Socrates, and a philosopher, Antisthenes presently gains renown from
his status as either a founder or a forerunner of Cynicism. He was the
teacher to Diogenes of Sinope, and he is regarded by Diogenes Laertius
as the first Cynic philosopher. He is credited with the authorship of
over sixty titles, appears as one of the primary interlocutors in
Xenophon's Memorabilia and Symposium, and is mentioned as one of those
present at Socrates' death by Plato, with whom it seems he had a
falling out. Antisthenes' philosophical interests engage ethics rather
than metaphysics or epistemology, and he advocates the practice of
virtue through an ascetic life and the cultivation of wisdom. Like
Socrates before him, Antisthenes adheres to ethical intellectualism,
and like the Stoics who follow the Cynics, he claims that virtue is
sufficient for happiness.
1. Life and Works
It is primarily through Xenophon's dialogues and Diogenes Laertius'
Lives of Eminent Philosophers that certain aspects of Antisthenes'
life and thought are known. These sources are not, however, without
problems: Xenophon is portraying Antisthenes as an interlocutor, which
leads some scholars to question whether this character is in fact
representative of the historical Antisthenes; Diogenes Laertius is
thought of as a dubious source due to his penchant for recounting
contradictory stories from multiple sources. Though each source is
questionable independently, when they are treated in conjunction they
provide a sketch of Antisthenes as both a Socratic and a Cynic
thinker.
Born probably in either 446 or 445 BCE of an Athenian father, also
named Antisthenes, and a Thracian mother, Antisthenes was a nothos,
which means literally someone born of an illegitimate union (due to
being born from a slave, foreigner, or prostitute, or because one's
parents were citizens but not legally married) and therefore was not
an Athenian citizen. Initially he was a pupil of Gorgias the
rhetorician, and the rhetorical sounding titles that are ascribed to
him by Diogenes Laertius almost certainly derive from this first phase
of his career. In fact, of his prolific literary corpus, only his Ajax
and Odysseus are extant, and both offer a demonstration of his
rhetorical training under Gorgias.
After meeting Socrates and deriving great benefit from him,
Antisthenes abandoned his study of rhetoric for philosophy and even
encouraged his own pupils to join him under Socrates' tutelage. His
close friendship with Socrates is well documented in Xenophon's
dialogues, and his importance would have been aided by his position as
an older and esteemed member of Socrates' circle. In the years
immediately following Socrates' death, then, it is likely that
Antisthenes was regarded as Socrates' most important follower (see
Kahn 4-5).
What little is known about Antisthenes' life is marked by both his
asceticism and humor. It is claimed that he was the first to double
his cloak in order to sleep in it, and recommended this to Diogenes of
Sinope (though Diogenes of Sinope is also claimed to be the first to
do so) and that, in addition, he was equipped with those elements that
would later be distinctive of the Cynics: the wallet and the staff. He
chose to live in poverty, and more than one of the surviving anecdotes
surrounds the ragged state of his cloak, usually involving those areas
where the cloak is torn. In addition to eschewing luxuries so many of
his fellow Athenians sought, he demonstrated an ad hoc and
improvisational sense of humor which allowed him to ridicule commonly
held beliefs and the mores of Athenian culture, a practice which would
be perfected by Diogenes of Sinope.
2. Basic Tenets
Xenophon's treatment of Antisthenes combines well with the details
Diogenes Laertius provides of his philosophical position at 6.10-12.
Though the list of his "favorite themes" is lengthy, it represents the
central aspects of his ethical thought. In sum, the basic tenets are:
1. Virtue can be taught.
2. Only the virtuous are noble.
3. Virtue is itself sufficient for happiness, since it requires
"nothing else except the strength of a Socrates" (D.L. 6.11).
4. Virtue is tied to deeds and actions, and does not require a
great deal of words or learning.
5. The wise person is self-sufficient.
6. Having a poor reputation is something good, and is like physical hardship.
7. The law of virtue rather than the laws established by the polis
will determine the public acts of one who is wise.
8. The wise person will marry in order to have children with the best women.
9. The wise person knows who are worthy of love, and so does not
disdain to love.
These themes, revolving as they do around virtue and the activity of
the wise man, bear an unmistakable resemblance to Socrates'
convictions. The teachability of virtue, the emphasis on deeds over
words, and the prominence of erōs are all explicitly found in Socratic
literature. Furthermore, according to Diocles, Antisthenes held virtue
to be the same for men as for women, a position that is echoed, if in
a more inchoate form, in Socratic thought.
Antisthenes' ethical views also, however, represent an innovation, and
do not merely repeat those held by Socrates. First, the unambiguous
statement of virtue as sufficient for happiness is a shift from
Socrates' hedging on this matter. Virtue and happiness are completely
coincident and open to all. Second, he begins to separate morality and
legality in a way that Socrates apparently did not. In Plato's Crito,
Socrates is clear that one is morally obliged to abide by the laws of
one's state, unless one can convince the state to change the laws. The
Cynics show no such regard for nomos, a term which means both law and
convention, whether it is in relation to cultural codes or legal
regulations. By loosening law and virtue Antisthenes sets the stage
for the more radical positions of Diogenes of Sinope and Crates.
Antisthenes takes a stronger position than did Socrates on the
abstention from physical pleasures, claiming, he says, to prefer
madness to pleasure (D.L. 6.3). The pursuit of pleasure is dangerous
insofar as it can recommend precarious activities (as is recounted in
the story of an adulterer fleeing for his life who Antisthenes claims
could have escaped peril "at the price of an obol," but more
importantly, its effect on self-sufficiency is ruinous. One can become
enslaved to pleasure and so lose all hope of being truly free. For
this reason "When someone extolled luxury his reply was, 'May the sons
of your enemies live in luxury'" (D.L. 6.8).
Finally, he is much more obviously anti-theoretical than Socrates.
Whereas Socrates claims to know nothing of theoretical philosophy,
Antisthenes suggests that it is useless. Though the terms are not yet
coined, the distinction is between metaphysics and ethics, and
Antisthenes focuses upon the latter only. His privileging of practice
over learning, or deeds over words, is clearly anti-theoretical, but
it should not be viewed as opposed to reason. Reason, for Antisthenes,
is the foundation of virtue. "Wisdom is a most sure stronghold which
never crumbles away nor is betrayed. Walls of defense must be
constructed in our own impregnable reasonings" (D.L. 6.13).
Antisthenes' caution against pleasure, his praise of poverty, and his
privileging of reason will be palpable in the Cynics who follow him
and Stoic cultivation of indifference.
3. Philosophical Influence
Antisthenes' influence is primarily upon the "school" of Cynicism,
both as a precursor and originator. Antisthenes' life and thought
provide a connection between Socrates and the Cynics. Diogenes
Laertius makes just this point: "From Socrates he learned his
hardihood, emulating his disregard of feeling, and thus he inaugurated
the Cynic way of life"(D.L. 6.2). Some scholars are more dubious.
Dudley, for example, claims that Antisthenes was a follower of
Socrates, and nothing more. The attribution of "first Cynic" to
Antisthenes is, on Dudley's account, merely an invention of the
Alexandrian writers of Successions meant to give the Stoic school the
proper Socratic pedigree.
Branham and Goulet-Cazé propose that Antisthenes be considered a
"forerunner" (The Cynics 7), and Navia claims that "in both
Antisthenes and Diogenes we come upon one reaction to the problem of
human existence, and one radical solution… for Cynicism emerged among
the Greeks from both, as if from twin sources" (Classical Cynicism
67). The subtler approaches of Branham, Goulet-Cazé, and Navia grasp
the impossibility of resolving the debate. The sources of antiquity
have combined the tradition of Diogenes with that of Antisthenes.
Thus, the Cynic movement is viewed as having begun with the Socratic
ethical practices of Antisthenes, practices which receive their more
robust instantiations through the life of Diogenes of Sinope.
The claim that Antisthenes had no connection to the Cynics is, given
Antisthenes' unique ethical position, tenuous. Antisthenes endorses
the Socratic position, but contributes his own understanding of virtue
and his insistence upon the importance of askēsis. His asceticism is
comparable to that of Socrates, but his animosity toward pleasure and
his pride in his poverty resembles better the position of later
Cynics. Finally, the privileging of virtue and the claim that virtue
is itself sufficient for happiness will be central to Stoic ethics.
"Antisthenes gave the impulse to the indifference of Diogenes, the
continence of Crates, and the hardihood of Zeno, himself laying the
foundations of their state" (D.L. 6.15).
4. References and Further Reading
* Billerbeck, Margarethe. Die Kyniker in der modernen Forschung.
Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 1991.
* Branham, Bracht and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, eds. The Cynics:
The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1996.
* Dudley, D. R. A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th
Century A.D. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937.
* Goulet-Cazé, Marie-Odile and Richard Goulet, eds. Le Cynisme
ancien et ses prolongements. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1993.
* Kahn, Charles H. Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The
Philosophical Use of a Literary Form. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996.
* Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers Vol. I-II.
Trans. R.D. Hicks. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.
* Long, A.A. and David N. Sedley, eds. The Hellenistic
Philosophers, Volume 1and Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987.
* Malherbe, Abraham J., ed. and trans. The Cynic Epistles.
Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1977.
* Navia, Luis E. Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study. Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996.
* Navia, Luis E. Antisthenes of Athens. Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 2001.
* Paquet, Léonce. Les Cyniques grecs: fragments et témoignages.
Ottawa: Presses de l'Universitaire d'Ottawa, 1988.
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