term that encompasses a number of different theories. Initially,
virtue ethics was characterized as a movement rivaling
consequentialism and deontology because it focused on the central role
of concepts like character and virtue in moral philosophy. Later
versions developed fuller accounts of virtue ethics theories. Most
virtue ethics theories take their inspiration from Aristotle, although
some (admittedly less well discussed) versions incorporate elements
from Plato, Aquinas, Hume and Nietzsche. This article looks at how
virtue ethics originally defined itself by calling for a change from
the dominant normative theories of deontology and consequentialism. It
goes on to examine some common objections raised against virtue ethics
and thenlooks at a sample of fully developed accounts of virtue ethics
and responses.
1. Changing Modern Moral Philosophy: Anscombe, Williams and MacIntyre
a. Anscombe
In 1958 Elisabeth Anscombe published a paper titled "Modern Moral
Philosophy" that changed the way we think about normative theories.
She criticized modern moral philosophy's pre-occupation with a law
conception of ethics. A law conception of ethics deals exclusively
with obligation and duty. Among the theories she criticized for their
reliance on universally applicable principles were J. S. Mill's
utilitarianism and Kant's deontology. These theories rely on rules of
morality that were claimed to be applicable to any moral situation
(i.e. Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle and Kant's Categorical
Imperative). This approach to ethics relies on universal principles
and results in a rigid moral code. Further, these rigid rules are
based on a notion of obligation that is meaningless in modern, secular
society because they make no sense without assuming the existence of a
lawgiver–an assumption we no longer make. In its place, Anscombe
called for a return to a different way of doing philosophy. Taking her
inspiration from Aristotle, she called for a return to concepts such
as character, virtue and flourishing. She also emphasized the
importance of the emotions and understanding moral psychology. With
the exception of this emphasis on moral psychology, Anscombe's
recommendations that we place virtue more centrally in our
understanding of morality were taken up by a number of philosophers.
The resulting body of theories and ideas has come to be known as
virtue ethics. Anscombe's critical and confrontational set the scene
for how virtue ethics was to develop in its first few years. The
philosophers who took up Anscombe's call for a return to virtue saw
their task as being to define virtue ethics in terms of what it is
not–i.e. how it differs from and avoids the mistakes made by the other
normative theories. Before we go on to consider this in detail, we
need to take a brief look at two other philosophers, Bernard Williams
and Alisdair MacIntyre, whose call for theories of virtue was also
instrumental in changing our understanding of moral philosophy.
b. Williams
Bernard Williams' philosophical work has always been characterized by
its ability to draw our attention to a previously unnoticed but now
impressively fruitful area for philosophical discussion. Williams
criticized how moral philosophy had developed. He drew a distinction
between morality and ethics. Morality is characterized mainly by the
work of Kant and notions such as duty and obligation. Crucially
associated with the notion of obligation is the notion of blame. Blame
is appropriate because we are obliged to behave in a certain way and
if we are capable of conforming our conduct and fail to, we have
violated our duty. Williams was also concerned that such a conception
for morality rejects the possibility of luck. If morality is about
what we are obliged to do, then there is no room for what is outside
of our control. But sometimes attainment of the good life is dependant
on things outside of our control. In response, Williams takes a wider
concept, ethics, and rejects the narrow and restricting concept of
morality. Ethics encompasses many emotions that are rejected by
morality as irrelevant. Ethical concerns are wider, encompassing
friends, family and society and make room for ideals such as social
justice. This view of ethics is compatible with the Ancient Greek
interpretation of the good life as found in Aristotle and Plato.
c. MacIntyre
Finally, the ideas of Alistair MacIntyre acted as a stimulus for the
increased interest in virtue. MacIntyre's project is as deeply
critical of many of the same notions, like ought, as Anscombe and
Williams. However, he also attempts to give an account of virtue.
MacIntyre looks at a large number of historical accounts of virtue
that differ in their lists of the virtues and have incompatible
theories of the virtues. He concludes that these differences are
attributable to different practices that generate different
conceptions of the virtues. Each account of virtue requires a prior
account of social and moral features in order to be understood. Thus,
in order to understand Homeric virtue you need to look its social role
in Greek society. Virtues, then, are exercised within practices that
are coherent, social forms of activity and seek to realize goods
internal to the activity. The virtues enable us to achieve these
goods. There is an end (or telos) that transcends all particular
practices and it constitutes the good of a whole human life. That end
is the virtue of integrity or constancy. These three writers have all,
in their own way, argued for a radical change in the way we think
about morality. Whether they call for a change of emphasis from
obligation, a return to a broad understanding of ethics, or a unifying
tradition of practices that generate virtues, their dissatisfaction
with the state of modern moral philosophy lay the foundation for
change.
2. A Rival for Deontology and Utilitarianism
There are a number of different accounts of virtue ethics. It is an
emerging concept and was initially defined by what it is not rather
than what it is. The next section examines claims virtue ethicists
initially made that set the theory up as a rival to deontology and
consequentialism.
a. How Should One Live?
Moral theories are concerned with right and wrong behavior. This
subject area of philosophy is unavoidably tied up with practical
concerns about the right behavior. However, virtue ethics changes the
kind of question we ask about ethics. Where deontology and
consequentialism concern themselves with the right action, virtue
ethics is concerned with the good life and what kinds of persons we
should be. "What is the right action?" is a significantly different
question to ask from "How should I live? What kind of person should I
be?" Where the first type of question deals with specific dilemmas,
the second is a question about an entire life. Instead of asking what
is the right act here and now, virtue ethics asks what kind of person
should I be in order to get it right all the time. Whereas deontology
and consequentialism are based on rules that try to give us the right
action, virtue ethics makes central use of the concept of character.
The answer to "How should one live?" is that one should live
virtuously, i.e. have a virtuous character.
b. Character and Virtue
Modern virtue ethics takes its inspiration from the Aristotelian
understanding of character and virtue. Aristotelian character is,
importantly, about a state of being. It's about having the appropriate
inner states. For example, the virtue of kindness involves the right
sort of emotions and inner states with respect to our feelings towards
others. Character is also about doing. Aristotelian theory is a theory
of action, since having the virtuous inner dispositions will also
involve being moved to act in accordance with them. Realizing that
kindness is the appropriate response to a situation and feeling
appropriately kindly disposed will also lead to a corresponding
attempt to act kindly. Another distinguishing feature of virtue ethics
is that character traits are stable, fixed, and reliable dispositions.
If an agent possesses the character trait of kindness, we would expect
him or her to act kindly in all sorts of situations, towards all kinds
of people, and over a long period of time, even when it is difficult
to do so. A person with a certain character can be relied upon to act
consistently over a time. It is important to recognize that moral
character develops over a long period of time. People are born with
all sorts of natural tendencies. Some of these natural tendencies will
be positive, such as a placid and friendly nature, and some will be
negative, such as an irascible and jealous nature. These natural
tendencies can be encouraged and developed or discouraged and thwarted
by the influences one is exposed to when growing up. There are a
number of factors that may affect one's character development, such as
one's parents, teachers, peer group, role-models, the degree of
encouragement and attention one receives, and exposure to different
situations. Our natural tendencies, the raw material we are born with,
are shaped and developed through a long and gradual process of
education and habituation. Moral education and development is a major
part of virtue ethics. Moral development, at least in its early
stages, relies on the availability of good role models. The virtuous
agent acts as a role model and the student of virtue emulates his or
her example. Initially this is a process of habituating oneself in
right action. Aristotle advises us to perform just acts because this
way we become just. The student of virtue must develop the right
habits, so that he tends to perform virtuous acts. Virtue is not
itself a habit. Habituation is merely an aid to the development of
virtue, but true virtue requires choice, understanding, and knowledge.
The virtuous agent doesn't just act justly out of an unreflective
response, but has come to recognize the value of virtue and why it is
the appropriate response. Virtue is chosen knowingly for its own sake.
The development of moral character may take a whole life-time. But
once it is firmly established, one will consistently, predictably, and
appropriately in a variety of situations. Aristotelian virtue is
defined in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics as a purposive
disposition, lying in a mean and being determined by the right reason.
As discussed above, Virtue is a settled disposition. It is also a
purposive disposition. A virtuous actor chooses virtuous action
knowingly and for its own sake. It is not enough to act kindly by
accident, unthinkingly, or because everyone else is doing so; you must
act kindly because you recognize that this is the right way to behave.
Note here that although habituation is a tool for character
development it is not equivalent to virtue; virtue requires conscious
choice and affirmation. Virtue "lies in a mean" because the right
response to each situation is neither too much nor too little. Virtue
is the appropriate response to different situations and different
agents. The virtues are associated with feelings. For example: courage
is associated with fear, modesty is associated with the feeling of
shame, and friendliness associated with feelings about social conduct.
The virtue lies in a mean because it involves displaying the mean
amount of emotion, where mean stands for appropriate. (This does not
imply that the right amount is a modest amount. Sometimes quite a lot
may be the appropriate amount of emotion to display, as in the case of
righteous indignation). The mean amount is neither too much nor too
little and is sensitive to the requirements of the person and the
situation. Finally, virtue is determined by the right reason. Virtue
requires the right desire and the right reason. To act from the wrong
reason is to act viciously. On the other hand, the agent can try to
act from the right reason, but fail because he or she has the wrong
desire. The virtuous agent acts effortlessly, perceives the right
reason, has the harmonious right desire, and has an inner state of
virtue that flows smoothly into action. The virtuous agent can act as
an exemplar of virtue to others. It is important to recognize that
this is a perfunctory account of ideas that are developed in great
detail in Aristotle. They are related briefly here as they have been
central to virtue ethics' claim to put forward a unique and rival
account to other normative theories. Modern virtue ethicists have
developed their theories around a central role for character and
virtue and claim that this gives them a unique understanding of
morality. The emphasis on character development and the role of the
emotions allows virtue ethics to have a plausible account of moral
psychology–which is lacking in deontology and consequentialism. Virtue
ethics can avoid the problematic concepts of duty and obligation in
favor of the rich concept of virtue. Judgments of virtue are judgments
of a whole life rather than of one isolated action.
c. Anti-Theory and the Uncodifiability of Ethics
In the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle warns us that
the study of ethics is imprecise. Virtue ethicists have challenged
consequentialist and deontological theories because they fail to
accommodate this insight. Both deontological and consequentialist type
of theories rely on one rule or principle that is expected to apply to
all situations. Because their principles are inflexible, they cannot
accommodate the complexity of all the moral situations that we are
likely to encounter. We are constantly faced with moral problems. For
example: Should I tell my friend the truth about her lying boyfriend?
Should I cheat in my exams? Should I have an abortion? Should I save
the drowning baby? Should we separate the Siamese twins? Should I join
the fuel protests? All these problems are different and it seems
unlikely that we will find the solution to all of them by applying the
same rule. If the problems are varied, we should not expect to find
their solution in one rigid and inflexible rule that does not admit
exception. If the nature of the thing we are studying is diverse and
changing, then the answer cannot be any good if it is inflexible and
unyielding. The answer to "how should I live?" cannot be found in one
rule. At best, for virtue ethics, there can be rules of thumb–rules
that are true for the most part, but may not always be the appropriate
response. The doctrine of the mean captures exactly this idea. The
virtuous response cannot be captured in a rule or principle, which an
agent can learn and then act virtuously. Knowing virtue is a matter of
experience, sensitivity, ability to perceive, ability to reason
practically, etc. and takes a long time to develop. The idea that
ethics cannot be captured in one rule or principle is the
"uncodifiability of ethics thesis." Ethics is too diverse and
imprecise to be captured in a rigid code, so we must approach morality
with a theory that is as flexible and as situation-responsive as the
subject matter itself. As a result some virtue ethicists see
themselves as anti-theorists, rejecting theories that systematically
attempt to capture and organize all matters of practical or ethical
importance.
d. Conclusion
Virtue ethics initially emerged as a rival account to deontology and
consequentialism. It developed from dissatisfaction with the notions
of duty and obligation and their central roles in understanding
morality. It also grew out of an objection to the use of rigid moral
rules and principles and their application to diverse and different
moral situations. Characteristically, virtue ethics makes a claim
about the central role of virtue and character in its understanding of
moral life and uses it to answer the questions "How should I live?
What kind of person should I be?" Consequentialist theories are
outcome-based and Kantian theories are agent-based. Virtue ethics is
character-based.
3. Virtue Ethical Theories
Raising objections to other normative theories and defining itself in
opposition to the claims of others, was the first stage in the
development of virtue ethics. Virtue ethicists then took up the
challenge of developing full fledged accounts of virtue that could
stand on their own merits rather than simply criticize
consequentialism and deontology. These accounts have been
predominantly influenced by the Aristotelian understanding of virtue.
While some virtue ethics take inspiration from Plato's, the Stoics',
Aquinas', Hume's and Nietzsche's accounts of virtue and ethics,
Aristotelian conceptions of virtue ethics still dominate the field.
There are three main strands of development for virtue ethics:
Eudaimonism, agent-based theories, and the ethics of care.
a. Eudaimonism
Eudaimonia is an Aristotelian term loosely (and inadequately)
translated as happiness. To understand its role in virtue ethics we
look to Aristotle's function argument. Aristotle recognizes that
actions are not pointless because they have an aim. Every action aims
at some good, For example: the doctor's vaccination of the baby aims
at the baby's health, Tim Henman works on his serve so that he can win
Wimbledon, and so on. Furthermore, some things are done for their own
sake (ends in themselves) and some things are done for the sake of
other things (means to other ends). Aristotle claims that all the
things that are ends in themselves also contribute to a wider end, an
end that is the greatest good of all. That good is eudaimonia.
Eudaimonia is happiness, contentment, and fulfillment; it s the name
of the best kind of life, which is an end in itself and a means to
live and fare well. Aristotle then observes that where a thing has a
function the good of the thing is when it performs its function well.
For example, the knife has a function, to cut, and it performs its
function well when it cuts well. This argument is applied to man: man
has a function and the good man is the man who performs his function
well. Man's function is what is peculiar to him and sets him aside
from other beings–reason. Therefore, the function of man is reason and
the life that is distinctive of humans is the life in accordance with
reason. If the function of man is reason, then the good man is the man
who reasons well. This is the life of excellence or of eudaimonia.
Eudaimonia is the life of virtue–activity in accordance with reason,
man's highest function. The importance of this point of eudaimonistic
virtue ethics is that it reverses the relationship between virtue and
rightness. A utilitarian could accept the value of the virtue of
kindness, but only because someone with a kind disposition is likely
to bring about consequences that will maximize utility. So the virtue
is only justified because of the consequences it brings about. In
eudaimonist virtue ethics the virtues are justified because they are
constitutive elements of eudaimonia, i.e. human flourishing and
wellbeing, which is good in itself. Rosalind Hursthouse developed one
detailed account of eudaimonist virtue ethics. Hursthouse argues that
the virtues make their possessor a good human being. All living things
can be evaluated qua specimens of their natural kind. Like Aristotle,
Hursthouse argues that the characteristic way of human beings is the
rational way: by their very nature human beings act rationally, a
characteristic that allows us to make decisions and effect change in
our character and allows others to hold us responsible for those
decisions. Acting virtuously, i.e. acting in accordance with reason,
is acting in the way characteristic of the nature of human beings and
this will lead to eudaimonia. This means that the virtues benefit
their possessor. One might think that the demands of morality conflict
with our self-interest, as morality is other-regarding, but
eudaimonist virtue ethics presents a different picture. Human nature
is such that virtue is not exercised in opposition to self-interest,
but rather is the quintessential component of human flourishing. The
good life for humans is the life of virtue and therefore it is in our
interest to be virtuous. It is not just that the virtues lead to the
good life (e.g. if you are good, you will be rewarded), but rather a
virtuous life is the good life because the exercise of our rational
capacities and virtue is its own reward. It is important to note,
however, that there have been many different ways of developing this
idea of the good life and virtue within virtue ethics. Philippa Foot,
for example, grounds the virtues in what is good for human beings. The
virtues are beneficial to their possessor or to the community (note
that this is similar to MacIntyre's argument that the virtues enable
us to achieve goods within human practices). Rather than being
constitutive of the good life, the virtues are valuable because they
contribute to it. Another account is given by perfectionists such as
Thomas Hurka, who derive the virtues from the characteristics that
most fully develop our essential properties as human beings.
Individuals are judged against a standard of perfection that reflects
very rare or ideal levels of human achievement. The virtues realize
our capacity for rationality and therefore contribute to our
well-being and perfection in that sense.
b. Agent-Based Accounts of Virtue Ethics
Not all accounts of virtue ethics are eudaimonist. Michael Slote has
developed an account of virtue based on our common-sense intuitions
about which character traits are admirable. Slote makes a distinction
between agent-focused and agent-based theories. Agent-focused theories
understand the moral life in terms of what it is to be a virtuous
individual, where the virtues are inner dispositions. Aristotelian
theory is an example of an agent-focused theory. By contrast,
agent-based theories are more radical in that their evaluation of
actions is dependent on ethical judgments about the inner life of the
agents who perform those actions. There are a variety of human traits
that we find admirable, such as benevolence, kindness, compassion,
etc. and we can identify these by looking at the people we admire, our
moral exemplars.
c. The Ethics of Care
Finally, the Ethics of Care is another influential version of virtue
ethics. Developed mainly by feminist writers, such as Annette Baier,
this account of virtue ethics is motivated by the thought that men
think in masculine terms such as justice and autonomy, whereas woman
think in feminine terms such as caring. These theorists call for a
change in how we view morality and the virtues, shifting towards
virtues exemplified by women, such as taking care of others, patience,
the ability to nurture, self-sacrifice, etc. These virtues have been
marginalized because society has not adequately valued the
contributions of women. Writings in this area do not always explicitly
make a connection with virtue ethics. There is much in their
discussions, however, of specific virtues and their relation to social
practices and moral education, etc., which is central to virtue
ethics.
d. Conclusion
There are many different accounts of virtue ethics. The three types
discussed above are representative of the field. There is a large
field, however, of diverse writers developing other theories of
virtue. For example, Christine Swanton has developed a pluralist
account of virtue ethics with connections to Nietzsche. Nietzsche's
theory emphasizes the inner self and provides a possible response to
the call for a better understanding of moral psychology. Swanton
develops an account of self-love that allows her to distinguish true
virtue from closely related vices, e.g. self-confidence from vanity or
ostentation, virtuous and vicious forms of perfectionism, etc. She
also makes use of the Nietzschean ideas of creativity and expression
to show how different modes of acknowledgement are appropriate to the
virtues. Historically, accounts of virtue have varied widely. Homeric
virtue should be understood within the society within which it
occurred. The standard of excellence was determined from within the
particular society and accountability was determined by one's role
within society. Also, one's worth was comparative to others and
competition was crucial in determining one's worth. Other accounts of
virtue ethics are inspired from Christian writers such as Aquinas and
Augustine (see the work of David Oderberg). Aquinas' account of the
virtues is distinctive because it allows a role for the will. One's
will can be directed by the virtues and we are subject to the natural
law, because we have the potential to grasp the truth of practical
judgments. To possess a virtue is to have the will to apply it and the
knowledge of how to do so. Humans are susceptible to evil and
acknowledging this allows us to be receptive to the virtues of faith,
hope and charity–virtues of love that are significantly different from
Aristotle's virtues. The three types of theories covered above
developed over long periods, answering many questions and often
changed in response to criticisms. For example, Michael Slote has
moved away from agent-based virtue ethics to a more Humean-inspired
sentimentalist account of virtue ethics. Humean accounts of virtue
ethics rely on the motive of benevolence and the idea that actions
should be evaluated by the sentiments they express. Admirable
sentiments are those that express a concern for humanity. The
interested reader must seek out the work of these writers in the
original to get a full appreciation of the depth and detail of their
theories.
4. Objections to Virtue Ethics
Much of what has been written on virtue ethics has been in response to
criticisms of the theory. The following section presents three
objections and possible responses, based on bread ideas held in common
by most accounts of virtue ethics.
a. Self-Centeredness
Morality is supposed to be about other people. It deals with our
actions to the extent that they affect other people. Moral praise and
blame is attributed on the grounds of an evaluation of our behavior
towards others and the ways in that we exhibit, or fail to exhibit, a
concern for the well-being of others. Virtue ethics, according to this
objection, is self-centered because its primary concern is with the
agent's own character. Virtue ethics seems to be essentially
interested in the acquisition of the virtues as part of the agent's
own well-being and flourishing. Morality requires us to consider
others for their own sake and not because they may benefit us. There
seems to be something wrong with aiming to behave compassionately,
kindly, and honestly because this will make me happier. Related to
this objection is a more general objection against the idea that
well-being is a master value and that all other things are valuable
only to the extent that they contribute to it. This line of attack,
exemplified in the writings of Tim Scanlon, objects to the
understanding of well-being as a moral notion and sees it more like
self-interest. Furthermore, well-being does not admit to comparisons
with other individuals. Thus, well-being cannot play the role that
eudaimonists would have it play. This objection fails to appreciate
the role of the virtues within the theory. The virtues are
other-regarding. Kindness, for example, is about how we respond to the
needs of others. The virtuous agent's concern is with developing the
right sort of character that will respond to the needs of others in an
appropriate way. The virtue of kindness is about being able to
perceive situations where one is required to be kind, have the
disposition to respond kindly in a reliable and stable manner, and be
able to express one's kind character in accordance with one's kind
desires. The eudaimonist account of virtue ethics claims that the good
of the agent and the good of others are not two separate aims. Both
rather result from the exercise of virtue. Rather than being too
self-centered, virtue ethics unifies what is required by morality and
what is required by self-interest.
b. Action-Guiding
Moral philosophy is concerned with practical issues. Fundamentally it
is about how we should act. Virtue ethics has criticized
consequentialist and deontological theories for being too rigid and
inflexible because they rely on one rule or principle. One reply to
this is that these theories are action guiding. The existence of
"rigid" rules is a strength, not a weakness because they offer clear
direction on what to do. As long as we know the principles, we can
apply them to practical situations and be guided by them. Virtue
ethics, it is objected, with its emphasis on the imprecise nature of
ethics, fails to give us any help with the practicalities of how we
should behave. A theory that fails to be action-guiding is no good as
a moral theory. The main response to this criticism is to stress the
role of the virtuous agent as an exemplar. Virtue ethics reflects the
imprecise nature of ethics by being flexible and situation-sensitive,
but can also be action guiding by observing the example of the
virtuous agent. The virtuous agent is the agent who has a fully
developed moral character, who possesses the virtues and acts in
accordance with them, and we know what to do by example. Further,
virtue ethics places a lot of emphasis on the development of moral
judgment. Knowing what to do is not a matter of internalizing a
principle, but a life-long process of moral learning that will only
provide clear answers when one reaches moral maturity. Virtue ethics
cannot give us an easy, instant answer. This is because these answers
do not exist. Nonetheless, it can be action-guiding if we understand
the role of the virtuous agent and the importance of moral education
and development. If virtue consists of the right reason and the right
desire, virtue ethics will be action-guiding when we can perceive the
right reason and have successfully habituated our desires to affirm
its commands.
c. Moral Luck
Finally, there is a concern that virtue ethics leaves us hostage to
luck. Morality is about responsibility and the appropriateness of
praise and blame. However, we only praise and blame agents for actions
taken under conscious choice. The road to virtue is arduous and many
things outside our control can go wrong. Just as the right education,
habits, influences, examples, etc. can promote the development of
virtue, the wrong influencing factors can promote vice. Some people
will be lucky and receive the help and encouragement they need to
attain moral maturity, but others will not. If the development of
virtue (and vice) is subject to luck, is it fair to praise the
virtuous (and blame the vicious) for something that was outside of
their control? Further, some accounts of virtue are dependent on the
availability of external goods. Friendship with other virtuous agents
is so central to Aristotelian virtue that a life devoid of virtuous
friendship will be lacking in eudaimonia. However, we have no control
over the availability of the right friends. How can we then praise the
virtuous and blame the vicious if their development and respective
virtue and vice were not under their control? Some moral theories try
to eliminate the influence of luck on morality (primarily deontology).
Virtue ethics, however, answers this objection by embracing moral
luck. Rather than try to make morality immune to matters that are
outside of our control, virtue ethics recognizes the fragility of the
good life and makes it a feature of morality. It is only because the
good life is so vulnerable and fragile that it is so precious. Many
things can go wrong on the road to virtue, such that the possibility
that virtue is lost, but this vulnerability is an essential feature of
the human condition, which makes the attainment of the good life all
the more valuable.
5. Virtue in Deontology and Consequentialism
Virtue ethics offers a radically different account to deontology and
consequentialism. Virtue ethics, however, has influenced modern moral
philosophy to not only by developing a full-fledged account of virtue,
but also has caused consequentialists and deontologists to re-examine
their own theories with view to taking advantage of the insights of
virtue. For years Deontologists relied mainly on the Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals for discussions of Kant's moral theory. The
emergence of virtue ethics caused many writers to re-examine Kant's
other works. Metaphysics of Morals, Anthropology From a Pragmatic
Point of View and, to a lesser extent, Religion Within the Limits of
Reason Alone, have becomes sources of inspiration for the role of
virtue in deontology. Kantian virtue is in some respects similar to
Aristotelian virtue. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant stresses the
importance of education, habituation, and gradual development–all
ideas that have been used by modern deontologists to illustrate the
common sense plausibility of the theory. For Kantian, The main role of
virtue and appropriate character development is that a virtuous
character will help one formulate appropriate maxims for testing. In
other respects, Kantian virtue remains rather dissimilar from other
conceptions of virtue. Differences are based on at least three ideas:
First, Kantian virtue is a struggle against emotions. Whether one
thinks the emotions should be subjugated or eliminated, for Kant moral
worth comes only from the duty of motive, a motive that struggles
against inclination. This is quite different from the Aristotelian
picture of harmony between reason and desire. Second, for Kant there
is no such thing as weakness of will, understood in the Aristotelian
sense of the distinction between continence and incontinence. Kant
concentrates on fortitude of will and failure to do so is
self-deception. Finally, Kantians need to give an account of the
relationship between virtue as occurring in the empirical world and
Kant's remarks about moral worth in the noumenal world (remarks that
can be interpreted as creating a contradiction between ideas in the
Groundwork and in other works). Consequentialists have found a role
for virtue as a disposition that tends to promote good consequences.
Virtue is not valuable in itself, but rather valuable for the good
consequences it tends to bring about. We should cultivate virtuous
dispositions because such dispositions will tend to maximize utility.
This is a radical departure from the Aristotelian account of virtue
for its own sake. Some consequentialists, such as Driver, go even
further and argue that knowledge is not necessary for virtue. Rival
accounts have tried to incorporate the benefits of virtue ethics and
develop in ways that will allow them to respond to the challenged
raised by virtue ethics. This has led to very fruitful and exciting
work being done within this area of philosophy.
6. References and Further Reading
a. Changing Modern Moral Philosophy
* Anscombe G.E. M., "Modern Moral Philosophy", Philosophy, 33 (1958).
o The original call for a return to Aristotelian ethics.
* MacIntyre A., After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985).
o His first outline of his account of the virtues.
* Murdoch I., The Sovereignty of Good (London: Ark, 1985)
* Williams B., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985).
o Especially Chapter 10 for the thoughts discussed in this paper.
b. Overviews of Virtue Ethics
* Oakley J., "Varieties of Virtue Ethics", Ratio, vol. 9 (1996)
* Trianosky G.V. "What is Virtue Ethics All About?" in Statman D.,
Virtue Ethics (Cambridge: Edinburgh University Press, 1997)
c. Varieties of Virtue Ethics
* Adkins A.W.H., Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient
Greece from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century (London: Chatto and
Windus, 1972).
o An account of Homeric virtue.
* Baier A., Postures of the Mind (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1985)
* Blum L.W., Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: 1980)
* Cottingham J., "Partiality and the Virtues", in Crisp R. and
Slote M., How Should One Live? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
* Cottingham J., "Religion, Virtue and Ethical Culture",
Philosophy, 69 (1994)
* Cullity G., "Aretaic Cognitivism", American Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 4, (1995a).
o Particularly good on the distinction between aretaic and deontic.
* Cullity G., "Moral Character and the Iteration Problem",
Utilitas, vol. 7, no. 2, (1995b)
* Dent N.J.H., "The Value of Courage", Philosophy, vol. 56 (1981)
* Dent N.J.H., "Virtues and Actions", The Philosophical Quarterly,
vol. 25 (1975)
* Dent N.J.H., The Psychology of the Virtues (G.B.: Cambridge
University Press, 1984)
* Driver J., "Monkeying with Motives: Agent-based Virtue Ethics",
Utilitas, vol. 7, no. 2 (1995).
o A critique of Slote's agent-based virtue ethics.
* Foot P., Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).
o Her more recent work, developing new themes in her account
of virtue ethics.
* Foot P., Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978).
o Her original work, setting out her version of virtue ethics.
* Hursthouse R., "Virtue Theory and Abortion", Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 20, (1991)
* Hursthouse R., On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 1999).
o A book length account of eudaimonist virtue ethics,
incorporating many of the ideas from her previous work and fully
developed new ideas and responses to criticisms.
* McDowell J., "Incontinence and Practical Wisdom in Aristotle",
in Lovibond S and Williams S.G., Essays for David Wiggins,
Aristotelian Society Series, Vol.16 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996)
* McDowell J., "Virtue and Reason", The Monist, 62 (1979)
* Roberts R.C., "Virtues and Rules", Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, vol. LI, no. 2 (1991)
* Scanlon T.M., What We Owe Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1998).
o A comprehensive criticism of well-being as the foundation
of moral theories.
* Slote M., From Morality to Virtue (New York: OUP, 1992).
o His original account of agent-based virtue ethics.
* Slote M., Morals from Motives, (Oxford: OUP, 2001).
o A new version of sentimentalist virtue ethics.
* Swanton C., Virtue Ethics (New York: OUP, 2003).
o A pluralist account of virtue ethics, inspired from
Nietzschean ideas.
* Walker A.D.M., "Virtue and Character", Philosophy, 64 (1989)
d. Collections on Virtue Ethics
* Crisp R. and Slote M., How Should One Live? (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996).
o A collection of more recent as well as critical work on
virtue ethics, including works by Kantian critics such as O'Neill,
consequentialist critics such as Hooker and Driver, an account of
Humean virtue by Wiggins, and others.
* Crisp R. and Slote M., Virtue Ethics (New York: OUP, 1997).
o A collection of classic papers on virtue ethics, including
Anscombe, MacIntyre, Williams, etc.
* Engstrom S., and Whiting J., Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics
(USE: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
o A collection bringing together elements from Aristotle,
Kant and the Stoics on topics such as the emotions, character, moral
development, etc.
* Hursthouse R., Lawrence G. and Quinn Warren, Virtues and Reasons
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
o A collections of essays in honour of Philippa Foot,
including contributions by Blackburn, McDowell, Kenny, Quinn, and
others.
* Rorty A.O., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (USA: University of
California Press, 1980).
o A seminal collection of papers interpreting the ethics of
Aristotle, including contributions by Ackrill, McDowell and Nagel on
eudaimonia, Burnyeat on moral development, Urmson on the doctrine of
the mean, Wiggins and Rorty on weakness of will, and others.
* Statman D., Virtue Ethics (Cambridge: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).
o A collection of contemporary work on virtue ethics,
including a comprehensive introduction by Statman, an overview by
Trianosky, Louden and Solomon on objections to virtue ethics,
Hursthouse on abortion and virtue ethics, Swanton on value, and
others.
e. Virtue and Moral Luck
* Andree J., "Nagel, Williams and Moral Luck", Analysis 43 (1983).
o An Aristotelian response to the problem of moral luck.
* Nussbaum M., Love's Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)
* Nussbaum M., The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986).
o Includes her original response to the problem of luck as
well as thoughts on rules as rules of thumb, the role of the emotions,
etc.
* Statman D., Moral Luck (USA: State University of New York Press, 1993).
o An excellent introduction by Statman as well as almost
every article written on moral luck, including Williams' and Nagel's
original discussions (and a postscript by Williams).
f. Virtue in Deontology and Consequentialism
* Baron M.W., Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (USA: Cornell
University Press, 1995).
o A book length account of a neo-Kantian theory that takes
virtue and character into account.
* Baron M.W., Pettit P. and Slote M., Three Methods of Ethics (GB:
Blackwell, 1997).
o Written by three authors adopting three perspectives,
deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics, this is an excellent
account of how the three normative theories relate to each other.
* Driver J., Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
o A book length account of a consequentialist version of
virtue ethics, incorporating many of her ideas from previous pieces of
work.
* Herman B., The Practice of Moral Judgement (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1993).
o Another neo-Kantian who has a lot to say on virtue and character.
* Hooker B., Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).
o A modern version of rule-consequentialism, which is in
many respects sensitive to the insights of virtue.
* O'Neill, "Kant's Virtues", in Crisp R. and Slote M., How Should
One Live? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
o One of the first Kantian responses to virtue ethics.
* Sherman N., The Fabric of Character (GB: Clarendon Press, 1989).
o An extremely sympathetic account of Aristotelian and
Kantian ideas on the emotions, virtue and character.
* Sherman N., Making a Necessity of Virtue (USA: Cambridge
University Press, 1997).
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