thing. More abstractly, toleration can be understood as a political
practice aiming at neutrality, objectivity, or fairness on the part of
political agents. These ideas are related in that the goal of
political neutrality is deliberate restraint of the power that
political authorities have to negate the life activities of citizens
and subjects. Related to toleration is the virtue of tolerance, which
can be defined as a tendency toward toleration. Toleration is usually
grounded upon an assumption about the importance of the autonomy of
individuals. This assumption and the idea of toleration are central
ideas in modern liberal theory and practice. The present article will
discuss toleration as found in the works of John Locke, Baruch de
Spinoza, Voltaire, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls and
other contemporary philosophers.
1. Conceptual Analysis
The English words, 'tolerate', 'toleration', and 'tolerance' are
derived from the Latin terms tolerare and tolerantia, which imply
enduring, suffering, bearing, and forbearance. Ancient Greek terms,
which may also have influenced philosophical thinking on toleration,
include: phoretos which means bearable, endurable, or phoreo,
literally 'to carry'; and anektikos meaning bearable, sufferable,
tolerable, from anexo, 'to hold up'.
Today, when we say that someone has a 'high tolerance for pain,' we
mean that he or she is able to endure pain. This ordinary way of
thinking is useful for understanding the idea of toleration and the
virtue of tolerance: it underscores the fact that toleration is
directed by an agent toward something perceived as negative. It would
be odd to say, for example, that someone has 'a high tolerance for
pleasure'.
With this in mind, we can formulate a general definition of toleration
that involves three interrelated conditions.
When an agent tolerates something:
(1) He holds a negative judgment about this thing;
(2) He has the power to negate this thing; and
(3) He deliberately refrains from negation.
The first condition requires a negative judgment, which can be
anything from disapproval to disgust. Judgment here is meant to be a
broad concept that can include emotions, dispositions, tastes, and
reasoned evaluations. This negative judgment inclines the agent toward
a negative action toward the thing in question. This broadly Stoic
conception of judgment is a common assumption in discussions of
toleration. Defenders of toleration assume that we can, to a certain
extent, voluntarily control the expression of our negative reactions
by opposing them with different, countervailing, judgments. Although
judgments and emotions are both thought to have motivating force, they
can be resisted by some other judgment, habit or virtue.
The entity toward which an agent has a negative judgment can be an
event, an object, or a person, although with regard to tolerance as a
moral and political disposition, the entity is usually thought to be a
person. Although we speak of tolerating pain, for example, the moral
and political emphasis is on tolerating some other person, a group of
people, or their activities.
The second condition states that the agent has the power to negate the
entity in question. Toleration is concerned with resisting the
temptation to actively negate the thing in question. To distinguish
toleration from cowardice or weakness of will the agent must have some
capacity to enact his negative judgment. Toleration occurs when the
agent could actively negate or destroy the person or object in
question, but chooses not to.
The word negate is used here in a broad sense that allows for a
variety of negative reactions. Negative actions can include:
expressions of condemnation, acts of avoidance, or violent attacks.
The continuum of negations is decidedly vague. It is not clear, for
example, whether condemnation and avoidance are negations of the same
sort as violent action. Despite the vagueness of the continuum of
negative activities, the focal point of the second criterion is the
power to negate: toleration is restraint of the power to negate.
The third condition states that the agent deliberately refrains from
exercising his power to negate. Tolerant agents deliberately choose
not to negate those things they view negatively. The negative
formulation, 'not negating,' is important because toleration is not
the same thing as positive evaluation, approbation, or approval.
Tolerant restraint of the negative judgment is supposed to be free and
deliberate: one refrains from negating the thing because one has a
reason not to negate it and is free to act. Good reasons for
toleration are plural. They include: respect for autonomy; a general
commitment to pacifism; concern for other virtues such as kindness and
generosity; pedagogical concerns; a desire for reciprocity; and a
sense of modesty about one's ability to judge the beliefs and actions
of others. Each of these provides us with a reason for thinking that
it is good not to negate the thing in question. As mentioned already,
there also may be other non-tolerant reasons for refraining from
negation: fear, weakness of will, profit motive, self-interest,
arrogance, etc.
Although there are many reasons to be tolerant, traditional
discussions have emphasized respect for autonomy and pedagogical
concerns. Underlying both of these approaches is often a form of
self-conscious philosophical modesty that is linked to the value of
respect for autonomy. As John Stuart Mill and others have argued,
individuals ought to be left to pursue their own good in their own way
in part because each individual knows himself and his own needs and
interests best. This view does, however, leave us with a lingering
problem as toleration can easily slip toward moral skepticism and
relativism. It is important to note then that toleration is a positive
value that is not based upon total moral skepticism. Proponents of
toleration think that toleration is good not because they are unsure
of their moral values but, rather, because toleration fits within a
scheme of moral values that includes values such as autonomy, peace,
cooperation, and other values that are thought to be good for human
flourishing.
2. Historical Development
a. Early History
The spirit of tolerance is evident in Socrates' dialogical method as a
component of his search for truth. Throughout the early Platonic
dialogues, Socrates tolerantly allows his interlocutors to pursue the
truth wherever this pursuit might lead. And he encourages his
interlocutors to offer refutations so that the truth might be
revealed. Sometimes Socrates' tolerance can appear to go too far. The
Euthyrphro concludes, for example, with Socrates allowing Euthyphro to
proceed in the prosecution of a questionable court case. And Socrates'
relationship with Alcibiades, as discussed in the Symposium, shows
Socrates as perhaps too tolerant toward this reckless Athenian youth.
In the Gorgias (at 458a) Socrates describes himself in terms that
establish a link between philosophical method and a form of
toleration. Socrates says, "And what kind of man am I? One of those
who would gladly be refuted if anything I say is not true, and would
gladly refute another who says what is not true, but would be no less
happy to be refuted myself than to refute, for I consider that a
greater benefit, inasmuch as it is a greater boon to be delivered from
the worst of evils oneself than to deliver another." The pursuit of
truth is linked to an open mind, although of course this form of
dialogical toleration is supposed to lead to a unitary vision of the
truth.
One can see a more developed form of tolerance celebrated in the
Stoicism of Epictetus (55-135 C.E.) and Marcus Aurelius (121-180
C.E.). The Stoic idea is that we should focus on those things we can
control—our own opinions and behaviors—while ignoring those things we
cannot control, especially the opinions and behaviors of others. The
Stoic idea is linked to resignation and apathy, as is clear in the
case of Epictetus, whose social position—raised as a Roman slave—might
explain his advice about bearing and forbearing. Of course, the
problem here is that slavish forbearance is not the same as tolerance:
it seems clear that tolerance properly requires the power to negate,
which the slave does not possess. With the Emperor Marcus Aurelius,
however, tolerance is seen as a virtue of power. Tolerance might be
linked to other virtues of power such as mercy and benevolence, as
suggested, for example by Seneca. However, it is important to note
that the Stoic approach to tolerance was not explicitly linked to a
general idea about political respect for autonomy and freedom of
conscience, as it is in the modern liberal tradition. Moreover, Roman
political life was not nearly as tolerant as modern political life.
For example, although Marcus' Meditations contain many passages
invoking the spirit of tolerance, Marcus was responsible for
continuing the persecution of Christians.
Religious traditions provide further historical background for the
idea of toleration. For example, the spirit of tolerance can be
discovered in the Christian Gospel's message of loving enemies,
forgiving others, and refraining from judging others. Christian
tolerance is linked to other virtues such as charity and
self-sacrifice. And it seems to go beyond tolerance toward a
self-abnegating type of love and acceptance. Christ's command to "love
your enemies" is one example of this attempt to go beyond tolerance.
It should be noted that other religious traditions also contain
resources for developing toleration. For example, Buddhist compassion
can be linked to the idea of toleration. Indeed, in the third century
B.C.E., the Buddhist emperor of India, Ashoka, called for official
religious toleration. Likewise, in the 16th Century C.E., the Islamic
emperor Akhbar made a similar attempt at establishing religious
toleration on the Indian subcontinent.
Despite these antecedents, toleration does not become a serious
subject of philosophical and political concern in Europe until the
16th and 17th Centuries. During the Renaissance and Reformation of the
15th and 16th Centuries, humanists such as Erasmus (1466-1536), De Las
Casas (1484-1566), and Montaigne (1533-1592) asserted the autonomy of
human reason against the dogmatism of the Church. Although religious
authorities reacted with the formation of the Inquisition and the
Index of Forbidden Books, by the 17th Century philosophers were
seriously considering the question of toleration.
b. The 17th Century
Following the divisions created by the Lutheran Reformation and the
Counter-Reformation, Europe was decimated by war and violence fomented
in the name of religion, which culminated in the Thirty Years War
(1618-1648). Through events such as these scholars became acutely
aware of the destructive power of intolerance and sought to limit this
destructive force by re-examining the biblical roots of toleration and
by re-considering the relation between religious belief and political
power. Additional influences on the cultural landscape of Europe
during this time include the struggle to define sovereignty and to
"purify" religion in Britain during the British Civil Wars
(1640-1660), as well as increased information about cultural
differences with the beginning of global exploration. Among the
thinkers of this period who defended tolerance were Milton
(1608-1674), Bayle (1647-1706), Spinoza (1634-1677), and Locke
(1632-1704).
One of the worries of the humanist thinkers of the Reformation was
whether it was possible to have infallible knowledge of the Divine
Will such that one could justify the persecution of heretics. This
concern with human fallibility lies at the heart of what will be
described subsequently as "epistemological toleration." When
recognition of human fallibility is combined with critique of
political and ecclesiastical power, more robust forms of political
toleration develop.
In this vein, Spinoza concluded his Theological-Political Treatise
(1670) with an argument for freedom of thought. It is not surprising
that Spinoza should have written this treatise, for he was himself a
product of a tolerant society: he was a Portuguese Jew living in
Holland. Indeed, the 17th Century saw the rise of toleration in
practice in certain parts of Europe, perhaps as a result of increased
trade and social mobility. Spinoza's argument for toleration focuses
on three claims: first, he claims that it is impossible for the state
to effectively curtail liberty of thought; second, he claims that
liberty of thought can in fact be allowed without detriment to state
power; and finally, Spinoza argues that political authority should
focus on controlling actions and not on restricting thought. This
emphasis on the difference between thought and action is crucial for
subsequent discussions of toleration in Locke, Mill, and Kant.
Somewhat different versions of Spinoza's basic insights can be found
in Locke's famous Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), an essay that
was written during Locke's exile in Holland. Locke's argument focuses
specifically on the conflict between political authority and religious
belief. He articulates a view of toleration based on the
epistemological claim that it is impossible for the state to coerce
genuine religious belief. He argues that the state should refrain from
interfering in the religious beliefs of its subjects, except when
these religious beliefs lead to behaviors or attitudes that run
counter to the security of the state. This exception allows him to
conclude that the state need not tolerate Catholics who were loyal to
a foreign authority or atheists whose lack of religious conviction
left them entirely untrustworthy.
c. The 18th Century
In the 18th Century, discussion of toleration was tied to the problem
of skepticism and to a more sustained critique of absolutism in
politics. Voltaire (1694-1778), who expressed his admiration for the
development of religious tolerance in England in his Philosophical
Letters (1734), was extremely worried about the tendency of religion
to become violent and intolerant. Moreover, he suffered under the
intolerant hands of the French authorities: he was thrown in jail for
his views and his books were censored and publicly burned. Religious
tolerance forms the theme of his Treatise on Tolerance (1763), which
argues vigorously for tolerance even though it retains a bias toward
Christianity. A concise summary of Voltaire's argument for tolerance
can be found in the entry on Tolerance in his Philosophical Dictionary
(1764). Voltaire's claim is that toleration follows from human frailty
and error. Since none of us has perfect knowledge, and since we are
all weak, inconsistent, liable to fickleness and error, we should
pardon one another for our failings. Voltaire's approach focuses on
tolerance at the level of personal interaction and risks slipping
toward moral skepticism and relativism: like his contemporary David
Hume (1711-1777), Voltaire presented a skeptical challenge to orthodox
belief.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), in response to skeptics such as Voltaire
and Hume, tried to avoid skepticism while focusing on the limits of
human knowledge and the limits of political power. In his essay, "What
is Enlightenment?" (1784), Kant argues for an enlightened form of
political power that would allow subjects to argue among themselves,
so long as they remained obedient to authority. This position is
further clarified by Kant's claim in Perpetual Peace (1795) that
philosophers should be allowed and encouraged to speak publicly.
Kant's point in this later essay is that public debate and discussion
lead to the truth, and that kings should have nothing to fear from the
truth. Kant's views on religious toleration are clarified in his
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793). Here Kant argues
against religious intolerance by pointing out that although we are
certain of our moral duties, human beings do not have apodictic
certainty of God's commands. Thus a religious belief that demands a
contravention of morality (such as the burning of a heretic) can never
be justified.
Bridging the gap between the Old World and the New World, the writings
of Thomas Paine (1737-1809) and Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) express a
theory of toleration that is tied directly to political practice.
Paine's and Jefferson's ideas followed Locke's. Not only were they
critical of unrestrained political power but they were also committed
to an ecumenical approach to religious belief known as deism. Paine
makes it clear in his Rights of Man (1791) that toleration for
religious diversity is essential because political and ecclesiastical
authorities do not have the capacity to adjudicate matters of
conscience. "Mind thine own concerns. If he believes not as thou
believest, it is a proof that thou believest not as he believeth, and
there is no earthly power can determine between you."
At the end of the 18th Century, we see tolerant ideas embodied in
practice in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights—the first 10
Amendments to the Constitution (ratified in 1791). Collectively these
amendments serve to restrain political power. Specifically, the First
Amendment states that there can be no law, which prohibits freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of
assembly, and freedom to petition to the government. Subsequent
developments in U.S. Constitutional law have led to a tradition of
respect for citizens' freedom of thought, speech, and action.
d. The 19th Century
In the 19th Century, the idea of toleration was developed further in
line with the liberal, enlightenment idea that moral autonomy is
essential to human flourishing. The most famous argument for
toleration in the 19th Century was made by John Stuart Mill in On
Liberty (1859). Mill argues here that the only proper limit of liberty
is harm: one is entitled to be as free as possible, except where one's
liberty poses a threat to the well-being of someone else: "the only
purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others."
Mill expands the notion of privacy that was implicit in Locke and Kant
to argue that political power should have no authority to regulate
those activities and interests of individuals that are purely private
and have no secondary effects on others. Mill also vigorously argues
that freedom of thought is essential for the development of knowledge.
Mill's general approach is utilitarian: he claims that individuals
will be happier if their private differences are tolerated and that
society in general will be better off if individuals are left to
pursue their own good in their own way.
In the 19th Century and into the early 20th Century, religious
toleration was also a subject of consideration for thinkers such as
Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), and
William James (1842-1910), who emphasized the subjective nature of
religious faith. For example, in his Varieties of Religious Experience
(1902), James argued that religious experience was diverse and not
subject to a definitive interpretation. Although this fits with
James's larger metaphysical commitment to pluralism, his point is that
religious commitment is personal—a matter of what he calls in another
essay, "the will to believe." It is up to each individual to decide
for himself what he will believe: if we properly understand the nature
of religious belief, we should respect the religious liberty of others
and learn to tolerate our differences.
e. The 20th Century
In the 20th Century, toleration has become an important component of
what is now known as liberal theory. The bloody history of the 20th
Century has led many to believe that toleration is needed to end
political and religious violence. Toleration has been defended by
liberal philosophers and political theorists such as John Dewey,
Isaiah Berlin, Karl Popper, Michael Walzer, Ronald Dworkin, and John
Rawls. It has been criticized by Herbert Marcuse and others such as
Iris Young who worry that toleration and its ideal of state neutrality
is merely another hegemonic Western ideology. Toleration has been the
explicit subject of many recent works in political philosophy by Susan
Mendus, John Horton, Preston King, and Bernard Williams. Much of the
current discussion focuses on responding to John Rawls, whose theory
of "political liberalism" conceives of toleration as a pragmatic
response to the fact of diversity (see "Political Toleration" below).
A recurring question in the current debate is whether there can be a
more substantive commitment to toleration that does not lead to the
paradoxical consequence that the tolerant must tolerate those who are
intolerant.
Further recent discussion, by David Heyd, Glenn Newey, and others, has
attempted to re-establish the link between tolerance and virtue. These
writers wonder whether tolerance is in fact a virtue and if so, what
sort of a virtue it is. A concern for racial equality, gender
neutrality, an end of prejudice, respect for cultural and ethnic
difference, and a general commitment to multiculturalism has fueled
ongoing debates about the nature of toleration in our age of
globalization and homogenization. Finally, in the U.S., First
Amendment Law has developed to allow for a broad idea of freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion. And under the
influence of an interpretation of the equal protection clause of the
14th Amendment, mechanisms to ensure equality have given support to
those minority groups who were once the victims of political
intolerance.
3. Epistemological Toleration
An epistemological argument for toleration can be traced to Socrates.
However, this ideal becomes explicit in the thinking of Milton, Locke,
and Mill. The epistemological claim is that one should tolerate the
opinions and beliefs of the other because it is either impossible to
coerce belief or because such coercion is not the most useful
pedagogical approach. This idea can be developed into a claim about
the importance of diversity, dialogue, and debate for the
establishment of truth. Finally, this approach might lead to a form of
relativism or skepticism that puts the idea of toleration itself at
risk.
a. Socrates
Socratic tolerance is discovered if we take seriously Socrates' claims
to ignorance. Socratic ignorance is linked to virtues, such as
sophrosyne (self-control), modesty and tolerance. These virtues are
essential components in the formation of the philosophical community
and the pursuit of philosophical truth. Throughout Plato's dialogues,
Socrates restrains himself deliberately—he modestly claims ignorance
and allows others to develop their own positions and make their own
mistakes—out of recognition that this is the best, perhaps the only,
way to proceed in the communal pursuit of truth. Socrates' main goal
is to discover the truth through open-minded debate. But there would
be no dialogue and indeed no education without tolerance. Socrates'
commitment to tolerance is part of his epistemological faith in the
autonomy of reason. We each must discover the truth for ourselves by
way of disciplined, modest, and tolerant dialogue.
b. Milton
Centuries later, John Milton's Areopagitica (1644) offers a similar
defense of the truth. Milton vigorously defended freedom of speech in
response to a censorship decree of the English parliament. His
argument relies upon the epistemological claim that open dialogue
supported by a tolerant government fosters the development of truth.
Milton's basic assumption is that the truth is able to defend itself
in a free debate. "Let truth and falsehood grapple; who ever knew
truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?" Milton further
argues that outward conformity to orthodoxy is not the same as genuine
belief.
c. Locke
These ideas were developed further by Locke in his Letter Concerning
Toleration. Locke argues that the civil and ecclesiastical authorities
ought to tolerate diversity of belief because one cannot force another
human being to have faith. In a claim that is reminiscent of Milton,
Locke claims "the truth certainly would do well enough if she were
left to shift for herself… She is not taught by laws, nor has she any
need of force to procure her entrance into the minds of men." This is
so because the authority of judgment resides within the free
individual. It is impossible to force someone to believe something for
external reasons. Rather, truth must be arrived at and believed for
internal reasons.
This epistemological claim is the focal point of Jeremy Waldron's
recent critique of Locke's account. Waldron claims that Locke's
argument is weak because it relies upon the false assumption that
beliefs cannot be coerced. The point is that we often believe things
quite sincerely without any good reason whatsoever. Moreover, Waldron
argues that the epistemological argument is too weak to provide a
moral limitation on coercion. Even though coercion cannot produce
genuine belief, an intolerant regime may not be interested in
producing genuine belief. It may simply be interested in guaranteeing
conformity. Waldron's point is important: the epistemological critique
is useful only if one is committed to the claim that genuine belief in
the truth is an important political or moral value. An epistemological
argument for toleration must claim not only that it is impractical or
impossible to impose belief upon others, but also that we ought to
value genuine commitment over mere conformity.
d. Mill
Mill's epistemological argument is quite similar to Locke's, although
Mill goes farther in advocating freedom of speech as essential for the
discovery of truth. Mill's epistemological argument begins with the
assumption that individuals know best what is good for them. This
claim runs counter to the traditional Platonic claim that often
individuals do not know what is in their own best interest. Mill
supports his claim by pointing out that the individual always has the
best access to his/her own interests and desires: others do not have
access to the kinds of internal evidence that would allow them to
judge for the individual. It is important to note that Mill does not
equate this access problem with relativism. Indeed, in his essay
Utilitarianism (1863), he famously defends a hierarchy of goods based
on the fact that those who have experienced both "lower" and "higher"
goods will prefer the higher ones (e.g., "it is better to be Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied"). The epistemological point
remains the same here, however: it is up to the individual to judge
for himself about what is good for him.
Mill's general argument for freedom of thought is based upon a
recognition of human fallibility and on the need for dialogue and
debate. Mill's argument for freedom of thought in On Liberty contains
the following claims. (1) Silenced opinions may be true. To assume
they are not is to assume that we are infallible. (2) Even false
opinions may contain valid points of contention and parts of the
truth. To know the whole of truth we might have to weave together
parts of truth from different sources. (3) To claim to know the truth
means that we are able to defend it against all vigorous opposition.
Thus we need to be able to hear and respond to false opinions in order
to know all of the arguments for a proposition. (4) Truth that is not
continuously and vigorously contested becomes mere superstition. Such
dogmatically held superstitions may thus crumble before even weak
opposition and will not be heartily believed or defended.
e. The Problem of Relativism
Like Socrates, Mill and Locke both arrive at the notion of toleration
from a non-relativistic understanding of belief and truth. However,
under the general rubric of epistemological toleration we might also
include the sort of toleration that follows from skepticism or
relativism. For the relativist or skeptic, since we cannot know the
truth or since all truths are relative, we ought to be tolerant of
those who hold different points of view. Contemporary American
philosopher, Richard Rorty has articulated an argument something like
this. The problem with this approach is the same problem with all
sorts of skepticism and relativism: either the claim
self-referentially undermines itself or it provides us with no
compelling reason to believe it. If we are skeptical about knowledge,
then we have no way of knowing that toleration is good. Likewise, if
truth is relative to a system of thought, then the claim that
toleration is required is itself merely a relatively justified claim.
The form of epistemological toleration espoused by Mill, at least,
attempts to avoid these problems by appealing to a form of fallibilism
that is not completely skeptical or relativistic. Mill's point is not
that there is no truth but, rather, that toleration is required for us
to come to know the truth.
4. Moral Toleration
We have seen that epistemological concerns can lead us to toleration.
Moral concerns can also bring us to toleration. Tolerance as a moral
virtue might be linked to other moral virtues such as modesty and
self-control. However, the most common moral value that is thought to
ground toleration is a concern for autonomy. We ought to refrain from
negating the other when concern for the other's autonomy provides us
with a good reason not to act. Toleration that follows from a
commitment to autonomy should not be confused with moral relativism.
Moral relativism holds that values are relative to culture or context.
A commitment to autonomy, in opposition to this, holds that autonomy
is good in a non-relative sense. A commitment to autonomy might
require that I allow the other to do something that I find abhorrent,
not because I believe that values are relative, but because I believe
that autonomy is so important that it requires me to refrain from
negating the autonomous action of the other. Of course, there are
limits here. Autonomous action that violates the autonomy of another
cannot be tolerated.
Mill's account of the principle of liberty is helpful for
understanding this idea of toleration. Mill tells us that we should be
given as much liberty as possible, as long as our liberty does not
harm others. This is in fact a recipe for toleration. Mill's argument
follows from certain basic assumptions about individuals.
1. Each individual has a will of his own.
2. Each individual is better off when not compelled to "do better."
3. Each individual knows best what is good for him.
4. Each individual is motivated to attain his own good and to
avoid actions that are contrary to his self-interest.
5. Self-regarding thought and activity can be distinguished from
its effects upon others.
Some of these claims (for example, #3) are linked to epistemological
toleration. However, the point here is not only that individuals know
what is in their own self-interest but also that it is good for
individuals to be able to pursue their own good in their own way. Such
an approach makes several important metaphysical assumptions about the
nature of human being: that autonomy is possible and important, that
individuals do know their own good, that there is a distinction
between self-regarding action and actions that effects others. Moral
toleration follows from these sorts of claims about human being.
a. The Paradox of Toleration
Of course, toleration and respect for autonomy are not simple ideas.
Much has been made about the so-called "paradox of toleration": the
fact that toleration seems to ask us to tolerate those things we find
intolerable. Toleration does require that we refrain from enacting the
negative consequences of our negative judgments. This becomes
paradoxical when we find ourselves confronting persons, attitudes, or
behaviors, which we vigorously reject: we then must, paradoxically,
tolerate that which we find intolerable. This becomes especially
difficult when the other who is to be tolerated expresses views or
activities that are themselves intolerant.
One way of resolving this paradox is to recognize that there is a
distinction between first-order judgments and second-order moral
commitments. First-order judgments include emotional reactions and
other practical judgments that focus on concrete and particular
attitudes and behaviors. Second-order moral commitments include more
complicated judgments that aim beyond emotion and particularity toward
rational universal principles. With regard to the paradox of
toleration there is a conflict between a first-order reaction against
something and a second-order commitment to the principle of respecting
autonomy or to the virtues of modesty or self-control. The paradox is
resolved by recognizing that this second-order commitment trumps the
first-order reaction: principle is supposed to outweigh emotion. Thus
we might have good reasons (based upon our second-order commitments)
to refrain from following through on the normal consequences of
negative first-order judgments. However, when there is a genuine
conflict of second-order commitments, i.e., when the tolerant
commitment to autonomy runs up against an intolerant rejection of
autonomy, then there is no need to tolerate. In other words the
paradox is resolved when we realize that toleration is not a
commitment to relativism but, rather, that it is a commitment to the
value of autonomy and to the distinction between first-order judgments
and second-order moral commitments.
b. Tolerance vs. Indifference
Of course, the ideal of toleration is a difficult one to enact. This
difficulty is related to the tension between first-order reactions and
second-order commitments that is found within the spiritual economy of
an individual. This is why the idea of tolerance as a virtue is
important. Virtues are tendencies or habits toward good action. In the
case of the virtue of tolerance, the tendency is toward respect for
the autonomy of others and toward the self-discipline necessary for
deliberately restraining first-order reactions. Virtues are usually
thought to be integrated into a system of virtues. Tolerance is no
exception. The virtue of tolerance is closely related to other virtues
such as self-control, modesty, generosity, kindness, mercy, and
forgiveness. One must be careful, however, not to conclude that the
virtue of tolerance is a tendency toward indifference or apathy.
Tolerance demands that we moderate and control our passions in light
of some larger good, whether that good be respect for autonomy or an
interest in self-control; tolerance does not demand that we completely
refrain from judging the other.
Moral toleration asks us to restrain some of our most powerful
first-order reactions: negative reactions to persons, attitudes, and
behaviors which we find repugnant. Without the tension between
first-order reactions and second-order commitment, toleration is
merely indifference. Indifference usually indicates a failure at the
level of first-order judgment: when we are indifferent, we do not have
any reaction, negative or positive, to the other. Such a state of
indifference is not virtuous. Indeed, it would be vicious and wrong
not to react strongly against injustice or violations of autonomy.
We often confuse indifference with toleration. However, indifference
is flawed as a human response for two reasons. First, it rejects the
truth of first-order reactions. First-order reactions should not be
ignored. Our emotional responses are important ways in which we
connect with the world around us. When we react negatively to
something, this emotional reaction provides important information
about the world and ourselves. Tolerance does not ask us to deaden our
emotional responses to others; rather it asks us to restrain the
negative consequences of our negative emotional responses out of
deference to a more universal set of commitments. Second, indifference
is often closely related to general skepticism about moral judgment.
The moral skeptic claims that no set of values is true. From this
perspective, both first-order reactions and second-order commitments
are mere tastes or preferences without any final moral significance.
From this skepticism, indifference with regard to any moral evaluation
is cultivated because all of our moral values are thought to be
equally groundless. The difficulty here is that moral skepticism
cannot lead to the conclusion that it is good to be tolerant, since
the skeptic holds that no moral value can be justified. If we claim
that toleration is good and that tolerance is a virtue, toleration
cannot be the same thing as indifference.
This distinction between tolerance and indifference is important for
explaining the spiritual disruption that occurs when we strive to
become tolerant. Indeed, the difficulty of toleration can be
understood in terms of the difficulty of the middle path between
indifference and dogmatism. Indifference is easy and satisfying
because it sets us free, as it were, from the difficult human task of
judging. Likewise, dogmatism is easy and satisfying because it follows
from a seamless synthesis of first-order reaction and second-order
commitment. Toleration is the middle path in which there is a conflict
between first-order reaction and second-order commitment. Toleration
thus requires self-consciousness and self-control in order to
coordinate conflicting parts of the spiritual economy. The discipline
required for toleration is part of any idea of education: we must
learn to distance ourselves from first-order reactions in order to
move toward universal principles. First-order reactions are often
wrong or incomplete, as are immediate sense perceptions. And yet,
education does not ask us to give up on first-order reactions or sense
perceptions. Rather, it asks us to be disciplined and self-critical,
so that we might control first-order reactions in order to uphold more
important principles.
5. Political Toleration
Moral toleration emphasizes a moral commitment to the value of
autonomy. Although it is linked, by Mill, for example to a political
idea about restraint of state power, moral toleration is ultimately
concerned with clarifying the second-order principle that is supposed
to lead to toleration.
While moral toleration is about relations between agents, political
toleration is about restraint of political power. The modern liberal
state is usually not thought to be a moral agent. Rather, the state is
supposed to be something like a third party referee: it is not thought
to be one of the parties engaged directly in the process of judgment
and negation. Political toleration is thus an ideal that holds that
the political referee should be impartial and unbiased. The term
toleration has been used, since Locke, in this political context to
describe a principle of state neutrality. The connection between moral
and political toleration can be understood in terms of the history of
the pre-modern era when the state was an agent—a monarch, for
example—who had particular judgments and the power to negate. As the
idea of the state has evolved since the 17th Century toward liberal
democratic notions of self-government and civil rights, the notion of
political toleration has evolved to mean something like state
indifference. Political toleration is now thought to entail respect
for privacy, separation of church and state, and a general respect for
human rights.
a. John Rawls
In the 20th Century, the idea of political toleration has developed,
especially under the influence of John Rawls (1921-2002) and his
books, Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1995).
Rawls' approach attempts to be neutral about moral values in order to
establish political principles of toleration. Rawls argues for
toleration in a pragmatic fashion as that which works best to achieve
political unity and an idea of justice among diverse individuals.
Although the idea of political toleration has been most vigorously
defended by Rawls, it also forms the basis of other pragmatic and
political accounts of toleration, including those of John Dewey,
Jürgen Habermas, Michael Walzer, and Richard Rorty. The danger with
this approach is that it tends toward relativism by self-consciously
limiting itself from articulating a metaphysical defense of autonomy
and toleration. The difficulty is that the idea of state neutrality
can become paradoxical: a state that is neutral about everything will
undermine its own existence.
The idea of political toleration begins from the claim that diverse
individuals will come to tolerate one another by developing what Rawls
calls "overlapping consensus": individuals and groups with diverse
metaphysical views or "comprehensive schemes" will find reasons to
agree about certain principles of justice that will include principles
of toleration. This is in part an empirical or historical argument
about the way in which diverse individuals or groups eventually
resolve their differences by way of a pragmatic commitment to
toleration as a modus vivendi, or means of life. One could trace this
idea back to Hobbes' idea of the social contract as a peace treaty.
Diverse individuals in the state of nature will, according to Hobbes's
argument in The Leviathan (1651), engage in the war of all against
all. This war is ultimately unsatisfying and so individuals relinquish
their warring power and create the social contract. The problem is
that this pragmatic account leaves us without a metaphysical
justification of the principles of toleration. Rather it comes to
toleration from the pragmatic assumption that diverse individuals
motivated by self-interest will agree to support the neutral state,
which is then supposed to act as a referee in their disputes. Of
course, Hobbes' account of the absolute sovereignty of the Leviathan
calls into question the idea that a social contract view will always
lead to a tolerant liberal state.
Rawls' idea of "justice as fairness" attempts to set limits to
political power without trying to evaluate the relative merits of
different conceptions of the good. Rawls clarifies his approach by
insisting that the principles of justice are political and not moral
principles. They are based upon what he calls "reasonable pluralism."
What he means by this is that the principles of toleration will be
agreed to by individuals from diverse perspectives because these
principles will appear reasonable to each individual despite their
differences. The idea of toleration results from a political consensus
that is developed by way of the ideal social contract that Rawls
describes at length in Theory of Justice. Like Mill, Rawls theory of
justice claims that the first principle of justice is the liberty
principle: "Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme
of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of
liberties for all." These basic civil liberties form the basis for
political toleration.
b. Risks and Benefits
Political liberalism focuses on the problem of diversity without
appealing to a larger metaphysical theory. This problem is exacerbated
when political liberalism takes up the question of international human
rights and the problem of intolerant groups or individual who demand
to be tolerated. Political liberalism aims at the creation of a global
human rights regime that is supposed to support politically tolerant
states and that is sensitive to the issue of group rights. From the
perspective of political liberalism, human rights—basic defenses
against the intolerant expansion of state power—are thought to be the
result of overlapping political consensus. From this perspective,
human rights, such as the right to autonomy that forms the basis of
moral toleration, are thought to be, not metaphysical givens, but the
conditions for the possibility of political consensus building.
The idea of a developing "overlapping consensus" in international
affairs was articulated in the 1950's by Jacques Maritain and was
developed in practice by international agencies such as the United
Nations. More recently Jürgen Habermas' approach links principles of
toleration to the very nature of political argument: for us to have a
political argument, we must agree to certain principles of fair
argumentation. The difficultly here is that diversity is even more of
a problem on the international scene, where discussions of human
rights are essential. At the local or national level, the point of
liberalism is that the neutral state ought not interfere or comment on
the quality of individual lives unless the lives and actions of
private individuals become a menace to the rights and privacy of other
individuals. Internationally, Rawls follows Kant in specifying "the
Law of Peoples" that is supposed to maintain order among diverse
mutually tolerant nations.
A further complication arises at the level of group rights (both
within national and international politics), where groups and their
members claim the right to be tolerated by larger political
organizations. Here the idea of tolerating the practices and
identities of groups may paradoxically result in toleration for
intolerant groups. This is the case for example, when tolerant
governments consider groups who advocate violence, discrimination, and
other intolerant practices. Such groups can be intolerant toward their
own members, toward the tolerant liberal societies in which they
subside, and indeed toward those international organizations who
support toleration throughout the globe.
The risk of political liberalism is that it hovers uneasily between
pluralism and relativism, while seeking to avoid metaphysical
dogmatism or political imperialism. The basic pluralism of political
liberalism supports political toleration by recognizing that
conflicting comprehensive doctrines can each be justified as
reasonable according to the standards internal to them. This leaves us
with the conflicts of reasonable pluralism: each of the conflicting
comprehensive doctrines is reasonable on its own terms and to the
extent that it recognizes the reasonableness of other comprehensive
doctrines. Thus, for Rawls, cooperation between reasonable
comprehensive doctrines is a practical political task. The state
should refrain from entering into a discussion of which comprehensive
doctrine is better morally, epistemologically, or metaphysically quite
simply because such a discussion would be unjust for a neutral state
confronted with the fact of diversity. By defining his account of
state neutrality as political, Rawls wants to distance his account of
reasonable pluralism from a more robust form of philosophical
skepticism. This is reminiscent of Locke's approach to epistemological
toleration: since we cannot in practice force individuals to agree
about moral or metaphysical truths, we should tolerate diversity at
the political level.
Rawls does, however, hold that there is a best political arrangement,
even if the truth about the best political arrangement is arrived at
by way of pragmatic concerns for what works politically in light of
the fact of diversity. And thus his idea of political consensus tries
to avoid the slide toward skepticism and relativism. It seems that for
political toleration, there is at least one non-relative value—that of
toleration and peaceful coexistence—even if this is merely
pragmatically justified by the concrete historical need for peaceful
coexistence among those who cannot arrive at consensus about their
views of the good.
The approach of political liberalism has appeared to succeed in
practice. One could argue that the idea of the neutral state and of
political consensus about the need for toleration has been gradually
developing in Constitutional Law in the U.S. and in international law
by way of the U.N.'s Declaration of Human Rights. Article 26 of the
U.N. Declaration states explicitly that education is a universal right
and that education should aim to "promote understanding, tolerance and
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups." We are
still far from actualizing the idea of a tolerant international
community. However, it is fairly clear that in the last several
decades the idea of political toleration has succeeded in the United
States and in other Western countries.
Despite this success, critics such as Michael Sandel, in his
Democracy's Discontent (1998), have argued that the tolerant attitude
of what he calls "the procedural republic" must be grounded in a more
comprehensive moral theory. Without such a ground, Sandel worries that
the tolerant neutral state will ultimately lose its connection with
the moral lives of individuals. Sandel claims in his arguments against
Rawls and against certain developments in Constitutional Law that the
approach of political liberalism cannot ultimately take account of the
depth of commitment that most individuals have to their own
comprehensive doctrines. Rawls admits that for his idea of overlapping
consensus to work, he must assume a weakening of private faith in
comprehensive doctrines. The problem here is that it argues for
toleration by underestimating the power of those forms of private
faith that must be tolerated.
A further problem of the political approach is that it struggles to
define the nature of privacy. Moral toleration claims that there are
certain private activities which are only of concern to the individual
and that the state would be unjustified in interfering with these
private activities. A merely political approach to toleration is
however unable to draw the line dividing public and private in a
metaphysical fashion. Rather, the sphere of privacy is itself defined
only as a result of the process of building political consensus. Thus
the worry is that the principles of political liberalism are not
clearly defined and that toleration, as a mere modus vivendi, could be
violated if the political consensus were to shift. In other words, if
there is no metaphysical basis for a sphere of privacy, then it is not
exactly clear what the politically grounded idea of liberal toleration
is supposed to tolerate.
6. References and Further Reading
* Beiner, Ronald. What's the Matter with Liberalism (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992).
* Berlin, Isaiah. "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Four Essays on
Liberty(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
* Cook, John W. Morality and Cultural Differences (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999).
* Dworkin, Ronald. Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2000).
* Dworkin, Ronald. Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard, 1977).
* Fiala, Andrew. "Toleration and Pragmatism" in Journal of
Speculative Philosophy, 16: 2, (2002), 103-116.
* Habermas, Jürgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990).
* Heyd, David, ed. Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996).
* Horton, John and Peter Nicholson, eds. Toleration: Philosophy
and Practice (London: Ashgate Publishing, 1992).
* King, Preston. Toleration (London: Frank Cass, 1998).
* Kymlicka, Will. Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989).
* Laursen, John Christian. "Spinoza on Toleration" in Difference
and Dissent: Theories of Tolerance in Medieval and Early Modern
Europe, edited by Nederman and Laursen (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1996).
* Locke, John. Letter Concerning Toleration in Steven M. Cahn ed.
Classics of Modern Political Theory (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997).
* Mara, Gerald M. "Socrates and Liberal Toleration" in Political
Theory, 16:3 (1988).
* Marcuse, Herbert. "Repressive Tolerance" in Wolff, Moore, and
Marcuse, eds., A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press,
1969).
* Maritain, Jacques. Man and the State (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1951).
* Mendus, Susan and David Edwards, eds. On Toleration (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987).
* Mendus, Susan. "Locke: Toleration, Morality, and Rationality" in
John Horton and Susan Mendus, eds., John Locke: A Letter Concerning
Toleration in Focus (London: Routledge, 1991).
* Mendus, Susan. Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989).
* Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford
World Classics, 1998).
* Milton, John. Aereopogatica in Encyclopedia Britannica's Great
Books of the Western World, vol. 29 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991).
* Newey, Glen. Virtue, Reason, and Toleration (Edinburgh:
University of Edinburgh Press, 1999).
* Oberdiek, Hans. Tolerance: Between Forbearance and Acceptance
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).
* Paine, Thomas. The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine ed. by
Philip Foner (New York: The Citadel Press, 1945).
* Popper, Karl. The Open Society and its Enemies (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971).
* Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1971).
* Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2001).
* Rawls, John. Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1995).
* Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2001).
* Razavi, Mehdi Amin and David Ambuel, eds. Philosophy, Religion,
and the Question of Intolerance (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1997).
* Ricoeur, Paul, ed. Tolerance Between Intolerance and the
Intolerable (an edition of Diogenes, No. 176, Vol. 44/4, Winter 1996).
* Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989).
* Rosenthal, Michael A. "Tolerance as a Virtue in Spinoza's
Ethics" in Journal of the History of Philosophy 39:4 (2001), 535-557.
* Sandel, Michael. Democracy's Discontent (Cambridge: Harvard, 1998).
* Sandel, Michael. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
* Sen, Amartya. "Human Rights and Asian Values" in The New
Republic 217: 2-3 (1997), 33-40.
* Spinoza, Baruch. Theological-Political Treatise and Political
Treatise (New York: Dover Publications, 1951).
* Tan, Kok-Chor. Toleration, Diversity, and Global Justice
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000).
* Voltaire. Philosophical Dictionary (Cleveland: World Publishing
Co., 1943).
* Waldron, Jeremy. "Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of
Persecution" in John Horton and Susan Mendus eds., John Locke: A
Letter Concerning Toleration in Focus (London: Routledge, 1991).
* Walzer, Michael. On Toleration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
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