CRS) is a theory of what constitutes the meanings possessed by
expressions of natural languages, or the propositions expressed by
their utterance. In the philosophy of mind, it is a theory of what
constitutes the contents of psychological attitudes, such as beliefs
or desires.
CRS comes in a variety of forms, not always clearly distinguished by
commentators. Such versions are known variously as
functional/causal/computational role semantics, and more broadly as
use-theories of meaning. Nevertheless, all are united in seeking the
meaning or content of an item, not in what it is made of, nor in what
accompanies or is associated with it, but in what is done with it, the
use it is put to. Roughly, according to CRS, the meaning or
propositional content of an expression or attitude is determined by
the role it plays in a person's language or in her cognition.
Currently, many view CRS as the main rival to theories that take
notions such as truth or reference as central (for example, Davidson
2001), although the relationship between the two is not
straightforward. The following outlines the main varieties of CRS,
provides a cursory survey of its history, introduces the central
arguments offered in its favor, and provisionally assesses how the
variants fair against a number of prominent criticisms.
1. Preparing the Ground
a. A Theory of Linguistic Meaning
CRS may be first introduced as a theory of meaning. The theory of
meaning must be distinguished from a meaning-theory. The former is a
philosophical project that seeks to explain what meaning is, or what
the meaning possessed by expressions in a natural language consists
in. The latter, in contrast, is an empirical project. More
specifically, it is a specification of the meaning of each expression
in a language. Since a natural language such as English contains a
potential infinity of expressions, these specifications must be
derived from a finite body of axioms concerning sentence constituents
and their modes of combination. CRS is a theory of meaning rather than
a meaning-theory, although as such it can and should inform the
construction of meaning-theories.
One must also distinguish the meaning of an expression from what is
said (the proposition expressed) by its utterance. For example, what
is said by the use of 'I am tired now' varies according to who employs
the expression and when, whereas the meaning remains constant.
Arguably, this overt context-dependency in the case of sentences
containing indexicals is quite general (see Travis 2000). Hence, the
invariant meaning possessed by a sentence is distinct from the
truth-evaluable propositional content expressed by its use on a
particular occasion, although the former (in combination with
contextual factors) determines the latter.
CRS can be profitably viewed as a refinement of the claim that the
meaning of an expression is its use (Wittgenstein 1967: §43; cf.
Alston 2000; see Wittgenstein, Ludwig). While many philosophers might
accept as platitudinous that, in some sense, an expression means what
it does because of how it is employed, what is here distinctive is the
claim that its having a meaning is its having a use. So stated,
however, the view suffers from a number of objections. Many things
have a 'use' (for example, hammers) but no meaning. More seriously,
there are linguistic expressions with a use but no meaning, such as
'um' or 'abracadabra'. Likewise, there can be differences in use
without differences in meaning. For example, where and by whom a word
is used can vary while meaning remains constant (see Glock 1996; Lycan
2000: 94ff; Rundle 2001: 100-1; Whiting 2007b).
One response to such criticisms is to identify more narrowly the
specific kind of use that is supposed to be constitutive of meaning.
According to CRS, it is use in inference. Roughly, it claims that to
understand an expression is to be prepared to make certain inferential
transitions. Accordingly, the meaning of the expression is its
inferential role. If one were to enumerate all the transitions an
expression is involved in, one would thereby give its meaning. So, to
take a simplified example, to grasp the meaning of 'brother' is to be
prepared to make linguistic moves of the following kind:
"x is a male sibling" → "x is a brother"
"x is a brother" → "x has parents"
Note that it is somewhat misleading to call the above 'inferential'
transitions, since properly-speaking inferential relations hold
between propositions not sentences. Nevertheless, the basic idea
remains the same once qualified. One might say that the invariant
meaning an expression possesses is its inferential potential, that is,
its usability by speakers to make certain inferential transitions.
Note also that it is sentences that in the first instance can properly
be said to have inferential significance, since ordinarily it is only
by uttering a sentence that one make a claim from which other claims
might be said to follow. Hence, for CRS, it is sentences that are the
primary bearers of meaning. Nonetheless, a proponent of CRS can still
speak of the meaning of a word as its stable contribution to the
inferential potential of sentences or, more abstractly, as the set of
inferential roles of sentences in which it occurs.
b. A Theory of Content
CRS extends straightforwardly to a theory of the propositional content
expressed by the use of an expression. According to it, to know what
is said by an utterance is to know, given the context, what the
grounds for making the utterance are, and which further utterances are
thereby in order. For an utterance to express such content just is for
speakers to perform, and respond to performances, in a characteristic
way. The proposition expressed is determined by the inferential
network the utterance is caught up in, the linguistic moves that lead
to and from it.
CRS simultaneously provides a theory of what constitutes mental
content. So-called psychological attitudes, such as beliefs, desires
and fears, appear to have two components: an attitude—believing,
desiring, fearing and so on—and a content—that which is believed,
desired, feared and so on. One can hold the same attitude toward
different contents, and different attitudes toward the same content.
According to CRS, for an attitude to have as its content a particular
proposition just is for it to play a particular role in cognition, and
to grasp that conceptual content is to be prepared to make certain
inferential transitions. So, to take another simplified example, to
possess the concept vixen, or to have thoughts involving it, is to be
prepared to make moves conforming to the following pattern:
x is a female fox → x is a vixen
x is a vixen → x is a mammal
c. Normativism and Naturalism
So far, this survey has talked neutrally of subjects being 'prepared'
to make inferences. But how exactly should this be understood? On this
issue, there is a broad division among theorists between what one
might label naturalists (for example, Block 1986; Field 1977; Harman
1999; Horwich 1998; 2005; Loar 1981; Peacocke 1992) and normativists
(for example, Brandom 1994; von Savigny 1988; Skorupski 1997; Travis
2000). Exploring this distinction will simultaneously address another
matter. One might have qualms about CRS as outlined above, since the
notion of inference is itself semantic. Surely, one might complain,
philosophy requires that a theory of meaning provide a more
illuminating explanation of what constitutes meaning or content.
Through outlining the naturalist and normativist positions, one can
see in each case how their proponents seek to capture the notion of an
inferential role in more fundamental terms.
According to normativists, content or meaning is constituted by those
transitions one ought to or may (not) make, and to grasp that content
or meaning is to grasp the propriety of those moves. While many
philosophers recognise that what an expression means, for example, has
normative implications, what is distinctive of the normativist view is
that such norms do not merely follow from but are rather determinative
of its meaning. Hence, such a theory typically takes as basic a
primitive normative notion, with which to explain semantic notions.
That said, one need not take the existence of such norms to be
inexplicable; one might instead view them as instituted in some way,
perhaps behaviorally or socially.
An issue on which normativists are divided is whether the existence of
such proprieties requires the existence of rules. If the issue is not
to be purely terminological, it presumably turns on whether the
relevant standards of usage stem from generalisations or from
particular considerations, and on whether to qualify as such, rules
must always be explicitly formulated. (For a defence of the appeal to
rules, see Glock 2005. For resistance, see Boghossian 1989; Brandom
1994: ch. 1; Dancy 2004: ch. 13.)
Naturalists in turn divide into two camps (although, it is fair to
say, they are typically not distinguished). According to regularists,
meaning or content is determined by those behavioral or psychological
transitions a person regularly or generally makes. According to
dispositionalists, in contrast, meaning or content is determined by
those transitions a person is disposed in certain actual and
counterfactual circumstances to make. On such accounts, the notion of
inferential role gives way to that of causal or computational role.
d. Perception and Action
In addition, one can distinguish the more liberal CRS from the more
restricted inferential role semantics (IRS) (sometimes referred to as
'long-' and 'short-armed' respectively). According to the latter,
meaning or content is determined by intra-linguistic transitions only.
According to the former, meaning or content is partially constituted
by the tokenings of a concept or expression that result from
perceptual experience, and the action such tokenings elicit. That is
to say, extra-linguistic transitions—which Sellars (2007: 36) dubs
'language-entry' and 'language-departure' moves—contribute to the
determination of meaning or content (cf. Harman 1999; McCulloch 1995).
e. Language and Mind
A final preliminary matter concerns the relative priority of (public)
language and mind. Some philosophers hold that CRS provides, in the
first instance, a theory of mental content, viewed as independent of
its public expression, and only derivatively extended to linguistic
content and meaning. On this view, the semantics of language is
parasitic upon the semantics of mental states (for example, Loar 1981;
Peacocke 1992). Typically, the connection between the two is thought
to be effected by various Gricean mechanisms (1989). Crudely, on this
picture, speakers intend to communicate their thoughts to one another,
and over time such thoughts are conventionally correlated with
particular linguistic expressions.
Alternatively, one might take mastery of a public language to be prior
to possession of psychological attitudes and view mental content as
derivative (for example, Sellars 1997), or hold that the two develop
in unison (for example, Brandom 1994; Harman 1999; Horwich 2005). One
reason for rejecting the priority of mind over language is that there
is arguably no substance in attributing beliefs to a creature
incapable in principle of manifesting them, and only linguistic
behavior is sufficiently fine-grained for this task.
f. Provisional Summary
By now it should be clear that, when investigating or propounding CRS,
one must keep in view a number of issues:
1. Is it a theory of meaning or propositional content?
2. Is it normativist or naturalist?
i. If normativist, are the norms in the forms of rules?
ii. If naturalist, is it regularist or a dispositionalist?
3. Does it incorporate language-entry and language-exit moves?
4. Is the mind prior to language or vice versa?
In many cases, which objections to CRS are relevant or effective will
depend on how these questions are answered.
2. A Very Brief History
Although this is not an exegetical essay, it is worth noting that CRS
has a distinguished history. Arguably, it goes back at least as far as
Kant, if not further (Brandom 2002). Uncontroversially, however, it
can be traced to Wittgenstein's dictum that
the meaning of a word is its use in the language. (1967: §43)
Likewise:
The use of the word in practice is its meaning. (1969: 69)
This putative insight was endorsed by, and in turn influenced the
methods of, Oxford philosophers such as Ryle (1968) and Strawson
(2004: 7).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the influence of Wittgenstein, there are
clear affinities between CRS and verificationism, according to which
for an expression to have a meaning is for it to possess evidential
conditions that warrant its application (Ayer 1959; Dummett 1991;
1996; Waismann 1968: 36). The shared idea is that the meaning of an
expression, or the content it expresses, is given in part by what
justifies and what are the implications of its employment.
One can also note similarities between CRS and the structuralist and
phenomenological traditions. Saussure, for example, held that the
meaning of a sign is determined by its role within a system of signs,
its structural relations to other signs (1983). And according to
Heidegger, for an expression to have a certain significance is for it
to occupy a role within a network of linguistic and non-linguistic
practices and, more specifically, for it to be subject to proprieties
of usage (1962: 203ff).
Arguably, however, it was Sellars (2007: pt. 1) who first explicitly
placed the notion of inference at the centre of the theory of meaning,
and advocated the first systematic and unmistakable version of CRS.
Having precedent, no matter how distinguished, is of course no
guarantee of correctness. So as to place us in a position to evaluate
CRS, the next section outlines a number of prominent arguments in its
favor, and the following introduces a number of prominent objections.
3. Arguments for CRS
a. Attributions of Meaning and Understanding
Reflection on our ordinary practices of attributing both meaning and
understanding lend support to CRS (Horwich 1998: 48-9; Wittgenstein
1969: 102-3). One would typically say of a word in a foreign language
that it has the same meaning as one in English if it has the same
role. And if a word has no discernible use, one would be reluctant to
attribute it meaning. Correlatively, if a person is able to use a word
correctly, and respond to its employment appropriately, one would
usually claim that she understands it. All of these observations
suggest that the meaning of an expression is its role within a
language.
Similar results are obtained by reflecting on everyday explanations of
the meaning of an expression. This can take a number of forms,
including exhibiting a familiar expression that plays a similar role,
indicating the circumstances or grounds for introducing the
expression, or noting what follows from its introduction. This
likewise indicates that the expression's meaning is given by its
linguistic role.
b. The No Intrinsic Meaning Thesis
A different route to CRS is via the 'no intrinsic meaning' thesis
(Skorupski 1997). It begins with the observation that a sign,
considered in itself, is a mere noise or ink-mark, and as such, surely
lacks any intrinsic meaning. That same noise or mark could have had a
different meaning altogether, or none at all. One might be tempted to
think that what 'animates' it is some entity to which it is (somehow)
related, perhaps an image in the mind or abstract object.
However, this appears only to push the explanation back a stage, since
one now needs to know in virtue of what these entities have the
significance that they do. What an expression means has consequences
for how it is to be employed on an indefinite number of occasions.
Hence, one requires an account of how the mental or abstract entity
could have such consequences when the mere noise or mark could not. As
Wittgenstein remarks,
whatever accompanied [the sign] would for us just be another sign. (1969: 5)
Once one feels the force of the no intrinsic meaning thesis, one might
be tempted by CRS. This view has the advantage of not positing any
further entity that accompanies or is associated with an expression to
act as an unexplained explainer, but instead looks to how the word is
employed to account for its significance, specifically its role in
inference.
c. The Insufficiency of Causation
Another motivation for endorsing CRS is through contrasting it with a
competitor, one which also accepts the no intrinsic meaning thesis.
According to it, the meaning or content of an item is determined by
that which typically causes its tokenings (Dretske 1981; Fodor 1990).
(This is no doubt crude but sufficient for present purposes.) Even if
such a differential response to environing stimuli were necessary to
grasp certain meanings or possess certain concepts, it cannot be
sufficient (Brandom 1994; Harman 1999: 211; Sellars 1997). To put it
vividly, it would not distinguish one who genuinely possesses
understanding from a thermostat! Surely, in order properly to grasp
the concept red, say, one must not only be able to respond
differentially to red things, but in addition know that if something
is red then it is not blue, or that if it is red it is colored, and so
on. Hence, these entailments and incompatibilities, that is, these
inferential connections, seem to be determinative of the relevant
concept. And to accept that is to accept CRS.
d. The Frege-problem
Diagnosis of what is often labelled the 'Frege-problem' likewise
speaks in favor of CRS (Frege 1997; see Frege and Language and Frege,
Gottlob). A prominent and intuitive view is that for an expression to
have a meaning is for it to refer to something. However, two
expressions can refer to the same thing, for example, 'table salt' and
'sodium chloride', and yet one acquainted with both expressions could
rationally adopt conflicting attitudes towards sentences containing
them. One might accept:
(1) Table salt dissolves.
but not:
(2) Sodium chloride dissolves.
It seems, therefore, that a term's 'cognitive significance' cannot
reside solely in its having a reference.
CRS is consonant with this observation. According to it, what
distinguishes co-referring (or co-extensive) terms is precisely their
cognitive role, or the inferential networks they are involved in.
e. Methodological Solipsism
A final, and more controversial, reason to endorse IRS (rather than
CRS) is to respect 'methodological solipsism' (see Lepore 1994).
Methodological solipsism requires that mental content properly
so-called supervene upon a person's internal physical and functional
make-up considered in isolation from her physical and social
environment, by 'what is in her head'. This is in part intended to
respect the conviction that mental states are causes of behavior, and
that such causes must be proximal rather than distal, and is presumed
indispensable for the ability to make generalisations about subjects'
behavior.
If, as IRS holds, the content of a mental state is determined by its
cognitive role, where this cognitive role is specified without
reference to the person's physical or social environment, then the
requirements imposed by methodological solipsism are satisfied.
4. Problems for CRS
Despite the number of factors that seem to point to CRS, it faces a
number of potential problems. The remainder outlines those
difficulties and suggests various possible responses one might offer
on its behalf. These issues not only pose a challenge for CRS, but
also serve to bring into view the respective strengths and weaknesses
of the various forms it might take.
a. Holism, Compositionality and Analyticity
CRS is evidently a holistic view of meaning or content. Since an
expression's meaning is possessed in virtue of the inferential
relations it stands in to other expressions, it follows that an
expression cannot have meaning on its own. This might seem innocuous,
but it leads swiftly to seemingly grave problems.
What one takes the inferential significance of an expression to be
depends on what beliefs one has. Therefore, since no two speakers
share the same beliefs, they will inevitably be disposed to make, or
treat as correct, different inferential transitions involving an
expression. Hence, according to CRS, the same word in different mouths
will possess a different meaning and be understood in different ways.
It seems to follow that communication is impossible. Relatedly, since
a particular speaker's beliefs are constantly changing, at different
times she will inevitably be disposed to make, or treat as correct,
different inferential transitions involving an expression. Hence,
according to CRS, the same word in the same mouth will possess a
different meaning and be understood differently at different times. It
seems to follow that constancy of meaning is impossible.
One possible response to this is to reject the need for CRS to
incorporate shareable, constant meaning, and hold instead that what is
required is only sufficiently similar understanding of an expression
(Block 1995; Harman 1993). But this is hard to stomach. It seems a
mere platitude, and is arguably definitive of the relevant notions,
that two speakers can understand one another or say the same thing,
that terms in different vocabularies might be synonymous, and so on.
One requires a better reason for rejecting such trivialities than the
fact that they are hard to accommodate in one's preferred theory of
meaning.
In any event, rather than offering an alternative, the above
suggestion simply takes for granted the possibility of shared concepts
or mutual understanding of the corresponding expressions (see Fodor
and Lepore 1992: 17-22; for further discussion, see Pagin 2006).
Consider how one might ascertain similar understandings. Presumably
one would need to enumerate the various inferences that any two
subjects are prepared to make. Their understanding is alike in so far
as they are prepared to make a sufficient number of the same
inferences. But what is to count as the same inference? Surely those
that contain identical concepts.
Related to the communication and constancy problems are difficulties
concerning the phenomena of productivity—the fact that competent
speakers of a language are able to produce and understand a potential
infinity of novel sentences—and systematicity—the fact that if a
speaker understands an expression that expresses a proposition of the
form aRb, then typically she will also understand one that expresses a
proposition of the form bRa. The best explanation of both is that
meanings are compositional. The meanings of the potentially infinite
complex expression in a language are a function of the meanings of
their parts, which constitute a finite vocabulary.
Therein lies the apparent difficulty for CRS, since inferential roles
are not usually compositional (Fodor and Lepore 1992; Lepore 1994).
The inferential role of 'Cars pollute', for example, is not determined
by the meanings of 'cars' and 'pollute' alone, but in part by
auxiliary information.
Proponents and critics alike typically accept that for CRS to avoid
all of the above problems it requires some kind of analytic/synthetic
distinction (Boghossian 1994; 1997; Fodor and Lepore 1992; Horwich
1998; Lepore 1994; Loewer 1997: 120-1). That is, a distinction in kind
between those transitions that are determinative of meaning or content
and those that are not. This would provide something constant—an
invariant significance—that could be grasped despite differences in
belief. And, moreover, it respects compositionality, since the meaning
of a complex expression is fixed only by its role in analytic
inferences, and that is determined by the meanings of its parts.
Where proponents and critics differ is over whether any such
distinction can and should be drawn. Some suggest that it would be
circular to appeal to the notion of analyticity in an analysis of
meaning, since 'analytic' just means true/valid in virtue of meaning
(Fodor and Lepore 1992; Lepore 1994; cf. Quine 1980: ch. 2). But
clearly the advocate of CRS need not specify the analytic inferences
using that very description, but might rather seek to do so in more
basic terms (Boghossian 1994; Horwich 1998; 2005; cf. Block 1993: 64).
Alternatively, one might challenge the requirement of reductionism.
CRS might serve to illuminate the nature and role of semantic notions
without appealing only to independently intelligible notions.
Nonetheless, since Quine's 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1980: ch. 2),
many consider the notion of analyticity to be spurious (see The
Classical Theory of Concepts). Therefore, if CRS requires an
analytic/synthetic distinction, however specified, so much the worse
for it.
Crucially, however, Quine's target is a conception of analyticity
according to which analytic statements possess no experiential
implications or factual content whatsoever. In virtue of this, they
owe their truth-value to meaning alone, and thereby provide a priori
knowledge. With this target in view, Quine argues that no statement is
immune from revision in the light of empirical data, and so no
statement is such that it possesses no factual content whatsoever, is
true in virtue of meaning alone, or knowable a priori. Therefore,
there is no such thing as analyticity.
Note, however, that to grant Quine undermines one conception of the
analytic/synthetic distinction is not to concede that he shows it to
be bogus as such. A notion of analyticity might be available that
respects the obviously fluctuating status of those statements
considered determinative of meaning, and does not involve such notions
as truth/validity in virtue of meaning, or a priori knowledge, or, if
it does, admits only watered-down versions. There is something of a
resurgence of work in this area and scepticism at this stage would be
precipitate (see Boghossian 1997; 2003; Glock 2003: ch. 3; Horwich
2005: 38-9; Lance and Hawthorne 1997).
Additionally, a quick argument is available to show that any account
of meaning must recognise some version of the analytic/synthetic
distinction (Boghossian 1997; cf. Glock 2003: 93-5; Grice and Strawson
1989). Certain putatively analytic statements—that is, statements that
might license analytically valid inferences—are such that they can be
turned into logical truths by replacing synonyms with synonyms. For
example:
(3) All bachelors are unmarried men.
is equivalent to:
(3') All unmarried men are unmarried men.
So, to say that there are no facts as to whether such statements are
analytic is just to say that there are no facts about synonymy. From
this it surely follows that there are no facts about meaning, which is
a conclusion few would accept whether they wish to defend CRS or an
alternative. Thus, the mere fact that CRS requires certain inferential
transitions to be privileged as analytic cannot be thought a
devastating problem peculiar only to it. All (realist) theories of
meaning are in the same boat.
b. Proper Names
Certain specific kinds of expression pose a potential problem for CRS.
One in particular is proper names, such as 'Kelly' or 'O Brother!
Where Art Thou?' According to one very influential view, proper names
have no meaning. Nevertheless, they certainly have a use and play a
role in cognition and language. Therefore, CRS must be rejected (Lycan
2000: 94; Rundle 2001: 101).
One response is to insist that proper names do indeed have meaning
(Baker and Hacker 2004; Horwich 1998: 88-9, 124ff). But this seems
strange. One does not find them in the dictionary, and the question
'What does "David" mean?' sounds confused. A more promising strategy
is to offer an explanation—consonant with CRS—as to why proper names
do not possess meaning, despite having a usage. That is, to show that
although they have a role it is not of the right kind. To do so, I
shall examine Kripke's arguments for the view that proper names
'directly refer'.
Kripke (1980) convincingly shows that there are no descriptions that
warrant (a priori) the introduction of a proper name, and the latter's
use alone does not license the transition to any such description.
Consider, for example, 'Aristotle' and the following:
the greatest pupil of Plato
the author of De Anima
the most famous teacher of Alexander the Great
As a matter of fact, one is warranted in replacing any of the above
descriptions with 'Aristotle'. Thus, the transition from 'This was
written by the greatest pupil of Plato' to 'This was written by
Aristotle' is correct. But in principle one could be unprepared to
make such a transition without failing to understand 'Aristotle'. One
could revise which transitions one takes to be correct, and the term
would still designate the same individual. Hence, there is no
essential relation between 'Aristotle' and the above descriptions.
This is supposed to generalise to cover any possible set of
descriptions and associated proper names.
These observations point toward a distinguishing feature of proper
names. They simply lack the kind of intra-linguistic role that bestows
meaning on other expressions; they really just function as labels or
proxies for their bearers. There are no transitions involving a proper
name that one who masters it must be prepared to make. So, rather than
count against CRS, one can precisely explain why proper names lack
meaning by pointing out that they lack the relevant established usage,
or inferential role, that is distinctive of meaningful expressions.
c. Externalism
This section temporarily focuses on IRS and the difficulty externalism
seems to pose for it. According to externalism, meaning and content
are determined by environmental, that is, extra-linguistic, factors.
This is in manifest tension with IRS, according to which meaning and
content are determined by intra-linguistic relations alone.
Different versions of externalism emphasise different environmental
factors. According to 'social' externalism (Burge 1979), the content
of a person's claim or thought is determined in part by the linguistic
community to which she belongs (so long as she is suitably deferent to
the 'experts'). What a person says, for example, in uttering 'I have
arthritis' (and so whether what she says is true or false) is fixed by
how her medical community employ 'arthritis'. While this form of
externalism is evidently in tension with methodological solipsism, it
is not in tension with IRS per se. On this account, the meaning of a
term is still its inferential significance, but that significance is
fixed communally not individually.
It is 'physical' externalism that is typically thought to pose
problems for IRS (Lepore 1994: 197-8; Lycan 2000: 93; McGinn 1982;
Putnam 1991: 46ff). Imagine that Sally on Earth has a twin on Twin
Earth. The term 'water' plays just the same role in the language of
Sally and Twin Sally. Both, for example, would make the transition
from 'That is the colorless, odorless liquid in lakes and rivers' to
'That is water', and vice versa. Nevertheless, the colorless odorless
liquid on Earth consists of H2O, whereas on Twin Earth it consists of
XYZ. Hence, the referent of 'water' is different on each planet, and
insofar as meaning determines reference, the meaning likewise differs
(Putnam 1975). Therefore, linguistic role alone does not determine
meaning. This point is supposed to generalise to hold for
propositional content too. Since intuitions about thought-experiments
of this kind appear strongly to support externalism, it would seem IRS
must be false.
One response to such cases regarding mental content is to postulate
'narrow content', to be explained by IRS. Narrow content has a
cognitive role but it does not have truth-conditions and its
constituents do not refer (Block 1986; Fodor 1990; McGinn 1982). 'Wide
content' involving truth-conditions and reference-relations is then
viewed as a mere device for attributing (narrow) thoughts to subjects,
or some additional (perhaps causal) theory is wheeled in to explain
how it attaches to the relevant item or state. Crucially, on such
'two-factor' accounts, only narrow content is genuinely, cognitively
'real' (since only it respects methodological solipsism).
Alternatively, one might reject Putnam's assumption that meaning
determines reference. On this account, 'water' would be treated as
equivalent to 'the colorless, odorless liquid in our lakes and
rivers'. Since this involves an indexical, it combines the externalist
intuition that the reference varies across worlds, with the view
compatible with IRS that its meaning is not determined by the physical
environment. The expression's role is constant across on Earth and
Twin Earth (Horwich 2005: ch. 1; Putnam 1975: 229ff).
While this might work for linguistic meaning, it is less clear that
the same account can be given for mental content. The worry with this
strategy is that it looks like what it offers is content in name only
(McCulloch 1995). Surely thoughts (unlike meanings) are essentially
truth-evaluable, and typically concern extra-mental reality. Such
features play a crucial part in their role in psychological
explanation. To divorce in this way the contents of beliefs, desires
and thoughts from their objects is deeply unpalatable. This objection
applies equally to the two-factor strategy mentioned above of
postulating narrow content.
A different tact is to adopt CRS rather than IRS (Harman 1999;
McCulloch 1995). On this view, since perception of distal objects and
action on those objects contributes to individuating cognitive roles,
one can indeed distinguish the roles of 'water' on Earth and Twin
Earth (even if subjectively things appear just the same to Sally and
her twin).
A concern with this suggestion is that it threatens to divorce the
notions of meaning and content from those of understanding and grasp
of content. According to it, the meaning of 'water', for example, is
partially determined by the micro-physical constitution of water, even
if a subject is utterly unaware of it. Hence, it apparently follows
that she is ignorant of what she says and thinks in employing that
expression or the corresponding concept. Insofar as this leaves a
subject unable to distinguish the contents of her thoughts, one would
expect this to have devastating consequences for her ability to
reason.
That externalism in general makes problematic knowledge of one's own
mind is widely-recognised (see Brown 2004), but it seems especially
acute in the case of CRS. There will inevitably be a disparity between
a concept's role as individuated by the physical environment and its
role in a subject's cognition, and insofar as they cannot be
reconciled, it is hard to imagine how a particular role (hence
content) could be assigned to the concept. Perhaps this problem facing
CRS can be resolved, but prima facie an alternative response to
externalism is preferable.
The above are conciliatory strategies, which accept the externalist's
claim and seek a theory of meaning to accommodate it. An altogether
different approach is to reject the externalist intuitions and insist
that Sally and Twin Sally mean the same thing by 'water', say
colorless, odorless liquid, and so both think thoughts that are true
of colorless, odorless liquid (whether H2O or XYZ). This is supported
by the observation that both subjects would behave, explain their
terms and react to their use in identical ways. Perhaps if deferential
relations are taken into consideration, one might be able to point to
relevant differences that would indicate semantic differences, but
this only pushes us toward social rather than physical externalism,
and the former has already been shown to be compatible with IRS.
Different strategies for responding to externalism have been
considered, and the issue remains unresolved. Nevertheless, there is
reason to be confident that intuitions about Twin-Earth style cases do
not present insuperable problems for CRS, and especially IRS.
d. Truth, Reference and Intentionality
This discussion points towards a further potential difficulty for CRS
(Loewer 1997; Putnam 1978), one which is sometimes treated
simultaneously. Thoughts and statements are 'about' the world; they
possess intentionality. And what they are about is determined by their
content. However, according to CRS, content consists primarily in
word-word relations (exclusively in some instances), whereas
intentionality is on the face of it a word-world relation.
This issue can be reformulated in terms of truth and reference.
Statements and thoughts are true or false, depending on how matters
stand in the world, and those statements refer to objects and events
in that world. How, one might ask, can CRS explain the evident
conceptual links between meaning, truth and reference? What is
required, surely, is a theory according to which for something to have
meaning is for it to stand in some relation to extra-linguistic
reality, from which one derives its truth-conditions and reference.
(For the remainder, I shall focus on truth. The relevant points can
easily be extended to reference, or being true of.)
This assumption, however, takes for granted a conception of truth
according to which it consists in some substantial, non-semantic
relation between an item and the world. According to deflationism, in
contrast, the notion of truth does not pick out any such relation (see
Horwich 1990; 1998). Rather, its content is exhausted by the schema:
(T) The proposition that p is true if and only if p
To grasp the notion of truth is to be disposed to accept, or grasp the
propriety of, statements of that form. No deeper account of truth is
needed or available. On this view, the reason for having an expression
such as 'is true' in a language is solely to enable us to make
generalisations such as 'Everything the Pope says is true'.
If the deflationary theory is correct then, since truth does not
consist in a non-semantic word-world relation, there is no reason to
expect or demand a theory that shows possessing meaning or content to
consist in such a relation either. A statement of the truth-conditions
of a sentence can be derived trivially from a statement of the content
it expresses.
More generally, if correct, the outcome of deflationism is that the
notion of truth cannot play a fundamental explanatory role in the
theory of meaning, as is commonly assumed, since it is to be explained
via an antecedently intelligible notion of proposition (or meaning).
Crucially, CRS need not deny the platitude that to grasp the content
of an attitude or utterance is to grasp its truth-conditions, but
instead can be seen as giving a theoretical account of what it is to
possess such truth-conditions (Field 1994; Harman 1999: 195).
There is obviously much more to be said for and against deflationism
(see Truth). But what should be clear is that it complements CRS and
(if successful) shows it to be compatible with the obvious conceptual
links between the notions of meaning and content on the one hand and
truth and reference on the other.
e. Indeterminacy
This section explores again the views of Kripke, who, on supposed
behalf of Wittgenstein, presents several notorious arguments against
regularist and dispositionalist theories of meaning (1982). If his
arguments succeed, those versions of CRS must be abandoned. (Quine
reaches similar conclusions (see 1993).)
The problem with regularism, according to Kripke's Wittgenstein (1982:
7), is that the actual use of an expression is consistent with an
indefinite number of semantic interpretations. A stretch of behavior
is only finite, whereas what a word means has consequences for its use
on an indefinite number of occasions. For example, that a person to
date has uttered 'blue' in response to all and only blue things does
not determine that by 'blue' she means blue, since that behavior is
consistent with its meaning 'blue until 2146AD and green thereafter.'
Thus, regularities of employment leave meaning indeterminate.
Such observations might lead one to dispositionalism. The apparent
advantage here is that it includes facts about what speakers would say
in an indefinite number of counterfactual circumstances, and thereby
promises to rule out gerrymandered interpretations. For example, if a
person would assent to an utterance of 'blue' in the presence of blue
after 2146AD, then by 'blue' she means what we mean and not 'blue
until 2146AD and green thereafter.'
Nevertheless, Kripke's Wittgenstein points out, focus on dispositions
fails to exclude deviant interpretations. The fact that a person
utters 'blue' in the presence of blue after 2146AD does not determine
that the expression means blue, since she might be making a mistake
and using the expression incorrectly, that is, in a way that conflicts
with its meaning. This in turn points to Kripke's fundamental
claim—dispositionalism fails because it does not accommodate the
intrinsically normative nature of meaning. What an expression means is
a matter of how it ought to or may (not) be used. If one understands
an expression, one knows not simply how it is as a matter of fact
employed but how it should be. Hence, for an expression to have a
meaning cannot be merely for a subject to be disposed to employ it in
certain circumstances, since a speaker's disposition only fixes for
what she would do, not what she should.
Several philosophers take this to show that the relevant use
constitutive of meaning must be specified using wholly semantic,
intentional or normative concepts (Boghossian 1989; Brandom 1994: ch.
1; McDowell 1998: chs. 11-2; Stroud 2002), that is, to favor
normativism. If the relevant behavior is described in the first
instance in normative terms, that is, as according or failing to
accord with a certain standard, then it would seem that the gap
between it and the relevant pattern picked out by the semantic
interpretation is closed. Alternatively, a dispositionalist or
regularist might challenge the claim that dispositions and
regularities of use leave meaning indeterminate, perhaps by rejecting
the suggestion that meaning is an essentially normative dimension (for
discussion, see Hattiangadi 2007; Horwich 1998; 2005; Miller 2007: ch.
5). It is fair to say that the issue of how exactly to respond to
Kripke's Wittgenstein's challenge is very much a live one.
f. Defective Expressions and Conservatism
Prior (1960) objects to CRS on the following grounds. Given IRS, one
could presumably provide a meaning for a connective 'tonk' by
stipulating that it is to be employed according to the following
rules:
Tonk-introduction: p p tonk q
Tonk-elimination: p tonk q p
Evidently, by following these rules for the use of 'tonk', one could
infer any claim from any other claim. Prior took this to be a reductio
ad absurdum of IRS. One cannot give an expression a genuine meaning
simply be stipulating that it is to be employed in inference in a
certain way. As Belnap diagnoses the complaint, a 'possible moral to
draw from this' is that one 'must first […] have a notion of what [an
expression] means, independently of the role it plays as premise or
conclusion' (1962: 130). That is, the example seems to show that it is
in virtue of having an antecedent grasp of an expression's meaning
that one can make judgments as to its inferential significance. Hence,
the latter cannot be constitutive of the former.
The traditional response on behalf of CRS is to maintain that the
relevant expression does not have a genuine meaning, since the
introduction of 'tonk' does not constitute a conservative extension of
the language (Belnap 1962; see also Dummett 1973: 397; 1991). An
extension of the language is conservative if and only if one cannot
use the new vocabulary to derive any statements in the original
vocabulary that could not already be derived using the original
vocabulary. More informally, the problem is that non-conservative
rules for the use of an expression clash with the meanings of existing
expressions or, rather, the rules governing their employment. The
novel rules 'clash' in the sense that, when added to the established
rules, they lead to contradiction. As a result, the extended language
is inconsistent.
This is evident in the case of 'tonk'. Were one to employ the
connective according to the above rules, one could derive any
statement in our tonk-free vocabulary from any other statement in that
vocabulary. Suppose, for example, that one accepts 'Grass is green'.
According to tonk-introduction, from that sentence, 'Grass is green
tonk it is not the case that grass is green' follows. From this, in
turn, according to tonk-elimination, 'Grass is not green' follows,
which manifestly contradicts the original sentence from which it was
derived. In such a way, assuming the meanings or rules for the use of
the other expressions remain constant, the tonk-rules lead immediately
and without auxiliary premises to contradiction; their introduction to
the language renders it inconsistent.
The constraints imposed by conservatism proscribe the fraudulent
connective 'tonk' by ruling out the introduction of non-conservative
rules of the kind that would generate inconsistency in the manner
outlined above. In doing so, they guarantee that there is no defective
meaning possessed by 'tonk' and so no counter-example to CRS.
According to Prior, CRS allows one to introduce into a language
obviously defective expressions. According to a recent twist on this
objection, our language obviously contains certain defective
expressions and CRS is unable to explain how (see Williamson 2003; cf.
Hornsby 2001; cp. Whiting 2007a; 2008). Pejorative terms like 'Boche'
provide vivid examples. A proponent of CRS might, following Dummett
(1973), hold that to grasp the meaning possessed by 'Boche' is to
infer according to rules such as:
Boche-introduction: x is German x is Boche
Boche-elimination: x is Boche x is cruel
As Williamson says (although he does not accept this evaluation), one
might regard the above account as providing CRS 'with a positive
success by elegantly explaining in inferentialist terms what is wrong
with pejorative expressions'. Unfortunately, however, it instead leads
immediately to the following problem.
Since most speakers (including you and I) are simply not disposed to
infer according to rules such as Boche-introduction and
Boche-elimination and do not consider it proper to do so, it appears
to follow (given CRS) that those speakers do not understand the term
'Boche' or grasp its meaning. This is, of course, implausible. As
Williamson glibly says, 'We find racist and xenophobic abuse offensive
because we understand it, not because we fail to do so' (2003: 257).
Pejorative terms, then, appear to provide a counter-example to CRS. An
expression can possess a certain meaning without speakers being
prepared to make the relevant inferences involving it; its inferential
role is therefore not constitutive of its meaning. It is in virtue of
having an antecedent grasp of meaning that one can make judgments as
to the inferential significance of an expression.
A possible solution to this problem runs parallel to Belnap's reply to
Prior. One might reject the Boche-introduction and Boche-elimination
rules on the grounds that they are non-conservative. They allow one to
make without the aid of collateral information the transition from,
for example, 'Merkel is German' to 'Merkel is cruel', when one could
not do so in the 'Boche'-free language. More informally,
Boche-introduction and Boche-elimination clash with the rules
governing the employment of existing terms, in the sense that
supplementing them with the Boche-rules leads to contradiction,
rendering the extended language inconsistent. Suppose, for example,
that Merkel was born in Germany and does not cause suffering with
disregard. On this basis—given what one may assume to be among the
established inferential rules for the employment of 'German' and
'cruel'—one infers 'Merkel is German and is not cruel'. However, by
following Boche-introduction one may make the transition to 'Merkel is
Boche and is not cruel', and in turn Boche-elimination allows one to
infer 'Merkel is cruel and is not cruel'. Hence, in such a way, the
introduction of the Boche-rules to a 'Boche'-free language leads to
contradiction.
Since it is non-conservative, the above account of the meaning of
'Boche' is bogus and so does not constitute a counter-example to IRS.
This point does not depend on the exact details of Dummett's proposal;
the same will be true of any model of pejoratives according to which
we accept the grounds for introducing them but not the consequences of
doing so.
This proposal might generate the following worry:
It is hard to believe that racists who employ boche-like concepts
fail to express complete thoughts. (Boghossian 2003: 243)
Accepting the above, however, does not lead to the conclusion that
bigots are not saying anything whatsoever, or express no thoughts,
when they use the term 'Boche'; it is to deny one account of its
meaning, not to deny that it has meaning. Indeed, a proponent of CRS
might view the term 'Boche' as having the same meaning as 'German'.
Thus, the meaning of 'Boche' is given by whatever (conservative) rules
govern 'German'. One can in turn explain the pejorative nature of
'Boche' by appeal not to its literal, semantic content, but to its
offensive associations, its conventional implications (see Grice 1989
ch. 2). According to this account, CRS deals with that aspect of a
word that is shared by its neutral counterpart (for example, 'German')
and an additional apparatus is wheeled in to explain the respect in
which it causes offence. (The former is the remit of semantics, the
latter of pragmatics.)
Williamson claims that such an account is not available to one who
recommends CRS (2003: 267-8). Even if the 'Boche' is governed by the
same rules as 'German', it is still the case that most speakers are
not prepared—given its offensive implications—to employ 'Boche' in
accordance with those rules. According to CRS, then, they do not
understand the term 'Boche' or grasp the concept it expresses, which
is implausible.
Note, however, that this criticism is effective against regularism and
dispositionalism, but not normativism. The normativist can insist that
the propriety of employment that is constitutive of the concept is
distinctively semantic, as opposed to (say) moral. Once this is
recognised, one can appreciate that speakers can indeed acknowledge
that inferring from 'x originates in Germany' to 'x is Boche' is
correct as far as the language is concerned, or according to the
semantic norms determinative of the relevant expressions' meanings,
and still refuse actually to use the term 'Boche', since the propriety
of doing so is trumped by other considerations (in this instance,
moral). So, if CRS distinguishes the relevant normative notion
according to which inferences are correct or incorrect, it has the
resources to meet Williamson's objection.
g. Circularity
The above discussion leads almost directly to a concern about CRS that
Davidson voices in the following passage:
It is empty to say that meaning is use unless we specify what use
we have in mind, and when we do specify, in a way that helps with
meaning, we find ourselves going in a circle. (2005: 13)
This is perhaps especially relevant to normativism. According to it,
for an expression to possess meaning, or express content, is for it be
correctly used in a certain way. But intuitively the 'correct' use is
just that which accords with meaning, or mastery of which is required
for understanding. Further, it was suggested above that norms of
meaning must be distinguished from other kinds of norm and hence
viewed as distinctively semantic. Clearly, for a theory of meaning to
appeal to such notions would be circular.
Two alternatives present themselves. One strategy would be to show how
the relevant norms can be picked out in independently intelligible or
more basic terms, say epistemological (Brandom 2000: ch. 6; Skorupski
1997; cf. Dummett 1991; 1996). Alternatively, one might reject the
requirement of reductionism (Alston 2000; Stroud 2002; Whiting 2006).
The assumption that an account of semantic notions must be given in
independently intelligible or more basic terms is one that should not
go unchallenged.
Note that dispositionalism arguably suffers from its own, distinctive
problem of circularity (see Boghossian 1989; Kripke 1982: 28).
According to it, to grasp the meaning of an expression is to be
disposed to use it in a certain way. So, for example, to grasp the
meaning of 'bachelor' is to be disposed to make the transition from
'He is an unmarried man' to 'He is a bachelor'. But, of course, a
person might fully understand the expression and yet not be disposed
to make that transition. Perhaps she desires to confuse her
interlocutor, or does not have long to live and wishes not to waste
words, or believes that within the elapsed time the person has
married, and so on. Evidently, the dispositionalist must say that to
grasp the meaning one must be disposed to perform in a certain way in
optimal circumstances. However, it appears unlikely that those
circumstances could possibly be specified without employing semantic
notions of the same kind as that of meaning or content.
5. Prospects and Applications
This entry has surveyed some of the arguments in favor of CRS and
sketched briefly a number of the prominent problems it faces. Its
critics' claims notwithstanding, there is no reason to think that CRS
faces proportionally more difficulties than its competitors. And in
each case there are lines of response that, if not immediately
decisive, are worthy of investigation.
For those sympathetic to CRS, examining such matters provide a means
of adjudicating between the different versions. Specifically, it seems
that the threats of indeterminacy and defective concepts point
strongly toward normativism. Of course, once one accepts that semantic
concepts are intrinsically normative, one must further distinguish
such norms from other kinds of propriety, and it is doubtful that this
can be done without making use of semantic concepts on a par with
meaning or content. Nevertheless, the assumption that the only
satisfactory philosophical explanations are those that provide
analyses in independently intelligible and more basic terms is
arguably unfounded and certainly not to be assumed.
In closing, it is worth noting that some consider CRS to provide
insights into the possibility of a priori knowledge (see A Priori and
A Posteriori), and as explaining our entitlement to follow certain
fundamental epistemic and ethical principles (Boghossian 1997; 2000;
2003; Hale and Wright 2000; Peacocke 1992; Wedgwood 2006; cp. Horwich
2005 ch. 6; Williamson 2003). This is a burgeoning field of research
and deserves investigation. In order to evaluate such claims, however,
the details of CRS need first to be spelled out. It is on that task
that this entry has focussed.
6. References and Further Reading
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* Ayer, A. J. (ed.) 1959: Logical Positivism. London: Allen and Unwin.
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* Belnap, N. 1962: Tonk, plonk, and plink. Analysis 22: 130-4.
* Block, N. 1986: Advertisement for a semantics for psychology.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 615-78.
* Block, N. 1993: Holism, hyper-analyticity and
hyper-compositionality. Mind and Language 3: 1-27.
* Block, N. 1995: An argument for holism. Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 95: 151-69.
* Boghossian, P. 1989: The rule-following considerations. Mind 93: 507-49.
* Boghossian, P. 1994: Inferential role semantics and the
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* Boghossian, P. 1997: Analyticity. In A Companion to the
Philosophy of Language, ed. B. Hale and C. Wright. Oxford: Blackwell.
* Boghossian, P. 2000: Knowledge of logic. In New Essays on the A
Priori, ed. P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
* Boghossian, P. 2003: Blind reasoning. The Aristotelian Society
Supplementary Volume 77: 225-48.
* Brandom, R. 1994: Making it Explicit. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press.
* Boghossian, P. 2000: Articulating Reasons. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
* Boghossian, P. 2002: Tales of the Mighty Dead. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
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