neither true nor false, that is, they lack truth-values. What this
means will be investigated by giving a brief logical-linguistic
analysis explaining the different illocutionary senses of normative
sentences. The analysis will make sense of how normative sentences
play their proper role even though they lack truth values, a fact
which is hidden by the ambiguous use of those sentences in our
language. The main body of the article explores various
non-cognitivist logics of norms from the early attempts by Hare and
Stevenson to the more recent ones by A. Gibbard and S. Blackburn.
Jorgensen's Dilemma and the Frege-Geach Problem are two important
aspects of this logic of norms. Jorgensen's Dilemma is the problem in
the philosophy of law of inferring normative sentences from normative
sentences, which is an apparent problem because inferences are
typically understood as involving sentences with truth values. The
Frege-Geach Problem is a problem in moral philosophy involving
inferences in embedded contexts or in illocutionary mixed sentences.
The article ends with a taxonomy of non-cognitivist theories.
1. Metaethical assumptions
In this section, we will introduce some preliminary linguistic notions
that will allow us to give a better account of the cognitivism vs.
non-cognitivism divide.
Canonically, forms of language are mainly divided in two species:
cognitive sentences (cognitive use of language) and non-cognitive
sentences (instrumental use of language). Cognitive sentences are
fact-dependent or bear truth-values, while non-cognitive sentences
are, on the contrary, fact independent and do not bear truth-values.
Cognitive sentences typically describe states of affairs, such as "The
earth is square" or "Schwarzenegger won the last California election;"
such sentences are verifiable and can be either true or false. On the
other hand, sentences such as "You shall not steal,, "You ought to pay
your taxes," and "Don't shut the door, please," do not describe states
of affairs nor can be understood as carrying falsehood or truth, but
they rather have a different kind of illocutionary force.
a. Different illocutionary acts
Before introducing the notion of illocutionary force, we need to say
more about language and its usage. The basic part of a language
carrying meaning is called a sentence, such as "The actual king of
France is bald" or "Close that door, please!" Thereby, a speaker's
actual empirical performance (here and now) of an actual linguistic
expression is not mentioned. We are rather referring to a class
including all the possible empirical performances made by a possible
speaker in any language and in any occurrence of that determined
expression. On the other hand, propositions are the meaning of
sentences: they are true or false, they can be known, believed or
doubted and, finally, they are kept constant in respect of their
translation from a language to another (Lyons, 1995, p. 141).
The same proposition may be used in different occurrences for doing
different things. In other words, the same proposition can be used for
asserting, questioning, asking, demanding and so on. A sentence,
therefore, can be understood as an illocutionary act. The general form
of illocutionary acts, according to Searle, is:
F(p)
where "F" stands for any indicator of illocutionary force, and "p"
takes expressions for propositions. In this way, we can symbolize
different kinds of illocutionary acts such as assertions:
├ p such as in "You are going to shut the door"
commands:
!p such as in "Shut the door!"
or questions:
?p such as in "Are you going to shut the door?"
According to Reichenbach (1947, p. 337), illocutionary acts are not
true or false. They are indeed instruments constructed with the help
of propositions, and therefore they belong to language; this is what
distinguishes them from other instruments devised to reach a certain
aim. We can distinguish two – not necessarily separated – elements
within an illocutionary act, namely the propositional indicator (p)
and the indicator of illocutionary force (F). What is called
propositional content (or proposition, or radical-proposition) is
symbolized with "p" and it is the invariant ingredient in an
illocutionary act (in our example above is: "your going to shut the
door" or the possible state of affair "you are going to shut the
door"). Indeed, it describes the "descriptive content" of a sentence;
or, in other words, it stands for a possible state of affair
containing meaning and, consequently, having truth-values.
On the contrary, illocutionary acts show the way a proposition is used
or what illocutionary force the sentence belongs to. Therefore,
illocutionary force has no semantic meaning whatsoever and so it does
not form part, for example, of the conceptual amount of a norm
sentence. Importantly, illocutionary forces are not alethic
modalities-like (such as "is necessary that"); they are not like
intensional operators and therefore they cannot be used for creating
propositions starting from propositions. For this reason Frege's Rule
states signs of illocutionary force cannot (a) being iterated and (b)
fall under the range of propositional connectives.
Finally, the illocutionary dimension has a perlocutionary element
attached. According to Levinson (1983, p. 237), a perlocutionary act
is specific to the circumstances of issuance and is therefore not
conventionally achieved just by uttering that particular utterance,
and includes all those effects, intended or unintended, often
indeterminate, that some particular utterance in a particular
situation may cause. The main difference between a perlocutionary act
and an illocutionary act stands on the fact that the former has a
conventional nature, as it can be represented in explicit form using
the performative formula; this conventional nature does not apply to
perlocutionary act. In the following, we will see the importance of
perlocutionary acts within the emotive theories of ethics, which
represent a kind of non-cognitivist theory.
b. Difference between language and metalanguage
Another fundamental notion to understand is considering the difference
between cognitivism and non-cognitivism concerns a linguistic
difference between language and meta-language. This distinction makes
clear another problematic feature intrinsic to the ordinary use of
natural languages such as the ambiguity of normative sentences and
prescriptions. Often non-cognitivist positions are confused with
relativistic positions because of the shift from the object language
into the meta-language. When we say, "Hitler was a bad leader," we are
uttering a normative sentence. When we say, "Winston said Hitler was a
bad leader" we are not uttering a normative although relativistic
sentence. Rather we are moving from the object-language (that is the
sentence "Hitler was a bad leader") to a meta-linguistic one (that is
"Winston said Hitler was a bad leader") which is typically a
descriptive sentence (taken as a whole) talking about a normative
sentence (that is: "Hitler was a bad leader"). There is no room for
relativism here: the latter is not a moral sentence but simply a
descriptive sentence (or, following Max Weber, a sociological
sentence), which, according to B. Russell (1935, p. 214-215), belongs
to psychology or biography. An important feature of descriptive
sentences holds that "The descriptive sentences of obligation and
permission are relative in a sense in which the prescriptive sentences
are not"; they always refer to the utterer/authority of that sentence
(that in our case is Winston): "conceptually, the reference to the
authority is necessary to identify the normative proposition [that is
"Hitler was a bad leader"] expressed by a normative sentence used in a
descriptive way" (Alchourrón, 1993)
c. Ambiguity of normative sentences
Notice that normative sentences are ambiguous; they can be uttered
both in descriptive and in normative ways at the level of common
language. In other words, the same normative sentence can be used
either to perform prescriptions as well as to describe that a
particular norm exists. Jeremy Bentham (1970, p. 104; Bentham, 1789,
chap. XVII, § XXIX n.1; see Alchourron and Bulygin, 1989 and Bulygin,
1982) was intuitively aware of ambiguity in normative sentences. In
fact, this semantical shift is due to a peculiar capacity of natural
languages to mix up the language level with meta-language level to the
extent in which we cannot appreciate any difference between them when
using ordinary language. According to Bentham, on the contrary, such a
linguistic difference should be clear; in fact he pointed out that
"The property and very essence of law, it may be said, is to command;
the language of the law then should be the language of command. For
expressing commands there is in all languages a particular mood, which
is styled the imperative" (Bentham, 1970, p. 105). Bentham also argues
that "There is still enough that serves, and that as effectually as in
the other case, to distinguish the imperative from the ordinary
didactic, narrative, informative or assertive style: the language of
the will from the language of the understanding" (ibid.). This
distinction is very important in the practice of law and in the field
of ethics because "What is been termed a declaratory law, so far as it
stands distinguished from either a coercive or a discoercive law, is
not properly speaking a law. It is not the expression of an act of
will exercised at the time: it is a mere notification of the existence
of a law, either of the coercive or the discoercive kind, as already
subsisting; of the existence of some document expressive of some act
of will, exercised, not at the time, but at some former period"
(Bentham, 1789, p.).
More recently, von Wright made that intuition more precise,
explaining, "Tokens of the same sentences are used, sometimes to
enunciate a prescription (that is, to enjoin, permit, or prohibit a
certain action), sometimes again to express a proposition to the
effect that there is a prescription enjoining, or permitting or
prohibiting a certain action. Such propositions are called
norm-propositions [or descriptive sentences of norms]" (von Wright,
1963, p. viii). Norms "should be carefully distinguished from
'normative propositions', i.e. descriptive propositions stating that
'p' is obligatory (forbidden or permitted) according to some
unspecified norm or set of norms. Normative propositions – which can
be regarded as propositions about sets (systems) of norms – also
contain normative terms like 'obligatory', 'prohibited', etc. but
these have a purely descriptive meaning" (Alchourrón e Bulygin, 1981).
The most influential analysis on the nature of normative sentences
(especially in the field of philosophy of law) was carried out by Hans
Kelsen (especially in Kelsen, 1941).
d. Definitions of ethical non-cognitivism
Ethical non-cognitivism claims that prescriptions have a different
nature than descriptive sentences; they have no truth-values, they are
not describing anything, and they have a different illocutionary role.
That is to say, they do not express factual claims or beliefs and
therefore are neither true nor false (they are not truth-apt); they
belong to a different illocutionary force, the prescriptive mood.
These theories, as opposed to cognitivist theories, are not holding
that ethical sentences are objectively and consistently true or false,
neither even presupposing new entities platonic-like (in the way
naturalistic theories do), and therefore they do not need to explain
the way in which we can epistemically access these theories (see
Blackburn, 1984, p. 169 and Hale, 1993). In other words,
non-cognitivism claims that the principal feature of normative
sentences (their lacking of truth values) is a consequence of the
illocutionary role of such sentences. In fact, these sentences are not
bearing any cognitive meaning (such as assertions or descriptions),
but they are just used to utter prescriptions.
Therefore, cognitivist theories reject three traditional theses: (1)
Hume's Law (that is the claims that a moral conclusion cannot be
validly inferred from non-moral premises), as some cognitivist
theories suppress the distinction between cognitive and normative
sentences; (2) Ockham's Razor, because some of cognitivist theories do
multiply entities without necessity, as they presuppose a (platonic)
realm of norms; and (3) Jorgensen's Dilemma (see below).
Non-cognitivist theories do not infringe Ockham's Razor as they are
not implying any platonic entity (we saw the difference between
normative sentences and descriptive sentences is just at the
illocutionary level) and they accept the challenge of Hume's Law.
We can find two main theories within noncognitivism: emotivism and
prescriptivism. These two theories, often confused, need to be
carefully distinguished. Indeed emotivism and prescriptivism are
different for two main reasons; for emotivists a normative sentence is
basically a sentence which expresses a speaker's feeling (such as
"Gasp!"). For prescriptivists a normative sentence is used for
uttering overriding universalizable prescriptions (such us: "You shalt
not steal!"). Another difference between those two theories is about
the possibility of a genuine logic of norms. Emotivists, at least in
classical formulations (from Ayer to Stevenson) claim a logic of norms
is very problematic or even impossible to build: while for
prescriptivists (in particular in Hare's theory or in von Wright's
works) the possibility for a logic of norms is open, although
problematic.
2. The problem of a logic of norms
The main challenge non-cognitivist theories face is about the
possibility of a logic of norms. Cognitivist theories are not facing
this dilemma as they claim there is no difference between normative
and descriptive sentences; therefore the classic logic based on
truth-values is sufficient for normative reasoning. What about norms
lacking truth-values?
The problem of a logic of norms is a vexata quaestio that dates back,
in modern times, to Language, Truth and Logic by A.J. Ayer (1936).
Ayer claimed that ethical sentences are pseudo concepts aimed at
expressing emotions or commands having no real meaning. The only
purpose of ethical sentences is to persuade the listener to act in a
certain way. In other words, ethical sentences have only a perlocutory
function. Therefore it is no possible to talk about disagreement and
unsoundness in ethics; neither is it possible to speak about ethical
reasoning because ethical sentences such as "parsimony is a virtue"
and "parsimony is a vice" are not expressing propositions (that is are
not true or false). Thus they can't be incompatible. On the other
hand, Ayer acknowledged that people do discuss about questions
regarding values, but they are not actually ethical dilemmas involving
values but factual questions. In fact, people, according to Ayer,
reason about empirical facts on which state of affairs to perform and
not about agreeing on an ethical belief.
According to M. Warnock (1978) Ayer's is a negative theory of ethics
because it lacks of meaning and scientific basis. The last word in
ethics is rather ideological, that is to state the superiority of a
moral system over another. Ayer's skeptical conclusion is a
consequence of the linguistic model he adopted (that is basically
Wittgenstein's Tractatus picture-theory, 1922). In fact, Ayer is not
able (at least in Language Truth and Logic) to distinguish in
normative sentences between an emotive (perlocutionary) part and a
descriptive (meaning) part. The distinction is necessary to give
ethics its full significance back.
Two years after Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, another author dealt
with the problem of the foundation of a logic of norms. Jorgen
Jorgensen (in "Imperativer og Logik", 1937-38) claimed that "any
imperative sentences may be considered as containing two factors which
I may call the imperative factor and the indicative factor, the first
indicating that some thing is commanded or wished and the latter
describing what it is that is commanded or wished." In an actual
sentence it is not possible to distinguish between those two factors
because a command void of content is impossible; but the indicative
factor can be kept apart from the imperative mood and it can be used
to express indicative sentences describing the action, changes or
state of affairs which can be ordered or wished. For example, in the
imperative "Close the door!" somebody is ordering that a door be
closed. The order is that the proposition "the door once open is now
closed" be true. Methodologically, Jorgensen was in line with the
modern distinction in sentences between illocutionary force and
propositional content (see i.e. Searle, 1969).
Jorgensen concluded, "it seems to be a syntactical rule that from an
imperative sentence of the form "Do so and so," an indicative sentence
of the form "This is so and so" may be derived." In other words,
Jorgensen claimed imperative sentences can be transformed in
indicative sentences in two ways: (1) the imperative factor is put
outside the brackets much as the assertion sign in the ordinary logic
and the logical operations are only performed within the brackets; or
(2) for each imperative sentences there is an equivalent indicative
sentence which is derived from the former. This derived indicative
sentence applies to the rules of classical logic and thereby
indirectly applies the rules of logic to the imperative sentences so
that entailments of the latter may be made explicit.
Jorgensen's first solution acknowledges the application of logic only
within the propositional content (or indicative factor) without using
the normative (or imperative) constituent. This solution is very
similar to R.M. Hare's dictive indifference of logic (Hare, 1949 and
1952) in which, we will see, logic is valid only at the phrastics
level. Jorgensen's second solution, on the other hand, seems to
propose that normative sentences and descriptive sentences are linked
through an isomorphic relation; that is prescriptions hold as the same
logical rules as their descriptive counterparts. G.H. von Wright
(1963) will successively explore this solution. Therefore Jorgensen,
differently from Ayer, moved to an idea of ethics, which is called
moderate emotivism close to Stevenson's (1944) and Hare's (1949). In
fact, Jorgensen acknowledges a descriptive component within
prescriptive sentences and also he thinks that it is possible to apply
logic to norms.
a. Jorgensen's dilemma: its importance for non-cognitivism
More importantly, Jorgensen proposed the so-called Jorgensen's
Dilemma, which is the first attempt to analyze the problem of the
inference of norms (prescriptive sentences) from norms (prescriptive
sentences) moving from the point that norms (prescriptive sentences)
are lacking of truth-values. In fact, Jorgensen analyzes this problem
moving from the so-called Poincare's argument (a variant of Hume's
Law) in which is studied the role of logical inference into
prescriptive contexts (that are lacking of truth-values). Jorgensen
still thinks logical inference is a concept linked to a classical idea
of logic, where an inference is when we get true conclusions starting
from true premises. However Jorgensen noticed that in ordinary
normative reasoning we perform inferences can be accepted as true;
such as:
1.Keep your promises
2.This is a promise of yours
__________________________
├ Therefore, keep this promise
Where at least one of the premises (in our case the premise 1.) is
prescriptive. Hence, Jorgensen finds himself in front of the following
"puzzle":
"According to a generally accepted definition of logical inferences
only sentences which are capable of being true or false can function
as premises or conclusion in a inference; nevertheless it seems
evident that a conclusion in the imperative mood may be drawn from two
premises one of which or both of which are in the imperative mood"
(Jorgensen, 1937-38).
There are two ways to explain this phenomenon: widening the notion of
logic inference beyond the "mere" sphere of truth, or bypassing this
distinction by using descriptive sentences equivalent to prescriptive
sentences and applying them to the classical notion of logic
inference. Otherwise it is not possible to apply the notion of logical
inference to norms: any normative discourse turns to be illogical (as
Ayer claimed).
The essence of the challenge of non-cognitivism is therefore
expressed: how is possible to apply the notion of logical inference
whatsoever to the realm of sentences lacking of truth-values?
3. From earlier non-cognitivism to the "new norm-expressivism"
If we believe norms are lacking of truth-values but a logic of norms
is possible, we are thinking about an objectivist and non-cognitivist
theory of norms, such as Hare's; while if we believe that logical
inference cannot be applied to sentences lacking of truth-values,
therefore we have a non-cognitivist and subjectivist theory of norms,
such as Ayer's.
a. C. L. Stevenson and the role of persuasion
C. L. Stevenson (1944) developed another non-cognitivist and
subjectivist theory of norms. Stevenson acknowledges that in moral
sentences there is a descriptive component, which has no cognitive
function but rather a quasi-imperative force which, operating through
suggestion and intensified by your tone of voice, readily permits you
to begin to influence or to modify another person's behavior.
Therefore, according to Stevenson, ethical terms are instruments used
in a cooperative enterprise that leads to a mutual readjustment of
human interest. So, when using ethical sentences, we are not using
logical inference, but, actually, we are using methods of persuasion.
According to Hare (1987), Stevenson treated what were perlocutionary
features of moral language as if they were constitutive of its
meaning, and as a result became an irrationalist, because
perlocutionary acts are not subject to logical rules.
b. R. M. Hare and the dictive indifference of logic
According to Hare, normative sentences are characterized by three
ingredients: prescriptivity, universalizability and
overridingness/supervenience; these three ingredients are logical
characteristics of normative sentences by virtue of their meaning
(Hare, 1989).
According to Hare, moral sentences are prescriptions that are
sentences used for guiding an action or to reply at the question:
"What shall I do?" (Hare, 1952). In other words, an indicative (or
descriptive) sentence is used for telling someone that something is
the case; an imperative is not about that – it is used for telling
someone to make something the case (ibid.). Differently from emotive
theories (such as Stevenson's), Hare claims that telling someone to
make something the case implies a persuasive process from the speaker
to the listener. Emotive theories, according to Hare, judge the
success of imperative solely by their effects, that is, by whether the
person believes or does what we are trying to get him or her to
believe or do. It does not matter whether the means used to persuade
him are fair or foul, so long as they persuade him/her. Persuasions
imply a lack of rationality by moral theories; therefore using
persuasion does not mean rationally replying to the question "What
shall I do?", but rather it is an attempt to answer the question in a
particular way.
Universalizability is a feature moral sentences share with
descriptions, but, according to Hare still is a logic component of
neustics (Hare's term for descriptive component of a sentence).
Roughly speaking it means that terms like "ought" and "must" are
similar to words like "all" rather than "red" or "blue". In other
words, normative concepts have to be compared to logical operators
(such as "all" or "some" or "It is necessary that") and not to
predicates (see Hare, 1963 and 1967). Moreover, the rules that define
their logical behavior make them universalizable. Another
interpretation of the thesis of Universalizability claims that
Universalizability is not about the way moral terms function, but it
is a principle (axiom) which is part of any possible normative system
as such (see Hare, 1982). In other words, Universalizability is
similar to the "Golden Rule" ("Treat others only in a way that you're
willing to be treated in the same situation") or to impartiality,
rather than an actual formal axiom in a ethical system. This thesis
has been attacked by several authors such as A. MacIntyre (1957), B.
Williams (1985) and M. Singer (1985). All those scholars agree that
actually there are several levels of universalizability which Hare's
monolithical formulation would melt. Particularly, MacIntyre argues
that Hare does not make clear between "generality" (that is general
principles) and "universality" (universal principles).
Supervenience is a feature moral sentences share with descriptions
too. This issue is discussed also in the philosophy of mind. In moral
philosophy, the issue of supervenience concerns the relationship which
is said to hold between moral properties and natural or non-moral
properties. Alternatively, it is put forward as a claim about a
certain feature of moral terms or moral predicates. When it is said of
"trust" that it is, say, good, "trust" is good because or in virtue of
some subjacent or underlying property of it. Generally, it is held
that these subjacent properties are natural properties of "trust".
For Hare overridingness is a feature, not just of evaluative words,
properties, or judgments, but of the wider class of judgments which
have to have, at least in some minimal sense, reasons or grounds of
explanations (Hare, 1989). Basically, Hare believes that
overridingness and universalizability are similar concepts in that
both involve a universal premise such as in the Golden Rule.
From a logical-linguistic point of view, Hare distinguishes in a
sentence between a phrastic and a neustic:
"I shall call the part of the sentence that is common to [assertive
and imperative] moods (…) the phrastic; and the part different in the
case of commands and sentences (…) the neustic" (Hare, 1952).
Roughly speaking, a phrastic is that component in the sentence we
called the descriptive component above, and a neustic is the
illocutionary part in a sentence. According to Hare, logical
connectives are part of phrastics; combinations of those connectives
are able to create, are valid in the case we deal with normative
sentences as well as we deal with descriptive sentences. It is,
indeed, the proper function of these connectives to establish
relations between sentences; in other words, the validity of a
reasoning depends upon the logical links subsisting among phrastics.
Hare's thesis is called "dictive indifference of logic": "we shall see
(…) that these connectives are all descriptive and not dictive. In
fact, it is the descriptive part of sentences with which formal
logicians are almost exclusively concerned; and this means that what
they say applied as much to imperatives as to indicatives; for to any
descriptor (or phrastic) we can add either kind of dictor (or
neustic), and get a sentence" (Hare, 1949). Therefore no difference
will subsist between a logic of imperatives and a logic of assertions:
"The method of reasoning used in (…) [imperative] inferences is, of
course, exactly which is used in indicative logic: these
considerations in no way support that there can be a separate 'Logic
of Imperatives', but only that imperatives are logical in the same way
as indicatives" (Ibid.). Phrastics, indeed, are the same in
imperatives and assertions, and we can assert "that any formula of
formal logic which is capable of an indicative interpretation is
capable also of an imperative one," that is, we can substitute an
indicative neustic with an imperative one, leaving the phrastic
unchanged (Ibid.).
c. The new "norm-expressivism"
Starting from the 80s there was a renewal of analysis of morals in an
emotivist key. These analyses were made by Simon Blackburn and by
Allan Gibbard. In their work the emotive theory of morals is revised
and enriched even accepting room for a logic of norms (in opposition
to what happened in the earlier emotive theories, such as
Stevenson's).
Blackburn's quasi-realism (1984) moves from the actual practice in the
ordinary language to express itself in a realistic way even when
uttering moral sentences. Blackburn claims that practice is to be, so
to speak, the way we made projections of our attitudes onto the world;
in Blackburn's own words, "we say we project an attitude or habit, or
other commitment which is not descriptive onto the world, when we
speak and think as though there were a property of things which our
saying describe, which we can reason about, know about, be wrong about
and so on" (Blackburn, ibid.).
Blackburn, on one hand, rehabilitates emotive theories of morals and,
on the other hand, says – contrary to Mackie's error theory – our use
of realist terminology is respectable and not in contract with its
projective origin. We will see in the next section how Blackburn can
make room for a logic of norms.
Gibbard's (1990) central concept is the idea that calling something
rational is to express one's acceptance of norms that permits it. It
applies to the rationality of actions, and it applied to the
rationality of beliefs and feelings (ibid.). For Gibbard, cognitive
analyses fail to recognize that judging a behavior as rational means
to endorse it; even classical non-cognitivist analyses fails this
point as they admit that moral judgment are not feelings, but
judgments of what moral feelings it is rational to have. Feelings we
think, can be apt or not, moral judgments are judgments of when guilt
and resentment are apt.
The primary function of norms (which Gibbard justifies on evolutionary
basis) is to facilitate the social cooperation, and while true factual
sentences are coupled with world representations, normative ones have
the function of making social cooperation stable, and not linked to
environmental and social changes. Gibbard's theory is a
non-cognitivist but naturalistic one, which is necessary to give an
account of rationality in terms of accepting a norm which is, in its
turn, a standard for rationality of actions; on the contrary it would
turn in a vicious circle.
Norms rule everybody's feelings and actions and they are the main
component of a moral judgment; to judging an action as wrong, in
Gibbard's terms, it means that an actor's feelings of guilt and
judging people's anger are apt feelings. Of course, these will be
changing from culture to culture. Finally, Gibbard suggests that
normative judgments – because their social function – commit us to
adopt higher level norms to encourage social cooperation.
Gibbard's key concept is "accepting a norm" which is to justify on a
psychological theory of meaning in a similar way to Stevenson's
theory. For Gibbard, a norm is a significant kind of a psychological
state of the mind, which is not fully understandable for us.
Therefore, Gibbard's theory rests on an ambiguity; on one hand, value
judgments are lacking of truth-values, but on the other hand, they
express the existence of someone's mental states.
4. The Frege-Geach Problem
The Frege-Geach problem (also known as the "embedding problem") is
used as the main "test" to understand rationality in non-cognitivist
theories. The problem was posed in P. Geach's article "Assertion"
(Geach, 1964), but the discussion starts back from Geach's article
"Imperatives and Deontic Logic" (Geach, 1958). In particular, Geach
used his own test to attack non-cognitivist claims; in fact, if we
find a positive solution to the Geach-Frege Problem we are de facto
giving significance to non-cognitivist moral reasoning. On the
contrary, if no solution to the problem is provided, the only option
left open to moral reasoning is cognitivism or excluding ethics into
the realm of rationality (likewise radical forms of emotivism such as
Ayer).
Briefly, the Frege-Geach problem is that sentences that express moral
judgments can form part of semantically complex sentences in a way
that an expressivist cannot easily explain. According to Geach, the
sentence "Telling the lies is wrong" has the same meaning regardless
of whether it occurs on its own or as the antecedent of "If telling
the lies is wrong, then getting your little brother to tell lies is
also wrong". This must be so, since we may derive "Telling your little
brother to tell lies is wrong" from them and both by modus ponens
without any fallacy of equivocation. Yet nothing is expressed (in the
relevant sense) by "Telling lies is wrong" when it forms the
antecedent of the conditional, since the antecedent is not itself the
same illocutionary force as the premise, and so its meaning
(regardless of where it occurs) apparently cannot be explained by an
expressivist analysis. Analogous problems within other kinds of
embedded contexts (Unwin, 1999).
However, Geach recommends attention to Frege's distinction between
assertion and predication, or in other words, between illocutionary
force and propositional content, respectively. In fact, if we assume
the role of the illocutionary force, there would be a slight change in
the meaning of the word "wrong" in the antecedent of the conditional
"If telling the lies is wrong, then getting your little brother to
tell lies is also wrong" and in its occurrence as consequence in the
same conditional sentence. This problem is even clearer using modus
ponens:
1. If tormenting the cat is wrong, then getting your little brother to
torment the cat is also wrong
2. Tormenting the cat is wrong
Therefore, getting your little brother to torment the cat is wrong.
In the case above it is difficult to say that the occurrence of
"wrong" as antecedent of the 1st conditional (which appears to be
descriptive) has exactly the same meaning as "wrong" in the 2nd
sentence (which appears to be normative).
We saw non-cognitivism is characterized by the assumption that norms
lack truth-values. Yet, the contexts introduced by ordinary logic
operators such as "and", "not", "or", "if… then", and the quantifiers,
together with predication itself, are normally explicated in terms of
the more basic semantic concepts of truth. Therefore, it seems that
this option is not available to non-cognitivists, in general, and in
particular to expressivists.
a. Blackburn solutions to the Frege-Geach Problem
S. Blackburn (1984) redefines the Frege-Geach Problem in terms of
whether expressive theories can cope with unasserted contexts in such
a way as to allow sentences the same meaning within them, as they have
when they are asserted. According to Blackburn, we use evaluative
sentences as if they were not different from assertions (because of
our projective attitude), and, therefore, we intuitively treat them as
if they were bearing truth-values and linked to descriptive sentences.
The problem will be about the interpretation of connectives to be used
to build up more complex commitments having in their own several
illocutionary characteristics (such as in a conditional). Blackburn
suggests commitments are used to create more complex sentences which
is accepted only if all its parts are accepted, according to the
following solution: "the notion of commitment is then capacious enough
to include both ordinary beliefs, and these other attitudes, habits
and prescriptions" (Blackburn, ibid., p. 192). Therefore a conditional
will express someone's endorsement to an attitude (which is an
expression of a moral standpoint, too) preceded by a belief. In other
words, it expresses a higher-order attitude, that is, an expression of
disapproval or approval toward a combination of attitudes (such as of
lying). Conditionals, as they are used in ordinary language, show the
way we express an endorsement over involvement of commitments – which
is expression of a moral standpoint. In other words, we can see that
using conditional forms (in normative contexts) is a higher level form
(compared to simple sentences like "it's wrong telling lies") which
serves to express one's attitudes on attitudes, or meta-attitudes.
Blackburn introduces these kinds of sentences formally in the following way:
(a) H! (B!p → B!q)
Where H! stands for the "Hooray" operator (expressive counterpart of
the deontic operator "O" – for obligation), B! is the "Booh" operator
(expressive equivalent to the deontic "F" – for forbidden). What
appears between slashes shows that our argument is an attitude or a
belief, which express a first order attitude (such as "The playing for
West Ham is wrong").
The main limit of Blackburn's solution of the Frege-Geach problem
concerns the nature of the H! and B! operators, while iterated in a
higher order sentence. Blackburn's formulation does not make clear the
illocutionary role of the operator. If we interpret all the operators
in the formula (a) in an expressive (or prescriptive) way, (that is
lacking of truth-values), the whole expression will not make sense.
According to Barcan Marcus (1966), iteration of normative operators
looks like stammering. Otherwise. if we interpret (according to
Blackburn) the external operator H! in an expressive (or prescriptive)
way and those into the slashes as descriptive ones, we will have a
correct way of interpreting operators but no solution to the
Frege-Geach problem. The formula (a) above, indeed, is formally
correct but does not solve the problem about the identity of meaning
for example between the antecedent of the 1st conditional in the Modus
Ponens shown above (which is descriptive) and its 2nd sentence (which
is normative).
b. Gibbard solution to the Frege-Geach Problem
Gibbard tries to solve the Frege-Geach problem using a slightly
modified version of possible worlds semantics that he labeled as
"factual-normative worlds". Factual-normative worlds are an ordered
pair where "w" is a possible world (or a set of facts) and "n" is a
complete system of general norms. The pair constitutes a
creedal-normative state completely opinionated (Gibbard, 1990, p. 95).
According to Gibbard, any particular normative judgment holds or not,
as a matter of logic, in the factual-normative world . That is, the
pair is a set of sound and complete norms where, for each possible
human behavior, we can state the normative status (Forbidden,
Obligatory or Indifferent) associated with it. In this way each
individual can understand the normative qualification of his or her
action.
Consider a human observer who is uncertain both factually and
normatively. When the observer will think about the rightness of a
normative judgment, she or he will rule out any possible action which
is not included into a set constituted by all the factual elements and
all the normative elements in which that normative judgment is valid.
Let's take for instance, the modus ponens above:
1. If tormenting the cat is wrong, then getting your little brother to
torment the cat is also wrong
2. Tormenting the cat is wrong
Therefore, getting your little brother to torment the cat is wrong.
The first premise rules out all the combinations in which it is not
wrong to get your little brother to tell lies. The second premise
rules out the set of combination between norms and facts in which is
wrong to torment the cat. Therefore both premises together rules out
the whole set of norms and facts in which it is not wrong to get your
little brother to torment the cat; including any combination that the
conclusion rules out.
What does it mean for a sentence to be valid in a particular
factual-normative world? According to Gibbard it means that for each
sentence containing a normative predicate there is a n-corresponding
descriptive version which makes a normative predicate (such as
"rational") refer to a particular set of norms (that is "rational"
according to the system n). Hence, Gibbard concludes, for any
logically complex sentence S containing normative predicates in
embedded contexts, we may construct the descriptive sentence Sn that
arises from replacing all normative predicates in S by their
n-corresponding version. Therefore we can operate with embedded
contexts saying the sentence S holds in if and only if Sn holds in a
possible world .
Actually Gibbard's solution to the Geach-Frege problem is rather a
bypass method to avoid the problem because he explains the functioning
of normative language by means of descriptive language and semantical
models. According to Sinnot-Armstrong's criticism (1993), Gibbard's
analysis appears to be compatible with a realist view on norms because
of his ambiguous use of normative judgment (which is a state of mind)
and his use of possible world semantics.
5. The significance of the Geach-Frege Problem and Jorgensen's Dilemma
for non-cognitivism
The Geach-Frege problems and Jorgensen's Dilemma are faces of the same
coin. The first deals with the problem of mixed, or embedded, contexts
(normative and descriptive) and how it is possible to deal with mixed
sentences. The main problem here is the interpretation of connectives
and logical operators in contexts that are partially lacking
truth-values.
Jorgensen's Dilemma, on the other hand, deals with making inferences
between norms, that is, sentences that are lacking of truth-values,
and to create a logical foundation that makes sense of inferences
between norms we actually find sound in the everyday discourse. The
Jorgensen's Dilemma also tries to explain the very nature lying behind
moral disagreements and the way we can rationally deliberate on them.
Both are questions involving the different illocutionary role of
normative/expressive sentences and their solution represents a
challenge to non-cognitivism. A positive solution to both challenges
would open a room to the rationality of non-cognitive discourse in
ethics. On the contrary, a negative one would show that the only
option for rationalism in ethics is cognitivism or — in the worst case
scenario — to irrationality and ethical nihilism.
Finally it is worth notice that while both cover a similar
perspective, the Frege-Geach problem is more popular in moral
philosophy, whereas Jorgensen's Dilemma is more popular in the
philosophy of law. It is difficult to understand the reasons for that
different interest. We can only guess that it was because the analysis
of sentences in terms of the Frege-Reichenbach model was popular among
moral philosophers while it was virtually unknown (until the works by
Alchourron and Bulygin, 1971) among philosophers of law.
6. A Taxonomy of Ethics
The following scheme is a development from R. M. Hare's A Taxonomy of
Ethical Theories (Hare, 1997, p. 42)
Descriptivism: Meanings of moral sentences are wholly determined by
syntax and truth conditions.
Naturalism: Truth conditions of moral sentences are non-moral properties.
Objectivistic naturalism: These properties are objective.
Subjective naturalism: These properties are subjective.
Intuitionism: Truth conditions of moral sentences are sui generis
moral properties.
Non-descriptivism: Meanings of moral sentences are not wholly
determined by syntax and truth conditions.
Emotivism: Moral sentences are not governed by logic.
Rationalistic non-descriptivism: Moral sentences are governed by logic.
Universal prescriptivism: The logic, which governs moral sentences, is
the logic of universal prescriptions.
Expressivism: The moral sentences are about beliefs and/or
commitments; their logic is different from the logic of descriptive
sentences.
7. References and Further Reading
Alchourrón, 1993: "Philosophical Foundations of Deontic Logic and the
Logic of Defeasible Conditionals", in Meyer e Wieringa (1993), Deontic
Logic in Computer Science, Chichester, Wiley, pp.43-84.
Alchourrón, C. E. and Bulygin, E. (1981): "The Expressive Conception
of Norms", in Hilpinen, H. (ed.) (1981), New Essays in Deontic Logic,
Dordrecht, D. Reidel, pp. 95-124
Alchourrón, C. E. and Bulygin, E. (1989): "Limits of Logic and Legal
Reasoning", in Martino, A.A. (ed.) (1989), Deontic Logic,
Computational Linguistics and Legal Information Systems, Amsterdam,
North-Holland, pp. 1-20.
Ayer, A. J. (1936): Language, Truth and Logic, London, Gollancz
Bentham, J. (1789): An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation, eds. Burns, J.H. and Hart, H.L.A., London, Athlone Press,
1970
Bentham, J. (1970): Of Laws in General, ed. Hart, H.L.A., London,
Athlone Press, 1970.
Blackburn, S. (1984): Spreading the Word, Oxford, Clarendon.
Bulygin, E. (1982): "Norms, normative propositions and legal
statements", in Floistad, G. (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy A New
Survey, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, pp. 157-163; rist. in Alchourron e
Bulygin (1991), pp. 215-238.
Geach, P. T., (1958): "Imperative and Deontic Logic", Analysis, 18, 3,
pp. 49-56.
Geach, P. (1964): "Assertion", Philosophical Review, 74, pp. 449-465
Gibbard, A. (1990): Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. A Theory of Normative
Judgement, Oxford, Clarendon Press
Hale, B., (1993): "Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?", in Haldane,
J., e Wright, C, (eds.) (1995), pp. 337-363
Hare, R. M. (1949): Imperatives Sentences, in Mind, LVIII; in Hare
(1971), pp.1-21.
Hare, R. M. (1952): The Language of Morals, Clarendon, Oxford.. Hare,
R.M. (1963): Freedom and Reason, Oxford, Oxford U.P.
Hare, R. M. (1967): "Some Alleged Differences between Imperatives and
Indicatives", in Mind, LXXVI
Hare R. M. (1982): Moral Thinkings: Its Levels, Methods and Point,
Oxford, Oxford U.P
Hare R. M. (1989): Essays in Ethical Theory, Oxford, Oxford U.P.
Hare R. M. (1997):Sorting Out Ethics, Oxford, O.U.P.
Jørgensen, J. (1937-38): "Imperatives and Logic", in Erkenntnis, 7, pp. 288-296
Kelsen, H. (1941): "The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical
Jurisprudence", in Harvard Law Review, 60, pp. 44-70
Levinson, S. C. (1983): Pragmatics. Cambridge, Cambridge U.P.
Lyons, J. (1995): Linguistic Semantics. An Introduction, Cambridge,
Cambridge U.P.
MacIntyre, A. (1957): "What Morality is Not", Philosophia, XXXII
(123), pp. 325-335.
Marcus, B. (1966): "Iterated Deontic Modalities", Mind, 75, pp. 580-582.
Reichenbach, H (1947): Elements of Symbolic Logic, New York, McMillan
Russell, B. (1935): Religion and Science, Oxford U.P.
Searle, J.R. (1969): Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of
Language, London, O.U.P.
Singer, M. (1985): "The Generalization Principle", in Potter, N.T. e
Simmons M. (eds.) Morality and Universality, Boston, Dordrecht, pp.
47-73.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1993): "Some problems for Gibbard's
norm-expressivism", Philosophical Studies, pp. 297-313.
Stevenson, C.L. (1944): Ethics and Language, New Haven, Yale U.P
Unwin, N. (1999): "Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic",
The Philosophical Quarterly, 51(202), pp.60-75
von Wright, G. H. (1963): Norm and Action. A Logical Inquiry, London,
Routledge & Kegan Paul
Warnock, M. (1978): Ethics since 1900, Oxford, Oxford U.P.,
Williams, B. A. O. (1985): Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy,
Cambridge (Mass.), Cambridge U.P.
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