Friday, September 4, 2009

Origen of Alexandria (185—254 CE)

Origen of Alexandria, one of the greatest Christian theologians, is
famous for composing the seminal work of Christian Neoplatonism, his
treatise On First Principles. Origen lived through a turbulent period
of the Christian Church, when persecution was wide-spread and little
or no doctrinal consensus existed among the various regional churches.
In this environment, Gnosticism flourished, and Origen was the first
truly philosophical thinker to turn his hand not only to a refutation
of Gnosticism, but to offer an alternative Christian system that was
more rigorous and philosophically respectable than the mythological
speculations of the various Gnostic sects. Origen was also an astute
critic of the pagan philosophy of his era, yet he also learned much
from it, and adapted its most useful and edifying teachings to a grand
elucidation of the Christian faith. Porphyry (the illustrious student
of Plotinus), though a tenacious adversary of Christianity,
nevertheless grudgingly admitted Origen's mastery of the Greek
philosophical tradition. Although Origen did go on to compose numerous
biblical commentaries and sermons, his importance for the history of
philosophy rests mainly on two works, the systematic treatise On First
Principles, and his response to the pagan philosopher Celsus' attack
on Christianity, the treatise Against Celsus. Since the purpose of
this article is to introduce students and interested laypersons to the
philosophy of Origen, it will be necessary to focus mainly on the
treatise On First Principles, which is the most systematic and
philosophical of Origen's numerous writings. In this work Origen
establishes his main doctrines, including that of the Holy Trinity
(based upon standard Middle Platonic triadic emanation schemas); the
pre-existence and fall of souls; multiple ages and transmigration of
souls; and the eventual restoration of all souls to a state of dynamic
perfection in proximity to the godhead. He is unique among Platonists
of his era for introducing history into his cosmological and
metaphysical speculations, and his insistence on the absolute freedom
of each and every soul, thereby denying the fatalism that so often
found its way into the more esoteric teachings of the various
philosophical and mystery schools of his day.

1. Origen's Life and Times

Origen was, according to Eusebius, "not quite seventeen" when
Septimius Severus' persecution of the Christians began "in the tenth
year of [his] reign," (Ecclesiastical History; tr. Williamson, p. 179)
which gives the approximate date of Origen's birth as 185/6 C.E. He
died around the reign of Gallus, which places his death in 254/5 C.E.
Origen lived during a turbulent period of the Roman Empire, when the
barbarian invasions were sweeping across Europe, threatening the
stability of the Roman Empire. His was also a time of periodic
persecution against Christians, notably during the reigns of the
Emperors Severus, Maximin, and Decius, so that Origen's life began and
ended with persecution.

His family was devoutly Christian, and likely highly educated; for his
father, who died a martyr, made sure that Origen was schooled not only
in biblical studies, but in Hellenistic education as well. Eusebius
(Ecclesiastical History, tr. Williamson, p. 182) tells us that Origen
was only seventeen when he took over as Headmaster (didaskalos) of the
Christian Catechetical School at Alexandria. He became interested in
Greek philosophy quite early in his life, studying for a while under
Ammonius Saccas (the teacher of Plotinus) and amassing a large
collection of philosophical texts. It is probably around this time
that he began composing On First Principles. However, as he became
ever more devoted to the Christian faith, he sold his library,
abandoning, for a time, any contact with pagan Greek wisdom, though he
would eventually return to secular studies (Greek philosophy), from
which he derived no small measure of inspiration, as Porphyry
(recorded in Eusebius) makes quite clear, as he continued with his
ever more sophisticated elucidation of biblical texts.
2. His Intellectual Heritage: Pagan, Jewish and Christian

Origen's debt to Holy Scripture is obvious; he quotes the bible at
great length, often drawing together seemingly disparate passages to
make a profound theological point. Yet his thought is all the while
informed by his Greek philosophical education, specifically that of
the Middle Platonic tradition, notably the works of the Jewish
Platonist Philo of Alexandria and the Neopythagorean philosopher
Numenius of Apamea (fl. 150-176 C.E.). Origen shares with Philo an
insistence on the free will of the person, a freedom that is direct
evidence of humanity's likeness to God – for, like God's Being, human
existence is free from all necessity. From Numenius, Origen likely
adopted the conception of a "second god" proceeding from a first,
ineffable being called the One, "First God," or Father. Numenius
referred to this "second god" as Demiurge or craftsman, and taught
that he created the cosmos by imitating the intellectual content of
the "First God." Origen applied this basic notion to his doctrine of
Christ, whom he also called Demiurge (Commentary on John 1.22), and
went on to describe Christ as a reflection of the Truth of the Father,
stating that compared to human beings Christ is Truth, but compared to
the Father He is falsehood (Jerome, Epistle 92, quoting Origen; see
also On First Principles 1.2.6).

Another extremely important part of Origen's intellectual heritage is
the concept of apokatastasis or "restoration of all things." This term
first appears, as a philosophical concept, in the writings of the
Stoics, whose materialistic pantheism led them to identify Zeus with
the pure, "craftsmanly" fire pervading and constituting the cosmos.
According to the Stoics, this fire expands and contracts according to
a fixed cycle. They called the contraction a "conflagration"
(ekpurôsis), destroying the cosmos, yet only temporarily. This
contraction was described as Zeus returning to his own thoughts, to
contemplate the eternal perfection of his mind/cosmos (the material
cosmos being the expression of his mind, or Logos). The expansion
would occur when Zeus once again expressed his mind in the creation of
the material cosmos; this re-creation or reconstitution of the cosmos
is what the Stoics called apokatastasis. Some Stoics argued that since
Zeus is perfect mind, then every reconstitution of the cosmos will
resemble identically the one that preceded it. This Stoic doctrine was
to have an immense influence on the development of the so-called
esoteric traditions in the Hellenistic era, notably the Hermetic
school, Gnosticism, and astrology, with all of which Origen was, in
varying degrees, familiar.

In Origen's time, Christianity as a religion had not yet developed a
system of theology as a basis of orthodoxy; therefore, in addition to
a wide variety of opinions regarding the faith, there were also
various sects, each claiming to possess the truth of the Christian
faith. Foremost among these sects was the group of schools loosely
labelled 'gnostic.' The Valentinian school (founded by Valentinus, an
outstanding teacher and philosopher who was at one point a candidate
for bishop of Rome) was the most philosophically accomplished of the
Christian Gnostic sects. In his Commentary on John, Origen refutes the
doctrines of a Valentinian Gnostic named Heracleon, who had earlier
written a commentary on the same Gospel. While Origen's opposition to
Gnosticism precluded any doctrinal influence, he saw in Gnosticism the
value of a system, for it was precisely by virtue of their elaborate
and self-consistent systems that the Gnostics were successful in
gaining adherents. Since there were no non-Gnostic Christian
theological systems in his day, it was up to Origen to formulate one.
This was the program of his treatise On First Principles.
3. The Philosophical System of Origen

Origen was the first systematic theologian and philosopher of the
Christian Church. Earlier Christian intellectuals had confined
themselves to apologetic and moralizing works; notable among such
writers is Clement of Alexandria (d. 215 C.E.), who, like Origen,
found much of value in Hellenic philosophy. Before proceeding with an
examination of Origen's system, it must be noted that scholars are
divided over the question of whether or not his On First Principles
contains a system. Henri Crouzel (1989), for example, has argued that
the presence of contradictory statements in certain portions of the
treatise, as well as in other texts, is proof against the claim that
Origen was presenting a system. Hans Jonas (1974), on the other hand,
recognized a clear system in On First Principles and gave a convincing
elucidation of such. The reason for this scholarly divide is mostly
due to the lack of a precise definition of 'system' and 'systematic'.
If one approaches Origen's text expecting a carefully worked-out
system of philosophy in the manner of a Kant or a Hegel, one will be
disappointed. However, if one reads the text with an eye for prominent
themes and inner consistency of such themes with one another, a system
does emerge. As John Dillon has pointed out, Origen succeeded in
luring away several students of the renowned Platonic teacher Ammonius
Saccas to study with him, and, Dillon convincingly observes, this
would not have been possible if Origen did not have some system to
offer (Dillon, in Kannengiesser, Petersen, ed. 1988, p. 216, and
footnote). It must also be pointed out that the text of On First
Principles that we possess is not complete. Origen's original Greek is
preserved only in fragments, the remainder of the text is extant only
in a Latin translation by Rufinus, who was a defender of Origen
against posthumous charges of heresy. While Rufinus' translation is,
as far as we can tell, faithful in most respects, there is ample
evidence that he softened certain potentially troublesome passages in
an ill-guided attempt to redeem his beloved teacher. When reading
Origen's treatise, then, one would do well to keep this in mind should
one stumble across seemingly contradictory passages, for one has no
way of knowing what the original Greek might have said.
a. The Trinity

Origen begins his treatise On First Principles by establishing, in
typical Platonic fashion, a divine hierarchical triad; but instead of
calling these principles by typical Platonic terms like monad, dyad,
and world-soul, he calls them "Father," "Christ," and "Holy Spirit,"
though he does describe these principles using Platonic language. The
first of these principles, the Father, is a perfect unity, complete
unto Himself, and without body – a purely spiritual mind. Since God
the Father is, for Origen, "personal and active," it follows that
there existed with Him, always, an entity upon which to exercise His
intellectual activity. This entity is Christ the Son, the Logos, or
Wisdom (Sophia), of God, the first emanation of the Father,
corresponding to Numenius' "second god," as we have seen above
(section 2). The third and last principle of the divine triad is the
Holy Spirit, who "proceeds from the Son and is related to Him as the
Son is related to the Father" (A. Tripolitis 1978, p. 94). Here is
Origen explaining the status of the Holy Spirit, in a passage
preserved in the original Greek:

The God and Father, who holds the universe together, is superior to
every being that exists, for he imparts to each one from his own
existence that which each one is; the Son, being less than the Father,
is superior to rational creatures alone (for he is second to the
Father); the Holy Spirit is still less, and dwells within the saints
alone. So that in this way the power of the Father is greater than
that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and that of the Son is more
than that of the Holy Spirit, and in turn the power of the Holy Spirit
exceeds that of every other holy being (Fragment 9 [Koetschau] tr.
Butterworth 1966, pp. 33-34, and footnote).

This graded hierarchy reveals an allotment of power to the second and
third members of the Trinity: the Father's power is universal, but the
Son's corresponds only to rational creatures, while the Spirit's power
corresponds strictly to the "saints" or those who have achieved
salvation. Such a structure of divine influence on the created realm
is found much later in the system of the Neoplatonic philosopher
Proclus (see J. Dillon, in G. Vesey, ed. 1989).
b. Souls and their Fall

According to Origen, God's first creation was a collectivity of
rational beings which he calls logika. "Although Origen speaks of the
logika as being created, they were not created in time. Creation with
respect to them means that they had a beginning, but not a temporal
one" (Tripolitis 1978, p. 94). Further, Origen explains that the
number of these rational beings is necessarily limited, since an
infinite creation would be incomprehensible, and unworthy of God.
These souls were originally created in close proximity to God, with
the intention that they should explore the divine mysteries in a state
of endless contemplation. They grew weary of this intense
contemplation, however, and lapsed, falling away from God and into an
existence on their own terms, apart from the divine presence and the
wisdom to be found there. This fall was not, it must be understood,
the result of any inherent imperfection in the creatures of God,
rather, it was the result of a misuse of the greatest gift of God to
His creation: freedom. The only rational creature who escaped the fall
and remained with God is the "soul of Christ" (Origen, On First
Principles 2.6.5; Tripolitis 1978, p. 96). This individual soul is
indicative of the intended function of all souls, i.e., to reveal the
divine mystery in unique ways, insofar as the meaning of this mystery
is deposited within them, as theandric (God-human) potentiality, to be
drawn out and revealed through co-operation with God (On First
Principles 2.9.2-8). As Origen explains, the soul of Christ was no
different from that of any of the souls that fell away from God, for
Christ's soul possessed the same potential for communion with God as
that of all other souls. What distinguished the soul of Christ from
all others – and what preserved Him from falling away – was His
supreme act of free choice, to remain immersed in the divinity.

What are now souls (psukhê) began as minds, and through boredom or
distraction grew "cold" (psukhesthai) as they moved away from the
"divine warmth" (On First Principles 2.8.3). Thus departing from God,
they came to be clothed in bodies, at first of "a fine ethereal and
invisible nature," but later, as souls fell further away from God,
their bodies changed "from a fine, ethereal and invisible body to a
body of a coarser and more solid state. The purity and subtleness of
the body with which a soul is enveloped depends upon the moral
development and perfection of the soul to which it is joined. Origen
states that there are varying degrees of subtleness even among the
celestial and spiritual bodies" (Tripolitis 1978, p. 106). When a soul
achieves salvation, according to Origen, it ceases being a soul, and
returns to a state of pure "mind" or understanding. However, due to
the fall, now "no rational spirit can ever exist without a body"
(Tripolitis 1978, p. 114), but the bodies of redeemed souls are
"spiritual bodies," made of the purest fire (see A. Scott 1991,
Chapter 9).
c. Multiple Ages, Metempsychosis, and the Restoration of All

Origen did not believe in the eternal suffering of sinners in hell.
For him, all souls, including the devil himself, will eventually
achieve salvation, even if it takes innumerable ages to do so; for
Origen believed that God's love is so powerful as to soften even the
hardest heart, and that the human intellect – being the image of God –
will never freely choose oblivion over proximity to God, the font of
Wisdom Himself. Certain critics of Origen have claimed that this
teaching undermines his otherwise firm insistence on free will, for,
these critics argue, the souls must maintin the freedom to ultimately
reject or accept God, or else free will becomes a mere illusion. What
escapes these critics is the fact that Origen's conception of free
will is not our own; he considered freedom in the Platonic sense of
the ability to choose the good. Since evil is not the polar opposite
of good, but rather simply the absence of good – and thus having no
real existence – then to 'choose' evil is not to make a conscious
decision, but to act in ignorance of the measure of all rational
decision, i.e., the good. Origen was unable to conceive of a God who
would create souls that were capable of dissolving into the oblivion
of evil (non-being) for all eternity. Therefore, he reasoned that a
single lifetime is not enough for a soul to achieve salvation, for
certain souls require more education or 'healing' than others. So he
developed his doctrine of multiple ages, in which souls would be
re-born, to experience the educative powers of God once again, with a
view to ultimate salvation. This doctrine, of course, implies some
form of transmigration of souls or metempsychosis. Yet Origen's
version of metempsychosis was not the same as that of the
Pythagoreans, for example, who taught that the basest of souls will
eventually become incarnated as animals. For Origen, some sort of
continuity between the present body, and the body in the age to come,
was maintained (Jerome, Epistle to Avitus 7, quoting Origen; see also
Commentary on Matthew 11.17). Origen did not, like many of his
contemporaries, degrade the body to the status of an unwanted
encrustation imprisoning the soul; for him, the body is a necessary
principle of limitation, providing each soul with a unique identity.
This is an important point for an understanding of Origen's
epistemology, which is based upon the idea that God educates each soul
according to its inherent abilities, and that the abilities of each
soul will determine the manner of its knowledge. We may say, then,
that the uniqueness of the soul's body is an image of its uniqueness
of mind. This is the first inkling of the development of the concept
of the person and personality in the history of Western thought.

The restoration of all beings (apokatastasis) is the most important
concept in Origen's philosophy, and the touchstone by which he judges
all other theories. His concept of universal restoration is based on
equally strong Scriptural and Hellenistic philosophical grounds and is
not original, as it can be traced back to Heraclitus, who stated that
"the beginning and end are common" (Fragment B 103, tr. J. Barnes
1987, p. 115). Considering that Origen's later opponents based their
charges of heresy largely on this aspect of his teaching, it is
surprising to see how well-grounded in scripture this doctrine really
is. Origen's main biblical proof-text is 1 Corinthians 15:25-28,
especially verse 28, which speaks of the time "when all things shall
be subdued unto him [Christ], then shall the Son also himself be
subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in
all" (KJV, my emphasis). This scriptural notion of God being "all in
all" (panta en pasin) is a strong theological support for his theory
of apokatastasis. There are, of course, numerous other passages in
scripture that contradict this notion, but we must remember that
Origen's strength resided in his philosophical ability to use reason
and dialectic in support of humane doctrines, not in the ability to
use scripture in support of dogmatical and anti-humanistic arguments.
Origen imagined salvation not in terms of the saved rejoicing in
heaven and the damned suffering in hell, but as a reunion of all souls
with God.
4. Important Themes in Origen's Philosophy

While Origen's lengthy treatise On First Principles contains numerous
discussions of a wide variety of issues relevant to the Christianity
of his day, as well as to broader philosophical concerns, certain key
themes do emerge that are of universal and timeless value for
philosophy. These themes are: free will; the educational value of
history; and the infinity and eternal motion (becoming) of human
beings.
a. Free Will

Origen's conception of freedom, as discussed above, was not the same
as modern conceptions. This is not to say that his conception was
wrong, of course. For Origen recognized freedom only in reason, in
rationality, which is precisely the ability to recognize and embrace
the good, which is for him God. Irrationality is ignorance, the
absence of a conception of the good. The ignorant person cannot be
held responsible for his ignorance, except to the extent that he has
been lazy, not applying himself to the cultivation of reason. The
moral dimension of this conception of freedom is that ignorance is not
to be punished, but remedied through education. Punishment, understood
in the punative sense, is of no avail and will even lead to deeper
ignorance and sin, as the punished soul grows resentful, not
understanding why he is being punished. Origen firmly believed that
the knowledge of the good (God) is itself enough to remove all taint
of sin and ignorance from souls. A 'freedom' to embrace evil (the
absence of good) would have made no sense to Origen who, as a
Platonist, identified evil with enslavement and goodness with freedom.
The soul who has seen the good, he argued, will not fall into
ignorance again, for the good is inspiring and worthy of eternal
contemplation (see Commentary on Romans 5.10.15).
b. Education and History

Origen may rightfully be called the first philosopher of history, for,
like Hegel, he understood history as a process involving the
participation of persons in grand events leading to an eventual
culmination or 'end of history'. Unlike mainstream Christian
eschatology, Origen did not understand the end of history as the final
stage of a grand revelation of God, but rather as the culmination of a
human-divine (co-operative) process, in which the image and likeness
of God (humanity) is re-united with its source and model, God Himself
(see Against Celsus 4.7; On First Principles 2.11.5, 2.11.7;
Tripolitis 1978, p. 111). This is accomplished through education of
souls who, having fallen away from God, are now sundered from the
divine presence and require a gradual re-initiation into the mysteries
of God. Such a reunion must not be accomplished by force, for God will
never, Origen insists, undermine the free will of His creatures;
rather, God will, over the course of numerous ages if need be, educate
souls little by little, leading them eventually, by virtue of their
own growing responsiveness, back to Himself, where they will glory in
the uncovering of the infinite mysteries of the eternal godhead (On
First Principles 2.11.6-7).
c. Eternal Motion of Souls

A common motif in Platonism during, before, and after Origen's time is
salvific stasis, or the idea that the soul will achieve complete rest
and staticity when it finally ascends to a contemplation of the good.
We notice this idea early on in Plato, who speaks in the Republic
(517c-d, 519c-e) of a state of pure contemplation from which the
philosopher is only wrenched by force or persuasion. In Origen's own
time, Plotinus developed his notion of an 'about-face' (epistrophê) of
the soul resulting in an instant union of the soul with its divine
principle, understood as an idealized, changeless form of
contemplation, allowing for no dynamism or personal development (see
Enneads 4.3.32, 4.8.4, for example). Influenced indirectly by
Plotinus, and more directly by later Neoplatonists (both Christian and
pagan), the Christian theologian St. Maximus the Confessor elaborated
a systematic philosophical theology culminating in an eschatology in
which the unique human person was replaced by the overwhelming,
transcendent presence of God (see Chapters on Knowledge 2.88). Origen
managed to maintain the transcendentality of God on the one hand, and
the dynamic persistence of souls in being on the other. He did this by
defining souls not by virtue of their intellectual content (or, in the
Plotinian sense, for example, by virtue of their 'prior' or higher,
constitutive principle) but rather by their ability to engage in a
finite manner with the infinite God. This engagement is constitutive
of the soul's existence, and guarantees its uniqueness. Each soul
engages uniquely with God in contemplating divine mysteries according
to its innate ability, and this engagement persists for all eternity,
for the mysteries of the godhead are inexhaustible, as is the
enthusiastic application of the souls' intellectual ability.
5. Origen's Importance in the History of Philosophy

Throughout this article, Origen's importance has largely been linked
to his melding of philosophical insights with elucidations of various
aspects of the Christian fatih. Yet his importance for Hellenistic
philosophy is marked, and though not quite as pervasive as his
influence on Christian thought, is nevertheless worth a few brief
remarks. His role in the formation of Christian doctrine is more
prominent, yet, because of its problematical nature, will be treated
of only briefly.
a. Hellenistic Philosophy

Origen's debt to Hellenistic (Greek) philosophy is quite obvious; his
influence on the development of later pagan philosophy is – at least
from the perspective of most contemporary scholarship – rather less
obvious, but it is there. His trinitarian doctrine, for example,
consisted of a gradation of influence beginning with the Father, whose
influence was of the most general, universal kind, binding together
all things; the influence of the Son extended strictly to sentient
beings; the Holy Spirit's influence extended only to the 'elect' or
saints who had already achieved salvation (Dillon, in D.J. O'Meara,
ed., 1982, p. 20; see also On First Principles 1.3.5). This conception
found later expression in Proclus' Elements of Theology (Proposition
57), where he elucidates this formulation: "Every cause both operates
prior to its consequent and gives rise to a greater number of
posterior terms" (tr. Dodds). For Origen, the pre-existent souls,
through their fall, gave rise to a history over which both the Father
and the Son came to preside, while the Holy Spirit only enters into
human reality to effect a salvific re-orientation toward God that is
already the result of an achieved history. The Holy Spirit, then, may
be understood as the final cause, the preparatory causes of which are
the Father and Son, the mutual begetters of history. A bit later, the
pagan philosopher Iamblichus reversed this Origenian notion, claiming
that the influence of the divine became stronger and more concentrated
the further it penetrated into created reality, extending in its pure
power even to stones and plants. In this sense, the Holy Spirit,
limited as it is (according to Origen) to interaction with the saints
alone, gives way to the universal power of the Father, which extends
to the furthest reaches of reality. Iamblichus saw no reason to divide
the divinity into persons or emanative effects; rather, he saw the
divinity as operative, in varying degrees, at every level of reality.
At the lowest level, however, this power is most effective, imparting
power to plants and stones, and providing support for the theurgical
practice advocated by Iamblichus (Olympiodorus, Commentary on
Alcibiades I, 115A; Psellus, Chaldaean Expositions 1153a10-11; Dillon,
ed. O'Meara 1982, p. 23).
b. Christianity

Origen's ideas, most notably those in the treatise On First
Principles, gave rise to a movement in the Christian Church known as
Origenism. From the third through the sixth centuries this movement
was quite influential, especially among the monastics, and was given
articulate – if excessively codified form – by the theologian Evagrius
Ponticus (c. 345-400 C.E.). It is to be noted that the spirit of
philosophical inquiry exemplified by Origen was largely absent from
the movement bearing his name. A far more creative use of Origen's
concepts and themes was made by Gregory of Nyssa (d. ca. 386 C.E.),
who adopted Origen's doctrine of apokatastasis or "restoration of all
things." Gregory was also responsible for articulating more clearly
than did Origen the notion that redeemed souls will remain in a state
of dynamic intellectual activity (see Gregory of Nyssa, Catechetical
Oration, esp. Chapters 26 and 35). After the posthumous condemnation
of Origen (and Origenism) in the fifth century, it became increasingly
difficult for mainstream theologians to make use of his work.
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (5th or 6th Century C.E.) drew upon
Neoplatonic philosophy, especially Proclus (411-485 C.E.) and
Iamblichus (ca. 240-325 C.E.), and though he followed in Origen's
footsteps in this use of pagan wisdom, he never mentioned his
predecessor by name. In the seventh century, Maximus the Confessor
(ca. 580-662), who may be called the last great Christian
Neoplatonist, set about revising Origen's doctrines in a manner more
acceptable to the theological climate of the early Byzantine Church.
Maximus changed the historicism of Origen into a more introspective,
personal struggle to attain the divine vision through asceticism and
prayer, the result being a total subsumption of the person by the
godhead. This was Maximus' vision of salvation: the replacement of the
ego by the divine presence (see L. Thunberg 1985, p. 89; also Maximus,
Chapters on Knowledge 2.88). While there is much that may be called
brilliant and even inspiring in Maximus' philosophical theology, this
loss of the centrality of the person – as unique, unrepeatable entity
– in the cosmic process of salvation led to the loss of a sense of
co-operation of humanity and God, and sapped Christianity of the
intellectual vigor that it displayed in the period leading up to the
establishment of a theocratical Byzantine state.

Thankfully, Origen's legacy was not lost. He was an inspiration to the
Renaissance Humanists and, more recently, to certain Existentialist
Christian theologians, notably Nicolas Berdyaev (1874-1948) whose
insistence on the absolute autonomy and nobility of the person in the
face of all objectifying reality is an echo across the ages of the
humanism of Origen. Berdyaev himself admits Origen's influence on his
thought (as well as that of Gregory of Nyssa) and insists that the
doctrine of hell and the eternal suffering of sinners is not
compatible with authentic Christianity. He also places a great
importance on history, and even broaches a modern, de-mythologized
conception of metempsychosis in terms of a universal, shared history
of which all persons are a part, regardless of their temporal
specificity. History, according to Berdyaev (and in this he follows
Origen) binds all of humanity together. No soul will be saved in
isolation; all must be saved together, or not be saved at all.
Berdyaev wrote numerous works, a few of the most important are Slavery
and Freedom (Eng. tr. 1944), The Beginning and the End(Eng. tr.1952),
and Truth and Revelation (Eng. tr. 1962).
6. Concluding Summary

Origen was an innovator in an era when innovation, for Christians, was
a luxury ill-afforded. He drew upon pagan philosophy in an effort to
elucidate the Christian faith in a manner acceptable to intellectuals,
and he succeeded in converting many gifted pagan students of
philosophy to his faith. He was also a great humanist, who believed
that all creatures will eventually achieve salvation, including the
devil himself. Origen did not embrace the dualism of Gnosticism, nor
that of the more primitive expressions of the Christian faith still
extant in his day. Rather, he took Christianity to a higher level,
finding in it a key to the perfection of the intellect or mind, which
is what all souls are in their pure form. The restoration of all souls
to a purely intellectual existence was Origen's faith, and his
philosophy was based upon such a faith. In this, he is an heir to
Socrates and Plato, but he also brought a new conception into
philosophy – that of the creative aspect of the soul, as realized in
history, the culmination of which is salvation, after which follows an
eternal delving into the deep mysteries of God.
7. References and Further Reading

Bibliography

Selected Works by Origen in English Translation
Origen, Against Celsus, tr. F. Crombie (The Ante-Nicene Fathers 4;
Michigan: Eerdmans 1979, reprint).
_____, On First Principles, tr. G.W. Butterworth (New York: Harper and
Row 1966).
_____, Commentary on John, tr. A. Menzies (The Ante-Nicene Fathers 10;
Michigan: Eerdmans 1978, reprint).
_____, Commentary on Matthew, tr. J. Patrick (The Ante-Nicene Fathers
10; Michigan: Eerdmans 1978, reprint).
_____, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Books 1-5), tr. T.P.
Scheck (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press
2001).
_____, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Books 6-10), tr. T.P.
Scheck (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press
2002).

Other Sources
Berdyaev, Nicholas, The Beginning and the End, tr. R.M. French (New
York: Harper and Brothers 1952).
_____, Slavery and Freedom, tr. R.M. French (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons 1944).
_____, Truth and Revelation, tr. R.M. French (New York: Collier Books 1962).
Chadwick, H., Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition:
Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen (New York: Oxford University
Press 1966).
Crouzel, H., Origen: The Life and Thought of the First Great
Theologian, tr. A.S. Worrall (T.&T. Clark Ltd. 1989).
Dillon, J.M., The Middle Platonists(Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1977).
Hardy, E.R., Christology of the Later Fathers (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press 1954).
Jonas, H., "Origen's Metaphysics of Free Will, Fall, and Salvation: A
'Divine Comedy' of the Universe," in Philosophical Essays: From
Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall
1974).
Kannengiesser, C., Petersen, W.L., eds., Origen of Alexandria: His
World and His Legacy (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press 1988).
Kelly, J.N.D., Early Christian Doctrines (New York: Harper and Row 1978).
Louth, A., Maximus the Confessor (New York: Routledge 1996).
Luibheid, C., Rorem, P., tr., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works
(Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press 1987).
Meyendorff, J., Christ in Eastern Christian Thought (Crestwood: St.
Vladimir's Seminary Press 1975).
Murphy, F.X., "Evagrius Ponticus and Origenism," in R. Hanson and H.
Crouzel, ed., Origeniana Tertia (1981).
O'Meara, D.J., ed., Neoplatonism and Christian Thought (New York:
State University of New York Press 1982).
Pelikan, J., Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of
Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism (New Haven:
Yale University Press 1993).
_____, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of
Doctrine, vol. 2: "The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700)
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1974).
Scott, A., Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991).
Shaw, G., Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1995).
Siorvanes, L., Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science (New
Haven: Yale University Press 1996).
Stevenson, J., ed. A New Eusebius: Documents Illustrative of the
History of the Church to A.D. 337 (London: S.P.C.K. 1957).
Tatakis, B., Byzantine Philosophy, tr. N.J. Moutafakis (Indianapolis:
Hackett 2003).
Thunberg, L., Man and the Cosmos: The Vision of St. Maximus the
Confessor (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press 1985).
Trigg, J.W., Origen: The Bible and Philosophy in the Third-century
Church (Atlanta: John Knox Press 1983).
Tripolitis, A., The Doctrine of the Soul in the Thought of Plotinus
and Origen (New York: Libra 1978).
Werner, M., The Formation of Christian Dogma, tr. S.G.F. Brandon (
Harper and Brothers 1957).
Williamson, G.A., tr., Eusebius, The History of the Church (New York:
Penguin Books 1965).
Zeller, E., Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, tr. L.R.
Palmer (New York: Meridian Books 1955).

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