about God or gods. Here is a typical philosophical problem of
religious language. If God is infinite, then words used to describe
finite creatures might not adequately describe God. For example, is
God good in the same sense that Kofi Annan is good? This difficulty
challenges us to articulate the degree that attributes used for finite
beings can be used for God and what these attributes mean when they
describe God. The ambiguity in meaning with respect to the terms
predicated of God is the "problem of religious language" or the
"problem of naming God." These predications could include divine
attributes, properties, or actions. Since the doctrines of the divine
in Eastern religious traditions differ radically from the doctrines of
the Abrahamic traditions, the problem of religious language has not
been accorded much attention in Eastern philosophy.
The problem of religious language is worrisome to practitioners of the
Abrahamic religious traditions because it has the potential to
undermine those traditions. All three faiths proclaim truths about God
in written texts, commentary traditions, and oral teachings. In fact,
speech about God is essential to both personal praxis and organized
celebration in these traditions. Without adequate solution to the
problem of religious language, human speech about God is called into
question. Without the ability to speak about God and to understand the
meaning of what is spoken, the Abrahamic faiths are vulnerable to the
criticism that their sacred texts and teachings are unintelligible.
The problem of religious language also provides a challenge for
philosophers of religion. If there is no adequate solution to the
problem of religious language, large discussions in the domain of
philosophy of religion will also be rendered unintelligible. For
example, philosophers of religion debate the nature of divine
foreknowledge and human freedom. These claims about God would be
rendered unintelligible if human speech about God is impossible. Thus,
the problem of religious language is a philosophical problem that must
be solved in order to provide a framework for understanding claims
about God in both the house of worship and the academy.
1. What Generates the Problem of Religious Language?
In contemporary discussions, it is not the question of God's existence
that generates the problem of religious language. If God does not
exist, any attempt to describe God will be an inaccurate description
of reality. Discussions about religious language attempt to articulate
how one could speak of God if, in fact, God exists. The problem of
religious language is generated by the traditional doctrine of God in
the Abrahamic traditions. Since God is thought to be incorporeal,
infinite, and timeless, the predicates we apply to corporeal, finite,
temporal creatures would not apply to God.
The problem of religious language is also generated by the medieval
doctrine of divine simplicity, which claims that God does not have any
intrinsic accidental properties. Intrinsic properties are
distinguished from Cambridge properties, such that the acquisition or
loss of a Cambridge property by a subject does not entail a change in
that subject, while the acquisition or loss of an intrinsic property
by a subject entails a change in that subject. Moreover, accidental
properties are distinguished from essential properties such that if a
subject were to acquire or lose an accidental property, the subject
would still be a member of its species. However, if a subject were to
acquire a new essential property or lose an essential property, that
subject would no longer be a member of its species. Thus, statements
such as, "God is P," where P is an intrinsic accidental property would
be ruled out by divine simplicity. For example, the statement, "Kofi
Annan is good," means that some property goodness is a property of
Kofi. When one says, "God is good," it would appear that this
statement means that some property goodness is a property of God. But
if the doctrine of divine simplicity is true, it is impossible that
God have the intrinsic accidental property of goodness. Rather, God is
goodness. That is, God's essence includes goodness and God is
identical with his essence. Consequently, whenever someone applies a
positive attribute to God they are speaking falsely, for God does not
have properties in the way that creatures have properties. Although
divine simplicity is a doctrine associated with medieval thinkers, it
has been defended in the twentieth century by Eleonore Stump and
Norman Kretzmann, among others.
2. Solutions to the Problem
Historically, there have been at least four different solutions to the
problem of religious language. Although no single solution has been
widely accepted by the philosophical community, some of the solutions
have fallen into disrepute.
a. Statements about God are Meaningless
Some philosophers have argued that statements about God do not have
truth-values and are thus meaningless or unintelligible. These claims
are derived from the views of the Vienna Circle, a group of early
twentieth century logical empiricists who developed a test for the
truth-value of statements known as Verificationism.
Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) argued that the only way one could be
certain of a statement's truth or falsity was by verifying those
statements through perceptions, observations, or experience. He offers
the following example of the process by which a statement could be
verified:
Let us take the statement P1: "This key is made of iron." There
are many ways of verifying this statement: for example,: I place the
key near a magnet; then I perceive that the key is attracted.
Here the deduction is made in this way: Premises: P1: "This key is
made of iron"; The statement to be examined. P2: "If an iron thing is
placed near a magnet, it is attracted;" this is a physical law,
already verified.
P3: "This object – a bar – is a magnet;" statement already verified.
P4: "The key is placed near the bar;" this is now directly
verified by our observation.
From these four premises we can deduce the conclusion: P5: "The
key will now be attracted by the bar."
This statement is a prediction which can be examined by
observation. If we look, we either observe the attraction or we do
not. In the first case we have found a positive instance, an instance
of verification of the statement P1 under consideration; in the second
case we have a negative instance, an instance of disproof of P1.
(Carnap 1966, 208).
Having established the principle of verification, Carnap then argues
that metaphysical assertions such as, "The principle of the world is
water," cannot be verified. (Ibid. 210). Since metaphysical assertions
cannot be verified, they are meaningless. One cannot assess the
truth-value of a metaphysical assertion because such assertions cannot
be empirically verified.
A.J. Ayer (1910-1989) agreed with Carnap, and thus inferred that since
all statements about God cannot be verified, they too are meaningless,
"But the notion of a person whose essential attributes are
non-empirical is not an intelligible notion at all. We may have a word
which is used as if it names this 'person,' [God] but, unless the
sentences in which it occurs express propositions which are
empirically verifiable, it cannot be said to symbolize anything."
(Ayer 1946, 144). Thus, on the basis of Verificationism, statements
about God do not have truth-values that can be verified and, thus, are
unintelligible expressions. So at least one solution to the problem of
religious language is to claim that statements about God are
unintelligible.
But Verificationism was challenged by philosophers such as Alonzo
Church and Richard Swinburne and largely abandoned in the twentieth
century. A.J. Ayer identified and defended a "weak principle of
verification" in his seminal paper, "The Principle of Verifiability."
He admitted that empirical propositions are not conclusively
verifiable, but argued that in order for a claim to be factual, and
thus to have its truth-value determined, it must be verifiable by some
possible observations. (Ayer 1936, 199). While Ayer didn't specify
exactly what those possible observations must be, he argued that they
need to be the kinds of observations that could verify an assertion.
In response, Richard Swinburne argues that the premises defending weak
Verificationism are false. He offers the following example of an
argument in defense of weak Verificationism: "It is claimed that a man
could not understand a factual claim unless he knew what it would be
like to observe it to hold or knew which observations would count for
or against it; from which it follows that a statement could not be
factually meaningful unless there could be observational evidence
which would count for or against it." (Swinburne 2000, 151).
Swinburne then argues that the premise of the above argument is false,
since one could understand a statement if one understands the words
forming that statement and if those words are organized in a
grammatically significant format. Thus, there could be factual
statements that do not have evidence either for or against them and
one could understand them. Consequently, metaphysical assertions
invoking God and his properties cannot be ruled out as meaningless by
weak Verificationism.
Ayer modified his principle of verification for the second edition of
his book, Language, Truth and Logic, as follows:
A statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an
observation-statement, or is such that in conjunction with one or more
observation-statements it entails at least one observation-statement
which is not deducible from these other premises alone; and I propose
to say that a statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies the
following conditions: first, that in conjunction with certain other
premises it entails one or more directly verifiable statements which
are not deducible from these other premises alone; and secondly, that
these other premises do not include any statement that is not either
analytic, or directly verifiable, or capable of being independently
established as indirectly verifiable. (Ayer 1946, 13).
In a review of the second edition, Alonzo Church argued that even
according to Ayer's revised principle of verification, any statement
whatsoever or its negation is verifiable:
For let O1, O2, O3 be three "observation-statements" (or
"experiential propositions") such that no one of the three taken alone
entails any of the others. Then using these we may show of any
statement S whatever that either it or its negation is verifiable, as
follows. Let -O1 and –S be the negations of O1 and S respectively.
Then (under Ayer's definition) -O1O2 v O3–S is directly verifiable,
because with O1 it entails O3. Moreover S and -O1O2 v O3–S together
entail O2. Therefore (under Ayer's definition) S is indirectly
verifiable – unless it happens that -O1O2 v O3–S alone entails O2 , in
which case –S and O3 together entail O2 , so that –S is directly
verifiable. (Church 1949, 53).
Church's objection was so devastating, that Ayer's definition of
verifiability from the second edition of his book was largely
abandoned. Despite repeated attempts by various thinkers such as Kai
Neilson to reformulate a principle of verification successfully,
Verificationism has been continually rejected as an inadequate
methodology. As Ruth Weintraub points out in a recent paper, almost no
one defends Verificationism in the twenty-first century. (Weintraub
2003, 83).
b. Other Possible Solutions: An Overview
There are at least three solutions to the problem of religious
language other than the view that statements about God are
meaningless. The first solution argues that when terms are used to
describe God and his attributes, those terms are equivocal with
respect to what they mean in reference to God and what they mean in
reference to creatures. Consequently, this solution would argue that
God is not good in the same sense in which Kofi is good; God's
goodness is entirely different from the goodness of a creature.
Despite this tremendous difference in kind, God can be spoken of by
human beings through negations. Rabbi Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides)
(1135-1204) is one of the most famous proponents of this doctrine. He
argued for this position in his Guide for the Perplexed. His view has
been defended in the twentieth century by, among others, Harry Austryn
Wolfson (1887-1974) and Kenneth Seeskin (1947- ).
The second solution argues that when terms are used to describe God
and his attributes, those terms are univocal with respect to what they
mean in reference to God and what they mean in reference to creatures.
This approach would argue that God is good in the same sense in which
Kofi is good. In the contemporary literature William Alston argues
that there are some concepts that can be applied univocally to God and
to human beings, but he rejects a completely univocal solution.
The third solution argues that when terms are used to describe God and
his attributes, those terms are used analogously. This solution argues
that God is good in an analogous sense to Kofi's goodness. "Good"
applied to both God and to Kofi would signify the same thing, but in
different modes. That is, when "good" is applied to Kofi it picks out
a property of Kofi, but when "good" is applied to God, it refers to
the unity that is God's essence and not to an individual property.
This approach provides a middle position between an equivocal solution
and a univocal solution, since terms used analogously aren't entirely
equivocal nor are they entirely univocal; terms used analogously
signify the same thing but in different modes. This is the approach of
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). He defends this position in his Summa
theologiae as well as his Summa contra Gentiles. The analogical
approach as been defended in the contemporary literature by a number
of philosophers, including Ralph McInerny (1929-).
i. Equivocal Language
Maimonides, like Aquinas, is committed to the doctrine of divine
simplicity, as it is described in Section 1 above. It is for this
reason that he rejects affirmative attributes with respect to God,
with some exceptions. Although it is accurate to characterize
Maimonides' solution to the problem of religious language as
equivocal, it certainly includes more than just equivocations. One can
speak of God through negations. For example, one can say, "God is not
dead," in order to signify that God lives. One can speak of God also
through naming the divine actions, such as, "God creates." However,
the Maimonidean attribute of action is not to be understood as
identical with the Aristotelian accident of action. Attributes of
action are understood to be events by Maimonides, while Aristotle
(384-322 BCE) understands actions to be accidents or properties that
inhere in a substance. Since Maimonidean attributes of action are not
properties, they do not abrogate divine simplicity.
One might oppose Maimonides on this point by arguing that actions
imply composition in their subject, and thus that they would abrogate
divine simplicity. For example, in the statement, "Zayd stood," the
fact that Zayd stands shows that Zayd has a special feature, namely,
the ability or power to stand. So the action of standing implies that
Zayd has the power to stand. This ability introduces composition in
Zayd in that it shows that Zayd is composed of "the power to stand"
among all his other properties. Consequently, Maimonides would be
mistaken in arguing that actions do not introduce composition in their
subject. In fact, it looks as if each action will introduce a separate
power in the agent, thus multiplying the composition in the agent. So
for every divine action, God will have a separate power in himself.
Maimonides addresses this objection by arguing that multiple actions
could be brought about by a single power or ability. (Maimonides 1966,
Vol. I, 53). He uses the example of the heat generated by a fire,
which can burn, blacken wood, cook food, and so forth. So, one should
not assume that a multiplicity of actions entails a multiplicity of
powers in the agent. In the fire example, the heat of the fire
produces multiple actions. The same could be said about an agent who
acts by virtue of his will. Consequently, Maimonides argues that God
brings about multiple actions and effects through his will, which is
contained in his essence but not as a property, and that the
multiplicity of effects or actions does not entail a multiplicity of
powers in God.
According to Maimonides, predicates such as qualities or relations are
to be denied of God. For example, one should say, "God is not a body,"
but one cannot say correctly, "God is merciful." While there are
biblical passages that contain some of these imperfections, they are
written in the language of human beings. Maimonides attempts to
interpret these passages to eliminate or to deny the imperfections.
His foundational assumption is that these passages do not ascribe to
God anything that could be viewed as a deficiency. For example,
passages that refer to God's "body parts" are to be interpreted as
indicating God's actions. Maimonides argues that when the Bible
indicates that God has an eye, "eye" indicates the intellectual act of
apprehension performed by God. This act of apprehension does not imply
composition in God insofar as it is an attribute of action, so it can
be attributed to God without compromising divine simplicity. Qualities
that are attributed to God in the Bible, such as "merciful," mean that
God performs acts that resemble certain acts done by human beings out
of a given quality such as mercy. But "merciful" does not indicate
what God is like or what his nature is; "merciful" only refers to a
certain kind of action. Taken as a quality, terms such as "merciful"
are applied to God equivocally. So we cannot say that God has certain
qualities such as "mercy" in the same sense in which we would say
"Kofi is merciful," because God's simplicity precludes his having the
quality of mercy. Nor can we speak of any relation of similarity
between God and creatures. Relations are accidental properties and God
does not have accidental properties. So any relation between God and
another thing must be denied of God.
With respect to God, the so-called essential attributes (for example,
living, existing, incorporeal, eternal, powerful, knowing, willing,
and one) are interpreted equivocally. According to Maimonides, these
attributes indicate composition in God and they purport to indicate a
feature of God's essence. In order to preserve divine simplicity,
Maimonides interprets these attributes as signifying "the negation of
the privation of the attribute in question" with respect to God. A
privation is the absence of the existence of a habit. For example,
blindness would be a privation of sight. So one could say, "The wall
does not see." Maimonides would not say that the wall is blind,
because the only things that could be blind are those things that
could or should have the capacity for sight. A wall never has the
capacity for sight, although a wall is unseeing. So the negation of
the privation of the attribute of seeing in the case of the wall
indicates that the property of sight is not fittingly said of the
wall, even in a negative sense. In the case of God, essential
attributes are to be interpreted as indicating that those attributes
are not fittingly said of God, even in a negative sense. For example,
"God is living," would be interpreted to signify, "God is not dead,"
which is taken to mean that "dead" is not fittingly said of God. A
similar procedure is to be followed for the other essential
attributes, none of which are appropriately said of God, even in
negations.
In summary, according to Maimonides, we can only say what God is not
and what actions he performs. The standard objection to Maimonides'
solution is that it is incompatible with the religious practices and
assumptions of his own tradition, Judaism, and with those of the other
Western monotheisms. Aquinas argues that an equivocal approach to God
would undermine religious practices. Any demonstration about God would
be formally invalid, as it would include an equivocation. Any
communication about God would be severely limited because we cannot
make any affirmative claims about God or his nature. Given that the
divine actions are named equivocally through a perceived similarity to
creaturely actions, how can human beings know what they mean? Even
through the divine actions, God is unknowable. Consequently, Aquinas
argues that one should look for a means of naming God that does not
fall prey to these problems and that is in keeping with religious
practices. It is on this basis that he defends the way of analogy as a
preferable solution.
It is important to note that Maimonides' pessimism with respect to
what can be said about God is derived largely from his metaphysical
commitment to divine simplicity. If this commitment were removed, then
Maimonides would have more latitude with respect to religious
language. However, other religious doctrines in the Abrahamic
traditions preclude a wholly univocal solution to the problem, as will
become evident in the next section.
ii. Univocal Language
A modern proponent of univocity is William Alston. Alston, however,
does not defend complete univocity, in which ordinary terms are used
in the same sense of God and creatures, because he recognizes that
divine otherness, especially divine incorporeality, would preclude
complete univocity. (Alston 1989a, 65). However, he argues that two
different things could possess the same abstract feature in different
ways,
A meeting and a train of thought can both be "orderly" even though
what it is for the one to be orderly is enormously different from what
it is for the other to be orderly. A new computer and a new
acquaintance can both be "intriguing" in a single sense of the term,
even though what makes the one intriguing is very different from what
makes the other intriguing. (Ibid., 66-67).
Having pointed out that two different kinds of things can possess the
same abstract feature in different ways, Alston argues that God and
human beings can possess the same abstract feature in different ways.
For example, a human being can know a particular fact and God can know
that same fact. But how God knows something or the way that God knows
something will be different from the way that a human being knows
something insofar as God is incorporeal, omniscient, and so forth.
According to Alston, the difference in the way knowledge is acquired
doesn't prevent us from saying that the psychological concept, "knows
p," can be applied to both human beings and to God. Moreover, one can
also apply functionalist concepts, which are concepts of a certain
functional role in the psyche, to both human beings and to God. Alston
offers the following description of functionalist concepts,
The concept of a belief, desire or intention is the concept of a
particular function in the psychological economy, a particular "job"
done by the psyche. A belief is a structure that performs that job,
and what psychological state it is – that it is a belief and a belief
with that particular content – is determined by what that job is . . .
. Our ordinary psychological terms carry no implications as to the
intrinsic nature of the structure, its neurophysiological or
soul-stuff character. . . . Thus, on this view, psychological concepts
are functional in the same way as many concepts of artifacts, for
example, the concept of a loudspeaker. (Ibid., 67-68).
Since functionalist concepts are indifferent as to the nature of the
structure of the psyche in which they inhere, it is possible to apply
a functionalist concept to both a human being and to God in the same
sense. According to Alston:
We can say of a human being that she will tend to do what she can
to bring about what she recognizes to be best in a given situation,
and we can take this tendency to be partly constitutive of the concept
of recognizing something to be best. We can then formulate the divine
regularities in tendency terms also. Thus it will be true of God also
that if He recognizes that it is good that p He will tend to bring
about p insofar as He can unless He recognizes something incompatible
with p to be a greater good. (Ibid., 79).
Alston claims that this example illustrates his method of applying
functionalist concepts to God and to human beings univocally.
According to Alston, the tendency statements are true of God, but the
core of common meaning between human beings and God is to be found in
the concept of "recognizing something to be best." Alston further
claims that although both God and human beings can be said to perform
the function "recognizing something to be best," human beings do not
always assess the situation correctly, but God does. Since God and
human beings perform the same function, albeit in a different way, the
functionalist concept "recognizing something to be best" can be
applied truly to both entities with a common core of meaning. So it
would be true to say of God that he recognizes something to be best
and that this concept can be applied to him and to human beings in the
same sense. Thus, Alston argues that functionalist concepts can be
constructed in such a way that they apply in the same sense to God and
creatures, and he identifies this position as "partial univocity."
At least one of the limitations of Alston's view is that the
predicates that are frequently used of God in the historical religious
traditions, for example, "good," and that are applied also to human
beings cannot be applied univocally to God; only constructed terms,
for example, "recognizing something to be best," could be applied
univocally to God. Therefore, with respect to the historical religious
traditions, Alston's view is not of much help. A religious believer,
for example, might ask herself the question whether or not God could
be said truly to be good. Alston can't provide an answer to this
question, because he intentionally limits partial univocity to
functionalist concepts. If goodness could be expressed in a
functionalist concept such as "recognizing something to be best," then
God could be said truly to possess this predicate in the same sense as
a human being who shares the same predicate. But functionalist
concepts are descriptive of mental states and so one might wonder if
the equation of goodness with a particular mental state is a
sufficiently robust description of goodness.
Second, one might wonder why Alston believes that God performs the
same functions as human beings, given divine otherness. Presumably, he
would argue that mental states would be the same in two minds,
regardless of how the minds are constructed or out of what materials
they are constructed. Granting this point, on what basis does Alston
reject complete univocity between the functionalist concepts of the
two minds? If the nature and constituents of their minds does not
prevent the two minds from having the same mental state, why would
Alston deny that there is a complete univocity between them? Complete
univocity is probably denied because of divine otherness. But divine
otherness has to do with, for example, divine incorporeality. Divine
incorporeality would impinge upon how God's mind is constructed, but
this would be irrelevant for the functionalist concepts. One wonders
if Alston should be committed to a completely univocal view, given his
account of functionalist concepts.
Given the limitations of Alston's view and some of the unanswered
questions that arise concerning it, it is appropriate to turn our
attention to the third possible solution to religious language, which
is the view of St. Thomas Aquinas.
iii. Analogical Language
Aquinas argues that the when terms are used to describe God and his
attributes, those terms are used analogously. Thus, when the predicate
"good" is applied to God, it doesn't pick out a property that God has.
Owing to divine simplicity, God does not have properties. When
predicated of God, "good" refers to the unity that is God's essence.
So when "good" is attributed to God and to Kofi, it signifies the same
thing in both attributions, but it signifies this thing in different
modes.
Aquinas grounds his analogical approach in the causal relation that
obtains between God and creatures. In his discussion of analogy,
Aquinas outlines the following points:
1) Human beings name things as they know them (Aquinas, Ia,.13.1).
2) Human beings know God from creatures.
3) God causes the existence of creatures (Ibid., 12.8).
4) Creatures resemble God just as an effect resembles its agent cause.
On the basis of the resemblance between creatures and God, human
beings can infer that certain perfections of created things are
present in God and they can name these perfections. Thus, the
foundation for an analogy of names between creatures and God is the
causal relationship that holds between God and creatures. >
Aquinas affirms the principle that effects resemble their efficient or
agent causes. His account of the similarity between an agent cause and
its effect includes a shared form. According to Aquinas, there are at
least two different kinds of forms: substantial forms and accidental
forms. Substantial forms configure the matter or physical stuff in
which they inhere. They contribute a set of essential properties to a
substance, such as rationality. A substantial form is the essence of a
substance, which is a matter-form composite such as a human being.
Accidental forms are non-essential properties, such as perfections or
qualities. Aquinas explains that creaturely perfections are associated
with both substantial forms and accidental forms;
"God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good
according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold:
first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in
respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect
operation […] Thus, for instance, the first perfection of fire
consists in its existence, which it has through its own substantial
form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness
[…] This […] perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it
belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in Whom there
are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally
belongs to Him essentially, as, to be powerful, wise, and the like."
(Ibid., 6.3.).
According to Aquinas, there is a perfection associated with a thing's
substantial form and there are the added perfections that attach to
the essence of a thing as accidents. In both cases, these perfections
are derived from God. However, insofar as the shared forms are found
in more eminent mode in God than in a creature, the creature will be
less perfect than God. Consequently, the shared form cannot share a
univocal name. However, the shared forms are not wholly different
(otherwise they couldn't be shared) and so they cannot share an
equivocal name. Thus, Aquinas argues that the shared forms also share
an analogical name, which would be neither univocal nor equivocal. So
human beings can name God's perfections by way of analogy, on the
basis of the causal relationship that holds between God and creatures.
It is on this basis that one could say, "God is good," and, "Kofi is
good," where "good" is understood to be said truly of both God and
Kofi, even though God is good essentially and Kofi possesses goodness
only as an accidental property.
Despite the similarities that exist between God and creatures, there
are many ways in which creatures do not resemble God. So when one
names God, one must be cognizant of the differences between God and
creatures as well as the similarities so that one does not make a
false attribution to God. So although Aquinas thinks that God can be
named on the basis of the resemblance that holds between him and
creatures, Aquinas acknowledges that this resemblance is limited and
that therefore not all terms that are correctly applied to creatures
may be correctly applied to God. For example, any terms indicating
corporeality cannot be applied to God since God is incorporeal.
In order to affirm the naming of God by analogy along with the
doctrine of simplicity, Aquinas makes a distinction between the mode
of signification of a name (modus significandi) and the thing
signified by a name (res significata). This distinction is not made by
Maimonides, so he is unable to use it in his attempt to provide a
solution to the problem of religious language. Owing to divine
simplicity, the divine names will be different in mode than the same
names as applied to creatures. For example, when "good" is applied to
a creature it will signify that the property "goodness" inheres in the
creature. However, when "good" is applied to God it will signify that
"goodness" is somehow included in God's essence, but not as a
property. The mode of signification of human language is inherently
defective with respect to God since it always picks out predicates as
accidental properties. God doesn't have accidental properties. In
contrast, the thing signified by names such as "good" belongs properly
to God and more so to God than to creatures, since any goodness that
could be found in a creature is derived from God as the creator. One
could say, "Kofi Annan is good," and one could say, "God is good,"
where "good" is included in God's essence in a higher mode and to a
greater degree than the property "goodness" inheres in Kofi Annan.
One might think that with respect to perfection terms the thing
signified would be applied univocally between God and creatures. But,
according to Aquinas, things are named univocally when they have both
the same name and the same definition of the name. The definition of
the name would include both the mode of signification and the thing
signified by the name. So in the case of perfection terms applied to
God and to creatures, the thing signified by the name would be the
same but the mode of signification would be different. So although the
thing signified would be the same, the name would not be said
univocally between God and creatures. God's perfection isn't a matter
of quantity such that he just has more perfection than a creature
does. The manner in which he possesses a given perfection is different
from the manner in which a creature possesses that same perfection,
since God is simple and creatures are not.
One might think that if we reject divine simplicity, all reasons for
naming God analogically would disappear. But this isn't quite right.
As Alston points out, the problem of religious language can be
generated by divine otherness. So even absent divine simplicity,
Aquinas would be likely to argue for an analogy between creatures and
God. However, Aquinas doesn't limit his approach to religious language
solely to analogies. He also approves of naming God by virtue of
negations, but he doesn't limit speech about God to negations.
Alston provides a recent objection to Aquinas' analogical solution. He
argues that serious problems arise in connection with the thing
signified by the name, as Aquinas understands it. This is so because
Aquinas is unable to specify completely God's perfections. Moreover,
he cannot make explicit what likeness holds between God and creatures
because all names fall short of him. According to Alston, there are
too many ambiguities in Aquinas' view.
But Aquinas has an answer to this objection in his recourse to the
principle that every effect is like its agent cause. Aquinas knows
this principle in general based upon observations of other agent
causes, such as artisans who craft artifacts, and he applies this
principle to God by virtue of the arguments that God is the first
efficient (agent) cause. (Aquinas, Ia., 2.3). Thus, God cannot be
wholly different from creatures in the way that Alston suspects.
Alston argues that since the thing signified by the name is
indeterminate with respect to God, we cannot know, for example, what
"God is good" means. But Aquinas would take issue with the inference
from the first claim to the second, on the grounds of the relationship
between created effects and God. Perfections such as goodness are
found both in the created effect and in God, but in God they are found
in a different mode and to a greater degree. So "God is good" is not
meaningless nor is it the case that we do not know what "God is good"
means. We know that goodness is found in God somehow, in a different
mode and to a different degree. So "God is good" is a true statement.
In fact, "good" is said primarily of God, rather than creatures,
because "good" is given to creatures via the causal relationship. The
thing signified by "good" is indeterminate in the sense that we do not
know exactly to what degree it is found in God, except that the mode
is different and the degree is greater than that found in creatures.
But this degree of indeterminateness does not entail the kind of
agnosticism about the divine attributes that Alston suggests.
Consequently, Alston's objection is unsuccessful.
Despite the virtues of Aquinas' approach to naming God, there are some
obvious drawbacks for his view. In particular, his view requires a
medieval metaphysics that most contemporary philosophers would find
questionable. For example, he believes in a causal relation between
creatures and God. However, in comparison with the other two solutions
and their respective disadvantages, Aquinas makes a strong case in
favor of his view.
3. Conclusion
With respect to the problem of religious language, multiple solutions
have been suggested and defended. Four of these solutions have been
presented in this entry. The first solution suggests that all
statements about God are meaningless. The second solution suggests
that all attributes predicated of God are to be interpreted
equivocally. The third solution suggests that the attributes
predicated of God are to be interpreted univocally. The fourth
solution suggests that the attributes predicated of God are to be
interpreted analogously.
While no single solution has emerged to the satisfaction of all
religious communities or philosophers of religion, three of the
historical solutions offer a way in which statements about God might
be understood. Maimonides' solution severely limits the degree to
which human beings can speak about God. Alston's solution raises at
least two objections that require a satisfactory response and a
possible modification of his proposal. Finally, the solution of
Aquinas requires a medieval metaphysic in which one affirms the
relation of creation between creatures and God, a foundation many
contemporary individuals would reject. Consequently, there is much
research and thought that is still to be done on the problem of
religious language. The historical solutions offered here provide a
tenuous beginning in that direction and show promise for the emergence
of a satisfactory solution.
4. References and Further Reading
* Alston, William P. "Religious Language." In The Oxford Handbook
of Philosophy of Religion. Ed. William J. Wainwright. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005. pp. 220-244.
* Alston, William P. "Aquinas on Theological Predication: A Look
Backward and A Look Forward." In Reasoned Faith: Essays in
Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann. Ed. Eleonore
Stump. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
o Alston provides several objections to Aquinas' analogical
solution to the problem of religious language.
* Alston, William P. "Functionalism and Theological Language." In
Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989a.
* Alston, William P. "Can We Speak Literally of God?" In Divine
Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1989b.
* Alston, William P. "Divine and Human Action." In Divine Nature
and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989c.
* Aquinas, Saint Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Trans. by Fathers of
the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros., 1948.
o Aquinas' most famous work, which summarizes his views on a
variety of theological and philosophical topics.
* Aristotle. Categories and On Interpretation. Trans. Hugh
Tredinnick. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1938.
o Two of Aristotle's logical works, which include
discussions of actions, accidents, logic and the truth-conditions of
assertions.
* Ayer, A. J. "The Principle of Verifiability." In Mind. vol. 45,
no. 178 (Apr 1936), pp. 199-203.
o Ayer's defense of weak Verificationism.
* Ayer, A. J. "God-Talk is Evidently Nonsense." In Philosophy of
Religion. Ed. Brian Davies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. pp.
143-147.
o In this extract from his book, Language, Truth and Logic,
Ayer argues that since assertions about God cannot be empirically
verified that they are therefore meaningless.
* Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Logic. 2nd ed. New York: Dover
Publications: 1946.
* Carnap, Rudolf. "Philosophy and Logical Syntax: Part I." In
20th-Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition. Ed. Morris Weitz. New
York: The Free Press, 1966. pp. 207-219.
o Carnap's groundbreaking lecture on Verificationism and its
implications for metaphysics.
* Church, Alonzo. "Review of A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and
Logic, Second Edition," in Journal of Symbolic Logic. vol. 14, no. 1,
(March 1949), pp. 52-53.
* Konyndyk, Kenneth. "Verificationism and Dogmatism" in
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. vol. 8, no. 1
(1977), pp. 1-17.
o In this article, Konyndyk canvasses Kai Neilsen's attempts
to formulate a successful principle of verification and argues that
each formulation is unclear and ambiguous.
* Kretzmann, Norman and Eleonore Stump, Eds. The Cambridge
Companion to Aquinas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
* Maimonides, Moses. The Guide of the Perplexed. 2 vols. Trans.
Shlomo Pines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
o Maimonides' famous work, which summarizes his views on a
variety of theological and philosophical topics, and includes various
polemics against Islamic theologians.
* McInerny, Ralph. Aquinas and Analogy. Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 1996.
* Neilsen, Kai. Contemporary Critiques of Religion. (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973).
o In this work, Neilsen offers his own principle of
Verification, which is subsequently criticized by Kenneth Konyndyk.
* Seeskin, Kenneth. "Sanctity and Silence: The Religious
Significance of Maimonides' Negative Theology." In American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly. 76 (2002): pp. 7-24.
* Seeskin, Kenneth, Ed. The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
* Stump, Eleonore and Norman Kretzmann. "Absolute Simplicity." In
Faith and Philosophy. 2, (1985), pp. 353-382.
o A contemporary defense of the medieval doctrine of divine
simplicity.
* Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas. New York: Routledge Press, 2003.
o A contemporary articulation and defense of many of
Aquinas' most important views on topics both theological and
philosophical, including an excellent treatment of Aquinas' views on
form.
* Swinburne, Richard. "God-Talk is not evidently nonsense." In
Philosophy of Religion. Ed. Brian Davies. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000. pp. 147-152.
o In this extract from his book, The Coherence of Theism,
Swinburne argues that weak Verificationism is founded on a false
premise.
* Weed, Jennifer Hart. Creation as a Foundation of Analogy in
Aquinas," forthcoming in Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the
Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas (Leuven: Peeters, 2006).
o A contemporary analysis of Aquinas' account of divine
causality and the kind of resemblance that holds between creatures and
their creator, with a brief discussion of how this resemblance
functions in Aquinas' method of naming God analogically.
* Weed, Jennifer Hart. "Maimonides and Aquinas: A Medieval
Misunderstanding?" In Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia. Forthcoming in
2006.
o A contemporary comparison between Maimonides' via negativa
and Aquinas' way of analogy, along with a re-examination of Aquinas'
alleged misunderstanding of Maimonides' method.
* Weintraub, Ruth. "Verificationism Revisited," in Ratio. Vol.
XVI, (March 2003), pp. 83-98.
o In this paper, Weintraub points out that almost no one
defends Verificationism in the contemporary philosophical community.
* Wolfson, Harry Autryn. Studies in the History of Philosophy and
Religion. Eds. Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams. 2 vols.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.
o A collection of Wolfson's papers, primarily on Jewish
philosophy and medieval philosophy.
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