dead. The resurrection of the dead brings to the forefront topics from
the study of personal identity and philosophical anthropology. For
example, some people think that we have souls and that the souls play
an important role in resurrection. Others claim that we do not have
souls and that this is a reason to deny that there is any life after
death. In addition, the study of resurrection has benefited from
interaction with topics in contemporary metaphysics. There are many
puzzles about how things survive change. Philosophers have taken
insights and distinctions from those cases and used them in their
discussion of resurrection.
The article begins with a brief overview of the doctrine of the
resurrection. It touches on the essential parts of the Christian
doctrine and points to some of the surrounding controversies. The most
common objection to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the
dead is that it cannot be made compatible with materialism, the claim
that humans are material beings and have no non-physical parts. This
article examines the supposed inconsistency and looks at four
different attempts by philosophers to advance a coherent account of
the doctrine of the resurrection. The conclusion is a brief look at
immaterialist accounts of resurrection and a summary and criticism of
John W. Cooper's argument that the Christian belief in an intermediate
state entails mind-body dualism.
1. The Christian Doctrine of Resurrection
Many different religions have accounts of life after death but the
Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead has received the
most attention by philosophers. This is in large part due to the
centrality of the doctrine in the Western religious tradition. Because
of the emphasis on Christian accounts of resurrection in the
philosophical literature, this entry will focus on the debates about
the Christian doctrine of resurrection. However, much of what is said
can be applied to other religions and traditions. To see a
contemporary non-Christian account of resurrection, see John Leslie's
Immortality Defended.
The raising of the dead plays a central role in Christian belief. To
begin with, Christians believe that Jesus died and rose from the dead.
Each of the four gospels contains testimony about the resurrection of
Jesus (see Matthew 28:1-20, Mark 16:1-8, Luke 24:1-53, and John
20:1-21:25). Jesus' resurrection is central to Christian belief
because on it rests claims about Jesus' divinity and various doctrines
about salvation.
There is a fair amount of scholarly work done on the question of
whether or not Jesus did rise from the dead. This debate falls outside
the scope of the article but the interested reader will find The Son
Rises: The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus by
William Craig and Did Jesus Rise From the Dead? The Resurrection
Debate by Gary Habermas, Anthony Flew, and Terry Miethe to be good
starting points.
Christians believe that Jesus' resurrection serves as a model for the
resurrection of some people (perhaps everyone) in the future. It is
this belief that is known as the Christian doctrine of the
resurrection of the dead (henceforth CDR). To be clear, this doctrine
is one of bodily resurrection. It is not a claim about figurative or
metaphorical resurrection. We will now look at various aspects of CDR.
First, one might wonder about the scope of CDR. Who, exactly, will be
raised from the dead? By far, the majority of Christians (lay people,
clergy, and scholars) have believed that both Christians and
non-Christians will be resurrected. In addition, it has been believed
that this resurrection is not the same for everyone. For example, some
believe that Christians will be raised in a new spiritual body that
will experience an eternity of blessing, while non-Christians will be
raised so that they might undergo judgment and punishment.
Two doctrines that are compatible with a denial that both Christians
and non-Christians will be resurrected are annihilationism and
conditional immortality. Annihilationism is the view that
non-Christians are not punished for eternity but rather are
annihilated. Some versions of annihilationism hold that God will
punish unrepentant sinners for a limited time in hell and then
annihilate them (thus, endorsing some sort of afterlife) while others
hold that sinners are not resurrected at all. Conditional immortality
is the view that the soul is not inherently immortal and that it is
only God's gift that grants the soul eternal life. Both of these views
are held by a small minority of evangelical Protestants and various
Adventist churches.
Proponents of the resurrection of the godly and the ungodly point to
scripture in support of their belief in a general resurrection. For
example, in Acts 24:15 it is reported that Paul believed that "there
shall certainly be a resurrection of both the righteous and the
wicked" (all verses quoted are from the New American Standard Bible
translation, NASB). In addition to the verse in Acts the reader can
also look to Daniel 12:2 and Revelation 20:13-15 for support of the
belief in a general resurrection. In any case, it must be acknowledged
that historically and scripturally the bulk of attention is placed on
the resurrection of the believer. Thus, while CDR's scope may include
the non-believer, it is primarily a doctrine about what happens to the
believer in the afterlife.
Second, one might wonder about the timing of the resurrection in CDR.
When will the dead be raised? This a contentious issue among Christian
theologians and the timing of the resurrection (or resurrections) is
largely determined by whether one is an amillennialist,
postmillennialist, or premillenialist. Amillenialists believe that
Jesus will return to earth and at that time the resurrection of the
dead will take place along with the establishment of the New Heaven
and the New Earth. Postmillennialists believe that there will be a
"millennial age," which need not be a thousand years long,
characterized by Christianity becoming the dominant religion and the
world turning towards God. At the end of this age, Christ will return
and the resurrection of the dead will take place. Finally,
premillenialists hold that the resurrection of the believers will
occur when Christ returns to earth. Following Christ's return, there
will be a millennial age in which Christ reigns on earth. At the end
of this time, among other things, the resurrection of unbelievers will
occur and the New Heaven and New Earth will be established. (This last
characterization is a simplification. There are some versions of
premillenialism in which more than two large scale resurrections take
place.)
Third, one might wonder about the nature of the resurrection in CDR.
What will people be like once they are raised from the dead? After
all, if someone was merely restored to his or her physical state right
before death, then in many cases death would occur immediately
afterwards. First, CDR teaches that the resurrection will be a
physical or bodily resurrection. For example, Paul writes in Romans
8:11 that "He who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will also give
life to your mortal bodies through His Spirit who dwells in you."
Additionally, Paul writes in 1 Corinthians 15:42-44:
So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown a perishable
body, it is raised an imperishable body; it is sown in dishonor, it is
raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is
sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.
Also, Christians cite the example of Jesus after his resurrection.
Jesus is depicted not as some ghostly figure but as an embodied
person, able to eat, drink, and physically interact with others.
Second, the depictions of the resurrected Christ in the gospels and
the scripture passages above indicate that the body that will be
raised will be significantly different than the one that died. In
Christ's case people who knew him before he died had difficulty
recognizing him after he died. However, they did recognize him after
some prompting. (See John 20:11-18 for a case of this.) Additionally,
while Paul contrasts the two bodies in the passage from Corinthians
above, the New Testament also indicates that believers will be able to
recognize one another. (See Matthew 8:11, 27:52-53 and Luke 9:30-33.)
We can now sum up what the core of CDR is. CDR is a doctrine that
claims believers will be resurrected in bodily form when Christ
returns to the earth. Christians disagree about the timing of Christ's
return, the particulars about the resurrected body, and the scope of
the resurrection. However, the creeds have been consistent in
affirming the essential parts of CDR. The Apostles Creed, written
around the third or fourth century C.E., affirms "the resurrection of
the body." The Nicene Creed, C.E. 325, reads "I look for the
resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come."
Additionally, various confessions and doctrinal statements have
overwhelmingly endorsed CDR. For example, in the Westminster
Confession of Faith, composed in 1643-46, there is a section on the
resurrection of the dead which includes the claim that "all the dead
shall be raised up, with the selfsame bodies, and none other (although
with different qualities)…."
2. Objections to the Christian Doctrine of Resurrection
In this section of the article two objections to the Christian
doctrine of resurrection (CDR) will be examined. First, the
relationship between CDR and miracles will be discussed. Second, we
will consider the claim that CDR is incompatible with materialism. The
majority of this section will focus on the second objection because it
is a) the most common objection to CDR and b) specific to CDR and not
applicable to any number of different doctrines, unlike the first
objection involving miracles. Ultimately, it will be suggested that
the difficulties that CDR has with materialism are not due to a
particular conflict with materialism. Instead, whether one is a
dualist or a materialist supporter of CDR, one must account for how a
material object can be numerically identical with a previous material
object that was destroyed.
One objection to CDR is that it requires a miracle to take place. The
objector presumably believes either that God would not perform such
miraculous events or cannot perform such events. This sort of
objection was more popular in the early to mid-20th century when many
leading theologians and philosophers believed that the notion of a
miracle was incoherent and that Christianity would be better off
without a commitment to such overt supernatural events. Note that this
sort of objection applies not only to CDR but to large parts of
traditional Christian doctrine.
Defenders of CDR will admit that it would take a miracle for God to
bring about the resurrection of the dead. However, the defenders of
CDR do not see this as a problem. Rather, they embrace the coherence
of the concept of a miracle, and argue that we are within our
epistemic rights to believe in miracles. Recently, the position that
Christianity has within it the resources to justify belief in miracles
has become more popular among philosophers. If this position is true,
then the defender of CDR is within her epistemic rights in believing
that a supernatural act of God is required for a resurrection to
occur. However, this does not mean that CDR is true. The opponent of
CDR can still argue that CDR is false because it is committed to the
existence of miracles. Of course, the opponent of CDR in raising this
objection is also calling into question the greater theological scheme
of which CDR is but a part. Therefore, any criticism of CDR's
commitment to miracles quickly escalates into a discussion about the
truth of Christianity.
The most common objection to CDR is that it is incompatible with
materialism. Since materialism is the predominant view of
philosophers, this objection is taken to be a serious blow to both CDR
and Christianity. In order to understand this objection, one must
understand the distinction between qualitative and numerical identity.
Suppose one day that you hear the following comments: "Joe is wearing
the same watch that he wore yesterday," and "Joe is wearing the same
watch that Amy is wearing." Both of these comments make use of the
phrase, "same watch," but mean very different things. The first
comment says that Joe is wearing a watch that is numerically identical
to the watch he wore the day before. If Joe bought a warranty for the
watch he was wearing yesterday, that warranty would apply to the watch
he is wearing today. The first speaker is not talking of two different
watches; he is talking of only one watch. The second speaker is not
talking of one watch but of two. The speaker is claiming that the
watch Joe is wearing is qualitatively identical to the watch that Amy
is wearing. The two watches are such that they are of the same brand,
have similar features, are of the same color, etc. If Joe were to
purchase a warranty for the watch he is wearing, it would not apply to
the watch that Amy is wearing. This case of watches generalizes to
other objects. If object X is numerically identical to object Y, then
there are not, in fact, two objects, but just one. For example,
Superman is numerically identical to Clark Kent; there is just one
person who happens to lead an interesting double life. If object X is
qualitatively identical to object Y, then there are two objects that
happen to be exactly alike in their various properties and qualities.
For example, two electrons might be thought of as being qualitatively
identical even though they are not numerically identical.
Note that very few pairs of things are qualitatively identical in a
strict and philosophical sense. For example, we might speak of two
desks of being "the same desk." However, it is likely they have enough
differences that they are not qualitatively identical. Rather, they
are just very similar. They are qualitatively alike and for almost any
purpose one of the desks will do just as well as the other.
Additionally, almost all numerically distinct objects are
qualitatively distinct as well. For, take any two numerically distinct
objects, unless they occupy the very same space, we could say that one
has the property of being in such and such a location and the other
lacks that property.
If CDR is true, then there will be many people in the far future that
will be resurrected. We can ask of each of these people, is he or she
the same person who died? In asking this question we are not asking if
they are qualitatively the same person. As we saw above, CDR claims
that those that are resurrected will have very different bodies than
they had before death. Furthermore, this change is unproblematic.
People can undergo a vast amount of qualitative change in their
present life and still be the same person. For example, a person can
be involved in a terrible accident that leaves him or her both
physically and mentally very different. However, we would still
consider that person to be the same person, numerically speaking, as
the person who was in the accident, despite the change he or she
endured. So, when we ask whether or not the resurrected persons are
the same persons who died, we are asking if they are numerical
identical to someone who lived in the past.
This question is problematic for the proponent of CDR. Suppose the
answer is no, then it seems as if CDR is an empty hope for those who
believe in it. For, the Christian does not merely believe that someone
like her will be resurrected, but believes that she will be the one
who is resurrected in the future. Thus, CDR is committed to the claim
that there must be some way for resurrection to occur that allows for
numerical identity between a person before death and after
resurrection.
The dualist seems to have an easier time meeting this commitment.
Under many dualist views, a person is identical to a soul or some sort
of non-physical entity. During a person's life, one soul is "attached"
or associated with one particular body. When death occurs, the dualist
thinks that the soul and the body become "detached." Later, when the
resurrection of the dead occurs, the soul becomes attached to a new
body. This is unproblematic because a person is not identical to the
body but to the soul. The newly resurrected person is identical to
someone who existed before because the soul is identical to a soul
that existed before.
It seems it is more difficult for a materialist to give an account of
resurrection that accounts for the numerical identity of persons
before and after death. To see this, we will first look at a case
involving the destruction and recreation of an everyday object and
then apply that case to the materialist believer of CDR. The following
case is taken from Peter van Inwagen (p.45). Consider an everyday
material object, such as a book or a manuscript. Suppose that at some
point in the past this manuscript was burned. Now, what would you
think if someone told you that he or she was currently in possession
of the very same manuscript that was burned in the past? Van Inwagen
would find this incredible. He does not doubt that someone could
possess an exact duplicate of the manuscript. He denies that anyone
could possess a manuscript that was numerically identical to the one
that was burned.
Suppose the owner of the manuscript tried to convince van Inwagen that
it was possible for it to be the same one by describing a scenario in
which God rebuilds the manuscript using the same atoms or other bits
of matter that used to compose the manuscript. Van Inwagen claims that
the manuscript God recreated is merely a duplicate. A duplicate is an
object that is merely qualitatively identical to another object. Van
Inwagen is not alone in thinking this. John Perry expresses this
intuition in his work A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality.
In it, a character of his argues that Kleenex boxes cannot be rebuilt
after being completely destroyed. Underlying these intuitions is the
view that mere rebuilding of an object (even using the same parts) is
not enough to insure that the object after rebuilding is numerically
identical to the object before rebuilding.
Applying this intuition to the materialist we can see why CDR seems to
be in conflict with materialism. For, materialism holds that people
are material objects like manuscripts and Kleenex boxes. Thus, if a
person's body is destroyed then a person is destroyed and God can no
better rebuild a person's body than he can a manuscript or any other
material object.
In response to this argument, the defender of CDR may reject the
intuition behind van Inwagen's argument and claim that God can rebuild
material objects as long as he is using the same parts that composed
the object when it is destroyed. Under this picture, the reassembly
view of resurrection, God would resurrect people by assembling
together all the bits of matter that used to be a part of their bodies
and bringing them together again to form healthy bodies. The reader
may wonder what is meant by "parts" or "bits of matter" in this
discussion. Specification of these terms will vary depending on the
proponent of the reassembly view, but typically the parts under
consideration are the basic micro-physical parts that we are made of.
For example, it would be a poor reassembly view of resurrection that
held that God resurrected people by gathering all the organs that
composed people at a previous time. After all, our organs will decay
and decompose in a similar way that our bodies will. The protons,
neutrons, electrons, quarks, superstrings, or whatever subatomic
particle you choose will not decay in the same way, and presumably
would survive into the future so that God might eventually gather them
and reassemble them.
There are objections to the view of resurrection as assembly that go
beyond the intuition that reassembly of a body is not enough to ensure
that a reassembled person is numerical identical to someone in the
past. First, it is not clear that all the parts that compose people
now will exist later when the time for resurrection comes. It seems
possible, if not plausible, that God would not be able to resurrect
some people if the reassembly view was true. The defender of CDR would
not be comfortable with such an outcome. Second, parts of people can
become parts of other people. For example, when a cannibal bites into
her latest victim, she digests and incorporates the parts of one
person into her own person. God would not be able to rebuild everyone
given the existence of cannibals and other mechanisms that allow parts
of one person to become parts of another person after death.
For the reasons above, philosophers have tended to reject reassembly
views. (For an account of the medieval debates about reassembly views
and resurrection see Caroline Walker Bynum's The Resurrection of the
Body. Some of the defenses of reassembly views by medieval apologists
are entertaining if not persuasive.) We are left with our original
problem, how can a material object be rebuilt? If materialism is true,
then how is resurrection possible? The remaining sections of this
article explain several different ways in which philosophers have
attempted to answer this question.
It should be noted that the argument against the materialist defender
of CDR can be transformed slightly to apply to any defender of CDR. In
the description of CDR the article left open the question of whether
or not the resurrected body is numerically identical to the body
pre-death. Many Christians think that it is true that a numerically
identical body is resurrected. Trenton Merricks makes this case
forcefully in his article "The Resurrection of the Body and the Life
Everlasting." There he argues that a) "the overwhelming majority of
theologians and philosophers in the history of the church have
endorsed the claim of numerical identity" (p. 268) and b) that
scripture teaches this. In defense of his second point he points to 1
Corinthians 15 and the fact that Christ bore the scars of crucifixion.
If Merricks is right, and numerical identity of the body is part of
CDR, then a believer in CDR must defend the view that it is possible
for God to resurrect a material object even if one is a dualist. If
Merricks is not right, then the dualist has an easier time coming up
with an account of resurrection than the materialist.
3. Materialist Accounts of Resurrection
a. The Simulacra Model
Peter van Inwagen has presented a model of resurrection that is
compatible with materialism and the Christian doctrine of resurrection
(CDR). The key problem for the defender of CDR is that once we die our
bodies begin to disintegrate and eventually are destroyed by natural
processes. Once this happens, it seems that even God cannot bring back
that body because it is a logically impossible thing to do, given the
intuition discussed above. Van Inwagen proposes solving this problem
by giving an account of resurrection where our bodies do not in fact
undergo decay. Under his account, "at the moment of each man's death,
God removes his corpse and replaces it with a simulacrum, which is
what is burned or rots" (van Inwagen, p. 49). Later, at the time of
the general resurrection, God will take the corpse that he has
preserved and restore it to life.
One objection that van Inwagen addresses in his article is that there
is no reason for God to replace genuine corpses with simulacra. If God
does preserve our corpse, why does he not preserve it here on earth or
remove the corpse from the earth without a replacement? Van Inwagen's
brief answer is that if God did not provide a simulacrum, then there
would be widespread irrefutable evidence of the supernatural. Suppose
someone put a torch to a corpse. If God were preserving that corpse,
then no amount of effort would allow the natural process of cremation
to take place. Van Inwagen goes on to say that there are good reasons
for God to have a policy of not providing regular evidence of the
supernatural (though in the article above van Inwagen is not specific
about what those reasons are.)
Another objection to the simulacrum view is that it makes God out to
be a great deceiver. We tend to think of the corpses that we bury or
cremate as genuine corpses. Further, we have every reason to suspect
that this is the case. If we are wrong, it is only due to God's
constant effort to deceive us. (See Hudson, p. 181, for a discussion
of this point.)
Finally, it can be objected that the simulacrum view is incredible.
Even though it is coherent, it requires us to adopt radically
different beliefs than we currently hold. Van Inwagen acknowledges
this point and in a postscript to his original article writes:
I am inclined now to think of the description that I gave in 'The
Possibility of Resurrection' of how an omnipotent being could
accomplish the Resurrection of the Dead as a 'just-so story': Although
it serves to establish a possibility, it probably isn't true (p.51).
He goes on to remark that while the theory itself might not be
literally true, it is true in another way in that it shows us some
important features about how God will accomplish the resurrection of
the dead.
b. The Constitution View
In the other sections of the article, we have assumed that a
materialist is someone who holds the view that not only is a person a
material object but that a person is identical to a material object,
namely her body. Some materialists deny this. Instead, they hold that
a person is constituted by her body and that this relation is not one
of identity.
By looking at a statue and the matter it is composed of we can better
understand the constitution view. Consider a hunk of marble; let us
call that hunk "Hunk". Suppose Hunk is carved into a wonderful statue
which we call "Statue." Arguably, Statue and Hunk are not identical
for Hunk has properties that Statue lacks. Hunk, for example, can
survive being carved into a different statue while Statue cannot.
Statue cannot exist without an artworld, while Hunk can, etc. Thus, by
Leibniz's Law, Statue and Hunk are not identical. However, we can say
that Statue is constituted by Hunk. (Lynne Rudder Baker argues for
this view in Persons and Bodies.)
Given the constitution view of persons, we can construct an account of
resurrection that purports to solve the problems of the reassembly
view we described earlier. In her paper "Need a Christian be a
Mind/Body Dualist," Baker claims that at the general resurrection God
will take some, not all, of the atoms that used to constitute a
person, let's call him Smith, and recreate Smith's body. The
difference between this and the reassembly view is that what God is
recreating is not Smith but merely a body that constitutes Smith.
Thus, while we are inclined to agree with van Inwagen that we do not
have numerically identical body here, Baker suggests that we should
think we have the same person here. For, unlike in the case of the
manuscript, God can "simply will (it seems to [Baker]) there to be a
body that has the complexity to 'subserve' Smith's characteristic
states, and that is suitably related to Smith's biological body, to
constitute Smith" (Baker, 1995, p. 499).
One might raise several objections to this view. First, it seems that
the constitutionalist has to concede that the body raised in glory is
not the same one that is sown in weakness. One constitutionalist,
Kevin Corcoran, shows that the constitutionalist can avoid this
consequence by combining the view expressed above with the falling
elevator account discussed in the following section.
Second, one might object that this view is merely a replay of the
reassembly view. After all, what makes this new person Smith and not
some replica? According to Baker, it is that "what makes Smith the
person she is are her characteristic intentional states, including
first-person reference to her body" (1995, p. 499). Unlike inanimate
objects, such as manuscripts, persons can survive by having a material
object constitute a mental life that has the suitable characteristics.
The thing constituting a person does not need to have a particular
origin, as in the case of van Inwagen's manuscript.
One can follow up this reply by asking: What would happen if God were
to reassemble several bodies, all of which are exactly like the body
God created for Smith? It seems like Baker is committed to them all
being identical to Smith, which is absurd. Baker responds to this
objection by claming that we can trust in God's goodness to not bring
this situation about.
Finally, some would object that this view commits us to a
controversial metaphysics, namely that of the constitutionalist
ontology. Exploring in detail this objection would go well outside the
scope of the present article. Rather, the reader should keep in mind
that this model of resurrection does require one to adopt an ontology
that many philosophers find disagreeable. (See Hudson for one
metaphysician who has argued against constitutionalism.)
c. The Falling Elevator Model
One serious problem with the simulacra view is its commitment to mass
deception by God. Recall that under this view none of the corpses we
see here on Earth are genuine corpses. They are bodies that have never
been alive and were not even around until God placed them, like movie
props, on the earth. Dean Zimmerman, in his paper "The Compatibility
of Materialism and Survival: The 'Falling Elevator' Model" has offered
the materialist (he is not one himself) an account of resurrection
that avoids the problems of both reassembly views and the simulacra
view. The origins of the name "the falling elevator model" or the
"jumping animals account" is due to the propensity of cartoon
characters to avoid death in a falling elevator by jumping out at the
last minute. In the same way, in the falling elevator model, bodies
"jump" at the last second before death to avoid being destroyed.
According to the falling elevator model at the point just before death
God enables a person to undergo fission. (An object undergoes a case
of fission when it splits, like an amoeba, into two objects, both of
which bear a causal relationship to the original object.) One body
resulting from this case of fission goes on to die and becomes a
genuine corpse. The second body is transported by God into the far
future where it goes on to be resurrected. Both of these bodies have
an immanent-causal connection to the body just before death and it is
this connection that supports the claim that the resurrected person is
identical with the person who died and the claim that the corpse is a
genuine corpse and not a simulacrum.
The main objection to this view is that it is committed to denying the
"only x and y principle." This principle has many variants, but it
basically states that the only things that matter when considering
whether or not x is numerically identical to y are the intrinsic
properties of x and y and the relationships between them. The falling
elevator model violates this principle because it allows for there to
be cases of fission where at one time there are two persons that are
both alive and have an immanent-causal connection to a previous
person. To see this, consider a case where this occurs and there are
two people "Joe" and "Fred" who both have an immanent-causal
connection to a previous person "Mark." Since the causal connection
between Joe and Mark and the causal connection between Fred and Mark
are both of the sort used by the proponent of the falling elevator
mode, the proponent is forced to acknowledge that both Joe and Fred
are numerically identical to Mark. But that can't be! Joe and Fred are
not numerically identical to one another, and the identity
relationship is transitive. Thus, the proponent of the falling
elevator model will have to insist that some other criteria, outside
Joe, Fred, and Mark, be used to evaluate personal identity. For
example, the proponent will likely say that an object x is numerically
identical to a previous object y only if x is the closest continuer to
y at that time. Thus, we have a violation of the only x and y
principle.
Hudson adopts the falling elevator model but avoids the consequence of
rejecting the "only x and y principle" by endorsing a perdurantist
view of persons. According to the perdurantist, people are not wholly
located at a particular time. Rather, they are spread out over time
and are composed of temporal parts. In the case above, the
perdurantist would not say that Joe and Fred are numerically identical
to Mark. Instead, he would claim that the temporal parts Joe and Fred
are related to the temporal part of Mark in such a way that the object
composed of Joe and Mark is a person and the object composed of Fred
and Mark is a different person. Granted, these two persons overlap for
the entirety of the temporal part Mark, but that is not an incoherent
outcome.
Perdurantism is a controversial metaphysics. A full discussion of it
falls outside the scope of this article. The reader should bear in
mind that if one adopts Hudson's view, one also has to adopt
metaphysical theses that are criticized by a wide variety of
philosophers.
d. Anti-Criterialism
In order to understand the motivations for anti-criterialism, it will
help if we look at a puzzle known as the Ship of Theseus. The Ship of
Theseus is a story about a ship captain, named Theseus, who slowly
replaces each one of the parts of his ship with a new part. This
change is gradual, and many are inclined to believe that at the end of
the process the repaired ship (call it ship A) is numerically
identical to the one he began with (see the distinction between
numerical and qualitative identity in section 2). Suppose that someone
were to reassemble the parts that were replaced and form a new ship
(call it ship B). Would ship B also be numerically identical to the
original ship? Again, many think so. Since identity is a transitive
relationship it cannot be that both ships A and B are identical to the
original ship. This poses a puzzle for us, as we have the intuitions
that ships can both survive a replacement of their parts and can be
disassembled and reassembled.
Faced with puzzles such as the Ship of Theseus, and the possibility of
fission (a case where one objects divides into two, such as an amoeba
splitting into two amoebas), philosophers have tended to adopt
criterialism. Criterialism is the claim that there are criteria for
identity over time. One recent philosopher to deny this is Trenton
Merricks. In this section of the article we will look at Merricks'
position and see how he applies it to the objections to the Christian
doctrine of resurrection (CDR).
A criterion for identity over time is a criterion for a particular
type of object that gives informative necessary and sufficient
conditions for numerical identity over time. For example, if you
possessed a criterion for identify over time for ships, then you would
be able to say what it is about a ship at the present time that makes
it identical to a ship that existed previously. Some philosophers
think that such criteria are useful because having them would allow us
to solve puzzles that involve questions regarding an objects identity
over time. For example, a criterion for ships would help us solve the
Ship of Theseus paradox by allowing us to determine whether or not
ship A or ship B is numerically identical to the original ship.
Let us now look some models given for CDR. Van Inwagen, for example,
believes that the criterion of identity over time for persons is that
a person at a given time must be part of the same life as a person at
a previous time. Hudson argues for what he calls a psychological
criterion of personal identity. Given these criteria, each philosopher
attempts to construct a model of resurrection that does not violate
his or her criterion for personal identity. (It should be noted that
Baker, a constitutionalist, does not think we can give a criterion of
personal identity. This seems to be because the criterion is
mysterious, and not because there is no criterion. While her model of
resurrection appears under a different section in this article, the
reader is encouraged to think about how an adoption of
anti-criterialism might be used to defend a constitutionalist account
of resurrection.)
The main objection to CDR was that there was no coherent account of
resurrection in which the persons or bodies resurrected were
numerically identical to persons or bodies before death. Note that
there was very little argument behind this objection. Rather, the
burden of proof was on the proponent of CDR to provide a "just-so"
story that showed how it was possible for us to be resurrected.
Underlying this assumption was the belief that there is some criterion
of personal identity and the intuition that no story about
resurrection can accommodate this criterion.
One might be able to shift the burden of proof away from the proponent
of CDR by denying that there is any criterion of personal identity.
Merricks does just this. He denies that there any criteria of identity
over time for any object. Further, he claims that he does not have an
account of resurrection and that lacking such an account is no problem
for the believer of CDR. It is now up to the opponent of CDR to say
why CDR is impossible. Since there are no criteria of personal
identity, this task will prove difficult if not impossible. Of course,
the anti-criterialist might wish, along with the rest of us, that we
knew how God will resurrect us. But this lack of knowledge merely
shows that we are ignorant of how resurrection occurs, not that
resurrection is impossible.
The main objection to this view of resurrection centers on the denial
of criterialism. As in the case of constitutionalism and perdurantism,
an account of the objections to this metaphysical thesis falls outside
the scope of this article. However, the reader is encouraged to look
at Dean Zimmerman's paper "Criteria of Identity and the 'Identity
Mystics'" for one response to anti-criterialism.
4. Immaterialists Accounts of Resurrection
a. Augustine and Aquinas
Of course, not all Christians are materialists and in this section we
will look briefly at two types of accounts of immaterialist
resurrection. Note that that by an "immaterialist account," we mean an
account that entails that materialism is false. Aquinas, for example,
is an immaterialist in this sense even though he did not think that we
are identical to our soul or essentially an immaterial object. Most of
the contemporary literature on resurrection focuses on material
accounts because a) many philosophers find the concept of an
immaterial soul mysterious at best and b) the most common objection to
the Christian doctrine of resurrection (CDR) involves its
incompatibility with materialism. The reader should not take the
current state of the literature to be a guide to the philosophical
merits of either materialist or immaterialist accounts or the
proportion of Christians who hold to each position.
One of the most popular forms of dualism held by Christians has been a
dualism inspired by Plato and Descartes in which 1) the soul and body
are separate substances, 2) the soul is immaterial, and 3) the soul is
identical to or strongly connected to the mind. One of the early
Christian adopters of this view was Augustine. He modified arguments
from Plato's Phaedo to show that the soul must be immortal.
Additionally, he argued that the soul must be immortal because it
desires perfect happiness. The desire for perfect happiness includes a
desire for immortality because no happiness would be perfect if one
feared losing it at death. This desire is a natural desire, and thus,
Augustine claimed, the soul must naturally be immortal. Bonaventure
later takes up this argument when he argues for the immortality of the
soul. (See the Copleston reference for more details about Augustine,
Bonaventure and Aquinas).
One contemporary philosopher who defends a dualism of mind and body in
the Augustinian tradition is Richard Swinburne. Swinburne compares the
soul to a light and the body to a light bulb. In his view, if our
bodies are destroyed then the soul would naturally cease to function
in the same way that a light would naturally go out when a light bulb
is destroyed. However, he thinks it is within God's power to "fix the
light bulb" and restore the functioning of the soul by providing a new
body or some other means. For example, God could by a miraculous
divine act cause souls to function while disembodied. In any case,
Swinburne emphasizes that the soul is not by nature immortal (this
goes against Augustine). Swinburne's view is compatible with the
doctrine of an intermediate state (see 4.b below) but denies Merricks'
claim that we will have numerically the same body when we are
resurrected. Swinburne himself thinks that there is no intermediate
state.
Many contemporary Christian dualists are similar to Swinburne. They
agree that a) the soul is not by nature immortal, b) the doctrine of
the intermediate state is compatible with dualism, and c) we will
receive new bodies at the time of the general resurrection and our
souls will be "hooked up" to these bodies by a divine act.
Disagreements among Cartesian dualist Christians tend to revolve
around the origin of the soul and the way in which the soul interacts
with the body. For example, William Hasker in his article
"Emergentism" argues that the soul is generated by the body while
Swinburne believes souls are created by God.
Some Christian immaterialists are not Platonic/Cartesian dualists but
rather are dualists in the spirit of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas held the
hylomorphic view that persons are a composite substance of matter and
form. The substantial form, that which makes someone a substance, is
the rational soul. Among those who held to a hylomorphic view, there
was a debate about whether or not the soul could survive death, and,
if it could, whether or not this ensures a personal resurrection.
Unlike some hylomorphists (perhaps Aristotle) he argues that the human
mind or soul can exist apart from the body. The human mind is not
dependent on the body because the way in which it knows depends upon
its state. So, instead of ceasing to exist when becoming disembodied,
the soul would merely come to know the world in a different way.
Additionally, Aquinas argued that we can look forward to a personal
resurrection. While the various human souls are nearly identical, we
can individuate them in virtue of the bodies they did have on Earth
and will have in the general resurrection.
b. The Intermediate State
A Christian belief that is related to the doctrine of resurrection is
the belief in an intermediate state. Many Christians believe that
between the time of death and the time of resurrection there is an
intermediate state at which people will continue to exist. This
section of the article will look at accounts of this intermediate
state and examine an argument for dualism based on the intermediate
state.
It should be pointed out that Protestants and Catholics differ
significantly on the nature of the intermediate state. Traditional
Catholic thought holds that some people go to purgatory when they die,
as opposed to ceasing to exist or immediately going to exist in the
presence of God. Purgatory is a place where souls go to be cleansed of
sin before entrance to heaven. Believers are encouraged to pray for
those souls that are in purgatory so that the souls might escape
purgatory sooner. Catholics find support for the doctrine of purgatory
in 2 Maccabees 12:42-45 and in church tradition. Protestants reject
the doctrine of purgatory because they deny that 2 Maccabees is an
authoritative source and because they claim the doctrine of purgatory
contradicts scripture. Additionally, some Catholics have held to a
belief in Limbus Patrum, a place where Old Testament saints went to
await the death and resurrection of Christ, and Limbus Infantum, a
place where unbaptized infants go after death.
In addition to the above controversies, Christians debate the fate of
believers after death. Many think that believers retain consciousness
and go into the presence of God. Proponents of the intermediate state
point to passages in the New Testament in support of the view. For
example, 2 Corinthians 5:6-8 reads:
Therefore, being of good courage, and knowing that while we are at
home in the body we are absent from the Lord…we are of good courage, I
say, and prefer rather to be absent from the body and to be at home
with the Lord.
Additionally, Jesus says to the thief in Luke 23:43, "Truly I say to
you, today you shall be with Me in Paradise." Some other verses that
theologians cite are Hebrews 12:23 and Philippians 1:23.
Most Christians have thought that the doctrine of an intermediate
state is taught by scripture. Occasionally, some thinkers have
proposed the doctrine of soul sleep which is incompatible with the
doctrine of an intermediate state. The doctrine of soul sleep is the
claim that when a person dies he or she is unconscious until he or she
is resurrected. This contradicts the doctrine of an intermediate state
because the doctrine of an intermediate state holds that the believer
is aware and mentally active during the time between death and the
receiving of the resurrection body.
The philosophical upshot of the doctrine of an intermediate state is
that some philosophers think that it entails mind-body dualism. This
is one of the major arguments of John W. Cooper's Body, Soul & Life
Everlasting. In the book he argues that there are only three options
given in the New Testament. The first is the view that there is an
intermediate state (which according to Cooper implies dualism). The
second is the view that resurrection does not happen at any future
time and thus when it does happen (say outside our normal dimension of
time) it is "instantaneous." Finally, the third view is that of a
resurrection after a passage of time here on earth.
Cooper accepts the theological arguments for the claim that there is
an intermediate state. Why does he think that an intermediate state
entails dualism? It seems to be because he thinks that an intermediate
state is necessarily a disembodied state and thus is, by definition,
one in which the person exists and is a non-physical entity. If this
is the case then mind-body dualism does follow. However, not all
scholars accept his contention that a person existing in an
intermediate state is disembodied. For example, Baker claims "there is
no reason to suppose that the intermediate state (if there is one) is
one of disembodiment" (Baker, 1995, p. 498). Cooper, of course, would
reject this claim. The reasons he cites mirror the claims made by the
proponent of the incompatibility of materialism and CDR. In short,
Cooper thinks that there is no coherent way for a material object to
be resurrected which is numerically identical to one that previously
existed, whether this resurrection occurs in an intermediate state or
at the general resurrection.
5. References and Further Reading
* Baker, L.R. "Need a Christian be a Mind/Body Dualist?" Faith and
Philosophy 12 (1995): 489-504.
o An article which presents the constitution view of persons
and which argues that constitutionalism is compatible with the
doctrine of the resurrection of the dead.
* Baker, L.R. Persons and Bodies. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000.
o A major work in defense of constitutionalism.
* Baker, L.R. "Persons and the metaphysics of resurrection."
Religious Studies, 43 (2007): 333–48.
o An article which defends the constitution view of
resurrection and touches on many of the other views discussed in this
entry.
* Bynum, C.W. The Resurrection of the Body in Western
Christianity, 200-1336. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
o A study of the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead in
the early and medieval church.
* Cooper, J.W. Body, Soul, & Life Everlasting. Grand Rapids
Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1989.
o A book that argues for mind-body dualism based on the
doctrine of the intermediate state. It includes a detailed study of
the Old and New Testament accounts of the mind-body distinction and
the doctrine of the resurrection.
* Copleston, F. A History of Philosophy, Volume II: Medieval
Philosophy. New York: Doubleday, 1993.
o A good historical overview of medieval philosophy which
includes details about Augustine, Bonaventure, and Aquinas and their
views on resurrection and the relationship between the body and the
soul.
* Corcoran, Kevin J. "Persons and Bodies." Faith and Philosophy 15
(1998): 324-340.
o An article that combines constitutionalism and the falling
elevator model.
* Craig, W. L. The Son Rises: The Historical Evidence for the
Resurrection of Jesus. Chicago: Moody, 1981.
o An apologetic work in favor of the thesis that Jesus rose
from the dead.
* Grudem, W. Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical
Doctrine. Grand Rapids Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1994.
810-839, 1109-1139.
o A well organized systematic theology that contains
references to many different religious traditions and creeds. Grudem
is a conservative theologian and gives a clear, if not exhaustive,
argument for traditional doctrines.
* Habermans, G., Flew, A., and Miethe, T. Did Jesus Rise From the
Dead? The Resurrection Debate. New York: Harper and Row, 1987.
o Perspectives on whether or not Jesus did rise from the
dead for a non-technical reader.
* Hasker, W. "Emergentism." Religious Studies 18 (1982): 473-488.
o A defense of emergentism. Additionally, Hasker argues that
the doctrine of resurrection makes dualism more attractive than
materialism.
* Hick, J. Philosophy of Religion. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1973. 97-117.
o Arguably, Hick argues for the replica model of
resurrection. Additionally, there is a chapter on non-Christian
accounts of life after death.
* Hudson, H. A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.
o A defense of perdurantism and the falling elevator model
of resurrection.
* Leslie, John. Immortality Defended. Malden, Massachusetts:
Blackwell publishing, 2007.
o A book that defends a theistic (not Christian) view of
resurrection that is notable for its use of modern physics and
incorporation of eastern philosophy.
* Merricks, T. "There are No Criteria of Identity Over Time." Noûs
32 (1998): 106-124.
o A technical defense of anti-criterialism.
* Merricks, T. "The Resurrection of the Body and the Life
Everlasting." Reason for the Hope Within, ed. Michael Murray. Grand
Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999. 261-286.
o A discussion of different accounts of resurrection and an
argument for the claim that the doctrine of the resurrection provides
support for materialism.
* Perry, J. A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality.
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978.
o A good introduction to the philosophical problems
surrounding resurrection. Written in dialogue form.
* Plato, Phaedo. Translated by G.M.A Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977.
o A fine translation of Plato's work on the immortality of the soul.
* Swinburne, R. The Evolution of the Soul. New York: Oxford, 1986.
o A defense of Cartesian dualism that has a chapter on the
future of the soul.
* Van Inwagen, P. "The Possibility of Resurrection." The
Possibility of Resurrection and Other Essays in Christian Apologetics.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998. 45-52.
o A reprint of van Inwagen's older article which defends the
simulacra view. This version contains a significant postscript.
* Zimmerman, D. "The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival:
The 'Falling Elevator' Model." Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999):
194-212.
o The origins of the falling elevator model of resurrection.
* Zimmerman, D. "Criteria of Identity and the 'Identity Mystics'."
Erkenntnis 48 (1998): 281-301.
o A discussion of criterialism.
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