can be known or communicated. It is often associated with extreme
pessimism and a radical skepticism that condemns existence. A true
nihilist would believe in nothing, have no loyalties, and no purpose
other than, perhaps, an impulse to destroy. While few philosophers
would claim to be nihilists, nihilism is most often associated with
Friedrich Nietzsche who argued that its corrosive effects would
eventually destroy all moral, religious, and metaphysical convictions
and precipitate the greatest crisis in human history. In the 20th
century, nihilistic themes–epistemological failure, value destruction,
and cosmic purposelessness–have preoccupied artists, social critics,
and philosophers. Mid-century, for example, the existentialists helped
popularize tenets of nihilism in their attempts to blunt its
destructive potential. By the end of the century, existential despair
as a response to nihilism gave way to an attitude of indifference,
often associated with antifoundationalism.
1. Origins
"Nihilism" comes from the Latin nihil, or nothing, which means not
anything, that which does not exist. It appears in the verb
"annihilate," meaning to bring to nothing, to destroy completely.
Early in the nineteenth century, Friedrich Jacobi used the word to
negatively characterize transcendental idealism. It only became
popularized, however, after its appearance in Ivan Turgenev's novel
Fathers and Sons (1862) where he used "nihilism" to describe the crude
scientism espoused by his character Bazarov who preaches a creed of
total negation.
In Russia, nihilism became identified with a loosely organized
revolutionary movement (C.1860-1917) that rejected the authority of
the state, church, and family. In his early writing, anarchist leader
Mikhael Bakunin (1814-1876) composed the notorious entreaty still
identified with nihilism: "Let us put our trust in the eternal spirit
which destroys and annihilates only because it is the unsearchable and
eternally creative source of all life–the passion for destruction is
also a creative passion!" (Reaction in Germany, 1842). The movement
advocated a social arrangement based on rationalism and materialism as
the sole source of knowledge and individual freedom as the highest
goal. By rejecting man's spiritual essence in favor of a solely
materialistic one, nihilists denounced God and religious authority as
antithetical to freedom. The movement eventually deteriorated into an
ethos of subversion, destruction, and anarchy, and by the late 1870s,
a nihilist was anyone associated with clandestine political groups
advocating terrorism and assassination.
The earliest philosophical positions associated with what could be
characterized as a nihilistic outlook are those of the Skeptics.
Because they denied the possibility of certainty, Skeptics could
denounce traditional truths as unjustifiable opinions. When
Demosthenes (c.371-322 BC), for example, observes that "What he wished
to believe, that is what each man believes" (Olynthiac), he posits the
relational nature of knowledge. Extreme skepticism, then, is linked to
epistemological nihilism which denies the possibility of knowledge and
truth; this form of nihilism is currently identified with postmodern
antifoundationalism. Nihilism, in fact, can be understood in several
different ways. Political Nihilism, as noted, is associated with the
belief that the destruction of all existing political, social, and
religious order is a prerequisite for any future improvement. Ethical
nihilism or moral nihilism rejects the possibility of absolute moral
or ethical values. Instead, good and evil are nebulous, and values
addressing such are the product of nothing more than social and
emotive pressures. Existential nihilism is the notion that life has no
intrinsic meaning or value, and it is, no doubt, the most commonly
used and understood sense of the word today.
Max Stirner's (1806-1856) attacks on systematic philosophy, his denial
of absolutes, and his rejection of abstract concepts of any kind often
places him among the first philosophical nihilists. For Stirner,
achieving individual freedom is the only law; and the state, which
necessarily imperils freedom, must be destroyed. Even beyond the
oppression of the state, though, are the constraints imposed by others
because their very existence is an obstacle compromising individual
freedom. Thus Stirner argues that existence is an endless "war of each
against all" (The Ego and its Own, trans. 1907).
2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism
Among philosophers, Friedrich Nietzsche is most often associated with
nihilism. For Nietzsche, there is no objective order or structure in
the world except what we give it. Penetrating the façades buttressing
convictions, the nihilist discovers that all values are baseless and
that reason is impotent. "Every belief, every considering
something-true," Nietzsche writes, "is necessarily false because there
is simply no true world" (Will to Power [notes from 1883-1888]). For
him, nihilism requires a radical repudiation of all imposed values and
meaning: "Nihilism is . . . not only the belief that everything
deserves to perish; but one actually puts one's shoulder to the
plough; one destroys" (Will to Power).
The caustic strength of nihilism is absolute, Nietzsche argues, and
under its withering scrutiny "the highest values devalue themselves.
The aim is lacking, and 'Why' finds no answer" (Will to Power).
Inevitably, nihilism will expose all cherished beliefs and sacrosanct
truths as symptoms of a defective Western mythos. This collapse of
meaning, relevance, and purpose will be the most destructive force in
history, constituting a total assault on reality and nothing less than
the greatest crisis of humanity:
What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe
what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of
nihilism. . . . For some time now our whole European culture has been
moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is
growing from decade to decade: restlessly, violently, headlong, like a
river that wants to reach the end. . . . (Will to Power)Since
Nietzsche's compelling critique, nihilistic themes–epistemological
failure, value destruction, and cosmic purposelessness–have
preoccupied artists, social critics, and philosophers. Convinced that
Nietzsche's analysis was accurate, for example, Oswald Spengler in The
Decline of the West (1926) studied several cultures to confirm that
patterns of nihilism were indeed a conspicuous feature of collapsing
civilizations. In each of the failed cultures he examines, Spengler
noticed that centuries-old religious, artistic, and political
traditions were weakened and finally toppled by the insidious workings
of several distinct nihilistic postures: the Faustian nihilist
"shatters the ideals"; the Apollinian nihilist "watches them crumble
before his eyes"; and the Indian nihilist "withdraws from their
presence into himself." Withdrawal, for instance, often identified
with the negation of reality and resignation advocated by Eastern
religions, is in the West associated with various versions of
epicureanism and stoicism. In his study, Spengler concludes that
Western civilization is already in the advanced stages of decay with
all three forms of nihilism working to undermine epistemological
authority and ontological grounding.
In 1927, Martin Heidegger, to cite another example, observed that
nihilism in various and hidden forms was already "the normal state of
man" (The Question of Being). Other philosophers' predictions about
nihilism's impact have been dire. Outlining the symptoms of nihilism
in the 20th century, Helmut Thielicke wrote that "Nihilism literally
has only one truth to declare, namely, that ultimately Nothingness
prevails and the world is meaningless" (Nihilism: Its Origin and
Nature, with a Christian Answer, 1969). From the nihilist's
perspective, one can conclude that life is completely amoral, a
conclusion, Thielicke believes, that motivates such monstrosities as
the Nazi reign of terror. Gloomy predictions of nihilism's impact are
also charted in Eugene Rose's Nihilism: The Root of the Revolution of
the Modern Age (1994). If nihilism proves victorious–and it's well on
its way, he argues–our world will become "a cold, inhuman world" where
"nothingness, incoherence, and absurdity" will triumph.
3. Existential Nihilism
While nihilism is often discussed in terms of extreme skepticism and
relativism, for most of the 20th century it has been associated with
the belief that life is meaningless. Existential nihilism begins with
the notion that the world is without meaning or purpose. Given this
circumstance, existence itself–all action, suffering, and feeling–is
ultimately senseless and empty.
In The Dark Side: Thoughts on the Futility of Life (1994), Alan Pratt
demonstrates that existential nihilism, in one form or another, has
been a part of the Western intellectual tradition from the beginning.
The Skeptic Empedocles' observation that "the life of mortals is so
mean a thing as to be virtually un-life," for instance, embodies the
same kind of extreme pessimism associated with existential nihilism.
In antiquity, such profound pessimism may have reached its apex with
Hegesis. Because miseries vastly outnumber pleasures, happiness is
impossible, the philosopher argues, and subsequently advocates
suicide. Centuries later during the Renaissance, William Shakespeare
eloquently summarized the existential nihilist's perspective when, in
this famous passage near the end of Macbeth, he has Macbeth pour out
his disgust for life:
Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more; it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.
In the twentieth century, it's the atheistic existentialist movement,
popularized in France in the 1940s and 50s, that is responsible for
the currency of existential nihilism in the popular consciousness.
Jean-Paul Sartre's (1905-1980) defining preposition for the movement,
"existence precedes essence," rules out any ground or foundation for
establishing an essential self or a human nature. When we abandon
illusions, life is revealed as nothing; and for the existentialists,
nothingness is the source of not only absolute freedom but also
existential horror and emotional anguish. Nothingness reveals each
individual as an isolated being "thrown" into an alien and
unresponsive universe, barred forever from knowing why yet required to
invent meaning. It's a situation that's nothing short of absurd.
Writing from the enlightened perspective of the absurd, Albert Camus
(1913-1960) observed that Sisyphus' plight, condemned to eternal,
useless struggle, was a superb metaphor for human existence (The Myth
of Sisyphus, 1942).
The common thread in the literature of the existentialists is coping
with the emotional anguish arising from our confrontation with
nothingness, and they expended great energy responding to the question
of whether surviving it was possible. Their answer was a qualified
"Yes," advocating a formula of passionate commitment and impassive
stoicism. In retrospect, it was an anecdote tinged with desperation
because in an absurd world there are absolutely no guidelines, and any
course of action is problematic. Passionate commitment, be it to
conquest, creation, or whatever, is itself meaningless. Enter
nihilism.
Camus, like the other existentialists, was convinced that nihilism was
the most vexing problem of the twentieth century. Although he argues
passionately that individuals could endure its corrosive effects, his
most famous works betray the extraordinary difficulty he faced
building a convincing case. In The Stranger (1942), for example,
Meursault has rejected the existential suppositions on which the
uninitiated and weak rely. Just moments before his execution for a
gratuitous murder, he discovers that life alone is reason enough for
living, a raison d'être, however, that in context seems scarcely
convincing. In Caligula (1944), the mad emperor tries to escape the
human predicament by dehumanizing himself with acts of senseless
violence, fails, and surreptitiously arranges his own assassination.
The Plague (1947) shows the futility of doing one's best in an absurd
world. And in his last novel, the short and sardonic, The Fall (1956),
Camus posits that everyone has bloody hands because we are all
responsible for making a sorry state worse by our inane action and
inaction alike. In these works and other works by the existentialists,
one is often left with the impression that living authentically with
the meaninglessness of life is impossible.
Camus was fully aware of the pitfalls of defining existence without
meaning, and in his philosophical essay The Rebel (1951) he faces the
problem of nihilism head-on. In it, he describes at length how
metaphysical collapse often ends in total negation and the victory of
nihilism, characterized by profound hatred, pathological destruction,
and incalculable violence and death.
4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism
By the late 20th century, "nihilism" had assumed two different castes.
In one form, "nihilist" is used to characterize the postmodern man, a
dehumanized conformist, alienated, indifferent, and baffled, directing
psychological energy into hedonistic narcissism or into a deep
ressentiment that often explodes in violence. This perspective is
derived from the existentialists' reflections on nihilism stripped of
any hopeful expectations, leaving only the experience of sickness,
decay, and disintegration.
In his study of meaninglessness, Donald Crosby writes that the source
of modern nihilism paradoxically stems from a commitment to honest
intellectual openness. "Once set in motion, the process of questioning
could come to but one end, the erosion of conviction and certitude and
collapse into despair" (The Specter of the Absurd, 1988). When sincere
inquiry is extended to moral convictions and social consensus, it can
prove deadly, Crosby continues, promoting forces that ultimately
destroy civilizations. Michael Novak's recently revised The Experience
of Nothingness (1968, 1998) tells a similar story. Both studies are
responses to the existentialists' gloomy findings from earlier in the
century. And both optimistically discuss ways out of the abyss by
focusing of the positive implications nothingness reveals, such as
liberty, freedom, and creative possibilities. Novak, for example,
describes how since WWII we have been working to "climb out of
nihilism" on the way to building a new civilization.
In contrast to the efforts to overcome nihilism noted above is the
uniquely postmodern response associated with the current
antifoundationalists. The philosophical, ethical, and intellectual
crisis of nihilism that has tormented modern philosophers for over a
century has given way to mild annoyance or, more interestingly, an
upbeat acceptance of meaninglessness.
French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard characterizes postmodernism
as an "incredulity toward metanarratives," those all-embracing
foundations that we have relied on to make sense of the world. This
extreme skepticism has undermined intellectual and moral hierarchies
and made "truth" claims, transcendental or transcultural, problematic.
Postmodern antifoundationalists, paradoxically grounded in relativism,
dismiss knowledge as relational and "truth" as transitory, genuine
only until something more palatable replaces it (reminiscent of
William James' notion of "cash value"). The critic Jacques Derrida,
for example, asserts that one can never be sure that what one knows
corresponds with what is. Since human beings participate in only an
infinitesimal part of the whole, they are unable to grasp anything
with certainty, and absolutes are merely "fictional forms."
American antifoundationalist Richard Rorty makes a similar point:
"Nothing grounds our practices, nothing legitimizes them, nothing
shows them to be in touch with the way things are" ("From Logic to
Language to Play," 1986). This epistemological cul-de-sac, Rorty
concludes, leads inevitably to nihilism. "Faced with the nonhuman, the
nonlinguistic, we no longer have the ability to overcome contingency
and pain by appropriation and transformation, but only the ability to
recognize contingency and pain" (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity,
1989). In contrast to Nietzsche's fears and the angst of the
existentialists, nihilism becomes for the antifoundationalists just
another aspect of our contemporary milieu, one best endured with
sang-froid.
In The Banalization of Nihilism (1992) Karen Carr discusses the
antifoundationalist response to nihilism. Although it still inflames a
paralyzing relativism and subverts critical tools, "cheerful nihilism"
carries the day, she notes, distinguished by an easy-going acceptance
of meaninglessness. Such a development, Carr concludes, is alarming.
If we accept that all perspectives are equally non-binding, then
intellectual or moral arrogance will determine which perspective has
precedence. Worse still, the banalization of nihilism creates an
environment where ideas can be imposed forcibly with little
resistance, raw power alone determining intellectual and moral
hierarchies. It's a conclusion that dovetails nicely with Nietzsche's,
who pointed out that all interpretations of the world are simply
manifestations of will-to-power.
5. Conclusion
It has been over a century now since Nietzsche explored nihilism and
its implications for civilization. As he predicted, nihilism's impact
on the culture and values of the 20th century has been pervasive, its
apocalyptic tenor spawning a mood of gloom and a good deal of anxiety,
anger, and terror. Interestingly, Nietzsche himself, a radical skeptic
preoccupied with language, knowledge, and truth, anticipated many of
the themes of postmodernity. It's helpful to note, then, that he
believed we could–at a terrible price–eventually work through
nihilism. If we survived the process of destroying all interpretations
of the world, we could then perhaps discover the correct course for
humankind:
I praise, I do not reproach, [nihilism's] arrival. I believe it is one
of the greatest crises, a moment of the deepest self-reflection of
humanity. Whether man recovers from it, whether he becomes master of
this crisis, is a question of his strength. It is possible. . . .
(Complete Works Vol. 13)
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