"Period of Disunity" between the stability of the Han and Tang
dynasties. His Zhaolun (Treatises of [Seng]zhao) is perhaps the most
significant text for the study of early Mādhyamika ("middle-ist") or
Sanlun ("Three-Treatise") Buddhism in China. His work may be the only
extensive compilation of early Chinese Mādhyamika treatises available,
although no Mādhyamika "school" is likely to have existed in China
until Jizang (549-623 CE) projected such a lineage back to the time of
Sengzhao. Mādhyamika, a philosophical development that arose within
Mahāyāna Buddhism in India during the first few centuries CE,
concentrates on distinguishing between concepts and ideas as necessary
but insubstantial tools for functioning within the world of
conventional reality and the false sense of duality between subject
and object that they often engender. As Sengzhao puts it in his
Commentary to the Vimalakīrtinirdesha Sūtra: "Those things which are
find their genesis in the mind; [those things] which originate in the
mind arise from things. That region of affirmation and negation is a
place of illusion." Considered to have been a brilliant young monk
who was the principal person responsible for the transmission of
Mādhyamika teaching in China, Sengzhao has received a great deal of
attention from scholars interested in resolving the question of the
extent to which the Chinese fully understood the Indian
religio-philosophical system and its relationship to the indigenous
Daoist and Confucian traditions.
1. Life
a. Traditional Biography
The Gaoseng Zhuan (Biographies of Eminent Monks), contains the
following traditional account of Sengzhao's life: The monk Sengzhao
was a man from Jingzhao. His family being impoverished, Zhao hired
himself out as a copyist in order to make a living. As such, he
successively went through the Classics and History, in the process
becoming proficient in writing. Zhao's interests inclined towards the
subtle and profound, having always considered Lao[zi] and Zhuang[zi]
as particularly important in terms of the mind. After studying Laozi's
Daodejing, Zhao declared, "It is indeed beautiful, but I have not yet
discovered the region where my spirit can settle down and my worldly
ties be completely severed." After a time, Zhao read the old [version]
of the Vimalakrtinirdesha Stra and was overcome with happiness and
pleasure. Opening it repeatedly, he relished its flavor and exclaimed,
"At last I know where I should be!" Because of this, Zhao became a
learned monk, studying both the Vaipulya Stra and the Tripitaka.
Having reached the age for capping [coming of age], Zhao's reputation
had become widespread through the Passes and in the administrative
capital. In time, however, quarrelsome people doubted the fame that
had come to him primarily because of his youth. Coming from as far
away as one thousand li, they entered the Passes and engaged Zhao in
debate. However, since Zhao had a talent for profound thinking and was
also an expert in pure conversation, he seized whatever openings he
had and pointedly crushed his opponents, who could not obstruct him.
In time, respected scholars from Jingzhao and from outside the Passes
wondered at his discriminating arguments and considered trying to
challenge him.
At the time when Kumrajva [a famous Central Asian Buddhist missionary
to China, c. 344-413 CE] arrived in Gecang, Zhao followed him in order
to become a disciple. Kumrajva highly praised him without limit. When
Kumrajva moved to Chang'an, Zhao also followed him there. Yao Xing
placed Zhao, Sengrui and other monks in the Xiaoyao pavilion, where
they assisted in the examination and editing of the Buddhist
treatises.
Zhao, being aware that the Sage [the Buddha] had passed on long ago,
that the literature had come to take on numerous mixed
interpretations, and that earlier translations of the texts had
certain mistakes in them, regularly consulted with Kumrajva and
greatly increased his comprehension. Therefore, following the
translation of the Pancavimshatisahsrik prajnpramit Stra (Twenty-Five
Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Stra), Zhao wrote the treatise
entitled Prajn Is Without Dichotomizing Knowledge in over two thousand
words. Upon its completion, Zhao presented it to Kumrajva. After
reading it, the master declared it to be beautiful and said to Zhao,
"My explanations are on par with yours, but your wording and
expression is far better!"
In time, the retired Lushan scholar Liu Yimin saw a copy of Zhao's
Prajn Is Without Dichotomizing Knowledge. He also praised it, saying,
"I did not think that among your monks there would be another
Bingshu." In turn, Liu Yimin presented it to his superior, Huiyuan,
who also cherished it. Huiyuan exclaimed that he had never seen
another like it. Accordingly, the entire community opened and savored
the treatise, passing it from one to another repeatedly.
Liu Yimin also composed a letter to Zhao. Following this, Zhao wrote
treatises on Non Absolute Emptiness, Things Do Not Shift and others.
In addition, he commented on the Vimalakrtinirdesha Stra and composed
numerous prefaces, all of which remain extant. Following the death of
Kumrajva, Zhao reflected on his teacher's untimely death and eternal
departure, feeling his longing desires and hopes vanquished. At this
time, Zhao wrote the treatise Nirvna Is Without Conceptualization.
This essay consists of ten explanations and nine arguments in
approximately one thousand words. When the treatise was completed,
Zhao presented it to his superior, Yao Xing….
Yao Xing's response to Zhao's work was very attentive to various
details about the meaning and included praise for its completeness. He
then ordered by decree that it be copied and distributed to all the
members of his family. This action demonstrates how highly Zhao was
regarded at this time. In the tenth year of the yixi period [c.
413-414 CE], Zhao died in Chang'an, having reached the autumn of his
thirty first year. (Taishô shinsh daizokyô L; No. 2509; 365a-366b.1)
b. Other Accounts
A number of other accounts exist concerning the life of Sengzhao,
though they rarely shed any new light on his work or activities. The
Weishou [a collection of canonical texts] accords Sengzhao preeminence
among the eight hundred or so scholars gathered at Chang'an: "Daorong
and his fellows were of knowledge and learning all-pervasive, and
Sengzhao was the greatest of them. When Kumrajva made a translation,
Sengzhao would always take pen in hand and define the meanings of
words. He annotated the Vimalakrtinirdesha Stra and also published
several treatises. They all have subtle meaning, and scholars venerate
them." (Hurvitz 54)
While adding nothing substantively new, this version highlights
Sengzhao's importance as a liaison between the Indian Kumrajva and the
Chinese language. All indications point to the foreign master's
reliance on Sengzhao's ability to "translate" the Indian terminology
into stylistically acceptable Chinese. The gong'an (meditation puzzle)
collection known as the Biyen lu (Blue Cliff Records) contains a tale
concerning Sengzhao's death which by all accounts is apocryphal.
Despite its spurious legend regarding Zhao's demise, within the gongan
commentary supplied by the Chan ("meditation"; Japanese Zen) master
Yunmen, we find another reference to his life that provides some
insight into his correspondence with Liu Yimin. According to the Biyen
lu, Sengzhao not only took Kumrajva as his teacher, but "he also
called upon the bodhisattva Buddhabhadra at the Temple of the Tile
Coffin, who had come from India to transmit the mind-seal of the
twenty-seventh Patriarch. Sengzhao then entered deeply into the inner
sanctum." (Cleary and Cleary 1977:401)
2. Works
In terms of literary output, Sengzhao's major extant work is the
Zhaolun. This text is a product of the formative years of the Chinese
Mdhyamika tradition, and consists of a preface, introduction, four
treatises and a set of correspondence between Sengzhao and Liu Yimin,
a lay monk from the nearby Lushan monastery. The Zhaolun represents
one of the earliest and most comprehensive examples of the embryonic
thought of the Chinese Mdhyamika school.
In fact, it may be the only extensive compilation of early Chinese
Mdhyamika treatises available. Not only do we possess most of the
works ascribed to Sengzhao, but the extant texts are full-length,
internally logical discourses. By comparing the preface, internal
evidence and Sengzhao's biography, the following order of composition
emerges:
c. 405: Prajn Is Without Dichotomizing Knowledge
c. 409: Non-Absolute Emptiness
c. 410: Correspondence with Liu Yimin
c. 410-411: Things Do Not Shift
c. 412-413: Nirvna Is Without Conceptualization
c. 412-413: Introduction (if genuinely composed by Sengzhao, as
tradition asserts)
In its completed form, as found in the Taishô shinsh daizokyô (Taishô
XLV, No. 1858), the text is rearranged into the following order:
Things Do Not Shift
Non-Absolute Emptiness
Prajn Is Without Dichotomizing Knowledge
Correspondence with Liu Yimin
Nirvna Is Without Conceptualization
In addition, Sengzhao is credited with a commentary on the
Vimalakrtinirdesha Stra, an obituary of Kumrajva, an afterword to the
Saddharmapundrika Stra, and prefaces to four Mahyna texts: the
Drghgama, the Shata Shstra, the Brahmajla Stra, and the
Vimalakrtinirdesha Stra.
The Chan tradition also attributes another treatise to the hand of
Sengzhao, the Baozang lun (Treasure Store Treatise) (Taishô XLV, No.
1857: 143b-150a), though most scholars regard the work as spurious.
Another work, entitled On the Identity of the Buddha's Two Bodies, has
been attributed to Sengzhao; this essay, however, is lost and no
corroborating evidence of its existence can be found, either in
Sengzhao's other work or that of later commentators.
In his writing, Sengzhao routinely employs the standard tools of
Mdhyamika discourse (see Ngrjuna). Thus, we find Sengzhao engaging in
dialectical arguments in which he resorts to the tetralemma
(four-cornered negation) as a "solution." According to this formula,
any proposition x entails four logical possibilities:
1. X is
2. X is not
3. X both is and is not
4. X neither is nor is not
Two of his treatises (Prajn Is Without Dichotomizing Knowledge and
Nirvna Is Without Conceptualization) follow the debate-like format of
Ngrjuna's Mulamadhyamakakrik (Verses on the Fundamentals of the Middle
Way) [MMK]. In addition, Sengzhao became famous for his artful use of
paradox, often reminiscent of the Daoist classic, Zhuangzi. This
stylistic trait would make him a favorite of the later Chan school,
which regarded Sengzhao as one of its unofficial patriarchs.
3. Background
a. Indian Mdhyamika
Mdhyamika, a philosophical development that arose within Mahyna
Buddhism during the first few centuries CE, concentrates on breaking
down the reliance on ordinary means of apprehending the world around
us. While concepts and ideas are a necessary part of functioning
within the world of conventional reality, our tendency to
substantialize those concepts into metaphysical realities leads to
behavior generating the basic problems of dis-ease (duhkha) and
therefore becoming.
Indian Mdhyamika targets the mind's natural disposition toward
conceptualization, a tendency that both creates and fosters a false
sense of duality ensuing between the perceiving subject and observed
objects. By assigning distinctive names and characteristics to things,
we unwittingly create a false dichotomy, particularly in terms of
linguistic conventions. Ngrjuna (c. 150-250 CE) referred to this
process as the proliferation of conceptual and verbal hair-splitting,
or prapanca. He articulated the concept of "emptiness" (shnyat) – the
view that neither subject nor object exist independently — as a
soteriological device, a deconstructive tool to rid the mind of
delusional prapanca. Defined in varying ways by Western scholars,
prapanca refers to the mind's natural tendency to both create
elaborate networks of interrelated mental constructions and to cling
to those constructs as real.
One who grasps the view that the Tathgata exists,
Having seized the Buddha,
Constructs conceptual fabrications [prapanca]
About one who has achieved nirvna.
Those who develop mental fabrications with regard to the Buddha,
Who has gone beyond all fabrications,
As a consequence of those cognitive fabrications,
Fail to see the Tathgata. (Garfield 1995:62)
These mental fabrications inevitably arise from the mind's
predilection for naming things. In trying to distinguish between
things and their respective functions, we assign names as a means of
identification. The process of naming itself involves the picking out
of abstracted characteristics unique to an entity and declaring it to
be the "essence" of the thing.
What human beings perceive as reality is nothing more than
artificially manufactured distinctions between things which in turn
re-combine into a sense of "I" and "it/them." From the practical
standpoint of everyday living and functioning within the confines of
the mundane, these constructs are absolutely necessary. As
conventional designations, however, their provisional descriptions
have no bearing whatsoever on Ultimate Reality. When taken for the
real, they become objects of clinging and therefore fuel for rebirth.
Clinging to these fabrications both fuels the cycle of becoming and
gives rise to quarrels and disputations.
Common people take their stand on their own points of view . . .
and hence there arise all the contentions. Prapanca is the root of all
contentions and prapanca arises from the mind. (Dazhi Dulun; Taishô
XXV, No. 1509; 61a)
Dissensions abound as a result of the mind's constant pursuit of
what it mistakes for the real. Clinging to the ephemeral, the mind
generates ignorance, following its own fantasies in contempt for the
way things truly are.
As Ngrjuna goes to great pains to point out, his opponents and the
common person continually misinterpret emptiness. One takes it to mean
complete annihilationism while another understands it in a newly
reified manner. In addressing his opponents' contention that his
emptiness leads to the utter destruction of the Buddhist doctrines of
co-dependent origination, karma, the four noble truths and all
conventional activity, Ngrjuna retorts:
You understand neither emptiness nor the reasons behind emptiness
nor the meaning of emptiness. Therefore you create these problems for
yourself. (MMK 24.7)
In his later commentary, Candrakrti (c. 600s CE) elaborates on this
verse by connecting the opponents' position to a misapprehension of
the entire Mdhyamika program. Mdhyamika does not advocate a nihilistic
position as alleged, nor does it take on ontological status within
Ngrjuna's philosophy. Rather, the purport of emptiness lies in its
capacity as a soteriological device intended to calm the excesses of
prapanca.
Emptiness is taught in order to calm conceptual diffusion
completely; therefore, its purpose is the calming of all conceptual
diffusion [prapanca]. (Huntington 1989:205)
Having pacified conceptualization and destroyed the proliferation of
mental constructs, a state of equanimity is reached. No longer drawing
artificial distinctions between things, no longer reifying the
conventional, the one who grasps the real meaning of emptiness ceases
apprehending mistaken perceptions of the self, and thereby realizes
the ultimate soteriological goal of release.
When views of "I"and "mine" are extinguished, whether with respect
to the inner or outer, the appropriator ceases. This having ceased,
arising comes to an end.Activity and dis-ease having come to an end,
there is nirvna. Activity and dis-ease arise out of conceptualization.
Conceptualization arises out of conceptual hair-splitting [prapanca].
Conceptual hair-splitting ceases through emptiness. (MMK XVIII. 4-5)
b. Chinese Mdhyamika
Although Mdhyamika is known in Chinese as the Sanlun Zong (Three
Treatise School), most scholars acknowledge that no such "school"
existed until Jizang (549-623), who projected such a lineage back to
the time of Sengzhao and the disciples of Kumrajva. The Sanlun Zong
derives its name from its identification of three major texts as the
focal point of study: the Zhonglun (Verses on the Fundamentals of the
Middle Way) and Shi'er Menlun (Twelve Topic Treatise) by Ngrjuna (c.
150-250), and the Bailun (Hundred Treatises) by Aryadeva. In addition
to these primary texts, the Chinese Mdhyamika concentrated on a number
of secondary texts, as evidenced by the commentaries and prefaces to
other Mahayanist texts, including the Vimalakrtinirdesha Stra,
Bodhisattva dhyna and the Brahmajla Stra.
Chinese Mdhyamika emphasizes the ontological, epistemological and
soteriological qualities of emptiness. From this perspective, the main
problem facing the unenlightened revolves around their reliance on
conceptualization or naming for their understanding and apprehension
of the world. In discussing false views concerning the nature of
nirvna, Sengzhao points out that "the way of nirvna cannot be
understood by grasping at either existence or nonexistence…. These
seemingly objective mental projections of existence and nonexistence
are merely regions of vain hope."
Sengzhao elaborates on this point using the concept of "the emptiness
of emptiness" (shnyatshnyat) in his Commentary to the
Vimalakrtinirdesha Stra:
Those things which are find their genesis in the mind; [those
things] which originate in the mind arise from things. That region of
affirmation and negation is a place of illusion. (Taishô XXXVIII, NO.
1775; 372c.17-26)
Thus, neither object nor subject exist independently. Mind depends
upon the conventionally real and the conventionally real in turn
depends upon the mind.
4. The Treatises
a. Overview
Each treatise begins with a basic statement of the problem as
understood by Sengzhao. In every instance, the fallacious
interpretation of either an object or doctrinal position is
immediately linked to the discriminatory activity of prapanca.
Understood both in the sense of verbal argumentation and conceptual
hair-splitting, prapanca plays a critical role in Sengzhao's
philosophy of religion. While rarely addressing the issue of prapanca
directly, he alludes to the question throughout the treatises.
Bringing these activities to an end represents the heart of not only
the individual treatises but also the text taken as a whole.
Sengzhao traces the genesis of mistaken apprehensions to the interplay
and co-dependency of words, concepts and existent things. One without
the others proves untenable. Built upon the matrix of observing the
phenomenal world (whose mundane existence is never questioned by
Sengzhao), ordinary perception functions by assigning a name to
individual manifestations and then conceptualizing the conjunction of
that name and phenomenon into a self-existent entity with distinctive
own-marks. Once the concept has been created and an appropriate name
assigned, knowledge of that object is generated. With the presumed
knowledge of the thing in hand, the unenlightened believe that they
have grasped reality and therefore attained soteriological release.
Sengzhao relentlessly undermines the conventional practice of naming
and conceptualizing, believing that the process lead to the delusions
and contentions plaguing his day. While never concerned with language
as such, he at the same time recognizes the fact that the continuous
inter-generational usage of words establishes a common perception that
the things so named and discussed possess discrete own-being. Sengzhao
certainly does not believe that from the standpoint of the ordinary
person this is a well-thought-out "philosophical" system. On the
contrary, he continually bemoans the fact that most people simply do
not take the time to reflect upon their everyday assumptions.
By opposing the worldly [perception], our words appear insipid and
flavorless, which then prevents the common person from deciding
between either accepting or rejecting [the correct perspective]. The
inferior person simply washes their hands of it and forgets about
these matters. . . . It is indeed grievous to me that people's
affections have been led astray for so long, that the truth lies in
front of them and yet they remain unaware of its existence. (Things Do
Not Shift)
Truth is under our feet, in front of our eyes and yet we lack either
the ability or will to apprehend reality. While displaying a sense of
compassion for the ordinary person, Sengzhao at the same time roundly
criticizes those who argue and dispute over the nature of reality.
Those philosophers and religious practitioners who embark on the
spiritual journey but get waylaid by mind games and conceptual
elaboration are held accountable for their misapprehensions. Sengzhao
immediately takes the contentious, the quarrelsome and the polemical
to task in the introductory remarks of each treatise. This practice
serves as one indication of his primary objective in dismantling the
propagation of conceptual and verbal hair-splitting.
b. Things Do Not Shift
Accordingly, the first treatise begins with Sengzhao's
characterization of the commonplace perception of reality. Life,
death, the seasons and all things seemingly rotate and change position
in a continuous round of movement. In actual fact, however, no motion
exists because the concept of motion presupposes a separation and
distinction between things which does not ultimately obtain. Motion
and its presumed opposite, rest, are nothing more than one and the
same thing from the perspective of absolute truth (paramrthasatya).
Those who remain deceived, however, cannot comprehend their
concurrence, giving rise to "quarrels and the drawing of distinctions.
[Thus], the ancient pathways are overrun by lovers of difference." The
multiplication of conceptual distinctions and the resulting
attachments to those differences generate a multitude of arguments
among the unenlightened, hopelessly complicating the apprehension of
the truth. If we neglect presenting the correct perspective, we merely
"allow deceptive views about the nature of things to arise and then
are unable to recover [the truth]." Sengzhao clearly has prapanca in
mind when he criticized the lovers of difference, even though he never
explicitly mentions it by name.
c. Non Absolute Emptiness
Similarly, Non-Absolute Emptiness begins with an eloquent description
of the relationship between the enlightened sage's wisdom and
emptiness Apprehending the truth concerning the nature of emptiness,
the sage engages the world while at the same time remaining unattached
to its snares. Through his enlightened mind, he comprehends the
absolute unity of all things in their suchness and deals with them
accordingly. By way of contrast, the masses cannot possibly penetrate
to the truth due to their reliance on ordinary understanding. As a
result, numerous arguments arose concerning the nature of emptiness.
Conversations today all end up disagreeing when they arrive at the
fundamentals of emptiness. Because they insist on disagreeing in order
to come to some type of agreement, how will they ever settle anything?
Hence, in their public quarrels they are unable to arrive at an
understanding.
After describing three such misinterpretations of emptiness, Sengzhao
underscores his contention that delusion arises through the
compounding of things and names. Talk has done nothing but lead the
masses to misapprehension and confusion, diverting them from the truth
concerning the actual nature of things. Sengzhao therefore alludes to
the co-dependent relationship between phenomenal things, naming,
thought and reification.
A thing is a thing with reference to things, and so you might call
it a thing; however, a thing which is a thing with reference to things
is not [truly] a thing, even though we call it [a thing]. Hence,
things are not identical with their names, which [do not] complete the
thing's actuality; names are not identical with the thing and are
therefore incapable of leading one to the Ultimate.
The correct apprehension of the true nature of things lies completely
outside of the morass of words and conceptualizations. Again, Sengzhao
is not taking an anti-linguistic stance as such; he does not argue
that language constitutes the root of all evil. However, he recognizes
that we form our perceptions of the world based on the mind's tendency
to discriminate, distinguish and assign names to things presumed to
possess own-being. His acknowledgement of language's relative
importance is reflected in the fact that despite its problems, he
"cannot remain silent . . . [and f]or the time being . . . will
utilize words . . . [in an attempt] to elucidate" the meaning of
emptiness.
In the end, false conceptualizations are done away with and the
arbitrariness of names established. Similes and metaphors function
only to dislodge the mind from its discriminatory activity. For this
reason, the sage engages the world of the phenomenal while remaining
detached and identifies with the essential unity of the ultimate and
mundane.
d. Prajn Is Without Dichotomizing Knowledge
Prajn (wisdom) is likewise undifferentiated from the One True
Ultimate. With correct perception, the emptiness and subtlety of
enlightened wisdom represents the culmination of all three vehicles.
In ultimacy, neither distinction nor contradiction exists between the
paths. Once again, however, "contentious arguments have recently led
to confusion and differentiated theories" over the nature of prajn.
The proliferation of prapanca has generated speculation that wisdom
operates through discriminatory and dichotomizing knowledge.
Therefore, Sengzhao feels compelled to dispel the falsehoods and
illuminate the correct viewpoint.
After an introductory survey chronicling prajn's arrival in China, the
third treatise opens its substantive argument by depicting sagely
wisdom as "subtle, its mysteries profound and [infinite depths]
difficult to plumb. Markless and without conceptualization, it cannot
be apprehended through either words or symbols." In attempting to
define it or use words to illustrate its nature, we inevitably dissect
and create differentiations in regard to the sage's mind and its
functioning. Nevertheless, Sengzhao once again feels that he has no
choice but to use words in discussing the matter.
e. Correspondence with Liu Yimin
Unfortunately, having committed description to the inadequacies of
language, difficulties and new contentions arise when Sengzhao's
treatise arrives at Lushan. In his correspondence with Sengzhao, Liu
Yimin, following his salutary remarks, acknowledges that while
erudite, Sengzhao's consignment of insight to the vagaries of language
has produced disagreement and contention within the assembly.
To resign such a subtle principle to mere words is indeed
dangerous; those who sing out in this manner find few who can
comprehend. Those who cannot cut themselves off from clinging to
manifested words and symbols will not grasp the meaning . . .
[therefore] I wish to tell you of the doubts which your lofty treatise
has raised in those seeking out differences in the mind of the sage.
Sengzhao responds by chastising Liu Yimin and his fellows for fixating
on the mere form of words. Looking to the finger as though it were the
moon, the scholar-monks at Lushan have equated the discriminative
nature of concepts and words with the non-dual functioning of the
sage's mind:
Those participating in the discussions have become fixated on mere
words. "In your investigation of the great space you search out the
corners." True understanding again lies outside the parameters of
speech and conceptualization. You true gentlemen trained in the
profound should know this teaching and understand.
One should abandon the search for the mere traces of truth and embrace
the meaning behind the words. "Once one sets his mind to think about
it, he begins to err; even more so if one attempts to use words."
Sengzhao advises the learned monks to desist from their reliance on
the mundane perspective in favor of the non-dual apprehension of the
enlightened.
f. Nirvna Is Without Conceptualization
Finally, in the case of Nirvna is Without Conceptualization, Sengzhao
again defends orthodox teachings against those who would constrain the
goal of final release to words and concepts. Misunderstanding the
basic import of nirvna, the deluded believe it to be a substantive
state, one to which they can attain while escaping the phenomenal
world. Subtle and mysterious, the expansive, infinite void is
unapproachable by the ordinary modes of sight and hearing, and
therefore incomprehensible for the banal multitudes.
While the masses lack the capability to apprehend the nuances of
nirvna, the philosophically minded have engaged in fruitless
disputations which in the end have turned them against the very truth
they sought. Inasmuch as they "care only for the words" describing the
indescribable, they are "unable to comprehend superior thinking."
Hence, the purpose behind this treatise was to "silence the heretical
discussions concerning that vast space."
For those tied to words, the "one who does not name/conceptualize" [wu
ming] proceeds to disabuse them of their views. As Sengzhao insists at
the outset, while nirvna is unnameable and non-conceptual,
it is [nevertheless] spoken of as either having or lacking a
remainder. These words surely only refer to the different signs of its
emergence and remaining. They are simply false thought constructions
applied to their corresponding manifestations.
Unattainable through either words or conceptualizations, nirvna
consistently eludes reification. Seeking it by means of the worldly
reduces the philosopher to stupidity, the rhetorician to silence and
the materialists to despair. Accordingly,
the Buddha practiced silence while at Magadha; Vimalakrti refused
to speak at Vaishli; Subhti taught the doctrine of no speech and
Sakra, King of the Devas, heard nothing and yet it rained flowers.
Only when understood through the non-conceptualizing, non-grasping and
non-discriminatory faculty of perfected wisdom does the soteriological
take on its true character.
g. The Treatises as a Whole
Another important key to understanding Sengzhao's thought lies in
recognizing the pattern established between the Treatises and the
logic inherent in their arrangement, a logic which ties the separate
treatises together into a coherent demonstration of the path toward
enlightenment. While never explicitly identified within the text
itself, this design effectively discloses the logic of religious
illumination and soteriological awakening. In following the
development of the text itself, we can approximate Sengzhao's vision
concerning the path to enlightenment.
Through the emptying of emptiness, the text progressively moves the
reader along a systematic presentation of the mutual relationships
which ensue between the objects of cognition [Things Do Not Shift and
Non-Absolute Emptiness], their subject [Prajn Is Without Dichotomous
Knowing and The Correspondence with LiuYimin] and the ultimate result
of correct perception into the nature of that relationship [Nirvna Is
Without Conceptualization].
In following the text's design, the reader is successively led through
four interrelated steps:
1. The realization that things are devoid of an intrinsic self and
therefore empty;
2. That the emptiness of things is not in itself an absolute to be
grasped by the conceptualizing mind, in spite of the fact that it
represents the ultimate perspective concerning the nature of all
things;
3. Although without graspable, and therefore obtainable,
characteristics, emptiness can nevertheless be realized through the
medium of perfect wisdom, representing the subject of a knowledge that
goes beyond conceptualization and the subject/object duality;
4. Inasmuch as wisdom illuminates emptiness, its knowing through
non-knowing serves as the effective cause for the illumination of the
non-conceptual, unnameable effect of the beginningless and endless
nirvna.
As reflected within the text and already noted, Sengzhao and the early
Chinese Buddhists recognize that conceptualization represents the
principal obstacle facing the unenlightened. Fundamentally tied to the
conception of an independently existing self, human beings
consistently engage the world from the perspective of the ego, viewing
the inner self as subject and all other things as objects. Granting
existence to both self and others, we naturally create a disjuncture
that results in clinging to some things while simultaneously rejecting
others, unavoidably fueling the continued round of becoming. Breaking
the cycle, for the Mdhyamika, begins with dislodging the mind's
attachment to logically absurd distinctions and its creation of
erroneous oppositional categories such as existent/nonexistent,
subject/object, nirvna/samsra.
In the final analysis, Mdhyamika sets out to demonstrate the logical
absurdity of the cognitive process' internal structure and the way it
expresses itself verbally. In terms of the twelve links in the chain
of becoming:
The root of cyclic existence is action.
Therefore the wise one does not act….
With the cessation of ignorance Action will not arise.
The cessation of ignorance occurs through Meditation and wisdom.
(MMK XXVI.10-11)
To bring the proliferation of mental fabrications to an end is to put
a stop to self-centered action and the refueling of samsra (the cycle
of rebirth and suffering). Therefore, the mind represents the
principal obstacle to full enlightenment while simultaneously
possessing the greatest potential for attaining final release. Ngrjuna
cites the Buddha in defense of his assertion that "the power of mind
is greatest. By practicing the perfection of wisdom, [an aspirant] can
shatter the great mound into tiny particles. . . . Insofar as the mind
possesses none of the four qualities [form, scent, taste and density],
its power is the greatest." (Dazhi dulun 299c.5) Kumrajva likewise
points to the mind as the root of human troubles and advocates a
transcendence of all discursive thought.
[The Dazhi dulun] says that dissociation from all verbalism and
quenching all workings of thought is termed the real-mark of all the
dharmas. The real-mark of the dharmas is conventionally termed
suchness, dharma-nature, and reality-limit. In this [suchness] even
the not-existent-and-not-inexistent cannot be found, much less the
existent and the inexistent. It is only because of fantasy-conceptions
that each one has difficulties about existence and inexistence. If you
will conform to the cessation-mark of the Buddha's Dharma, then you
will have no discursive fictions [prapanca]. If you figment fictions
about existence and inexistence, then you depart from the Buddha's
Dharma. (Robinson 1978:184-185)
Sengzhao's primary concern as a Mdhyamikan, therefore, revolves around
the mind's proclivity for naming and absolutizing. A natural operation
of the "knowing" faculty, conceptualization functions through the
cause and effect relationship of "knowing" arising as an effect
generated by the "known" acting as cause. The known therefore function
as the objects of knowledge's knowing and so long as the objects are
considered real or substantive, "knowing" represents the proper avenue
for realizing the real. Activity and suffering arise as a result of
conceptualization, which itself arises from mental fabrications
located within the discriminative mind. Bringing to cessation the
activity of the knowing mind represents the starting point for the
self-realization of reality.
As Nishitani Keiji describes it, religion itself constitutes the "real
self-awareness of reality," by which he means that
our ability to perceive reality means that reality realizes
(actualizes) itself in us; that this in turn is the only way that we
can realize (appropriate through understanding) the fact that reality
is so realizing itself in us; and that in so doing the
self-realization of reality itself takes place. (Nishitani 1982:5)
In the end, Sengzhao and the Zhaolun take the reader full circle. Just
as the mundane object of knowledge (things) is inherently empty, so
too is the ultimate goal toward which things are striving. Unified in
their emptiness, each is completely fulfilled and established in their
home-ground. The sage has awakened to the wondrous mystery of
self-realization, locating reality right where he stands. By following
the design of the unified text, the reader can also attain to the
attainable as Sengzhao gradually guides us through a thorough-going
analysis of the factors of existence and core teachings of the
Mdhyamika school.
Beginning with the establishment of the provisional nature of the
myriad things and their inherent emptiness, Sengzhao systematically
dismantles delusional conceptions concerning emptiness, wisdom and
nirvna. In each case, the reliance on mental fabrications and
reification of the inherently empty are shown to be logically
inconsistent and therefore wrong-headed views about the nature of
things as they truly are. Realizing through the power of wisdom and
employment of skillful means that emptiness constitutes the true
nature of all things, created as well as uncreated, the aspirant
attains to the knowledge that ultimate reality is not an absolute
lying outside the bounds of the phenomenal, but rather the absolute
within the phenomenal. Immanent and yet inaccessible to the ordinary
mind, only prajnpramit can bridge the chasm separating the common
person from nirvna. Its use, however, within the context of and
following the pattern established by the Zhaolun, will eventually end
with the realization that
the one who follows after the Genuine becomes the same as the
Genuine, while those who go after illusion become the same as illusion
. . . [and] liberation exists in the midst of non-liberation.
5. References and Further Reading
* Chang, Chung-yuan. "Nirvna is Nameless." Journal of Chinese
Philosophy 1 (1974): 247-274.
* Cheng, Hsueh-li. "Zen and San-lun Mdhyamika Thought: Exploring
the Theoretical Foundation of Zen Teachings and Practices." Religious
Studies 15 (1979): 343-363.
* Cheng, Hsueh-li. "Motion and Rest in the Middle Treatises."
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 7 (1980): 229-244.
* Cheng, Hsueh-li. "Truth and Logic in San-lun Mdhyamika
Buddhism." International Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1981): 261-276.
* Cheng, Hsueh-li. Empty Logic: Mdhyamika Buddhism from Chinese
Sources. New York: Philosophical Library, 1984; reprint ed., Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1991.
* Cleary, Thomas, and J.C. Cleary, trans. The Blue Cliff Records.
Boulder, CO: Shambala, 1978.
* Garfield, Jay L., trans. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle
Way: Ngrjuna's Mulamadhyamakakrik. New York: Oxford University Press,
1995.
* Huntington, C. W. The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to
Early Indian Mdhyamika. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989.
* Hurvitz, Leon, trans. "Wei Shou, Treatise on Buddhism and
Taoism." In Yun-kang: The Buddhist Cave Temples of the Fifth Centruy
A.D. in North China, Vol. 16 (supplement), 25-103. Kyoto: Kyoto
University, Institute of Humanistic Studies, 1956.
* Ichimura, Shohei. "A Study on the Mdhyamika Method of Refutation
and its Influence on Buddhist Logic." Journal of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies 4.1 (1981): 87-95.
* Ichimura, Shohei. "A Determining Factor that Differentiated
Indian and Chinese Mdhyamika Methods of Dialectic as
Reductio-ad-absurdum and Paradoxical Argument Respectively." Journal
of Indian and Buddhist Studies 33 (March, 1985): 841-834.
* Ichimura, Shohei. "On the Dialectical Meaning of Instantiation
in terms of Maya-Drstanta in the Indian and Chinese Mdhyamikas."
Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 36.2 (March, 1988): 977-971.
* Ichimura, Shohei. "On the Paradoxical Method of the Chinese
Mdhyamika: Seng-chao and the Chao-lun Treatise." Journal of Chinese
Philosophy 19 (1992): 51-71.
* Liebenthal, Walter. The Chao Lun: The Treatises of Seng-Chao.
2nd rev. ed. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1968.
* Liu, Ming-wood. "Seng-chao and the Mdhyamika Way of Refutation."
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14 (1987): 97-110.
* Liu, Ming-wood. Mdhyamaka Thought in China. Sinica Leidensia,
Vol. XXX. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994.
* Nishitani, Keiji. Religion and Nothingness. Trans. Jan Van
Bragt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
* Robinson, Richard H. "Mysticism and Logic in Seng-chao's
Thought." Philosophy East and West 8.3-4 (1958-1959): 99-120.
* Robinson, Richard H. Early Mdhyamika in India and China. New
York: Samuel Weiser, 1965; reprint ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1978.
* Sharf, Robert. Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism: A Reading
of the Treasure Store Treatise. Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2001.
* Tsukamoto Zenry. A History of Early Chinese Buddhism: From Its
Introduction to the Death of Hui-yüan. 2 vols. Trans. Leon Hurvitz.
Tokyo, New York, San Francisco: Kodansha International, 1985.
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