major figure in the intellectual life of the Victorian era. He was one
of the principal proponents of evolutionary theory in the mid
nineteenth century, and his reputation at the time rivaled that of
Charles Darwin. Spencer was initially best known for developing and
applying evolutionary theory to philosophy, psychology and the study
of society — what he called his "synthetic philosophy" (see his A
System of Synthetic Philosophy, 1862-93). Today, however, he is
usually remembered in philosophical circles for his political thought,
primarily for his defense of natural rights and for criticisms of
utilitarian positivism, and his views have been invoked by
'libertarian' thinkers such as Robert Nozick.
1. Life
Spencer was born in Derby, England on 27 April 1820, the eldest of
nine children, but the only one to survive infancy. He was the product
of an undisciplined, largely informal education. His father, George,
was a school teacher, but an unconventional man, and Spencer's family
were Methodist 'Dissenters,' with Quaker sympathies. From an early
age, Herbert was strongly influenced by the individualism and the
anti-establishment and anti-clerical views of his father, and the
Benthamite radical views of his uncle Thomas. Indeed, Spencer's early
years showed a good deal of resistance to authority and independence.
A person of eclectic interests, Spencer eventually trained as a civil
engineer for railways but, in his early 20s, turned to journalism and
political writing. He was initially an advocate of many of the causes
of philosophic radicalism and some of his ideas (e.g., the definition
of 'good' and 'bad' in terms of their pleasurable or painful
consequences, and his adoption of a version of the 'greatest happiness
principle') show similarities to utilitarianism.
From 1848 to 1853, Spencer worked as a writer and subeditor for The
Economist financial weekly and, as a result, came into contact with a
number of political controversialists such as George Henry Lewes,
Thomas Carlyle, Lewes' future lover George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans
[1819-1880])–with whom Spencer had himself had a lengthy (though
purely intellectual) association–and T.H. Huxley (1825-1895). Despite
the diversity of opinions to which he was exposed, Spencer's
unquestioning confidence in his own views was coupled with a
stubbornness and a refusal to read authors with whom he disagreed.
In his early writings, Spencer defended a number of radical causes–
particularly on land nationalization, the extent to which economics
should reflect a policy of laissez-faire, and the place and role of
women in society–though he came to abandon most of these causes later
in his life.
In 1851 Spencer's first book, Social Statics, or the Conditions
Essential to Human Happiness appeared. ('Social statics'–the term was
borrowed from Auguste Comte–deals with the conditions of social order,
and was preliminary to a study of human progress and evolution–i.e.,
'social dynamics.') In this work, Spencer presents an account of the
development of human freedom and a defense of individual liberties,
based on a (Lamarckian-style) evolutionary theory.
Upon the death of his uncle Thomas, in 1853, Spencer received a small
inheritance which allowed him to devote himself to writing without
depending on regular employment.
In 1855, Spencer published his second book, The Principles of
Psychology. As in Social Statics, Spencer saw Bentham and Mill as
major targets, though in the present work he focussed on criticisms of
the latter's associationism. (Spencer later revised this work, and
Mill came to respect some of Spencer's arguments.) The Principles of
Psychology was much less successful than Social Statics, however, and
about this time Spencer began to experience serious (predominantly
mental) health problems that affected him for the rest of his life.
This led him to seek privacy, and he increasingly avoided appearing in
public. Although he found that, because of his ill health, he could
write for only a few hours each day, he embarked upon a lengthy
project–the nine-volume A System of Synthetic Philosophy (1862-
93)–which provided a systematic account of his views in biology,
sociology, ethics and politics. This 'synthetic philosophy' brought
together a wide range of data from the various natural and social
sciences and organized it according to the basic principles of his
evolutionary theory.
Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy was initially available only through
private subscription, but he was also a contributor to the leading
intellectual magazines and newspapers of his day. His fame grew with
his publications, and he counted among his admirers both radical
thinkers and prominent scientists, including John Stuart Mill and the
physicist, John Tyndall. In the 1860s and 1870s, for example, the
influence of Spencer's evolutionary theory was on a par with that of
Charles Darwin.
In 1883 Spencer was elected a corresponding member of philosophical
section of the French academy of moral and political sciences. His
work was also particularly influential in the United States, where his
book, The Study of Sociology, was at the center of a controversy
(1879-80) at Yale University between a professor, William Graham
Sumner, and the University's president, Noah Porter. Spencer's
influence extended into the upper echelons of American society and it
has been claimed that, in 1896, "three justices of the Supreme Court
were avowed 'Spencerians'." His reputation was at its peak in the
1870s and early 1880s, and he was nominated for the Nobel Prize for
Literature in 1902. Spencer, however, declined most of the honors he
was given.
Spencer's health significantly deteriorated in the last two decades of
his life, and he died in relative seclusion, following a long illness,
on December 8, 1903.
Within his lifetime, some one million copies of his books had been
sold, his work had been translated into French, German, Spanish,
Italian, and Russian, and his ideas were popular in a number of other
countries such as Poland (e.g., through the work of the positivist,
Wladyslaw Kozlowski). Nevertheless, by the end of his life, his
political views were no longer as popular as they had once been, and
the dominant currents in liberalism allowed for a more interventionist
state.
2. Method
Spencer's method is, broadly speaking, scientific and empirical, and
it was influenced significantly by the positivism of Auguste Comte.
Because of the empirical character of scientific knowledge and because
of his conviction that that which is known–biological life–is in a
process of evolution, Spencer held that knowledge is subject to
change. Thus, Spencer writes, "In science the important thing is to
modify and change one's ideas as science advances." As scientific
knowledge was primarily empirical, however, that which was not
'perceivable' and could not be empirically tested could not be known.
(This emphasis on the knowable as perceivable led critics to charge
that Spencer fails to distinguish perceiving and conceiving.)
Nevertheless, Spencer was not a skeptic.
Spencer's method was also synthetic. The purpose of each science or
field of investigation was to accumulate data and to derive from these
phenomena the basic principles or laws or 'forces' which gave rise to
them. To the extent that such principles conformed to the results of
inquiries or experiments in the other sciences, one could have
explanations that were of a high degree of certainty. Thus, Spencer
was at pains to show how the evidence and conclusions of each of the
sciences is relevant to, and materially affected by, the conclusions
of the others.
3. Human Nature
In the first volume of A System of Synthetic Philosophy, entitled
First Principles (1862), Spencer argued that all phenomena could be
explained in terms of a lengthy process of evolution in things. This
'principle of continuity' was that homogeneous organisms are unstable,
that organisms develop from simple to more complex and heterogeneous
forms, and that such evolution constituted a norm of progress. This
account of evolution provided a complete and 'predetermined' structure
for the kind of variation noted by Darwin–and Darwin's respect for
Spencer was significant.
But while Spencer held that progress was a necessity, it was
'necessary' only overall, and there is no teleological element in his
account of this process. In fact, it was Spencer, and not Darwin, who
coined the phrase "survival of the fittest," though Darwin came to
employ the expression in later editions of the Origin of Species.
(That this view was both ambiguous –for it was not clear whether one
had in mind the 'fittest' individual or species–and far from universal
was something that both figures, however, failed to address.)
Spencer's understanding of evolution included the Lamarckian theory of
the inheritance of acquired characteristics and emphasized the direct
influence of external agencies on the organism's development. He
denied (as Darwin had argued) that evolution was based on the
characteristics and development of the organism itself and on a simple
principle of natural selection.
Spencer held that he had evidence for this evolutionary account from
the study of biology (see Principles of Biology, 2 vols. [1864-7]). He
argued that there is a gradual specialization in things–beginning with
biological organisms–towards self-sufficiency and individuation.
Because human nature can be said to improve and change, then,
scientific–including moral and political– views that rested on the
assumption of a stable human nature (such as that presupposed by many
utilitarians) had to be rejected. 'Human nature' was simply "the
aggregate of men's instincts and sentiments" which, over time, would
become adapted to social existence. Spencer still recognized the
importance of understanding individuals in terms of the 'whole' of
which they were 'parts,' but these parts were mutually dependent, not
subordinate to the organism as a whole. They had an identity and value
on which the whole depended–unlike, Spencer thought, that portrayed by
Hobbes.
For Spencer, then, human life was not only on a continuum with, but
was also the culmination of, a lengthy process of evolution. Even
though he allowed that there was a parallel development of mind and
body, without reducing the former to the latter, he was opposed to
dualism and his account of mind and of the functioning of the central
nervous system and the brain was mechanistic.
Although what characterized the development of organisms was the
'tendency to individuation' (Social Statics [1851], p. 436), this was
coupled with a natural inclination in beings to pursue whatever would
preserve their lives. When one examines human beings, this natural
inclination was reflected in the characteristic of rational
self-interest. Indeed, this tendency to pursue one's individual
interests is such that, in primitive societies, at least, Spencer
believed that a prime motivating factor in human beings coming
together was the threat of violence and war.
Paradoxically, perhaps, Spencer held an 'organic' view of society.
Starting with the characteristics of individual entities, one could
deduce, using laws of nature, what would promote or provide life and
human happiness. He believed that social life was an extension of the
life of a natural body, and that social 'organisms' reflected the same
(Lamarckian) evolutionary principles or laws as biological entities
did. The existence of such 'laws,' then, provides a basis for moral
science and for determining how individuals ought to act and what
would constitute human happiness.
4. Religion
As a result of his view that knowledge about phenomena required
empirical demonstration, Spencer held that we cannot know the nature
of reality in itself and that there was, therefore, something that was
fundamentally "unknowable." (This included the complete knowledge of
the nature of space, time, force, motion, and substance.)
Since, Spencer claimed, we cannot know anything non-empirical, we
cannot know whether there is a God or what its character might be.
Though Spencer was a severe critic of religion and religious doctrine
and practice–these being the appropriate objects of empirical
investigation and assessment–his general position on religion was
agnostic. Theism, he argued, cannot be adopted because there is no
means to acquire knowledge of the divine, and there would be no way of
testing it. But while we cannot know whether religious beliefs are
true, neither can we know that (fundamental) religious beliefs are
false.
5. Moral Philosophy
Spencer saw human life on a continuum with, but also as the
culmination of, a lengthy process of evolution, and he held that human
society reflects the same evolutionary principles as biological
organisms do in their development. Society–and social institutions
such as the economy–can, he believed, function without external
control, just as the digestive system or a lower organism does
(though, in arguing this, Spencer failed to see the fundamental
differences between 'higher' and 'lower' levels of social
organization). For Spencer, all natural and social development
reflected 'the universality of law'. Beginning with the 'laws of
life', the conditions of social existence, and the recognition of life
as a fundamental value, moral science can deduce what kinds of laws
promote life and produce happiness. Spencer's ethics and political
philosophy, then, depends on a theory of 'natural law,' and it is
because of this that, he maintained, evolutionary theory could provide
a basis for a comprehensive political and even philosophical theory.
Given the variations in temperament and character among individuals,
Spencer recognized that there were differences in what happiness
specifically consists in (Social Statics [1851], p. 5). In general,
however, 'happiness' is the surplus of pleasure over pain, and 'the
good' is what contributes to the life and development of the organism,
or–what is much the same–what provides this surplus of pleasure over
pain. Happiness, therefore, reflects the complete adaptation of an
individual organism to its environment–or, in other words, 'happiness'
is that which an individual human being naturally seeks.
For human beings to flourish and develop, Spencer held that there must
be as few artificial restrictions as possible, and it is primarily
freedom that he, contra Bentham, saw as promoting human happiness.
While progress was an inevitable characteristic of evolution, it was
something to be achieved only through the free exercise of human
faculties (see Social Statics).
Society, however, is (by definition, for Spencer) an aggregate of
individuals, and change in society could take place only once the
individual members of that society had changed and developed (The
Study of Sociology, pp. 366-367). Individuals are, therefore,
'primary,' individual development was 'egoistic,' and associations
with others largely instrumental and contractual.
Still, Spencer thought that human beings exhibited a natural sympathy
and concern for one another; there is a common character and there are
common interests among human beings that they eventually come to
recognize as necessary not only for general, but for individual
development. (This reflects, to an extent, Spencer's organicism.)
Nevertheless, Spencer held that 'altruism' and compassion beyond the
family unit were sentiments that came to exist only recently in human
beings.
Spencer maintained that there was a natural mechanism–an 'innate moral
sense'–in human beings by which they come to arrive at certain moral
intuitions and from which laws of conduct might be deduced (The
Principles of Ethics, I [1892], p. 26). Thus one might say that
Spencer held a kind of 'moral sense theory' (Social Statics, pp. 23,
19). (Later in his life, Spencer described these 'principles' of
moral sense and of sympathy as the 'accumulated effects of instinctual
or inherited experiences.') Such a mechanism of moral feeling was,
Spencer believed, a manifestation of his general idea of the
'persistence of force.' As this persistence of force was a principle
of nature, and could not be created artificially, Spencer held that no
state or government could promote moral feeling any more than it could
promote the existence of physical force. But while Spencer insisted
that freedom was the power to do what one desired, he also held that
what one desired and willed was wholly determined by "an infinitude of
previous experiences" (The Principles of Psychology, pp. 500-502.)
Spencer saw this analysis of ethics as culminating in an 'Absolute
Ethics,' the standard for which was the production of pure
pleasure–and he held that the application of this standard would
produce, so far as possible, the greatest amount of pleasure over pain
in the long run.
Spencer's views here were rejected by Mill and Hartley. Their
principal objection was that Spencer's account of natural 'desires'
was inadequate because it failed to provide any reason why one ought
to have the feelings or preferences one did.
There is, however, more to Spencer's ethics than this. As individuals
become increasingly aware of their individuality, they also become
aware of the individuality of others and, thereby, of the law of equal
freedom. This 'first principle' is that 'Every man has freedom to do
all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any
other man' (Social Statics, p. 103). One's 'moral sense,' then, led to
the recognition of the existence of individual rights, and one can
identify strains of a rights-based ethic in Spencer's writings.
Spencer's views clearly reflect a fundamentally 'egoist' ethic, but he
held that rational egoists would, in the pursuit of their own self
interest, not conflict with one another. Still, to care for someone
who has no direct relation to oneself–such as supporting the un- and
under employed–is, therefore, not only not in one's self interest, but
encourages laziness and works against evolution. In this sense, at
least, social inequity was explained, if not justified, by
evolutionary principles.
6. Political Philosophy
Despite his egoism and individualism, Spencer held that life in
community was important. Because the relation of parts to one another
was one of mutual dependency, and because of the priority of the
individual 'part' to the collective, society could not do or be
anything other than the sum of its units. This view is evident, not
only in his first significant major contribution to political
philosophy, Social Statics, but in his later essays–some of which
appear in later editions of The Man versus the State.
As noted earlier, Spencer held an 'organic' view of society,
Nevertheless, as also noted above, he argued that the natural growth
of an organism required 'liberty'–which enabled him (philosophically)
to justify individualism and to defend the existence of individual
human rights. Because of his commitment to the 'law of equal freedom'
and his view that law and the state would of necessity interfere with
it, he insisted on an extensive policy of laissez faire. For Spencer,
'liberty' "is to be measured, not by the nature of the government
machinery he lives under [...] but by the relative paucity of the
restraints it imposes on him" (The Man versus the State [1940], p.
19); the genuine liberal seeks to repeal those laws that coerce and
restrict individuals from doing as they see fit. Spencer followed
earlier liberalism, then, in maintaining that law is a restriction of
liberty and that the restriction of liberty, in itself, is evil and
justified only where it is necessary to the preservation of liberty.
The only function of government was to be the policing and protection
of individual rights. Spencer maintained that education, religion, the
economy, and care for the sick or indigent were not to be undertaken
by the state.
Law and public authority have as their general purpose, therefore, the
administration of justice (equated with freedom and the protection of
rights). These issues became the focus of Spencer's later work in
political philosophy and, particularly, in The Man versus the State.
Here, Spencer contrasts early, classical liberalism with the
liberalism of the 19th century, arguing that it was the latter, and
not the former, that was a "new Toryism"–the enemy of individual
progress and liberty. It is here as well that Spencer develops an
argument for the claim that individuals have rights, based on a 'law
of life'. (Interestingly, Spencer acknowledges that rights are not
inherently moral, but become so only by one's recognition that for
them to be binding on others the rights of others must be binding on
oneself–this is, in other words, a consequence of the 'law of equal
freedom.') He concluded that everyone had basic rights to liberty 'in
virtue of their constitutions' as human beings (Social Statics, p.
77), and that such rights were essential to social progress. (These
rights included rights to life, liberty, property, free speech, equal
rights of women, universal suffrage, and the right 'to ignore the
state'–though Spencer reversed himself on some of these rights in his
later writings.) Thus, the industrious–those of character, but with no
commitment to existing structures except those which promoted such
industry (and, therefore, not religion or patriotic
institutions)–would thrive. Nevertheless, all industrious individuals,
Spencer believed, would end up being in fundamental agreement.
Not surprisingly, then, Spencer maintained that the arguments of the
early utilitarians on the justification of law and authority and on
the origin of rights were fallacious. He also rejected utilitarianism
and its model of distributive justice because he held that it rested
on an egalitarianism that ignored desert and, more fundamentally,
biological need and efficiency. Spencer further maintained that the
utilitarian account of the law and the state was also
inconsistent—that it tacitly assumed the existence of claims or rights
that have both moral and legal weight independently of the positive
law. And, finally, Spencer argues as well against parliamentary,
representative government, seeing it as exhibiting a virtual "divine
right"—i.e., claiming that "the majority in an assembly has power that
has no bounds." Spencer maintained that government action requires not
only individual consent, but that the model for political association
should be that of a "joint stock company", where the 'directors' can
never act for a certain good except on the explicit wishes of its
'shareholders'. When parliaments attempt to do more than protect the
rights of their citizens by, for example, 'imposing' a conception of
the good–be it only on a minority–Spencer suggested that they are no
different from tyrannies.
7. Assessment
Spencer has been frequently accused of inconsistency; one finds
variations in his conclusions concerning land nationalization and
reform, the rights of children and the extension of suffrage to women,
and the role of government. Moreover, in recent studies of Spencer's
theory of social justice, there is some debate whether justice is
based primarily on desert or on entitlement, whether the 'law of equal
freedom' is a moral imperative or a descriptive natural law, and
whether the law of equal freedom is grounded on rights, utility, or,
ultimately, on 'moral sense'. Nevertheless, Spencer's work has
frequently been seen as a model for later 'libertarian' thinkers, such
as Robert Nozick, and he continues to be read–and is often invoked–by
'libertarians' on issues concerning the function of government and the
fundamental character of individual rights.
8. References and Further Reading
a. Primary Sources
* The Proper Sphere of Government, London: W. Brittain, 1843.
* Social Statics. London: Chapman, 1851.
* The Principles of Psychology. London: Longmans, 1855; 2nd edn.,
2 vols. London: Williams and Norgate, 1870-2; 3rd edn., 2 vols.
(1890). [A System of Synthetic Philosophy ; v. 4-5]
* First Principles. London: Williams and Norgate, 1862; 6th edn.,
revised, 1904. [A system of Synthetic Philosophy ; v. 1]
* Principles of Biology, 2 vols. London: Williams and Norgate,
1864, 1867; 2nd edn., 1898-99).[A System of Synthetic Philosophy ; v.
2-3]
* The Study of Sociology. New York: D. Appleton, 1874, [c1873]
* The Principles of Sociology.3 vols. London : Williams and
Norgate, 1882-1898. [A System of Synthetic Philosophy, v. 6-8]
CONTENTS: Vol. 1: pt. 1. The data of sociology. pt. 2. The inductions
of sociology. pt. 3. The domestic relations; Vol. 2: pt. 4. Ceremonial
institutions. pt. 5. Political institutions; v. 3: pt. 6.
Ecclesiastical institutions. pt. 7. Professional institutions. pt. 8.
Industrial institutions.]
* The Man versus the State:containing "The new Toryism," "The
coming slavery," "The sins of legislators," and "The great political
superstition," London : Williams & Norgate, 1884; with additional
essays and an introduction by Albert Jay Nock. [adds "From freedom to
bondage," and "Over- legislation"] Intro. A.J. Nock. Caldwell, ID:
Caxton, 1940.
* Spencer, Herbert. The Factors of Organic Evolution. London:
Williams and Norgate, 1887.
* Spencer, Herbert. The Principles of Ethics. 2 vols. London:
Williams and Northgate, 1892. [A system of synthetic philosophy ; v.
9-10]
* An Autobiography. 2 v. London: Williams and Norgate, 1904.
b. Secondary Sources
* Andreski, S. Herbert Spencer: Structure, Function and Evolution.
London, 1972.
* Duncan, David. (ed.) The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer.
London: Methuen, 1908.
* Gray, T.S. The Political Philosophy of Herbert Spencer,
Aldershot: Avebury, 1996.
* Jones, G. Social Darwinism and English Thought: The Interaction
between Biological and Social Theory. Brighton, 1980.
* Kennedy, James G. Herbert Spencer. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1978.
* Miller, David. Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976. Ch. 6
* Paxton, N.L. George Eliot and Herbert Spencer: Feminism,
Evolutionism, and the Reconstruction of Gender. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1991.
* Peel, J.D.Y. Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist.
London, 1971.
* Ritchie, David G. The Principles of State Interference: Four
Essays on the Political Philosophy of Mr Herbert Spencer, J.S. Mill
and T.H. Green. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1891.
* Taylor, M.W. Men versus the State: Herbert Spencer and late
Victorian Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
* Wiltshire, David. The Social and Political Thought of Herbert
Spencer. New York: Oxford, 1978.
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