period, the three centuries following the death of Alexander the Great
in 323 BCE (and of Aristotle in 322 BCE). Epicurus developed an
unsparingly materialistic metaphysics, empiricist epistemology, and
hedonistic ethics. Epicurus taught that the basic constituents of the
world are atoms, uncuttable bits of matter, flying through empty
space, and he tried to explain all natural phenomena in atomic terms.
Epicurus rejected the existence of Platonic forms and an immaterial
soul, and he said that the gods have no influence on our lives.
Epicurus also thought skepticism was untenable, and that we could gain
knowledge of the world relying upon the senses. He taught that the
point of all one's actions was to attain pleasure (conceived of as
tranquility) for oneself, and that this could be done by limiting
one's desires and by banishing the fear of the gods and of death.
Epicurus' gospel of freedom from fear proved to be quite popular, and
communities of Epicureans flourished for centuries after his death.
1. Life
Epicurus was born around 341 BCE, seven years after Plato's death, and
grew up in the Athenian colony of Samos, an island in the
Mediterranean Sea. He was about 19 when Aristotle died, and he studied
philosophy under followers of Democritus and Plato. Epicurus founded
his first philosophical schools in Mytilene and Lampsacus, before
moving to Athens around 306 BCE. There Epicurus founded the Garden, a
combination of philosophical community and school. The residents of
the Garden put Epicurus' teachings into practice. Epicurus died from
kidney stones around 271 or 270 BCE.
After Epicurus' death, Epicureanism continued to flourish as a
philosophical movement. Communities of Epicureans sprang up throughout
the Hellenistic world; along with Stoicism, it was one of the major
philosophical schools competing for people's allegiances. Epicureanism
went into decline with the rise of Christianity. Certain aspects of
Epicurus' thought were revived during the Renaissance and early modern
periods, when reaction against scholastic neo-Aristotelianism led
thinkers to turn to mechanistic explanations of natural phenomena.
2. Sources
Epicurus was a voluminous writer, but almost none of his own work
survives. A likely reason for this is that Christian authorities found
his ideas ungodly. Diogenes Laertius, who probably lived in the third
century CE , wrote a 10-book Lives of the Philosophers, which includes
three of Epicurus' letters in its recounting of the life and teachings
of Epicurus. These three letters are brief summaries of major areas of
Epicurus' philosophy: the Letter to Herodotus, which summarizes his
metaphysics, the Letter to Pythocles, which gives atomic explanations
for meteorological phenomena, and the Letter to Menoeceus, which
summarizes his ethics. It also includes the Principal Doctrines, 40
sayings which deal mainly with ethical matters.
Because of the absence of Epicurus' own writings, we have to rely on
later writers to reconstruct Epicurus' thought. Two of our most
important sources are the Roman poet Lucretius (c. 94-55 BCE) and the
Roman politician Cicero (106-43 BCE). Lucretius was an Epicurean who
wrote De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things), a six-book poem
expounding Epicurus' metaphysics. Cicero was an adherent of the
skeptical academy, who wrote a series of works setting forth the major
philosophical systems of his day, including Epicureanism. Another
major source is the essayist Plutarch (c. 50-120 CE), a Platonist.
However, both Cicero and Plutarch were very hostile toward
Epicureanism, so they must be used with care, since they often are
less than charitable toward Epicurus, and may skew his views to serve
their own purposes.
Although the major outlines of Epicurus' thought are clear enough, the
lack of sources means many of the details of his philosophy are still
open to dispute.
3. Metaphysics
Epicurus believes that the basic constituents of the world are atoms
(which are uncuttable, microscopic bits of matter) moving in the void
(which is simply empty space). Ordinary objects are conglomerations of
atoms. Furthermore, the properties of macroscopic bodies and all of
the events we see occurring can be explained in terms of the
collisions, reboundings, and entanglements of atoms.
a. Arguments for the existence of atoms and void
Epicurus' metaphysics starts from two simple points: (1) we see that
there are bodies in motion, and (2) nothing comes into existence from
what does not exist. Epicurus takes the first point to be simply a
datum of experience. The second point is a commonplace of ancient
Greek philosophy, derived from the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the
principle that for everything which occurs there is a reason or
explanation for why it occurs, and why this way rather than that).
First, because bodies move, there must be empty space for them to move
in, and Epicurus calls this empty space 'void.' Second, the ordinary
bodies that we see are compound bodies–that is, bodies which are made
up of further bodies, which is shown by the fact that they can be
broken down into smaller pieces. However, Epicurus thinks that this
process of division cannot go on indefinitely, because otherwise
bodies would dissolve away into nothing. Also, there must be basic and
unchangeable building blocks of matter in order to explain the
regularities in nature. These non-compound bodies are atoms–literally,
'uncuttables.' Only bodies and void exist per se, that is, exist
without depending for their existence on something else. Other
things–such as colors, time, and justice–are ultimately explicable as
attributes of bodies.
b. Properties of Atoms, limitlessness of the Universe
Because Epicurus believes that nothing comes into existence from
nothing, he thinks that the universe has no beginning, but has always
existed, and will always exist. Atoms, too, as the basic building
blocks of all else, cannot come into existence, but have always
existed. Our particular cosmos, however, is only a temporary
agglomeration of atoms, and it is only one of an infinite number of
such cosmoi, which come into existence and then dissolve away. Against
Aristotle, Epicurus argues that the universe is unlimited in size. If
the universe were limited in size, says Epicurus, you could go to the
end of it, stick your fist out, and where your fist was located would
be the new 'limit' of the universe. Of course, this process could be
reiterated an endless number of times. Since the universe is unlimited
in size, there must also be an unlimited number of atoms and an
infinite amount of void. If the number of atoms were limited, then the
'density' of atoms in any region would effectively be zero, and there
would be no macroscopic bodies, as there evidently are. And there must
be an unlimited amount of void, since without a limitless amount of
void, the infinite number of atoms would be unable to move.
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c. Differences from Democritus
Up to this point, Epicurus is largely following the thought of
Democritus, a pre-Socratic philosopher and one of the inventors of
atomism. However, he modifies Democritus' atomism in at least three
important ways.
i. Weight
The first is that Epicurus thinks that atoms have weight. Like
Democritus, Epicurus believes that atoms have the properties of size,
shape, and resistance. Democritus explains all atomic motion as the
result of previous atomic collisions, plus the inertia of atoms.
Aristotle, however, criticizes Democritus on this point, saying that
Democritus has not explained why it is that atoms move at all, rather
than simply standing still. Epicurus seems to be answering this
criticism when he says that atoms do have a natural motion of
direction–'downward'–even though there is no bottom to the universe.
This natural motion is supposed to give an explanation for why atoms
move in the first place. Also, Epicurus thinks that it is evident that
bodies do tend to travel down, all else being equal, and he thinks
that positing weight as an atomic property accounts for this better
than thinking all atomic motion is the result of past collisions and
inertia.
ii. The Swerve
The second modification of Democritus' views is the addition of the
'swerve.' In addition to the regular tendency of atoms to move
downward, Epicurus thinks that occasionally, and at random times, the
atoms swerve to the side. One reason for this swerve is that it is
needed to explain why there are atomic collisions. The natural
tendency of atoms is to fall straight downward, at uniform velocity.
If this were the only natural atomic motion, the atoms never would
have collided with one another, forming macroscopic bodies. As
Lucretius puts it, they would 'fall downward, like drops of rain,
through the deep void.' The second reason for thinking that atoms
swerve is that a random atomic motion is needed to preserve human
freedom and 'break the bonds of fate,' as Lucretius says. If the laws
of atomic motion are deterministic, then the past positions of the
atoms in the universe, plus these laws, determine everything that will
occur, including human action. Cicero reports that Epicurus worries
that, if it has been true from eternity that, e.g., "Milo will wrestle
tomorrow," then presently deliberating about whether to make it true
or false would be idle.
iii. Sensible Qualities
The third difference between Epicurus and Democritus has to do with
their attitudes toward the reality of sensible properties. Democritus
thinks that, in reality, only atoms and the void exist, and that
sensible qualities such as sweetness, whiteness, and the like exist
only 'by convention.' It is controversial exactly how to understand
Democritus' position, but most likely he is asserting that atoms
themselves have no sensible qualities–they are simply extended bits of
stuff. The sensible qualities that we think bodies have, like
sweetness, are not really in the object at all, but are simply
subjective states of the percipient's awareness produced by the
interaction of bodies with our sense-organs. This is shown, thinks
Democritus, by the fact that the same body appears differently to
different percipients depending on their bodily constitution, e.g.,
that a 'white' body appears yellow to somebody with jaundice, or that
honey tastes bitter to an ill person. From this, Democritus derives
skeptical conclusions. He is pessimistic about our ability to gain any
knowledge about the world on the basis of our senses, since they
systematically deceive us about the way the world is.
Epicurus wants to resist these pessimistic conclusions. He argues that
properties like sweetness, whiteness, and such do not exist at the
atomic level–individual atoms are not sweet or white–but that these
properties are nonetheless real. These are properties of macroscopic
bodies, but the possession of these properties by macroscopic bodies
are explicable in terms of the properties of and relations amongst the
individual atoms that make up bodies. Epicurus thinks that bodies have
the capability to cause us to have certain types of experiences
because of their atomic structure, and that such capabilities are real
properties of the bodies. Similar considerations apply for properties
like "being healthy," "being deadly," and "being enslaved." They are
real, but can only apply to groups of atoms (like people), not
individual atoms. And these sorts of properties are also relational
properties, not intrinsic ones. For example, cyanide is deadly–not
deadly per se, but deadly for human beings (and perhaps for other
types of organisms). Nonetheless, its deadliness for us is still a
real property of the cyanide, albeit a relational one.
d. Mechanistic explanations of natural phenomena
One important aspect of Epicurus' philosophy is his desire to replace
teleological (goal-based) explanations of natural phenomena with
mechanistic ones. His main target is mythological explanations of
meteorological occurrences and the like in terms of the will of the
gods. Because Epicurus wishes to banish the fear of the gods, he
insists that occurrences like earthquakes and lightning can be
explained entirely in atomic terms and are not due to the will of the
gods. Epicurus is also against the intrinsic teleology of philosophers
like Aristotle. Teeth appear to be well-designed for the purpose of
chewing. Aristotle thinks that this apparent purposiveness in nature
cannot be eliminated, and that the functioning of the parts of
organisms must be explained by appealing to how they contribute to the
functioning of the organism as a whole. Other philosophers, such as
the Stoics, took this apparent design as evidence for the intelligence
and benevolence of God. Epicurus, however, following Empedocles, tries
to explain away this apparent purposiveness in nature in a
proto-Darwinian way, as the result of a process of natural selection.
e. The gods
Because of its denial of divine providence, Epicureanism was often
charged in antiquity with being a godless philosophy, although
Epicurus and his followers denied the charge. The main upshot of
Epicurean theology is certainly negative, however. Epicurus'
mechanistic explanations of natural phenomena are supposed to displace
explanations that appeal to the will of the gods. In addition,
Epicurus is one of the earliest philosophers we know of to have raised
the Problem of Evil, arguing against the notion that the world is
under the providential care of a loving deity by pointing out the
manifold suffering in the world.
Despite this, Epicurus says that there are gods, but these gods are
quite different from the popular conception of gods. We have a
conception of the gods, says Epicurus, as supremely blessed and happy
beings. Troubling oneself about the miseries of the world, or trying
to administer the world, would be inconsistent with a life of
tranquility, says Epicurus, so the gods have no concern for us. In
fact, they are unaware of our existence, and live eternally in the
intermundia, the space between the cosmoi. For Epicurus, the gods
function mainly as ethical ideals, whose lives we can strive to
emulate, but whose wrath we need not fear.
Ancient critics thought the Epicurean gods were a thin smoke-screen to
hide Epicurus' atheism, and difficulties with a literal interpretation
of Epicurus' sayings on the nature of the gods (for instance, it
appears inconsistent with Epicurus' atomic theory to hold that any
compound body, even a god, could be immortal) have led some scholars
to conjecture that Epicurus' 'gods' are thought-constructs, and exist
only in human minds as idealizations, i.e., the gods exist, but only
as projections of what the most blessed life would be.
f. Philosophy of Mind
Epicurus is one of the first philosophers to put forward an Identity
Theory of Mind. In modern versions of the identity theory, the mind is
identified with the brain, and mental processes are identified with
neural processes. Epicurus' physiology is quite different; the mind is
identified as an organ that resides in the chest, since the common
Greek view was that the chest, not the head, is the seat of the
emotions. However, the underlying idea is quite similar. (Note: not
all commentators accept that Epicurus' theory is actually an Identity
Theory.)
The main point that Epicurus wants to establish is that the mind is
something bodily. The mind must be a body, thinks Epicurus, because of
its ability to interact with the body. The mind is affected by the
body, as vision, drunkenness, and disease show. Likewise, the mind
affects the body, as our ability to move our limbs when we want to and
the physiological effects of emotional states show. Only bodies can
interact with other bodies, so the mind must be a body. Epicurus says
that the mind cannot be something incorporeal, as Plato thinks, since
the only thing that is not a body is void, which is simply empty space
and cannot act or be acted upon.
The mind, then, is an organ in the body, and mental processes are
identified with atomic processes. The mind is composed of four
different types of particles–fire, air, wind, and the "nameless
element," which surpasses the other particles in its fineness.
Although Epicurus is reticent about the details, some features of the
mind are accounted for in terms of the features of these atoms–for
instance, the mind is able to be moved a great deal by the impact of
an image (which is something quite flimsy), because of the smallness
of the particles that make up the mind. The mind proper, which is
primarily responsible for sensation and thought, is located in the
chest, but Epicurus thinks that there is also a 'spirit,' spread
throughout the rest of the body, which allows the mind to communicate
with it. The mind and spirit play roles very similar to those of the
central and peripheral nervous systems in modern theory.
One important result of Epicurus' philosophy of mind is that death is
annihilation. The mind is able to engage in the motions of sensation
and thought only when it is housed in the body and the atoms that make
it up are properly arranged. Upon death, says Epicurus, the container
of the body shatters, and the atoms disperse in the air. The atoms are
eternal, but the mind made up of these atoms is not, just as other
compound bodies cease to exist when the atoms that make them up
disperse.
g. Perception
Epicurus explains perception in terms of the interaction of atoms with
the sense-organs. Objects continually throw off one-atom-thick layers,
like the skin peeling off of an onion. These images, or "eidola," fly
through the air and bang into one's eyes, from which one learns about
the properties of the objects that threw off these eidola. This
explains vision. Other senses are analyzed in similar terms; e.g., the
soothing action of smooth atoms on the tongue causes the sensation of
sweetness. As noted above, Epicurus maintains that such sensible
qualities are real qualities of bodies.
4. Epistemology
Epicurus' epistemology is resolutely empiricist and anti-skeptical.
All of our knowledge ultimately comes from the senses, thinks
Epicurus, and we can trust the senses, when properly used. Epicurus'
epistemology was contained in his work the 'Canon,' or 'measuring
stick,' which is lost, so many of the details of his views are
unavailable to us. 4a. The Canon: sensations, preconceptions, and
feelings
Epicurus says that there are three criteria of truth: sensations,
'preconceptions,' and feelings. Sensations give us information about
the external world, and we can test the judgments based upon
sensations against further sensations; e.g., a provisional judgment
that a tower is round, based upon sensation, can be tested against
later sensations to be corroborated or disproved. Epicurus says that
all sensations give us information about the world, but that sensation
itself is never in error, since sensation is a purely passive,
mechanical reception of images and the like by sense-organs, and the
senses themselves do not make judgments 'that' the world is this way
or that. Instead, error enters in when we make judgments about the
world based upon the information received through the senses.
Epicurus thinks that, in order to make judgments about the world, or
even to start any inquiry whatsoever, we must already be in possession
of certain basic concepts, which stand in need of no further proof or
definition, on pain of entering into an infinite regress. This concern
is similar to the Paradox of Inquiry explored by Plato in the Meno,
that one must already know about something in order to be able to
inquire about it. However, instead of postulating that our immaterial
souls had acquaintance with transcendent Forms in a pre-natal
existence, as Plato does, Epicurus thinks that we have certain
'preconceptions'–concepts such as 'body,' 'person,' 'usefulness,' and
'truth'–which are formed in our (material) minds as the result of
repeated sense-experiences of similar objects. Further ideas are
formed by processes of analogy or similarity or by compounding these
basic concepts. Thus, all ideas are ultimately formed on the basis of
sense-experience.
Feelings of pleasure and pain form the basic criteria for what is to
be sought and avoided.
b. Anti-skeptical Arguments
Epicurus is concerned to refute the skeptical tendencies of
Democritus, whose metaphysics and theory of perception were similar to
Epicurus'. At least three separate anti-skeptical arguments are given
by Epicureans:
i. The "lazy argument"
Epicurus says that it is impossible to live as a skeptic. If a person
really were to believe that he knows nothing, then he would have no
reason to engage in one course of action instead of another. Thus, the
consistent skeptic would engage in no action whatsoever, and would
die.
ii. The self-refutation argument
If a skeptic claims that nothing can be known, then one should ask
whether he knows that nothing can be known. If he says 'yes,' then he
is contradicting himself. If he doesn't say yes, then he isn't making
a claim, and we don't need to listen to him.
iii. The argument from concept-formation
If the skeptic says that nothing can be known, or that we cannot know
the truth, we can ask him where he gets his knowledge of concepts such
as 'knowledge' and 'truth.' If the senses cannot be relied on, as the
skeptic claims, then he is not entitled to use concepts such as
'knowledge' and 'truth' in formulating his thesis, since such concepts
derive from the senses.
5. Ethics
Epicurus' ethics is a form of egoistic hedonism; i.e., he says that
the only thing that is intrinsically valuable is one's own pleasure;
anything else that has value is valuable merely as a means to securing
pleasure for oneself. However, Epicurus has a sophisticated and
idiosyncratic view of the nature of pleasure, which leads him to
recommend a virtuous, moderately ascetic life as the best means to
securing pleasure. This contrasts Epicurus strongly with the
Cyrenaics, a group of ancient hedonists who better fit the stereotype
of hedonists as recommending a policy of "eat, drink, and be merry."
a. Hedonism, psychological and ethical
Epicurus' ethics starts from the Aristotelian commonplace that the
highest good is what is valued for its own sake, and not for the sake
of anything else, and Epicurus agrees with Aristotle that happiness is
the highest good. However, he disagrees with Aristotle by identifying
happiness with pleasure. Epicurus gives two reasons for this. The main
reason is that pleasure is the only thing that people do, as a matter
of fact, value for its own sake; that is, Epicurus' ethical hedonism
is based upon his psychological hedonism. Everything we do, claims
Epicurus, we do for the sake ultimately of gaining pleasure for
ourselves. This is supposedly confirmed by observing the behavior of
infants, who, it is claimed, instinctively pursue pleasure and shun
pain. This is also true of adults, thinks Epicurus, but in adults it
is more difficult to see that this is true, since adults have much
more complicated beliefs about what will bring them pleasure. But the
Epicureans did spend a great deal of energy trying to make plausible
the contention that all activity, even apparently self-sacrificing
activity or activity done solely for the sake of virtue or what is
noble, is in fact directed toward obtaining pleasure for oneself.
The second proof, which fits in well with Epicurus' empiricism,
supposedly lies in one's introspective experience. One immediately
perceives that pleasure is good and that pain is bad, in the same way
that one immediately perceives that fire is hot; no further argument
is needed to show the goodness of pleasure or the badness of pain. (Of
course, this does not establish Epicurus' further contention that only
pleasure is intrinsically valuable and only pain is intrinsically
bad.)
Although all pleasures are good and all pains evil, Epicurus says that
not all pleasures are choiceworthy or all pains to be avoided.
Instead, one should calculate what is in one's long-term
self-interest, and forgo what will bring pleasure in the short-term if
doing so will ultimately lead to greater pleasure in the long-term.
b. Types of pleasure
For Epicurus, pleasure is tied closely to satisfying one's desires. He
distinguishes between two different types of pleasure: 'moving'
pleasures and 'static' pleasures. 'Moving' pleasures occur when one is
in the process of satisfying a desire, e.g., eating a hamburger when
one is hungry. These pleasures involve an active titillation of the
senses, and these feelings are what most people call 'pleasure.'
However, Epicurus says that after one's desires have been satisfied,
(e.g., when one is full after eating), the state of satiety, of no
longer being in need or want, is itself pleasurable. Epicurus calls
this a 'static' pleasure, and says that these static pleasures are the
best pleasures.
Because of this, Epicurus denies that there is any intermediate state
between pleasure and pain. When one has unfulfilled desires, this is
painful, and when one no longer has unfulfilled desires, this steady
state is the most pleasurable of all, not merely some intermediate
state between pleasure and pain.
Epicurus also distinguishes between physical and mental pleasures and
pains. Physical pleasures and pains concern only the present, whereas
mental pleasures and pains also encompass the past (fond memories of
past pleasure or regret over past pain or mistakes) and the future
(confidence or fear about what will occur). The greatest destroyer of
happiness, thinks Epicurus, is anxiety about the future, especially
fear of the gods and fear of death. If one can banish fear about the
future, and face the future with confidence that one's desires will be
satisfied, then one will attain tranquility (ataraxia), the most
exalted state. In fact, given Epicurus' conception of pleasure, it
might be less misleading to call him a 'tranquillist' instead of a
'hedonist.'
c. Types of desire
Because of the close connection of pleasure with desire-satisfaction,
Epicurus devotes a considerable part of his ethics to analyzing
different kinds of desires. If pleasure results from getting what you
want (desire-satisfaction) and pain from not getting what you want
(desire-frustration), then there are two strategies you can pursue
with respect to any given desire: you can either strive to fulfill the
desire, or you can try to eliminate the desire. For the most part
Epicurus advocates the second strategy, that of paring your desires
down to a minimum core, which are then easily satisfied.
Epicurus distinguishes between three types of desires: natural and
necessary desires, natural but non-necessary desires, and "vain and
empty" desires. Examples of natural and necessary desires include the
desires for food, shelter, and the like. Epicurus thinks that these
desires are easy to satisfy, difficult to eliminate (they are
'hard-wired' into human beings naturally), and bring great pleasure
when satisfied. Furthermore, they are necessary for life, and they are
naturally limited: that is, if one is hungry, it only takes a limited
amount of food to fill the stomach, after which the desire is
satisfied. Epicurus says that one should try to fulfill these desires.
Vain desires include desires for power, wealth, fame, and the like.
They are difficult to satisfy, in part because they have no natural
limit. If one desires wealth or power, no matter how much one gets, it
is always possible to get more, and the more one gets, the more one
wants. These desires are not natural to human beings, but inculcated
by society and by false beliefs about what we need; e.g., believing
that having power will bring us security from others. Epicurus thinks
that these desires should be eliminated.
An example of a natural but non-necessary desire is the desire for
luxury food. Although food is needed for survival, one does not need a
particular type of food to survive. Thus, despite his hedonism,
Epicurus advocates a surprisingly ascetic way of life. Although one
shouldn't spurn extravagant foods if they happen to be available,
becoming dependent on such goods ultimately leads to unhappiness. As
Epicurus puts it, "If you wish to make Pythocles wealthy, don't give
him more money; rather, reduce his desires." By eliminating the pain
caused by unfulfilled desires, and the anxiety that occurs because of
the fear that one's desires will not be fulfilled in the future, the
wise Epicurean attains tranquility, and thus happiness.
d. The virtues
Epicurus' hedonism was widely denounced in the ancient world as
undermining traditional morality. Epicurus, however, insists that
courage, moderation, and the other virtues are needed in order to
attain happiness. However, the virtues for Epicurus are all purely
instrumental goods–that is, they are valuable solely for the sake of
the happiness that they can bring oneself, not for their own sake.
Epicurus says that all of the virtues are ultimately forms of
prudence, of calculating what is in one's own best interest. In this,
Epicurus goes against the majority of Greek ethical theorists, such as
the Stoics, who identify happiness with virtue, and Aristotle, who
identifies happiness with a life of virtuous activity. Epicurus thinks
that natural science and philosophy itself also are instrumental
goods. Natural science is needed in order to give mechanistic
explanations of natural phenomena and thus dispel the fear of the
gods, while philosophy helps to show us the natural limits of our
desires and to dispel the fear of death.
e. Justice
Epicurus is one of the first philosophers to give a well-developed
contractarian theory of justice. Epicurus says that justice is an
agreement "neither to harm nor be harmed," and that we have a
preconception of justice as "what is useful in mutual associations."
People enter into communities in order to gain protection from the
dangers of the wild, and agreements concerning the behavior of the
members of the community are needed in order for these communities to
function, e.g., prohibitions of murder, regulations concerning the
killing and eating of animals, and so on. Justice exists only where
there are such agreements.
Like the virtues, justice is valued entirely on instrumental grounds,
because of its utility for each of the members of society. Epicurus
says that the main reason not to be unjust is that one will be
punished if one gets caught, and that even if one does not get caught,
the fear of being caught will still cause pain. However, he adds that
the fear of punishment is needed mainly to keep fools in line, who
otherwise would kill, steal, etc. The Epicurean wise man recognizes
the usefulness of the laws, and since he does not desire great wealth,
luxury goods, political power, or the like, he sees that he has no
reason to engage in the conduct prohibited by the laws in any case.
Although justice only exists where there is an agreement about how to
behave, that does not make justice entirely 'conventional,' if by
'conventional' we mean that any behavior dictated by the laws of a
particular society is thereby just, and that the laws of a particular
society are just for that society. Since the 'justice contract' is
entered into for the purpose of securing what is useful for the
members of the society, only laws that are actually useful are just.
Thus, a prohibition of murder would be just, but antimiscegenation
laws would not. Since what is useful can vary from place to place and
time to time, what laws are just can likewise vary.
f. Friendship
Epicurus values friendship highly and praises it in quite extravagant
terms. He says that friendship "dances around the world" telling us
that we must "wake to blessedness." He also says that the wise man is
sometimes willing to die for a friend. Because of this, some scholars
have thought that in this area, at least, Epicurus abandons his
egoistic hedonism and advocates altruism toward friends. This is not
clear, however. Epicurus consistently maintains that friendship is
valuable because it is one of the greatest means of attaining
pleasure. Friends, he says, are able to provide one another the
greatest security, whereas a life without friends is solitary and
beset with perils. In order for there to be friendship, Epicurus says,
there must be trust between friends, and friends have to treat each
other as well as they treat themselves. The communities of Epicureans
can be seen as embodying these ideals, and these are ideals that
ultimately promote ataraxia.
g. Death
One of the greatest fears that Epicurus tries to combat is the fear of
death. Epicurus thinks that this fear is often based upon anxiety
about having an unpleasant afterlife; this anxiety, he thinks, should
be dispelled once one realizes that death is annihilation, because the
mind is a group of atoms that disperses upon death.
i. The no subject of harm argument
If death is annihilation, says Epicurus, then it is 'nothing to us.'
Epicurus' main argument for why death is not bad is contained in the
Letter to Menoeceus and can be dubbed the 'no subject of harm'
argument. If death is bad, for whom is it bad? Not for the living,
since they're not dead, and not for the dead, since they don't exist.
His argument can be set out as follows:
1. Death is annihilation.
2. The living have not yet been annihilated (otherwise they
wouldn't be alive).
3. Death does not affect the living. (from 1 and 2)
4. So, death is not bad for the living. (from 3)
5. For something to be bad for somebody, that person has to exist, at least.
6. The dead do not exist. (from 1)
7. Therefore, death is not bad for the dead. (from 5 and 6)
8. Therefore death is bad for neither the living nor the dead. (from 4 and 7)
Epicurus adds that if death causes you no pain when you're dead, it's
foolish to allow the fear of it to cause you pain now.
ii. The symmetry argument
A second Epicurean argument against the fear of death, the so-called
'symmetry argument,' is recorded by the Epicurean poet Lucretius. He
says that anyone who fears death should consider the time before he
was born. The past infinity of pre-natal non-existence is like the
future infinity of post-mortem non-existence; it is as though nature
has put up a mirror to let us see what our future non-existence will
be like. But we do not consider not having existed for an eternity
before our births to be a terrible thing; therefore, neither should we
think not existing for an eternity after our deaths to be evil.
6. Select Bibliography
This is not meant as comprehensive bibliography; rather, it's a
selection of further texts to read for those who want to learn more
about Epicurus and Epicureanism. Most of the books listed below have
extensive bibliographies for those looking for more specialized and
scholarly publications.
Collections of Primary Sources:
The Epicurus Reader, translated and edited by Brad Inwood and L.P.
Gerson, Hackett Publishing.
This inexpensive collection has most of the major extant writings of
Epicurus, in addition to other ancient sources such as Cicero and
Plutarch who wrote about Epicureanism. (Lucretius is not included
much.) However, there is little commentary or explication of the
material, and some of the primary sources are fairly opaque.The
Hellenistic philosophers, Volume 1: translations of the principal
sources, with philosophical commentary, by A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley,
Cambridge University Press.
This excellent book organizes the texts into sections topically,
(e.g., "Atoms," "Soul," "Language," "Death,") and follows each
selection of texts with commentary and explication. Vol. 2, which
contains the original Greek and Latin texts, has a fine, if somewhat
dated (1987) bibliography at the end.Lucretius, De Rerum Natura
There are many different editions of Lucretius' masterpiece, an
extended exposition of Epicurus' metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and
natural science. I personally like the translation by Rolfe Humphries:
Lucretius: The Way Things Are. The De Rerum Natura of Titus Lucretius
Carus, Indiana University Press. Humphries translates Lucretius' poem
as a poem, not as prose, yet the translation is still very clear and
readable.Recent books on particular areas of Epicurus' philosophy:
The books below are all well-written and influential. They deal
in-depth with problems of interpreting particular areas of Epicurus'
philosophy, while still remaining, for the most part, accessible to
well-educated general readers. They also have extensive
bibliographies. However, do not assume that the interpretations of
Epicurus in these books are always widely accepted.
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, by Julia Annas, University of California Press.
This book deals with Epicurean and Stoic theories of what the mind
is.Epicurus' Ethical Theory : The Pleasures of Invulnerability, by
Phillip Mitsis, Cornell University Press.
This book is concerned with all of the major areas of Epicurean
ethics, from pleasure, to friendship, justice, and human freedom.
Mitsis is especially good at showing how Epicurus' conception of
pleasure differs from that of the utilitarians.The Morality of
Happiness, by Julia Annas, Oxford University Press.
This book focuses deals with all major ancient theorists from
Aristotle on, but is still a good source of information on Epicurean
ethics, especially if one wants to put Epicurean ethics in the context
of other ancient ethical theories.Epicurus' Scientific Method, by
Elizabeth Asmis, Cornell University Press.
The best book-length treatment of Epicurus' epistemology available. A
little more technical than the books above, but still fairly
accessible.
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