century philosophy. A second use of "phenomenology" common in
contemporary philosophy names a property of some mental states, the
property they have if and only if there is something it is like to be
in them. Thus, it is sometimes said that emotional states have a
phenomenology while belief states do not. For example, while there is
something it is like to be angry, there is nothing it is like to
believe that Paris is in France. Although the two uses of
"phenomenology" are related, it is the first which is the current
topic. Accordingly, "phenomenological" refers to a way of doing
philosophy that is more or less closely related to the corresponding
movement. Phenomenology utilizes a distinctive method to study the
structural features of experience and of things as experienced. It is
primarily a descriptive discipline and is undertaken in a way that is
largely independent of scientific, including causal, explanations and
accounts of the nature of experience. Topics discussed within the
phenomenological tradition include the nature of intentionality,
perception, time-consciousness, self-consciousness, awareness of the
body and consciousness of others. Phenomenology is to be distinguished
from phenomenalism, a position in epistemology which implies that all
statements about physical objects are synonymous with statements about
persons having certain sensations or sense-data. George Berkeley was a
phenomenalist but not a phenomenologist.
Although elements of the twentieth century phenomenological movement
can be found in earlier philosophers—such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant
and Franz Brentano—phenomenology as a philosophical movement really
began with the work of Edmund Husserl. Following Husserl,
phenomenology was adapted, broadened and extended by, amongst others,
Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel
Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Phenomenology has, at one time or
another, been aligned with Kantian and post-Kantian transcendental
philosophy, existentialism and the philosophy of mind and psychology.
This article introduces some of the central aspects of the
phenomenological method and also concrete phenomenological analyses of
some of the topics that have greatly exercised phenomenologists.
1. Introduction
The work often considered to constitute the birth of phenomenology is
Husserl's Logical Investigations (Husserl 2001). It contains Husserl's
celebrated attack on psychologism, the view that logic can be reduced
to psychology; an account of phenomenology as the descriptive study of
the structural features of the varieties of experience; and a number
of concrete phenomenological analyses, including those of meaning,
part-whole relations and intentionality.
Logical Investigations seemed to pursue its agenda against a backdrop
of metaphysical realism. In Ideas I (Husserl 1982), however, Husserl
presented phenomenology as a form of transcendental idealism. This
apparent move was greeted with hostility from some early admirers of
Logical Investigations, such as Adolph Reinach. However, Husserl later
claimed that he had always intended to be a transcendental idealist.
In Ideas I Husserl offered a more nuanced account of the
intentionality of consciousness, of the distinction between fact and
essence and of the phenomenological as opposed to the natural
attitude.
Heidegger was an assistant to Husserl who took phenomenology in a
rather new direction. He married Husserl's concern for legitimating
concepts through phenomenological description with an overriding
interest in the question of the meaning of being, referring to his own
phenomenological investigations as "fundamental ontology." His Being
and Time (Heidegger 1962) is one of the most influential texts on the
development of European philosophy in the Twentieth Century. Relations
between Husserl and Heidegger became strained, partly due to the
divisive issue of National Socialism, but also due to significant
philosophical differences. Thus, unlike his early works, Heidegger's
later philosophy bears little relation to classical Husserlian
phenomenology.
Although he published relatively little in his lifetime, Husserl was a
prolific writer leaving a large number of manuscripts. Alongside
Heidegger's interpretation of phenomenology, this unpublished work had
a decisive influence on the development of French existentialist
phenomenology. Taking its lead from Heidegger's account of authentic
existence, Sartre's Being and Nothingness (Sartre 1969) developed a
phenomenological account of consciousness, freedom and concrete human
relations that perhaps defines the term "existentialism."
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty 1962) is
distinctive both in the central role it accords to the body and in the
attention paid to the relations between phenomenology and empirical
psychology.
Although none of the philosophers mentioned above can be thought of
straightforwardly as classical Husserlian phenomenologists, in each
case Husserl sets the phenomenological agenda. This remains the case,
with a great deal of the contemporary interest in both
phenomenological methodology and phenomenological topics drawing
inspiration from Husserl's work. Accordingly, Husserl's views are the
touchstone in the following discussion of the topics, methods and
significance of phenomenology.
2. Phenomenological Method
Husserlian phenomenology is a discipline to be undertaken according to
a strict method. This method incorporates both the phenomenological
and eidetic reductions.
a. Phenomena
Phenomenology is, as the word suggests, the science of phenomena. But
this just raises the questions: "What are phenomena?" and "In what
sense is phenomenology a science?".
In answering the first question, it is useful to briefly turn to Kant.
Kant endorsed "transcendental idealism," distinguishing between
phenomena (things as they appear) and noumena (things as they are in
themselves), claiming that we can only know about the former (Kant
1929, A30/B45). On one reading of Kant, appearances are in the mind,
mental states of subjects. On another reading, appearances are things
as they appear, worldly objects considered in a certain way.
Both of these understandings of the nature of phenomena can be found
in the phenomenological literature. However, the most common view is
that all of the major phenomenologists construe phenomena in the
latter way: phenomena are things as they appear. They are not mental
states but worldly things considered in a certain way. The
Phenomenologists tend, however, to reject Kantian noumena. Also,
importantly, it is not to be assumed that the relevant notion of
appearing is limited to sensory experience. Experience (or intuition)
can indeed be sensory but can, at least by Husserl's lights, be
understood to encompass a much broader range of phenomena (Husserl
2001, sec. 52). Thus, for example, although not objects of sensory
experience, phenomenology can offer an account of how the number
series is given to intuition.
Phenomenology, then, is the study of things as they appear
(phenomena). It is also often said to be descriptive rather than
explanatory: a central task of phenomenology is to provide a clear,
undistorted description of the ways things appear (Husserl 1982, sec.
75). This can be distinguished from the project of giving, for
example, causal or evolutionary explanations, which would be the job
of the natural sciences.
b. Phenomenological Reduction
In ordinary waking experience we take it for granted that the world
around us exists independently of both us and our consciousness of it.
This might be put by saying that we share an implicit belief in the
independent existence of the world, and that this belief permeates and
informs our everyday experience. Husserl refers to this positing of
the world and entities within it as things which transcend our
experience of them as "the natural attitude" (Husserl 1982, sec. 30).
In The Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl introduces what he there refers
to as "the epistemological reduction," according to which we are asked
to supply this positing of a transcendent world with "an index of
indifference" (Husserl 1999, 30). In Ideas I, this becomes the
"phenomenological epoché," according to which, "We put out of action
the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural
attitude; we parenthesize everything which that positing encompasses
with respect to being" (Husserl 1982, sec. 32). This means that all
judgements that posit the independent existence of the world or
worldly entities, and all judgements that presuppose such judgements,
are to be bracketed and no use is to be made of them in the course of
engaging in phenomenological analysis. Importantly, Husserl claims
that all of the empirical sciences posit the independent existence of
the world, and so the claims of the sciences must be "put out of play"
with no use being made of them by the phenomenologist.
This epoché is the most important part of the phenomenological
reduction, the purpose of which is to open us up to the world of
phenomena, how it is that the world and the entities within it are
given. The reduction, then, is that which reveals to us the primary
subject matter of phenomenology—the world as given and the givenness
of the world; both objects and acts of consciousness.
There are a number of motivations for the view that phenomenology must
operate within the confines of the phenomenological reduction. One is
epistemological modesty. The subject matter of phenomenology is not
held hostage to skepticism about the reality of the "external" world.
Another is that the reduction allows the phenomenologist to offer a
phenomenological analysis of the natural attitude itself. This is
especially important if, as Husserl claims, the natural attitude is
one of the presuppositions of scientific enquiry. Finally, there is
the question of the purity of phenomenological description. It is
possible that the implicit belief in the independent existence of the
world will affect what we are likely to accept as an accurate
description of the ways in which worldly things are given in
experience. We may find ourselves describing things as "we know they
must be" rather than how they are actually given.
The reduction, in part, enables the phenomenologist to go "back to the
'things themselves'"(Husserl 2001, 168), meaning back to the ways that
things are actually given in experience. Indeed, it is precisely here,
in the realm of phenomena, that Husserl believes we will find that
indubitable evidence that will ultimately serve as the foundation for
every scientific discipline. As such, it is vital that we are able to
look beyond the prejudices of common sense realism, and accept things
as actually given. It is in this context that Husserl presents his
Principle of All Principles which states that, "every originary
presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that
everything originally (so to speak, in its 'personal' actuality)
offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is
presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is
presented there" (Husserl 1982, sec. 24).
c. Eidetic Reduction
The results of phenomenology are not intended to be a collection of
particular facts about consciousness, but are rather supposed to be
facts about the essential natures of phenomena and their modes of
givenness. Phenomenologists do not merely aspire to offer accounts of
what their own experiences of, say, material objects are like, but
rather accounts of the essential features of material object
perception as such. But how is this aspiration to be realized given
that the method of phenomenology is descriptive, consisting in the
careful description of experience? Doesn't this, necessarily, limit
phenomenological results to facts about particular indviduals'
experience, excluding the possibility of phenomenologically grounded
general facts about experience as such?
The Husserlian answer to this difficulty is that the phenomenologist
must perform a second reduction called "eidetic" reduction (because it
involves a kind of vivid, imagistic intuition). The purpose of the
eidetic reduction in Husserl's writings is to bracket any
considerations concerning the contingent and accidental, and
concentrate on (intuit) the essential natures or essences of the
objects and acts of consciousness (Husserl 1982, sec. 2). This
intuition of essences proceeds via what Husserl calls "free variation
in imagination." We imagine variations on an object and ask, "What
holds up amid such free variations of an original […] as the
invariant, the necessary, universal form, the essential form, without
which something of that kind […] would be altogether inconceivable?"
(Husserl 1977, sec. 9a). We will eventually come up against something
that cannot be varied without destroying that object as an instance of
its kind. The implicit claim here is that if it is inconceivable that
an object of kind K might lack feature F, then F is a part of the
essence of K.
Eidetic intuition is, in short, an a priori method of gaining
knowledge of necessities. However, the result of the eidetic reduction
is not just that we come to knowledge of essences, but that we come to
intuitive knowledge of essences. Essences show themselves to us
(Wesensschau), although not to sensory intuition, but to categorial or
eidetic intuition (Husserl 2001, 292-4). It might be argued that
Husserl's methods here are not so different from the standard methods
of conceptual analysis: imaginative thought experiments (Zahavi 2003,
38-39).
d. Heidegger on Method
It is widely accepted that few of the most significant post-Husserlian
phenomenologists accepted Husserl's prescribed methodology in full.
Although there are numerous important differences between the later
phenomenologists, the influence of Heidegger runs deep.
On the nature of phenomena, Heidegger remarks that "the term
'phenomenon'…signifies 'to show itself'" (Heidegger 1962, sec. 7).
Phenomena are things that show themselves and the phenomenologist
describes them as they show themselves. So, at least on this score
there would appear to be some affinity between Husserl and Heidegger.
However, this is somewhat controversial, with some interpreters
understanding Husserlian phenomena not as things as given, but as
states of the experiencing subject (Carman 2006).
It is commonly held that Heidegger reject's the epoché: "Heidegger
came to the conclusion that any bracketing of the factual world in
phenomenology must be a crucial mistake" (Frede 2006, 56). What
Heidegger says in his early work, however, is that, for him, the
phenomenological reduction has a different sense than it does for
Husserl:
For Husserl, phenomenological reduction… is the method of leading
phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being
whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the
transcendental life of consciousness…. For us phenomenological
reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the
apprehension of a being…to the understanding of the being of this
being.
(Heidegger 1982, 21)
Certainly, Heidegger thinks of the reduction as revealing something
different—the Being of beings. But this is not yet to say that his
philosophy does not engage in bracketing,for we can distinguish
between the reduction itself and its claimed consequences. There is,
however, some reason to think that Heidegger's position is
incompatible with Husserl's account of the phenomenological reduction.
For, on Husserl's account, the reduction is to be applied to the
"general positing" of the natural attitude, that is to a belief. But,
according to Heidegger and those phenomenologists influenced by him
(including both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty), our most fundamental
relation to the world is not cognitive but practical (Heidegger 1962,
sec. 15).
Heidegger's positive account of the methods of phenomenology is
explicit in its ontological agenda. A single question dominates the
whole of Heidegger's philosophy: What is the meaning of being? To
understand this, we can distinguish between beings (entities) and
Being. Heidegger calls this "the ontological difference." According
to Heidegger, "ontology is the science of Being. But Being is always
the being of a being. Being is essentially different from a being,
from beings…We call it the ontological difference—the differentiation
between Being and beings" (Heidegger 1982, 17). Tables, chairs,
people, theories, numbers and universals are all beings. But they all
have being, they all are. An understanding at the level of beings is
"ontical," an understanding at the level of being is "ontological".
Every being has being, but what does it mean to say of some being that
it is? Might it be that what it means to say that something is differs
depending on what sort of thing we are talking about? Do tables,
people, numbers have being in the same way? Is there such a thing as
the meaning of being in general? The task is, for each sort of being,
to give an account of the structural features of its way of Being,
"Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of being, of
being's structure and its possibilities" (Heidegger 1982, 11).
According to Heidegger, we have a "pre-ontological" understanding of
being: "We are able to grasp beings as such, as beings, only if we
understand something like being. If we did not understand, even though
at first roughly and without conceptual comprehension, what actuality
signifies, then the actual would remain hidden from us…We must
understand being so that we may be able to be given over to a world
that is" (Heidegger 1982, 10-11). Our understanding of being is
manifested in our "comportment towards beings" (Heidegger 1982, 16).
Comportment is activity, action or behaviour. Thus, the understanding
that we have of the Being of beings can be manifested in our acting
with them. One's understanding of the being of toothbrushes, for
example, is manifested in one's capacity for utilizing toothbrushes.
Understanding need not be explicit, nor able to be articulated
conceptually. It is often embodied in "know-how." This is the sense,
on Heidegger's account, that our most fundamental relation to the
world is practical rather than cognitive. It is this that poses a
challenge to the phenomenological reduction.
Heidegger's relation to the eidetic reduction is complex. The purpose
of the eidetic reduction in Husserl's writings is to bracket any
considerations concerning the contingent and accidental, and
concentrate on (intuit) the essential natures of the objects and acts
of consciousness. Heidegger's concentration on the meaning of the
Being of entities appears similar in aim. However, insofar as the
Being of entities relies on the notion of essence, Heidegger's project
calls it into question. The idea that there are different "ways of
being" looks as though it does not abide by the traditional
distinction between existence and essence. So, on Heidegger's account,
what it takes for something to have being is different for different
sorts of thing.
3. Intentionality
How is it that subjective mental processes (perceptions, thoughts,
etc.) are able to reach beyond the subject and open us up to an
objective world of both worldly entities and meanings? This question
is one that occupied Husserl perhaps more than any other, and his
account of the intentionality of consciousness is central to his
attempted answer.
Intentionality is one of the central concepts of Phenomenology from
Husserl onwards. As a first approximation, intentionality is aboutness
or directedness as exemplified by mental states. For example, the
belief that The Smiths were from Manchester is about both Manchester
and The Smiths. One can also hope, desire, fear, remember, etc. that
the Smiths were from Manchester.
Intentionality is, say many, the way that subjects are "in touch with"
the world. Two points of terminology are worth noting. First, in
contemporary non-phenomenological debates, "intentional" and its
cognates is often used interchangeably with "representational" and its
cognates. Second, although they are related, "intentionality" (with a
"t") is not to be confused with "intensionality" (with an "s"). The
former refers to aboutness (which is the current topic), the latter
refers to failure of truth-preservation after substitution of
co-referring terms.
a. Brentano and Intentional Inexistence
Franz Brentano, Husserl's one time teacher, is the origin of the
contemporary debate about intentionality. He famously, and
influentially claimed:
Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics
of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of
an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously,
reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to
be understood here as meaning a thing) or immanent objectivity. Every
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although
they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation, something is
presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.
(Brentano 1995, 88)
Brentano thought that all and only psychological states exhibit
intentionality, and that in this way the subject matter of psychology
could be demarcated. His, early and notorious, doctrine of intentional
inexistence maintains that the object of an intentional state is
literally a part of the state itself, and is, therefore, an "immanent"
psychological entity. This position is based on Brentano's adherence
to (something like) the first interpretation of the Kantian notion of
phenomena mentioned above (Crane 2006).
b. Husserl's Account in Logical Investigations
Since phenomenology is descriptive, Husserl's aim is to describe
(rather than explain or reduce) intentionality. Husserl differs from
Brentano in that he thinks that, apart from some special cases, the
object of an intentional act is a transcendent object. That is, the
object of an intentional act is external to the act itself (Husserl
2001, 126-7) (Husserl's "acts" are not to be thought of as actions, or
even as active. For example, on Husserl's view, a visual experience is
a conscious act (Husserl 2001, 102)). The object of the belief that
Paris is the capital of France is Paris (and France). This is in
keeping with the suggestion above that when phenomenologists describe
phenomena, they describe worldly things as they are presented in
conscious acts, not mental entities.
Intentionality is not a relation, but rather an intrinsic feature of
intentional acts. Relations require the existence of their relata (the
things related to one another), but this is not true of intentionality
(conceived as directedness towards a transcendent object). The object
of my belief can fail to exist (if my belief is, for example, about
Father Christmas). On Husserl's picture, every intentional act has an
intentional object, an object that the act is about, but they
certainly needn't all have a real object (Husserl 2001, 127).
Husserl distinguishes between the intentional matter (meaning) of a
conscious act and its intentional quality, which is something akin to
its type (Husserl 2001, 119-22). Something's being a belief, desire,
perception, memory, etc. is its intentional quality. A conscious act's
being about a particular object, taken in a particular way, is its
intentional matter. An individual act has a meaning that specifies an
object. It is important to keep these three distinct. To see that the
latter two are different, note that two intentional matters (meanings)
can say the same thing of the same object, if they do it in a
different way. Compare: Morrissey wrote "I know it's Over," and The
lead singer of the Smiths wrote the second track on The Queen is Dead.
To see that the first two (act and meaning) are distinct, on Husserl's
view, meanings are ideal (that is, not spatio-temporal), and therefore
transcend the acts that have them (Husserl 2001, 120). However,
intentional acts concretely instantiate them. In this way,
psychological subjects come into contact with both ideal meaning and
the worldly entities meant.
c. Husserl's Account in Ideas I
In his Ideas I, Husserl introduced a new terminology to describe the
structure of intentionality. He distinguished between the noesis and
the noema, and he claimed that phenomenology involved both noetic and
noematic analysis (Husserl 1982, pt. 3, ch.6). The noesis is the act
of consciousness; this notion roughly corresponds to what Husserl
previously referred to as the "intentional quality." Thus, noetic
analysis looks at the structure of conscious acts and the ways in
which things are consciously intended. The noema is variously
interpreted as either the intentional object as it is intended or the
ideal content of the intentional act. Thus, noematic analysis looks at
the structure of meaning or objects as they are given to
consciousness. Exactly how to interpret Husserl's notions of the noema
and noematic analysis are much debated (Smith 2007, 304-11), and this
debate goes right to the heart of Husserlian phenomenology.
d. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty on Intentionality
On Husserl's view, intentionality is aboutness or directedness as
exemplified by conscious mental acts. Heidegger and, following him,
Merleau-Ponty broaden the notion of intentionality, arguing that it
fails to describe what is in fact the most fundamental form of
intentionality. Heidegger argues:
The usual conception of intentionality…misconstrues the structure
of the self-directedness-toward…. An ego or subject is supposed, to
whose so-called sphere intentional experiences are then supposed to
belong…. [T]he mode of being of our own self, the Dasein, is
essentially such that this being, so far as it is, is always already
dwelling with the extant. The idea of a subject which has intentional
experiences merely inside its own sphere and is not yet outside it but
encapsulated within itself is an absurdity.
(Heidegger 1982, 63-4)
Heidegger introduces the notion of comportment as a meaningful
directedness towards the world that is, nevertheless, more primitive
than the conceptually structured intentionality of conscious acts,
described by Husserl (Heidegger 1982, 64). Comportment is an implicit
openness to the world that continually operates in our habitual
dealings with the world. As Heidegger puts it, we are "always already
dwelling with the extant".
Heidegger's account of comportment is related to his distinction, in
Being and Time, between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand.
These describe two ways of being of worldly entities. We are aware of
things as present-at-hand, or occurrent, through what we can call the
"theoretical attitude." Presence-at-hand is the way of being of
things—entities with determinate properties.
Thus, a hammer, seen through the detached contemplation of the
theoretical attitude, is a material thing with the property of
hardness, woodenness etc. This is to be contrasted with the
ready-to-hand. In our average day-to-day comportments, Dasein
encounters equipment as ready-to-hand,
"The kind of Being which equipment possesses – in which it manifests
itself in its own right – we call 'readiness-to-hand'" (Heidegger
1962, sec. 15). Equipment shows itself as that which is in-order-to,
that is, as that which is for something. A pen is equipment for
writing, a fork is equipment for eating, the wind is equipment for
sailing, etc. Equipment is ready-to-hand, and this means that it is
ready to use, handy, or available. The readiness-to-hand of equipment
is its manipulability in our dealings with it.
A ready-to-hand hammer has various properties, including
Being-the-perfect-size-for-the-job-at-hand. Heidegger claims that
these "dealings" with "equipment" have their own particular kind of
"sight": "[W]hen we deal with them [equipment] by using them and
manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own
kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided… the sight with
which they thus accommodate themselves is circumspection" (Heidegger
1962, sec. 15). Circumspection is the way in which we are aware of the
ready-to-hand. It is the kind of awareness that we have of "equipment"
when we are using it but are not explicitly concentrating on it or
contemplating it, when it recedes. For example, in driving, one is not
explicitly aware of the wheel. Rather, one knowledgeably use it; one
has "know how." Thus, circumspection is the name of our mode of
awareness of the ready-to-hand entities with which Dasein comports in
what, on Heidegger's view, is the most fundamental mode of
intentionality.
Merleau-Ponty's account of intentionality introduces, more explicitly
than does Heidegger's, the role of the body in intentionality. His
account of "motor intentionality" treats bodily activities, and not
just conscious acts in the Husserlian sense, as themselves
intentional. Much like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty describes habitual,
bodily activity as a directedness towards worldly entities that are
for something, what he calls "a set of manipulanda" (Merleau-Ponty
1962, 105). Again, like Heidegger, he argues that motor intentionality
is a basic phenomenon, not to be understood in terms of the
conceptually articulated intentionality of conscious acts, as
described by Husserl. As Merleau-Ponty says, "it is the body which
'catches' and 'comprehends movement'. The acquisition of a habit is
indeed the grasping of a significance, but it is the motor grasping or
a motor significance" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 142-3). And again, "it is
the body which 'understands'" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 144).
4. Phenomenology of Perception
Perceptual experience is one of the perennial topics of
phenomenological research. Husserl devotes a great deal of attention
to perception, and his views have been very influential. We will
concentrate, as does Husserl, on the visual perception of three
dimensional spatial objects. To understand Husserl's view, some
background will be helpful.
a. Naïve Realism, Indirect Realism and Phenomenalism
We ordinarily think of perception as a relation between ourselves and
things in the world. We think of perceptual experience as involving
the presentation of three dimensional spatio-temporal objects and
their properties. But this view, sometimes known as naïve realism, has
not been the dominant view within the history of modern philosophy.
Various arguments have been put forward in an attempt to show that it
cannot be correct. The following is just one such:
1. If one hallucinates a red tomato, then one is aware of something red.
2. What one is aware of cannot be a red tomato (because there isn't
one); it must be a private, subjective entity (call this a sense
datum).
3. It is possible to hallucinate a red tomato while being in
exactly the same bodily states as one would be in if one were seeing a
red tomato.
4. What mental/experiential states people are in are determined by
what bodily states they are in.
5. So: When one sees a red tomato, what one is (directly) aware of
cannot be a red tomato but must be a private, subjective entity (a
sense datum).
The conclusion of this argument is incompatible with naïve realism.
Once naïve realism is rejected, and it is accepted that perception is
a relation, not to an ordinary worldly object, but to a private mental
object, something must be said about the relation between these two
types of object. An indirect realist view holds that there really are
both kinds of object. Worldly objects both cause and are represented
by sense data. However, this has often been thought to lead to a
troubling skepticism regarding ordinary physical objects: one could be
experiencing exactly the same sense data, even if there were no
ordinary physical objects causing one to experience them. That is, as
far as one's perceptual experience goes, one could be undergoing one
prolonged hallucination. So, for all one knows, there are no ordinary
physical objects.
Some versions of a view known as phenomenalism answer this skeptical
worry by maintaining that ordinary physical objects are nothing more
than logical constructions out of (collections of) actual and possible
sense data. The standard phenomenalist claim is that statements about
ordinary physical objects can be translated into statements that refer
only to experiences (Ayer 1946). A phenomenalist might claim that the
physical object statement "there is a white sheep in the kitchen"
could be analysed as "if one were to currently be experiencing
sense-data as of the inside of the kitchen, then one would experience
a white, sheep-shaped sense-datum." Of course, the above example is
certainly not adequate. First, it includes the unanalysed physical
object term "kitchen." Second, one might see the kitchen but not the
sheep. Nevertheless, the phenomenalist is committed to the claim that
there is some adequate translation into statements that refer only to
experiences.
b. Husserl's Account: Intentionality and Hyle
However, another route out of the argument from hallucination is
possible. This involves the denial that when one suffers a
hallucination there is some object of which one is aware. That is, one
denies premise 1 of the argument. Intentional theories of perception
deny that perceptual experience is a relation to an object. Rather,
perception is characterised by intentionality. The possibility of
hallucinations is accounted for by the fact that my perceptual
intentions can be inaccurate or "non-veridical." When one hallucinates
a red tomato, one "perceptually intends" a red tomato, but there is
none. One's conscious experience has an intentional object, but not a
real one.
This, of course, is the fundamental orientation of Husserl's view. In
sensory perception we are intentionally directed toward a transcendent
object. We enjoy, "concrete intentive mental processes called
perceivings of physical things" (Husserl 1982, sec. 41). Further,
Husserl takes this view to be consistent with the intuition that in
part drives naïve realism, that in perception we are aware of
three-dimensional physical things, not subjective mental
representations of them. As Husserl writes, "The spatial physical
thing which we see is, with all its transcendence, still something
perceived, given 'in person' in the manner peculiar to consciousness"
(Husserl 1982, sec. 43). If the intentional account of perceptual
experience is correct, we can agree that naïve realism is false while
avoiding the postulation of private sense data.
But if perceiving is characterised by intentionality, what
distinguishes it from other intentional phenomena, such as believing?
What is the difference between seeing that there is a cat on the mat
and believing that there is a cat on the mat? Part of Husserl's answer
to this is that perception has a sensory character. As one commentary
puts it, "The authentic appearance of an object of perception is the
intentional act inasmuch and to the extent that this act is interwoven
with corresponding sensational data" (Bernet, Kern, and Marbach 1993,
118). The "sensational data" (also called hyle) are non-intentional,
purely sensory aspects of experience. Sensory data are, on Husserl's
account, "animated" by intentions, which "interpret" them (Husserl
1982, 85). Thus, although perception is an intentional phenomenon, it
is not purely intentional; it also has non-intentional, sensory
qualities. In contemporary debates over intentionality and
consciousness, those who believe that experiences have such
non-intentional qualities are sometimes said to believe in qualia.
c. Husserl's Account: Internal and External Horizons
When we visually perceive a three-dimensional, spatial object, we see
it from one particular perspective. This means that we see one of its
sides at the expense of the others (and its insides). We see a
profile, aspect or, as Husserl puts it, "adumbration." Should we
conclude from this that the other sides of the object are not visually
present? Husserl thinks not, claiming that a more phenomenologically
adequate description of the experience would maintain that, "Of
necessity a physical thing can be given only 'one-sidedly;'… A
physical thing is necessarily given in mere 'modes of appearance' in
which necessarily a core of 'what is actually presented' is
apprehended as being surrounded by a horizon of 'co-givenness'"
(Husserl 1982, sec. 44).
Husserl refers to that which is co-given as a "horizon,"
distinguishing between the internal and external horizons of a
perceived object (Husserl 1973, sec. 8). The internal horizon of an
experience includes those aspects of the object (rear aspect and
insides) that are co-given. The external horizon includes those
objects other than those presented that are co-given as part of the
surrounding environment. In visual experience we are intentionally
directed towards the object as a whole, but its different aspects are
given in different ways.
Husserl often uses the term "anticipation" to describe the way in
which the merely co-presented is present in perceptual experience. As
he says, "there belongs to every external perception its reference
from the 'genuinely perceived' sides of the object of perception to
the sides 'also meant'—not yet perceived, but only anticipated and,
at first, with a non-intuitional emptiness… the perception has
horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions
that we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception
otherwise" (Husserl 1960, sec. 19). In these terms, only the front
aspect of an object is "genuinely perceived." Its other features (rear
aspect and insides) are also visually present, but by way of being
anticipated. This anticipation consists, in part, in expectations of
how the object will appear in subsequent experiences. These
anticipations count as genuinely perceptual, but they lack the
"intuitional fullness" of the fully presented. The non-intuitional
emptiness of the merely co-given can be brought into intuitional
fullness precisely by making the previously co-given rear aspect fully
present, say, by moving around the object. Perceptual anticipations
have an "if…then…" structure, that is, a perceptual experience of an
object is partly constituted by expectations of how it would look were
one to see it from another vantage point.
d. Husserl and Phenomenalism
Above, phenomenalism was characterised in two ways. On one, the view
is that ordinary physical objects are nothing more than logical
constructions out of (collections of) actual and possible sense data.
One the other, the view is that statements about ordinary physical
objects can be translated into statements that refer only to
experiences. But, in fact, these views are not equivalent. The first,
but not the second, is committed to the existence of sense data.
Husserl's intentional account of perception does not postulate sense
data, so he is not a phenomenalist of the first sort. However, there
is some reason to believe that he may be a phenomenalist of the second
sort. Concerning unperceived objects, Husserl writes:
That the unperceived physical thing "is there" means rather that,
from my actually present perceptions, with the actually appearing
background field, possible and, moreover, continuously-harmoniously
motivated perception-sequences, with ever new fields of physical
things (as unheeded backgrounds) lead to those concatenations of
perceptions in which the physical thing in question would make its
appearance and become seized upon.
(Husserl 1982, sec. 46)
Here Husserl seems to be claiming that what it is for there to be a
currently unperceived object is for one to have various things given,
various things co-given and various possibilities of givenness. That
is, he appears to endorse something that looks rather like the second
form of phenomenalism—the view that statements about physical objects
can be translated into statements that only make reference to actual
and possible appearances. Thus, there is some reason to think that
Husserl may be a phenomenalist, even though he rejects the view that
perceptual experience is a relation to a private, subjective sense
datum.
e. Sartre Against Sensation
Sartre accepts, at least in broad outline, Husserl's view of
intentionality (although he steers clear of Husserl's intricate
detail). Intentionality, which Sartre agrees is characteristic of
consciousness, is directedness toward worldly objects and, importantly
for Sartre, it is nothing more than this. He writes, "All at once
consciousness is purified, it is clear as a strong wind. There is
nothing in it but a movement of fleeing itself, a sliding beyond
itself" (Sartre 1970, 4). Consciousness is nothing but a directedness
elsewhere, towards the world. Sartre's claim that consciousness is
empty means that there are no objects or qualities in consciousness.
So, worldly objects are not in consciousness; sense data are not in
consciousness; qualia are not in consciousness; the ego is not in
consciousness. In so far as these things exist, they are presented to
consciousness. Consciousness is nothing more than directedness toward
the world. Thus, Sartre rejects Husserl's non-intentional, purely
sensory qualities.
A test case for Sartre's view concerning the emptiness of
consciousness is that of bodily sensation (for example, pain). A long
tradition has held that bodily sensations, such as pain, are
non-intentional, purely subjective qualities (Jackson 1977, chap. 3).
Sartre is committed to rejecting this view. However, the most obvious
thing with which to replace it is the view according to which bodily
sensations are perceptions of the body as painful, or ticklish, etc.
On such a perceptual view, pains are experienced as located properties
of an object—one's body. However, Sartre also rejects the idea that
when one is aware of one's body as subject (and being aware of
something as having pains is a good candidate for this), one is not
aware of it as an object (Sartre 1969, 327). Thus, Sartre is committed
to rejecting the perceptual view of bodily sensations.
In place of either of these views, Sartre proposes an account of pains
according to which they are perceptions of the world. He offers the
following example:
My eyes are hurting but I should finish reading a philosophical
work this evening…how is the pain given as pain in the eyes? Is there
not here an intentional reference to a transcendent object, to my body
precisely in so far as it exists outside in the world? [...] [P]ain is
totally void of intentionality…. Pain is precisely the eyes in so far
as consciousness "exists them"…. It is the-eyes-as-pain or
vision-as-pain; it is not distinguished from my way of apprehending
transcendent words.
(Sartre 1969, 356)
Bodily sensations are not given to unreflective consciousness as
located in the body. They are indicated by the way objects appear.
Having a pain in the eyes amounts to the fact that, when reading, "It
is with more difficulty that the words are detached from the
undifferentiated ground" (Sartre 1969, 356). What we might intuitively
think of as an awareness of a pain in a particular part of the body is
nothing more than an awareness of the world as presenting some
characteristic difficulty. A pain in the eyes becomes an experience of
the words one is reading becoming indistinct, a pain in the foot might
become an experience of one's shoes as uncomfortable.
5. Phenomenology and the Self
There are a number of philosophical views concerning both the nature
of the self and any distinctive awareness we may have of it. Husserl's
views on the self, or ego, are best understood in relation to well
known discussions by Hume and Kant. Phenomenological discussions of
the self and self-awareness cannot be divorced from issues concerning
the unity of consciousness.
a. Hume and the Unity of Consciousness
Hume's account of the self and self-awareness includes one of the most
famous quotations in the history of philosophy. He wrote:
There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment
intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its
existence and its continuance in existence…. For my part, when I enter
most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some
particular perception or other, or heat or cold, light or shade, love
or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time
without a perception, and never can observe anything but the
perception.
(Hume 1978, 251-2)
Hume claims that reflection does not reveal a continuously existing
self. Rather, all that reflection reveals is a constantly changing
stream of mental states. In Humean terms, there is no impression of
self and, as a consequence of his empiricism, the idea that we have of
ourselves is rendered problematic. The concept self is not one which
can be uncritically appealed to.
However, as Hume recognized, this appears to leave him with a problem,
a problem to which he could not see the answer: "…all my hopes vanish
when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive
perceptions in our thought or consciousness" (Hume 1978, 635-6). This
problem concerns the unity of consciousness. In fact there are at
least two problems of conscious unity.
The first problem concerns the synchronic unity of consciousness and
the distinction between subjects of experience. Consider four
simultaneous experiences: e1, e2, e3 and e4. What makes it the case
that, say, e1 and e2 are experiences had by one subject, A, while e3
and e4 are experiences had by another subject, B? One simple answer is
that there is a relation that we could call ownership such that A
bears ownership to both e1 and e2, and B bears ownership to both e3
and e4. However if, with Hume, we find the idea of the self
problematic, we are bound to find the idea of ownership problematic.
For what but the self could it be that owns the various experiences?
The second problem concerns diachronic unity. Consider four successive
conscious experiences, e1, e2, e3 and e4, putatively had by one
subject, A. What makes it the case that there is just one subject
successively enjoying these experiences? That is, what makes the
difference between a temporally extended stream of conscious
experience and merely a succession of experiences lacking any
experienced unity? An answer to this must provide a relation that
somehow accounts for the experienced unity of conscious experience
through time.
So, what is it for two experiences, e1 and e2, to belong to the same
continuous stream of consciousness? One thought is that e1 and e2 must
be united, or synthesised, by the self. On this view, the self must be
aware of both e1 and e2 and must bring them together in one broader
experience that encompasses them. If this is right then, without the
self to unify my various experiences, there would be no continuous
stream of conscious experience, just one experience after another
lacking experiential unity. But our experience is evidently not like
this. If the unity of consciousness requires the unifying power of the
self, then Hume's denial of self-awareness, and any consequent doubts
concerning the legitimacy of the idea of the self, are deeply
problematic.
b. Kant and the Transcendental I
Kant's view of these matters is complex. However, at one level, he can
be seen to agree with Hume on the question of self-awareness while
disagreeing with him concerning the legitimacy of the concept of the
self. His solution to the two problems of the unity of concious is, as
above, that diverse experiences are unified by me. He writes:
The thought that these representations given in intuition all
together belong to me means, accordingly, the same as that I unite
them in a self-consciousness, or at least can unite them therein…for
otherwise I would have as multicoloured, diverse a self as I have
representations of which I am conscious.
(Kant 1929, sec. B143)
Thus, Kant requires that the notion of the self as unifier of
experience be legitimate. Nevertheless, he denies that reflection
reveals this self to direct intuition:
…this identity of the subject, of which I can be conscious in all
my representations, does not concern any intuition of the subject,
whereby it is given as an object, and cannot therefore signify the
identity of the person, if by that is understood the consciousness of
the identity of one's own substance, as a thinking being, in all
change of its states.
(Kant 1929, sec. B408)
The reason that Kant can allow the self as a legitimate concept
despite the lack of an intuitive awareness of the self is that he does
not accept the empiricism that drove Hume's account. On the Kantian
view, it is legitimate to appeal to an I that unifies experience since
such a thing is precisely a condition of the possibility of
experience. Without such a unifying self, experience would not be
possible, therefore the concept is legitimate. The I, on this account,
is transcendental—it is brought into the account as a condition of the
possibility of experience (this move is one of the distinctive
features of Kantian transcendental philosophy).
c. Husserl and the Transcendental Ego
Husserl's views on the self evolved over his philosophical career. In
Logical Investigations, he accepted something like the Humean view
(Husserl 2001, 91-3), and did not appear to find overly problematic
the resulting questions concerning the unity of consciousness.
However, by the time of Ideas I, he had altered his view. There he
wrote that, "all mental processes…as belonging to the one stream of
mental processes which is mine, must admit of becoming converted into
actional cogitationes…In Kant's words, 'The 'I think' must be capable
to accompanying all my presentations.'" (Husserl 1982, sec. 57). Thus,
Husserl offers an account of unity that appeals to the self
functioning transcendentally, as a condition of the possibility of
experience.
However, Husserl departs from Kant, and before him Hume, in claiming
that this self is experienced in direct intuition. He claims that, "I
exist for myself and am constantly given to myself, by experiential
evidence, as 'I myself.' This is true of the transcendental ego and,
correspondingly, of the psychologically pure ego; it is true,
moreover, with respect to any sense of the word ego." (Husserl 1960,
sec. 33).
On Kant's view, the I is purely formal, playing a role in structuring
experience but not itself given in experience. On Husserl's view, the
I plays this structuring role, but is also given in inner experience.
The ego appears but not as (part of) a mental process. It's presence
is continual and unchanging. Husserl says that it is, "a transcendency
within immanency" (Husserl 1982, sec. 57). It is immanent in that it
is on the subject side of experience; It is transcendent in that it is
not an experience (or part of one). What Husserl has in mind here is
somewhat unclear, but one might liken it to the way that the object as
a whole is given through an aspect—except that the ego is at "the
other end" of intentional experience.
d. Sartre and the Transcendent Ego
Sartre's view that consciousness is empty involves the denial not only
of sensory qualities but also of the view that we are experientially
aware of an ego within consciousness. Sartre denies that the ego is
given in pre-reflective experience, either in the content of
experience (as an object) or as a structural feature of the experience
itself (as a subject). As he puts it, "while I was reading, there was
consciousness of the book, of the heroes of the novel, but the I was
not inhabiting this consciousness. It was only consciousness of the
object and non-positional consciousness of itself" (Sartre 1960,
46-7). Again, "When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time,
when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no I."
(Sartre 1960, 48-9).
Here Sartre appears to be siding with Hume and Kant on the question of
the givenness of the self with respect to everyday, pre-reflective
consciousness. However, Sartre departs from the Humean view, in that
he allows that the ego is given in reflective consciousness:
…the I never appears except on the occasion of a reflexive act. In
this case, the complex structure of consciousness is as follows: there
is an unreflected act of reflection, without an I, which is directed
on a reflected consciousness. The latter becomes the object of the
reflecting consciousness without ceasing to affirm its own object (a
chair, a mathematical truth, etc.). At the same time, a new object
appears which is the occasion of an affirmation by reflective
consciousness…This transcendent object of the reflective act is the I.
(Sartre 1960, 53)
On this view, the self can appear to consciousness, but it is
paradoxically experienced as something outside of, transcendent to,
consciousness. Hence the transcendence of the ego, Sartre's title.
With respect to unreflective consciousness, however, Sartre denies
self-awareness. Sartre also denies that the ego is required to
synthesise, or unite, one's various experiences. Rather, as he sees
it, the unity of consciousness is achieved via the objects of
experience, and via the temporal structure of experience. Although his
explanation is somewhat sketchy, his intent is clear:
…it is certain that phenomenology does not need to appeal to any
such unifying and individualizing I…The object is transcendent to the
consciousness which grasps it, and it is in the object that the unity
of the consciousness is found…It is consciousness which unifies
itself, concretely, by a play of "transversal" intentionalities which
are concrete and real retentions of past consciousnesses. Thus
consciousness refers perpetually to itself.
(Sartre 1960, 38-9)
6. Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness
Various questions have occupied phenomenologists concerning
time-consciousness—how our conscious lives take place over time. What
exactly does this amount to? This question can be seen as asking for
more detail concerning the synthesising activity of the self with
respect to the diachronic unity of consciousness. Related to this,
temporal objects (such as melodies or events) have temporal parts or
phases. How is it that the temporal parts of a melody are experienced
as parts of one and the same thing? How is it that we have an
experience of succession, rather than simply a succession of
experiences? This seems an especially hard question to answer if we
endorse the claim that we can only be experientially aware of the
present instant. For if, at time t1 we enjoy experience e1 of object
(or event) o1, and at t2 we enjoy experience e2 of object (or event)
o2, then it seems that we are always experientially confined to the
present. An account is needed of how is it that our experience appears
to stream through time.
a. The Specious Present
When faced with this problem, a popular view has been that we are
simultaneously aware of more than an instant. According to William
James, "the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a
saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit
perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit
of composition of our perception of time is a duration" (James 1981,
609).The doctrine of the specious present holds that we are
experientially aware of a span of time that includes the present and
past (and perhaps even the future). So, at t2 we are aware of the
events that occur at both t2 and t1 (and perhaps also t3).
The specious present is present in the sense that the phases of the
temporal object are experienced as present. The specious present is
specious in that those phases of the temporal object that occur at
times other than the present instant are not really present. But this
would seem to have the bizarre consequence that we experience the
successive phases of a temporal object as simultaneous. That is, a
moving object is simultaneously experienced as being at more than one
place. It goes without saying that this is not phenomenologically
accurate.
Also, given that our experience at each instant would span a duration
longer than that instant, it seems that we would experience everything
more than once. In a sequence of notes c, d, e we would experience c
at the time at which c occurs, and then again at the time at which d
occurs. But, of course, we only experience each note once.
b. Primal Impression, Retention and Protention
Husserl's position is not entirely unlike the specious present view.
He maintains that, at any one instant, one has experience of the phase
occurring at that instant, the phase(s) that has just occurred, and
that phase that is just about to occur. His labels for these three
aspects of experience are "primal impression," "retention" and
"protention." All three must be in place for the proper experience of
a temporal object, or of the duration of a non-temporal object.
The primal impression is an intentional awareness of the present event
as present. Retention is an intentional awareness of the past event as
past. Protention is an intentional awareness of the future event as
about to happen. Each is an intentional directedness towards a
present, past and future event respectively. As Husserl puts matters,
"In each primal phase that originally constitutes the immanent content
we have retentions of the preceding phases and protentions of the
coming phases of precisely this content" (Husserl 1991, sec. 40). The
movement from something's being protended, to its being experienced as
a primal impression, to its being retained, is what accounts for the
continuous stream of experience. Retention and protention form the
temporal horizon against which the present phase is perceived. That
is, the present is perceived as that which follows a past present and
anticipates a future present.
c. Absolute Consciousness
Not only does the present experience include a retention of past
worldly events, it also includes a retention of the past experiences
of those past events. The same can be said with regard to protention.
The fact that past and future experiences are retained and protended
respectively, points towards this question: What accounts for the fact
that mental acts themselves are experienced as enduring, or as having
temporal parts? Do we need to postulate a second level of conscious
acts (call it "consciousness*") that explains the experienced
temporality of immanent objects? But this suggestion looks as though
it would involve us in an infinite regress, since the temporality of
the stream of experiences constituting consciousness* would need to be
accounted for.
Husserl's proposed solution to this puzzle involves his late notion of
"absolute constituting consciousness." The temporality of experiences
is constituted by a consciousness that is not itself temporal. He
writes: "Subjective time becomes constituted in the absolute timeless
consciousness, which is not an object" (Husserl 1991, 117). Further,
"The flow of modes of consciousness is not a process; the
consciousness of the now is not itself now…therefore sensation…and
likewise retention, recollection, perception, etc. are nontemporal;
that is to say, nothing in immanent time." (Husserl 1991, 345-6).
The interpretation of Husserl's notion of absolute constituting
consciousness is not helped by the fact that, despite the non-temporal
nature of absolute consciousness, Husserl describes it in temporal
terms, such as "flow." Indeed, Husserl seems to have thought that here
we have come up against a phenomenon intrinsically problematic to
describe:
Now if we consider the constituting appearances of the
consciousness of internal time we find the following: they form a
flow…. But is not the flow a succession? Does it not have a now, an
actually present phase, and a continuity of pasts which I am now
conscious in retentions? We have no alternative here but to say: the
flow is something we speak of in conformity with what is constituted,
but it is not "something in objective time." It…has the absolute
properties of something to be designated metaphorically as "flow"….
For all of this we have no names. (Husserl 1991, 381-2)
7. Conclusion
Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenology stands in complex
relations to a number of different philosophical traditions, most
notably British empiricism, Kantian and post-Kantian transcendental
philosophy, and French existentialism. One of the most important
philosophical movements of the Twentieth Century, phenomenology has
been influential, not only on so-called "Continental" philosophy
(Embree 2003), but also on so-called "analytic" philosophy (Smith and
Thomasson 2005). There continues to be a great deal of interest in the
history of phenomenology and in the topics discussed by Twentieth
Century phenomenologists, topics such as intentionality, perception,
the self and time-consciousness.
8. References and Further Reading
* Ayer, A. J. 1946. Phenomenalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 47: 163-96
* Bernet, Rudolf, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach. 1993. An
Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology. Evanston, Ill: Northwestern
University Press.
* Brentano, Franz. 1995. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.
Ed. Oskar Kraus. Trans. Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and Linda
L. McAlister. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
* Carman, Taylor. 2006. The Principle of Phenomenology. In The
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles, B. Guignon. 2nd ed.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
* Carman, Taylor. 2008. Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge.
* Cerbone, David R. 2006. Understanding Phenomenology. Chesham: Acumen.
* Crane, T. 2006. Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence.
In The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy, ed. Mark Textor.
London: Routledge.
* Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1991. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on
Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
* Embree, L. 2003. Husserl as Trunk of the American Continental
Tree. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11, no. 2:
177-190.
* Frede, Dorothea. 2006. The Question of Being:Heidegger's
Project. In The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, trans. Charles, B.
Guignon. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
* Gallagher, Shaun, and Dan Zahavi. 2008. The Phenomenological
Mind: An Introduction to Philosophyof Mind and Cognitive Science.
London: Routledge.
* Gennaro, Rocco. 2002. Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of
Consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32, no.3: 293-330.
* Hammond, Michael, Jane Howarth, and Russell Keat. 1991.
Understanding Phenomenology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
* Heidegger, Martin. 1962 [1927]. Being and Time. Trans. John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell.
* Heidegger, Martin. 1982 [1927]. The Basic Problems of
Phenomenology. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
* Hume, David. 1978 [1739-40]. A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. L.
A Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
* Husserl, Edmund. 1960 [1931]. Cartesian Meditations: An
Introduction to Phenomenology. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague:
Nijhoff.
* Husserl, Edmund. 1973 [1939]. Experience and Judgement:
Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press.
* Husserl, Edmund. 1977 [1925]. Phenomenological Psychology:
Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925. Trans. John Scanlon. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff.
* Husserl, Edmund. 1982 [1913]. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Trans. F. Kersten.
The Hague: Nijhoff.
* Husserl, Edmund. 1991 [1893-1917]. On the Phenomenology of the
Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Trans. John B Brough.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
* Husserl, Edmund. 1999 [1907]. The Idea of Phenomenology. Trans.
Lee Hardy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
* Husserl, Edmund. 2001 [1900/1901]. Logical Investigations. Ed.
Dermot Moran. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: Routledge.
* Jackson, Frank. 1977. Perception: A Representative Theory.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
* James, William. 1981 [1890]. The Principles of Psychology.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
* Kant, Immanuel. 1929 [1781/1787]. Critique of Pure Reason.
Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan.
* Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1989 [1945]. Phenomenology of
Perception. Trans. Colin Smith. London: Routledge.
* Moran, Dermot. 2000. Introduction to Phenomenology. London: Routledge.
* Polt, Richard F. H. 1999. Heidegger: An Introduction. London: UCL Press.
* Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1972 [1936-7]. The Transcendence of the Ego:
An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness. New York: Noonday.
* Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1989 [1943]. Being and Nothingness: An Essay
on Phenomenological Ontology. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. London:
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