radical. He is primarily known today for his moral philosophy,
especially his principle of utilitarianism, which evaluates actions
based upon their consequences. The relevant consequences, in
particular, are the overall happiness created for everyone affected by
the action. Influenced by many enlightenment thinkers, especially
empiricists such as John Locke and David Hume, Bentham developed an
ethical theory grounded in a largely empiricist account of human
nature. He famously held a hedonistic account of both motivation and
value according to which what is fundamentally valuable and what
ultimately motivates us is pleasure and pain. Happiness, according to
Bentham, is thus a matter of experiencing pleasure and lack of pain.
Although he never practiced law, Bentham did write a great deal of
philosophy of law, spending most of his life critiquing the existing
law and strongly advocating legal reform. Throughout his work, he
critiques various natural accounts of law which claim, for example,
that liberty, rights, and so on exist independent of government. In
this way, Bentham arguably developed an early form of what is now
often called "legal positivism." Beyond such critiques, he ultimately
maintained that putting his moral theory into consistent practice
would yield results in legal theory by providing justification for
social, political, and legal institutions.
Bentham's influence was minor during his life. But his impact was
greater in later years as his ideas were carried on by followers such
as John Stuart Mill, John Austin, and other consequentialists.
1. Life
A leading theorist in Anglo-American philosophy of law and one of the
founders of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham was born in Houndsditch,
London on February 15, 1748. He was the son and grandson of attorneys,
and his early family life was colored by a mix of pious superstition
(on his mother's side) and Enlightenment rationalism (from his
father). Bentham lived during a time of major social, political and
economic change. The Industrial Revolution (with the massive economic
and social shifts that it brought in its wake), the rise of the middle
class, and revolutions in France and America all were reflected in
Bentham's reflections on existing institutions. In 1760, Bentham
entered Queen's College, Oxford and, upon graduation in 1764, studied
law at Lincoln's Inn. Though qualified to practice law, he never did
so. Instead, he devoted most of his life to writing on matters of
legal reform—though, curiously, he made little effort to publish much
of what he wrote.
Bentham spent his time in intense study, often writing some eight to
twelve hours a day. While most of his best known work deals with
theoretical questions in law, Bentham was an active polemicist and was
engaged for some time in developing projects that proposed various
practical ideas for the reform of social institutions. Although his
work came to have an important influence on political philosophy,
Bentham did not write any single text giving the essential principles
of his views on this topic. His most important theoretical work is the
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), in
which much of his moral theory—which he said reflected "the greatest
happiness principle"—is described and developed.
In 1781, Bentham became associated with the Earl of Shelburne and,
through him, came into contact with a number of the leading Whig
politicians and lawyers. Although his work was admired by some at the
time, Bentham's ideas were still largely unappreciated. In 1785, he
briefly joined his brother Samuel in Russia, where he pursued his
writing with even more than his usual intensity, and he devised a plan
for the now infamous "Panopticon"—a model prison where all prisoners
would be observable by (unseen) guards at all times—a project which he
had hoped would interest the Czarina Catherine the Great. After his
return to England in 1788, and for some 20 years thereafter, Bentham
pursued—fruitlessly and at great expense—the idea of the panopticon.
Fortunately, an inheritance received in 1796 provided him with
financial stability. By the late 1790s, Bentham's theoretical work
came to have a more significant place in political reform. Still, his
influence was, arguably, still greater on the continent. (Bentham was
made an honorary citizen of the fledgling French Republic in 1792, and
his The Theory of Legislation was published first, in French, by his
Swiss disciple, Etienne Dumont, in 1802.)
The precise extent of Bentham's influence in British politics has been
a matter of some debate. While he attacked both Tory and Whig
policies, both the Reform Bill of 1832 (promoted by Bentham's
disciple, Lord Henry Brougham) and later reforms in the century (such
as the secret ballot, advocated by Bentham's friend, George Grote, who
was elected to parliament in 1832) reflected Benthamite concerns. The
impact of Bentham's ideas goes further still. Contemporary
philosophical and economic vocabulary (for example, "international,"
"maximize," "minimize," and "codification") is indebted to Bentham's
proclivity for inventing terms, and among his other disciples were
James Mill and his son, John (who was responsible for an early edition
of some of Bentham's manuscripts), as well as the legal theorist, John
Austin.
At his death in London, on June 6, 1832, Bentham left literally tens
of thousands of manuscript pages—some of which was work only sketched
out, but all of which he hoped would be prepared for publication. He
also left a large estate, which was used to finance the
newly-established University College, London (for those individuals
excluded from university education—that is, non-conformists, Catholics
and Jews), and his cadaver, per his instructions, was dissected,
embalmed, dressed, and placed in a chair, and to this day resides in a
cabinet in a corridor of the main building of University College. The
Bentham Project, set up in the early 1960s at University College, has
as its aim the publishing of a definitive, scholarly edition of
Bentham's works and correspondence.
2. Method
Influenced by the philosophes of the Enlightenment (such as Beccaria,
Helvétius, Diderot, D'Alembert, and Voltaire) and also by Locke and
Hume, Bentham's work combined an empiricist approach with a
rationalism that emphasized conceptual clarity and deductive argument.
Locke's influence was primarily as the author of the Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, and Bentham saw in him a model of one
who emphasized the importance of reason over custom and tradition and
who insisted on precision in the use of terms. Hume's influence was
not so much on Bentham's method as on his account of the underlying
principles of psychological associationism and on his articulation of
the principle of utility, which was then still often annexed to
theological views.
Bentham's analytical and empirical method is especially obvious when
one looks at some of his main criticisms of the law and of moral and
political discourse in general. His principal target was the presence
of "fictions"—in particular, legal fictions. On his view, to consider
any part or aspect of a thing in abstraction from that thing is to run
the risk of confusion or to cause positive deceit. While, in some
cases, such "fictional" terms as "relation," "right," "power," and
"possession" were of some use, in many cases their original warrant
had been forgotten, so that they survived as the product of either
prejudice or inattention. In those cases where the terms could be
"cashed out" in terms of the properties of real things, they could
continue to be used, but otherwise they were to be abandoned. Still,
Bentham hoped to eliminate legal fictions as far as possible from the
law, including the legal fiction that there was some original contract
that explained why there was any law at all. He thought that, at the
very least, clarifications and justifications could be given that
avoided the use of such terms.
3. Human Nature
For Bentham, morals and legislation can be described scientifically,
but such a description requires an account of human nature. Just as
nature is explained through reference to the laws of physics, so human
behavior can be explained by reference to the two primary motives of
pleasure and pain; this is the theory of psychological hedonism.
There is, Bentham admits, no direct proof of such an analysis of human
motivation—though he holds that it is clear that, in acting, all
people implicitly refer to it. At the beginning of the Introduction to
the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham writes:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we
ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand
the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and
effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in
all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our
subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. (Ch. 1)
From this we see that, for Bentham, pleasure and pain serve not only
as explanations for action, but they also define one's good. It is, in
short, on the basis of pleasures and pains, which can exist only in
individuals, that Bentham thought one could construct a calculus of
value.
Related to this fundamental hedonism is a view of the individual as
exhibiting a natural, rational self-interest—a psychological egoism.
In his "Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy" (1833), Mill cites Bentham's
The Book of Fallacies (London: Hunt, 1824, pp. 392-3) that "[i]n every
human breast… self-regarding interest is predominant over social
interest; each person's own individual interest over the interests of
all other persons taken together." Fundamental to the nature and
activity of individuals, then, is their own well-being, and reason—as
a natural capability of the person—is considered to be subservient to
this end.
Bentham believed that the nature of the human person can be adequately
described without mention of social relationships. To begin with, the
idea of "relation" is but a "fictitious entity," though necessary for
"convenience of discourse." And, more specifically, he remarks that
"the community is a fictitious body," and it is but "the sum of the
interests of the several members who compose it." Thus, the extension
of the term "individual" is, in the main, no greater and no less than
the biological entity. Bentham's view, then, is that the
individual—the basic unit of the social sphere—is an "atom" and there
is no "self" or "individual" greater than the human individual. A
person's relations with others—even if important—are not essential and
describe nothing that is, strictly speaking, necessary to its being
what it is.
Finally, the picture of the human person presented by Bentham is based
on a psychological associationism indebted to David Hartley and Hume;
Bentham's analysis of "habit" (which is essential to his understanding
of society and especially political society) particularly reflects
associationist presuppositions. On this view, pleasure and pain are
objective states and can be measured in terms of their intensity,
duration, certainty, proximity, fecundity and purity. This allows both
for an objective determination of an activity or state and for a
comparison with others.
Bentham's understanding of human nature reveals, in short, a
psychological, ontological, and also moral individualism where, to
extend the critique of utilitarianism made by Graeme Duncan and John
Gray (1979), "the individual human being is conceived as the source of
values and as himself the supreme value."
4. Moral Philosophy
As Elie Halévy (1904) notes, there are three principal characteristics
of which constitute the basis of Bentham's moral and political
philosophy: (i) the greatest happiness principle, (ii) universal
egoism and (iii) the artificial identification of one's interests with
those of others. Though these characteristics are present throughout
his work, they are particularly evident in the Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation, where Bentham is concerned with
articulating rational principles that would provide a basis and guide
for legal, social and moral reform.
To begin with, Bentham's moral philosophy reflects what he calls at
different times "the greatest happiness principle" or "the principle
of utility"—a term which he borrows from Hume. In adverting to this
principle, however, he was not referring to just the usefulness of
things or actions, but to the extent to which these things or actions
promote the general happiness. Specifically, then, what is morally
obligatory is that which produces the greatest amount of happiness for
the greatest number of people, happiness being determined by reference
to the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. Thus, Bentham
writes, "By the principle of utility is meant that principle which
approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the
tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness
of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing
in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness." And Bentham
emphasizes that this applies to "every action whatsoever" (Ch. 1).
That which does not maximize the greatest happiness (such as an act of
pure ascetic sacrifice) is, therefore, morally wrong. (Unlike some of
the previous attempts at articulating a universal hedonism, Bentham's
approach is thoroughly naturalistic.)
Bentham's moral philosophy, then, clearly reflects his psychological
view that the primary motivators in human beings are pleasure and
pain. Bentham admits that his version of the principle of utility is
something that does not admit of direct proof, but he notes that this
is not a problem as some explanatory principles do not admit of any
such proof and all explanation must start somewhere. But this, by
itself, does not explain why another's happiness—or the general
happiness—should count. And, in fact, he provides a number of
suggestions that could serve as answers to the question of why we
should be concerned with the happiness of others.
First, Bentham says, the principle of utility is something to which
individuals, in acting, refer either explicitly or implicitly, and
this is something that can be ascertained and confirmed by simple
observation. Indeed, Bentham held that all existing systems of
morality can be "reduced to the principles of sympathy and antipathy,"
which is precisely that which defines utility. A second argument found
in Bentham is that, if pleasure is the good, then it is good
irrespective of whose pleasure it is. Thus, a moral injunction to
pursue or maximize pleasure has force independently of the specific
interests of the person acting. Bentham also suggests that individuals
would reasonably seek the general happiness simply because the
interests of others are inextricably bound up with their own, though
he recognized that this is something that is easy for individuals to
ignore. Nevertheless, Bentham envisages a solution to this as well.
Specifically, he proposes that making this identification of interests
obvious and, when necessary, bringing diverse interests together would
be the responsibility of the legislator.
Finally, Bentham held that there are advantages to a moral philosophy
based on a principle of utility. To begin with, the principle of
utility is clear (compared to other moral principles), allows for
objective and disinterested public discussion, and enables decisions
to be made where there seem to be conflicts of (prima facie)
legitimate interests. Moreover, in calculating the pleasures and pains
involved in carrying out a course of action (the "hedonic calculus"),
there is a fundamental commitment to human equality. The principle of
utility presupposes that "one man is worth just the same as another
man" and so there is a guarantee that in calculating the greatest
happiness "each person is to count for one and no one for more than
one."
For Bentham, then, there is no inconsistency between the greatest
happiness principle and his psychological hedonism and egoism. Thus,
he writes that moral philosophy or ethics can be simply described as
"the art of directing men's action to the production of the greatest
possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is
in view."
5. Political Philosophy
Bentham was regarded as the central figure of a group of intellectuals
called, by Elie Halévy (1904), "the philosophic radicals," of which
both Mill and Herbert Spencer can be counted among the "spiritual
descendants." While it would be too strong to claim that the ideas of
the philosophic radicals reflected a common political theory, it is
nevertheless correct to say that they agreed that many of the social
problems of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century England were
due to an antiquated legal system and to the control of the economy by
a hereditary landed gentry opposed to modern capitalist institutions.
As discussed in the preceding section, for Bentham, the principles
that govern morals also govern politics and law, and political reform
requires a clear understanding of human nature. While he develops a
number of principles already present in Anglo-Saxon political
philosophy, he breaks with that tradition in significant ways.
In his earliest work, A Fragment on Government (1776), which is an
excerpt from a longer work published only in 1928 as Comment on
Blackstone's Commentaries, Bentham attacked the legal theory of Sir
William Blackstone. Bentham's target was, primarily, Blackstone's
defense of tradition in law. Bentham advocated the rational revision
of the legal system, a restructuring of the process of determining
responsibility and of punishment, and a more extensive freedom of
contract. This, he believed, would favor not only the development of
the community, but the personal development of the individual.
Bentham's attack on Blackstone targeted more than the latter's use of
tradition however. Against Blackstone and a number of earlier thinkers
(including Locke), Bentham repudiated many of the concepts underlying
their political philosophies, such as natural right, state of nature,
and social contract. Bentham then attempted to outline positive
alternatives to the preceding "traditionalisms." Not only did he work
to reform and restructure existing institutions, but he promoted
broader suffrage and self (that is, representative) government.
a. Law, Liberty and Government
The notion of liberty present in Bentham's account is what is now
generally referred to as "negative" liberty—freedom from external
restraint or compulsion. Bentham says that "[l]iberty is the absence
of restraint" and so, to the extent that one is not hindered by
others, one has liberty and is "free." Bentham denies that liberty is
"natural" (in the sense of existing "prior to" social life and thereby
imposing limits on the state) or that there is an a priori sphere of
liberty in which the individual is sovereign. In fact, Bentham holds
that people have always lived in society, and so there can be no state
of nature (though he does distinguish between political society and
"natural society") and no "social contract" (a notion which he held
was not only unhistorical but pernicious). Nevertheless, he does note
that there is an important distinction between one's public and
private life that has morally significant consequences, and he holds
that liberty is a good—that, even though it is not something that is a
fundamental value, it reflects the greatest happiness principle.
Correlative with this account of liberty, Bentham (as Thomas Hobbes
before him) viewed law as "negative." Given that pleasure and pain are
fundamental to—indeed, provide—the standard of value for Bentham,
liberty is a good (because it is "pleasant") and the restriction of
liberty is an evil (because it is "painful"). Law, which is by its
very nature a restriction of liberty and painful to those whose
freedom is restricted, is a prima facie evil. It is only so far as
control by the state is limited that the individual is free. Law is,
Bentham recognized, necessary to social order and good laws are
clearly essential to good government. Indeed, perhaps more than Locke,
Bentham saw the positive role to be played by law and government,
particularly in achieving community well-being. To the extent that law
advances and protects one's economic and personal goods and that what
government exists is self-government, law reflects the interests of
the individual.
Unlike many earlier thinkers, Bentham held that law is not rooted in a
"natural law" but is simply a command expressing the will of the
sovereign. (This account of law, later developed by Austin, is
characteristic of legal positivism.) Thus, a law that commands morally
questionable or morally evil actions, or that is not based on consent,
is still law.
b. Rights
Bentham's views on rights are, perhaps, best known through the attacks
on the concept of "natural rights" that appear throughout his work.
These criticisms are especially developed in his Anarchical Fallacies
(a polemical attack on the declarations of rights issued in France
during the French Revolution), written between 1791 and 1795 but not
published until 1816, in French. Bentham's criticisms here are rooted
in his understanding of the nature of law. Rights are created by the
law, and law is simply a command of the sovereign. The existence of
law and rights, therefore, requires government. Rights are also
usually (though not necessarily) correlative with duties determined by
the law and, as in Hobbes, are either those which the law explicitly
gives us or those within a legal system where the law is silent. The
view that there could be rights not based on sovereign command and
which pre-exist the establishment of government is rejected.
According to Bentham, then, the term "natural right" is a "perversion
of language." It is "ambiguous," "sentimental" and "figurative" and it
has anarchical consequences. At best, such a "right" may tell us what
we ought to do; it cannot serve as a legal restriction on what we can
or cannot do. The term "natural right" is ambiguous, Bentham says,
because it suggests that there are general rights—that is, rights over
no specific object—so that one would have a claim on whatever one
chooses. The effect of exercising such a universal, natural "right"
would be to extinguish the right altogether, since "what is every
man's right is no man's right." No legal system could function with
such a broad conception of rights. Thus, there cannot be any general
rights in the sense suggested by the French declarations.
Moreover, the notion of natural rights is figurative. Properly
speaking, there are no rights anterior to government. The assumption
of the existence of such rights, Bentham says, seems to be derived
from the theory of the social contract. Here, individuals form a
society and choose a government through the alienation of certain of
their rights. But such a doctrine is not only unhistorical, according
to Bentham, it does not even serve as a useful fiction to explain the
origin of political authority. Governments arise by habit or by force,
and for contracts (and, specifically, some original contract) to bind,
there must already be a government in place to enforce them.
Finally, the idea of a natural right is "anarchical." Such a right,
Bentham claims, entails a freedom from all restraint and, in
particular, from all legal restraint. Since a natural right would be
anterior to law, it could not be limited by law, and (since human
beings are motivated by self-interest) if everyone had such freedom,
the result would be pure anarchy. To have a right in any meaningful
sense entails that others cannot legitimately interfere with one's
rights, and this implies that rights must be capable of enforcement.
Such restriction, as noted earlier, is the province of the law.
Bentham concludes, therefore, that the term "natural rights" is
"simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical
nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts." Rights—what Bentham calls "real"
rights—are fundamentally legal rights. All rights must be legal and
specific (that is, having both a specific object and subject). They
ought to be made because of their conduciveness to "the general mass
of felicity," and correlatively, when their abolition would be to the
advantage of society, rights ought to be abolished. So far as rights
exist in law, they are protected; outside of law, they are at best
"reasons for wishing there were such things as rights." While
Bentham's essays against natural rights are largely polemical, many of
his objections continue to be influential in contemporary political
philosophy.
Nevertheless, Bentham did not dismiss talk of rights altogether. There
are some services that are essential to the happiness of human beings
and that cannot be left to others to fulfill as they see fit, and so
these individuals must be compelled, on pain of punishment, to fulfill
them. They must, in other words, respect the rights of others. Thus,
although Bentham was generally suspicious of the concept of rights, he
does allow that the term is useful, and in such work as A General View
of a Complete Code of Laws, he enumerates a large number of rights.
While the meaning he assigns to these rights is largely stipulative
rather than descriptive, they clearly reflect principles defended
throughout his work.
There has been some debate over the extent to which the rights that
Bentham defends are based on or reducible to duties or obligations,
whether he can consistently maintain that such duties or obligations
are based on the principle of utility, and whether the existence of
what Bentham calls "permissive rights"—rights one has where the law is
silent—is consistent with his general utilitarian view. This latter
point has been discussed at length by H.L.A. Hart (1973) and David
Lyons (1969).
6. References and Further Reading
a. Bentham's Works
The standard edition of Bentham's writings is The Works of Jeremy
Bentham, (ed. John Bowring), London, 1838-1843; Reprinted New York,
1962. The contents are as follows:
* Volume 1: Introduction; An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation; Essay on the Promulgation of Laws, Essay on
the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation, A Table of
the Springs of Action, A Fragment on Government: or A Comment on the
Commentaries; Principles of the Civil Code; Principles of Penal Law
* Volume 2: Principles of Judicial Procedure, with the outlines of
a Procedural Code; The Rationale of Reward; Leading Principles of a
Constitutional Code, for any state; On the Liberty of the Press, and
public discussion; The Book of Fallacies, from unfinished papers;
Anarchical Fallacies; Principles of International Law; A Protest
Against Law Taxes; Supply without Burden; Tax with Monopoly
* Volume 3: Defence of Usury; A Manual of Political Economy;
Observations on the Restrictive and Prohibitory Commercial System; A
Plan for saving all trouble and expense in the transfer of stock; A
General View of a Complete Code of Laws; Pannomial Fragments;
Nomography, or the art of inditing laws; Equal Dispatch Court Bill;
Plan of Parliamentary Reform, in the form of a catechism; Radical
Reform Bill; Radicalism Not Dangerous
* Volume 4: A View of the Hard Labour Bill; Panopticon, or, the
inspection house; Panopticon versus New South Wales; A Plea for the
Constitution; Draught of a Code for the Organisation of Judicial
Establishment in France; Bentham's Draught for the Organisation of
Judicial Establishments, compared with that of a national assembly;
Emancipate Your Colonies; Jeremy Bentham to his Fellow Citizens of
France, on houses of peers and Senates; Papers Relative to
Codification and Public Instruction; Codification Proposal
* Volume 5: Scotch Reform; Summary View of the Plan of a
Judiciary, under the name of the court of lord's delegates; The
Elements of the Art of Packing; "Swear Not At All"; Truth versus
Ashhurst; The King against Edmonds and Others; The King against Sir
Charles Wolseley and Joseph Harrison; Optical Aptitude Maximized,
Expense Minimized; A Commentary on Mr Humphreys' Real Property Code;
Outline of a Plan of a General Register of Real Property; Justice and
Codification Petitions; Lord Brougham Displayed
* Volume 6: An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence;
Rationale of Judicial Evidence, specially applied to English Practice,
Books I-IV
* Volume 7: Rationale of Judicial Evidence, specially applied to
English Practice, Books V-X
* Volume 8: Chrestomathia; A Fragment on Ontology; Essay on Logic;
Essay on Language; Fragments on Universal Grammar; Tracts on Poor Laws
and Pauper Management; Observations on the Poor Bill; Three Tracts
Relative to Spanish and Portuguese Affairs; Letters to Count Toreno,
on the proposed penal code; Securities against Misrule
* Volume 9: The Constitutional Code
* Volume 10: Memoirs of Bentham, Chapters I-XXII
* Volume 11: Memoirs of Bentham, Chapters XXIII-XXVI; Analytical Index
A new edition of Bentham's Works is being prepared by The Bentham
Project at University College, University of London. This edition
includes:
* The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham, Ed. Timothy L. S. Sprigge,
10 vols., London : Athlone Press, 1968-1984. [Vol. 3 edited by I.R.
Christie; Vol. 4-5 edited by Alexander Taylor Milne; Vol. 6-7 edited
by J.R. Dinwiddy; Vol. 8 edited by Stephen Conway].
* An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ed.
J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, London: The Athlone Press, 1970.
* Of Laws in General. London: Athlone Press, 1970.
* A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government, Ed.
J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, London: The Athlone Press, 1977.
* Chrestomathia, Ed. M. J. Smith, and W. H. Burston, Oxford/New
York : Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1983.
* Deontology ; together with A Table of the Springs of Action ;
and the Article on Utilitarianism. Ed. Amnon Goldworth, Oxford/New
York : Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1983.
* Constitutional Code : vol. I . Ed. F. Rosen and J. H. Burns,
Oxford/New York : Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1983.
* Securities Against Misrule and Other Constitutional Writings for
Tripoli and Greece. Ed. Philip Schofield, Oxford/New York : Clarendon
Press ; Oxford University Press, 1990.
* Official Aptitude Maximized : Expense Minimized. Ed. Philip
Schofield, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1993.
* Colonies, Commerce, and Constitutional Law : Rid Yourselves of
Ultramaria and Other Writings on Spain and Spanish America. Ed. Philip
Schofield, Oxford/New York : Clarendon Press ; Oxford University
Press, 1995.
b. Secondary Sources
* Duncan, Graeme & Gray, John. "The Left Against Mill," in New
Essays on John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism, Eds. Wesley E. Cooper,
Kai Nielsen and Steven C. Patten, 1979.
* Halévy, Elie. La formation du radicalisme philosophique, 3 vols.
Paris, 1904 [The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism. Tr. Mary Morris.
London: Faber & Faber, 1928.]
* Harrison, Ross. Bentham. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983.
* Hart, H.L.A. "Bentham on Legal Rights," in Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence (second series), ed. A.W.B. Simpson (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 171-201.
* Lyons, David. "Rights, Claimants and Beneficiaries," in American
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 6 (1969), pp. 173-185.
* MacCunn, John. Six Radical Thinkers, second impression, London, 1910.
* Mack, Mary Peter. Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideas 1748-1792.
London: Heinemann, 1962.
* Manning, D.J. The Mind of Jeremy Bentham, London: Longmans, 1968.
* Plamenatz, John. The English Utilitarians. Oxford, 1949.
* Stephen, Leslie. The English Utilitarians. 3 vols., London:
Duckworth, 1900.
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