philosophy as epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics. His
deep influence on Western philosophy is asserted in the famous remark
of Alfred North Whitehead: "the safest characterization of the
European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of
footnotes to Plato." He was also the prototypical political
philosopher whose ideas had a profound impact on subsequent political
theory. His greatest impact was Aristotle, but he influenced Western
political thought in many ways. The Academy, the school he founded in
385 B.C.E., became the model for other schools of higher learning and
later for European universities.The philosophy of Plato is marked by
the usage of dialectic, a method of discussion involving ever more
profound insights into the nature of reality, and by cognitive
optimism, a belief in the capacity of the human mind to attain the
truth and to use this truth for the rational and virtuous ordering of
human affairs. Plato believes that conflicting interests of different
parts of society can be harmonized. The best, rational and righteous,
political order, which he proposes, leads to a harmonious unity of
society and allows each of its parts to flourish, but not at the
expense of others. The theoretical design and practical implementation
of such order, he argues, are impossible without virtue.
Table of Contents
1. Life – from Politics to Philosophy
2. The Threefold Task of Political Philosophy
3. The Quest for Justice in The Republic
4. The Best Political Order
5. The Government of Philosopher Rulers
6. Politics and the Soul
7. Plato's Achievement
1. Life – from Politics to Philosophy
Plato was born in Athens in c. 427 B.C.E. Until his mid-twenties,
Athens was involved in a long and disastrous military conflict with
Sparta, known as the Peloponnesian War. Coming from a distinguished
family – on his father's side descending from Codrus, one of the early
kings of Athens, and on his mother's side from Solon, the prominent
reformer of the Athenian constitution – he was naturally destined to
take an active role in political life. But this never happened.
Although cherishing the hope of assuming a significant place in his
political community, he found himself continually thwarted. As he
relates in his autobiographical Seventh Letter, he could not identify
himself with any of the contending political parties or the succession
of corrupt regimes, each of which brought Athens to further decline
(324b-326a). He was a pupil of Socrates, whom he considered the most
just man of his time, and who, although did not leave any writings
behind, exerted a large influence on philosophy. It was Socrates who,
in Cicero's words, "called down philosophy from the skies." The
pre-Socratic philosophers were mostly interested in cosmology and
ontology; Socrates' concerns, in contrast, were almost exclusively
moral and political issues. In 399 when a democratic court voted by a
large majority of its five hundred and one jurors for Socrates'
execution on an unjust charge of impiety, Plato came to the conclusion
that all existing governments were bad and almost beyond redemption.
"The human race will have no respite from evils until those who are
really philosophers acquire political power or until, through some
divine dispensation, those who rule and have political authority in
the cities become real philosophers" (326a-326b).
It was perhaps because of this opinion that he retreated to his
Academy and to Sicily for implementing his ideas. He visited Syracuse
first in 387, then in 367, and again in 362-361, with the general
purpose to moderate the Sicilian tyrants with philosophical education
and to establish a model political rule. But this adventure with
practical politics ended in failure, and Plato went back to Athens.
His Academy, which provided a base for succeeding generations of
Platonic philosophers until its final closure in C.E. 529, became the
most famous teaching institution of the Hellenistic world.
Mathematics, rhetoric, astronomy, dialectics, and other subjects, all
seen as necessary for the education of philosophers and statesmen,
were studied there. Some of Plato's pupils later became leaders,
mentors, and constitutional advisers in Greek city-states. His most
renowned pupil was Aristotle. Plato died in c. 347 B.C.E. During his
lifetime, Athens turned away from her military and imperial ambitions
and became the intellectual center of Greece. She gave host to all the
four major Greek philosophical schools founded in the course of the
fourth century: Plato's Academy, Aristotle's Lyceum, and the Epicurean
and Stoic schools.
2. The Threefold Task of Political Philosophy
Although the Republic, the Statesman, the Laws and a few shorter
dialogues are considered to be the only strictly political dialogues
of Plato, it can be argued that political philosophy was the area of
his greatest concern. In the English-speaking world, under the
influence of twentieth century analytic philosophy, the main task of
political philosophy today is still often seen as conceptual analysis:
the clarification of political concepts. To understand what this
means, it may be useful to think of concepts as the uses of words.
When we use general words, such as "table," "chair," "pen," or
political terms, such as "state," "power," "democracy," or "freedom,"
by applying them to different things, we understand them in a certain
way, and hence assign to them certain meanings. Conceptual analysis
then is a mental clearance, the clarification of a concept in its
meaning. As such it has a long tradition and is first introduced in
Platonic dialogues. Although the results are mostly inconclusive, in
"early" dialogues especially, Socrates tries to define and clarify
various concepts. However, in contrast to what it is for some analytic
philosophers, for Plato conceptual analysis is not an end to itself,
but a preliminary step. The next step is critical evaluation of
beliefs, deciding which one of the incompatible ideas is correct and
which one is wrong. For Plato, making decisions about the right
political order are, along with the choice between peace and war, the
most important choices one can make in politics. Such decisions cannot
be left solely to public opinion, he believes, which in many cases
does not have enough foresight and gets its lessons only post factum
from disasters recorded in history. In his political philosophy, the
clarification of concepts is thus a preliminary step in evaluating
beliefs, and right beliefs in turn lead to an answer to the question
of the best political order. The movement from conceptual analysis,
through evaluation of beliefs, to the best political order can clearly
be seen in the structure of Plato's Republic.
3. The Quest for Justice in The Republic
One of the most fundamental ethical and political concepts is justice.
It is a complex and ambiguous concept. It may refer to individual
virtue, the order of society, as well as individual rights in contrast
to the claims of the general social order. In Book I of the Republic,
Socrates and his interlocutors discuss the meaning of justice. Four
definitions that report how the word "justice" (dikaiosune) is
actually used, are offered. The old man of means Cephalus suggests the
first definition. Justice is "speaking the truth and repaying what one
has borrowed" (331d). Yet this definition, which is based on
traditional moral custom and relates justice to honesty and goodness;
i.e. paying one's debts, speaking the truth, loving one's country,
having good manners, showing proper respect for the gods, and so on,
is found to be inadequate. It cannot withstand the challenge of new
times and the power of critical thinking. Socrates refutes it by
presenting a counterexample. If we tacitly agree that justice is
related to goodness, to return a weapon that was borrowed from someone
who, although once sane, has turned into a madman does not seem to be
just but involves a danger of harm to both sides. Cephalus' son
Polemarchus, who continues the discussion after his father leaves to
offer a sacrifice, gives his opinion that the poet Simonides was
correct in saying that it was just "to render to each his due" (331e).
He explains this statement by defining justice as "treating friends
well and enemies badly" (332d). Under the pressure of Socrates'
objections that one may be mistaken in judging others and thus harm
good people, Polemarchus modifies his definition to say that justice
is "to treat well a friend who is good and to harm an enemy who is
bad" (335a). However, when Socrates finally objects that it cannot be
just to harm anyone, because justice cannot produce injustice,
Polemarchus is completely confused. He agrees with Socrates that
justice, which both sides tacitly agree relates to goodness, cannot
produce any harm, which can only be caused by injustice. Like his
father, he withdraws from the dialogue. The careful reader will note
that Socrates does not reject the definition of justice implied in the
saying of Simonides, who is called a wise man, namely, that "justice
is rendering to each what befits him" (332b), but only its explication
given by Polemarchus. This definition is, nevertheless, found unclear.
The first part of Book I of the Republic ends in a negative way, with
parties agreeing that none of the definitions provided stands up to
examination and that the original question "What is justice?" is more
difficult to answer than it seemed to be at the outset. This negative
outcome can be seen as a linguistic and philosophical therapy.
Firstly, although Socrates' objections to given definitions can be
challenged, it is shown, as it stands, that popular opinions about
justice involve inconsistencies. They are inconsistent with other
opinions held to be true. The reportive definitions based on everyday
usage of the word "justice" help us perhaps to understand partially
what justice means, but fail to provide a complete account of what is
justice. These definitions have to be supplied by a definition that
will assist clarity and establish the meaning of justice. However, to
propose such an adequate definition one has to know what justice
really is. The way people define a given word is largely determined by
the beliefs which they hold about the thing referred to by this word.
A definition that is merely arbitrary or either too narrow or too
broad, based on a false belief about justice, does not give the
possibility of communication. Platonic dialogues are expressions of
the ultimate communication that can take place between humans; and
true communication is likely to take place only if individuals can
share meanings of the words they use. Communication based on false
beliefs, such as statements of ideology, is still possible, but seems
limited, dividing people into factions, and, as history teaches us,
can finally lead only to confusion. The definition of justice as
"treating friends well and enemies badly" is for Plato not only
inadequate because it is too narrow, but also wrong because it is
based on a mistaken belief of what justice is, namely, on the belief
grounded in factionalism, which Socrates does not associate with the
wise ones but with tyrants (336a). Therefore, in the Republic, as well
as in other Platonic dialogues, there is a relationship between
conceptual analysis and critical evaluation of beliefs. The goals of
these conversations are not merely linguistic, to arrive at an
adequate verbal definition, but also substantial, to arrive at a right
belief. The question "what is justice" is not only about linguistic
usage of the word "justice," but primarily about the thing to which
the word refers. The focus of the second part of Book I is no longer
clarification of concepts, but evaluation of beliefs.
In Platonic dialogues, rather than telling them what they have to
think, Socrates is often getting his interlocutors to tell him what
they think. The next stage of the discussion of the meaning of justice
is taken over by Thrasymachus, a sophist, who violently and
impatiently bursts into the dialogue. In the fifth and fourth century
B.C.E., the sophists were paid teachers of rhetoric and other
practical skills, mostly non-Athenians, offering courses of
instruction and claiming to be best qualified to prepare young men for
success in public life. Plato describes the sophists as itinerant
individuals, known for their rhetorical abilities, who reject
religious beliefs and traditional morality, and he contrasts them with
Socrates, who as a teacher would refuse to accept payment and instead
of teaching skills would commit himself to a disinterested inquiry
into what is true and just. In a contemptuous manner, Thrasymachus
asks Socrates to stop talking nonsense and look into the facts. As a
clever man of affairs, he gives an answer to the question of "what is
justice" by deriving justice from the city's configuration of power
and making it relative to the interests of the dominant social or
political group. "Justice is nothing else than the interest of the
stronger" (338c). Now, by contrast to what some commentators say, the
statement that Thrasymachus offers as an answer to Socrates' question
about justice is not a definition. The careful reader will notice that
Thrasymachus identifies justice with either maintenance or observance
of law. His statement is an expression of his belief that, in the
world imperfect as it is, the ruling element in the city, or as we
would say today the dominant political or social group, institutes
laws and governs for its own benefit (338d). The democrats make laws
in support of democracy; the aristocrats make laws that support the
government of the well-born; the propertied make laws that protect
their status and keep their businesses going; and so on. This belief
implies, firstly, that justice is not a universal moral value but a
notion relative to expediency of the dominant status quo group;
secondly, that justice is in the exclusive interest of the dominant
group; thirdly, that justice is used as a means of oppression and thus
is harmful to the powerless; fourthly, that there is neither any
common good nor harmony of interests between those who are in a
position of power and those who are not. All there is, is a domination
by the powerful and privileged over the powerless. The moral language
of justice is used merely instrumentally to conceal the interests of
the dominant group and to make these interests appear universal. The
powerful "declare what they have made – what is to their own advantage
– to be just" (338e). The arrogance with which Thrasymachus makes his
statements suggests that he strongly believes that to hold a different
view from his own would be to mislead oneself about the world as it
is.
After presenting his statement, Thrasymachus intends to leave as if he
believed that what he said was so compelling that no further debate
about justice was ever possible (344d). In the Republic he exemplifies
the power of a dogma. Indeed he presents Socrates with a powerful
challenge. Yet, whether or not what he said sounds attractive to
anyone, Socrates is not convinced by the statement of his beliefs.
Beliefs shape our lives as individuals, nations, ages, and
civilizations. Should we really believe that "justice [obeying laws]
is really the good of another, the advantage of the stronger and the
ruler, harmful to the one who obeys, while injustice [disobeying laws]
is in one's own advantage" (343c)? The discussion between Socrates and
his interlocutors is no longer about the meaning of "justice." It is
about fundamental beliefs and "concerns no ordinary topic but the way
we ought to live" (352d). Although in Book I Socrates finally succeeds
in showing Thrasymachus that his position is self-contradictory and
Thrasymachus withdraws from the dialogue, perhaps not fully convinced,
yet red-faced, in Book II Thrasymachus' argument is taken over by two
young intellectuals, Plato's brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, who for
the sake of curiosity and a playful intellectual exercise push it to
the limit (358c-366d). Thrasymachus withdraws, but his statement:
moral skepticism and relativism, predominance of power in human
relations, and non-existence of the harmony of interests, hovers over
the Western mind. It takes whole generations of thinkers to struggle
with Thrasymachus' beliefs, and the debate still continues. It takes
the whole remainder of the Republic to present an argument in defense
of justice as a universal value and the foundation of the best
political order.
4. The Best Political Order
Although large parts of the Republic are devoted to the description of
an ideal state ruled by philosophers and its subsequent decline, the
chief theme of the dialogue is justice. It is fairly clear that Plato
does not introduce his fantastical political innovation, which
Socrates describes as a city in speech, a model in heaven, for the
purpose of practical implementation (592a-b). The vision of the ideal
state is used rather to illustrate the main thesis of the dialogue
that justice, understood traditionally as virtue and related to
goodness, is the foundation of a good political order, and as such is
in everyone's interest. Justice, if rightly understood, Plato argues,
is not to the exclusive advantage of any of the city's factions, but
is concerned with the common good of the whole political community,
and is to the advantage of everyone. It provides the city with a sense
of unity, and thus, is a basic condition for its health. "Injustice
causes civil war, hatred, and fighting, while justice brings
friendship and a sense of common purpose" (351d). In order to
understand further what justice and political order are for Plato, it
is useful to compare his political philosophy with the
pre-philosophical insights of Solon, who is referred to in a few
dialogues. Biographical information about Plato is fairly scarce. The
fact that he was related through his mother to this famous Athenian
legislator, statesman and poet, regarded as one of the "Seven Sages,"
may be treated as merely incidental. On the other hand, taking into
consideration that in Plato's times education would have been passed
on to children informally at home, it seems highly probable that Plato
was not only well acquainted with the deeds and ideas of Solon, but
that these deeply influenced him.
The essence of the constitutional reform which Solon made in 593
B.C.E., over one hundred and fifty years before Plato's birth, when he
became the Athenian leader, was the restoration of righteous order,
eunomia. In the early part of the sixth century Athens was disturbed
by a great tension between two parties: the poor and the rich, and
stood at the brink of a fierce civil war. On the one hand, because of
an economic crisis, many poorer Athenians were hopelessly falling into
debt, and since their loans were often secured by their own persons,
thousands of them were put into serfdom. On the other hand, lured by
easy profits from loans, the rich stood firmly in defense of private
property and their ancient privileges. The partisan strife, which
seemed inevitable, would make Athens even more weak economically and
defenseless before external enemies. Appointed as a mediator in this
conflict, Solon enacted laws prohibiting loans on the security of the
person. He lowered the rate of interest, ordered the cancellation of
all debts, and gave freedom to serfs. He acted so moderately and
impartially that he became unpopular with both parties. The rich felt
hurt by the reform. The poor, unable to hold excess in check, demanded
a complete redistribution of landed property and the dividing of it
into equal shares. Nevertheless, despite these criticisms from both
sides, Solon succeeded in gaining social peace. Further, by
implementing new constitutional laws, he set up a "mighty shield
against both parties and did not allow either to win an unjust
victory" (Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution). He introduced a
system of checks and balances which would not favor any side, but took
into consideration legitimate interests of all social groups. In his
position, he could easily have become the tyrant over the city, but he
did not seek power for himself. After he completed his reform, he left
Athens in order to see whether it would stand the test of time, and
returned to his country only ten years later. Even though in 561
Pisistratus seized power and became the first in a succession of
Athenian tyrants, and in 461 the democratic leader Ephialtes abolished
the checks upon popular sovereignty, Solon's reform provided the
ancient Greeks with a model of both political leadership and order
based on impartiality and fairness. Justice for Solon is not an
arithmetical equality: giving equal shares to all alike irrespective
of merit, which represents the democratic concept of distributive
justice, but it is equity or fairness based on difference: giving
shares proportionate to the merit of those who receive them. The same
ideas of political order, leadership, and justice can be found in
Plato's dialogues.
For Plato, like for Solon, the starting point for the inquiry about
the best political order is the fact of social diversity and
conflicting interests, which involve the danger of civil strife. The
political community consists of different parts or social classes,
such as the noble, the rich, and the poor, each representing different
values, interests, and claims to rule. This gives rise to the
controversy of who should rule the community, and what is the best
political system. In both the Republic and the Laws, Plato asserts not
only that factionalism and civil war are the greatest dangers to the
city, more dangerous even than war against external enemies, but also
that peace obtained by the victory of one part and the destruction of
its rivals is not to be preferred to social peace obtained through the
friendship and cooperation of all the city's parts (Republic 462a-b,
Laws 628a-b). Peace for Plato is, unlike for Marxists and other
radical thinkers, not a status quo notion, related to the interest of
the privileged group, but a value that most people usually desire. He
does not stand for war and the victory of one class, but for peace in
social diversity. "The best is neither war nor faction – they are
things we should pray to be spared from – but peace and mutual good
will" (628c). Building on the pre-philosophical insights of Solon and
his concept of balancing conflicting interests, in both the Republic
and the Laws, Plato offers two different solutions to the same problem
of social peace based on the equilibrium and harmonious union of
different social classes. If in the Republic it is the main function
of the political leadership of philosopher-rulers to make the civil
strife cease, in the Laws this mediating function is taken over by
laws. The best political order for Plato is that which promotes social
peace in the environment of cooperation and friendship among different
social groups, each benefiting from and each adding to the common
good. The best form of government, which he advances in the Republic,
is a philosophical aristocracy or monarchy, but that which he proposes
in his last dialogue the Laws is a traditional polity: the mixed or
composite constitution that reconciles different partisan interests
and includes aristocratic, oligarchic, and democratic elements.
5. The Government of Philosopher Rulers
It is generally believed today that democracy, "government of the
people by the people and for the people," is the best and only fully
justifiable political system. The distinct features of democracy are
freedom and equality. Democracy can be described as the rule of the
free people who govern themselves, either directly or though their
representatives, in their own interest. Why does Plato not consider
democracy the best form of government? In the Republic he criticizes
the direct and unchecked democracy of his time precisely because of
its leading features (557a-564a). Firstly, although freedom is for
Plato a true value, democracy involves the danger of excessive
freedom, of doing as one likes, which leads to anarchy. Secondly,
equality, related to the belief that everyone has the right and equal
capacity to rule, brings to politics all kinds of power-seeking
individuals, motivated by personal gain rather than public good.
Democracy is thus highly corruptible. It opens gates to demagogues,
potential dictators, and can thus lead to tyranny. Hence, although it
may not be applicable to modern liberal democracies, Plato's main
charge against the democracy he knows from the ancient Greek political
practice is that it is unstable, leading from anarchy to tyranny, and
that it lacks leaders with proper skill and morals. Democracy depends
on chance and must be mixed with competent leadership (501b). Without
able and virtuous leaders, such as Solon or Pericles, who come and go
by chance, it is not a good form of government. But even Pericles, who
as Socrates says made people "wilder" rather than more virtuous, is
considered not to be the best leader (Gorgias, 516c). If ruling a
state is a craft, indeed statecraft, Plato argues, then politics needs
expert rulers, and they cannot come to it merely by accident, but must
be carefully selected and prepared in the course of extensive
training. Making political decisions requires good judgment. Politics
needs competence, at least in the form of today's civil servants. Who
then should the experts be and why? Why does Plato in the Republic
decide to hand the steering wheel of the state to philosophers?
In spite of the idealism with which he is usually associated, Plato is
not politically naive. He does not idealize, but is deeply pessimistic
about human beings. Most people, corrupted as they are, are for him
fundamentally irrational, driven by their appetites, egoistic
passions, and informed by false beliefs. If they choose to be just and
obey laws, it is only because they lack the power to act criminally
and are afraid of punishment (Republic, 359a). Nevertheless, human
beings are not vicious by nature. They are social animals, incapable
of living alone (369a-b). Living in communities and exchanging
products of their labor is natural for them, so that they have
capacities for rationality and goodness. Plato, as later Rousseau,
believes that once political society is properly ordered, it can
contribute to the restoration of morals. A good political order, good
education and upbringing can produce "good natures; and [these] useful
natures, who are in turn well educated, grow up even better than their
predecessors" (424a). Hence, there are in Plato such elements of the
idealistic or liberal world view as the belief in education and
progress, and a hope for a better future. The quality of human life
can be improved if people learn to be rational and understand that
their real interests lie in harmonious cooperation with one another,
and not in war or partisan strife. However, unlike Rousseau, Plato
does not see the best social and political order in a democratic
republic. Opinions overcome truth in everyday life. Peoples' lives and
the lives of communities are shaped by the prevailing beliefs. If
philosophers are those who can distinguish between true and false
beliefs, who love knowledge and are motivated by the common good, and
finally if they are not only master-theoreticians, but also the
master-practitioners who can heal the ills of their society, then
they, and not democratically elected representatives, must be chosen
as leaders and educators of the political community and guide it to
proper ends. They are required to counteract the destabilizing effects
of false beliefs on society. Are philosophers incorruptible? In the
ideal city there are provisions to minimize possible corruption, even
among the good-loving philosophers. They can neither enjoy private
property nor family life. Although they are the rulers, they receive
only a modest remuneration from the state, dine in common dining
halls, and have wives and children in common. These provisions are
necessary, Plato believes, because if the philosopher-rulers were to
acquire private land, luxurious homes, and money themselves, they
would soon become hostile masters of other citizens rather than their
leaders and allies (417a-b). The ideal city becomes a bad one,
described as timocracy, precisely when the philosophers neglect music
and physical exercise, and begin to gather wealth (547b).
To be sure, Plato's philosophers, among whom he includes both men and
women, are not those who can usually be found today in departments of
philosophy and who are described as the "prisoners who take refuge in
a temple" (495a). Initially chosen from among the brightest, most
stable, and most courageous children, they go through a sophisticated
and prolonged educational training which begins with gymnastics, music
and mathematics, and ends with dialectic, military service and
practical city management. They have superior theoretical knowledge,
including the knowledge of the just, noble, good and advantageous, but
are not inferior to others in practical matters as well (484d, 539e).
Being in the final stage of their education illuminated by the idea of
the good, they are those who can see beyond changing empirical
phenomena and reflect on such timeless values as justice, beauty,
truth, and moderation (501b, 517b). Goodness is not merely a
theoretical idea for them, but the ultimate state of their mind. If
the life of the philosopher-rulers is not of private property, family
or wealth, nor even of honor, and if the intellectual life itself
seems so attractive, why should they then agree to rule? Plato's
answer is in a sense a negative one. Philosophical life, based on
contemplative leisure and the pleasure of learning, is indeed better
and happier than that of ruling the state (519d). However, the
underlying idea is not to make any social class in the city the
victorious one and make it thus happy, but "to spread happiness
throughout the city by bringing the citizens into harmony with each
other … and by making them share with each other the benefits that
each class can confer on the community" (519e). Plato assumes that a
city in which the rulers do not govern out of desire for private gain,
but are least motivated by personal ambition, is governed in the way
which is the finest and freest from civil strife (520d). Philosophers
will rule not only because they will be best prepared for this, but
also because if they do not, the city will no longer be well governed
and may fall prey to economic decline, factionalism, and civil war.
They will approach ruling not as something really enjoyable, but as
something necessary (347c-d).
Objections against the government of philosopher-rulers can be made.
Firstly, because of the restrictions concerning family and private
property, Plato is often accused of totalitarianism. However, Plato's
political vision differs from a totalitarian state in a number of
important aspects. Especially in the Laws he makes clear that freedom
is one of the main values of society (701d). Other values for which
Plato stands include justice, friendship, wisdom, courage, and
moderation, and not factionalism or terror that can be associated with
a totalitarian state. The restrictions which he proposes are placed on
the governors, rather than on the governed. Secondly, one can argue
that there may obviously be a danger in the self-professed claim to
rule of the philosophers. Individuals may imagine themselves to be
best qualified to govern a country, but in fact they may lose contact
with political realities and not be good leaders at all. If
philosopher-rulers did not have real knowledge of their city, they
would be deprived of the essential credential that is required to make
their rule legitimate, namely, that they alone know how best to
govern. Indeed, at the end of Book VII of the Republic where
philosophers' education is discussed, Socrates says: "I forgot that we
were only playing, and so I spoke too vehemently" (536b), as if to
imply that objections can be made to philosophical rule. As in a few
other places in the dialogue, Plato throws his political innovation
open to doubt. However, in Plato's view, philosopher-rulers do not
derive their authority solely from their expert knowledge, but also
from their love of the city as a whole and their impartiality and
fairness. Their political authority is not only rational but also
substantially moral, based on the consent of the governed. They regard
justice as the most important and most essential thing (540e). Even if
particular political solutions presented in the Republic may be open
to questioning, what seems to stand firm is the basic idea that
underlies philosophers' governance and that can be traced back to
Solon: the idea of fairness based on difference as the basis of the
righteous political order. A political order based on fairness leads
to friendship and cooperation among different parts of the city.
For Plato, as for Solon, government exists for the benefit of all
citizens and all social classes, and must mediate between potentially
conflicting interests. Such a mediating force is exercised in the
ideal city of the Republic by the philosopher-rulers. They are the
guarantors of the political order that is encapsulated in the norm
that regulates just relations of persons and classes within the city
and is expressed by the phrase: "doing one's own work and not meddling
with what isn't one's own" (433a-b). If justice is related to
equality, the notion of equality is indeed preserved in Plato's view
of justice expressed by this norm as the impartial, equal treatment of
all citizens and social groups. It is not the case that Plato knew
that justice meant equality but made it inequality, as Karl Popper
believed. In the ideal city all persons and social groups are given
equal opportunities to be happy, i.e. pursue happiness, but not at the
expense of others. Their particular individual, group or class
happiness is limited by the need of the happiness for all. The
happiness of the whole city is not for Plato the happiness of an
abstract unity called the polis, or the happiness of the greatest
number, but rather the happiness of all citizens derived from a
peaceful, harmonious, and cooperative union of different social
classes. According to the traditional definition of justice by
Simonides from Book I, which is reinterpreted in Book IV, as "doing
one's own work," each social class receives its proper due in the
distribution of benefits and burdens. The philosopher-rulers enjoy
respect and contemplative leisure, but not wealth or honors; the
guardian class, the second class in the city, military honors, but not
leisure or wealth; and the producer class, family life, wealth, and
freedom of enterprise, but not honors or rule. Then, the producers
supply the city with goods; the guardians, defend it; and the
philosophers, attuned to virtue and illuminated by goodness, rule it
impartially for the common benefit of all citizens. The three
different social classes engage in mutually beneficial enterprise, by
which the interests of all are best served. Social and economic
differences, i.e. departures from equality, bring about benefits to
people in all social positions, and therefore, are justified. In the
Platonic vision of the Republic, all social classes get to perform
what they are best fit to do and are unified into a single community
by mutual interests. In this sense, although each are different, they
are all friends.
6. Politics and the Soul
It can be contended that the whole argument of the Republic is made in
response to the denial of justice as a universal moral value expressed
in Thrasymachus' statement: "Justice is nothing else than the interest
of the stronger." Moral relativism, the denial of the harmony of
interests, and other problems posed by this statement are a real
challenge for Plato for whom justice is not merely a notion relative
to the existing laws instituted by the victorious factions in power.
In the Laws a similar statement is made again (714c), and it is
interpreted as the right of the strong, the winner in a political
battle (715a). By such interpretation, morality is denied and the
right to govern, like in the "Melian Dialogue" of Thucydides, is
equated simply with might. The decisions about morals and justice
which we make are for Plato "no trifle, but the foremost thing"
(714b). The answer to the question of what is right and what is wrong
can entirely determine our way of life, as individuals and
communities. If Plato's argument about justice presented in both the
Republic and the Laws can be summarized in just one sentence, the
sentence will say: "Justice is neither the right of the strong nor the
advantage of the stronger, but the right of the best and the advantage
of the whole community." The best, as explained in the Republic, are
the expert philosophical rulers. They, the wise and virtuous, free
from faction and guided by the idea of the common good, should rule
for the common benefit of the whole community, so that the city will
not be internally divided by strife, but one in friendship (Republic,
462a-b). Then, in the Laws, the reign of the best individuals is
replaced by the reign of the finest laws instituted by a judicious
legislator (715c-d). Throughout this dialogue Plato's guiding
principle is that the good society is a harmonious union of different
social elements that represent two key values: wisdom and freedom
(701d). The best laws assure that all the city's parts: the
democratic, the oligarchic, and the aristocratic, are represented in
political institutions: the popular Assembly, the elected Council, and
the Higher Council, and thus each social class receives its due
expression. Still, a democratic skeptic can feel dissatisfied with
Plato's proposal to grant the right to rule to the best, either
individuals or laws, even on the basis of tacit consent of the
governed. The skeptic may believe that every adult is capable of
exercising the power of self-direction, and should be given the
opportunity to do so. He will be prepared to pay the costs of eventual
mistakes and to endure an occasional civil unrest or even a limited
war rather than be directed by anyone who may claim superior wisdom.
Why then should Plato's best constitution be preferable to democracy?
In order to fully explain the Platonic political vision, the meaning
of "the best" should be further clarified.
In the short dialogue Alcibiades I, little studied today and thought
by some scholars as not genuine, though held in great esteem by the
Platonists of antiquity, Socrates speaks with Alcibiades. The subject
of their conversation is politics. Frequently referred to by
Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War, Alcibiades, the
future leader of Athens, highly intelligent and ambitious, largely
responsible for the Athenian invasion of Sicily, is at the time of
conversation barely twenty years old. The young, handsome, and
well-born Alcibiades of the dialogue is about to begin his political
career and to address the Assembly for the first time (105a-b). He
plans to advise the Athenians on the subject of peace and war, or some
other important affair (107d). His ambitions are indeed extraordinary.
He does not want just to display his worth before the people of Athens
and become their leader, but to rule over Europe and Asia as well
(105c). His dreams resemble that of the future Alexander the Great.
His claim to rule is that he is the best. However, upon Socrates'
scrutiny, it becomes apparent that young Alcibiades knows neither what
is just, nor what is advantageous, nor what is good, nor what is
noble, beyond what he has learned from the crowd (110d-e, 117a). His
world-view is based on unexamined opinions. He appears to be the worst
type of ignorant person who pretends that he knows something but does
not. Such ignorance in politics is the cause of mistakes and evils
(118a). What is implied in the dialogue is that noble birth, beautiful
looks, and even intelligence and power, without knowledge, do not give
the title to rule. Ignorance, the condition of Alcibiades, is also the
condition of the great majority of the people (118b-c). Nevertheless,
Socrates promises to guide Alcibiades, so that he becomes excellent
and renowned among the Greeks (124b-c). In the course of further
conversation, it turns out that one who is truly the best does not
only have knowledge of political things, rather than an opinion about
them, but also knows one's own self and is a beautiful soul. He or she
is perfect in virtue. The riches of the world can be entrusted only to
those who "take trouble over" themselves (128d), who look "toward what
is divine and bright" (134d), and who following the supreme soul, God,
the finest mirror of their own image (133c), strive to be as beautiful
and wealthy in their souls as possible (123e, 131d). The best
government can be founded only on beautiful and well-ordered souls.
In a few dialogues, such as Phaedo, the Republic, Phaedrus, Timaeus,
and the Laws, Plato introduces his doctrine of the immortality of the
soul. His ultimate answer to the question "Who am I?" is not an
"egoistic animal" or an "independent variable," as the twentieth
century behavioral researcher blatantly might say, but an "immortal
soul, corrupted by vice and purified by virtue, of whom the body is
only an instrument" (129a-130c). Expert political knowledge for him
should include not only knowledge of things out there, but also
knowledge of oneself. This is because whoever is ignorant of himself
will also be ignorant of others and of political things, and,
therefore, will never be an expert politician (133e). Those who are
ignorant will go wrong, moving from one misery to another (134a). For
them history will be a tough teacher, but as long they do not
recognize themselves and practice virtue, they will learn nothing.
Plato's good society is impossible without transcendence, without a
link to the perfect being who is God, the true measure of all things.
It is also impossible without an ongoing philosophical reflection on
whom we truly are. Therefore, democracy would not be a good form of
government for him unless, as it is proposed in the Laws, the element
of freedom is mixed with the element of wisdom, which includes
ultimate knowledge of the self. Unmixed and unchecked democracy,
marked by the general permissiveness that spurs vices, makes people
impious, and lets them forget about their true self, is only be the
second worst in the rank of flawed regimes after tyranny headed by a
vicious individual. This does not mean that Plato would support a
theocratic government based on shallow religiosity and religious
hypocrisy. There is no evidence for this. Freedom of speech, forming
opinions and expressing them, which may be denied in theocracy, is a
true value for Plato, along with wisdom. It is the basic requirement
for philosophy. In shallow religiosity, like in atheism, there is
ignorance and no knowledge of the self either. In Book II of the
Republic, Plato criticizes the popular religious beliefs of the
Athenians, who under the influence of Homer and Hesiod attribute vices
to the gods and heroes (377d-383c). He tries to show that God is the
perfect being, the purest and brightest, always the same, immortal and
true, to whom we should look in order to know ourselves and become
pure and virtuous (585b-e). God, and not human beings, is the measure
of political order (Laws, 716c).
7. Plato's Achievement
Plato's greatest achievement may be seen firstly in that he, in
opposing the sophists, offered to decadent Athens, which had lost
faith in her old religion, traditions, and customs, a means by which
civilization and the city's health could be restored: the recovery of
order in both the polis and the soul.
The best, rational and righteous political order leads to the
harmonious unity of a society and allows all the city's parts to
pursue happiness but not at the expense of others. The characteristics
of a good political society, of which most people can say "it is mine"
(462c), are described in the Republic by four virtues: justice,
wisdom, moderation, and courage. Justice is the equity or fairness
that grants each social group its due and ensures that each "does
one's own work" (433a). The three other virtues describe qualities of
different social groups. Wisdom, which can be understood as the
knowledge of the whole, including both knowledge of the self and
political prudence, is the quality of the leadership (428e-429a).
Courage is not merely military courage but primarily civic courage:
the ability to preserve the right, law-inspired belief, and stand in
defense of such values as friendship and freedom on which a good
society is founded. It is the primary quality of the guardians (430b).
Finally, moderation, a sense of the limits that bring peace and
happiness to all, is the quality of all social classes. It expresses
the mutual consent of both the governed and the rulers as to who
should rule (431d-432a). The four virtues of the good society describe
also the soul of a well-ordered individual. Its rational part, whose
quality is wisdom, nurtured by fine words and learning, should
together with the emotional or spirited part, cultivated by music and
rhythm, rule over the volitional or appetitive part (442a). Under the
leadership of the intellect, the soul must free itself from greed,
lust, and other degrading vices, and direct itself to the divine. The
liberation of the soul from vice is for Plato the ultimate task of
humans on earth. Nobody can be wicked and happy (580a-c). Only a
spiritually liberated individual, whose soul is beautiful and well
ordered, can experience true happiness. Only a country ordered
according to the principles of virtue can claim to have the best
system of government.
Plato's critique of democracy may be considered by modern readers as
not applicable to liberal democracy today. Liberal democracies are not
only founded on considerations of freedom and equality, but also
include other elements, such as the rule of law, multiparty systems,
periodic elections, and a professional civil service. Organized along
the principle of separation of powers, today's Western democracy
resembles more a revised version of mixed government, with a degree of
moderation and competence, rather than the highly unstable and
unchecked Athenian democracy of the fourth and fifth century B.C.E.,
in which all governmental policies were directly determined by the
often changing moods of the people. However, what still seems to be
relevant in Plato's political philosophy is that he reminds us of the
moral and spiritual dimension of political life. He believes that
virtue is the lifeblood of any good society.
Moved by extreme ambitions, the Athenians, like the mythological
Atlantians described in the dialogue Critias, became infected by
"wicked coveting and the pride of power" (121b). Like the drunken
Alcibiades from the Symposium, who would swap "bronze for gold" and
thus prove that he did not understand the Socratic teaching, they
chose the "semblance of beauty," the shining appearance of power and
material wealth, rather than the "thing itself," the being of
perfection (Symposium, 218e). "To the seen eye they now began to seem
foul, for they were losing the fairest bloom from their precious
treasure, but to such who could not see the truly happy life, they
would appear fair and blessed" (Critias, 121b). They were losing their
virtuous souls, their virtue by which they could prove themselves to
be worthy of preservation as a great nation. Racked by the selfish
passions of greed and envy, they forfeited their conception of the
right order. Their benevolence, the desire to do good, ceased. "Man
and city are alike," Plato claims (Republic, 577d). Humans without
souls are hollow. Cities without virtue are rotten. To those who
cannot see clearly they may look glorious but what appears bright is
only exterior. To see clearly what is visible, the political world out
there, Plato argues, one has first to perceive what is invisible but
intelligible, the soul. One has to know oneself. Humans are immortal
souls, he claims, and not just independent variables. They are often
egoistic, but the divine element in them makes them more than mere
animals. Friendship, freedom, justice, wisdom, courage, and moderation
are the key values that define a good society based on virtue, which
must be guarded against vice, war, and factionalism. To enjoy true
happiness, humans must remain virtuous and remember God, the perfect
being.
Plato's achievement as a political philosopher may be seen in that he
believed that there could be a body of knowledge whose attainment
would make it possible to heal political problems, such as
factionalism and the corruption of morals, which can bring a city to a
decline. The doctrine of the harmony of interests, fairness as the
basis of the best political order, the mixed constitution, the rule of
law, the distinction between good and deviated forms of government,
practical wisdom as the quality of good leadership, and the importance
of virtue and transcendence for politics are the political ideas that
can rightly be associated with Plato. They have profoundly influenced
subsequent political thinkers.
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