of the most important rationalist philosophers in the early modern
period, along with Descartes, Leibniz, and Malebranche. Spinoza is
also the most influential "atheist" in Europe during this period.
"Atheist" at the time meant someone who rejects the traditional
Biblical views concerning God and his relation to nature. In his most
important book, titled Ethics Demonstrated in a Geometrical Manner,
Spinoza argues for a radically new picture of the universe to rival
the traditional Judeo-Christian one. Using a geometrical method
similar to Euclid's Elements and later Newton's Principia, he argues
that there is no transcendent and personal God, no immortal soul, no
free will, and that the universe exists without any ultimate purpose
or goal. Instead, Spinoza argues the whole of the natural world,
including human beings, follows one and the same set of natural laws
(so, humans are not special), that everything that happens could not
have happened differently, that the universe is one inherently active
totality (which can be conceived of as either "God" or "Nature"), and
that the mind and the body are one and the same thing conceived in two
ways.
Spinoza's Ethics appeared provocative to his contemporaries. First,
many of them found his arguments clear and compelling. Spinoza begins
Ethics by defining key terms and identifying his assumptions. Most of
these would have seemed commonplace to Spinoza's contemporaries. He
then derives theorems, which he calls "propositions," on the basis of
this foundation. Many of the philosophers and theologians who first
read Spinoza's Ethicsn found these definitions and assumptions
unproblematic, but were horrified by the theorems which Spinoza proved
on the basis of them. Second, by all accounts Spinoza was an
especially good man who lived a modest and virtuous life. The mere
possibility of a "virtuous atheist," however, severed one of the most
popular arguments in favor of traditional Biblical religion: that
without it, living a moral life was impossible.
This article examines some fundamental issues of Spinoza's new
"atheistic" metaphysics, and it focuses on three of the most important
and difficult aspects of Spinoza's metaphysics: his theory of
substance monism, his theory of attributes, and his theory of conatus.
1. The Formal Structure of the Ethics
The Ethics is broken into five parts:
1. Of God
2. Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind
3. Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects
4. Of Human Bondage, or the Power of the Affects
5. Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom
Part I concerns issues in general metaphysics (the existence of God,
free will, the nature of bodies and minds, etc.) Part II concerns two
issues related to the mind: (i) what the mind is and how it relates to
the body, and (ii) a general theory of knowledge. In Part III, Spinoza
presents his theory of emotions (which he calls "affects") and a fully
deterministic human psychology. In Parts IV and V, Spinoza presents
his ethical theory.
Each part of the Ethics is broken into definitions of key terms,
axioms (assumptions),
propositions (theorems proven on the basis of the definitions, axioms,
and the previous propositions), demonstrations (proofs), corollaries
(where Spinoza often draws attention to other claims which can be
proven on the basis of his propositions, but which are not part of his
main argument), and scholia (where Spinoza breaks out of his rigorous
structure to comment, argue, or restate the demonstrated material in a
more easily accessible way.)
To this classic geometrical structure, Spinoza adds three additions to
the Ethics. (1) Spinoza ends Parts I and IV with appendices. In these
appendices he comments on the previous part, clarifies his position,
and adds new arguments. (2) In Part II and after proposition 13,
Spinoza interrupts his argument to include a short discussion on
physics and the laws of motion. This part of the Ethics is sometimes
called the "Physical Digression," "Physical Interlude," or the "Short
Treatise on Bodies." (3) At the end of Part III Spinoza includes an
organized list of the definition of the affects (emotions) as argued
for in Part III.
When citing the Ethics begin with the Part number, then use the
following shorthand:
a Axiom
d Definition
l Lemma
post. Postulate
p Proposition
c Corollary
d demonstration
s Scholium
exp. Explanation
For example, to cite the demonstration of the 14th proposition of Part
III one would write "3p14d." A number of minor variations exist. Some
authors also put an "E" at the beginning of the citation to stand for
"Ethics" to distinguish the Ethics from Spinoza's other book written
in a geometrical manner, the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy
Demonstrated in a Geometrical Manner (1663). For example, the
demonstration of the 14th proposition of Part III is often cited as
"E3p14d." Other scholars mark the part number with Roman numerals,
thus citing the proposition as "IIIp14d" or "EIIIp14d."
So why does Spinoza utilize this cumbersome method of proof in the
Ethics? Scholars have given a number of different answers to this
question. One common explanation concerns how people thought about
science in this period. In the 17th century, mathematics was the
paradigmatic science. It was widely admired for offering conclusive
and incontrovertible proofs which no rational person (who understood
them) could reject. Many philosophers attempted to replicate Euclid's
success in other areas and so found other sciences as conclusive and
demonstrable as mathematical science. For example, Hobbes attempted to
organize political concepts "geometrically" in his Leviathan.
Descartes also considered the possibility of organizing his entire
philosophy geometrically in the Second Replies, though he never made a
serious attempt to do so.) Spinoza, however, geometrically reorganized
the first two books of Descartes' Principles (along with other
original material) in his first published book: Principles of
Cartesian Philosophy Demonstrated in a Geometrical Manner (1663).
Other scholars argue that there is a deeper reason for Spinoza's use
of the geometrical method. The goal of the Ethics, Spinoza says, is to
prove those things that can "lead us, by the hand, as it were, to the
knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness" (Preface to
Part II). Ethics is supposed to be a philosophical therapy which helps
its readers to overcome their passions and superstitions and become
more rational. Working through the proofs, Spinoza promotes these
goals by forcing us to think carefully, and so promotes the
therapeutic aim of his book. For more on the purpose of the
geometrical method see Wolfson 1958, I 3-32; Bennett 1988, 16-28;
Garrett 2003; Nadler 2006, 35-51.
2. The Basic Metaphysical Picture: Substance, Attributes, and Modes
According to Spinoza, everything that exists is either a substance or
a mode (E1a1). A substance is something that needs nothing else in
order to exist or be conceived. Substances are independent entities
both conceptually and ontologically (E1d3). A mode or property is
something that needs a substance in order to exist, and cannot exist
without a substance (E1d5). For example, being furry, orange, hungry,
angry, etc. are modes that need a substance which is furry, orange,
hungry, angry, etc. Hunger and patches of orange color cannot exist
floating around on their own, but rather, hunger and patches of orange
color need something (namely, a substance) to be hungry and have the
orange color. Hunger and colors are, therefore, dependent entities or
modes.
According to almost all of Spinoza's predecessors (including Aristotle
and Descartes) there are lots of substances in the universe, each with
their own modes or properties. For example, according to Descartes a
cat is a substance which has the modes or properties of being furry,
orange, soft, etc. (Though some have argued that Descartes cannot
actually individuate multiple extended substances. See Curley 1988,
15-19; 141-2 n. 9.) Spinoza, however, rejects this traditional view
and argues instead that there is only one substance, called "God" or
"Nature." Cats, dogs, people, rocks, etc. are not substances in
Spinoza's view, but rather, cats, dogs, people, rocks, etc. are just
modes or properties of one substance. This one substance is simply
people-like in places, rock-like in other places, chair-like in still
other places, etc.
One can think of substance as an infinite space. Some regions of this
one space are hard and brown (rocks), other regions of space are
green, juicy, and soft (plants), while still other regions are furry,
orange, and soft (cats), etc. As a cat walks across the room all that
happens in Spinoza's view is that different regions of space become
successively furry, orange, and soft (See Bennett 1984: 88-92 for more
on space and the extended substance in Spinoza).
This one substance has an infinite number of attributes. An attribute
is simply an essence; a "what it is to be" that kind of thing.
According to Descartes, every substance has only one attribute: bodies
have only the attribute of extension, and minds have only the
attribute of thought. Spinoza, however, argues against this claim that
the one substance is absolutely infinite and so it must exist in every
way that something can exist. Thus, he infers that the one substance
must have an infinite number of attributes (E1p9). An attribute,
according to Spinoza, is just the essence of substance under some way
of conceiving or describing the substance (E1d4). When we consider
substance one way, then we conceive of its essence as extension. When
we consider substance another way, then we conceive of its essence as
thought. (See Della Rocca 1996a: 164-167.) While substance has an
infinite number of different attributes, Spinoza argues that human
beings only know about two of them: extension and thought.
3. Substance Monism
The most distinctive aspect of Spinoza's system is his substance
monism; that is, his claim that one infinite substance—God or
Nature—is the only substance that exists. His argument for this
monism is his first argument in Part I of the Ethics. The basic
structure of the argument is as follows:
1. Every substance has at least one attribute. (Premise 1, E1d4)
2. Two substances cannot share the same nature or attribute.
(Premise 2, E1p5)
3. God has all possible attributes. (Premise 3, Definition of 'God', E1d6)
4. God exists. (Premise 4, E1p11)
5. Therefore, no other substance other than God can exist. (From 1-4, E1p14)
That is, there is only one substance (called "God" or "Nature") which
has all possible attributes. No other substance can exist because if
it existed it would have to share an attribute with God, but it is
impossible for two different substances to both have the same
attribute. Spinoza defends each of his four assumptions as follows:
The Argument for Premise One (E1d4)
If a substance existed which did not have any attributes, then (by
Spinoza's definition of attribute at E1d4) the substance would not
have an essence. However, according to Spinoza, it makes no sense to
claim that something exists which does not have an essence. Thus,
every substance has at least one attribute. This premise is not
particularly controversial.
The Argument for Premise Two (E1p5)
Spinoza's argument for the second premise ("Two substances cannot
share the same nature or attribute") is much more controversial. Here
Spinoza argues that if two substances share one and the same
attribute, then there is no way to tell the two substances apart. If
substance A and substance B both have attribute 1 as their nature,
then in virtue of what are there two different substances here? Why
aren't A and B just one substance? Since no cause can be given to
explain their distinctness, Spinoza infers that they must actually be
the same. Formally, the argument is as follows:
1. Two substances are distinguished from each other either by a
difference in attributes or a difference in modes. (Premise 1)
2. Substance is prior in nature to its modes. (Premise 2, E1p1)
3. If two substances A and B are indistinguishable, then they are
identical. (Premise 3)
4. If substances A and B differ only in attributes, then A and B
are two different substances with different natures. (From 1 and the
definition of "attribute.")
5. If substances A and B differ only in modes and share an
attribute, and if the modes are put to one side and the substances are
considered in themselves, then the two substances would be
indistinguishable. (From 1, 2)
6. But if substances A and B are indistinguishable, then they are
identical. (From 3, 5)
7. Thus, no two substances can share a nature or attribute. (From 4, 6)
The Arguments for Premise Four (E1p11)
In the demonstration of E1p11, Spinoza explicitly provides a number of
different proofs for the existence of a substance with infinite
attributes (namely, God.) One proof is a version of the Ontological
Argument also used by Anselm and Descartes. Spinoza's argument is
interesting, however, because he provides a very different reason for
claiming that the essence of each substance includes existence.
Spinoza's Ontological Argument, once unpacked, is as follows:
1. When two things have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause
of the other (Premise 1, E1p3).
2. It is impossible for two substances to have the same attribute
(or essence) (Premise 2, E1p5).
3. Two substances with different attributes have nothing in common
(Premise 3, E1p6d).
4. Thus, one substance cannot cause another substance to exist
(From 1, 2, 3. E1p6).
5. Either substances are caused to exist by other substances, or
they exist by their own nature (Premise 4, E1p7d).
6. Thus, substances must exist by their own nature (that is, the
essence of a substance must involve existence.) (From 4, 5. E1p7)
This argument differs from the Ontological Arguments offered by Anselm
and Descartes in that (i) Spinoza does not infer the existence of God
from the claim that our idea of God involves existence and (ii)
Spinoza does not assume that existence is a perfection (and so a
property). Spinoza's argument, therefore, can avoid some of the more
common objections to the Ontological proofs as formulated by Descartes
and Anselm. See Earle 1973a and Earle 1973b for a partial defense of
Spinoza's Ontological Argument.
a. Leibniz's Objection to Spinoza's Substance Monism Argument
Spinoza's Argument for Substance Monism is generally deemed a failure
by contemporary philosophers. There are a number of ways to attack
the argument. The most common way is to reject Spinoza's second
premise (E1p5: "That two substances cannot share the same nature or
attribute.") One of the most popular arguments against this promise
was first presented by Leibniz. Leibniz argued that whereby it might
be impossible for two substances to have all of their attributes in
common (because then they would be indistinguishable), it may be
possible for two substances to share an attribute and yet differ by
each having another attribute that is not shared. For example, one
substance may have attributes A and B and another substance has
attributes A and C. The two substances would be distinguishable
because each has an attribute the other lacks, but both substances
would nevertheless share an attribute. This objection was first
presented by Leibniz to Spinoza himself. Though Spinoza did not find
the objection persuasive, he never offered an explicit reply. See
Della Rocca 2002: 17-22 for a plausible solution on Spinoza's behalf
based upon the conceptual independence of the attributes.
b. Why Does the One Substance Have Modes?
If Spinoza's Substance Monism Argument were sound, it would prove that
the only substance which exists is God or Nature (a substance with an
infinite number of attributes). But why does this one substance have
any finite modes (properties)? Spinoza provides an answer at E1p16.
Here Spinoza argues that "from the necessity of the divine nature
there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many ways (that
is, everything which can fall under an infinite intellect)" (E1p16).
Spinoza argues that the greater something is, the greater the number
of properties which follow from its nature or essence. For example,
it follows from the nature of a triangle that it has three sides. Why
do triangles have interior angles of 180 degrees? Because of the kind
of things that they are (that is, because of their essence.)
The greater the essence of the thing, the more properties that follow
from it. God's essence is the greatest possible essence. Thus, the
greatest possible number of properties (that is, an infinite number)
must follow from God's essence or nature. Thus, an infinite number of
finite modes must follow from the essence of God in just the way that
certain properties of triangles (having interior angles of 180
degrees, for example) follow from the essence of a triangle. Because
a triangle's essence is finite only a finite number of properties
follow from it; because God's essence is infinite an infinite number
of properties follow from it. Human beings, chairs, tables, cats,
dogs, trees, etc. are some of the properties that follow from God's
essence or nature.
Spinoza claims that one important consequence of this proof is that
modes are properties of substance. The view that modes are properties
of substance has been denied by at least one prominent interpreter of
Spinoza (Curley 1988: 31-39). Curley's view has, however, proven
unpopular (See Carriero 1999; Malamed 2009.) The dominant
interpretation today is that modes are properties of the one
substance.
4. Attributes
Spinoza's theory of the attributes (extension, thought, etc.) is the
most original, difficult, and controversial aspect of his metaphysics.
According to Descartes, the attribute of a substance is simply the
substance's essence (Principles I.53.) Given this definition,
Descartes infers that each substance has only one attribute. Spinoza
modifies Descartes's definition at E1d4 and states that "by attribute
I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance as
constituting its essence." The Latin here is "per attributum
intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem
essentiam constituens." Spinoza then claims that the one substance
("God" or "Nature") has an infinite number of attributes (E1d6.) A
number of scholars have found it hard to understand how one substance
could have multiple attributes each one of which is "what the
intellect perceives … as constituting its essence." Either Spinoza is
claiming that the one substance has multiple essences, or that the
attributes are not really the essence of the substance but only seem
to be.
The interpretive problems with Spinoza's theory of attributes begin
with his definition. In the definition he uses the word 'tanquam'
which can be correctly translated into English both as 'as if' and as
'as.' If 'tanquam' is translated as 'as if', then that translation
suggests that the attributes are not really the essence of substance
but only seem to be the essence of substance. If, however, 'tanquam'
is translated as 'as', then that translation would seem to indicate
that each attribute really is the essence of substance. The problem
is then to explain how we can have one substance with more than one
essence. Thus, the first problem with Spinoza's theory of attributes
is to explain the relation between the attributes and the essence of
substance.
According to some scholars (often called "subjectivists") each
attribute is not really the essence of substance but merely seems to
be. According to these scholars, substance's essence is in some way
"hidden" from the intellect and "unthinkable." All we can know is how
the essence of the one substance appears to the intellect (either as
extension or as thought.) According to other scholars (often called
"objectivists") each attribute really is the essence of substance.
The problem is then to explain how one substance can have multiple
essences and still remain one substance.
The second problem with Spinoza's theory of attributes is to explain
how the attributes are related to one other. If each attribute really
is the essence of the one substance, then how do they relate to each
other? Are they identical? Or is each attribute really different
from every other attribute? If they are identical, then why does the
intellect distinguish them? If they are different, then how can one
substance have more than one essence? Some subjectivists (such as
Wolfson 1958: 142 ff.) argue that there is really only one attribute
which is distinguished wrongly into numerous attributes by the
intellect. Objectivists, on the other hand, argue that there is more
than one attribute and that they are really distinct from each other.
In summary, there are two major problems with Spinoza's theory of attributes:
1. The Attribute-Essence Problem: How do the attributes relate to
the essence of substance? Are they identical to the essence of
substance or distinct?
2. The Attribute-Attribute Problem: How do the attributes relate
to each other? Are they identical or distinct?
a. Subjectivism
The most influential defense of the "Subjectivist" interpretation of
the attributes is presented by Wolfson 1958 Vol. 1: 142-157. Wolfson
argues that
the two attributes appear to the mind as being distinct from each
other. In reality, however, they are one. For by [E1p10],
attributes, like substance, are summa genera ("conceived through
itself".) The two attributes must therefore be one and identical with
substance. Furthermore, the two attributes have not been acquired by
substance after it had been without them, nor are they conceived by
the mind one after the other or deduced one from the other. They have
always been in substance together, and are conceived by our mind
simultaneously. Hence, the attributes are only different words
expressing the same reality and being of substance (Wolfson 1958 Vol.
1: 156.)
That is, substance has only one essence and that essence is the sum
total of all of its attributes. The attributes are all identical (and
also identical with the substance itself). The attributes are
distinguished from one another merely conceptually ("only different
words expressing the same reality"), but in reality the attributes are
all one and the same. The essence of substance is therefore the one
attribute extension-thought-etc. This one attribute cannot be thought
as it is, but is instead mentally broken into pieces and considered
only partially. Wolfson thus explicitly provides answers to both the
Attribute-Essence Problem and to the Attribute-Attribute Problem. In
both cases Wolfson claims that the relation is identity. Each
attribute is identical to every other attribute (in reality, there is
only one "super attribute") and the essence of substance is this one
unthinkable "super attribute." Wolfson goes further, however, and
also argues that substance is identical to this one unthinkable "super
attribute."
A very different theory of attributes, which also goes by the name of
"Subjectivism," is offered by Bennett. Bennett argues that the
attributes do not constitute the essence of substance at all. Instead
the essence of substance is really the infinite series of finite
modes. The attributes merely appear to constitute the essence of
substance. Bennett disagrees with Wolfson in that Bennett believes
"that Nature really has extension and thought, which really are
distinct from one another, but that they are not really fundamental
properties, although they must be perceived as such by any intellect"
(Bennett 1984: 147.) Thus, Bennett's solution to the
Attribute-Essence Problem is to claim that the essence and attributes
are distinct. But he differs from Wolfson in regard to the
Attribute-Attribute Problem. Here Bennett argues that the attributes
are not identical (as Wolfson claims.)
One thing to note here is the looseness of the term "Subjectivism."
Both Bennett and Wolfson are considered "Subjectivists" because they
each deny at least one of the following two claims:
1. The attributes are really distinct.
2. The attributes constitute the essence of substance.
Wolfson denies both; Bennett denies only the second.
b. Objectivism
There are significant problems with both Wolfson's and Bennett's
"Subjectivism." The problem is that there is strong textual evidence
in favor of the two claims:
1. The attributes are really distinct.
2. The attributes constitute the essence of substance.
The argument in favor of (i) is that Spinoza claims at E1p10d that all
intellects can conceive of the attributes as really distinct (that is,
one without the help of the other.) Thus, even the infinite intellect
(that is, God's Mind) must conceive of the attributes as really
distinct. But the infinite intellect understands everything exactly
as it is
(E1p32). Therefore, the attributes must be really distinct. This
argument has persuaded almost all recent scholars that (i) is true.
The argument in favor of (ii) also relies on the infinite intellect.
Spinoza claims at E2p3 that the infinite intellect has an adequate and
true idea of God's essence. But on both Wolfson's and Bennett's
subjectivist accounts that is not true. On Wolfson's account the
infinite intellect cannot have an adequate idea of the one "super
attribute" extension-thought-etc. The infinite intellect can only
have an idea of the different fragmented pieces, namely, extension,
thought, etc. On Bennett's account the essence of substance isn't
even an attribute. Both scholars have to admit that the infinite
intellect does not have an adequate idea of the essence of substance,
which contradicts Spinoza's claim at E2p3. See Della Rocca 1996a:
157-171 for more on the case against Subjectivism.
If both claims (i) and (ii) are true on Spinoza's view, then the
attributes are really distinct, and yet each one constitutes the
essence of substance. This is a significant problem. How can there
be only one substance if this substance has multiple distinct
essences? Edwin Curley answers this question by claiming both that
"the attributes of substance satisfy the definition of substance"
(Curley 1988: 29) and that the attributes come together to form one
essence because "this particular complex is a complex of very special
elements" (Curley 1988: 30.) The attributes on Curley's view are a
collection of an infinite number of substances that come together in
much the same way that numbers come together to form a number line.
The number line is a unity composed of an infinite amount of very
special elements.
Thus, Curley's solution to the Attribute-Essence Problem is to claim
that each attribute pertains to the essence of substance. Concerning
the Attribute-Attribute Problem, Curley claims that the attributes are
really distinct from each other. A similar view may also have been
held by Gueroult 1968 Vol. 1. Objectivism is often characterized by
three theses:
1. The attributes are really distinct.
2. The attributes constitute the essence of substance.
3. The attributes are substances.
The third claim, however, has been disputed by some more recent
Objectivists. Della Rocca in his 1996 book Representation and the
Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza offers what is currently the most
influential objectivist interpretation of Spinoza's theory of the
attributes. Della Roccca accepts claims (i) and (ii), but rejects the
idea that attributes are themselves substances. Della Rocca's
interpretation centers on the idea of "referential opacity." Della
Rocca claims that "a context is referentially opaque if the truth
value of the sentence resulting from completing the context does
depend on which particular term is used to refer to that object"
(Della Rocca 1996a, 122.) That is, the truth value of a particular
sentence depends upon how the objects in the sentence are described.
If the description changes, then the truth value of the sentence may
change too. For example, consider the morning star and the evening
star. The following sentence is true: Bob believes that the morning
star rises in the morning. However, if you replace 'the morning star'
without another equally correct description of the same object, then
the sentence turns out false. Because Bob does not know that the
morning star and evening star are actually the same thing (namely,
Venus) the following sentence is false: Bob believes that the evening
star rises in the morning. Because the truth-value of the sentence
depends upon the description of Venus used in the sentence, this
context is referentially opaque.
Della Rocca provides the example of a spy. One may know that there is
a spy in the community and even hate this spy, without knowing that
the spy is one's brother. In this case the truth-value of sentences
such as I hate the spy, I believe that the spy is a spy, etc. all
depend upon the term used to pick out the spy. If we replace 'the
spy' with the term 'my brother,' the truth value of these two
sentences changes: I hate my brother, I believe that my brother is a
spy. Because the truth-value changes when the term used to pick out
the person changes, these contexts are referentially opaque.
Della Rocca believes that referential opacity is the key to
understanding Spinoza's theory of attributes. The idea here is to
understand that attribute contexts are referentially opaque. So, the
sentence "the essence of substance is thought" and the sentence "the
essence of substance is extension" are referentially opaque contexts.
Della Rocca claims that Spinoza's definition of attribute should be
interpreted as saying: "by attribute I understand that which
constitutes the essence of a substance under some description or way
of conceiving that substance" (Della Rocca 1996a, 166.) When
substance is considered in one way, then the essence of substance is
thought; when substance is considered in another way, then the essence
of substance is extension. What the essence of substance is taken to
be will depend upon how the substance is being considered.
By arguing that attribute contexts are referentially opaque, Della
Rocca believes that he can avoid the central problem of Subjectivism:
the claim that God misunderstands his own essence (contra E2p3).
Thus, though Della Rocca's view may at first sound like a form of
Subjectivism, it avoids the central problem. The attributes are
really distinct on Della Rocca's interpretation in that each attribute
is the essence of substance under some description of that substance:
each really distinct description gives one a different essence. The
attributes also constitute the essence of substance on this view, so
long as we add the phrase "under some description or way of conceiving
of that substance" to the end. Della Rocca, however, does not have to
accept that attributes are themselves substances. An attribute is not
a substance according to this view (contra Curley); an attribute is
simply the essence of a substance under some description or way of
conceiving of that substance.
c. Modal Parallelism
How one interprets Spinoza's theory of attributes will significantly
affect the rest of his metaphysics. For example, one of Spinoza's
most important claims is that "the order and connection of ideas is
the same as the order and connection of things" (E2p7.) That is, the
order of modes under the attribute of extension is the same as the
order of modes under the attribute of thought. Spinoza explains this
idea in an important and controversial scholium. He claims that
a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which
is also in God, are one and the same thing, which is explained through
different attributes. Therefore, whether we conceive nature under the
attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under
any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order, or one and
the same connection of causes, i.e., that the same things follow one
another (E2p7s.)
The view that one and the same order exists under each of the
attributes is called 'modal parallelism.' The word 'parallelism' is
used because not all scholars believe that the relationship between a
body and the mind of that body is identity. How one interprets modal
parallelism in Spinoza will depend upon one's interpretation of
Spinoza's theory of the attributes. Two of the most developed and
influential recent interpretations of Spinoza's parallelism are
Bennett 1984 (who argues that the mind and body are not identical) and
Della Rocca 1996a (who argues that the mind and body are identical).
Bennett and others reject the numerical identity interpretation of
parallelism on the grounds that it commits Spinoza to a contradiction.
Spinoza claims that there is no causal interaction between minds and
bodies at E3p2. If he then claimed (so the argument goes) that minds
and bodies are identical, then he would seemingly be committed to the
following contradiction: if mind M causally interacts with mind N and
body 1 is identical with mind M, then it seems as though body 1 must
also causally interact with mind N (thus violating Spinoza's explicit
claims at E3p2.) This argument is presented by both Bennett 1984, 141
and Delahunty 1985, 197 to argue against the identity of minds and
bodies in Spinoza.
But Spinoza does say that the mind and the body are "one and the same
thing" conceived in two ways (E2p7s). What could that mean if not
that minds and bodies are identical? Bennett argues that in Spinoza a
mind and a body merely share a part (which he calls a "trans-attribute
mode"). Minds and bodies are not fully identical. (See Bennett 1984,
141). One "trans-attribute mode" can combine both with the attribute
of thought (creating a mind) and the attribute of extension (creating
a body) at the same time. Thus, my body is a trans-attribute mode
combined with the attribute of extension; my mind is that same
trans-attribute mode combined with the attribute of thought. Bennett
thus rejects the interpretation of parallelism whereby a body and a
mind are one and the same thing. A body and its parallel mind merely
share a part (namely, a trans-attribute mode).
By contrast Della Rocca argues that minds and bodies in Spinoza are
fully identical. Della Rocca argues that the notion of referential
opacity (see the Objectivism section above) can allow Spinoza to
accept both the identity of minds and bodies without accepting that
minds and bodies causally interact. Della Rocca claims that causal
contexts in Spinoza are referentially opaque. That is, x is the cause
of y only under certain descriptions or ways of thinking about x. It
is not the case that the sentence "x causes y" is true under all
possible ways of describing or conceiving of x. For example, "x under
a mental description caused y" can be true while "x under a physical
description caused y" is false. Thus, Della Rocca argues that the
claim that minds and bodies are identical does not entail that minds
and bodies causally interact because whether x caused y or not depends
upon how x is described. (See Della Rocca 1996a, 118-140, 157-167.)
5. Conatus
In Part III of the Ethics, Spinoza argues that each mode (that is,
every physical and mental thing) "strives to persevere in its being"
(E3p6.) The word translated into English as "strives" is the Latin
"conatus." ("Conatus" is also sometimes translated as "endeavor.")
From the claim that every mode strives to persevere in its being,
Spinoza infers that each mode's conatus is the actual essence (E3p7.)
That is, what it is to be a cat is just to strive in a certain
cat-like way. What it is to be a desk is for the complex body to
strive in a certain desk-like way. Every thing that exists—every
particle, rock, plant, animal, planet, solar system, idea, mind,
etc.—is striving to survive. From the claim that the essence of every
mode is its striving to persist Spinoza derives much of his physics,
psychology, moral philosophy, and political theory in Parts III, IV,
and V of the Ethics.
Despite the importance of Spinoza's theory of conatus, there are a
number of interpretive and philosophical difficulties with it and
Spinoza's argument for it. First, there is the widely debated issue
of whether Spinoza's theory of conatus should be interpreted
teleologically or non-teleologically. Is each mode trying to survive?
Are modes goal-oriented things? Or is Spinoza simply claiming that
everything that modes do helps them to survive (while not claiming
that modes are acting purposively)?
Second, Spinoza's argument for the theory of conatus (which takes
place in Part III of the Ethics from propositions 4 to 6) has been
subject to considerable scrutiny and many scholars have argued that it
is multiply invalid. A few recent scholars have, however, attempted
to defend Spinoza's argument for his conatus theory against the charge
of invalidity. Garrett 2002, for example, provides an influential
defense of the validity of the argument. Likewise, Waller (2009)
provides a partial defense of the first third of the argument.
a. Conatus and Purposive Action
Spinoza clearly denies the claim that God or Nature has a purpose or
plan for the universe. The universe simply exists because it could
not fail to exist. God did not make the universe with any
predetermined goal or plan in mind; instead the universe simply
follows from God's essence in just the way that the properties of a
triangle follow from the essence of the triangle (E1p16, E1p32c1,
E1p33). In the Appendix to Part I of the Ethics Spinoza claims that
[People] find—both in themselves and outside themselves—many means
that are very helpful in seeking their own advantage, for example,
eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the
sun for light, the sea for supporting fish. Hence, they consider all
natural things as means to their own advantage. And knowing that they
had found these means, not provided them for themselves, they had
reason to believe that there was someone else who had prepared the
means for their use … And since they had never heard anything about
the temperament of these rules, they had to judge from themselves.
Hence, they maintained that the gods direct all things for the use of
men in order to bind men to them and be held by men in the highest
honor. … But while they sought to show that Nature does nothing in
vain (that is, nothing not of use to men), they seem to have shown
only that Nature and the gods are as mad as man. … Not many words
will be required to show that Nature has no end set before it, and
that all final causes are nothing but human fictions (Ethics Part I,
Appendix.)
The earth does not exist so that we may live on it. The universe is
not designed for the good of human beings. The universe has no
purpose; it simply exists. These ideas were revolutionary in the
seventeenth century and remain controversial even today.
But some scholars (most influentially, Bennett 1984) argue that
Spinoza's rejection of purpose or goals in nature goes much further
than a simple rejection of Divine purposes or goals—Bennett argue that
Spinoza rejects all purposive or goal directed activities whatsoever,
including human purposive action. The claim that human actions are
not purposive or goal-oriented is startling and presents us with a
very different theory of what human beings are.
To understand the impact of this claim, consider the following
example: if I walk across the room to get a drink of water, we might
believe that this activity is purposive or goal-oriented. I am
walking across the room in order to get a glass of water. My behavior
is partly explained in the common sense view by my goal or purpose
(that is, getting a drink of water.) Bennett 1984, 240-251, however,
claims that according to Spinoza this explanation of my behavior must
be wrong. According to Bennett's Spinoza, I do not walk across the
room in order to get water. Rather I walk across the room because my
organs were organized in a certain way such that when light strikes my
eyes, it moves certain parts of my brain, which in turn moves certain
tendons in my legs, which in turn causes my legs to move back and
forth in certain ways, carrying my body to the counter, moving my hand
toward the water fountain, etc. That is, my behavior can be fully and
completely understood mechanistically, just like a watch. The springs
inside a watch do not move so that the watch may indicate the correct
time, rather the clock indicates the correct time because the springs
and levers move in a certain way. Similarly with human beings, they
do not walk in order to get to certain places; they get to certain
places because they walk. (When considering a human being under the
attribute of thought, Spinoza would claim that certain ideas follow
logically from other ideas in just the way that certain effects follow
necessarily from certain causes in the physical world.) In just the
way that the universe exists without any purpose or goal, so every
action performed by every human similarly is done for no purpose or
goal. We do what we do simply because we could not fail to—our
actions simply follow from the organization of our many complex parts.
Bennett's interpretation of Spinoza as denying all purposive or
goal-oriented action is controversial because Spinoza does claim in a
number of different places that while the whole of nature has no
purpose or ultimate goal, individuals do act purposively. In the
Appendix to Part I, where Spinoza makes his clearest claims against
Divine purposes, he also claims that "men act always on account of an
end." This passage and other similar ones have been a problem for
Bennett's interpretation. (See Curley 1990 and Bennett 1990 for more
on this debate.)
The issue of whether purposive action is possible is important to the
interpretation of Spinoza's theory of conatus. Does Spinoza's theory
of conatus entail that every physical thing—every animal, plant, rock,
planet, solar system, idea, and mind—acts in order to persevere in its
own being? Is all of nature goal-oriented, even though the whole of
nature is not? Some (including Garrett 1999) think so. If Garrett is
right, then Spinoza's physical theory may be a lot closer to
Aristotle's than it is to Descartes'. Spinoza does not seem fully
consistent on the point. In the words of one recent scholar, Spinoza
is "having trouble getting the blind efficient causality of the new
science and the end-governed efficient causality of human activity
into the same frame, so to speak" (Carriero 2005, 146.) When Spinoza
attempts to treat all of nature, including human behavior and
emotions, in a completely deterministic scientific way—as if human
beings were just complicated clocks—he struggles to remain consistent.
b. The Conatus Argument
The argument for Spinoza's claim that everything strives to persevere
in its own being is found at the very beginning of Part III of the
Ethics. The argument is usefully summarized by Garrett 2002 as
follows:
1. The definition of a thing affirms, and does not deny, the
thing's essence, or it posits the thing's essence, and does not take
it away.
2. While we attend only to the thing itself, and not to external
causes, we shall not be able to find anything in it which can destroy
it. (from 1)
3. 3p4 – Nothing can be destroyed except through an external cause. (from 2)
4. If [things insofar as they can destroy one another] could agree
with one another, or be in the same subject at once, then there could
be something in the same subject which could destroy it.
5. [That there could be something in the same subject which could
destroy it] is absurd. (from 3)
6. 3p5 – Things are of a contrary nature, that is, cannot be in the
same subject, insofar as one can destroy the other. (from 4-5)
7. 1p25c – Singular things are modes by which God's attributes are
expressed in a certain and determinate way.
8. 1p34 – God's power is his essence itself.
9. Singular things are modes that express, in a certain and
determinate way, God's power, by which God is and acts. (from 7-8)
10. No thing has anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or
which takes its existence away. (from 3)
11. [Each thing] is opposed to everything which can take its
existence away. (from 6)
12. 3p6 – Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to
persevere in its being (from 9-10).
That is, Spinoza begins by arguing that no thing can destroy itself
(E3p4). He argues for this claim on the basis of the claim that the
definition affirms and does not deny the thing's essence. From the
claim that no thing can destroy itself, Spinoza then infers that no
two things which can destroy each other can be parts of the same whole
(E3p5.) From this claim Spinoza infers that each thing must strive to
persevere in its own being (E3p6).
There seem to be numerous invalid inferences here. The first occurs
right at the beginning of the argument. In the first three lines,
Spinoza infers that since a definition of something does not contain
anything inconsistent with the thing, that a thing contains nothing
contrary to its own nature. But this inference seems invalid. If we
understand a definition to be a statement of a thing's essence (see
E2d2), then it does validly follow that the essence includes nothing
inconsistent with itself (if the essence were internally inconsistent,
then it could not exist.) But it does not follow that a thing cannot
have certain accidental properties (not mentioned in the definition)
which are capable of destroying the thing. Thus, Spinoza seems to
mistakenly infer a claim about the whole thing (both essential and
accidental properties) from a premise which merely concerns the
essence. (See Bennett 1984, 234-237; Della Rocca 1996b, 202-206. For
a recent defense of Spinoza's argument see Waller forthcoming.)
Another invalid inference occurs toward the end of the argument in
lines 6 and 11. Spinoza infers that since two things cannot both be
parts of the same whole, they must actively oppose one another.
However, perhaps they could simply be in a passive relation to one
another. It is one thing to passively resist, and it is quite another
to actively resist. (See Garber 1994, 61-63 for more on this
objection and its roots in Leibniz.) A few recent scholars have
attempted to respond to these charges on Spinoza's behalf. See, for
example, Garrett 2002.
6. References and Further Reading
a. Original Language
* Gebhart, Carl. (ed.) Spinoza Opera. (Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1925.)
o This is the standard original language edition of Spinoza's works.
b. English Translations
* Edwin Curley, trans. The Collected Works of Spinoza Vol. 1.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.)
o This translation is the standard English translation.
* R.H.M. Elwes, trans. On the Improvement of the Understanding,
The Ethics, Correspondence. (New York: Dover, 1955.)
o An out-of-date English translation first published in the
nineteenth century.
* Samuel Shirley, trans. and Michael Morgan, editor. Spinoza:
Complete Works. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002.)
o The only single volume English translation of Spinoza's
complete works currently available. Shirley's translation is often
much easier to read, but a little less accurate than Curley's.
c. Historical Studies
* Israel, Jonathan. Radical Enlightenment. (New York: Oxford, 2001.)
o This book is the most extensive and authoritative
historical study of the rise and influence of Spinoza and Spinozism
during the Enlightenment (1650-1750.) Israel argues that Spinoza is
the one of the key figures of the Radical Enlightenment.
* Nadler, Steven. Spinoza: A Biography. (New York, Cambridge, 1999.)
o This is the most authoritative biography of Spinoza.
* Stewart, Matthew. The Courtier and the Heretic. (W.W. Norton: 2006.)
o This book is an entertaining novel for the non-specialist
on the relationship between Leibniz and Spinoza.
d. Philosophical Studies
* Bennett, Jonathan. A Study of Spinoza's "Ethics" (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1984.)
o An influential and often critical study of Spinoza. The
book is widely cited in secondary literature. Much of the recent
scholarship on Spinoza has been an attempt to defend Spinoza against
Bennett's criticisms.
* Bennett, Jonathan. "Spinoza and Teleology: A Reply to Curley"
in Spinoza: Issues and Directions. Edited by Edwin Curley and
Pierre-Francois Moreau. (New York: E.J. Brill, 1990), p. 53-57.
o An important defense of the view that there is no
purposive action in Spinoza.
* Carriero, John. "On the Relationship Between Mode and Substance
in Spinoza's Metaphysics" in The Rationalists: Critical Essays on
Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Edited by Derk Pereboom. (New York:
Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 131-164.
o This article defends the claim that modes are "individual
accidents" or "tropes" as opposed to universals (as Bennett
maintains.)
* Carriero, John. "Spinoza on Final Causality" in Oxford Studies
in Early Modern Philosophy Vol. II. Edited by Daniel Garber and Steven
Nadler. (New York: Claredon Press, 2005), 105-148.
o This article concerns the metaphysics of causation in
early modern philosophy and argues that the rejection of final causes
in the early modern period forces a change in the conception of
efficient causality. The article clarifies different issues related
to the notion of teleology in Spinoza.
* Curley, Edwin. Spinoza's Metaphysics. (MA: Harvard University
Press, 1969.)
o Curley argues in this book for a controversial
interpretation of the mode-substance relation. Instead of arguing
that modes are properties or tropes, he argues that they are merely
causally dependent entities. This conclusion has been widely
criticism and is currently unpopular.
* Curley, Edwin. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of
Spinoza's Ethics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.)
o A more recent defense of Curley's controversial
interpretation of Spinoza which replies to many of the criticisms
offered by Bennett and others.
* Curley, Edwin. "On Bennett's Spinoza: the Issue of Teleology"
in Spinoza: Issues and Directions. Edited by Edwin Curley and
Pierre-Francois Moreau. (New York: E.J. Brill, 1990), p. 39-52.
o A critique of Bennett's view that there is no purposive
action in Spinoza.
* Della Rocca, Michael. Representation and the Mind-Body Problem
in Spinoza. (New York: Oxford, 1996a.)
o This book is one of the most influential books on Spinoza
written in English in the last thirty years. In this book Della Rocca
argues for a new interpretation of the attributes, defends the
mind-body identity thesis, and works out the necessary and sufficient
conditions for representation in Spinoza.
* Della Rocca, Michael. "Spinoza's Metaphysical Psychology" in
The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Edited by Don Garrett. (New York:
Cambridge, 1996b.)
o A study of Spinoza's deterministic psychology. One of the
most influential parts of this study is Della Rocca's analysis of
various possible interpretations of E3p6.
* Della Rocca, Michael. "Spinoza's Substance Monism" in Spinoza:
Metaphysical Themes. Edited by Olli Koistinen and John Biro. (New
York: Oxford, 2002), p. 11-37.
o This article defends Spinoza's argument for substance
monism from a number of common objections.
* Della Rocca, Michael. Spinoza (Routledge Philosophers Series).
(Routledge: 2008.)
o Della Rocca argues for a double use of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason in Spinoza. First, everything has an explanation.
Second, that explanation can be given in terms of explanatory
concepts. Della Rocca uses this double use of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason to interpret many of Spinoza's more difficult
doctrines.
* Earle, William. "The Ontological Argument in Spinoza" reprint
in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays. Edited by Marjorie Grene.
(Garden City: Anchor Press, 1973a), p. 213-219.
o A limited defense of Spinoza's ontological argument.
* Earle, William. "The Ontological Argument in Spinoza: Twenty
Years Later" in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays. Edited by
Marjorie Grene. (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1973b), p. 220-226.
o A meditation on the ontological argument and various
misinterpretations of it.
* Garrett, Aaron. Meaning in Spinoza's Method. (Cambridge: 2003.)
o This book is the most extensive and authoritative study of
Spinoza's geometrical method. Garrett argues that the method has
moral import and is supposed to help readers view the world and
themselves in a different way.
* Garrett, Don. "Teleology in Spinoza and Early Modern
Rationalism" in New Essays on the Rationalists. Edited by Rocco J.
Gennaro and Charles Huenemann. (New York: Oxford, 1999), p. 310-335.
o This article defends an Aristotelian interpretation of
Spinoza's theory of teleology.
* Garrett, Don. "Spinoza's Conatus Argument" in Spinoza:
Metaphysical Themes. Edited by Olli Koistinen and John Biro. (New
York: Oxford, 2002), p. 127-158.
o An extremely influential defense of the validity of
Spinoza's Conatus Argument. Garrett bases his interpretation on a
novel theory of inherence.
* Gueroult, Martial. Spinoza. 2 Volumes. (Paris:
Aubier-Montaigne, 1968, 1974.)
o An extremely influential two volume work among both French
and English scholars on the first two parts of Spinoza's Ethics.
Gueroult presents the classic case against the Subjectivism of
Wolfson. These volumes have not to date been translated into English.
* Kulstad, Mark. "Leibniz, Spinoza, and Tschirnhaus: Metaphysics
a Trois, 1675-1676" in Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes. Edited by Olli
Koistinen and John Biro. (New York: Oxford, 2002), p. 221-240.
o An interesting and useful analysis of the relationship
between Leibniz, Tschirnhaus, and Spinoza during a critical period in
Leibniz's philosophical development.
* Melamed, Yitzhak. "Spinoza's Metaphysics of Substance: The
Substance-Mode Relation as a Relation of Inherence and Predication",
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1): 2009. 17-82
o In this article Melamed argues against Curley's
interpretation of modes and in favor of the claim that modes are
properties that both inhere in substance and are predicated of
substance.
* Nadler, Steven. Spinoza's Ethics: An Introduction. (New York:
Cambridge, 2005.)
o A good general introduction to Spinoza's Ethics which
takes into account much of the recent scholarship.
* Pruss, Alexander. The Principle of Sufficient Reason. (New
York: Cambridge, 2007.)
o A recent defense of a weakened form of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason. Pruss both defends the PSR against all of the
classical objections to it and provides a number of arguments in favor
of it.
* Waller, Jason. "Spinoza on the Incoherence of
Self-Destruction", British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 17
(3) 2009, 507-523
o This article is a defense of the validity of Spinoza's
demonstration of E3p4 ("No thing can be destroyed except through an
external cause.") Waller argues that the conclusion follows validly
given Spinoza's views on causation and destruction.
* Wolfson, Harry. The Philosophy of Spinoza, Vols 1 and 2. (New
York: Meridian Books, 1958.)
o Wolfson's book contains the classic statement of
subjectivism. The scholarship of the book is extremely impressive,
however, Wolfson's conclusions are often criticized for providing a
reductionist account of Spinoza.
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