century British Empiricists (see John Locke and David Hume). He is
best known for his motto, esse is percipi, to be is to be perceived.
He was an idealist: everything that exists is either a mind or depends
for its existence upon a mind. He was an immaterialist: matter does
not exist. He accepted the seemingly outrageous position that ordinary
physical objects are composed solely of ideas, which are inherently
mental. He wrote on vision, mathematics, Newtonian mechanics,
economics, and medicine as well as philosophy. In his own time, his
most often-read works concerned the medicinal value of tar-water. And
in a curious sense, he was the first great American philosopher.
1. Life and Works
George Berkeley was born in or near Kilkenny, Ireland on 12 March
1685. He was raised in Dysart Castle. Although his father was English,
Berkeley always considered himself Irish. In 1696, he entered Kilkenny
College. He entered Trinity College, Dublin on 21 March 1700 and
received his B.A. in 1704. He remained associated with Trinity College
until 1724. In 1706 he competed for a College Fellowship which had
become available and became a Junior Fellow on 9 June 1707. After
completing his doctorate, he became a Senior Fellow in 1717. As was
common practice for British academics at the time, Berkeley was
ordained as an Anglican priest in 1710.
The works for which Berkeley is best known were written during his
Trinity College period. In 1709, he published An Essay towards a New
Theory of Vision. In 1710, he published A Treatise concerning the
Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I. In 1712, he published Passive
Obedience, which focuses on moral and political philosophy. In 1713,
he published Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. In 1721, he
published De Motu. In addition, there is a set of notebooks, often
called the Philosophical Commentaries (PC), that covers the period
during which he developed his idealism and immaterialism. These were
personal notebooks, and he never intended to publish them.
While Berkeley was associated with Trinity College until 1724, he was
not continuously in residence. In 1713, he left for London, in part to
arrange publication for the Three Dialogues. He befriended some of the
intellectual lights of the time, including Jonathan Swift, Joseph
Addison, Richard Steele, and Alexander Pope. He contributed several
articles against free-thinking (agnosticism) to Steele's Guardian.
Since the articles were unsigned, disagreement remains regarding which
articles Berkeley wrote. He was the chaplain to Lord Peterborough
during his 1713-1714 continental tour. There is some evidence that
Berkeley met the French philosopher Nicholas Malebranche during that
tour, although the popular myth that their conversation occasioned
Malebranche's death is false: Malebranche died in 1715. He was the
chaperone of young St. George Ashe, son of the Trinity College
provost, during his continental tour from 1716-21. It was during this
tour that Berkeley later claimed to have lost the manuscript to the
second part of the Principles (Works 2:282). He observed the eruption
of Mount Vesuvius in 1717 and sent a description of it to the Royal
Society (Works 4:247-250). While in Lyon, France in 1720, Berkeley
wrote De Motu, an essay on motion which reflects his scientific
instrumentalism. The manuscript was Berkeley's entry for a
dissertation prize sponsored by the French Academy. It did not win.
In May 1724, Berkeley became Anglican dean of Londonderry and resigned
his position at Trinity College. He was never a dean in residence.
Between 1722 and 1728, Berkeley developed a plan to establish a
seminary in Bermuda for the sons of colonists and Native Americans. He
actively lobbied for his project. He obtained a charter for the
college, private contributions, and a promise for a grant of £20,000
from the British Parliament. After marrying Anne Foster on August 1,
1728, he and his bride departed for America in September 1728. He
settled near Newport, Rhode Island, waiting for the promised grant. He
bought a farm and built a house named Whitehall, which is still
standing. He was an active cleric during his stay in Rhode Island. He
was in contact with some of the leading American intellectuals of the
time, including Samuel Johnson, who became the first president of
King's College (now Columbia University). He wrote the bulk of
Alciphron, his defense of Christianity against free-thinking, while in
America. In early 1731, Edmund Gibson, the Bishop of London, informed
Berkeley that Sir Robert Walpole had informed him that there was
little likelihood that the promised grant would be paid. Berkeley
returned to London in October 1731. Before leaving America he divided
his library between the Harvard and Yale libraries, and he gave his
farm to Yale.
After his return to London, Berkeley published A Sermon before the
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (1732),
Alciphron: or the Minute Philosopher (1732), The Theory of Vision, or
Visual Language shewing the immediate Presence and Providence of A
Deity, Vindicated and Explained (1733), The Analyst; or, a Discourse
Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician (1734), A Defense of
Free-Thinking in Mathematics (1735), Reasons for not Replying to Mr
Walton's Full Answer (1735), as well as revised editions of the
Principles and the Dialogues (1734). The revisions of the Principles
and Dialogues contain Berkeley's scant remarks on the nature and one's
knowledge of mind (notions).
While the Bermuda Project was a practical failure, it increased
Berkeley's reputation as a religious leader. It is considered
partially responsible for his appointment as Bishop of Cloyne in
January 1734. In February 1734 he resigned as Dean of Londonderry. He
was consecrated Bishop of Cloyne in St. Paul's Church, Dublin, on 19
May 1734.
Berkeley was a good bishop. As bishop of an economically poor Anglican
diocese in a predominantly Roman Catholic country, he was committed to
the well-being of both Protestants and Catholics. He established a
school to teach spinning, and he attempted to establish the
manufacture of linen. His Querist (1735-1737) concerns economic and
social issues germane to Ireland. Among other things, it contains a
proposal for monetary reform. His Siris (1744) prefaces his
philosophical discussions with an account of the medicinal value of
tar water. The relationship of Siris to his early philosophy continues
to be a matter of scholarly discussion.
Except for a trip to Dublin in 1737 to address the Irish House of
Lords and a trip to Kilkenny in 1750 to visit family, he was
continually in Cloyne until his retirement. In August 1752, Berkeley
and his family left Cloyne for Oxford, ostensibly to oversee the
education of his son George. While at Oxford, he arranged for the
republication of his Alciphron and the publication of his Miscellany,
a collection of essays on various subjects. He died on January 14,
1753 while his wife was reading him a sermon. In keeping with his
will, his body was "kept five days above ground, … even till it grow
offensive by the cadaverous smell" (Works 8:381), a provision that was
intended to prevent premature burial. (This was the age in which some
caskets were fitted with bells above ground so the "dead" could "ring
up" if their beneficiaries had been a bit hasty.)
2. Essays on Vision
In 1709, Berkeley published An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision
(NTV). This is an empirical account of the perception of distance,
magnitude, and figure. The New Theory of Vision does not presuppose
immaterialism, and, although Berkeley held that it was connected with
his later works, the degree of connection is hotly contested among
scholars. Berkeley also discusses vision in Dialogue 4 of Alciphron
(1732), and, in reply to a set of objections, in the Theory of Vision
…Vindicated (TVV). He alludes to his account of vision in the
Principles of Human Knowledge (PHK §§42-44) and the Three Dialogues
(DHP1 201-203).
Berkeley's objective in the New Theory of Vision was "to shew the
manner wherein we perceive by sight the distance, magnitude, and
situation of objects. Also to consider the difference there is betwixt
the ideas of sight and touch, and whether there be any idea common to
both senses" (NTV §1). Berkeley agrees with other writers on optics
that distance is not immediately seen (NTV §2) and recounts the
positions of earlier writers. Some held that we correlate our current
perceptions with earlier perceptions and judge that the objects are
distant because we had experienced the large size of intermediate
objects, or because the objects which now appear small and faint had
earlier appeared large and vigorous (NTV §3). Some, such as Descartes,
held that distance is judged by a natural geometry based on the angles
between the perceived object and the eyes or on the angles of the rays
of light that fall upon the eye (NTV §§4 and 6, and Works 1:237-238;
Descartes 1:170). Berkeley rejects those accounts.
When one perceives mediately, one perceives one idea by means of
perceiving another (NTV §9), for example, one perceives that someone
is frightened by perceiving the paleness of her face (NTV §10).
Empirically, the geometrical account fails, since one perceives
neither the requisite lines, nor angles, nor rays as such (NTV
§§12-15), even though such mathematical computations can be useful in
determining the apparent distance or magnitude of an object (NTV §§
38, 78; TVV §58). So, what are the immediate ideas that mediate the
perception of distance? First, there are the kinesthetic sensations
associated with focusing the eyes when perceiving objects at various
distances (NTV §16). Second, as objects are brought closer to the eye,
their appearance becomes more confused (blurred or double, NTV §21).
Third, as an object approaches the eyes, the degree of confusion can
be mitigated by straining the eyes, which is recognized by kinesthetic
sensations (NTV §27). In each case, there is no necessary connection
between the ideas and distance; there is merely a customary connection
between two types of ideas (NTV §§17, 26, 28). A necessary connection
is a relation such as that found among numbers in true arithmetic
equations. It is impossible for 7+3 to equal anything other than 10,
and it is impossible to imagine it to be anything other than 10. A
customary connection is a relation found in experience in which one
type of idea is found with or followed by another, but which one could
imagine the situation to be otherwise. David Hume's famous example is
that experience shows that whenever one billiard ball hits another,
the second rolls away, but the fact that one could imagine anything
happening shows that there is merely a customary connection between
the actions of the billiard balls. It is in this sense that ideas of
touch and sight are merely customarily, and not necessarily,
connected. The absence of a necessary connection between these ideas
is further illustrated by the fact that nearsighted (purblind) persons
find that objects appear less, rather than more, confused as they
approach to the eyes (NTV §37). Since one perceives distance by sight
mediately through the correlation of visual ideas with nonvisual
ideas, a person born blind and who came to see would have no notion of
visual distance: even the most remote objects would "seem to be in his
eye, or rather his mind (NTV §41) This is Berkeley's first allusion to
Molyneux's man-born-blind-made-to-see (cf. Locke 2.9.8, pp. 145-146),
which Berkeley regularly uses to show the consequences of his theory
of vision (see also NTV §§79, 110, and 132-133; TVV §71). Molyneux's
contention was that if a person were born blind and had learned to
distinguish a cube from a sphere by touch, he would not immediately be
able to distinguish a visual cube from a sphere if he were given
sight.
Like most philosophers of the period, Berkeley seems to assume that
touch provides immediate access to the world. Visual ideas of an
object, on the other hand, vary with one's distance from the object.
As one approaches a tower one judges to be about a mile away, "the
appearance alters, and from being obscure, small, and faint, grows
clear, large, and vigorous" (NTV §44). The tower is taken to be of a
determinate size and shape, but the visual appearance continually
changes. How can that be? Berkeley claims that visual ideas are merely
signs of tactile ideas. There is no resemblance between visual and
tactile ideas. Their relationship is like that between words and their
meanings. If one hears a noun, one thinks of an object it denotes.
Similarly, if one sees an object, one thinks of a corresponding idea
of touch, which Berkeley deems the secondary (mediate) object of
sight. In both cases, there are no necessary connections between the
ideas. The associative connection is based on experience (NTV §51; cf.
TVV §40, Alciphron, Dialogue 4).
His discussion of magnitude is analogous to his discussion of
distance. Berkeley explores the relationships between the objects of
sight and touch by introducing the notions of minimum visibles and
tangibles, the smallest points one actually can perceive by sight and
touch, points which must be taken to be indivisible. The apparent size
of a visible object varies with distance, while the size of the
corresponding tangible object is taken to be constant (NTV §55). The
apparent size of the visual object, its confusion or distinctness, and
its faintness or vigor play roles in judging the size of the tangible
object. All things being equal, if it appears large, it is taken to be
large. "But, be the idea immediately perceived by sight never so
large, yet if it be withal confused, I judge the magnitude of the
thing to be but small. If it be distinct and clear, I judge it
greater. And if it be faint, I apprehend it to be yet greater" (NTV
§56; see also §57). As in the case of distance, there are no necessary
connections between the sensory elements of the visual and tangible
object. The correlations are only known by consistent experience (NTV
§§59, 62-64), and Berkeley argues that measurements (inches, feet,
etc.) are applicable only to tangible size (NTV §61).
The arguments are repeated, mutates mutandis, regarding visual and
tangible figure (NTV §§105ff).
Berkeley argues that the objects of sight and touch – indeed, the
objects of each sensible modalities – are distinct and
incommensurable. This is known as the heterogeneity thesis (see NTV
§§108ff). The tower that visually appears to be small and round from a
distance is perceived to be large and square by touch. So, one complex
tactual object corresponds to the indefinitely large number of visual
objects. Since there are no necessary connections between the objects
of sight and touch, the objects must be distinct. Further, his
discussion of "hearing the coach approach" shows that there is a
similar distinction between the objects of hearing and touch (NTV
§46). Given the hypothesis that the number of minimum visibles seen is
constant and the same among individual humans and other creatures (NTV
§§80-81), it follows that the objects seen when using a microscope are
not the same as those seen by the naked eye (NTV §85; cf. NTV §105 and
DHP3 245-246).
Before turning to the discussions of Berkeley's idealism and
immaterialism, there are several points we should notice. First, there
are various points in the New Theory of Vision where Berkeley writes
as if ideas of touch are or are of external objects (cf. §§ 46, 64,
77, 78, 82, 88, 99, 117, 155). Since the Berkeley of the Principles
and Dialogues contends that all ideas are mind-dependent and all
physical objects are composed of ideas, some have questioned whether
the position in the New Theory of Vision is consistent with the work
that immediately follows. Some scholars suggest that either that the
works on vision are scientific works which, as such, make no
metaphysical commitments or that allusions to "external objects" are
cases of speaking with the vulgar. Secondly, insofar as in his later
works Berkeley claims that ordinary objects are composed of ideas, his
discussion of the correlation of ideas of sight and touch tends to
anticipate his later view by explaining how one "collects" the ideas
of distinct senses to form one thing. Finally, the New Theory of
Vision includes discussions of the primary/secondary qualities
distinction (§§43, 48-49, 61, 109) and of abstraction (NTV §§122-127)
that anticipate his later discussions of those topics.
3. Against Abstraction
In the Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley
laments the doubt and uncertainty found in philosophical discussions
(Intro. §§1-3), and he attempts to find those principles that drew
philosophy away from common sense and intuition (PHK §4). He finds the
source of skepticism in the theory of abstract ideas, which he
criticizes.
Berkeley begins by giving a general overview of the doctrine:
It is agreed on all hands, that the qualities or modes of things
do never really exist each of them apart by it self, and separated
from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together,
several in the same object. But we are told, the mind being able to
consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities
with which it is united, does by that means frame to it self abstract
ideas. … Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without
extension: but only that the mind can frame to it self by abstraction
the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of
both colour and extension. (Intro, §7)
In §§8-9 he details the doctrine in terms of Locke's account in the
Essay concerning Human Understanding. Although theories of abstraction
date back at least to Aristotle (Metaphysics, Book K, Chapter 3,
1061a29-1069b4), were prevalent among the medievals (cf. Intro, §17
and PC §779), and are found in the Cartesians (Descartes, 1:212-213;
Arnauld and Nicole, pp. 37-38), there seem to be two reasons why
Berkeley focused on Locke. First, Locke's work was recent and
familiar. Second, Berkeley seems to have considered Locke's account
the best available. As he wrote in his notebooks, "Wonderful in Locke
that he could wn advanc'd in years see at all thro a mist yt had been
so long a gathering & was consequently thick. This more to be admir'd
than yt he didn't see farther" (PC §567).
According to Locke, the doctrine of abstract ideas explains how
knowledge can be communicated and how it can be increased. It explains
how general terms obtain meaning (Locke, 3.3.1-20, pp. 409-420). A
general term, such as 'cat' refers to an abstract general idea, which
contains all and only those properties that one deems common to all
cats, or, more properly, the ways in which all cats resemble each
other. The connection between a general term and an abstract idea is
arbitrary and conventional, and the relation between an abstract idea
and the individual objects falling under it is a natural relation
(resemblance). If Locke's theory is sound, it provides a means by
which one can account for the meaning of general terms without
invoking general objects (universals).
Berkeley's attack on the doctrine of abstract ideas follows three
tracks. (1) There is the "I can't do it" argument in Intro. §10. (2)
There is the "We don't need it" argument in Intro. §§11-12. And (3)
there is the "The theory leads to inconsistencies" argument in Intro.
§13, which Berkeley deemed the "killing blow" (PC §687). As we shall
see, Berkeley uses a similar tripartite attack on doctrine of material
substance (see PHK §§16-23).
Having outlined Locke's account of abstraction in Introduction §§8-9,
which allegedly results in the idea of a human which is colored but
has no determinate color – that the idea includes a general idea of
color, but not a specific color such as black or white or brown or
yellow – which has a size but has no determinate size, and so forth,
Berkeley argues in §10 that he can form no such idea. On the face of
it, his argument is weak. At most it shows that insofar as he cannot
form the idea, and assuming that all humans have similar psychological
abilities, there is some evidence that no humans can form abstract
ideas of the sort Locke described.
But there is a remark made in passing that suggests there is a much
stronger argument implicit in the section. Berkeley writes:
To be plain, I own my self able to abstract in one sense, as when
I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others,
with which though they are united in some object, yet, it is possible
they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one
from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is
impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general
notion by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid. Which
two last are the proper acceptations of abstraction. (Intro. §10)
This three-fold distinction among types of abstraction is found in
Arnauld and Nicole's Logic or the Art of Thinking. The first type of
abstraction concerns integral parts. The head, arms, torso, and legs
are integral parts of a body: each can exist in separation from the
body of which it is a part (Arnauld and Nicole, p. 37). The second
kind of abstraction "arises when we consider a mode without paying
attention to its substance, or two modes which are joined together in
the same substance, taking each one separately" (Arnauld and Nicole,
p. 37). The third concerns distinctions of reason, for example,
conceiving of a triangle as equilateral without conceiving of it as
equiangular (Arnauld and Nicole, p. 38). Berkeley grants that he can
abstract in the first sense – "I can consider the hand, the eye, the
nose, each by it self abstracted or separated from the rest of the
body" (Intro. §10) – but he denies that he can abstract in the latter
two senses. The latter two cases represent impossible states of
affairs. In §7 Berkeley noted that the abstractionists held that it is
impossible for a mode to exist apart from a substance. Many
abstractionists also accepted a conceivability criterion of
possibility: If one can (clearly and distinctly) conceive of a state
of affairs, then it is possible for that state of affairs to exist as
conceived (cf. Descartes, 2:54). This principle entails that
impossible states of affairs are inconceivable. So, granting it is
impossible for a mode to exist apart from a substance (Intro. §7), it
follows that it is impossible to conceive of a mode apart from a
substance, that the second form abstraction is impossible. And if the
second falls, the third falls as well, since the third requires that
alternative descriptions of an object pick out no differences in
reality. So, a traditional theory of modes and substances, the
conceivability criterion of possibility, and abstraction are an
inconsistent triad. The inconsistency can be resolved by dropping the
doctrine of abstract ideas. Berkeley made this point explicitly in the
first draft of the Introduction:
It is, I think, a receiv'd axiom that an impossibility cannot be
conceiv'd. For what created intelligence will pretend to conceive,
that which God cannot cause to be? Now it is on all hands agreed, that
nothing abstract or general can be made really to exist, whence it
should seem to follow, that it cannot have so much as an ideal
existence in the understanding. (Works 2:125)
One of the marks of the modern period is an adherence to the principle
of parsimony (Ockham's Razor). The principle holds that the
theoretically simpler of two explanations is more probably true. In
the seventeenth and eighteen centuries, this was sometimes expressed
as "God does nothing in vain" (cf. DHP2 214). So, if it is possible to
construct a theory of meaning that does not introduce abstract ideas
as a distinct kind of idea, that theory would be simpler and deemed
more probably true. This is the strategy Berkeley adopts in
Introduction §§11-12.
Granting Locke that all existents are particulars (Locke 3.3.6, p.
410), Berkeley remarks, "But it seems that a word becomes general by
being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea but, of several
particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the
mind" (Intro. §11). Ideas remain particular, although a particular
idea can function as a general idea. For example, when a geometer
draws a line on a blackboard, it is taken to represent all lines, even
though the line itself is particular and has determinate qualities.
Similarly, a particular idea can represent all similar ideas. So,
whether one takes Berkeley to mean that words apply immediately to
objects or that meaning is mediated by paradigmatic ideas, the theory
is simpler than the abstractionists' insofar as all ideas are
particular and determinate.
In Introduction §13, Berkeley turns to Locke's abstract general idea
of a triangle, an idea which "must be neither oblique nor rectangle,
neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of
these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist,
an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas
are put together" (Locke 4.7.9, p. 596; quoted in Intro. §13,
Berkeley's emphasis). Upon quoting the passage, Berkeley merely asks
his reader whether he or she can form the idea, but his point seems to
be much stronger. The described idea is inconsistent, and therefore
represents an impossible state of affairs, and it is therefore
inconceivable, since whatever is impossible is inconceivable. This is
explicit in a parallel passage in the New Theory of Vision. After
quoting the triangle passage, Berkeley remarks, "But had he called to
mind what he says in another place, to wit, 'That ideas of mixed modes
wherein any inconsistent ideas are put together cannot so much as
exist in the mind, i.e. be conceived.' vid. B. iii. C. 10. S. 33.
ibid. I say, had this occurred to his thoughts, it is not improbable
he would have owned it above all the pains and skill he was master of,
to form the above-mentioned idea of a triangle, which is made up of
manifest, staring contradictions" (NTV §125).
If abstract ideas are not needed for communication – Berkeley takes
the fact that infants and poorly educated people communicate, while
the formation of abstract ideas is said to be difficult, as a basis
for doubting the difficulty thesis (Intro. §14) – he is able to give
short shrift to the contention that abstract ideas are necessary for
knowledge. The abstractionists maintain that abstract ideas are needed
for geometrical proofs. Berkeley argues that only properties
concerning, for example, a triangle as such are germane to a geometric
proof. So, even if one's idea of a triangle is wholly determinate
(consider a diagram on a blackboard), none of the differentiating
properties prevent one from constructing a proof, since a proof is not
concerned solely with the idea (or drawing) with which one begins. He
maintains that it is consistent with his theory of meaning to
selectively attend to a single aspect of a complex, determinate idea
(Intro. §16).
Berkeley concludes his discussion of abstraction by noting that not
all general words are used to denote objects or kinds of objects. His
discussion of the nondenotative uses of language is often taken to
anticipate Ludwig Wittgenstein's interest in meaning-as-use.
4. Idealism and Immaterialism
Berkeley's famous principle is esse is percipi, to be is to be
perceived. Berkeley was an idealist. He held that ordinary objects are
only collections of ideas, which are mind-dependent. Berkeley was an
immaterialist. He held that there are no material substances. There
are only finite mental substances and an infinite mental substance,
namely, God. On these points there is general agreement. There is less
agreement on Berkeley's argumentative approach to idealism and
immaterialism and on the role of some of his specific arguments. His
central arguments are often deemed weak.
The account developed here is based primarily on the opening
thirty-three sections of the Principles of Human Knowledge. It
assumes, contrary to some commentators, that Berkeley's metaphysics
rests on epistemological foundations. This approach is prima facie
plausible insofar as it explains the appeal to knowledge in the title
of the Principles (cf. Intro. §4), it is consistent with Berkeley's
epistemic concerns in other writings (cf. TVV §18), and it provides an
explanatory role for abstract ideas. There will be occasional
digressions concerning the problems perceived by those who claim that
Berkeley's approach was more straightforwardly metaphysical.
Berkeley begins his discussion as follows:
It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of
human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the
senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and
operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and
imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing
those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. (PHK §1).
This seems to say that ideas are the immediate objects of knowledge in
a fundamental sense (acquaintance). Following Locke, there are ideas
of sense, reflection, and imagination. So, ordinary objects, as known,
are collections of ideas marked by a single name. Berkeley's example
is an apple.
If ideas are construed as objects of knowledge, then there must also
be something that "knows or perceives them, and exercises divers
operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them" (PHK §2;
cf. §6). This Berkeley calls this 'mind' or 'spirit'. Minds (as
knowers) are distinct from ideas (as things known). For an idea, to be
is to be perceived (known). Since this holds for ideas in general, it
holds for "sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense" in particular
(§3).
Berkeley contends that the "opinion strangely prevailing amongst men,
that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a world all sensible objects
have an existence natural or real, distinct from being perceived" is
inconsistent, "a manifest contradiction" (PHK §4). If one construes
'sensible objects' as ideas of sense, and ideas are objects of
knowledge, then having a real existence distinct from being perceived
would require that an object be known (as an idea) and unknown (as a
thing distinct from being perceived), which is inconsistent. He
explains the source of the error on the basis of the doctrine of
abstract ideas (PHK §5), a discussion which parallels the discussion
in Introduction §10.
Ordinary objects, as known, are nothing but collections of ideas. If,
like Descartes, Berkeley holds that claims of existence are justified
if and only if the existent can be known, then ordinary objects must
be at least collections of ideas. As Berkeley put it, "all the choir
of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which
compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence
without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known" (PHK
§6). The only substance that can be known is a spirit or thinking
substance (PHK §7). But notice what has not yet been shown. It has not
been shown that ordinary objects are only collections of ideas, nor
has it be shown that thinking substances are immaterial. Berkeley's
next move is to ask whether there are grounds for claiming ordinary
objects are something more than ideas.
The above account is not the only interpretation of the first seven
sections of the Principles. Many commentators take a more directly
metaphysical approach. They assume that ideas are mental images
(Pitcher, p.70; cf. Winkler, p. 13 and Muehlmann, p. 49), or objects
of thought (Winker, p.6), or modes of a mental substance (Bracken, pp.
76ff), or immediate objects of perception (Pappas, pp. 21-22), or any
of Berkeley's other occasional characterizations of ideas, and proceed
to show that, on the chosen account of ideas, Berkeley's arguments
fail. A. A. Luce tells us that Berkeley's characterization of an apple
in terms of ideas (PHK §1) is concerned with the apple itself, rather
than a known apple (Luce 1963, p. 30; cf. Tipton, p. 70), which
suggests that Berkeley begs the question of the analysis of body. Many
commentators tell us that what seems to be an allusion to ideas of
reflection in the first sentence of §1 cannot be such, since Berkeley
claims one has no ideas of minds or mental states (PHK §§27, 89, 140,
142; DHP2 223, DHP3 231-233; cf. Works 2:42n1). They ignore his
allusions to ideas of reflection (PHK §§13, 25, 35, 68, 74, 89) and
the presumption that if there are such ideas, they are the effects of
an active mind (cf. PHK §27). Many commentators suggest that the
argument for esse is percipi is in §3 – ignoring the concluding words
in §2 – and find the "manifest contradiction" in §4 puzzling at best.
Most commentators assume that the case for idealism – the position
that there are only minds and mind-dependent entities – is complete by
§7 and lament that Berkeley has not established the 'only'. The
epistemic interpretation we have been developing seems to avoid these
problems.
Berkeley holds that ordinary objects are at least collections of
ideas. Are they something more? In §§8-24 Berkeley examines the prime
contenders for this "something more," namely, theories of material
substance. He prefaces his discussion with his likeness principle, the
principle that nothing but an idea can resemble an idea. "If we look
but ever so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for
us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas" (PHK §8). Why
is this? A claim that two objects resemble each other can be justified
only by a comparison of the objects (cf. PC §377, ##16-18). So, if
only ideas are immediately perceived, only ideas can be compared. So,
there can be no justification for a claim that an idea resembles
anything but an idea. If claims of existence rest on epistemically
justified principles, the likeness principle blocks both grounds for
claiming that there are mediately perceived material objects and
Locke's claim that the primary qualities of objects resemble one's
ideas of them (Locke, 1.8.15, p. 137).
One of the marks of the modern period is the doctrine of primary and
secondary qualities. Although it was anticipated by Descartes,
Malebranche, and others, the terms themselves were introduced in
Robert Boyle's "Of the Origins of Forms and Qualities" (1666) and
Locke's Essay. Primary qualities are the properties of objects as
such. The primary qualities are solidity, extension, figure, number,
and mobility (Locke 2.8.9, p. 135; cf. 2.8.10, p. 135). Secondary
qualities are either the those arrangements of corpuscles containing
only primary qualities that cause one to have ideas of color, sound,
taste, heat, cold, and smell (Locke 2.8.8, p. 135; 2.8.10, p. 135) or,
on some accounts, the ideas themselves. If the distinction can be
maintained, there would be grounds for claiming that ordinary objects
are something more than ideas. It is this theory of matter Berkeley
considers first.
After giving a sketch of Locke's account of the primary/secondary
quality distinction (PHK §9), his initial salvo focuses on his
previous conclusions and the likeness principle. "By matter therefore
we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which
extension, figure, and motion, do actually subsist" (PHK §9). Such a
view is inconsistent with his earlier conclusions that extension,
figure, and motion are ideas. The likeness principle blocks any
attempt to go beyond ideas on the basis of resemblance. Combining the
previous conclusions with the standard account of primary qualities
requires that primary qualities both exist apart from the mind and
only in the mind. So, Berkeley concludes that "what is called matter
or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it" (PHK §9). He
then turns to the individual qualities.
If there is a distinction between primary and secondary qualities,
there must be a ground for the distinction. Indeed, given the common
contention that an efficient cause must be numerically distinct from
its effect (see Arnauld and Nicole, p. 186; Arnauld in Descartes,
2:147; Locke 2.26.1-2, pp. 324-325), if one cannot show that primary
and secondary qualities are distinct, there are grounds for
questioning the causal hypothesis. Berkeley argues that there is no
ground for the distinction. Appealing to what one knows – ideas as
they are conceived – Berkeley argues that one cannot conceive of a
primary quality such as extension without some secondary quality as
well: one cannot "frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I
must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is
acknowledged to exist only in the mind" (PHK §10). If such sensible
qualities as color exist only in the mind, and extension and motion
cannot be known without some sensible quality, there is no ground for
claiming extension exists apart from the mind. The primary/secondary
quality distinction collapses. The source of the philosophical error
is cited as the doctrine of abstract ideas. His arguments in
Principles §§11-15 show that no evidence can be found that any of the
other so-called primary qualities can exist apart from the mind.
After disposing of the primary/secondary quality distinction, Berkeley
turns to an older theory of material substance, a substratum theory.
At least since Aristotle, philosophers had held that qualities of
material objects depend on and exist in a substance which has those
qualities. This supposed substance allegedly remains the same through
change. But if one claims there are material substances, one must have
reasons to support that claim. In Principles §§16-24 Berkeley develops
a series of arguments to the effect that (1) one cannot form an idea
of a substratum, (2) the theory of material substance plays no
explanatory role, and (3) it is impossible to produce evidence for the
mere possibility of such an entity.
Can one form an idea a substratum? No. At least one cannot form a
positive idea of a material substratum itself – something like an
image of the thing itself – a point that was granted by its most
fervent supporters (see Descartes 1:210; Locke 2.23.3, p. 295). The
most one can do is form "An obscure and relative Idea of Substance in
general" (Locke 2.23.3, p. 296), "though you know not what it is, yet
you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and
what is meant by its supporting them" (PHK §16). Berkeley argues that
one cannot make good on the notion of 'support' – "It is evident
support cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense, as when we
say that pillars support a building: in what sense therefore must it
be taken?" (PHK §16) – so one does not even have a relative idea of
material substratum. Without a clear notion of the alleged relation,
one cannot single out a material substance on the basis of a relation
to something perceived (PHK §17).
If an idea of a material substratum cannot be derived from sense
experience, claims of its existence might be justified if it is
necessary to provide an explanation of a phenomenon. But no such
explanation is forthcoming. As Berkeley notes: "But what reason can
induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from
what we perceive, since the very patrons of matter themselves do not
pretend, there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas?
I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams,
phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible
we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though no bodies
existed without, resembling them" (PHK 18). Since material substance
is not necessary to provide an explanation of mental phenomena, reason
cannot provide grounds for claiming the existence of a material
substance.
Berkeley's final move against material substance is sometimes called
the "Master Argument." It takes the form of a challenge, one on which
Berkeley is willing to rest his entire case. "It is but looking into
your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible
for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour, to exist without the
mind, or unperceived. This easy trial may make you see, that what you
contend for, is a downright contradiction" (PHK §22). Berkeley seems
to argue that in any case one might consider – books in the back of a
closet, plants deep in a wood with no one about, footprints on the far
side of the moon – the objects are related to the mind conceiving of
them. So, it is contradictory to claim that those objects have no
relation to a mind (PHK, §§22-23; cf. DHP1 199-201). This is generally
not considered Berkeley at his best, since many commentators argue
that it is possible to distinguish between the object conceived and
the conceiving of it. George Pappas has provided a more sympathetic
interpretation of the passage. He contends that Berkeley is calling
for an "impossible performance" (Pappas, pp. 141-144). Conceivability
is the ground for claiming that an object is possible. If one
conceives of an object, then that object is related to some mind,
namely, the mind that conceives it. So, the problem is that it is not
possible to fulfill the conditions necessary to show that it would be
possible for an object to exist apart from a relation to a mind.
Thus, Berkeley concludes, there are no grounds for claiming that an
ordinary object is more than a collection of ideas. The arguments in
§§1-7 showed that ordinary objects are at least collections of ideas
of sense. The arguments in §§8-24 provide grounds for claiming that
ordinary objects are nothing more than ideas. So, Berkeley is
justified in claiming that they are only ideas of sense. Berkeley's
argument for immaterialism is complete, although he has not yet
provided criteria for distinguishing ideas of sense from ideas of
memory and imagination. This is his task in §§29-33. Before turning to
this, Berkeley introduces several remarks on mind.
Berkeley claims that an inspection of our ideas shows that they are
causally inert (PHK §25). Since there is a continual succession of
ideas in our minds, there must be some cause of it. Since this cause
can be neither an idea nor a material substance, it must be a
spiritual substance (PHK §26). This sets the stage for Berkeley's
argument for the existence of God and the distinction between real
things and imaginary things.
One knows that one causes some of one's own ideas (PHK §28). Since the
mind is passive in perception, there are ideas which one's own mind
does not cause. Only a mind or spirit can be a cause. "There is
therefore some other will or spirit that produces them" (PHK §29). As
such, this is not an argument for the existence of God (see PHK
§§146-149), although Berkeley's further discussion assumes that at
least one mind is the divine mind.
He is now in a position to distinguish ideas of sense from ideas of
the imagination: "The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and
distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a
steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as
those which are the effects of human wills often are" (PHK §30). This
provides the basis for both the distinction between ideas of sense and
ideas of imagination and for the distinction between real things and
imaginary things (PHK §33). Real things are composed solely of ideas
of sense. Ideas of sense occur with predictable regularity; they form
coherent wholes that themselves can be expected to "behave" in
predictable ways. Ideas of sense follow (divinely established) laws of
nature (PHK §§30. 34, 36, 62, 104).
So, Berkeley has given an account of ordinary objects without matter.
Ordinary objects are nothing but lawfully arranged collections of
ideas of sense.
5. Notions
If one reads the Principles and Dialogues, one discovers that Berkeley
has little to say regarding our knowledge of minds, and most of what
is found was added in the 1734 editions of those works. The reason is
Berkeley originally intended the Principles to consist of at least
three parts (cf. PC §583). The second was to examine issues germane to
mind, God, morality, and freedom (PC §§508, 807). He told Samuel
Johnson, his American correspondent, that the manuscript for the
second part was lost during his travels in Italy in about 1716 (Works
2:282). In the 1734 editions of the Principles and Dialogues, Berkeley
included brief discussions of our notions of minds.
Berkeley claims we do not have ideas of minds, since minds are active
and ideas are passive (PHK §27; cf. §89, 140, 142). Nonetheless, "we
have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, such
as willing, loving, hating, in as much as we know or understand the
meaning of those words" (PHK §27, 1734 edition). Given Berkeley's
theory of meaning, this seems to imply that so long as one able to
pick out (distinguish) minds from other things one can have a notion
of mind. Since Berkeley remarks, "Such is the nature of spirit or that
which acts, that it cannot be of it self perceived, but only by the
effects which it produceth" (PHK §27, all editions), one might come to
believe that Berkeley knows minds in much the same way as Locke knows
them. Locke claims one has a relative idea of substance in general
(Locke 2.23.3, p. 296): one is able to pick out a substance as such on
the basis of its relation to a directly perceived idea or quality.
While nominally distinct from Lockean relative ideas, Berkeley could
claim that notions pick out an individual mind as the thing that
perceives some determinate idea (one's own mind) or which causes some
determinate idea (God or, perhaps, some other spirit). Since Berkeley
held that causal and perceptual relations are necessary connections,
this seems to avoid the problems with 'support' discussed in
Principles §16. Such a position seems to be consistent with everything
said in the Principles and much of what is said in the Dialogues (DHP2
2:223; DHP3 2:232-233). However, there are two passages in the Third
Dialogue which suggest that one's own mind is known directly, rather
than relatively. Philonous says:
I own I have properly no idea, either of God or any other spirit;
for these being active, cannot be represented by things perfectly
inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless know, that I who am a
spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly, as I know my ideas
exist. Farther, I know what I mean by the terms I and myself; and I
know this immediately, or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as
I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. (DHP3 2:231, all
editions)
How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of [my
emphasis] my own being; and that I my self am not my ideas, but
somewhat else, a thinking active principle that perceives, knows,
wills, and operates about ideas. (DHP3 233, 1734 edition)
If you know yourself immediately "by a reflex act" (DHP3 232, all
editions), and if this is independent of any relation to an idea, then
it would seem that notions of oneself are nothing more than that
unique way in which the mind knows itself. Nothing more can be said of
them. Such a position seems to make notions an ad hoc addition to
Berkeley's philosophy.
But, perhaps, we need to draw a distinction between knowing that there
is a mind and knowing what a mind is. Perhaps one might know directly
that one has a mind, but one can know what a mind is only relative to
ideas: a mind is that which causes or perceives ideas. One should not
be surprised if this is Berkeley's position. Such a relative
understanding of the mind as knower and ideas as the known is already
found in the opening sections of the Principles.
6. Concluding Remarks
According to Berkeley, the world consists of nothing but minds and
ideas. Ordinary objects are collections of ideas. Already in his
discussion of vision, he argued that one learns to coordinate ideas of
sight and touch to judge distance, magnitude, and figure, properties
which are immediately perceived only by touch. The ideas of one sense
become signs of ideas of the other senses. In his philosophical
writings, this coordination of regularly occurring ideas becomes the
way the world is known and the way humans construct real things. If
there are only minds and ideas, there is no place for some scientific
constructs. Newtonian absolute space and time disappear. Time becomes
nothing but the succession of ideas in individual minds (PHK §98).
Motion is entirely object-relative (PHK §§112-117). Science becomes
nothing more than a system of natural signs. With the banishing of
abstraction, mathematics is reduced to a system of signs in which
words or numerals signify other words or numerals (PHK §122). Space is
reduced to sensible extension, and since one cannot actually divide a
piece of extension into an infinite number of sensible parts, various
geometrical paradoxes dissolve. As Berkeley understands them, science
and Christian theology become compatible.
7. References and Further Reading
Berkeley, George. Philosophical Works, Including the Works on Vision.
Edited by Michael R. Ayers. Everyman edition. London: J. M. Dent,
1975. This is the most comprehensive one-volume edition of Berkeley's
philosophical works available. When the work is not divided into
sections, marginal references are made to the page in The Works of
George Berkeley.
_____. The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. Edited by A. A.
Luce and T. E. Jessop. 9 volumes. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons,
1948-1957. This is the standard edition of Berkeley's works. Page
references above are to this edition.
Arnauld, Antoine and Nicole, Pierre. Logic or the Art of Thinking.
Translated by Jill Vance Buroker. Cambridge Texts in the History of
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. This was one
of the most widely-read logic textbooks of the early modern period.
Atherton, Margaret. Berkeley's Revolution in Vision. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1990.
Belfrage, Bertil. "Towards a New Interpretation of Berkeley's Theory
of Vision" (in French). In Dominique Berlioz, editor, Berkeley:
language de la perception et art de voir. Paris: Presses Universitires
de France, 2003.
Berman, David. George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994.
Boyle, Robert. Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle. Edited
by M. S. Stewart. Philosophical Classics. Manchester: University of
Manchester Press, 1979.
Bracken, Harry M. Berkeley. Philosophers in Perspective. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1974.
Dancy, Jonathan. Berkeley: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987.
Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Translated
and edited by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Steward, and
(volume 3) Anthony Kenny. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985,
1984, 1991.
Flage, Daniel E. Berkeley's Doctrine of Notions: A Reconstruction
based on his Theory of Meaning. London and New York: Croom Helm and
St. Martin's Press, 1987.
Grayling, A. C. Berkeley: The Central Arguments. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1986.
Locke, John. An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Peter
H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Luce, A. A. Berkeley's Immaterialism: A Commentary on his "A Treatise
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge". London: Thomas Nelson
and Sons, 1945.
_____. The Dialectic of Immaterialism. London: Hodder and Stroughton, 1963.
Muehlmann, Robert G. Berkeley's Ontology. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992.
Pappas, George S. Berkeley's Thought. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000.
Pitcher, George. Berkeley. The Arguments of the Philosophers. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.
Stoneham, Tom. Berkeley's World: An Examination of the Three
Dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Tipton, I. C. Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism. London: Methuen, 1974.
Warnock, G. J. Berkeley. London: Penquin, 1953.
Winkler, Kenneth P. Berkeley: An Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
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