early Christianity through Immanuel Kant and into the twentieth
century is rarely understood and even more rarely appreciated.
Throughout history, Stoic ethical doctrines have both provoked harsh
criticisms and inspired enthusiastic defenders. The Stoics defined the
goal in life as living in agreement with nature. Humans, unlike all
other animals, are constituted by nature to develop reason as adults,
which transforms their understanding of themselves and their own true
good. The Stoics held that virtue is the only real good and so is both
necessary and, contrary to Aristotle, sufficient for happiness; it in
no way depends on luck. The virtuous life is free of all passions,
which are intrinsically disturbing and harmful to the soul, but
includes appropriate emotive responses conditioned by rational
understanding and the fulfillment of all one's personal, social,
professional, and civic responsibilities. The Stoics believed that the
person who has achieved perfect consistency in the operation of his
rational faculties, the "wise man," is extremely rare, yet serves as a
prescriptive ideal for all. The Stoics believed that progress toward
this noble goal is both possible and vitally urgent.
1. Definition of the End
Stoicism is known as a eudaimonistic theory, which means that the
culmination of human endeavor or 'end' (telos) is eudaimonia, meaning
very roughly "happiness" or "flourishing." The Stoics defined this end
as "living in agreement with nature." "Nature" is a complex and
multivalent concept for the Stoics, and so their definition of the
goal or final end of human striving is very rich.
The first sense of the definition is living in accordance with nature
as a whole, i.e. the entire cosmos. Cosmic nature (the universe), the
Stoics firmly believed, is a rationally organized and well-ordered
system, and indeed coextensive with the will of Zeus, the impersonal
god. Consequently, all events that occur within the universe fit
within a coherent, well-structured scheme that is providential. Since
there is no room for chance within this rationally ordered system, the
Stoics' metaphysical determinism further dictated that this cosmic
Nature is identical to fate. Thus at this level, "living in agreement
with nature" means conforming one's will with the sequence of events
that are fated to occur in the rationally constituted universe, as
providentially willed by Zeus.
Each type of thing within the universe has its own specific
constitution and character. This second sense of 'nature' is what we
use when we say it is the nature of fire to move upward. The manner in
which living things come to be, change, and perish distinguishes them
from the manner in which non-living things come to be, change, and
cease to be. Thus the nature of plants is quite distinct from the
nature of rocks and sand. To "live in agreement with nature" in this
second sense would thus include, for example, metabolic functions:
taking in nutrition, growth, reproduction, and expelling waste. A
plant that is successful at performing these functions is a healthy,
flourishing specimen.
In addition to basic metabolism, animals have the capacities of
sense-perception, desire, and locomotion. Moreover, animals have an
innate impulse to care for their offspring. Thus living in agreement
with a creature's animality involves more complex behaviors than those
of a plant living in agreement with its nature. For an animal parent
to neglect its own offspring would therefore be for it to behave
contrary to its nature. The Stoics believed that compared to other
animals, human beings are neither the strongest, nor the fastest, nor
the best swimmers, nor able to fly. Instead, the distinct and uniquely
human capacity is reason. Thus for human beings, "living in agreement
with nature" means living in agreement with our special, innate
endowment—the ability to reason.
2. Theory of Appropriation
The Stoics developed a sophisticated psychological theory to explain
how the advent of reason fundamentally transforms the world view of
human beings as they mature. This is the theory of 'appropriation,' or
oikeiôsis, a technical term which scholars have also translated
variously as "orientation," "familiarization," "affinity," or
"affiliation." The word means the recognition of something as one's
own, as belonging to oneself. The opposite of oikeiôsis is
allotriôsis, which neatly translates as "alienation." According to the
Stoic theory of appropriation, there are two different developmental
stages. In the first stage, the innate, initial impulse of a living
organism, plant, or animal is self-love and not pleasure, as the rival
Epicureans contend. The organism is aware of its own constitution,
though for plants this awareness is more primitive than it is for
animals. This awareness involves the immediate recognition of its own
body as "belonging to" itself. The creature is thus directed toward
maintaining its constitution in its proper, i.e. its natural,
condition. As a consequence, the organism is impelled to preserve
itself by pursuing things that promote its own well-being and by
avoiding things harmful to it. Pleasure is only a by-product of
success in this activity. In the case of a human infant, for example,
appropriation explains why the baby seeks his mother's milk. But as
the child matures, his constitution evolves. The child continues to
love himself, but as he matures into adolescence his capacity for
reason emerges and what he recognizes as his constitution, or self, is
crucially transformed. Where he previously identified his constitution
as his body, he begins to identify his constitution instead with his
mental faculty (reason) in a certain relation to his body. In short,
the self that he now loves is his rationality. Our human reason gives
us an affinity with the cosmic reason, Nature, that guides the
universe. The fully matured adult thus comes to identify his real
self, his true good, with his completely developed, perfected rational
soul. This best possible state of the rational soul is exactly what
virtue is.
Whereas the first stage of the theory of appropriation gives an
account of our relationship toward ourselves, the second stage
explains our social relationship toward others. The Stoics observed
that a parent is naturally impelled to love her own children and have
concern for their welfare. Parental love is motivated by the child's
intimate affinity and likeness to her. But since we possess reason in
common with all (or nearly all) human beings, we identify ourselves
not only with our own immediate family, but with all members of the
human race—they are all fellow members of our broader rational
community. In this way the Stoics meant social appropriation to
constitute an explanation of the natural genesis of altruism.
3. Good, Evil, and Indifferents
The Stoics defined the good as "what is complete according to nature
for a rational being qua rational being" (Cicero Fin. III.33). As
explained above, the perfected nature of a rational being is precisely
the perfection of reason, and the perfection of reason is virtue. The
Stoics maintained, quite controversially among ancient ethical
thought, that the only thing that always contributes to happiness, as
its necessary and sufficient condition, is virtue. Conversely, the
only thing that necessitates misery and is "bad" or "evil" is the
corruption of reason, namely vice. All other things were judged
neither good nor evil, but instead fell into the class of
"indifferents." They were called "indifferents" because the Stoics
held that these things in themselves neither contribute to nor detract
from a happy life. Indifferents neither benefit nor harm since they
can be used well and badly.
However, within the class of indifferents the Stoics distinguished the
"preferred" from the "dispreferred." (A third subclass contains the
'absolute' indifferents, e.g. whether the number of hairs on one's
head is odd or even, whether to bend or extend one's finger.)
Preferred indifferents are "according to nature." Dispreferred
indifferents are "contrary to nature." This is because possession or
use of the preferred indifferents usually promotes the natural
condition of a person, and so selecting them is usually commended by
reason. The preferred indifferents include life, health, pleasure,
beauty, strength, wealth, good reputation, and noble birth. The
dispreferred indifferents include death, disease, pain, ugliness,
weakness, poverty, low repute, and ignoble birth. While it is usually
appropriate to avoid the dispreferred indifferents, in unusual
circumstances it may be virtuous to select them rather than avoid
them. The virtue or vice of the agent is thus determined not by the
possession of an indifferent, but rather by how it is used or
selected. It is the virtuous use of indifferents that makes a life
happy, the vicious use that makes it unhappy.
The Stoics elaborated a detailed taxonomy of virtue, dividing virtue
into four main types: wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation. Wisdom
is subdivided into good sense, good calculation, quick-wittedness,
discretion, and resourcefulness. Justice is subdivided into piety,
honesty, equity, and fair dealing. Courage is subdivided into
endurance, confidence, high-mindedness, cheerfulness, and
industriousness. Moderation is subdivided into good discipline,
seemliness, modesty, and self-control. Similarly, the Stoics divide
vice into foolishness, injustice, cowardice, intemperance, and the
rest. The Stoics further maintained that the virtues are
inter-entailing and constitute a unity: to have one is to have them
all. They held that the same virtuous mind is wise, just, courageous,
and moderate. Thus, the virtuous person is disposed in a certain way
with respect to each of the individual virtues. To support their
doctrine of the unity of virtue, the Stoics offered an analogy: just
as someone is both a poet and an orator and a general but is still one
individual, so too the virtues are unified but apply to different
spheres of action.
4. Appropriate Acts and Perfect Acts
Once a human being has developed reason, his function is to perform
"appropriate acts" or "proper functions." The Stoics defined an
appropriate act as "that which reason persuades one to do" or "that
which when done admits of reasonable justification." Maintaining one's
health is given as an example. Since health is neither good nor bad in
itself, but rather is capable of being used well or badly, opting to
maintain one's health by, say, walking, must harmonize with all other
actions the agent performs. Similarly, sacrificing one's property is
an example of an act that is only appropriate under certain
circumstances. The performance of appropriate acts is only a necessary
and not a sufficient condition of virtuous action. This is because the
agent must have the correct understanding of the actions he performs.
Specifically, his selections and rejections must form a continuous
series of actions that is consistent with all of the virtues
simultaneously. Each and every deed represents the totality and
harmony of his moral integrity. The vast majority of people are
non-virtuous because though they may follow reason correctly in
honoring their parents, for example, they fail to conform to 'the laws
of life as a whole' by acting appropriately with respect to all of the
other virtues.
The scale of actions from vicious to virtuous can be laid out as
follows: (1) Actions done "against the appropriate act," which include
neglecting one's parents, not treating friends kindly, not behaving
patriotically, and squandering one's wealth in the wrong
circumstances; (2) Intermediate appropriate actions in which the
agent's disposition is not suitably consistent, and so would not count
as virtuous, although the action itself approximates proper conduct.
Examples include honoring one's parents, siblings, and country,
socializing with friends, and sacrificing one's wealth in the right
circumstances; (3) "Perfect acts" performed in the right way by the
agent with an absolutely rational, consistent, and formally perfect
disposition. This perfect disposition is virtue.
5. Passions
As we have seen, only virtue is good and choiceworthy, and only its
opposite, vice, is bad and to be avoided according to Stoic ethics.
The vast majority of people fail to understand this. Ordinary people
habitually and wrongly judge various objects and events to be good and
bad that are in fact indifferent. The disposition to make a judgment
disobedient to reason is the psychic disturbance the Stoics called
passion (pathos). Since passion is an impulse (a movement of the soul)
which is excessive and contrary to reason, it is irrational and
contrary to nature. The four general types of passion are distress,
fear, appetite, and pleasure. Distress and pleasure pertain to present
objects, fear and appetite to future objects. The following table
illustrates their relations.
Table of Four Passions (pathê)
Present Object
Future Object
Irrationally judged to be good
Pleasure
Appetite
Irrationally judged to be bad
Distress
Fear
Distress is an irrational contraction of the soul variously described
as malice, envy, jealousy, pity, grief, worry, sorrow, annoyance,
vexation, or anguish. Fear, an irrational shrinking of the soul, is
expectation of something bad; hesitation, agony, shock, shame, panic,
superstition, dread, and terror are classified under it. Appetite is
an irrational stretching or swelling of the soul reaching for an
expected good; it is also called want, yearning, hatred,
quarrelsomeness, anger, wrath, intense sexual craving, or
spiritedness. Pleasure is an irrational elation over what seems to be
worth choosing; it includes rejoicing at another's misfortunes,
enchantment, self-gratification, and rapture.
The soul of the virtuous person, in contrast, is possessed of three
good states or affective responses (eupatheiai). The three 'good
states' of the soul are joy (chara), caution (eulabeia), and wish
(boulêsis). Joy, the opposite of pleasure, is a reasonable elation;
enjoyment, good spirits, and tranquility are classed under it.
Caution, the opposite of fear, is a reasonable avoidance. Respect and
sanctity are subtypes of caution. Wish, the opposite of appetite, is a
reasonable striving also described as good will, kindliness,
acceptance, or contentment. There is no "good feeling" counterpart to
the passion of distress.
Table of Three Good States
Present Object
Future Object
Rationally judged to be good
Joy
Wish
Rationally judged to be bad
—
Caution
For example, the virtuous person experiences joy in the company of a
friend, but recognizes that the presence of the friend is not itself a
real good as virtue is, but only preferred. That is to say the company
of the friend is to be sought so long as doing so in no way involves
any vicious acts like a dereliction of his responsibilities to others.
The friend's absence does not hurt the soul of the virtuous person,
only vice does. The vicious person's soul, in contrast, is gripped by
the passion of pleasure in the presence of, say, riches. When the
wealth is lost, this irrational judgment will be replaced by the
corresponding irrational judgment that poverty is really bad, thus
making the vicious person miserable. Consequently, the virtuous person
wishes to see his friend only if in the course of events it is good to
happen. His wish is thus made with reservation (hupexhairesis): "I
wish to see my friend if it is fated, if Zeus wills it." If the event
does not occur, then the virtuous person is not thwarted, and as a
result he is not disappointed or unhappy. His wish is rational and in
agreement with nature, both in the sense of being obedient to reason
(which is distinctive of our human constitution) and in the sense of
harmonizing with the series of events in the world.
The virtuous person is not passionless in the sense of being unfeeling
like a statue. Rather, he mindfully distinguishes what makes a
difference to his happiness—virtue and vice—from what does not. This
firm and consistent understanding keeps the ups and downs of his life
from spinning into the psychic disturbances or "pathologies" the
Stoics understood passions to be.
6. Moral Progress
The early Stoics were fond of uncompromising dichotomies—all who are
not wise are fools, all who are not free are slaves, all who are not
virtuous are vicious, etc. The later Stoics distinguished within the
class of fools between those making progress and those who are not.
Although the wise man or sage was said to be rarer than the phoenix,
it is useful to see the concept of the wise man functioning as a
prescriptive ideal at which all can aim. This ideal is thus not an
impossibly high target, its pursuit sheer futility. Rather, all who
are not wise have the rational resources to persevere in their journey
toward this ideal. Stoic teachers could employ this exalted image as a
pedagogical device to exhort their students to exert constant effort
to improve themselves and not lapse into complacency. The Stoics were
convinced that as one approached this goal, one came closer to real
and certain happiness.
7. References and Further Reading
* Becker, Lawrence C. 1998. A New Stoicism. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
o A daring exposition of what Stoic philosophy would look
like today if it had enjoyed a continuous development through the
Renaissance, the Enlightenment, modern science, and the fads of
twentieth century moral philosophy.
* Brennan, Tad. 2003. "Stoic Moral Psychology," in Brad Inwood,
ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, 257-294.
* Cooper, John. 1989. "Greek Philosophers on Euthanasia and
Suicide," in Brody, B.A. ed., Suicide and Euthanasia. Dordrecht, 9-38.
* Inwood, Brad and Donini, Pierluigi. 1999. "Stoic ethics," in
Algra, Keimpe, et al. eds. The Cambridge History of Hellenistic
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 675-738.
o A detailed treatment of the subject.
* Long, A. A. 1986. Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans,
Sceptics. 2nd ed. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press.
o A very readable introduction to the three Hellenistic schools.
* Long, A. A. and D. N. Sedley. 1987. The Hellenistic
Philosophers, Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
o Readings from the main schools: Epicureanism, Stoicism,
Scepticism, and the Academics. Includes commentaries on the readings.
This is the standard primary source text.
* Schofield, Malcolm. "Stoic Ethics," in Brad Inwood, ed., The
Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, 233-256.
o A fine overview that argues that Zeno (founder of the
Stoa) systematized the Socratic and Cynic philosophies. Two different
types of projects in Stoic ethics are identified: (1) laying out the
definitions and divisions of the key concepts in discursive ethical
discourse, and (2) trying to explain and establish by argument the
Stoic view on key ethical subjects.
* Sorabji, Richard. 2000. Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic
Agitation to Christian Temptation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
o A meticulous study of Stoic moral psychology and much more.
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