of belief by relying on premises that are themselves based on the
source. It is a widely shared intuition that there is something wrong
with epistemically circular arguments.
William Alston, who first used the term in this sense, argues
plausibly that there is no way to know or to be justified in believing
that our basic sources of belief–such as perception, introspection,
intuitive reason, memory and reasoning–are reliable except by using
such epistemically circular arguments. And many contemporary accounts
of knowledge and justification allow our gaining knowledge and
justified beliefs by relying on such arguments. Indeed, any account
that accepts that a belief source can deliver knowledge (or justified
beliefs) prior to one's knowing (or believing justifiably) that the
source is reliable allows this. It allows our knowing the premises of
an epistemically circular argument without already knowing the
conclusion, and using the argument for attaining knowledge of the
conclusion. Still, we have the intuition that any such account makes
knowledge too easy.
In order to avoid too easy knowledge via epistemic circularity, we
need to assume that a source can yield knowledge only if we first know
that it is reliable. However, this assumption leads to the ancient
problem of the criterion and the danger of landing in radical
skepticism. Skepticism could be avoided if our knowledge about
reliability were basic or noninferential. It could also be avoided if
we had some sort of "non-evidential" entitlement to taking our sources
to be reliable. Both options are problematic.
One might think that we have to allow easy knowledge and some
epistemic circularity because it is the only way to avoid skepticism.
If we do so, however, we still need to explain what is then wrong with
other epistemically circular arguments. One possible explanation is
that they fail to be dialectically effective. You cannot rationally
convince someone who doubts the conclusion of the epistemically
circular argument, because such a person also doubts the premises.
Another possible explanation is that such arguments fail to defeat a
reliability defeater: if you have a reason to believe that one of your
sources of belief is unreliable, you have a defeater for all beliefs
based on the source. You cannot defeat this defeater and regain
justification for these beliefs by means of epistemically circular
arguments. Yet, there are still disturbing cases in which you do not
doubt the reliability of a source; you are just ignorant of it. The
present account allows your gaining knowledge about the reliability of
the source too easily.
Thus there seems to be no completely satisfactory solution to the
problem of epistemic circularity. This suggests that the ancient
problem of the criterion is a genuine skeptical paradox.
1. Alston on Epistemic Circularity
When Descartes tried to show that clear and distinct perceptions are
true by relying on premises that are themselves based on clear and
distinct perceptions, he was quickly made aware that there was
something viciously circular in his attempt. It seems that we cannot
use reason to show that reason is reliable. Thomas Reid [1710-1796]
(1983, 276) pointed out that such an attempt would be as ridiculous as
trying to determine a man's honesty by asking the man himself whether
he was honest or not. Such a procedure is completely useless. Whether
he were honest or not, he would of course say that he was. All
attempts to show that any of our sources of belief is reliable by
trusting its own verdict of its reliability would be similarly
useless.
The most detailed characterization of this sort of circularity in
recent literature is given by William Alston (1989; 1991; 1993), who
calls it "epistemic circularity." He argues that there is no way to
show that any of our basic sources of belief–such as perception,
intuitive reason, introspection, memory or reasoning–is reliable
without falling into epistemic circularity: there is no way to show
that such a source is reliable without relying at some point or
another on premises that are themselves derived from that source. Thus
we cannot have any noncircular reasons for supposing that the sources
on which we base our beliefs are reliable. What kind of circularity is
this?
Alston (1989; 1993, 12-15) takes sense perception as an example. If we
wish to show that sense perception is reliable, the simplest and most
fundamental way is to use a track-record argument. We collect a
suitable sample of beliefs that are based on sense perception and take
the proportion of truths in the sample as an estimation of the
reliability of that source of belief. We rely on the following
inductive argument:
At t1, S1 formed the perceptual belief that p1, and p1 is true.
At t2, S2 formed the perceptual belief that p2, and p2 is true.
.
.
.
At tn, Sn formed the perceptual belief that pn, and pn is true.
Therefore, sense perception is a reliable source of belief.
How are we to determine whether the particular perceptual beliefs
mentioned in the premises are true? The only way seems to be to form
further perceptual beliefs. Thus the premises of the track-record
argument for the reliability of sense perception are themselves based
on sense perception. The kind of circularity involved in this argument
is not logical circularity because the conclusion that sense
perception is reliable is not used as one of the premises.
Nevertheless, we cannot consider ourselves justified in accepting the
premises unless we assume that sense perception is reliable. Since
this kind of circularity involves commitment to the conclusion as a
presupposition of our supposing ourselves to be justified in accepting
the premises, Alston calls it epistemic circularity.
Epistemic circularity is thus not a feature of the argument as such.
It relates to our attempt to use the argument to justify the
conclusion or to arrive at a justified belief by reasoning from the
premises to the conclusion. In order to succeed, such attempts require
that we be justified in accepting the premises. According to Alston,
we cannot suppose ourselves to be justified in holding the premises
unless we somehow assume the conclusion. He explains our commitment to
the conclusion dialectically: "If one were to challenge our premises
and continue the challenge long enough, we would eventually be driven
to appeal to the reliability of sense perception in defending our
right to those premises.¨ (1993, 15)
Surprisingly, Alston (1989; 1993, 16) argues that epistemic
circularity does not prevent our using an epistemically circular
argument to show that sense perception is reliable or to justify the
claim that it is. Neither does it prevent our being justified in
believing or even knowing that sense perception is reliable. This is
so if there are no higher-level requirements for justification and
knowledge, such as the requirement that we be justified in believing
that sense perception is reliable. If we can have justified perceptual
beliefs without already being justified in believing that sense
perception is reliable, we can be justified in accepting the premises
of the track-record argument and using it for attaining justification
for the conclusion.
Alston does not suggest that there are higher-level requirements for
knowledge and justification. His account of justification is a form of
generic reliabilism that do not make such requirements. According to
such reliabilism,
S's belief that p is justified if and only if it has a
sufficiently reliable causal source.
If reliabilism is true, we can very well be justified in believing the
premises of the track-record argument without being justified in
believing the conclusion. It merely requires that the conclusion be,
in fact, true. If sense perception is reliable along with other
relevant sources–such as introspection and inductive reasoning–we can
be justified in accepting the premises and thus arrive at a justified
belief in the conclusion by reasoning inductively from the premises.
Moreover, nothing prevents our coming to know the conclusion by means
of such reasoning.
What, then, is wrong with epistemically circular arguments? This is
what Alston states:
Epistemic circularity does not in and of itself disqualify the
argument. But even granting this point, the argument will not do its
job unless we are justified in accepting its premises; and that is the
case only if sense perception is in fact reliable. This is to offer a
stone instead of bread. We can say the same of any belief-forming
practice whatever, no matter how disreputable. We can just as well say
of crystal ball gazing that if it is reliable, we can use a
track-record argument to show that it is reliable. But when we ask
whether one or another source of belief is reliable, we are interested
in discriminating those that can be reasonably trusted from those that
cannot. Hence merely showing that if a given source is reliable it can
be shown by its record to be reliable, does nothing to indicate that
the source belongs to the sheep rather that with the goats. (1993, 17)
This is puzzling. Earlier Alston grants that, assuming reliabilism, we
can use an epistemically circular track-record argument to show that
sense perception is reliable. Now he is suggesting that such an
argument shows at most the conditional conclusion that if a given
source is reliable it can be shown by its record to be reliable. This
seems merely to contradict the point he already granted.
We can make sense of this if we distinguish between two kinds of
showing. When Alston talks about showing he usually has in mind
something we could call "epistemic showing." Showing in this sense
requires a good argument with justified premises. If we have such an
epistemically circular argument for the reliability of sense
perception, we can show the categorical conclusion that sense
perception is reliable. Assuming that reliabilism is true and that
sense perception, introspection and induction are reliable processes,
the premises of the track-record argument are surely justified, and
the justification of the premises is transmitted to the conclusion. If
this is all that is required for showing, then epistemic circularity
does not disqualify the argument.
There is another sense of showing, that of "dialectical showing."
Showing in this sense is relative to an audience, and it requires that
we have an argument that our audience takes to be sound, otherwise we
would be unable to rationally convince it. If we assume that our
audience is skeptical about the reliability of sense perception, it is
clear that we cannot convince such an audience with an epistemically
circular argument. This is so because the audience would also be
skeptical about the truth of the premises. Assuming that our audience
is skeptical only about perception and not about introspection and
induction, we can only show to such an audience Alston's hypothetical
conclusion: if sense perception is reliable, we can show–in the
epistemic sense–that it is.
Whether this is what Alston has in mind or not, it is one possible
diagnosis of the failure of epistemically circular arguments. Although
they may provide justification for our reliability beliefs, they are
unable to rationally remove doubts about reliability. They are not
dialectically effective against the skeptic.
2. Epistemic Failure
The problem of epistemic circularity derives from our intuition that
there is something wrong with it. Many philosophers have expressed
doubts that this intuition is completely explained by dialectical
considerations. The fault seems to be epistemic rather than just
dialectical. Richard Fumerton (1995) and Jonathan Vogel (2000) argue
that we cannot gain knowledge and justified beliefs by means of
epistemically circular reasoning. They conclude that any account of
knowledge or justification that allows this must be mistaken. Their
target is reliabilism in particular. Fumerton writes:
You cannot use perception to justify the reliability of
perception! You cannot use memory to justify the reliability of
memory! You cannot use induction to justify the reliability of
induction! Such attempts to respond to the skeptic's concerns involve
blatant, indeed pathetic, circularity. Frankly, this does seem right
to me and I hope it seems right to you, but if it does, then I suggest
you have a powerful reason to conclude that externalism is false.
(1995, 177)
If the mere reliability of a process is sufficient for giving us
justification, as reliabilism entails, then we can use it to obtain a
justified belief even about its own reliability. According to
Fumerton, this counterintuitive result shows that reliabilism is
false.
Vogel (2000, 613-623) gives the example of Roxanne, who has a car with
a highly reliable gas gauge and who believes implicitly what the gas
gauge indicates, without knowing that it is reliable. In order to gain
knowledge about the reliability of the gauge, she undertakes the
following procedure. She looks at the gauge often and forms a belief
not only about how much gas there is in the tank, but also about the
reading of the gauge. For example, when the gauge reads 'F', she
believes both that the gauge reads 'F' and that the tank is full. She
combines these beliefs into the belief:
(1) On this occasion, the gauge reads 'F' and the tank is F.
Surely, the perceptual process by which Roxanne forms her belief about
the reading of the gauge is reliable, but so is, by hypothesis, the
process through which she reaches the belief that the tank is full.
Roxanne's belief in (1) is thus the result of a reliable process. She
then repeats this process on several occasions and forms beliefs of
the form:
(2) On this occasion, the gauge reads 'X' and the tank is X.
From a representative set of such beliefs, she concludes inductively that:
(3) The gauge is reliable.
Because induction is also a reliable process, the whole process by
which Roxanne reaches her conclusion is reliable. Thus reliabilism
allows that in this way she gains knowledge that the gauge is
reliable.
Vogel assumes that this process, which he calls bootstrapping, is
illegitimate and concludes that reliabilism goes wrong in improperly
ratifying bootstrapping as a way of gaining knowledge.
We have an intuition that there is something wrong with this sort of
epistemically circular reasoning. Here, it is difficult to explain the
intuition in terms of some sort of dialectical failure because there
is nobody who is questioning the reliability of the gauge and who
needs to be convinced about the matter. It is merely assumed that
Roxanne did not originally know that it was reliable. It follows from
reliabilism that she can gain this knowledge by this sort of
bootstrapping, which is contrary to our intuitions.
3. Easy Knowledge and the KR Principle
Epistemic circularity is not only a problem for reliabilism. As Alston
pointed out, any epistemological theory that does not set higher-level
requirements for knowledge or justified belief is bound to allow
epistemic circularity. The problem is that such a theory makes
knowledge and justified belief about reliability intuitively too easy.
Stewart Cohen (2002) argues that any theory that rejects the following
principle allows knowledge about reliability too easily:
KR: A potential knowledge source K can yield knowledge for S, only
if S knows K is reliable.
Theories that reject this KR principle allow that a belief source can
deliver knowledge prior to one's knowing that the source is reliable.
Cohen calls such knowledge "basic" knowledge. (Note that he uses the
phrase in a nonstandard way.) Theories that allow for basic knowledge
can appeal to our basic knowledge in order to explain how we know that
our belief sources are reliable:
According to such views, we first acquire a rich stock of basic
knowledge about the world. Such knowledge, once obtained, enables us
to learn how we are situated in the world, and so to learn, among
other things, that our belief sources are reliable. (2002, 310)
In obtaining such knowledge of reliability we reason in a way that is
epistemically circular. The problem is that we gain knowledge too
easily.
It is not only reliabilism that rejects the KR principle: there are
other currently popular theories that do so. For example,
evidentialism makes knowledge a function of evidence. An evidentialist
who denies the KR principle allows that one can know that p on the
basis of evidence E without knowing that E is a reliable indication of
the truth of p. Such evidentialism allows our gaining knowledge of
reliability through epistemically circular reasoning.
However, the principle does not seem to be strong enough because even
some theories that accept it do not avoid epistemic circularity, and
thus make knowledge too easy. The KR principle, as Cohen formulates
it, does not make any requirements about epistemic order. It does not
require in particular that knowledge about the reliability of source K
be prior to (or independent of) knowledge based on K. It allows that
we gain both kinds of knowledge simultaneously.
4. Coherence and Reflective Knowledge
According to holistic coherentism, knowledge is generated
simultaneously in the whole system of beliefs once a sufficient degree
of coherence is achieved. It is clear that meta-level beliefs about
the sources of belief and their reliability can increase the coherence
of the whole system of beliefs. So coherentism that requires such a
meta-level perspective into the reliability of the sources of belief
satisfies the KR principle: I can know that p only if I also know that
the source of my belief that p is reliable.
However, as James Van Cleve (2003, 55-57) points out, coherentism does
not avoid the problem of easy knowledge. It allows that we gain
knowledge through epistemically circular reasoning. The steps by which
we gain such knowledge may be exactly the same as in the
foundationalist version. The only difference is that when, according
to foundationalism, knowledge is first generated in the premises and
then transmitted to the conclusion, coherentism makes it appear
simultaneously in the premises and in the conclusion. The fact that
knowledge is not generated in the premises until the conclusion is
reached does not make it less easy to attain knowledge.
Ernest Sosa (1997) suggests that we can resolve the problems of
circularity by his distinction between animal knowledge and reflective
knowledge, but as both Cohen (2002, 326) and Van Cleve (2003, 57)
point out, Sosa's account allows knowledge about reliability too
easily. Animal knowledge is knowledge as it is understood in simple
reliabilism: it requires just a true and reliably formed belief. So it
does not satisfy the KR principle and allows easy knowledge. We can
attain animal knowledge about the reliability of a source through
epistemically circular reasoning.
Sosa's point is that reflective knowledge satisfies the principle. In
addition to animal knowledge, it requires a coherent system of beliefs
that includes an epistemic perspective into the reliability of the
sources of belief. So a source delivers reflective knowledge for me
only if I know that the source is reliable, yet it is still true that
the epistemically circular track-record argument provides all the
ingredients needed for such reflective knowledge. I attain animal
knowledge about the reliability of perception by reasoning from my
animal knowledge about the truth of particular perceptual beliefs.
Once I have attained this knowledge, my system of beliefs also
achieves a sufficient degree of coherence that transfers my animal
knowledge into reflective knowledge. All this happens still too
easily. It happens in fact as easily as before. The only difference is
the points at which different sorts of knowledge are attained. The
reasoning itself is exactly the same.
It seems that we can avoid allowing easy knowledge only by
strengthening the KR principle. It must require that knowledge of the
reliability of source K be prior to knowledge based on K. We must know
that the source is reliable independently of any knowledge based on
the source. The problem with coherentism and Sosa's account is that
they reject this strengthened KR principle, and this is why they make
knowledge too easy.
5. The Problem of the Criterion
By affirming the strengthened KR principle we avoid the easy-knowledge
problem but are in danger of falling into skepticism. The strengthened
principle leads to the ancient problem of the criterion.
Ancient Pyrrhonian skeptics were puzzled about the disagreements that
prevailed about any object of inquiry. They insisted that, in order to
resolve these disagreements and to attain any knowledge, we need
criteria that distinguish beliefs that are true from those that are
false. However, there are also disagreements about the right criteria
of truth. In order to resolve these disagreements and to know what the
right criteria are, we need to know already which beliefs are true–the
ones the criteria are supposed to pick out. We are thus caught in a
circle.
If we understand the right criteria of truth as reliable sources of
belief–sources that mostly produce true beliefs–we arrive at the
following formulation of the problem of the criterion:
(1) We can know that a belief based on source K is true only if we
first know that K is reliable.
(2) We can know that K is reliable only if we first know that some
beliefs based on source K are true.
Assumption (1) is a formulation of the strengthened KR principle.
Together with assumption (2), it leads to skepticism: we cannot know
which sources are reliable nor which beliefs are true. To be sure, (2)
does not require us to know that beliefs based on K are true through K
itself; we can rely on some other source. However, (1) posits that
this other source can deliver knowledge only if we first know that it
is reliable, and (2) that, in order to know this, we need to know that
some beliefs based on it are true. In order to know this, in turn, we
once again have to rely on some third source, and so on. Because we
cannot have an infinite number of sources, sooner or later we have to
rely on sources already relied on at some earlier point. We are thus
reasoning in a circle, and circular reasoning is unable to provide
knowledge.
The circle we are caught in is not epistemic. It is a
straightforwardly logical circle. It is clear that a logical circle
does not produce knowledge. Such a circle is nowhere connected to
reality. Thus in trying to avoid epistemic circularity, we are caught
in a more clearly vicious circle–a logical circle.
It is natural to think that epistemic circularity is the lesser evil.
If we only have the alternatives of making knowledge too easy or
impossible, most philosophers would surely choose the former. This may
be the motivation behind currently popular reliabilist and
evidentialist epistemologies that deny higher-level requirements for
knowledge, but are these really our only options? Could we not reject
assumption (2) instead of (1)?
6. Basic Reliability Knowledge
One might concede that a source can give us knowledge only if we first
know that it is reliable, but still deny that this knowledge of
reliability must in turn be inferred from some other knowledge. One
might insist instead that our knowledge about our own reliability is
basic or noninferential. This would break the skeptic's circle.
Thomas Reid (1983, 275) seems to be the traditional advocate of this
position. He takes it as a first principle that our cognitive
faculties are reliable. He states that first principles are
self-evident: we know them directly without deriving them from some
other truths (257). How is it possible to know directly a
generalization that is only contingently true? It may be easy to see
how we can directly know a generalization, such as "All triangles have
three angles," which is a necessary truth: we can simply see its truth
through a priori intuition. However, we cannot simply see that our
faculties are reliable. The faculty of a priori reason does not give
us knowledge of contingent generalizations.
Reid (259-260) posits that there is a special faculty for knowing the
first principles, which he calls common sense. Thus, common sense
tells us that our faculties are reliable. However, it cannot give us
knowledge unless we first know that it is reliable. How can we know
this? The only available answer seems to be that we also know this
through common sense. (Bergmann 2004, 722-724) There is a serious
problem if we assume the skeptic's strengthened KR principle. This
entails that we can know that common sense is reliable only if we
first know that it is reliable. We must know it before we know it,
which is impossible. We avoid this result if we go back to Cohen's
original KR principle (Van Cleve, 2003, 50-52), but then we face
epistemic circularity once again.
According to the Reidian view, knowledge about the reliability of our
faculties is basic, and the source of it is common sense. However,
common sense delivers this knowledge only if it is itself known to be
reliable. If we accept Cohen's original KR principle and deny the
skeptic's requirement that this knowledge be prior to other knowledge
delivered by common sense, we allow that common sense delivers
simultaneously basic knowledge about the reliability of our faculties
and about the reliability of common sense itself. This is a coherent
position.
However, this Reidian view allows one kind of epistemic circularity.
Although it is not quite the same kind as in the track-record
argument, it allows that we can know that a faculty is reliable by
using that very same faculty. The only difference is that this is
basic knowledge and not knowledge based on reasoning. It seems that
this view makes knowledge about reliability even easier than before.
If we wanted to determine whether to trust a guru, we could construct
an inductive argument based on the premises about the truth of what he
says and leading to the conclusion that he is reliable. If our belief
in the premises is itself based on what he tells us, our argument is
epistemically circular. It seems that this cannot be a way of gaining
knowledge about his reliability in that it would be intuitively too
easy. It would be even easier to base our belief in his reliability on
his simply saying that he is reliable. If we cannot gain knowledge
through epistemically circular reasoning, how could we gain it by
taking this more direct route?
7. Wittgenstein, Entitlement and Practical Rationality
Let us grant that we somehow presuppose the reliability of our sources
of belief when we form and evaluate beliefs. What kind of normative
status do these presuppositions have if they cannot have the status of
basic knowledge? Many philosophers have been inspired by
Wittgenstein's last notebooks published as On Certainty (1969, §§
341-343):
K the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact
that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like
hinges on which they turn.
That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific
investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted.
But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't
investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest
content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must
stay put.
The idea is that in every context of inquiry there are certain
propositions that are not and cannot be doubted. They are the hinges
that must stay put if we are to conduct inquiry at all. According to
Wittgenstein, these hinge propositions cannot be justified, neither
can we know them. They are the presuppositions that make justification
and knowledge possible.
Wittgenstein (§§ 163, 337) suggests that such hinge propositions
include propositions about the reliability of our sources of belief.
This explains why we cannot gain knowledge about reliability through
epistemically circular reasoning, because we cannot have such
knowledge at all. Wittgenstein may have thought so because he took
hinge "propositions¨ to have no factual content and thus to be neither
true nor false. Thus our concepts of knowledge and justification would
not apply to them. However, this view is not very intuitive. Surely
the sentence "Sense perception is reliable" appears to express a
genuine proposition that is either true or false. If it does express
such a proposition, we can have doxastic attitudes to the proposition,
and these attitudes can be evaluated epistemically.
Crispin Wright (2004) follows Wittgenstein but takes hinge
propositions to be genuine propositions that are epistemically
evaluable. He provides an account of the structure of justification
that explains why the justification of the premises in certain valid
arguments does not transmit to the conclusion. Although the
epistemically circular track-record argument is an inductive argument,
the same account explains the transmission failure here.
According to Wright's account, we cannot be justified in accepting the
premises of Alston's track-record argument unless we are already
justified in accepting the conclusion that sense perception is
reliable. This is why the justification we may have for the premises
does not transmit to the conclusion: it presupposes a prior
justification for the conclusion. Thus Wright accepts a version of the
skeptic's strengthened KR principle, which effectively blocks
epistemically circular reasoning.
He then tries to avoid skepticism by distinguishing between ordinary
evidential justification and non-evidential justification he calls
"entitlement." In order to form justified perceptual beliefs, we must
already be entitled to take it for granted that sense perception is
reliable. However, because this entitlement is a kind of unearned
justification that requires no evidential work, we can break the
skeptic's circle.
Wright's entitlement is not based on sources of justification, such as
perception, introspection, memory or reasoning. We get it by default,
which is why the KR principle does not apply to it. Thus it avoids the
problem of the Reidian account.
Unfortunately, it has its own problems. One of these concerns the
nature of entitlement. According to Wright, it is a kind of rational
entitlement, but what kind is it? This is how he comments on certain
of Wittgenstein's passages:
I take Wittgenstein's point in these admittedly not unequivocal
passages to be that this is essential: one cannot but take certain
such things for granted. (2004, 189)
This line of reply concedes that the best sceptical arguments have
something to teach us–that the limits of justification they bring out
are genuine and essential–but then replies that, just for that reason,
cognitive achievement must be reckoned to take place within such
limits. The attempt to surpass them would result not in an increase in
rigour or solidity but merely in cognitive paralysis. (2004, 191)
Wright argues here that we cannot but take certain things for granted.
In order to engage in inquiry and to form justified beliefs, one must
accept certain presuppositions. Refusing to do that would mean
cognitive paralysis. As Duncan Pritchard (2005) comments, this seems
to be a defense of the practical rationality of assuming that the
sources of one's beliefs are reliable. Nothing is said for the truth
of those presuppositions or of the epistemic rationality of accepting
them.
Alston defends more explicitly the practical rationality of taking our
sources of belief to be reliable:
In the nature of the case, there is no appeal beyond the practices
we find ourselves firmly committed to, psychologically and socially.
We cannot look into any issue whatever without employing some way of
forming and evaluating beliefs; that applies as much to issues
concerning the reliability of doxastic practices as to any others.
Hence there is no alternative to employing the practices we find to be
firmly rooted in our lives, practices we could abandon or replace only
with extreme difficulty if at all. (1993, 125)
Alston adds that the suspension of all belief is not an option, and
that there is no reason to substitute our firmly established doxastic
practices for some new ones because neither would there be any
noncircular defense of these new practices. Alston makes it quite
clear that this is a defense of the practical rationality of engaging
in firmly established practices and taking them to be reliable.
However, this defense of the practical rationality of taking our
sources of belief to be reliable does not contradict skepticism. In
posing the problem of the criterion, the skeptic is not denying the
practical rationality of our using the practices that we in fact use.
What he or she is denying is the epistemic rationality or
justification of the beliefs produced by them. That it would be
practically rational for us to assume that the practices are reliable
and that they therefore produce justified beliefs is not something the
skeptic would deny.
Alston (2005, 240-242) has since rejected this practical validation
argument for our sources of belief and settled for a simpler form of
Wittgensteinian contextualism. Now he does not tell what kind of
entitlement we have to the hinge propositions about the reliability of
our sources. Perhaps there is no entitlement, and we just have to
blindly trust in their reliability. How, then, does this differ from
skepticism?
Curiously enough, neither Wright nor Alston really avoid the allowing
of epistemic circularity. Alston even underlines the fact that
epistemically circular arguments can produce justification for our
beliefs about reliability. His point seems to be that whether this in
fact happens is something that we can have only practical reasons for
assuming, which does not really explain what is wrong with these
arguments.
According to Wright, the justification of the premises does not
transmit to the conclusion if it requires that we already be
independently justified in accepting the conclusion. However, because
this independent justification is a different sort of non-evidential
justification–entitlement–it is unclear why the argument fails in
transmitting evidential justification. Assuming that the entitlements
are already in place–that we are entitled to take introspection, sense
perception and inductive reasoning to be reliable–nothing prevents our
also gaining evidential justification for the conclusion that sense
perception is reliable. At least nothing in Wright's account does so.
Thus the appeal to default entitlement or practical rationality does
not solve our problem: it does not avoid epistemic circularity. At the
same time, it may be too concessive to skepticism.
8. Sensitivity
It is possible to reject the KR principle without allowing epistemic
circularity. One might simply deny–as Wittgenstein does–that we have
any knowledge about our own reliability. One could defend this view–as
Wittgenstein does not do–on the basis of the sensitivity condition of
knowledge. Analyses of knowledge as defended by Fred Dretske (1971)
and Robert Nozick (1981) set the following necessary condition for S's
knowing that p:
Sensitivity: if it were not true that p, S would not believe that p.
According to Cohen (2002, 316), our beliefs about the reliability of
our sources of belief do not satisfy this condition. Assume that we
form a belief in the reliability of sense perception on the basis of
epistemically circular reasoning. According to the sensitivity
condition, we cannot know on this basis that sense perception is
reliable if we believed on this basis that it is reliable even if it
were not reliable. It seems that this is exactly what is wrong with
such arguments: they would cause us to believe that a source is
reliable even if it were not. A guru would tell us that he is reliable
even if he were not.
The sensitivity condition concerns the possible worlds in which our
belief is false but which are otherwise closest to the actual world.
Alvin Goldman (1999, 86) suggests that the relevant alternative to the
hypothesis that visual perception is reliable is that visual
perception is randomly unreliable. If this is the case in the closest
possible worlds in which our belief in the reliability of visual
perception is false, it may be that we can, after all, know that
visual perception is reliable, because in these worlds it would
produce a massive amount of inconsistent beliefs, and therefore we
would not believe that it is reliable. So, are the worlds in which
visual perception is randomly unreliable the closest unreliability
worlds? It may be rather that the closest worlds are those in which
visual perception is systematically unreliable, and in these worlds we
believe that it is reliable. If this is the case, the sensitivity
accounts explain very well the intuition that we cannot gain knowledge
through epistemically circular reasoning.
Sensitivity accounts of knowledge have not been popular in recent
years because they deny the intuitively plausible principle that
knowledge is closed under known logical implication. However, as Cohen
(2002) has shown, this principle has counterintuitive consequences as
does the denial of the KR principle. It allows cases in which we gain
knowledge too easily, and perhaps we should therefore accept a
sensitivity account that can handle both problems at once. However, a
more serious problem is that there are cases of inductive knowledge
that do not satisfy the sensitivity condition (Vogel, 1987).
9. Dialectical Ineffectiveness and the Inability to Defeat Defeaters
Arguments are dialectical creatures, so it is natural to evaluate them
in terms of their dialectical effectiveness. We have seen already that
epistemically circular arguments are poor in this respect. They are
not able to rationally convince someone who doubts the conclusion
because such a person also doubts the premises. Such arguments
therefore fail to be dialectically effective. It could be suggested
that this is enough to explain our intuition that there is something
wrong with them, and that they need not involve any epistemic failure.
(Markie 2005; Pryor 2004)
When it is a question of one's own self-doubts, we could even allow a
kind of epistemic failure. Let us assume that I have doubts about the
reliability of my color vision: I believe that my color vision is not
reliable, or I have considered the matter and have decided to suspend
judgment about it. This doubt is a defeater for my color beliefs: it
defeats or undermines my justification for them. Now it seems clear
that I cannot defeat this defeater and regain my justification for
these beliefs through epistemically circular reasoning. Such reasoning
would rely on those very same beliefs for which I have lost the
justification. It is unable to defeat reliability defeaters. (Bergmann
2004, 717-720)
We can thus readily explain the failure of epistemically circular
arguments in cases in which there are serious doubts about
reliability. They fail to remove these doubts. However, as the case of
Roxanne shows, dialectical ineffectiveness and the failure to defeat
defeaters cannot be the only things that are wrong with epistemic
circularity. Neither Roxanne nor anybody else doubts her gas gauge;
she is just ignorant about its reliability. She has no knowledge or
justified beliefs about the matter. Our intuition is that she cannot
gain knowledge or justified beliefs about the reliability of the gauge
through the process of bootstrapping.
10. Epistemology and Dialectic
Although the term "epistemic circularity¨ is of recent origin, the
phenomenon itself has been well known since the ancient skeptics.
Ancient Pyrrhonian skeptics argued that we should suspend belief
unless we can resolve the disagreements that there are about any
object of inquiry. We could try to resolve these disagreements by
relying on reliable sources of belief. Unfortunately, we cannot do
this because there is also a disagreement about which sources are
reliable, and this disagreement must be resolved first. However, we
cannot resolve this disagreement because it would be dialectically
ineffective to defend a set of such sources by appealing to premises
that are themselves based on them. This is something that the skeptics
most emphatically condemned. (Lammenranta 2008)
They also assumed that this sort of failure to resolve disagreements
was not merely dialectical. It also prevented our having knowledge. If
we should suspend belief about some question, we would certainly not
know what the correct answer is. In connecting epistemology closely to
dialectic, skeptics were just following the ancient tradition of Plato
and Aristotle. This tradition continued in Descartes and early modern
philosophy, and seems to be alive even today among the followers of
John L. Austin, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Wilfrid Sellars.
In spite of this influential tradition that connects epistemology
closely with dialectic, the mainstream of contemporary analytic
epistemology takes epistemology to be independent of dialectical
issues. Accordingly, we may very well know even if we cannot
rationally defend ourselves against those who disagree with us. After
all, our sources of belief may, in fact, be reliable, and if this is
the case they will provide us with reasons for believing that they are
reliable and that those who disagree with us are wrong.
However, most of us have the intuition that it would be too easy to
gain knowledge about our own reliability in this way. Perhaps the
intuition shows that epistemology is more closely connected to
dialectic than is currently acknowledged. This would explain our
uneasiness with epistemic circularity and show that the ancient
problem of the criterion is a genuine skeptical paradox for which we
still lack a plausible solution.
11. References and Further Reading
Alston, William P. "Epistemic Circularity.¨ Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 47 (1986). Reprinted in Epistemic
Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989: 319-349.
The first and most influential account of the nature and
significance of epistemic circularity.
Alston, William P. The Reliability of Sense Perception. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1993.
Defends the inevitability of epistemic circularity and the
practical rationality of engaging in firmly established doxastic
practices.
Alston, William P. Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic
Evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005: ch. 11.
Opts for Wittgensteinian contextualism concerning the status of
reliability propositions.
Bergmann, Michael. "Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign."
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 709-727.
Explains when epistemically circular arguments do and when they do
not provide knowledge about reliability, and defends the Reidian
common-sense approach.
Cohen, Stewart. "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of the Problem of
Easy Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002):
309-329.
Poses the problem of easy knowledge and tries to avoid epistemic
circularity.
Dretske, Fred, "Conclusive Reasons.¨ Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 49 ( 1971): 1-22. Reprinted in Perception, Knowledge and
Belief. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2000.
Defends an early version of the sensitivity condition of knowledge.
Fumerton, Richard. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1995: ch. 6.
Accuses externalism of allowing epistemic circularity.
Goldman, Alvin I. Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999: section 3.3.
A Bayesian defense of the epistemic value of epistemic circularity.
Lammenranta, Markus. "Reliabilism and Circularity.¨ Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 111-124.
Relates epistemic circularity to Chisholm's version of the problem
of the criterion.
Lammenranta, Markus. "Reliabilism, Circularity, and the Pyrrhonian
Problematic.¨ Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (2003): 311-328.
Discusses reliabilist responses to epistemic circularity.
Lammenranta, Markus. "The Pyrrhonian Problematic.¨ The Oxford Handbook
of Skepticism. Ed. John Greco. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Defends the dialectical nature and philosophical importance of the
ancient Pyrrhonian problematic.
Lemos, Noah. "Epistemic Circularity Again.¨ Philosophical Issues 14
(2004): 254ƒ{270.
Examines and rejects some objections to Sosa's view that epistemic
circularity does not prevent our knowing that our ways of forming
beliefs are reliable.
Markie, Peter. "Easy Knowledge.¨ Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 70 (2005): 406-416.
Argues that the failure in epistemically circular argument is
dialectical rather than epistemic.
Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press:
Cambridge, Mass., 1981: ch. 3.
Defends the sensitivity (tracking) condition of knowledge and
formulates the closure-based skeptical argument.
Pritchard, Duncan. "Wittgenstein's On Certainty and Contemporary
Anti-Scepticism.¨ Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty. Eds. D.
Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005:
189V224.
Discusses anti-skeptical views deriving from Wittgenstein's On Certainty.
Pryor, James. "What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?¨ Philosophical
Issues14 (2004): 349-378.
Defends the epistemic respectability of Moore's proof of the external world.
Reid, Thomas. Inquiry and Essays. Eds. Ronald E. Beanblossom & Keith
Lehrer. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983.
An abbreviated edition of Reid' major works on the philosophy of
common sense.
Schmitt, Frederick F. "What Is Wrong with Epistemic Circularity?¨
Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 379-402.
Argues that epistemically circular arguments do have the power of
answering doubts about reliability.
Sosa, Ernest. "Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity.¨
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 (1994): 263-290.
Reprinted in Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Eds. Keith DeRose &
Ted A. Warfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999: 93-114.
Defends the inevitability and epistemic value of epistemically
circular arguments.
Sosa, Ernest. "Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles.¨ The Journal
of Philosophy 94 (1997): 410-430.
Uses the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective
knowledge to explain why epistemic circles are not vicious.
Van Cleve, James. "Is Knowledge Easy–or Impossible? Externalism as the
Only Alternative to Skepticism.¨ The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays.
Ed. Steven Luper. Hampshire: Ashgate, 2003.
Defends externalism and allowing epistemic circularity as the only
alternatives to skepticism.
Vogel, Jonathan. "Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge.¨ The
Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Ed. Steven
Luper-Foy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987: 197-215.
Criticizes the sensitivity condition of knowledge for not allowing
inductive knowledge.
Vogel, Jonathan. "Reliabilism Leveled.¨ The Journal of Philosophy 97
(2000): 602-623.
Criticizes reliabilism for allowing epistemically circular reasoning.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. On Certainty. Eds. G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von
Wright. Tr. D. Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1969.
An influential defense of the view that the presuppositions of
knowledge are not known.
Wright, Crispin. "Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free).¨
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2004): 167-211.
Uses the concept of entitlement to resolve skeptical paradoxes.
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