history of political philosophy whose brilliance of exposition and
breadth of scholarly activity remains profoundly influential.
Locke proposed a radical conception of political philosophy deduced
from the principle of self-ownership and the corollary right to own
property, which in turn is based on his famous claim that a man earns
ownership over a resource when he mixes his labour with it.
Government, he argued, should be limited to securing the life and
property of its citizens, and is only necessary because in an ideal,
anarchic state of nature, various problems arise that would make life
more insecure than under the protection of a minimal state. Locke is
also renown for his writings on toleration in which he espoused the
right to freedom of conscience and religion (except when religion was
deemed intolerant!), and for his cogent criticism of hereditary
monarchy and patriarchalism. After his death, his mature political
philosophy leant support to the British Whig party and its principles,
to the Age of Enlightenment, and to the development of the separation
of the State and Church in the American Constitution as well as to the
rise of human rights theories in the Twentieth Century.
However, a closer study of any philosopher reveals aspects and depths
that introductory caricatures (including this one) cannot portray, and
while such articles seemingly present a completed sketch of all that
can ever be known of a great thinker, it must always be remembered
that a great thinker is rarely captured in a few pages or paragraphs
by a lesser one, or one that approaches him with particular
philosophical interest or bias: the reader, once contented with the
glosses provided here, should always return to and scrutinise Locke in
the original – just as an academic exposition of Beethoven's Eroica
symphony will always be a sallow reflection of the actual music.
This article summarises the general drift of Locke's political
thinking, leaving the other IEP article on Locke to examine his
general philosophy and his theory of knowledge. The article touches on
his biography as it relates to the development of his political
thought, and it also provides an analysis of some of the issues that
his philosophy raises – especially with regards to the Two Treatises
of Government. Locke is rightly famous for his Treatises, yet during
his life he repudiated his authorship, although he subtly recommended
them as essential reading in letters and thoughts on reading for
gentlemen. The Treatises swiftly became a classic in political
philosophy, and its popularity has remained undiminished since his
time: the 'John Locke academic industry' is vibrant and broad with an
academic journal (John Locke Studies) and books regularly coming out
dealing with his philosophy.
1. Reading Locke
The first caveat to note is that Locke's political philosophy is
divided into two discernible eras – his Oxford period (1652-66) and
his Shaftesbury period, when he was employed by Lord Anthony
Ashley-Cooper (later Earl of Shaftesbury) from 1666-1683 through his
final years following Shaftesbury's death. The 'two Lockes' are
somewhat distinguishable and should certainly be born in mind, even if
one were to concentrate solely on his Two Treatises, and ignore his
earlier thinking. Nonetheless, the Treatises, written in his later
incarnation should be read not just as classics in their own right but
as the mature culmination of Locke's political philosophy into an
original and insightful theory of government, power, property, trust,
and rights, for there are Lockean continuities in his political
thinking that reach back into his earliest political sketches. For
example, scriptural exegesis used to support his political ideas, and
his fear of violence (national and towards him and his friends),
uncertainty, war, and accordingly of any doctrine or behaviour that
could lead to unsettling anarchy or persecution. It was a fear of
persecution that kept him from admitting to authorship of the Two
Treatises, after all Seventeenth Century Britain certainly produced
many provocative and extreme opinions, and indeed a few writers,
including some close associates, were executed for their seditious
thoughts. Locke retained a fear for his life long after the troubles
had died down.
The earlier Locke, a student and tutor at Oxford, was morally and
politically conservative, Hobbesian one could say were such thoughts
not so generally reflective of the post-bellum times in England in
which strong and stable government was manifestly preferable to the
apparent anarchy of the recent Civil Wars in the British Isles
(1642-51). The mature Locke developed into a radical proponent of
religious freedom, individual liberty and conscience. By no means did
he become an anarchist or a thorough and consistent libertarian who
decried the use of power – power, he believed, is essential to the
running of a peaceful commonwealth, but it must be vigorously checked
and controlled, as well as used to secure national interests. His
later writings are certainly in the vein of what is now termed
'classical liberalism' upholding the sanctity of private property,
self-ownership, minimal government, and the innate distrust of the use
of power, yet throughout his political theorising and despite the
later emphasis towards inviolable rights, he remains, politically
conservative, economically mercantilist, morally authoritarian, highly
Christian, and generally suspicious of swathes of people who could
affect the Commonwealth's peace and security (atheists, Quakers, Roman
Catholics). Locke also enjoyed dabbling in rationalist designs for how
societies ought to be run, which is far removed from the hero of
libertarian thinking of live and let live that he is sometimes held to
be.
For example, Locke retained an Oxford born academic scepticism of the
people (tinted with a sense of noblesse oblige – he left money for the
poor of the parishes of his birth and death) well into his Shaftesbury
years, but this is later admixed with his political experiences in
which he gained a healthier cynicism of those who wield power and of
their effects on what he increasingly believed ought to remain private
and thus beyond the remit of the magistrate. Throughout Locke's
writings those who would threaten or undermine government through
their intolerance, leanings toward papal theocracy, or indulging in
bone idleness are castigated and are to be outlawed according to his
schemes: inconsistencies or at least intolerances or prudential
considerations linger within his general libertarian framework.
Indeed, writing in 1669 Locke accepts the institution of slavery (FCC)
and as late as 1697 (a good decade and a half after writing the Two
Treatises), he advises press-ganging beggars into military service and
that begging minors should be "soundly whipped." (EPL).
The second caveat is that Locke's works deserve re-reading – only
then, or even after several attempts, can one begin to enjoy the
humour that sometimes punctuates the texts, and to see that Locke's
apparently circumlocutory style belies a great depth of thought
peppered with qualifications and sub-clauses which are employed to
tighten his argument. Locke neither rants from the extremes nor wraps
his language in poetical mysticism to awe the superstitious, nor does
he proffer snippets of profound metaphysical insights to satiate the
quick reader. As a medical doctor and amateur scientist and the author
of the classical work on epistemology and psychology, An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding (1689, published the same year as the
Two Treatise), it's not surprising that Locke's political writings are
methodical and tightly argued. Locke's arguments lifted from his texts
present an uncompromising and modern vision of empiricism and
scientific enquiry; however, his language is immersed in Old Testament
anecdotes and references that when we peruse his writings, we must
remember that John Locke was of Seventeenth Century Puritan and
Scholastic background, and at Oxford he studied amidst the general
University contract of religious uniformity until his departure on a
freer, if relatively unsure foot, in employment with the politically
ambitious courtier Lord Ashley.
The next section reviews Locke's political biography and although it
may be skipped for those interested in a cursory glance at the
political arguments of the Two Treatises, it is of invaluable
background for a more profound understanding.
2. John Locke's political Life
This section outlines the broad political events surrounding Locke's
life and thereby provides a useful, although not exhaustive, sketch of
the man and the context of his works.
The Seventeenth Century was a period of immense upheavals – across
Europe the Thirty Years Wars had raged (1608-48), and in Locke's
Britain, Civil War broke out in 1642: "I no sooner perceived myself in
the world but I found myself in a storm." (FT). He lived through the
overthrow and execution of the monarch, the interregnum of the
Cromwell's Republic, the Restoration, and the overthrow of another
monarch in the Glorious Revolution. Without some knowledge of this
political context and thus the world in which he wrote and acted, it
is difficult to understand the thrust of Locke's political philosophy.
John Locke was born in 1632 in a cottage in the village of Wrington,
near the great port of Bristol, Somerset, and was raised at Pensford a
few miles to the west. The second Stuart King of England, Wales,
Scotland, and Ireland had been on the throne for seven years – the
ill-fated Charles I, whose reign was to lead to a brutal Civil War
dividing the British along religious and political lines and which
ended in his execution in 1649. Somerset was one of the most populous
and rich counties of the country, yet despite its affluence gained
from hard work and a division of labour, social strata (albeit highly
flexible since Tudor times) permeated social relations – each
individual had a moral superior to look up to in a moral hierarchy
that ended with the monarch, whose superior was God. This political
and social context is vital to be aware of, for the tensions and
violence of the era permeate the atmosphere in which Locke matured and
wrote his political writings.
The essential divisions that operated in the Civil Wars may be thought
of as splitting Puritan or Independent religious proponents with
supporters of the rights of Parliament (generally lumped into
'Parliamentarians') from adherents to the Anglican Church, closet
Catholics, and supporters of the Royal Establishment (generally
referred to as 'Royalists'). Locke's parents were low gentry Puritans
(tanners and clothiers), and his father, an attorney to the local
Justices of the Peace, went to war on the Parliamentarian side in the
cavalry. The local city of Bristol was a Royalist stronghold during
the wars but fell to the Parliamentarians in 1645, and in 1647, a good
acquaintance of Locke's father, officer and Member of Parliament for
the West Country, Alexander Popham, secured young Master Locke a place
at Westminster School in London in the first example of patronage that
was to assist Locke's career.
Locke's family instilled him good values of independence and
self-discipline, which he retained throughout his life, but the move
to London opened up Locke's mind and took him far from his parochial
Puritan upbringing (Dunn). Westminster School was run by the
formidable Dr Richard Busby, a Royalist, who was apparently fond of
beating the boys, something the older Locke was to recommend for young
beggars. Young Locke was there the same time as the poet and future
apologist for Charles II, John Dryden (1644-54) and was at school at
the time of Charles I's execution on the scaffolding erected in front
of the nearby Banqueting House (Jan. 1649). The execution caused a
sympathetic reaction to the Royalist cause to foment during the next
decade – and a posthumously published pamphlet, allegedly written by
Charles (Eikon Basilike) encouraged the raising of his status from
traitor (in the eyes of the High Court that tried him) to one of
martyr, and it popularised not just the Stuart doctrine that the
Stuarts (or monarchs in general) were divinely appointed (rather than
chancing upon the throne of England – the last Tudor monarch,
Elizabeth I died without issue), but that Parliamentarians were guilty
of the heinous crime of regicide.
a. Oxford
In 1652 the twenty year old Locke moved onto Oxford's Christ Church.
Oxford had enjoyed an influx of scientific inquiry and humanism –
Roger Bacon (1220-92), John Wycliffe (1330-84), Desiderius Erasmus
(1469-1536) and Sir Thomas More (1477-1535), all had their influence
on the colleges. The present head of Christ Church for Locke was the
Presbyterian John Owen (1616-83), a Puritan proponent of toleration
and independence for Protestant sects and an earlier supporter and
follower of Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658). (Owen travelled with Cromwell
into his wars in Scotland and Ireland). Avoiding a career in theology
and despising the dry Scholasticism (although the techniques and
knowledge were of great use to his mind), Locke concentrated his
studies on medical science at Oxford and later held teaching and
diplomatic positions until meeting up with Lord Ashley Cooper in 1666
(later Earl of Shaftesbury). The position of a don was Locke's
preferred ambition and would have loved to live his whole life at
Oxford – but events altered this path and he was illegally ejected on
political grounds in 1684 from his studentship at Christ Church.
Locke's politically formative years as a young man were dominated by
the rise of Puritan dissenters and Parliamentarians, the outbreak of
Civil War when he was ten, the fall of Bristol when he was 13, the
execution of Charles I when he was 17 and the formation and government
of a Republic until he was 28. His religious thinking had shifted from
a traditional acceptance of his Puritan heritage to Latitudinarianism,
which emphasises the employment of reason in understanding religious
and Scriptural matters. A constant political problem he drew his
attention to was the rights of the civil magistrates relative to the
rights of the clergy; up until the mid-1660s, Locke espoused the
primacy of civil institutions in defining the nation's religious
culture and forms – he was, in effect, an advocate of the earlier Acts
of Supremacy (1534, 1559) establishing the Monarch as the head of the
Church and State, and the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity (1559) that
sought to unify religious worship in the Kingdom; the Republic
contrarily had promoted diversity.
The Lords and the Monarchy were abolished by the reforming Republic,
and Cromwell defeated Royalist and Catholic forces in Ireland
(viciously at Drogheda [Droichead Átha] and Wexford [Loch Garman]
in1649) and Charles II's army in Scotland. John Lambert (1619-1684)
penned the first British Constitution to give the Republic a stable
form. The position of Lord Protector was created, which was passed to
Cromwell. However, political divisions beset the Republic, which
teetered into a dictatorship as Cromwell became increasingly
frustrated with his attempts at reforming the country. Nonetheless,
Cromwell was, in many respects, a highly capable ruler – rejecting the
offered crown to become a de jure monarch, and realising what a
political vacuum the dissolution of the monarchy implied he appointed
good judges to ensure the rule of law, encouraged religious
toleration, liberty of conscience and the immigration of Jews. The
Republic was a strange political beast, taking over in a country
wracked by war the powers that the Tudors and early Stuarts (James I
and Charles I) had arrogated to themselves, and whose traditional, but
by then very well worn down, checks on arbitrary executive and
legislative power were thereby diminished. It is unsurprising that the
country swiftly descended into a military dictatorship under Oliver
Cromwell's rule. The Republic became a pariah state, and European
(notably the French) monarchs sought to assist Charles II to regain
his throne.
The immanent political difficulties led to the Republic's rapid demise
following Cromwell's death, and the 'Long Parliament' (whose Members
were initially summoned by Charles I in 1640 and which was recalled by
General Monck) soon sought out the exiled King Charles II to bring
peace and calm to the vulnerable state. Yet relief following Charles's
return in 1660 soon turned to grave concern in many parts of the
country, and the problems that had beset or been unleashed in the
previous two decades of war and interregnum resurfaced.
In 1660, John Locke was aged twenty eight and a newly appointed tutor
in Greek at Oxford. Oxford and Locke prudently rejoiced in the
Restoration in a commissioned book of poetry: "Our prayers are heard,"
penned Locke – but so had he and his Oxford colleagues praised
Cromwell's rule, "You, mighty Prince!" (V) Initially, Locke was
unwilling to add to the political controversies of the era, until he
penned his first two Tracts on Government. The occasion was a highly
controversial reversal of policy on the part of Charles's government.
In 1662 Charles II's government passed a new Act of Uniformity, which
Locke supported in his Tracts as being within the monarch's rights.
But the repercussions were severe. The Puritans and Parliamentarians
had originally supported Charles's restoration as being the most
peaceful alternative the country possessed in 1660, and they had been
assured that there would be a broad toleration of "tender consciences"
as Charles described the beliefs of the various independent branches
of Protestantism then flourishing in the Kingdom. However, the
Uniformity Act dashed Puritan hopes for toleration. The Act and
subsequent legislation ejected two thousand Puritan ministers from
their churches, fined anyone over 16 attending ceremonies not
conducted by the Anglican Book of Common Prayer, and forced ex-Puritan
ministers to live at least five miles away from where they used to
preach. An intolerant Act passed so soon after the dissolution of the
Commonwealth caused concern and rebellion in parts of the Kingdom –
nevertheless Locke was more of the opinion that the magistrate (King)
possessed the right to demand uniformity, with the caveat that in
their consciences men may remain free in order to secure peace in a
troubled land. It was an opinion he gradually moved away from.
In 1666, Locke returned to Oxford from a year in Brandenburg (in
modern Germany) acting as secretary to the diplomat Sir Walter Vane,
and at Oxford Locke was introduced to a man who was to change his
life, of whom it has been said that without him there would have been
no 'Locke'. To understand Locke's change from a political conservative
accepting the magistrate's right to rule as both prudential and moral
to a radical supporter of the individual against the government, it is
worth considering a few details of Ashley's life.
b. Shaftesbury
Anthony Ashley Cooper (1621-83) was a wealthy and politically powerful
patron to work for, and Ashley worked for whomever was in power –
Royalists, Parliamentarians, the Protectorate, and the Restoration
monarchy. He had initially sided with Charles I in the first Civil
War, but changed sides to fight with the Parliamentarians having
become displeased with the political and religious advice afforded the
King. He supported Cromwell and was promoted well till he became
dissatisfied with the increasingly military leaning of the
Protectorate (1653-54). A year after Cromwell's death in 1660, Ashley
sat on the commission for the Convention Parliament that invited
Charles II to return to England; although Ashley was not a thoroughly
enthusiastic supporter of the Restoration, it appeared to many
Presbyterians to be the most prudential step for the country to take.
From 1660-73 Ashley worked for Charles II, eventually rising to become
Chancellor – and was promoted to an Earldom in 1672. Ashley argued for
religious toleration for dissenting Protestants and supported the
Anglo-Dutch wars on mercantilist grounds (Dutch profit equates to
English losses), but his anti-Catholic stance eventually led to his
dismissal from government.
Ashley actively engaged Parliament to keep Charles II's brother,
James, an open Catholic, from marrying another Catholic and from
becoming King. James, the then Duke of York, was also a capable and
efficient Lord High Admiral of the Fleet and had taken New Amsterdam
from the Dutch in 1664, having it renamed New 'York'; he later fought
in the Anglo-Dutch wars. Initially, James had the backing of the
establishment – he was more serious and thus more appreciable to the
Anglicans, and he leaned towards toleration. However, his very
Catholicism worried those of a more puritan and cynical leaning.
Out of office and in opposition, Shaftesbury formed 'the Country
Party' to criticise the King's government. From this evolved the first
two political parties of modern times – the Whigs and the Tories. (The
Whigs generally speaking followed Shaftesbury and the Tories supported
the Anglican establishment). However, in 1679, a spurious plot was
uncovered to assassinate Charles II to instate his Catholic brother on
the throne; this gave Shaftesbury's political stance momentum and
growth, for the country feared a return to Catholic Stuart rule and
the conditions that had created the Civil Wars. In 1681, Shaftesbury
marched to Parliament with a force of men, but the King's dissolution
of the Parliament left him suddenly vulnerable – he was imprisoned and
charged with treason, a charge rejected by the jury. The poet laureate
and Westminster graduate, John Dryden, penned a satirical attack on
Shaftesbury at this time (Absalom and Achitophel) and a year later
Shaftesbury fled to Holland and died in exile in 1683.
c. Locke and Shaftesbury
Returning to how all this affected Locke's life, in 1666 Lord Ashley
had happened to go to Oxford to see his doctor about a liver
complaint. Locke was introduced to him and the two became good
friends. Locke gained employment at the heart of Lord Ashley's
household in London following the Great Fire until 1675. In 1668 he
oversaw a life-saving operation on his patron to remove liver cists.
Locke learned much from Shaftesbury. For example, his first Essay on
Toleration marked a substantial shift away from his earlier
establishmentarian views that the ruler should prescribe the form of
religious service for the country. This was very reflective of Lord
Ashley's philosophy of encouraging toleration rather than division.
Debate had heated up following the Act of Uniformity (1662), and in
Scotland, the Covenanters, who opposed any form of episcopalianism
(hierarchical rule of bishops and archbishops) and uniformity,
suffered brutally. There were various uprisings in Scotland in 1666,
1679, and 1685, which had led to thousands of martyrs burning at the
stake and being hanged for their opposition. (Visitors to Edinburgh
may see where they were burned in the Grass Market and visit a
memorable commemorative grave in Greyfriar's graveyard).
In 1668 Locke was elected to the Royal Society, and as his patron rose
to become Chancellor for Charles II, Locke served the Lords
Proprietors of Carolina (helping to draft a Constitution for the
plantation), Secretary for Presentations (dealing with church
livings), and Secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations. His
employment kept him busy from philosophical thought – but no doubt
gave him invaluable experience of the workings of power and the court.
In 1675 Charles' brother and heir to the throne James publicly
converted to Catholicism and caused the expected crisis that left Lord
Ashley – now Earl of Shaftesbury – ejected from office and in
opposition. From 1675-79, an unwell Locke travelled to France,
returning to London in 1679-81 with his master to enjoy the heat of
the Exclusion Crisis in which Shaftesbury and his supporters sought a
Parliamentary Act to exclude James from taking the throne.
In 1680 the late Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha was published at the
height of the Exclusion Crisis. Filmer (1588-1653) had written his
work in 1648 supporting the divine right of Kings and their absolute
power over the land. James I had given his support to the medieval
notion that a ruler is divinely appointed (a theory designed to secure
the monarch's power in relation to the Church), but a few decades
later it was given a theoretical defence by Filmer (and later by
Jacques-Benigne Bossuet (1627-1704) in Louis XIV's France) – Locke was
to reply with his Two Treatises, rejecting Filmer's theory as 'glib
nonsense' and the evidence is that Locke began writing his Treatises
not long after purchasing a copy of Patriarcha.
In 1681 however, Locke's patron, Shaftesbury, was charged with treason
following 'the Rye House Plot' of an alleged attempt to kill Charles
and James. The jury rejected the charge against Shaftesbury, but Tory
political advances prompted Shaftesbury, in the absence of any hope of
a Parliament sitting to provide support to his party, to flee to
Holland where he died in 1683. Two of his colleagues opposing James's
succession, Algernon Sidney and Lord William Russell, were, however,
executed, while a third, the Earl of Essex, committed suicide.
Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government (published posthumously in
1698) had argued for a right to revolt and his words were used against
him during his trial; Russell had withdrawn from public life, but
informers inculpated him in the Plot to assassinate Charles II.
The intolerant and charged atmosphere kept Locke abroad from 1683-89
and freedom from political intrigues and duties allowed him to develop
his philosophy.
In 1685 Charles II died and his brother James ascended the throne. The
ripples from the Rye House Plot continued to upset the initially
stable and sober new regime, and after the failed Monmouth and Argyll
rebellions (1685) to oust James, the new monarch clamped down on those
who sought to overthrow him. James subsequently handed out army posts
to supporting and trustworthy Catholics, and he advanced Catholics to
his Privy Council; in November he dismissed Parliament. Nonetheless,
he tolerantly presented a Declaration of Indulgences permitting
Catholic and Non-Conformist freedom – the motives for which remain
unclear; but the Queen's pregnancy and the possibility of a Catholic
succession led Protestant leaders to consult with James' daughter's
husband (and her cousin – both sharing Charles I as grandfather!),
William of Orange in Holland. William had been fighting the might of
Catholic France with much gusto and success. Accordingly, as James
became increasingly unstable and a boy (James) was born to his wife,
William was invited over to take the throne. Upon landing in South
Devon and marching toward London many of James's officers immediately
switched sides and James fled to France. Soon both the English and
Scots Parliaments declared the de facto abdication of James and the
accession of William in what is often called the 'Glorious
Revolution'.
Locke returned to England with William's wife, Mary, and other exiles.
The ousted James had lost all his military abilities and an attempt at
recovering his throne via an invasion of hope of a sympathetic
uprising in Ireland led to his defeat by William at the Battle of the
Boyne in 1690.
These were certainly times of political commotion. In 1689, Locke's
Essay Concerning Human Understanding was published, along with,
anonymously, his Two Treatises and a Letter Concerning Toleration.
Amendments to the Two Treatises present it as work defending the
'Glorious Revolution' and William and Mary's accession to the throne
at the consent of the English people, although modern research has
dated it back to 1679-81 and the occasion of Patriarcha's publication.
Locke returned to England and settled at the house of Sir Francis and
Lady Damaris Masham. Damaris was the daughter of Ralph Cudworth
(1617-88), a Cambridge platonist, whose writings Locke had enjoyed and
which had influenced his shift towards Latitudinarianism. Amidst
friends and in a politically more cordial environment, Locke published
works on economics, the Scriptures, toleration, and education. In 1695
he advised on the ending of press censorship, and was appointed a
member of the Board of Trade (1696-1700). His Essay Concerning Human
Understanding gathered pace – drawing controversy and support and
earning a translation into French in 1700. Locke died with Lady
Damaris reading the Psalms to him. His death, she wrote, "was like his
life, truly pious, yet natural, easy and unaffected." (Aaron)
3. The Political Writings.
Locke was initially reluctant to compose political tracts, which he
considered, very much like Thomas Hobbes does in his Behemoth, as
producing more conflict than men's swords. Nonetheless, at Christ
Church, Oxford, he penned two key essays on the extent of toleration,
the most disruptive and contentious issue of the time – the Two Tracts
on Government and his lectures on the Law of Nature, the latter
written as Censor of Moral Philosophy at Christ Church.
a. Locke's Oxford Phase (1652-67)
In a century of religious and civil wars, Locke understandably sought
to explore the limits to toleration that a state should permit its
citizens in their choice and manner of religious expression and
worship. Toleration and how men ought to lead their lives are two
central themes to Locke's entire political philosophy, yet it is
remarkable, if one approaches his works from the Two Treatises, how
politically conservative and accepting he was at Oxford both of the
Restoration and Charles's later Act of Uniformity. The Two Tracts were
penned on the occasion of the Restoration of the Monarchy, in which
Puritans hoped for continued toleration for their practices and
beliefs as they had enjoyed under Cromwell.
b. Two Tracts on Government
Locke's Two Tracts on Government (1660 and 1662), not published until
the 20th Century, form a reply to his fellow student at Christ Church,
Edward Bagshaw, who had published and argued for religious
authenticity and a rejection of the state's attempt at religious
uniformity, and whose friends and pupils had stolen priests' surplices
in reaction to what they (rightly) perceived as a political shift
towards religious uniformity. Bagshaw was a Presbyterian who was in
general agreement with Locke's thesis but who vehemently disagreed
with the Anglicanisation of religion that the Act required.
Locke begins with how disruptive the religious "scribblings" of the
age have been to his country, pens causing "as much guilt as their
swords." While acknowledging his respect for both authority and
liberty, Locke prefers to steer a middle path observing that liberty
may "turn loose to the tyranny of a religious rage," unless its
outward form is subjected to the state's jurisdiction – that is,
religious dissent should be subservient to the need to secure the
peace, and thus the people ought to accept the religious policy of the
presiding regimes.
In forming a Commonwealth, Locke argues, in strong Hobbesian echoes, a
man should give up his liberty to the magistrate, "and [entrust] the
magistrate with as full a power over all his actions as he himself
hath." Avoiding any discussion of the divine right to rule (which he
later takes up in the Two Treatises), Locke claims that the magistrate
ought to be the sole judge, even if elected by the people, of 'matters
indifferent' – i.e., the form and manner in which a people worship.
Not only should such matters be given up to the wisdom of the
magistrate but the people are also obliged to obey. Christ commanded
obedience, he notes, and after all, the magistrate looks to the public
welfare, while the individual citizen seeks only his own interest.
Implicatively, self-interested pursuit in resolving 'matters
indifferent' would lead to clashes were they not put in the hands of
the magistrate – the ruler.
Yet the ruler's ability to mould the citizenry is limited to what can
be seen, Locke adds. This is an important caveat that develops with an
increasing emphasis over his life: a man's conscience is private, so
the magistrate can only influence the obedience of the "outward man."
Immersed in the classics as he was at Oxford, we can note that this is
a particularly Roman, prudential consideration of religion which
initially caused much harm for Christians: so long as conquered
peoples outwardly worshipped the current Roman gods, native religious
dispositions and consciences were tolerated – the Christians, however,
refused to acquiesce in such 'matters indifferent' and many martyrs
were created (something the Scottish Covenanters were keen to mimic).
Of this and of the recent religious turmoil in his land, Locke is
keenly aware – the ruler "cannot cast men's minds and manners into one
mould," but he is optimistic that the magistrate will use only those
powers that are in sympathy with the people and the time in easing
them into the same Church. After all, Locke surmises from monastic
Oxford, the ruler is supposed to be wise.
In what does more danger lie, Locke rhetorically asks – in the hands
of a single, wise man, or an ignorant mob? "From an orderly council or
a confused multitude?" The dilemma echoes the Platonic vision of
politics and indeed, Locke deploys the perennially popular analogy
used by all statists from Plato onwards of the need for a capable
captain of the ship (cf. Plato's Republic, Book VI), which assumes
that the citizens are on a single ship and not a flotilla all seeking
their own purposes; this collectivist position of assuming we are
mariners in desperate need of a swarthy captain, Locke was to alter
(but never completely drop) in his Shaftesbury years. But at Oxford,
he was quite taken with the metaphor: indeed he notes that such great
captains who steer their nations wisely are those "whom the Scriptures
calls gods" compared to the multitudinous "beasts".
The academician Locke highlights his distrust of the masses and
prefers to put political control in the hands of a few rather than the
many. The multitude is "always craving, never satisfied" and if they
are given liberty in religion "where will they stop, where will they
themselves bound it …?" It was "a liberty for tender consciences"
(using Charles II's description) that "was the first inlet to all
those confusions and unheard of and destructive opinions that
overspread this nation" in the Civil Wars. No, mankind is not to be
trusted with liberty of religion, Locke urges: "there had been no
design so wicked which hath not worn the vizor of religion, nor
rebellion not been so kind to itself as to assume the specious name of
reformation" that have drawn men into war with promises of liberty and
glory. "Hence the cunning and malice of men taken occasion to pervert
the doctrine of peace and charity into a perpetual foundation of war
and contention."
Whilst upholding the innate pacifism of Christianity and the horror of
wars waged in its name, Locke is of the opinion that permitting men
the choice and freedom to worship will create havoc and violence as
each sect will take arms to fight those they judge to be offensive
"and so in the actions of the greatest cruelty applaud themselves as
good Christians." Hence the magistrate ought to look for the good of
society and secure the peace between men.
In the Second Tract, Locke stresses the Christian duty of obedience to
the magistrate – invoking implicitly Christ's ambiguous answer to the
Pharisees: "render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God
the things that are God's." But what does a magistrate do? For the
early Locke, the ruler's job is to be responsible for the care of the
community – to preserve the public good and keep the people in peace.
What the particular policies a magistrate ought to follow depends,
Locke admits, on contemporary conventions and expectations, but the
magistrate is in the best position to judge in light of the times what
ought to be the best policy and what ought to be orderly and decent.
The magistrate symbolises the apex of natural power and order in the
world – at least from Locke's Protestant Oxford perspective. Whether
"some are born to rule others" as Aristotle argued, or that men are
all born into equality, or monarchs are divinely appointed, Locke, at
this point in his intellectual development, offers no conclusion and
thereby avoids the foray bubbling all around him. Nonetheless, the
Lockean magistrate ought to act without private interest in securing
the nation's peace, and the citizens ought to passively obey him –
even if he steps over his constitutional boundaries, for "God wished
there to be order, society, and government among men" so "in every
commonwealth there must be supreme power." To that power "God in his
great wisdom and beneficence has relinquished [religious rites] to the
discretion of the magistrate." Deferring to the Almighty, "God in his
great mercy appointed that Christian doctrine should be embraced by
the soul and faith alone and that true worship should be fulfilled in
public gatherings and outward actions."
A more conservative philosopher, accepting of the newly Restored
monarchy, one could not imagine from the perspective of the later
writer of the Treatises. Yet are there glimmerings of the path Locke
eventually takes? Certainly in the realm of private conscience, which
Locke emphatically declares cannot be forced. A man has perfect
liberty over his conscience (the "liberty of judgement"). If the
magistrate commands what has already been divinely commanded, then the
citizen is obliged to obey and such laws can not be unjust for they do
not bind a man's conscience or his action. Similarly, legislation
passed by a magistrate, "in so far as he is provided with legislative
power", may impose upon the liberty of the will in requiring outward
assent and behaviour, but that leaves the conscience free to judge
differently. However, if a magistrate seeks to constrain the liberty
of judgement, then he sins – but, Locke quickly adds (just before the
Act of Uniformity was passed), ecclesiastical rules are not likely to
infringe upon people's right to judge for they deal with ceremonial
practice.
Against those who would fear the potential for magisterial abuse and
who would allow religious liberty, Locke firstly describes them as the
conjuring of "empty heads of these foolish men" and that if religious
legislation were taken from the magistrate so too would be other
legislation, and those who do not agree with Locke's conservativism
and thereby "take arms" against him will find himself in the "ranks
set out above." In doing so, the Oxford lecturer committed two
fallacies – ad hominem (decrying an argument as false because of the
person who utters it) and the slippery-slope fallacy (that if one
thing were taken from the powers of the state, the state would lose
all of its powers).
Yet the blatant contradiction in Locke's attempt at resolving the
political question of his time will fester and become increasingly
apparent – if men have to go against their consciences to obey the
magistrate, then they turn away from their God; if they disobey the
magistrate in pursuit of their consciences, then they revolt against
their monarch and the secular system of securing peace in the country.
Locke cannot have it both ways and the realm and freedom of men's
consciences eventually win over political allegiance.
Also written at this time were some comments on Infallibility in which
Locke outlines an orthodox Protestant attack on Catholicism. Catholic,
"sharp-sighted priests have violated both these powers [making and
interpreting laws] in their efforts to establish in every way that
control over the conduct and consciences of men which they so strongly
claim." Yet such theory constituted the essence of Western political
philosophy stretching back to the early centuries after the fall of
Rome and the awkward relationship between the powers of the Church and
the State. The Puritans of several sects logically rejected
governmental or institutional interference in belief and their beliefs
eventually forged the principle of absolute toleration in religious
matters to which Locke was later to give his agreement and
philosophical defence; but even in this very conservative phase,
Locke's non-conformist Protestant and Puritan upbringing is evident:
interpretation should be left to the individual's reading of the
infallible Scriptures, not the alleged infallible interpretations of
the priests. This would of course imply a rejection of any Act of
Uniformity – of the imposition of Anglicanism and its Book of Common
Prayer on the people. Nonetheless, Locke recoils, obedience is always
the "safe and secure" path for the Christian congregation, for "the
shepherds of the church can perhaps err while they are leading, but
the sheep certainly cannot err while they are following."
c. Essays on the Law of Nature 1663-4.
In his Essays or lectures to students as Censor, teacher of Moral
Philosophy at Christ Church, Locke argues that there is a Law of
Nature – a basic system of morals – which is given to every man to
know. The Essays were unpublished but circulated and had an influence
on writers such as James Tyrell (1642-1718). His argument begins with
an acceptance of God's existence ("there will be no one to deny the
existence of God" – and certainly not at Oxford, when subscribing to
the Christian faith and the eventual taking of Holy Orders for tutors
was a necessary condition of being admitted). The law, he adds, is
something which is the decree of a superior will (God), and lays down
what is to be done and not to be done, and which is binding on all
men.
The moral law for Locke demands that some things are completely
forbidden (theft, murder), others depend on certain sentiments,
periodic duties, or conditional attitudes. These are binding on all
equally, and despite the apparent relativism of morality, "no nation
or human being is so removed from all humanity, so savage and so
beyond the law, that it is not held by these bonds of law." The moral
law is a fixed and permanent set of morals, for "what is proper now
for the rational nature [of man] … must needs be proper for ever, and
the same reason will pronounce everywhere the same moral rules." It is
man's nature that binds him to a universally binding moral law, which
he cannot alter, despite his laziness and disposition to be led by
others and follow the multitude or give into his passions.
Against the objection that the Law of Nature cannot be found, because
not all people who possess reason have knowledge of it or that they
will disagree over its content, Locke counters that possessing the
faculty of reason does not necessitate its use. Some prefer living in
ignorance, while others may be too dull, or are slaves to their
passions to raise their intellect to what is required of them to
understand the Natural Law, and others still are brought up amidst
such evil that they become accustomed to it. Secondly, disagreement –
what we now term moral relativism – does not indicate a lack of a law,
but rather its existence.
In another glimmering of the development of Locke's political and
general philosophical thought, he examines the methods by which a man
can know moral laws. (The theory of how we know things becomes a
life-long quest for Locke, culminating in his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding). It is obvious that the nature of the world is governed
by laws and so too is man's conduct, and that without moral laws, men
would not have society; without moral law, trust between men would
collapse. We can know moral laws through four different methods:
inscription, tradition, sense experience, or divine revelation.
Ignoring the last, Locke also rejects both inscription and tradition
(which were both connected to Roman Catholic theology) in favour of
learning morality with our senses and reason.
Following René Descartes's methodology, which had turned him onto
philosophy, Locke argues that sense experience proclaims the existence
of a supreme law maker, a wise creator or the world, which has made
man for a purpose. Man thus has purposes – to contemplate and to
procure and preserve his life. Yet the moral law cannot be garnered
from consent – from mass or democratic agreement, for the voice of the
people is as likely to lead to fallacies and evil. Men's actual
morality may be highly relative, but differences do not undermine the
existence of commonalties in the law, hence we should not obey (or
follow) others blindly. Nonetheless, the conservative Locke continues
to argue that we ought to obey our lawmakers as possessing rightful
power over creation, but our obedience should not just be out of fear
for the lawmaker's power, but conscientiously too: we ought to obey it
because the magistrate should request morally right action.
Yet there is detectable in Locke's essay a growing suspicion of
government. In conjecturing that a good policy is one that can be obey
both without fear or without conscientious qualms, Locke is possibly
indicating that the magistrate also has the responsibility not to
provoke a rebellion of conscience in the people, words that may
reflect the growing sense of concern that the Act of Uniformity
engendered. There also creeps into his theorising a growing
realisation of the limits to power's use and the good it putatively
brings about: the lawmaker possesses the right to impose his will on
dissidents, but Locke advises that that power should be used only as a
last resort.
In an interesting passage, wherein we can detect Locke's philosophical
abilities maturing, he discusses whether the Law of Nature can be said
to be based on man's self-interest. He rejects the Ancient Greek
Carneades' theory that all men act in the own interest, while he
accepts the role that self-interest plays in the Law of Nature, "for
the strongest protection of each man's private property is the Law of
Nature, without the observance of which it is impossible for anybody
to be master of his own property and to pursue his own advantage." Yet
this is not quite anticipating Adam Smith's theory of private profit
leading to public advantage (Wealth of Nations, 1776), for Locke later
accepts Montesquieu's mercantilist (and ultimately Aristotelian)
theory that one man's gain is another's loss; but what is of
importance here is something we read of later in Hume's criticism of
self-interested pursuits. Some actions we deem moral, Locke remarks,
can be personally costly – such as generosity and friendship, and
while private profit may enrich some at the expense of others,
"justice in one does not take equity away in another." Similarly, if
all were to pursue their own interest, that would imply that the
individual would judge his own affairs and that can only lead to
chaos, fraud, violence, and hatred.
After rejecting self-interest as a justification of natural law, Locke
proceeds to reject the argument that utility forms the basis of the
moral law. (It is always useful to know that what are often portrayed
as 20th Century debates on, say, utilitarianism versus deontology,
have a long philosophical pedigree). For Locke, it is not seeking to
do good that produces morality, for whatever good does occur arises
from the moral law: "utility is not the basis of the law or the ground
of obligation, but the consequence of obedience to it." (This is the
position that Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) later espouses in his strict
application of duty ethics.)
Interestingly, Locke adds that the moral law "neither supposes nor
allows men to be inflamed with hatred for one another and to be
divided into hostile states." On the one hand, this belief may be
considered as a theoretical attack on Hobbes's description of the
state of nature – that it is characterised by a war of all against
all, yet that would be rather misplaced, for even in the state of
nature, Hobbes's musings are in agreement with Locke that natural laws
(common ethical codes) apply to human interaction. On the other hand,
it may be a philosopher's warning to his government and the fanatics
of the various religions and sects who were seeking to impose their
vision and will on others.
The Two Tracts and the Essay are not political classics in the sense
that political theorists, whose speciality is not the 17th Century,
readily turn to them. But they contain philosophical elements and
beliefs that Locke was to work on and develop – especially the role
and limits to government, conscientious objection to the misuse of
power, and religious freedom; although he was to dramatically alter
his
4. Shaftesbury Era
On leaving the cloistered walls of Oxford to employment in Lord
Ashley's household, we detect a shift in Locke's political thinking,
away from the acceptance of the magistrate's philosopher-king status
towards Locke supposing him a man capable of erring like any other
man. Indeed, Locke's thought increasingly moves over the next few
years from upholding passive obedience – and thus one's station in
life – to justifying rebellion when the magistrate oversteps certain
boundaries, and in his Essay on Toleration we mark that change.
a. The Essay on Toleration (1667)
Locke is now concerned about the extremes of absolute obedience and
absolute liberty in matters of conscience, a change in Locke's
priorities towards outlining the conditions under which a man ought to
possess religious freedom and the limits – moral and prudential – of
the magistrate's powers. The Essay gives a better indication of the
direction that Locke's arguments take in the Two Treatises.
What is the purpose of government? It is to be used for the good,
preservation, and the peace of men. If men could live peacefully,
there would be no need for a magistrate, but patently the Seventeenth
Century was strewn with war and its effects, and the thought of
permitting a generally peaceful, anarchic state of nature was still
too absurd for Locke to contemplate, so he dismisses it out of hand.
He then deals strongly with those who would argue for a monarchy based
on a divine right to rule, presaging the critique of the Two
Treatises. Supporters of the divine right "have forgotten what country
they are born in", he writes.
In marked contrast to his Oxford phase, Locke now argues that in
forming a government, "it cannot be supposed the people should give
any one or more of their fellow men an authority over them for any
other purpose than their own preservation, or extend the limits of
their jurisdiction beyond the limits of this life." This is indeed a
shift from his Platonic vision of the goodly rational captain steering
the ship! The magistrate ought to meddle with nothing but securing the
peace. (In Scotland at this time, recall that the Covenanters were
being put down for their rejection of Uniformity.) Yet we are still
far from a libertarian thesis on a restricted government, for in
outlining his principles of toleration, strict rules apply as to whom
may be admitted into the tolerant club – Catholics and atheists need
not apply. Within a broadly, pluralist Protestant nation though,
toleration on 'matters indifferent' ought now to be practised by the
magistrate on a scale relating to their epistemological status.
In matters speculative and divine worship a man ought to possess
absolute liberty, for these are based on his subjective understanding
of the nature of the universe and of God. In such areas of thought, no
man may force his opinion on others – excepting atheists, for the are
like 'wild beasts'. In so arguing, Locke again adheres to a very
Protestant (Puritan) theory of conscience and the individual's
relationship to God. Whereas the Catholic Church emphasises the role
of priests and the theological hierarchy in reaching up to God, the
Protestant reformers of the Church proclaimed the individual's right
to seek God by his own path, and Locke, following the Cambridge
Platonists, emphasised the role of reason in understanding the
relationship between man qua individual and God.
Toleration of others' religious and speculative thinking is also
politically prudential – so much misery had been generated by the
state or various sects seeking to impose their will on others, and
such antagonists are rarely motivated by religion than "depraved,
ambitious human nature." Thus, with regards to "matters indifferent",
Locke still insists that the government must look at their application
to the nation's peace and security, and may prohibit publications that
tend to "the disturbance of government." Toleration does not imply
freedom of expression. Yet even here, since no man may be forced to
alter his opinion, the citizens should obey the magistrate's
prescriptions and accept the state's legislation as their consciences
see fit "as far without violence they can." In other words, if the
state imposes forms of behaviour that a sect finds particularly
offensive, it ought, for the peace and security of the nation as a
whole, accept the laws (and not disrupt the peace in an "obstinate
pursuit or flight") leaving people's consciences free to speculate as
they see fit – in other words, they must give God and Caesar both
their due. Some opinions must not be tolerated, if their natural
tendency is absolutely destructive to society – so "faith may be
broken with heretics."
The third area that the magistrate may be concerned in involves the
general moral virtues and vices of society. Interestingly, although
these barely relate to acts of conscience, the state should not
interfere here, for the magistrate has "nothing to do with the good of
men's souls." This is a powerful departure from his previous stance as
Censor and perhaps may be read as reflecting the licentiousness of
Charles's Court (which he surely must have known about from Ashley)
and Locke's acceptance of a distinction between tolerating private
vices but not public ones. Nonetheless, the state may intervene in
men's affairs when their opinions are likely to be destructive of the
society that harbours them – hence, for Locke, Catholicism is not to
be tolerated. In other words, those who argue for theocracy ought to
be restricted in their speech. The reason for this – and a mature
political one – is that most men use power for their own advancement
and those who are intolerant of others should in turn not be tolerated
– such groups are not to be trusted with any path that may lead them
to power and the overthrow of the liberties of others. Catholics in
particular, when in power tend to "think themselves bound to deny it
to others." They ought to be handled "severely" Locke proposes.
Similarly, factions ought not to be tolerated if their numbers grow to
threaten the state. Nevertheless, Locke is adamant that any attempt to
use force to get others to change their opinions should be fully
rejected as "the worst, the last to be used, and with the greatest
caution." Indeed, caution and prudence should be the watchwords of
Locke's theoretical government at this point in his thinking.
Toleration of the various Protestant sects is the "readiest way to
secure the safety and peace, and promote [public] welfare" and
Protestant fanatics ought to be tolerated to be made useful and of
assistance to the government rather than driving them into secrecy and
unity through persecution. Again, Locke emphasises that "there is
scarce an instance to be found of any opinion driven out of the world
by persecution" which can be taken as a word of warning to the present
government persecuting Covenanters and others. The option is to accept
and tolerate such diverse Protestant fanatics – or kill them all; but
the latter is not very Christian, Locke reminds his readers.
b. Other Writings
In 1669-70 Locke commented on Samuel Parker's Discourse of
Ecclesiastical Party (1669), which attacked Nonconformists or
Dissenters. Shaftesbury sought a policy of toleration against the
Anglican policy to unify the Kingdom under its brand of Protestantism.
(The Anglican Church or Church of England was created by Henry VIII's
split from Rome – he became both head of state and head of the church,
and the ruling monarch remains head of both state and church in
England today. The Church of England, as its name suggests is a
particular nationalist brand of Protestantism in which Bishops sit
with Lords in the Upper Chamber of Parliament). Locke's comments are
worth noting for evidence of a further swing away from political
conservativism adhering to establishment structures to a radicalism
that seeks their containment in favour of inalienable individual
rights. He now insists that government's purpose is to secure the
peace and not to get involved with the outward appearances of
different interpretations of religion – he questions whether the
policy of uniformity is conducive of peace (OSP); and here Locke
presents a theory that he was to embellish on over the next decade in
his denial that government can be said to stem from Adam's
descendants. This the theory Locke criticises of Sir Robert Filmer in
the Two Treatises: if Adam was the first king, it is not the case that
his descendants automatically gain the same right – "all government,
monarchical or other, is only from the consent of the people." (OSP)
Locke repeats the purpose of government of securing the peace and
tranquillity of the commonwealth and stresses the separation of the
Church and State in what can be seen as the glimmerings of his minimal
state theory. "The end of civil society is civil peace and prosperity
… but beyond the concernments of this life [i.e., religion], this
society hath nothing to do at all." (CEP) Since religion deals with
the hereafter and the state the present, and the two jurisdictions
should not mix.
Thus prior to the change of wind in the Two Treatises, Locke's
conservative, moral authoritarian philosophy is highly apparent in
various comments throughout the 1670s and 80s. In Obligation of Penal
Laws, for example, Locke scepticism of the government's misuse of
power is growing, but he still insists that the subject's duty is to
preserve a peaceful society and not to disturb or endanger his
government and that, so long as a man's conscience is free from
political interference, he ought to obey the rules of his country.
This, incidentally, is symptomatic of a mind-body dualism (as it
affects the political realm), in which a philosopher asserts the
primacy and hence freedom of the mind while accepting the subjugation
of the body, a dichotomy that Locke only gradually moves away from.
By 1676, for instance, we again see evidence of a change in his
thinking towards Protestant dissenters (Catholics standing outwith the
Lockean picture). In his second essay on Toleration (Tb) in the year
he expands on his critique of uniformity. He demands what a policy
ought to be if all dissenters are in error – should they be all
hanged? But if there is a fear of them is it because of the manner in
which they are treated by the authorities, or if there is a fear that
they may influence other people, then why not let others choose by
their own consent to follow or not, or if it is feared that supporters
of dissenting doctrines shall multiply, then either dissenters are
attracting others because of the truth or orthodox teachers have
become slack in propagating the truth. Since Christians are likely to
fight over their sectarian differences, "to settle the peace of places
where there are different opinions in religion, two things are to be
perfectly distinguished: religion and government … and their provinces
[ought] to be kept well distinct." That is, the Church and the State
should be kept thoroughly separate.
Yet Locke's political rationalism – his disposition to impose a
particular, ideal moral order on his nation – remains strong. In notes
for his Atlantis (1676-79), he proposes stringent laws to deal with
vagrants, demands that everyone work at their handicraft at least six
hours a week, that limits be put on migration across parishes, and
that tithingmen be put in control of assuring the moral purity of
their jurisdiction (one tithingman to twenty homes). Each month the
tithingman even ought to visit the houses of his tithing "to see what
lives they lead." (At). Public almshouses ought to be erected for
those incapable of working, otherwise "all beggars shall ipso facto be
taken and sent to the public workhouse and there remain for the rest
of their lives." (At).
Between 1677 and 1678 Locke scribbled thoughts on the springs of human
action. "Happiness and misery are the two great springs," he notes,
but happiness in misery are both resoluble into pleasure and pain.
Accordingly, Locke argues for a hedonistic, utilitarian basis for
morality – a different direction from his earlier Oxford essays, but
tempers the thrust of hedonism noting the importance that reputation
plays in a man's life, also calling reputation "the principle spring
from which the actions of men take their rise …" (R) and were there no
human laws – no positive legislation – "there'd still be such species
of actions as justice, temperance and fortitude…" (R) for the laws of
morality come from God and from nature.
Thus prior to the penning of the Two Treatises, we find a John Locke
who is becoming increasingly concerned with the direction of
Restoration policy with regards to religious toleration, and although
he remains very conservative in his moral outlook, the formulation of
a new approach is evidently developing. The government, he declares
with a stronger and more influential voice, ought to remove itself
from the religious matters of the nation. The separation of the state
and religion is now paramount in his philosophy, all it needed was a
structure within which such a minimal, non-interfering government
could be justified. That was prompted by the publication of the late
Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha – a defence of divinely appointed and
justified monarchy and absolutism.
c. Economic Writings.
In the 1670s under Shaftesbury's patronage, Locke expounded a
mercantilist philosophy of trade and a hard-money policy.
The mercantilist Locke argues that the end of trade is "riches and
power" – and trade increases a nation's wealth and its people,
producing a virtuous circle of economic improvement; yet, like most
mercantilists, he condemns activity that are not conducive to economic
growth – a theory that has seeped into present day tax codes and
economic policy, although the characters targeted tend to change. For
Locke anyone involved in the service industry hinders trade: retailers
to some degree, lawyers, "but above all soldiers in pay." The economic
theory is suspicious, as is Locke's assertion that one man's gain is
another man's loss – an Aristotelian view of trade that has yet to be
shaken from present day conceptions and which mercantilists support.
However, Locke also favoured a hard money policy to secure the value
of a nation's currency. It would be wrong to debase the coinage to
match the number of notes that the Bank of England printed.
Some detect in Locke a 'labour theory of value' – the proposition that
all economic values can be resolved into the amount and quality of
labour imbued in them. Marxists, for example, assume Locke to have
proposed a labour theory of value, whereas the libertarian economist,
Murray Rothbard, argues that what Locke propounded was a labour theory
of property, not of value. The sections to read are in Chapter V, and
a close reading of the text suggests that Locke's emphasis on the
ability of labour to create value qua production, rather than value
qua price. For elsewhere, Locke observes that the fair price (a term
that has wended down through the ages from Aristotle) is that which is
generated in a market on a particular occasion, tempered by notions of
Christian charity to avoid gaining excess profits (leaving enough for
others, as Locke advises for the enclosure of land). Labour – active
productive labour, based on rationality and productivity – increases
the wealth of the nation, it does not generate a system of fair
prices.
5. The Two Treatises.
There is a scholarly debate on when the Two Treatises were written.
They were first published in 1698, but when they were penned is of
critical importance; originally the Two Treatises were deemed an
apology – a defence – for the Glorious Revolution, but Peter Laslett
claims its origins back to 1679, while Richard Ashcroft disagrees and
places it in 1680-82, allowing Locke to make amendments to the
manuscript to give the impression it acts as an apology for rather
than a prescription of revolt; for readers interested in knowing more,
I refer them to Laslett's 1988 Cambridge Edition of the Two Treatises.
In opening the Two Treatises, diligence and perseverance pay off for
the reader – and on a pedagogical note, I would recommend (following
Laslett) beginning with the Second before the First Treatise. The
reader ought to work through each chapter carefully, noting the main
point or points in each section (denoted §) to follow Locke's
relatively convoluted sentences in pursuit of the main clause like
Sherlock Holmes on a case, and revising what notes have been reaped
before pressing on. Locke's system is brilliant, and so we must read
him, for hidden in the well-crafted arguments, we also find gems of
thoughts and insights.
a. First Treatise
The First Treatise is a logical rebuttal of the works of Sir Robert
Filmer whose Patriarcha and other writings supported the theory of the
divine rights of kings – that is, monarchy is a divine established
institution and that kings rule as God's regents on earth. The First
Treatise paves the way, as Locke advertises in his Preface, to justify
government by the consent of the people. In this summary, I am not
concerned with a scholastic checking of the validity of Locke's
examination of Filmer's work (or of Locke's own selective reading of
the Bible – see Cox) but with summarising the essential points he
presents.
Chapter I.
Locke summarises Filmer's theory that all government is [or ought to
be] an absolute monarchy: since Adam was an absolute monarch, all
princes since his time should also be absolute monarchs. Secondly,
since Filmer believes that no man is born free, men cannot [or should
not be able to] choose their governors, thus government by consent is
to be rejected on the epistemological grounds that the masses do not
possess the intellectual wherewithal to elect their leaders.
"Slavery is so vile and miserable an Estate of Man," begins the
overture of Locke's critique of Filmer's system (§1). But a
description of affairs under absolute monarchy does not in itself
provide a justification of establishing government on popular consent,
nor does the presumption that men would live in a miserable condition
rebut the claim for absolutism. Accordingly, Locke proceeds to examine
carefully Filmer's assumptions and the logical cohesion of his
arguments to refute the theory of divine rule before outlining, in the
Second Treatise, his justification of consensual government (see
below). Locke's analysis of Filmer proceeds by drawing upon the
essential assumptions or premises which Filmer presents.
Chapter II.
Filmer firstly (as we read Locke's critique) claims that man is not
born into freedom, because he is born to parents – and the right that
the father naturally possesses is unlimited over the child's life.
However, Locke replies, Filmer does not give an account of this
fatherly power – that is, Filmer assumes the father ought to possess
unlimited power without providing a justification of that power, and
since, according to Locke, Filmer's assertion implies that humanity
should be enslaved to a single ruler, it behoves his opponent to offer
a justification. Nonetheless, as the First Treatise continues, Filmer
is seen to have provided a justification, for Locke has to provide
several arguments against Filmer's attempts to provide a secure
theoretical basis for patriarchy.
Chapter III.
Filmer secondly proposes that to assert man's freedom is equivalent to
denying the Biblical story of man's assertion, a claim that Locke
swiftly shows to be logically fallacious. Questioning the validity of
the former does not imply a concurrent questioning of the latter.
Moreover, Locke demands why the fact of Adam's creation should give
him sovereignty over anything – that has to be established and not
presumed. Locke thus queries Filmer's conception of sovereignty: as
first man and possessing no subjects, he could hardly be called a
monarch. He is "a governor in habit rather than in act," Filmer
contends, to which Locke humorously replies: "A very pretty way of
being a Governor without Government, a Father without Children, and a
King without Subjects. And thus Sir Robert was an Author before he
writ his Book …" (§18). In other words, potentiality does not imply
actuality.
Locke presses the point – whence does Adam receive his power over
others? By becoming a father, Filmer (thirdly) argues (and thereby
provides a justification for his patriarchy). Locke reminds his
readers that Filmer passes over the role of the mother in producing
children and that in quoting from the Bible, Filmer drops any
references to the mother: 'honour thy father and thy mother' becomes
just 'honour thy father'. Nonetheless, if Adam's power comes from
begetting children and becoming a father, then without children he was
surely powerless, Locke concludes.
Chapter IV.
Perhaps Adam's title, as understood by Filmer, was over the resources
of the earth, that is, Adam was a proprietor rather than a monarch.
No, Locke writes, quoting from the Scriptures, for God gave the earth
to 'them', in other words to mankind as a whole and not to one
particular individual. Nevertheless, Locke asks, even if Adam were
given title over the earth's resources, how does that give him
political power over others' lives?
Chapter V.
Filmer fourthly attempts to justify patriarchy by claiming that Eve
was created to be subject to her husband, and thus forms the 'Original
Grant of Government' whereas Locke retorts that a distinction must be
made between her role as a wife and that of Adam's power over her
life, or that of any other. Firstly, Locke replies, since Adam sinned
with Eve in the Garden of Eden, this hardly gives him a moral standing
to rule others, and secondly, how does Eve's matrimonial subjection to
Adam entitle him to head a monarchical government? The two are
separable issues, and Filmer, Locke notes, often deploys linguistic
ambiguities in his terms to assert his theory without actually
justifying it. Thirdly, if a man gains monarchical power by possessing
a wife, then surely, Locke concludes, according to Filmer's position
there should be as many monarchs as there are husbands.
Chapter VI.
Filmer's fifth attempt to claim Adam's royal authority is based on the
subjection of his children and this power should be supreme. This
time, Filmer presents a justification: since the father gives life and
being to a child he therefore possesses absolute power over him. Yet,
Locke counters, firstly: if you give something to another, that does
not mean that you have a right to take it back; secondly, Filmer
ignores that life is given to us all by God, and adds that we know so
little as to what produces a soul or breathes life into an entity that
assuming it to be wholly the father is presumptuous; indeed and
thirdly, what role in begetting a child does a man have except "the
satisfying his present Appetite"? (§54) Fourthly, Locke notes the
obvious and greater role a woman plays in producing a child. All these
counterarguments undermine Filmer's emphasis on male dominion and take
Locke into very liberal territory (contemporarily speaking) of raising
woman's status, a view more consistent with the Puritans than
Anglicans.
Filmer's defence of his fifth point, as Locke reads him, is that the
Ancients had absolute rights over their children, and Locke rightly
rejoins that that does not mean present generations ought to – after
all, the Ancients also practised incest, adultery, and sodomy, (§59),
and presumably Filmer would not wish those to be re-established.
A parent may, arguably, alienate his rights over a child, Locke notes,
but a child cannot alienate the honour due to his parent, an argument
Filmer ignores. More pointedly, if a father possesses absolute rights
over his children and that gives him political dominion too, then
surely, echoing the logic of Chapter V, Locke complains that Filmer's
theory would all as many monarchs as there are fathers. Such political
plurality would destroy all lawful governments in the world, which
would contradict Filmer's attempt to justify a stable political
regime.
Chapter VII.
Switching to discuss the role of property in Filmer's theory; if we
allow Adam's entitlement to the earth's resources and that he wills it
upon his eldest son, this does not necessarily mean that Adam's power
is also willed to the eldest son. The eldest son, Locke reasons, did
not beget his brethren, and accordingly cannot be said to inherit his
father's power over them. Accordingly, power over resources and
political power are distinguishable and should be treated as separate
issues.
Chapter VIII.
Locke discovers that Filmer accepts that governmental power may be
passed on by succession, grant, usurpation, and election, and that
Filmer accepts that "it matters not by what Means [a king] came by
it." Filmer's theory is thus full of contradiction, Locke contends.
Although he would apparently discard Filmer's theory at this point,
Locke continues his logical critique of patriarchy.
Chapter IX.
If we are to have one ruler, we should know who that person is
otherwise there would be no distinction between pirates and princes.
How successful is Filmer in describing this? Filmer claims that Adam's
power did not end in him but was passed onto succeeding generations
and that secondly, present princes and rulers are direct descendants
of that power. If Filmer's first argument fails, that is not too
problematic, Locke notes, for another theory of government may be
expounded; but if the second fails, that would "destroy the Authority
of the present Governors, and absolve the People from Subjection to
them." (§83). It must therefore be shown how Adam's power is passed
on, otherwise we must assume his power died with him and was passed
back to God: in other words, we must look to the origins of government
(Locke thus sets the reader up for the Second Treatise) – if the
formation of government was consensual, then that must also direct its
descent [although why that must be the case is not established], or it
was by divine donation then God must also give it to the successor,
rather than presuming it passes to the eldest male. But certainly,
power cannot be derived from the act of begetting, for the eldest did
not beget his younger siblings nor could he inherit his father's
rights over his mother. Paternal power can not therefore be inherited
and the power that is now in the world is not Adam's. (§103).
Although power cannot be passed onto children, Locke also rejects the
passing of property solely to the eldest – it must pass equally to all
of his children as God gave the earth in common to all, but once a man
has formed a property right over something, it is a law of nature that
his property be passed on to his children: children have a title to
share in the property of their parents, and for Locke, that
entitlement is equal (§93). Locke's rejection of primogeniture is also
of interest here and reminds the reader of his unorthodox stance on
several issues.
Incidentally, in this Chapter Locke outlines his own theory to act as
a foil to Filmer's attempted justification of patriarchy and
primogeniture. God planted in man the drive to preserve himself; He
made the earth's resources available to him and directed man to use
his reason and senses to exploit the earth and its creatures for his
benefit, and government is established to preserve a man's property
from the violence of others.
Chapter X.
Filmer claims that wherever there is a multitude of people, there will
be one who is the heir to Adam's monarchical power. This implies,
counters Locke, that there will be one king who presently rules over
all the kings in power, which means that either this right of being
Adam's political descendant is not necessary to justify the power
presently held by rulers, or that they are all unlawfully in power,
and accordingly, the multitude has no need to conscientiously obey
their governments – a conclusion that Filmer would surely wish to
avoid, as well as one that Locke implies is unacceptable to his own
theory of government.
Chapter XI.
So who should be the heir, Locke asks, if we continue with Filmer's
exposition and accept that Adam's power descended from him? After all,
we are not questioning whether there ought to be government (Power)
but who should be in power (§106). Filmer claims sovereignty to pass
through Adam's lineage – but who is not of that lineage, Locke asks.
If it is the eldest son, Scriptural evidence contradicts Filmer's
theory, and what happens if there is not a son, or that son is a fool?
With such a convoluted theory, surely God would have given us
indications as to his meaning, after all, Locke adds, Scripture tells
us whom we can and cannot marry.
Filmer offers several descriptions of Biblical characters possessing
power, but Locke disallows them all. Firstly, Filmer says evidence of
patriarchy is that the ruler possessed the power of death over people
– to which Locke replies, anyone may have that power. Secondly, the
ruler possessed the power to raise and army and to make war – to which
Locke replies, as can any commonwealth, or indeed, any individual can
also possess that power, implying that the power to wage war is
independent of sovereignty and is merely attached to the ability to
raise an army. And if power can be gained by attacking and conquering
others, then Filmer's attempt at securing sovereignty through the line
of Adam fails. Nonetheless, Locke argues that contrary to patriarchal
forms of government, God's chosen people were often leaderless and
lived in commonwealths – and what, he asks, happened to their form of
government when they suffered centuries of bondage? Where was the
rightful heir to Adam's power during that period? Looking over the
judges that were raised to power, whom Locke sees as being
consensually appointed, he finds childless men and one woman –
continuing evidence against Filmer's assertion that power descended
linearly through Adam's descendants.
The rejection of the divine right theory of monarchy and of absolutism
now complete, Locke turns his attention to outlining and justifying
his own conception of government and the rights of citizens. It is one
of the greatest texts in political philosophy and deserves a close
reading.
b. Second Treatise.
Chapter I.
Locke now sets out his own theory of political power in which he will
look at the power of the magistrate as distinct from the power a
parent wields over children or employers over employees ("a Master
over his Servant") or conjugal power ("a Husband over his Wife"). He
defines political power as the power of making laws and executing
penalties, the preservation of property, and of employing the force of
the community in executing the laws and defending the commonwealth
from foreign attack. Power, he stresses, must only be used for the
public good.
Chapter II.
Locke outlines his theoretical construction of the state of nature.
Given God gave the earth to all of mankind, Locke envisages the state
of nature as a state of perfect equality in which each person has the
freedom to do as he sees fit without asking leave or depending on the
will of any other man. Reason teaches man not to harm his neighbour or
his liberty or possessions, but also that he is right to punish those
who transgress against him. "The State of Nature has a Law of Nature
to govern it, which obliges everyone", and "there cannot be supposed
any such Subordination among us, that may Authorize us to destroy one
another." (§6). Indeed, aggressors – those who violate the freedom of
others – live life by another (implicatively unnatural) standard, one
that is irrational and thus dangerous. If a man is attacked by
another, he is fully justified in punishing the offender and being the
"Executioner of the Law of Nature" (§8) to kill murderers and seek
reparation from thieves. It is better for a man to judge his own case
than to have "one Man commanding a multitude, has the Liberty to be
Judge in his own Case, and may do to al his Subjects whatever he
pleases" (§13). So far has Locke moved away from his conservative
Oxford days of erring on the side of magistrates.
The state of nature is not just a theoretical conception, for wherever
there is a lack of government or arbitrating institutions between men
or nations, the state of nature presides. "For 'tis not every Compact
that puts an end to the State of Nature between men." (§14).
Chapter III.
Whenever a man "declaring by Word or Action, not a passionate and
hasty, but a sedate settled Design upon another Mans life, [he puts]
him a State of War." That is, the breach of peace is the declaration
of war, and accordingly a man has the natural right to defend himself
against aggressors who renounce reason and who live like predators.
Where there is no common power, any use of force takes man back to the
state of nature and this continues until a common magistrate is set
up; but where proper government is lacking, a man's actions are to be
judged by his conscience alone. But the state of nature is
distinguishable from the state of war, a dissimilarity Locke
criticises followers of Thomas Hobbes for not making. The state of
nature is governed by peace, goodwill, preservation, and mutual
assistance, whereas the state of war is a condition of enmity, malice,
violence, and mutual destruction.
To avoid the costs (the "inconveniences") associated with the state of
nature – of being without a common power to ensure the rule of law and
order – men are disposed to join a society.
Chapter IV.
Locke presents his rejection of slavery: man's liberty in society is
to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent
and under no other will or power but what the legislative enacts
according to the trust put in it. Slavery is defined as being under
absolute, arbitrary, and despotic power, and, we may recall from
Chapter I of the First Treatise, it is the most miserable condition of
man – yet it is not wholly unjustifiable in Locke's system; if a man
aggresses against another, he loses all rights in the just war fought
against his aggression, and thus may he be rightly enslaved.
(Incidentally, Locke deemed the West Africans enslaved by the Royal
Africa Company to have been taken prisoners in a just war against
them, thus defending, if somewhat naively, colonial slavery).
Locke rebuffs the argument that a man can enslave himself to another,
because, ultimately, he may take his own life and by so regaining his
freedom thus deprives the slave master of his power. This puts a
terminal limit on a master's power over his charges. Freedom, Locke
notes in passing, is not something to do as one pleases, as Sir Robert
Filmer [and many since] would describe it in order to reject it (that
is, a straw man fallacy).
Chapter V.
With regards to property, Locke recalls his earlier argument that the
earth is initially given to all in common, but most importantly for
Lockean political theory he argues that "every man has a Property in
his own Person." (§27). Therefore, when he moves away from the state
of nature, whatever he mixes his labour with becomes his property,
with the proviso that "at least where there is enough, and as good
left in common for others." (§27). Although God gave the earth in
common, He did not mean it to remain in common and uncultivated, for
"He gave it to the use of the Industrious and Rational." (§34). The
expansion of private property also increases the net yield to the
commonwealth (that is, causes economic growth – something Adam Smith
was to later develop). Private property also clarifies resource
ownership and thus removes areas of contention.
When a man mixes his labour with anything and by drawing it into his
private ownership, he makes it more valuable. The benefits of private
ownership can be readily compared to those nations in which few people
reside upon commonly owned tracts. Ownership gives a man an
entitlement to do with his resources as he pleases, although in this
chapter, Locke is ready to remind his readers of the duty they bear to
others, for those who waste their (non-durable) resources "rob others"
of the benefits they could have produced for the community; but apart
from that, a man may acquire wealth justly.
Chapter VI.
In discussing paternal power, Locke proclaims that children are under
their parents' rule until maturity, but, in comparison with Filmer,
who claimed that no men can be free because of the subjection to their
parents, Locke asserts that the development of a man's reason frees
him from their protection. To turn children out of the home before
their reason has developed sufficiently is to throw them out amongst
the beasts and into a wretched state. Once they are mature enough,
children have the ability and hence the right to choose what society
they wish to belong to; accordingly, Locke emphasises that parental
power should not be confused with political power.
Chapter VII.
God drives men into society, Locke notes, deploying the traditional
Aristotelian thesis that society stems from sexual desire,
reproduction, and then employment (that is, man and woman come
together, they reproduce, and employ servants – and gain slaves
captured in just wars), a thesis that was repeated throughout the ages
but more recently, in Locke's time, being advanced by, for example, by
Hugo Grotius and Pufendorf. Incidentally, Locke notes that a wife has
a right to leave her husband (§82).
The society that develops from conjugal and kinship origins tends to
posses commonly established laws and a judicature, as well as an
adjudicating authority. All men are equal before the law, including
those passing legislation. The created commonwealth then possesses the
power, a power delegated to it by the citizens, to punish
transgressors and external aggressors and to protect the property of
its members. In removing themselves from the state of nature, men hand
over the power to punish to the executive; but where the process of
appeal is lacking, men remain – or at least their social relations
remain – in the state of nature. When their property is not safe, then
people cannot think themselves as being in a civil society.
The move towards a civil, law-abiding society, also shows why absolute
monarchy is inconsistent with that society: "to think that Men are so
foolish that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them
by Pole-Cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be
devoured by Lions." (The lion being the traditional symbol of
kingship).
Chapter VIII
This chapter continues with the origins of political society.
Community begins with consent, Locke argues, and this consent can only
be majority consent, as universal consent is impossible to gain.
Consent of the governed is the only justifiable form of government,
but of course critics are going to ask for evidence for consensual
government. Locke replies that the lack of evidence does not imply
that early governments were not formed consensually, but because
people were initially equal in the state of nature, it can be deduced
that they consented to put rulers over and above them.
Indeed, Locke accepts that people historically converged onto
monarchical forms of government, for he agrees that it would make
sense to put political power into the hands of those they trusted or
who were capable of ensuring the rule of peace; certainly such a
government would reflect the natural disposition to look up to a male
patriarch, but Locke is not bowing down to Filmer's theoretical
proposition that all government should be monarchical. Any power given
to the government was given to secure the public good and safety and
the defence of immature societies from external aggression, but once
the legislators or executors of the law sought to use power for their
own interests then it becomes vital for men to understand the origins
of government and the limitations to its power, so that they may find
methods to prevent such abuses of power.
A people are free to remove themselves from their government – that
is, they are free to secede and to establish a new commonwealth if
they see fit, for only an explicit promise or contract can put man
into a society and, just as children upon reaching maturity are free
to leave their parents, so too are men free to leave their society.
Chapter IX
Locke raises the question as to why a man may give up his freedom that
he enjoys in the state of nature. He answers because that state is
full of uncertainty and it is also exposed to aggression. The state of
nature lacks established, known and settled laws, a known and
indifferent judge, and the power to give a judge execution of the law.
In the state of nature man has two powers – to preserve himself
according to the Law of Nature and the power to punish criminals. In
such a free state, all men are of one community making up a society
distinct from the animals. "And were it not for the corruption, and
vitiousness of degenerate Men, there would be no need of any other; no
necessity that Men should separate from this great and natural
Community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided
associations." (§128) In other words, the few who seek to predate and
to live by force, prompt people to form polities.
In joining a society, man gives up his power to protect himself to the
laws of his society; he also gives up the power of punishing
aggressors, and they do this "only with an intention in every one the
better to preserve himself his Liberty and Property." (§131). It could
not be supposed that we would join a society to be made worse off.
Chapter X
What form a government takes depends on where the supreme
(legislative) power is located.
Chapter XI
Legislative power is supreme but it ought not to be absolute or
arbitrary. What power it should wield is limited to the powers that
man possessed in the state of nature which should also be limited to
serving the public good. It "can never have a right to destroy,
enslave, or designedly impoverish the subjects." (§135) Its laws must
thus conform to the laws of nature and any use of arbitrary or
absolute power, or indeed, operating without settled law, creates a
situation worse than the state of nature. "For then Mankind will be in
a far worse condition, than in the State of Nature, if they shall have
armed one or a few Men with the joynt power of a Multitude. (§137).
The government cannot take a man's property without his consent, and
since governments need to raise taxes to finance themselves, they can
only do so with the consent of the governed. "Hence it is a mistake to
think, that the Supream or Legislative Power of any Commonwealth, can
do what it will, and dispose of the Estates of the Subject
arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure." (§137) The
tendency of politicians is to think "themselves to have a distinct
interest, from the rest of the Community; and so will apt to increase
their own Riches and Power, by taking, what they think fit, from the
People." (§137) This last is a powerful statement, both of Locke's
cynical conception of power and the legitimate boundaries based on
natural law that he envisages for governments.
Chapter XII
There is no need for the legislative to stand all the time (and in the
following chapter Locke observes that if it meets frequently it can
become dangerous or at least burdensome), but the executive power
ought to be permanently in office to ensure that the laws are
enforced.
Chapter XIII
The people have the right to alter the legislative; similarly, if the
executive stops the legislative from sitting, it effectively declares
war on the people (§155). Executive power is held wholly on trust and
representation in the legislative should be equal (§157).
Chapter XIV
The executive may use powers of prerogative to ensure the smooth
process of legislation, but it ought never to overstep its bounds.
Locke observes that while good princes stay within their limitations,
"the reigns of good princes have always been most dangerous to the
liberties of their people" for developing a trust in their prerogative
which is soon abused by the next generation.
Chapter XV.
Since nature does not give one man power over another, as all men are
equal, that power can only be gained over those who wage unjust war
upon the peaceful commonwealth. The aggressor forfeits his rights, for
he acts like the beasts that society is formed to protect people from
and therefore "renders himself liable to be destroied by the injur'd
person and the rest of mankind, that will joyn with him in the
execution of Justice." (§172)
Chapter XVI.
Human history is certainly of war and conquest, however "many have
mistaken the force of Arms, for the consent of the People … But
Conquest is as far from setting up any Government as demolishing an
House is from building a new one in the place … but, without the
Consent of the people, can never erect a new one." (§176) Aggressors
in an unjust war cannot have rights over the conquered people; on the
other hand, in fighting a just war, power can only be justifiably held
over those who fought and not the innocents who did not partake in the
fighting. Locke thus establishes strict just war code, strictly
demarcating non-combatants from combatants, and also the property of
conquered combatants and their dependents. "Conquerors, 'tis true,
seldom trouble themselves to make the distinction, but they willingly
permit the confusion of War to sweep altogether; but yet this alters
not the Right." (§179).
Chapter XVII.
In a note on usurpation, Locke apparently accepts the usurpation of
power by another personality; it only becomes problematic when the
usurper adds to his power.
Chapter XVIII.
Accordingly, tyranny is the exercise of power beyond normal rights; no
one can have a right to that power and an unjust regime may thusly be
opposed. "Tyranny is the exercise of Power beyond Right, which no Body
can have a Right to." (§199) If the laws do not protect me, I have a
right to defend myself. "May the Commands then of a Prince be
opposed?" Yes, when the Prince deploys unjust force (§204).
Chapter XIX.
A government is thus dissolved if it falls to a foreign power or if
there is a civil war, when the government acts illegally or refuses
the legislative to sit, or acts contrary to the trust put in it by the
people. A people should not wait until the chains are put on them
before they rebel.
6. Analysis of Locke's Two Treatises.
In this section, the reader's attention is drawn to several issues
that the Two Treatises raises. It is by no means exhaustive, indeed it
is extremely fractional in comparison with the debates and problems
the Two Treatises have provoked. Lockean scholarship has attracted and
continues to generate hundreds of articles on the various aspects of
his philosophy – property, rights, rebellion, women, trust, social
contract theory, anarchy, toleration, etc., and here I can only touch
on a few. References are to sections (§) within the Second Treatise
unless noted.
a. The State of Nature.
Locke's state of nature is often contrasted with that of Thomas
Hobbes's, with which he would have had some familiarity either through
reading Hobbes's Leviathan or Pufendorf's critique of Hobbes. Hobbes's
vision of a world without government is one of a war of all against in
all, in which each will seek to aggress opportunistically against his
neighbour – violence and resulting fear are endemic to life in a world
without political power. At §19, Locke compares his own vision with
Hobbes's, arguing that Hobbes has not distinguished between the state
of nature and the state war. Nonetheless, Locke's vision remains
tainted with the fear of neighbourly mistrust and Hobbesian elements:
rather than the majority being so disposed to violence or fraud, in
Locke it is the "inconveniences" brought about by a minority that the
majority seek to defend themselves against.
On the whole, Locke's anarchic state of nature is a benevolent
condition of anarchic individualism, rather than Hobbesian brutality
and mutual suspicion, in which conscience guides actions and reason
(reflecting the law of nature) highlights the wrongness and
counter-productivity of aggressing against one's neighbour. Those who
do aggress thereby renounce their humanity and act worse than beasts
and may justly be harshly dealt with.
So why leave this idyllic state? Locke falls back on the fears of his
time – the absence of power produces "inconveniences" and the fear of
civil tumult, and where there is no common set of laws and impartial
adjudicators, the advantages of "perfect freedom and equality" are
offset by the worries of aggression. Three inconveniences arise: a
lack of knowledge of known laws, which creates informational costs
involved in action if agents do not know, or disagree on, the
particularities of the laws of nature that legislation seeks to
reflect; secondly, the absence of power to execute laws, and hence the
vulnerability of small groups or individuals being violated by
aggressive, more numerous groups; thirdly, in the state of nature, the
agent judges his own case and for Locke, people can not be trusted to
judge impartially and hence require a government to adjudicate.
There are problems with each of these. Firstly, the lack of known laws
does not stop agents from working together to produce a common
framework without the state. The Law Merchant is a good example and
could have been known to Locke – merchants trading across different
governmental jurisdictions often find national laws highly awkward or
inconsistent, so they seek their own forms of international law –
independent of any political power. Secondly, a lack of executive
power in the state of nature does not warrant a monopolisation of
power, just as, on Lockean reasoning, the lack of property ownership
does not warrant a government monopoly in property – an argument Locke
rejected in Filmer's Patriarcha. As private ownership develops, so too
does the breadth of the services offered, and just as one family does
not have to produce all of the goods they desire (bread, shelter,
clothing), so it does not need to produce security services. Thirdly,
while individuals may disagree on what may be the particularities of
the law in a case of conflict of interests, it does not imply that all
individuals will agree to accept the same arbitrator, i.e., put all
adjudication services into the same hands or institution. In fact, by
handing over arbitration to a single institution logically invalidates
the reason for seeking arbitration – if the state possesses a monopoly
on adjudication services, then to whom should individuals turn for
arbitrating between the state and themselves? Locke is aware of the
failure of governmental adjudication, for in §20, he recognises that
"where an appeal to the Law … lies open, but the remedy is deny'd by a
manifest perverting of Justice, … there it is hard to imagine any
thing but a State of War. For wherever violence is used, and injury
done, though by hands appointed to administer Justice, it is still
violence and injury, however colour'd with the Name, Pretences, or
Forms of Law…" But rather than counselling rebellion and a rejection
of the only system of appeals a state offers, Locke shrugs and reminds
his readers that "the only remedy in such Cases [is] an appeal to
Heaven."
What Locke does not consider is a world without political power – just
as Filmer assumed that Adam's creation gave him monarchical power and
proprietorship over the world, so too Locke makes the same logical
leap into accepting the need for power, and his reasons for justifying
it – the three inconveniences – are as subject to criticism as
Filmer's justification of Adam's power in the fact of his begetting
children. Similarly, the free and equal society of the state of nature
is arguably not rendered more efficient by consenting to be ruled by a
single, albeit limited, power. Locke's comment on the reign of good
princes shows good perception – if the state appears to work
efficiently, then it is more disposed to expanding its goodly services
and thereby weakening or even destroying the very reason for its
formation.
b. Reason and Violence
Reason teaches the maturing individual to respect others' rights to
their freedom and the extent to which an aggressor ought to be
punished – "so far as reason and conscience dictate" (§8). Just as we
have seen in his other writings, Locke's moral absolutism and even Old
Testament ethic resurface – murderers (§12) and thieves (§18) deserve
death, for a man has a right to destroy that which threatens his life.
However, in §16, Locke's definition of war, that it arises when
declared by word or action and not a "hasty" or a "passionate" action
– suggests that a crime de passion may be forgivable, yet it also
raises the possibility that a declared act of war could be a very
reasonable option for an aggressor; yet Locke insists that aggressors
have, by the fact of initiating force, renounced reason, despite the
implication of a cold and calculating, "sedate settled Design." It is
an apparent inconsistency which requires deeper consideration, for
aggressors cannot be both lower than beasts, who are motivated by
their appetite say, and be simultaneously of such a calculating
mentality. At some point, a man's reason could be said to bifurcate,
with one branch producing rationalisations – excuses for initiating
violence – and the other branch reflecting the laws of nature that man
is free and must logically accept his neighbour's right to be free and
to live without interference.
An aggressor seeks to gain absolute control over the individual – over
his life and his property, that is, he seeks to enslave him. Nothing,
for Locke, can justify such a motive for that would "take away the
Freedom, that belongs to any one in that State [of Nature]." (§17).
Locke's logical development of the framework is excellent –
individuals possess the right of retaliation and defence against
aggressors, who, by initiating force, thereby introduce a state of
war, an unjustifiable condition of violence and inequality that leads
to enslavement. But can a man be said to lose his rights if he
aggresses against another? Hobbes was of the opinion that a man
possessed an inalienable right to self-preservation, such that if he
were to be executed (justly for murder say) he would still possess the
right to flee. Locke's asymmetrical conception of moral status
presents problems that begin with the termination of an inalienable
right to life.
This leads to Locke's exposition of the nature of a just war.
c. Just War
Lockean war is judged primarily on the objective distinction between
aggressor and defender: aggressors act without justice and defenders
act with justice. But it should be noted that it is a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition of Lockean just war that a party has been
attacked. For although the initiation of force provides the objective
criterion that distinguishes just from unjust acts, it is not a
sufficient condition that may sustain a protracted defence of a
country once it has fallen. Locke counsels patience (and prayer) for a
defending side that has lost a just war.
But when the violence is over, both sides may subject themselves to
"the fair determination of the Law" and agree to the appropriate
conditions of reparation and penalty and deterrence from further
aggression, but where no adjudicating body exists, then the state of
war continues (§20). This may be read as a very Hobbesian view of
international affairs, which is a popular conception (cf. Political
Realism) that sees the lack of, or ineffectiveness of international
bodies, as evidence of a presiding anarchy between nations – even in
the absence of actual war, such a situation is still, on Lockean and
Hobbesian reasoning characteristic of the state of nature.
The aggressor forfeits his own life and rights when he initiates force
(§172) and sets up the rule of force as his standard. The defenders –
the prosecutors of a just war – thus gain arbitrary and despotic power
over soldiers captured in a just war. How long should such a right
last for? Locke's presumption of guilt suggests that a war crime
(participating in an unjust war being sufficient) lasts for the
lifetime of the soldier, which raises the question of forgiveness and
amnesties and their applicability in Locke's system. If we look at it
from the position of victorious aggressors in an unjust war, Locke is
adamant that they can "never come to have a right over the Conquered."
This surely implies that the guilty can never lose their guilt.
Whether a government or a villain commits aggression does not make any
difference, Locke echoes the words of the philosophers reaching back
through Aquinas, Augustine, and to Cicero. Yet what ought the unjustly
defeated do? Remain patient, Locke counsels. Without proper redress
against either a petty villain or an aggressive government, the
citizen ought to persevere, for justice remains with God and
aggressors will ultimately be judged there. Nonetheless, in the
meantime, the conquerors in an unjust war have no title to the
subjection and obedience of the conquered. Apparently, Locke again
retreats to a Hobbesian position here – that the security of peace is
to be preferred to the violence, uncertainty, and fears of war. Yet
the defeated are entitled to survive – outward obedience to the regime
may certainly be coupled with an inward conscientious disobedience.
Anything extorted or taken from an individual by force, including
promises and consent to obey, do not mean anything (§186). The shaking
off an unjust force or rebellion against such masters "is no Offence
before God" (§196).
On the other hand, the conquerors in a just war gain absolute power
over those who raised arms against them in the first place – but there
is no collective retribution permitted in Locke's system. Those who
did not fight – innocents, or in today's parlance, non-combatants – do
not lose any rights to the just conquerors. There must, accordingly,
be a strict distinction between combatants and non-combatants, which
reflects the just war conventions, but, as Locke admits, rarely in the
history of war, conquerors "willingly permit[ting] the confusion of
War to sweep altogether." (§178-9) The right over the aggressors is
perfectly despotic – that is, they may justly be put to death or
enslaved, but that right does not extend to their property, for that
property must also support the lives of those who did not bear arms.
The conqueror has a right to reparation payments to "repair the
damages he has sustained by the War", but not beyond the aggressor's
estates, for that it would be robbery on the defender's side to take
more than that which covers his cost of war or to impose on the
property of those who did not fight, such as his wife and children.
Self-defence against individuals or against states that infringe upon
the fundament right to life, liberty, and property justifies defence.
So to what extent can the Lockean state expand its jurisdiction? While
its remit is ostensibly minimal or libertarian, other elements in
Locke's thinking suggest there are loopholes that may deemed
utilitarian.
d. The Lockean State
The Lockean state is commissioned by a people to serve their interests
in securing their rights to live peacefully. It opposes the organic
Aristotelian conception of the state that perceives the state as the
natural result of social growth – a development Locke agrees with but
rejects the non-consensual characteristic of the Aristotelian state.
The organic conception of the state collectivises the citizenry into a
single body (a family ruled by the fatherly head as Filmer would
perceive it), and thereby permits wielding the masses into directions
the rulers see fit – ensuring that the collective as a whole survives
and flourishes. We have seen that Locke's conception of the state
moves away from that of the ship and captain analogy to conceiving the
state as an instrument whose sole purpose is to provide a secure
framework for the life, property, and liberty of the people.
The organic conception is antithetical to the Lockean order. For
Locke, government is no more than a tool that continuously depends on
the consent of the people and must not violate the maximum conditions
of securing peace and property – to do so is to violate the trust that
is afforded the institution. It possesses no mystical nature of either
a divine or a supernatural order, it is a mere prudential institution
that can efficiently and effectively provide a better security service
(though that is highly debatable – see above) than individuals working
along in the natural state of freedom.
Political power is the power that every man in the state of nature
possesses but which is given over to the society that they form: i.e.,
to the government set up to create an established and known set of
laws, to arbitrate in disputes, and to preserve the life and property
of its members. Locke's vision is thusly of a minimal state whose
justification can only be that of consent (§176). The state must not
possess arbitrary, absolute powers over the lives and property of the
civilians, yet its mandate must seek the public good and be democratic
(that is, majority rule). This opens up issues.
First, historically, as Locke notes, "this Consent is little taken
notice of: And therefore many have mistaken the force of Arms, for the
consent of the people," (§175). This does not undermine the
theoretical justification of government – that it ought to be
consensual, for earlier Locke stresses that adults have the right to
secede from their present society to form a new one, therefore present
occupation or de facto rule does not validate a government's status.
However, it does raise wonderfully intricate problems for any
incumbent regime that oversteps its boundaries and initiates force
against the people it is supposedly seeking to protect. It also tends
to undermine the legitimacy of any regime not founded on consensual
origins, as well as raises the question of how continual that
consensus ought to be: should each generation renew its contract with
its government body, and if it didn't would that not undermine any
legitimacy the government possessed? Or should implied consensus be an
acceptable criterion of continual legitimisation of government –
namely, the fact that a people do not seek to secede to migrate should
be held as evidence of continued trust in their state?
Secondly, once government is justified, Locke's particular political
ethics demand that some people should not be part of the Commonwealth
at all – Roman Catholics, atheists, and extreme religious sects should
not be tolerated. Vagabonds and beggars are to be outlawed and pressed
into government service (army or navy), and accordingly Locke argued
for severe measures that would curtail a man's freedom of movement,
but what would the status of say, Roman Catholics, be in a Lockean
state? If we take John Locke's view – which was typical of many
Protestant thinkers at the time (and indeed for the next hundred
years) Catholics would be barred from enfranchisement – prohibited
from attending political meetings or taking part in the political
process; but if, on the other hand, we take the Lockean theory of the
state and remove what can arguably considered as the incidental
prejudices of the man and his time, then it is much more difficult to
sustain a strong denial of freedom to those who would be intolerant of
freedom. If a man's conscience is to be free from interference, then
so too must his freedom to express himself on his own land, say. The
argument develops accordingly: may I possess the right to espouse
treason in my own home, but not as a member of a public body? Or is it
more the case that I can express what theories I care to, as long as
the consequences of those speeches do not undermine the peaceful and
Commonwealth? Locke remained intolerant of those who would overthrow a
peaceful settlement, but that demands we look closer at the nature of
peaceful settlements. The Glorious Revolution was bloodless in
England, but not in Scotland or Ireland, and the inhabitants there saw
the accession of William III through different eyes to their English
contemporaries. Nevertheless, Lockean theory implies that we seek out
objective distinctions rather than subjectively held differences –
does the new regime uphold peace, property, and liberty, or does it
strain to abuse power for its own ends. That remains the deciding
argument for the Lockean, even though the details may be difficult to
ascertain in practice.
e. Property
Much of Locke's thesis depends on the status of property – that a man
initially owns himself and then owns that with which he mixes his
labour. It is a powerful theory and one that goes a long way in
justifying private property both on utilitarian grounds that it
creates wealth and on moral grounds. The Lockean conception of the
state, as we have seen above, depends greatly on the role of property
– the relationship between the two topics being difficult to
disentangle. But let's look more closely at what Locke says about
property and some of the issues that arise.
In the state of nature, everything is commonly owned; but as God gave
man senses and reason to use for his preservation and reproduction,
that which he removes out of the state of nature with his own hands
becomes his property – and this is natural and just. The fact that a
man labours to pick fruit or till the soil presents the distinguishing
characteristic of private versus commonly held property. There is no
need for any consent to be given by his comrades living in the state
of nature, indeed awaiting that consent may mean he starves! (§28).
"The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they
were in, hath fixed my Property in them."
But take a river from which a man draws water. The water in his
pitcher is necessarily his – by virtue of his labouring to retrieve
it; however, the water remains in common ownership. Any game in the
wild is owned by all, until the hunter marks it for the chase, upon
which the hare or the deer begins to become his property (§30). Locke
deals with the first objection that if a man, with his labour, manages
to secure vast resources, but there are brakes on such an engrossment.
Firstly, Christian morality demands that a man take from nature that
which is for his enjoyment, "as much as any one can make use of to any
advantage of life before it spoils … whatever is beyond this, is more
than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for Man
to spoil or destroy." (§31). While human population was small, there
was of course enough resources to go around, but with the increase in
numbers, pressures are put on Locke's proviso (ably examined in Robert
Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia) that enough be left for others.
While in England further enclosures would require the "consent of
Fellow-Commoners"; nevertheless, enough vacant land was available to
permit a doubling of the population and still permit enough to left
over for others if every man sought to make use. Arguably, against
present (21stC) misconceptions of man's imprint on the globe, most of
the earth is relatively under-populated by humans, yet governments
have created severe barriers to the free migration of peoples to
under-populated (and high wage) lands, something the Lockean would
reject as abrogating the common land into the government's hands yet
not dispersing it to those who would (or actually do) mix their labour
with it. Indeed, Locke favoured free migration as the quickest means
to increase a nation's wealth through the ensuing expansion of trade
and markets. "You may therefore safely open your doors, and a freedom
to them to settle here being secure of this advantage that you have
the profit of all their labour …" (FGN).
As men settle down, Locke continues, they needed to delineate their
titles to the land, a pressure that gathers as a population increases.
Nonetheless, in the early state of ownership, a man's title to the
land depends on his continual cultivation of it (§38). If he lets his
grass rot, or his fruit perish, then his enclosure reverts back to
wasteland – i.e., common ownership, and hence to be available for
another to cultivate. But once land is taken under private ownership,
its productivity increases and a man can sell its surplus; in turn,
economic growth causes a population to grow, and thereby the value of
cultivated land increases. The introduction of money also permits a
man to hold his profit in the form of coin, which does not waste, and
thereby enables him (justly) to increase his wealth. The advance of
private property, tempered with Christian charitable considerations,
is inherently virtuous. But should the advancement resulting from
enclosure be encouraged or even forced?
Some, for example, may read in Locke the right to take commonly held,
uncultivated lands off the peoples that reside on them and who yet do
not exploit them well, and certainly there is evidence that Locke
would support such an enterprise (§45: "there are still great tracts
of Land to be found which (the Inhabitants thereof not having joyned
with the rest of Mankind, in the consent of the Use of their common
Money) lie waste, and are more than the People, who dwell on it, do,
or can make use of, and so still lie in common." As an applied example
of this Lockean problem, we may refer to an enterprise that forged the
westward expansion of the United States. The fact that much of Indian
territory was uncultivated could, on Lockean, grounds justify Abraham
Lincoln's Homestead Act of 1862 promoting the mixing of "Industrious
and Rational" labour with the land to promote settlement, the
expansion of the commonwealth and economic growth, for the "taking of
this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the
Commoners" (§28); alternatively, it could equally support the 1763
Proclamation of King George III accepting the land rights of the
native Indians and prohibiting further European settlement of their
land.
The initial Northwest Ordinance (1787) stipulated in very Lockean
language, "The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the
Indians, their lands and property shall never be taken from them
without their consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty,
they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful
wars authorized by congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity
shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to
them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them." However,
between 1830 and 1870 the US Government pushed for a policy of
annexation and enforced migration that is far removed from anything
John Locke would have condoned, but which has left Lockean scholars
debating the nature and extent of the injustice perpetrated and the
potential reparations due, a debate that gained momentum in the 1960s
and which, in academic circles, now extends to other parts of the
world in which unjust aggression has caused a population displacement
or violation of a people.
From a standard reading of Locke, his theory supports the right of the
original inhabitants' entitlement of their land. "the Inhabitants of
any Countrey [sic], who are descended, and derive a Title to their
Estates from those, who are subdued, and had a Government forced upon
them against their free consents, retain a Right to the Possession of
their Ancestors, though they consent not freely to the Government,
whose hard Conditions were by force imposed on the Possessors of that
Country." Since much of human history involves conquest, the extent of
lands held unjustly are vast and the application of Lockean theory to
explore potential solutions becomes consequently cumbersome. To what
period of time can the original settlers of a land refer back to in
establishing their primary proprietorship?
In the immediate aftermath of Locke's publication of the Two Treatises
his friend and Member of the Irish Parliament, William Molyneux,
published The Case of Ireland, a defence of Irish nationalism in the
face of British control. Locke refused to admit he had written the Two
Treatises to Molyneux, who came to stay with Locke. Nothing is known
of their conversation, but Molyneux's work echoed the principles of
the Two Treatises, but the House of Lords took umbrage and had the
book burned. It is unclear what Locke's response would have been, for
Molyneux's argument logically included the native Catholic population
(as well as its Protestants) in the right to run Ireland. As Dunn
notes, Locke may have favoured Catholic rule for Catholic nations far
from the British Isles, but he could not approve of Catholic rule
within the British jurisdiction. Molyneux's Lockean arguments seeped
through to the North American colonies and to Otis and Jefferson and
eventually culminated in the American Revolution.
7. References and Further Reading
This article touches on the main political issues that emanate from
Locke's writings. It is highly advisable for the student to return
again and again to Locke's original works, where the depth and breadth
of the philosopher's thoughts can be better appreciated. The library
of secondary literature (books and journals) is immense and growing –
Locke has certainly has had an effective impact on political
philosophy and new readers of his works can always add something to
Lockean scholarship.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge Texts in the
History of Political Thought. Ed. Peter Laslett. CUP: Cambridge, 1997.
Locke, John. Political Writings. Cambridge Texts in the History of
Political Thought.Ed. Mark Goldie. CUP: Cambridge, 2002.
Locke, John. "Two Tracts on Government." In Political Writings.
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Ed. Mark Goldie.
CUP: Cambridge, 2002.
Locke, John. "Essay on the Law of Nature." In Political Writings.
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Ed. Mark Goldie.
CUP: Cambridge, 2002.
Abbreviations used:
At: Atlantis, in Political Writings.
CEP: Civil and Ecclesiastical Power in Political Writings
EPL: Essay on the Poor Law in Political Writings
FCC: Fundamental Constitution of Carolina (*) in Political Writings
FGN: For a General Naturalisation (1693), in Political Writings.
FT: First Tract on Government (also known as the English Tract), in
Political Writings.
OSP: On Samuel Parker (1669-70), in Political Writings
R: Reputation (1678) in Political Writings
Tb: Toleration B (1676) in Political Writings
V: Verses on Cromwell and King Charles II's Restoration, in Political Writings.
Secondary Reading
Aaron, Richard I. John Locke. Encyclopedia Britannica. CD-ROM, 2001.
Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy: Volume V. Image Books,
New York, 1994.
Cox, R.H. Locke on War and Peace. OUP: Oxford, 1960.
Dunn, John. John: A Very Short Introduction. OUP: Oxford, 2003.
Harris, Ian. The Mind of John Locke. CUP: Cambridge, 1994. An
excellent contextual analysis of the political and religious mindset
of Locke's Britain.
Laslett, Peter. "Introduction." In Two Treatises of Government. CUP:
Cambridge, 1997, pp.3-133.
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