. However, even with
this clarification, the notion of an'ideal' or, 'morally sensitive',
audience still seems problematic.
b. Ethicism vs Moderate Moralism

Conolly suggests that there are four possible interpretations of MM;
Optimistic Instrumental MM, Ideal-Spectator Instrumental MM, Standard
Instrumental MM and Standard Intrinsic MM. According to Optimistic
Instrumental MM, "moral virtues always happen to lead to greater
audience-absorption, owing to a uniformly moral audience."(Conolly,
2000, p. 308) This interpretation of MM is not only far too
optimistic, but also explicitly rejected by Carroll, who distinguishes
his 'morally sensitive audiences' from actual audiences, saying,
"sometimes actual audiences may fail to be deterred by a moral defect
in a work because, given the circumstances, they are not as morally
sensitive as they should be…"(Carroll, 2000 p. 378) He gives the
example of an audience during the midst of war. This clarification
also avoids the problem of explaining the moral and aesthetic value of
artworks simply in terms of popular opinion. Hence, the appeal to the
normative notion of an ideal audience, rather than actual audiences
avoids relativism. However, Conolly points out that MM's reliance on
this normative element leads to a collapse of MM into ethicism.
According to Ideal Spectator MM, "[i]f only ideally moral audiences
count, then … it follows that all moral virtues / defects are also
aesthetic virtues / defects." (Conolly, 2000, p. 306) Conolly explains
that "[t]his is because 'morally sensitive audiences' will always
react favourably to moral virtue and unfavourably to moral vice. That,
one takes it, is what makes them morally sensitive."(p. 306) Conolly
goes on to argue that the two other possible interpretations of MM are
wrong, but I will not follow him there. The central point is that, to
the extent that it relies on the notion of the ideal audience, MM
collapses into ethicism, because in actual fact moral features (merits
or defects) will always be aesthetic features also (merits or
defects). However, it should be noted that MM's reliance on 'ideal' or
'morally sensitive' audiences means that Carroll doesn't specify
particular criteria upon which to base judgments about the moral
defectiveness or moral virtue of artworks, but his position is
compatible with such criteria, which would render the ideal audience
redundant.

However, although there are valuable aspects to MM – in particular,
the common reason argument has its merits – it nevertheless seems more
plausible to claim, as the ethicist does, that the moral features of
narrative artworks are always aesthetically relevant, i.e. they are
always also aesthetic features in the sense that they impact to some
degree on the overall aesthetic value of those works. One reason for
this is that since MM states that moral features will only sometimes
also be aesthetic features, there must be some moral features of
artworks that are not aesthetically relevant, whereas no such category
is required by ethicism. Carroll never explains what would distinguish
a case in which moral features were aesthetically relevant from a case
in which they weren't – it seems only to be a question of degree – and
I suggest that it makes more sense to simply say that moral features
can impact on aesthetic value to varying degrees.

I have previously mentioned that MM is more limited in scope than
ethicism. Although he is not unsympathetic to Gaut's view, Carroll
attempts to show that ethicism is harder to defend than MM. Carroll
claims that there is a problem with what exactly is built into the
notion of an unmerited response. He says that according to ethicism
"[a]ll immoral responses are alleged to be unmerited in a way that is
relevant to aesthetic response."(Carroll, 2000 p. 375) But Carroll
questions this assumption by drawing an analogy with immoral humour.
He argues: "if the ethicist means by 'unmerited' "unwarranted," then
the claim with respect to artworks that all prescribed, though
immoral, responses are unmerited is false, since, like a joke, the
structure and content of an artwork may warrant a prescribed response
that is immoral. On the other hand, if the ethicist protests that by
(aesthetically) 'unmerited' he means to include "morally unmerited,"
then he can be charged with begging the question."(p. 376) So, Carroll
concludes, the 'merited response argument' can be criticised on the
grounds that "not all ethically unmerited responses to artworks are
unmerited aesthetically."(p. 376) This objection can be challenged on
Carroll's own terms, since ideally moral audiences presumably would
not find an immoral joke (for instance a racist joke) amusing, any
more than they would find Triumph of the Will engaging, it can also be
challenged on the grounds that laughing at a joke is not the same
thing as judging an artwork to have high aesthetic value. Sometimes we
laugh at 'bad jokes', such as pathetic puns, even while we recognise
them as such. Likewise, we might be entertained by a 'bad film', such
as 'Revenge of the Killer Tomatoes' or 'Girl On a Motorcycle', or
other such cult films, while recognising it as such all the while.
5. The Causal Thesis

While much of the recent research on ethical criticism has wrangled
over what should and should not count as an aesthetic feature, a more
commonplace concern about literary, or narrative, art and morality
would be concerned with the possible effects those works might have on
their audiences. For example, the popular Ben Elton novel Popcorn is a
black comedy dealing with the issue of the effects of violent films
portraying killers as attractive and powerful. However, it is
desirable to keep causal claims about the harmful or 'edifying'
effects of art at a distance when discussing the aesthetic relevance
of the moral features of literary artworks. One of the main objections
to ethical criticism made by radical autonomists is the
anti-consequentialist objection that there is no evidence for causal
claims about either the harmful or edifying effects of art. However,
this objection assumes that ethical criticism is consequentialist,
whereas it needn't be at all. (A consequentialist version of ethical
criticism would hold that the moral value of artworks, or certain
artworks, was determined by that work's actual effects on its
audience. An expectational-consequentialist version of ethical
criticism would hold that the moral value of art is determined by its
likely effects on its audience.) If one rejects a consequentialist, or
expectational-consequentialist, account of the moral value of art,
then consideration of the effects (actual or likely) of literary
artworks is a only matter for further consideration once the question
of a work's moral status has been decided; it is not relevant to the
judgment of that work's moral status. More work could certainly be
done on the effects of artworks, however it is an area where empirical
research would be required, and this is another reason causal claims
have not figured highly in recent work on ethical criticism, although
it should be mentioned that there is an imbalance is the extent to
which positive and negative causal claims about the effects of
narrative art have featured in this research.

Hence, it comes as no surprise that many of those who attempt to
defend ethical criticism distance themselves from the causal thesis
that morally bad art corrupts, and its counterpart, that art with high
moral value morally improves its audience. Although most advocates of
ethical criticism successfully avoid the negative causal thesis that
bad art corrupts, many do in fact defend a version of the positive
causal thesis that good art morally improves its audience. Thus, the
negative thesis is avoided more assiduously than the positive, and the
positive causal thesis has been more thoroughly developed. I think
there are two main reasons for this. The first is that the negative
thesis is not only more difficult to prove conceptually, but work in
this area leads to fears about censorship of works deemed harmful. As
discussed later, this fear need not preclude research on the negative
effects of artworks, as the discovery that a work can have negative,
or even harmful, effects on its audience does not necessarily entail
that it should be censored. Another reason for the imbalance between
the two sides of the causal thesis is that the positive causal thesis
is more obviously relevant to discussions of the role, and value, of
art in society.

It should be remembered that both the positive and negative sides of
the causal thesis comprise a set of claims varying in degree. The
strongest causal claims about art would be that bad art always
corrupts its audience, while good art always brings about moral
improvement; but any thesis this strong is intuitively implausible,
and would be difficult to prove. The theses that bad art has the
capacity to encourage immoral behaviour or attitudes in its audience,
and that good art has the capacity to play an important role in our
moral education (with the implication that these capacities may go
unrealised) are rather more plausible. Martha Nussbaum has been the
strongest advocate of the latter, while the former has not, to my
knowledge, yet been fully explored. The following sub-section
considers Nussbaum's contribution to the ethical criticism debate, in
particular with respect to the role that realist literature can play
in moral education.
a. Literature and Moral Education

The 'Ethical Criticism Symposium', is a debate which took place,
mostly within two issues of Philosophy and Literature, (Volumes 21-22)
between Richard Posner on the one hand, who argued vehemently against
the legitimacy of ethical criticism, and Martha Nussbaum and Wayne
Booth on the other, who defended ethical criticism. Posner has already
been introduced, and identified as at least a radical autonomist, and
probably an extreme autonomist / aestheticist, or in other words, an
aesthete. Against those who engage in ethical criticism, with a
particular focus on Martha Nussbaum and Wayne Booth, Posner employs
three of the most common objections to ethical criticism: autonomism /
aestheticism, cognitive triviality and anti-consequentialism. However,
Posner's arguments rely on a narrow understanding of the ways in which
literature can manifest moral features, and I will argue here that a
broader moral context, such as that explicated in Nussbaum's work on
morality and literature, makes her claims about the moral value of
literature plausible. Posner's narrow understanding of moral knowledge
and moral education mean that his criticisms of Nussbaum miss their
mark. Nussbaum could be described as a moderate moralist (although her
position is also compatible with ethicism) for although she never
explicitly argues for MM, she makes two claims in her article "Exactly
and Responsibly: A Defense of Ethical criticism", in which her views
are strikingly similar to Carroll's 'Common Reason Argument':

* "Consider Booth's marvelous critique of Peter Benchley's novel
Jaws … Booth records his critique as a moral evaluation of Benchley.
But isn't it just these features of the text – its superficiality, its
human barrenness, its formulaic use of persons as objects – that one
would mention in an aesthetic critique?"
* "I suggest that in general and for the most part, and only where
novels are concerned, we find aesthetically pleasing only works that
treat human beings as humans and not just animals or objects, that
contain what I have called respect before the soul. But this quality
is also moral, so we might say that in the novel aesthetic interest
and moral interest are not altogether unrelated." (Nussbaum, 1998, p.
357) Carroll's overview of ethical criticism also suggests some ways
of responding to the sort of objections to ethical criticism made by
Posner.

Some of the main arguments against radical autonomism were presented
earlier, and the position was shown to be an inadequate way of
understanding aesthetic value, particularly the aesthetic value of
literary art. Nussbaum, however, criticizes Posner's autonomist
position on more specific grounds, claiming:

Nor, it turns out, does Posner himself consistently hold the
aesthetic-detachment position. Indeed, the role he imputes to
literature in human life is clearly a moral one in my sense . . .
Literature, he says, 'helps us make sense of our lives, helps us to
fashion an identity for ourselves.' Reading a poem of Donne, he
continues, won't persuade someone who never thought about love that
love is the most important thing in the world. But it may 'make you
realize that this is what you think, and so may serve to clarify
yourself to yourself.' That, of course, is what I have been saying all
along. (p359)

Nussbaum is right to point out the inconsistency. As with the rather
ironic quotation, in which Posner provides a moral justification for
an extreme aestheticism (see section two), there are times when he
uses moral discourse in his analysis of the aesthetic value of a work
of literature – only he doesn't seem to recognise it as such. There
appear to be two main reasons why Posner objects so strongly to
ethical criticism, and especially to Nussbaum's employment of it.
First, Posner's understanding of ethics is very much a traditional
'justice ethics', and thus he is already at odds with Nussbaum, who's
understanding of ethics is somewhat broader. She says:

One can think of works of art which can be contemplated reasonably
well without asking any urgent questions about how one should live.
Abstract formalist paintings are sometimes of this character, and some
intricate but non-programmatic works of music (though by no means
all). But it seems highly unlikely that a responsive reading of any
complex literary work is utterly detached from concerns about time and
death, about pain and the transcendence of pain, and so on — all the
material of 'how one should live' questions as I have conceived it.
Thus, even with regard to works I don't talk about at all — poetic
dramas, lyric poems, novels by novelists very different from Dickens
and James — the aesthetic-detachment thesis is implausible if we use
'ethical' and 'moral' in the broad sense that I have consistently and
explicitly given it. (Nussbaum, 1998, p. 358)

Nussbaum's understanding of morality is informed not only by
Aristotle, but also by Iris Murdoch's work, and by the insights of
feminist moral philosophy.

Nussbaum's main concern is with moral philosophy, and her interest in
ethical criticism appears to stem from the desire to show the value
and usefulness of a particular selection of literature to moral
philosophy, and to the development of important moral skills. Thus,
her perspective on ethical criticism differs from that of anyone who
is approaching the topic with a central focus on aesthetics. However,
Nussbaum recognises that literature can have many different purposes
(1998 p. 347); she is merely pursuing one avenue. Among her responses
to Posner's criticisms, she makes explicit her specific purposes in
the two books to which he refers:

Posner's attack is directed at two very different works: Love's
Knowledge, where my primary concern is with moral philosophy, and with
the claim that moral philosophy needs certain carefully selected works
of narrative literature in order to pursue its own task in a complete
way; and Poetic Justice, where my concern is with the conduct of
public deliberations in democracy, and where my claim is that
literature of a carefully specified sort can offer valuable assistance
to such deliberations by both cultivating and reinforcing valuable
moral abilities. In neither work do I make any general claims about
'literature' as such; indeed, I explicitly eschew such claims in both
works, and I insist that my argument is confined to a narrow group of
pre-selected works . . . (1998 p. 346)

Nussbaum goes so far as to say that is her contention that, "certain
novels are, irreplaceably, works of moral philosophy. But I shall go
further … the novel can be a paradigm of moral activity." (1987 p.
170) Nussbaum's central purposes for her selected literature are to
demonstrate that this literature has a place amongst moral philosophy,
and to argue that such literature has important role in moral
education due to its capacity to help develop certain moral abilities.

Posner objects to the idea that literature should be used or
interpreted as an extension of moral philosophy, and that it can
contribute to moral education. There are two main objections; the
first is that literature is not a unique or particularly good source
of moral knowledge, the second that there is no evidence to suggest
that certain literature can morally improve its audience. With
reference to the former, Posner argues:

There is neither evidence nor a theoretical reason for a belief
that literature provides a straighter path to knowledge about man and
society than other sources of such knowledge, including writings in
other fields, such as history and science, and interactions with real
people. Some people prefer to get their knowledge of human nature from
novels, but it doesn't follow that novels are a superior source of
such knowledge to life and to the various genres of nonfiction.
(Posner, 1997, p. 10)

This objection is characteristic of those Carroll describes as
arguments from cognitive triviality. (Carroll, 2000, pp. 353-355) The
two main claims that make up this objection are; first, that "the
moral theses associated with artworks are usually in the nature of
truisms," which "would hardly count as moral discoveries."(Carroll,
2000, p. 354) And secondly, the claim made explicitly by Posner
(above), that the knowledge (in this case, moral knowledge), imparted
by artworks is not superior to (and some object that it is actually
inferior to) that imparted by moral philosophy and the sciences. As
Carroll notes, one way of countering this objection:

. . . is to claim that the model of knowledge employed by the
skeptic is too narrow. The skeptic, albeit encouraged by the apparent
practice of many ethical critics, thinks that the knowledge that is
relevant to ethical criticism takes the form of propositions —
propositions such as 'that hypocrisy is noxious' — and goes on to say
that where such propositions are abstractable from artworks they are
generally overwhelmingly trivial. But some ethical critics counter
that there are more forms of knowledge than 'knowledge that.' (p. 361)

As an alternative to this narrow approach to the way in which
literature may be morally informative, Carroll proposes the
'acquaintance approach' as an alternative, which is best summed up in
the following paragraph:

It is one thing to be told that roadways in Mumbai are massively
overcrowded, it is another thing to be given a detailed description
full of illustrative incidents, emotively and perceptively portrayed.
The first presents the fact: the second suggests the flavour. The
first tells you that the streets are congested: the second gives a
sense of what that congestion is like. The ethical critic, or at least
some ethical critics, then, answer skeptics by first agreeing that the
propositional knowledge available in art is often trivial or
platitudinous; art is not competitive with science, philosophy,
history, or even much journalism in supplying 'knowledge that.' But
this is not the only type of knowledge there is. There is also
'knowledge of what such and such would be like.' . . . Moreover, this
kind of knowledge is especially relevant for moral reasoning. In
entertaining alternative courses of action, there is a place for the
imagination. (p. 362)

This is a promising strategy, and one that is consistent with
Nussbaum's views. Nussbaum, again drawing on Henry James, tells us
that moral knowledge restricted to propositions would be incomplete,
what is needed is a broader understanding of moral knowledge: "Moral
knowledge, James suggests, is not simply intellectual grasp of
propositions; it is not even simply intellectual grasp of particular
facts; it is perception, It is seeing a complex, concrete reality in a
highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking in what is there,
with imagination and feeling." (Nussbaum, 1987 p. 174)

Nussbaum's views are informed by the views of Iris Murdoch, as well as
James, and one of the important features of Murdoch's work Nussbaum
draws on is the notion that our inner lives, our perceptions,
self-awareness and so on, can be moral achievements. Speaking of
Maggie, a character in James' The Golden Bowl, Nussbaum says, "Her
perceptions are necessary to her effort to give him up and to preserve
his dignity. They are also moral achievements in their own right:
expressions of love, protections of the loved, creations of a new and
richer bond between them." (p. 175)) The artistic conventions and
stylistic devices available to the literary artist make it possible to
represent our inner lives in a very full and realistic way, through
the engagement of the audiences' imaginations. Nussbaum suggests that
there are some morally relevant aspects of our inner lives that can
only be represented accurately through artistic representation:

I have said that these picturings, describings, feelings and
communications — actions in their own right — have a moral value that
is not reducible to that of the overt acts they engender. I have
begun, on this basis, to build a case for saying that the morally
valuable aspects of this exchange [between Maggie and Adam] could not
be captured in a summary or paraphrase. Now I shall begin to close the
gap between action and description from the other side, showing that a
responsible action, as James conceives it, is a highly
context-specific and nuanced and responsive thing whose rightness
could not be captured in a description that fell short of the
artistic. (1987 p. 176)

Thus, objections to the idea that literature can play an important
role in moral education which are based on claims of
cognitive-triviality are based on too narrow an understanding of moral
knowledge. As Carroll argues, it is quite plausible to suppose that
there are types of moral knowledge other than those which fall within
a propositional model. Accounts of morality such as those proposed by
Murdoch and Nussbaum, which emphasis the importance of our inner
lives, provide obvious morally relevant subject matter, for which
artistic representation is a highly appropriate means of
communication.

However, the causal thesis Nussbaum proposes, that certain literature
can help us to develop moral abilities, has not yet been fully
defended here. Posner especially objects to the proposal that
literature can morally improve its audience. His three main
anti-consequentialist objections are; the importance of a good
upbringing, literature loving Nazi's and English professors who are no
more moral than anyone else. (Posner, 1997 pp. 4-5) Nussbaum responds
to this by clarifying the scope of her claims about the positive
effects of literature, pointing out that:

I am fully in agreement with Posner that the phenomenon he
designates as 'empathy' is not sufficient to motivate good action; I
never suggest that it is, and early in Poetic Justice I insist that
empathy is likely to be hooked up with compassion in someone who has
had a good early education in childhood, one that teaches concern for
others. (Nussbaum, 1998 p. 352)

And, with respect to the latter two points:

Booth and I are talking about the interaction between novel and
mind during the time of reading. We do not claim that this part of
one's life invariably dominates, although we do think that if the
novels are ethically good it will have a good influence, other things
equal; nor do we claim that spending more time reading novels will
make it more likely that this part will dominate. Moreover, reading
can only have the good effects we claim for it if one reads with
immersion, not just as a painful duty. (1998 p. 353)

Having thus clarified that hers is a moderate causal thesis about the
possible positive effects of morally commendable literature, as one
among many influences, Nussbaum's position seems to stand up to
Posner's objections quite well. She only says that such literature can
have morally beneficial effects, not that it will. Posner's objections
are not good ones; literature may have the capacity to aid in the
moral education of those who are already predisposed to learn what
literature specifically has to offer, but this does not mean that this
capacity will always be realised. A novel's full potential may not be
realised all that often in ways other than the audience's failure to
see its full moral import; the novel's fine stylistic features may
also go unappreciated by many readers.

It now remains to consider the specific ways in which literature may
morally educate. Carroll has some suggestions, which he collects under
the heading, 'the cultivation approach'. He explains that a further
response to a skeptic such as Posner would be to:

…maintain that the skeptic's conception of education is too
narrow. For the skeptic, education is the acquisition of insightful
propositions about the moral life. For the advocate of the cultivation
approach, education may also involve other things, including the
honing of ethically relevant skills and powers (such as the capacity
for finer perceptual discrimination, the imagination, the emotions,
and the overall ability to conduct moral reflection) as well as the
exercise and refinement of moral understanding (that is, the
improvement and sometimes the expansion of our understanding of the
moral precepts and concepts we already possess). As the label for this
approach indicates, the educative value of art resides in its
potential to cultivate our moral talents. (Carroll, 2000, p. 367)

This is clearly in keeping with Nussbaum's sentiments regarding the
value of literature to moral education. What is required to make this
causal thesis plausible is a departure from rigid views of the realms
of aesthetics, morality and education. Rather, an account such as
Nussbaum's, which emphasises those important aspects of moral
education which Carroll summarizes above, finds the common ground
between ethics, education and literature.

It turns out that Posner's criticisms of Nussbaum's position are based
on an understanding of morality, and moral education, which is too
narrow. Posner's conception of the aesthetic, and the value of art, is
also too narrow; so narrow in fact that it misses some of the central
reasons why we value literary art. Rather, it may be that the moral
value of literary artworks is just one feature among many contributing
to their overall aesthetic value, within a broad conception of the
aesthetic, such as that proposed by Gaut's ethicism. Nussbaum does not
discuss what other aesthetic features might be relevant to an
'all-things-considered' judgment of aesthetic value, because it is not
relevant to her primary interest. It is true that she takes certain
literary works and uses them for a specific purpose which focuses on
just one aspect of the whole aesthetic value of those works, but she
says in her defense:

It is, of course, true that ethical and political considerations have
played, and continue to play, a central role in my own literary
projects. But one should not infer from this that I believe this is
the only legitimate way of approaching literature — any more than one
would rightly infer from the fact that a person makes a career of
playing the clarinet that this person thinks the flute an instrument
not worth playing. . . . In short . . . I am a pluralist about
literary approaches, holding that there are many that deserve to be
respected and fostered. (1998 p. 347)

Certainly this seems a healthy attitude. Respecting approaches to
literature which have a specific purpose, such as Nussbaum's work on
the usefulness of literature to moral philosophy and moral
development, can help us gain a more comprehensive understanding of
the various reasons for which we value literary art, and the artists
who create it.
b. Ethical Criticism and Censorship

Unfortunately, censorship decisions are often seen as being closely
linked to judgments about the moral value of art. Censorship which
restricts those art and entertainment objects available to us due to
the imposition of a strict and rigid moral code is one of the great
fears of the radical autonomist. However, the link between the moral
value of artworks and censorship is often overemphasised. Although the
ability to make judgments about the moral value, or perhaps even the
effects of artworks, would sometimes be pertinent to informed,
responsible decisions about censorship, judgments about the moral
value, or effects, of artworks are neither sufficient nor necessary
grounds upon which to base censorship decisions, since there are other
relevant, and important, considerations.

To begin with, it has been maintained above that to judge a literary
artwork as being morally problematic is not equivalent to judging that
that work will have, or even could have, a corrupting influence on its
audience; claims about the negative moral effects of artworks require
a further step. As discussed earlier, causal claims about the effects
of artworks, especially negative causal claims, are difficult to
prove. But even if it could be shown that a particular artwork had the
potential to corrupt audience members, it still does not automatically
follow that that work should be censored.

There are, of course, issues of rights at stake; for instance the
artist's right to the freedom of expression, and the (mature)
audience's right to 'make up their own minds' about the value of
particular works, as opposed to the public's 'right' to be protected
from corrupting influences and/or obscenity. There is a large body of
literature which deals with the possible effects of pornography on
society (this appears to have been researched far more than the
possible immoral effects of artworks), on what exactly constitutes
obscenity, and on issues of competing rights and responsibilities
relevant to censorship. When one reviews the extent of this
literature, it becomes clear that there are a great many issues to be
considered with respect to censorship, of which the moral value of
artworks is but one.

In fact, it is possible for partial censorship decisions, that is,
restricted access rather than a complete ban, to be made without any
reference to a work's moral value at all. As discussed earlier, the
strong causal thesis that certain artworks will corrupt their audience
is implausible, given that at least some audience members may resist
the corrupting influence of the artwork, and would be very difficult
to prove; empirical as well as conceptual investigation would be
required. It seems likely that the most we could be sure of is that a
certain artwork had the potential to corrupt some audience members.
The obvious next question is which audience members would be most
likely to be affected. This is partly what is behind the film and
television classification scheme; a kind of scaled censorship. The
criterion here for the recommended restrictions on the audience is
simply age. But the possibility that such works might morally corrupt
some of their audience is not the only reason for classifying some
such works as suitable for only an adult audience. More often the
concern is simply that the issues raised by certain films or
television programs are issues only a person of a certain age could
properly grasp. Some films might be deemed too confusing, too
frightening, or too explicit for a young audience's comfort level, for
instance, regardless of the moral status of those films. In these
cases, a limited censorship is decided largely by judging what is
appropriate for certain age groups, and this need not have anything to
do with a work's moral value.

This very brief comment on censorship is only intended to point out
that although the ability to make sound moral judgments about artworks
is sometimes relevant to censorship decisions, it isn't always, and,
furthermore, the judgment that a work is immoral is not sufficient
grounds for that work to be censored; there are other pertinent issues
to be taken into account. While a thesis such as this one could
provide a starting point for further discussion on those censorship
decisions which are based on judgments about the moral value of
literary artworks, the issue of censorship is a substantial topic,
which needs to be dealt with separately from the subject of the moral
value of literary art.
6. References and Further Reading

* Anderson, J.C. & Dean, J.T., "Moderate Autonomism," British
Journal of Aesthetics, (Vol. 38, Issue 2, 1998).
o Defends 'moderate autonomism', arguing against both
moderate moralism and ethicism.
* Beardsley, M.C., Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of
Criticism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1958).
o Considers some of the main issues in philsophical aesthetics.
* Beardsmore, R.W., Art & Morality, (London: Macmillan, 1971).
o This book covers the more traditional positions on the
ethical criticism of art.
* Bell, C., "Significant Form," (1914) in J. Hospers (ed.),
Introductory Readings in Aesthetics, (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1969).
o An argument for a narrow version of 'formalism' with
respect to the evaluation of art.
* Booth, W., "Why Banning Ethical Criticism is a Serious Mistake,"
Philosophy and Literature, (Vol. 22, 1998).
o A defence of the practice of the ethical criticism of art;
particularly targetting Posner's arguments against it.
* Carroll, N., "Moderate Moralism," British Journal of Aesthetics,
(Vol. 36, No. 3, 1996).
o Introduces and defines the positions 'moderate autonomism'
and 'moderate moralism', defending the latter against any form of
autonomism.
* Carroll, N., "Moderate Moralism versus Moderate Autonomism,"
British Journal of Aesthetics, (Vol. 38, Issue 4, 1998a).
o A further defence of 'moderate moralism' against
objections from moderate autonomists, J.C. Anderson and J.T. Dean.
* Carroll, N., "Art, Narrative and Moral Understanding," in
Levinson, J. (ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics, (Cambridge: CUP, 1998b).
o An argument for the leitimacy of the ethical criticism of
narrative froms of art.
* Carroll, N., "Art and Ethical Criticism: An Overview of Recent
Directions of Research," Ethics, (Vol. 110, 2000).
o Explains the three main forms of objection to ethical
criticism – autonomism, cognitive triviality and anti-consequentialism
– and attempts to answer each of these objections, defnding 'moderate
moralism.
* Conolly, O., "Ethicism and Moderate Moralism," British Journal
of Aesthetics, (Vol. 40, Issue 3), 2000.
o Considers some possible interpretations of 'moderate
moralism', compares moderate moralism with 'ethicism' and defends
ethicism as the more plausible of the two positions
* Devereaux, M., "Beauty and Evil: the case of Leni Riefensthal's
Triumph of the Will," in J. Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics,
(Cambridge: CUP, 1998).
o Gives a detailed analysis of the morally problematic film
Triumph of the Will, and through this analysis argues that 'formalism'
and sophisticated formalism' are inadequate ways of responding to such
a film.
* Gaut, B., "The Ethical Criticism of Art," in Levinson, J. (ed.),
Aesthetics and Ethics, (Cambridge: CUP, 1998).
o Proposes a new position with respect to the ethical
criticism of art, ethicism, which argues for an
'all-things-considered' evaluation of aesthetic value which takes into
account any moral merits or defects exhibited by an artwork.
* Kieran, M., "In Defence of the Ethical Evaluation of Art,"
British Journal of Aesthetics, (Vol. 41, Issue 1, 2001).
o Argues for an ammendment to Carroll's 'moderate moralism',
called 'most moderate moralism', which focusses on the intelligibility
of artworks.
* Levinson, J. (ed.), Aesthetics & Ethics, (Cambridge: CUP, 1998).
o A selection of essays at the interesection of ethics and
aesthetics, most of the essays dealing with ethical issues in
narrative art.
* Nussbaum, M., "Exactly and Responsibly: A Defense of Ethical
Criticism," Philosophy and Literature, (Vol. 22, 1998).
o A defense of the practice of ethical criticism; in
particular a defense of Nussbaum's thesis that certain works of
literature potentially play an important supplementary role in moral
education.
* Nussbaum, M., "Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Literature
and the Moral Imagination," in Cascardi, A.J. (ed.), Literature and
the Question of Philosophy, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1987).
o Explains the view described above with detailed reference
to the novels of Henry James.
* Posner, R., "Against Ethical Criticism," Philosophy and
Literature, (Vol. 21, 1997).
o Argues against the practice of ethical criticism on the
grounds of autonomism, cognitive triviality and anti-consequentialism.
* Posner, R., "Against Ethical Criticism: Part Two," Philosophy
and Literature, (Vol. 22:2, 1998).
o Responds to Nussbaum and Booth's defence of ethical
criticism against Posner's original article.
* Stow, S., "Unbecoming Virulence: The Politics of the Ethical
Criticism Debate," Philosophy and Literature, (Vol. 24, 2000).
o Suggests ways in which the debate between Posner, Nussbaum
and Booth over the ethical criticism of art was heavily influenced by
their respective political differences.
* Tolstoy, L., What Is Art? (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1994).
o For the purposes of this subject, the significant aspect
of Tolstoy's book is his emphasis on the moral import of art in
society as essential to the (aesthetic) value of that art. Tolstoy is
a 'radical moralist' with respect to the ethical criticism of art.
* Wilde, O., "The Preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray," in
Wilde, O., Plays, Prose Writings and Poems, (London: J.M. Dent & Sons,
1975).
o In the preface to his, ironically, very moral story, Wilde
claims that the moral merits or defects of art should in no way
influence its aesthetic evaluation.