Thomas Aquinas (1225—1274)

aquinas

Saint Thomas Aquinas was a Catholic Priest in the Dominican Order and
one of the most important Medieval philosophers and theologians. He
was immensely influenced by scholasticism and Aristotle and known for
his synthesis of the two aforementioned traditions. Although he wrote
many works of philosophy and theology throughout his life, his most
influential work is the Summa Theologica which consists of three
parts.

The first part is on God. In it, he gives five proofs for God's
existence as well as an explication of His attributes. He argues for
the actuality and incorporeality of God as the unmoved mover and
describes how God moves through His thinking and willing.

The second part is on Ethics. Thomas argues for a variation of the
Aristotelian Virtue Ethics. However, unlike Aristotle, he argues for a
connection between the virtuous man and God by explaining how the
virtuous act is one towards the blessedness of the Beatific Vision
(beata visio).

The last part of the Summa is on Christ and was unfinished when Thomas
died. In it, he shows how Christ not only offers salvation, but
represents and protects humanity on Earth and in Heaven. This part
also briefly discusses the sacraments and eschatology. The Summa
remains the most influential of Thomas's works and is mostly what will
be discussed in this overview of his philosophy.

1. Life

The birth-year of Thomas Aquinas is commonly given as 1227, but he was
probably born early in 1225 at his father's castle of Roccasecea (75
m. e.s.e. of Rome) in Neapolitan territory. He died at the monastery
of Fossanova, one mile from Sonnino (64 m. s.e. of Rome), Mar. 7,
1274. His father was Count Landulf of an old high-born south Italian
family, and his mother was Countess Theodora of Theate, of noble
Norman descent. In his fifth year he was sent for his early education
to the monastery of Monte Cassino, where his father's brother Sinibald
was abbot. Later he studied in Naples. By about 1243 he determined to
enter the Dominican order; but on the way to Rome he was seized by his
brothers and brought back to his parents at the castle of S. Giovanni,
where he was held a captive for a year or two and besieged with
prayers, threats, and even sensual temptation to make him relinquish
his purpose. Finally the family yielded and the order sent Thomas to
Cologne to study under Albertus Magnus, where he arrived probably
toward the end of 1244. He accompanied Albertus to Paris in 1245,
remained there with his teacher, continuing his studies for three
years, and followed Albertus at the latter's return to Cologne in
1248. For several years longer he remained with the famous philosopher
of scholasticism, presumably teaching. This long association of Thomas
with the great polyhistor was the most important influence in his
development; it made him a comprehensive scholar and won him
permanently for the Aristotelian method. Around 1252 Thomas went to
Paris for the master's degree, which he found some difficulty in
attaining owing to attacks, at that time on the mendicant orders.
Ultimately, however, he received the degree and entered ceremoniously
upon his office of teaching in 1257; he taught in Paris for several
years and there wrote certain of his works and began others. In 1259
he was present at an important chapter of his order at Valenciennes at
the solicitation of Pope Urban IV. Therefore not before the latter
part of 1261, he took up residence in Rome. In 1269-71 he was again
active in Paris. In 1272 the provincial chapter at Florence empowered
him to found a new studium generale at any place he should choose, and
he selected Naples. Early in 1274 the pope directed him to attend the
Council of Lyons and he undertook the journey, although he was far
from well. On the way he stopped at the castle of a niece and became
seriously ill. He wished to end his days in a monastery and not being
able to reach a house of the Dominicans he was carried to the
Cistercian Fossanova. There he died and his remains were preserved.
2. Writings

The writings of Thomas may be classified as: (1) exegetical,
homiletical, and liturgical; (2) dogmatic, apologetic, and ethical;
and (3) philosophical. Among the genuine works of the first class
were: Commentaries on Job (1261-65); on Psalms, according to some a
reportatum, or report of speeches furnished by his companion
Raynaldus; on Isaiah; the Catena aurea, which is a running commentary
on the four Gospels, constructed on numerous citations from the
Fathers; probably a Commentary on Canticles, and on Jeremiah; and
wholly or partly reportata, on John, on Matthew, and on the epistles
of Paul; including, according to one authority, Hebrews i.-x. Thomas
prepared for Urban IV: Officium de corpore Christi (1264); and the
following works may be either genuine or reportata: Expositio
angelicce salutationis; Tractatus de decem praeceptis; Orationis
dominico expositio; Sermones pro dominicis diebus et pro sanctorum
solemnitatibus; Sermones de angelis, and Sermones de quadragesima. Of
his sermons only manipulated copies are extant. In the second division
were: In quatitor sententiarum libros, of his first Paris sojourn;
Questiones disputatce, written at Paris and Rome; Questiones
quodlibetales duodecini; Summa catholicce fidei contra gentiles
(1261-C,4); andthe Summa theologica. To the dogmatic works belong also
certain commentaries, as follows: Expositio in librum beati Dionysii
de divinis nominibits; Expositiones primoe et secundce; In Boethii
libros de hebdomadibus; and Proeclare quoestiones super librum Boethii
de trinitate. A large number ofopuscitla also belonged to this group.
Of philosophical writings there are cataloged thirteen commentaries on
Aristotle, besides numerous philosophical opuscula of which fourteen
are classed as genuine.
a. The Summa Part I: God

The greatest work of Thomas was the Summa, and it is the fullest
presentation of his views. He worked on it from the time of Clement IV
(after 1265) until the end of his life. When he died he had reached
question ninety of part III, on the subject of penance. What was
lacking was afterward added from the fourth book of his commentary on
the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard as a supplementum, which is not found
in manuscripts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Summa
consists of three parts. Part I treats of God, who is the "first
cause, himself uncaused" (primum movens immobile) and as such existent
only in act (actu), that is pure actuality without potentiality and,
therefore, without corporeality. His essence is actus purus et
perfectus. This follows from the fivefold proof for the existence of
God; namely, there must be a first mover himself unmoved, a first
cause in the chain of causes, an absolutely necessary being, an
absolutely perfect being, and a rational designer. In this connection
the thoughts of the unity, infinity, unchangeableness, and goodness of
the highest being are deduced. The spiritual being of God is further
defined as thinking and willing. His knowledge is absolutely perfect
since he knows himself and all things as appointed by him. Since every
knowing being strives after the thing known as end, will is implied in
knowing. Inasmuch as God knows himself as the perfect good, he wills
himself as end. But in that everything is willed by God, everything is
brought by the divine will to himself in the relation of means to end.
Therein God wills good to every being which exists, that is he loves
it; and, therefore, love is the fundamental relation of God to the
world. If the divine love be thought of simply as act of will, it
exists for every creature in like measure: but if the good assured by
love to the individual be thought of, it exists for different beings
in various degrees. In so far as the loving God gives to every being
what it needs in relation practical reason, affording the idea of the
moral law of nature, so important in medieval ethics.
b. The Summa Part II: Ethics

The first part of the Summa is summed up in the thought that God
governs the world as the universal first cause. God sways the
intellect in that he gives the power to know aid impresses the species
intelligibileson the mind; and he ways the will in that he holds the
good before it as aim, and creates the virtus volendi. To will is
nothing else than a certain inclination toward the object of the
volition which is the universal good. God works all in all, but so
that things also themselves exert their proper efficiency. Here the
Areopagitic ideas of the graduated effects of created things play
their part in Thomas's thought. The second part of the Summa
(consisting of two parts, namely, prima secundae and secundae,
secunda) follows this complex of ideas. Its theme is man's striving
after the highest end, which is the blessedness of the visio beata.
Here Thomas develops his system of ethics, which has its root in
Aristotle. In a chain of acts of will man strives for the highest end.
They are free acts in so far as man has in himself the knowledge of
their end and therein the principle of action. In that the will wills
the end, it wills also the appropriate means, chooses freely and
completes the consensus. Whether the act be good or evil depends on
the end. The "human reason" pronounces judgment concerning the
character of the end, it is, therefore, the law for action. Human
acts, however, are meritorious in so far as they promote the purpose
of God and his honor. By repeating a good action man acquires a moral
habit or a quality which enables him to do the good gladly and easily.
This is true, however, only of the intellectual and moral virtues,
which Thomas treats after the mariner of Aristotle; the theological
virtues are imparted by God to man as a "disposition" from which the
acts here proceed, but while they strengthen, they do not form it. The
"disposition" of evil is the opposite alternative. An act becomes evil
through deviation from the reason and the divine moral law. Therefore,
sin involves two factors: its substance or matter is lust; in form,
however, it is deviation from the divine law. Sin has its origin in
the will, which decides, against the reason, for a changeable good.
Since, however, the will also moves the other powers of man, sin has
its seat in these too. By choosing such a lower good as end, the will
is misled by self-love, so that this works as cause in every sin. God
is not the cause of sin, since, on the contrary, he draws all things
to himself. But from another side God is the cause of all things, so
he is efficacious also in sin as *-ctio but not as ens. The devil is
not directly the cause of sin, but he incites by working on the
imagination and the sensuous impulse of man, as men or things may also
do. Sin is original. Adam's first sin passes upon himself and all the
succeeding race; because he is the head of the human race and "by
virtue of procreation human nature is transmitted and along with
nature its infection." The powers of generation are, therefore,
designated especially as "infected."

In every work of God both justice and mercy are united, and his
justice always presupposes his mercy since he owes no one anything and
gives more bountifully than is due. As God rules in the world, the
"plan of the order of things" preexists in him; i.e., his providence
and the exercise of it in his government are what condition as cause
everything which comes to pass in the world. Hence follows
predestination: from eternity, some are destined to eternal life;
while others "he permits some to fall short of that end." Reprobation,
however, is more than mere foreknowledge; it is the "will of
permitting anyone to fall into sin and incur the penalty of
condemnation for sin." The effect of predestination is grace. Since
God is the first cause of everything, he is the cause of even the free
acts of men through predestination. Determinism is deeply grounded in
the system of Thomas; things with their source of becoming in God are
ordered from eternity as means for the realization of his end in
himself. On moral grounds Thomas advocates freedom energetically; but,
with his premises, he can have in mind only the psychological form of
self-motivation. Nothing in the world is accidental or free, although
it may appear so in reference to the proximate cause. From this point
of view miracles become necessary in themselves and are to be
considered merely as inexplicable to man. From the point of view of
the first cause all is unchangeable; although from the limited point
of view of the secondary cause miracles may be spoken of. In his
doctrine of the Trinity, Thomas starts from the Augustinian system.
Since God has only the functions of thinking and willing, only
twoprocessiones can be asserted from the Father. However, these
establish definite relations of the persons of the Trinity to each
other. The relations must be conceived as real and not as merely
ideal; for, as with creatures relations arise through certain
accidents, since in God there is no accident but all is substance, it
follows that "the relation really existing in God is the same as the
essence according to the thing." From another side, however, the
relations as real must be really distinguished one from another.
Therefore, three persons are to be affirmed in God. Man stands
opposite to God; he consists of soul and body. The "intellectual soul"
consists of intellect and will. Furthermore the soul is the absolutely
indivisible form of man; it is immaterial substance, but not one and
the same in all men (as the Averrhoists assumed). The soul's power of
knowing has two sides; a passive (the intellectus possibilis) and an
active (theintellectus agens). It is the capacity to form concepts and
to abstract the mind's images (species) from the objects perceived by
sense. However, since the abstractions of the intellect from
individual things is a universal, the mind knows the universal
primarily and directly, and knows the singular only indirectly by
virtue of a certain reflection. As certain principles are immanent in
the mind for its speculative activity, so also a "special disposition
of works," or the synderesis (rudiment of conscience), is inborn in
the scholastics. Held to creationism, they therefore taught that the
souls are created by God. Two things according to Thomas constituted
man's righteousness in paradise-the justitia originalis or the harmony
of all man's powers before they were blighted by desire, and the
possession of the gratia gratum faciens(the continuous indwelling
power of good). Both are lost through original sin, which in form is
the "loss of original righteousness." The consequence of this loss is
the disorder and maiming of man's nature, which shows itself in
"ignorance, malice, moral weakness, and especially in concupiscentia,
which is the material principle of original sin." The course of
thought here is as follows: when the first man transgressed the order
of his nature appointed by nature and grace, he, and with him the
human race, lost this order. This negative state is the essence of
original sin. From it follow an impairment and perversion of human
nature in which thenceforth lower aims rule contrary to nature and
release the lower element in man. Since sin is contrary to the divine
order, it is guilt, and subject to punishment. Guilt and punishment
correspond to each other; and since the "apostasy from the invariable
good which is infinite," fulfilled by man, is unending, it merits
everlasting punishment.
c. The Summa Part III: Christ

The way which leads to God is Christ: and Christ is the theme of part
III. It can not be asserted that the incarnation was absolutely
necessary, "since God in his omnipotent power could have repaired
human nature in many other ways": but it was the most suitable way
both for the purpose of instruction and of satisfaction. The unio
between the logos and the human nature is a "relation" between the
divine and the human nature which comes about by both natures being
brought together in the one person of the logos. An incarnation can be
spoken of only in the sense that the human nature began to be in the
eternal hypostasis of the divine nature. So Christ is unum since his
human nature lacks the hypostasis. The person of the logos,
accordingly, has assumed the impersonal human nature, and in such way
that the assumption of the soul became the means for the assumption of
the body. This union with the human soul is the gratia unionis which
leads to the impartation of the gratia habitualis from the logos to
the human nature. Thereby all human potentialities are made perfect in
Jesus. Besides the perfections given by the vision of God, which Jesus
enjoyed from the beginning, he receives all others by the gratia
habitualis. In so far, however, as it is the limited human nature
which receives these perfections, they are finite. This holds both of
the knowledge and the will of Christ. The logos impresses the species
intelligibiles of all created things on the soul, but the intellectus
agens transforms them gradually into the impressions of sense. On
another side, the soul of Christ works miracles only as instrument of
the logos, since omnipotence in no way appertains to this human soul
in itself. Furthermore, Christ's human nature partook of
imperfections, on the one side to make his true humanity evident, on
another side because he would bear the general consequences of sin for
humanity. Christ experienced suffering, but blessedness reigned in his
soul, which, however, did not extend to his body. Concerning
redemption, Thomas teaches that Christ is to be regarded as redeemer
after his human nature but in such way that the human nature produces
divine effects as organ of divinity. The one side of the work of
redemption consists herein, that Christ as head of humanity imparts
perfection and virtue to his members. He is the teacher and example of
humanity; his whole life and suffering as well as his work after he is
exalted serve this end.

This is the first course of thought. Then follows a second complex of
thoughts which has the idea of satisfaction as its center. To be sure,
God as the highest being could forgive sins without satisfaction; but
because his justice and mercy could be best revealed through
satisfaction he chose this way. As little, however, as satisfaction is
necessary in itself, so little does it offer an equivalent, in a
correct sense, for guilt; it is rather a "super-abundant
satisfaction," since on account of the divine subject in Christ in a
certain sense his suffering and activity are infinite. With this
thought the strict logical deduction of Anselm's theory is given up.
Christ's suffering bore personal character in that it proceeded out of
love and obedience. It was an offering brought to God, which as
personal act had the character of merit. Thereby Christ "merited"
salvation for men. As Christ still influences men, so does he still
work in their behalf continually in heaven through the intercession
(interpellatio). In this way Christ as head of humanity effects the
forgiveness of their sins, their reconciliation with God, their
immunity from punishment, deliverance from the devil, and the opening
of heaven's gate. But inasmuch as all these benefits are already
offered through the inner operation of the love of Christ, Thomas has
combined the theories of Anselm and Abelard by joining the one to the
other.
3. The Sacraments

The doctrine of the sacraments follows the Christology; for the
sacraments "have efficacy from the incarnate Word himself." The
sacraments are signs which not only signify sanctification, but also
effect it. That they bring spiritual gifts in sensuous form, moreover,
is inevitable because of the sensuous nature of man. The res sensibles
are the matter, the words of institution are the form of the
sacranieits. Contrary to the Franciscan view that the sacraments are
mere symbol, whose efficacy God accompanies with a directly following
creative act in the soul, Thomas holds it not unfit to say with Hugo
of St. Victor that "a sacrament contains grace," or to teach of the
sacraments that they "cause grace." Thomas attempts to remove the
difficulty of a sensuous thing producing a creative effect by a
distinction between the causa principalis et instrumentalism. God as
the principal cause works through the sensuous thing as the means
ordained by him for his end. "Just as instrumental power is acquired
by the instrument from this, that it is moved by the principal agent,
so also the sacrament obtains spiritual power from the benediction of
Christ and the application of the minister to the use of the
sacrament. There is spiritual power in the sacraments in so far as
they have been ordained by God for a spiritual effect." This spiritual
power remains in the sensuous thing until it has attained its purpose.
Thomas distinguished the gratia sacramentalis from the gratia virtutum
et donorum in that the former in general perfects the essence and the
powers of the soul, and the latter in particular brings to pass
necessary spiritual effects for the Christian life. Although, later
this distinction was ignored.

In a single statement the effect of the sacraments is to infuse
justifying grace into men. Christ's humanity was the instrument for
the operation of his divinity; the sacraments are the instruments
through which this operation of Christ's humanity passes over to men.
Christ's humanity served his divinity as instrumentum conjuncture,
like the hand; the sacraments are instruments separate, like a staff;
the former can use the latter, as the hand can use a staff.

Of Thomas' eschatology, according to the commentary on the
"Sentences," only a brief account can here be given. Everlasting
blessedness consists for Thomas in the vision of God; and this vision
consists not in an abstraction or in a mental image supernaturally
produced, but the divine substance itself is beheld. In such a manner,
God himself becomes immediately the form of the beholding intellect;
that is, God is the object of the vision and at the same time causes
the vision. The perfection of the blessed also demands that the body
be restored to the soul as something to be made perfect by it. Since
blessedness consist in operation, it is made more perfect in that the
soul has a definite opcralio with the body. Although, the peculiar act
of blessedness (that is, the vision of God) has nothing to do with the
body.