we freely choose to reciprocate His love, He has made His knowledge
of, and plans for, the future conditional upon our actions. Though
omniscient, God does not know what we will freely do in the future.
Though omnipotent, He has chosen to invite us to freely collaborate
with Him in governing and developing His creation, thereby also
allowing us the freedom to thwart His hopes for us. God desires that
each of us freely enter into a loving and dynamic personal
relationship with Him, and He has therefore left it open to us to
choose for or against His will.
While Open Theists affirm that God knows all the truths that can be
known, they claim that there simply are not yet truths about what will
occur in the "open," undetermined future. Alternatively, there are
such contingent truths, but these truths cannot be known by anyone,
including God.
Even though God is all-powerful, allowing Him to do everything that
can be done, He cannot create round squares or make 2 +2 = 5 or do
anything that is logically impossible. Omniscience is understood in a
similar manner. God is all-knowing and can know all that can be known,
but He cannot know the contingent future, since that too, is
impossible. God knows all the possible ways the world might go at any
point in time, but He does not know the one way the world will go, so
long as some part of what will happen in the future is contingent. So,
Open Theists oppose the claim of the sixteenth century Jesuit
theologian, Luis de Molina, that God has "middle knowledge."
Open Theists believe that Scripture teaches that God wanted to give us
the freedom to choose to love or reject Him. In order for each of us
to genuinely have a choice for which we are morally responsible, we
must have the ability to do otherwise than we do. This is the
distinctive necessary condition of what has come to be called
libertarian freedom. God may intervene in the created world at any
time, and He may determine that we act in ways of His choosing. But He
cannot both respect our libertarian freedom and guarantee that we will
do specific things freely. Thus, Open Theists believe that God has
created a world in which He takes the risk that many of us will reject
Him and act in ways opposed to Him, in order to give us the
opportunity to freely choose to love and obey Him.
1. History of Open Theism
Open Theism has been a significant topic in philosophy of religion and
in evangelical Christian circles since the 1994 publication of The
Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding
of God by Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker,
and David Basinger. Philosophers of religion such as A. N. Prior, J.
R. Lucas, Peter Geach, Richard Swinburne, and Richard Purtill had
advocated Open Theism in their writings prior to this date, though not
under that name, and Rice had published a work initially entitled The
Openness of God in 1980. (It was later republished as God's
Foreknowledge and Man's Free Will.) But the 1994 book's attempt to
systematically explicate the relational view of God that its authors
labeled the open view clearly marks the beginning of increased
discussion and debate over Open Theism's tenets.
Since the publication of The Openness of God, there has been
significant debate about not only the philosophical and theological
merits of Open Theism, but also its orthodoxy. In 2003, The
Evangelical Theological Society considered whether to remove Clark
Pinnock and John Sanders from its membership for implicitly disavowing
the inerrancy of Scripture in their writings by suggesting that some
Biblical passages traditionally understood to be prophecies have
remained and may continue to remain unfulfilled. While Pinnock agreed
to revise the most objectionable passage in his book Most Moved Mover,
Sanders continued to maintain that God does not infallibly predict or
prophesy what will contingently occur in the future, and he maintained
that Biblical passages may initially appear to predicate divine
foreknowledge and/or unconditional prophecies by God of what will
contingently occur but these passages must be interpreted differently
(more below). The charges against Pinnock and Sanders were not
sustained, but this was just barely the case for Sanders.
Proponents of Open Theism allow that their view is at odds with the
great majority of the Christian tradition in rejecting both meticulous
providence and divine foreknowledge of what will contingently occur.
However, they argue that the tradition, guided by neo-Platonic
philosophy in its formation, had difficulty reconciling beliefs about
the implications of God's perfection with the Biblical witness to a
God that cares deeply about His people and how they respond to Him.
Many of the early Church Fathers affirmed elements of the Open
Theists' relational view of God, in tension with their beliefs in
divine impossibility. Then Saint Augustine, whose Confessions tell us
that his faith partially resulted from a careful study of
neo-Platonism, forcefully argued for an emphasis on God's perfection
and otherness from His creation that precluded genuine responsiveness
on God's part to our actions. The (Western) Christian tradition
subsequently became largely identified with an Augustinian
understanding of providence. The early Church Fathers' idea that God's
foreknowledge is conditioned by human actions did not receive
significant consideration again until Jacob Arminius in the sixteenth
century and John Wesley in the eighteenth. And it is only recently, in
light of philosophical considerations of the nature of freedom, that
the full reciprocal relationality of Open Theism has been affirmed,
with its concordant denial that God knows what will contingently
occur.
Open Theists suggest that when the testimony of Scripture is
considered together with philosophical reflection on the conditions
necessary for free and morally responsible action, the view that
results is theirs. An emphasis on God's conditioned relationship to
His creation is clearly present in the early Church, in the Eastern
Church, and in developments during and in response to the Protestant
Reformation. This emphasis is largely absent from the theology of the
Middle Ages, but the giants of theology from Augustine to Aquinas were
clearly attempting to understand God and His relationship to the world
in light of the best secular philosophy available to them. While Open
Theists acknowledge that their view is in important respects at odds
with the Christian tradition, they also maintain that their view is
not as dissonant from that tradition as might be thought; it is just
that the emphasis on God as a perfect being who does not change in any
respect, which is neither clearly taught by Scripture nor obviously
compatible with God's loving relationality, must be rethought.
2. The Biblical Witness
Open Theists suggest that there is a strong Biblical case to be made
for affirming a God who respects our moral responsibility while
inviting us into a loving relationship with Him. They argue that the
most plausible reading of the Bible reveals a personal God who
genuinely interacts with human persons and accepts that His desires
and projects are dependent on that interaction. As discussed below,
Open Theists read the Bible as showing that God desires to be in
relationship with the people He has created, that He sometimes changes
His mind as a result of dialogue with His people, and that He seeks to
accomplish His goals for the world in concert with human agents. They
also point to passages that attribute to God the learning of
information as evidence that God's knowledge is not settled, and does
not include foreknowledge of the occurrence of contingent events.
Critics of Open Theism offer alternative interpretations of the
passages frequently cited by Open Theists, and bring forward their own
proof texts that the Biblical God is one whose sovereignty over
creation includes exhaustive foreknowledge and ultimate control over
each and every aspect of His creation. In any consideration of how
well Open Theism accords with the teachings of Scripture, it is
important to note that one's philosophical understandings of freedom
and moral responsibility necessarily inform one's hermeneutic. One
cannot fully appreciate the Biblical cases made for or against Open
Theism without also appreciating the philosophical considerations to
be considered in the subsequent section. Open Theism is most plausible
if the dignity and responsibility of an agent require the freedom to
do otherwise; if this is so, then texts that attribute responsibility
to persons seem to clearly require that God does not also determine
the humans' actions. If foreknowledge is also incompatible with the
ability to do otherwise, then neither can God know what we will do.
But if our responsibility is consistent with either or both of divine
foreknowledge and God's sovereign determination, then the force of
these passages is not nearly as great, and there is no need to seek a
more nuanced reading of passages that on their face seem to attribute
to God unconditioned knowledge of contingent events in the future.
Open Theists argue that the God revealed in the Bible clearly desires
to be in relationship with the people He has created. From the
beginning, we have been created in God's image and given
responsibility to care for His creation (Gen. 1:26). God's
relationship to His creation is clear throughout the narrative of the
Old Testament. Both Abraham and Moses, among others, speak, and indeed
argue, directly with God. Abraham questions God about how His promises
will be fulfilled (Gen. 15), and prevails upon Him to spare Sodom if
only ten righteous people can be found living there (Gen. 18).
Immediately after Abraham shows himself faithful to God by his
willingness to obey God even to the point of sacrificing his son
Isaac, God states that it is because of Abraham's obedience that He
will maintain His promise to bless Abraham and his descendants (Gen.
22:15-18). Abraham questions God, dialogues with God, affects God's
decisions, and his actions of obedience are credited by God as at
least partly responsible for Him fulfilling the promise of blessings
that He has revealed to Abraham. Moses speaks with God, and because He
lacks confidence to speak to his fellow Israelites, God appoints Aaron
to speak for Him (Ex. 4: 1-18). God reveals His law to Moses, and when
the Israelites turn their backs on their Deliverer, Moses reminds God
of His promises and asks Him to relent from His anger and spare His
people (Ex. 32: 9-14). It is clear throughout the Pentateuch that God
speaks to chosen leaders of His chosen people, and that He not only
commands them, but also listens to their concerns, often adjusting His
original plans in light of His dialogue with them.
In both the Old and New Testaments, God presents Himself as working
with human agents, and as being disappointed in His hopes for them,
rather than as compelling them to act in prescribed ways. This is
clear throughout the narrative of Israel, and in passages such as Is.
65:1-2, in which the Lord bemoans the stubbornness of those who will
not call on Him, despite His many revelations to them. The Bible
teaches us that we can thwart God's desire that we freely return His
love. This is suggested by passages such as Mark 6:5-6, in which we
are told that Jesus could not perform many miracles in his hometown
because of the lack of faith of its people, and it is explicit in Luke
7:30, in which we are told that the Pharisees rejected God's purpose.
God asks us to follow and obey Him; He does not compel obedience. Nor
should every calamitous event be assumed to be divine punishment for
disobedience (Job, Lk. 13:1-5, Jn. 9:1-3).
The above passages suggest that God desires to be in relationship with
His created people in a manner that respects their freedom to respond
to Him in various ways, and that He is genuinely responsive to our
concerns. There are also passages in Scripture that more directly
suggest that the future is open, and that not even God has
foreknowledge of what will contingently happen. Genesis 22:12 records
God as stating, "Now I know that you fear God, because you have not
withheld from me your son, your only son." The emphasis on "now"
knowing "because" of Abraham's action clearly points to this being a
genuine test of Abraham's faith, where even God could not be sure of
Abraham's response to the test. Jeremiah 3:7 and 19-20 quote God as
saying that He thought Israel would return to faith in Him, but that
she had not. Mark 6:6 emphasizes Jesus' amazement at the lack of faith
of those in His hometown, a reaction that only makes sense if He had
had an expectation of greater faith. These passages suggest that God
can genuinely learn new information.
Of course, the above is meant only to be suggestive of the kinds of
considerations that Open Theists emphasize in reading the Bible. These
several texts are among those that suggest that God desires to be in a
relationship that respects our freedom to respond to God in a variety
of ways, and that He has thus left the future open to determination
through our actions, at least in part. But critics of Open Theism
interpret the same data differently. For instance, Classical Theists
may suggest that an incarnational theology's emphasis on the
revelation of God in Christ is misguided if it does not give
sufficient weight to the idea that God veiled His glory in becoming
human (see Jn. 17:5). And they cite other texts that are arguably more
suggestive of the traditional view of God as providentially in control
of all that happens, such as Isaiah 40-48, Romans 9, and Ephesians
1:11.
Any reading of the Bible must seek a consistent hermeneutic, and must
acknowledge that certain texts must be given readings that are not
initially obvious. "Prophetic" texts are read by Open Theists as
either decrees of what God has decided to do, conditional predictions
about what will happen if certain conditions (such as repentance) are
not met, or forecasts based upon God's exhaustive knowledge of the
past and present. None of these interpretations require God to have
exhaustive foreknowledge of future events, but responsible readers of
the Bible may well disagree about the plausibility of these
interpretations as applied to specific passages. Open Theists also
argue that plausible readings that accord with Open Theism can be
given of "pancausality" texts such as those alluded to in the previous
paragraph, and that this is preferable to dismissing as merely
anthropomorphic the overwhelming sense of the Bible that God is in
dynamic relationship with His creation.
3. Philosophical Considerations
Many theologians in the Christian tradition have maintained both that
we are free to choose how we act, and that God foresees our choices.
Many lay Christians likewise think that this is the obvious way to
reconcile our freedom with God's omniscience. So long as God does not
pre-determine that we act in the ways that we do, but only "sees" what
we do, what is the problem? Why does Open Theism insist that the
future is open in such a way that God's foreknowledge of contingent
events must be denied?
There are two primary ways of understanding the nature of human
freedom. The "compatibilist" view of freedom is that so long as one is
acting in a manner that accords with one's desires or can be otherwise
identified with one's character, one acts freely. Our freedom is
compatible with our actions being determined, so long as we are acting
in the way we want. We are free so long as were we to desire
otherwise, we could act otherwise, and this is so even if we could not
desire otherwise. If this is the right view of our freedom, then God
might predetermine all of our actions while they are yet free, so long
as they are consistent with our character.
The alternative account of the nature of freedom is "libertarian."
This account maintains that unless one is genuinely able to do
otherwise than one does, one is not free. So, if one's character is
formed in such a way that one will certainly act in a particular way,
and if one has no control over one's character, then one is not really
free, since one cannot act in a manner otherwise than one does.
Importantly, one may remain morally responsible for one's action if
one's character has become thus through one's earlier free decisions.
(Alternatively, one might be said to be free in a derivative sense if
one's character was freely chosen in the past.) If as a result of our
sinful nature we cannot choose to do good, then we are not genuinely
free to do otherwise than sin. We must really be able to either accept
God's invitation to love Him or to reject it, if we are free with
respect to this choice. And if we are not and have never been
libertarianly free with respect to this choice , then we are not
morally responsible for our choice of whether or not to love God.
Open Theists affirm a libertarian view of freedom. From almost the
beginning of Western philosophy, philosophers have been concerned with
whether such freedom is compatible with prior truths about what one
will do. Aristotle famously argued in his De Interpretatione (book 9)
that prior truth is incompatible with future contingency. His argument
there may be represented as follows:
1. It is true that it will be white.
2. If it is true that it will be white, then it has always been
true that it will be white.
3. If it has always been true that it will be white, then it is
impossible that it will not be white.
4. If it is impossible that it will not be white, then it is
necessary that it will be white.
5. It is necessary that it will be white.
An obvious implication of this argument is that if it is now true that
one will act in a particular way, then it is necessary that one will
act thusly. But it is not immediately clear why one should accept
premise 3. Why should one think that something's always having been
the case entails the impossibility of its ever being otherwise?
One plausible reason for thinking this is based on the idea that one
cannot change the past. If a proposition was once true, can one now
act in such a way that it is no longer true? If not, then the prior
truth of a proposition about what one will do seems enough to rule out
one's doing otherwise, and thus rule out one's being libertarianly
free with respect to that action. The same type of consideration
applies to God's prior knowledge of what one will do. Consider the
following argument given by William Hasker in The Openness of God:
1. It is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for
breakfast tomorrow. (Premise)
2. It is impossible that God should at any time believe what is
false, or fail to believe anything that is true. (Premise: divine
omniscience)
3. God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese omelet
tomorrow. (From 1, 2)
4. If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in
anyone's power to bring it about that God has not always believed that
thing. (Premise: the unalterability of the past)
5. Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to bring it about that
God has not always believed that he would have a cheese omelet for
breakfast. (From 3, 4)
6. It is not possible for it to be true both that God has always
believed that Clarence would have a cheese omelet for breakfast, and
that he does not in fact have one. (from 2)
7. Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to refrain from having
a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (From 5, 6) So Clarence's
eating the omelet tomorrow is not an act of free choice. (From the
definition of free will.)
If premise 4 is true and if we have libertarian freedom, then it is
not possible for God to know what we will freely do before we do it.
Whether one finds Open Theism plausible largely depends on whether one
finds the intuition underlying premise 4 plausible. Philosophers have
debated whether all of the past is comprised of "hard" facts fixed in
this way, or whether there are "soft" facts that might be conditional
upon our future actions. Proponents of the compatibility of human
libertarian freedom with divine foreknowledge have argued that facts
about God's prior knowledge of our future actions are conditional on
our subsequent choices. To use Clarence as an example, were he to
choose to have a bagel tomorrow, it always would have been true that
God knew that he would so choose, rather than that he would choose to
eat an omelet. Since there is no reason to think that Clarence's
choice is determined by prior causes, divine or otherwise, one may
affirm that he is free to have an omelet or not even while maintaining
that God knows he will have an omelet. Clarence has what has been
termed "counterfactual power" over the past: the power to act in such
a way that were he to so act, the past always would have been
different than it in fact is. Proponents of counterfactual power over
the past can thus agree that Clarence does not have the power to
change, or alter, the past, since were he to eat a bagel, it never
would have been true that he would eat an omelet tomorrow.
Philosophers have not come to an agreement over whether one might have
counterfactual power over the past, or whether the past is instead
fixed in a manner that rules out this power. On this topic, basic
intuitions about freedom and the fixity of the past differ from person
to person, and largely determine how they view the compatibility of
divine foreknowledge with human freedom, and thus how they view the
plausibility of Open Theism.
It is important to note that even if foreknowledge and freedom are
compatible, it is not clear that simple foreknowledge — foreknowledge
that is not based on middle knowledge (see below) — could be of any
aid to God in providentially ordering His creation. If God knows what
will actually happen, He cannot also use this information to arrange
for something else to happen, for then the contents of what He "knows"
would not comprise knowledge. Foreknowledge is of the actual
occurrence of future events; once the occurrence of these events is
known, it is "too late" to prevent them (or to bring them about).
Doing so is incompatible with their occurrence being infallibly known
by God. Simple foreknowledge, if God has it, allows Him to know what
will occur without having to wait for the future occurrence of events,
as He must for contingent events according to Open Theism. But His
knowledge is no less conditioned by the occurrence of the events; He
has no greater control over their occurrence based on foreknowledge
than He does if Open Theism is true.
Once it is realized that simple foreknowledge does not offer any
providential advantage to God, one may wonder what reason there is to
affirm it, aside from an assumption that it is more perfect for God to
have such knowledge than not. One might think that foreknowledge would
provide an explanation for the accuracy of prophecy. But it does not.
If God has "at once" complete foreknowledge of all that happens, He
"sees" what will happen including whether or not He instructs persons
to prophesy that events will happen. Given knowledge of what will
occur, God is not free to do otherwise than He foresees He will do.
Perhaps God could "look" at a little bit of the future at a time, make
decisions about how He will react to the events He foresees, and then
"look" a little further to see how His creation reacts to these
actions. But this would offer no greater help for predicting future
events. Suppose that God foresees the course of the world until the
end of 1935. Could He then decide to warn persons on January 1st of
1936 that the holocaust is about to occur? Not in any infallible way.
For assuming that the holocaust was still avoidable in 1935, and
assuming that God has not yet "looked" beyond 1935, He does not yet
know what will occur in the next ten years. He can decide to make
probably accurate but possibly mistaken predictions on January 1,
1936, based on the tendencies present at that point, but this is no
more than He can do given Open Theism.
Simple foreknowledge has no utility for God's providential governance
of the world, nor can it ground infallible predictions of future
events. (It should also be reiterated that Open Theists believe that
there are less instances of such predictions in the Bible than is
thought by those who affirm a traditional meticulous view of
providence.) If one wants to affirm that we have libertarian freedom
and still maintain a traditional view of providence according to which
God directs the course of the world rather than merely witnessing how
it unfolds, then affirming foreknowledge is not enough.
The most plausible view of how human libertarian freedom might be
compatible with a traditional view of providence, and thus the
greatest competitor to Open Theism, is a view called "Molinism," named
after a sixteenth century Jesuit theologian, Luis de Molina. Molina
predicated "middle knowledge" to God and explained God's providential
determination of what will occur in terms of this knowledge. Middle
knowledge is knowledge that lies between (in an explanatory sense, not
a temporal sense) God's "natural" knowledge of all the possible ways
the world might go and His "free" knowledge of the one way the world
will go based upon His creative decree. Natural knowledge is
pre-volitional knowledge of necessary truths, including all the
possibilities for creation. Free knowledge is post-volitional
knowledge of contingent truths, including all future contingent
truths. And middle knowledge is pre-volitional knowledge of contingent
subjunctive conditional truths of the form: if such and such were the
case, then so and so would be the case. God's middle knowledge
includes all the facts about how the world would go given various
antecedent conditions. These facts, because they are known before God
wills anything, are outside of His control.
Through middle knowledge, God might have known that were he to place
Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden in just the way He did, then they
would sin by eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. And
He might have known that if they did this and He subsequently kicked
them out of the garden, events would unfold in a certain way. God's
middle knowledge would include all the true subjunctive conditionals
about how the persons He might create would act in the various
circumstances He might place them. These subjunctive conditionals have
come to be called "counterfactuals of creaturely freedom." Based on
this exhaustive middle knowledge, God would have known how events
would unfold given any creative action He might decide to perform. And
on the assumption that libertarian freedom is consistent with
knowledge of how one would act in various circumstances, our freedom
would remain intact. Molinism promises to uphold both our libertarian
freedom and God's ability to providentially decide exactly what occurs
in His creation.
There are two primary objections to Molinism that Open Theists have
advanced. If the argument that foreknowledge is incompatible with
libertarian freedom is valid, then a similar argument can be made
against the compatibility of middle knowledge with libertarian
freedom. If it has always been true and known by God that I would act
in such and such a way if I were in such and such circumstances, then
do I have the power to bring it about that this fact has never been
true, or never been known by God? Do I have counterfactual power over
this past truth and God's past knowledge of it? I must, in order to be
libertarianly free. The same intuitions about the fixity of the past
are brought into play. The other objection to Molinism given by Open
Theists, termed the "grounding objection," is based on the status of
the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. These are truths that,
though contingent, are not under God's control. God "finds Himself"
faced with these truths, similarly to the manner in which He "finds
Himself" faced with the fact that 2+2=4. But why are certain
subjunctives true and certain ones not? The grounding objection is
that there seems to be no reason that some particular counterfactuals
of creaturely freedom are true rather than others. There is no ground
for their truth or falsity. If one believes that all truths, or all
contingent truths, must have some underlying ground or "truth-maker,"
then one will reject the idea that there are counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom available to God prior to creation.
The most important philosophical argument for Open Theism is based on
the idea that God's foreknowledge of one's actions is incompatible
with those actions being free because one does not have the power to
bring it about that God has never known something that He does in fact
know. But it is important to note that foreknowledge alone is of no
help to God in providentially directing the course of His creation.
The real competitor to Open Theism as an account of God's providence
is Molinism. Open Theists object to Molinism because they view as
implausible the counterfactual power over the past that Molinism
requires, and because they believe that there are insufficient grounds
for the contingent truth of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom
that Molinists believe God knows via His middle knowledge.
4. Theological Implications
In considering any theology, it is important not only to evaluate the
Scriptural and philosophical arguments for and against the view, but
also to consider how it might be incorporated into one's lived faith.
So, this article ends with a consideration of the practical
implications of Open Theism – for how one views evil, for prayer, and
for how one understands the responsibility for salvation.
The traditional view of divine providence holds that each and every
event occurs according to God's will. The implication that the most
horrendous evils are thus intended by God has troubled many persons.
One of the advantages of Open Theism (and any other view that denies
meticulous providence) is that the responsibility for evil is much
more clearly removed from God and placed upon our free choices.
Because God desires that we freely choose to love Him, he has given us
the freedom to reject Him as well, and our acts of rejection take all
kinds of horrible forms. The responsibility for the evil that we
freely perform is fundamentally ours. While God gave us the ability to
do evil things, He does not in any sense intend that we do them.
Rather, He grieves with and comforts the victims of our sins.
If God's will for the world is inviolable, then we must have faith
that each instance of evil serves some greater good that God has
purposed. On the other hand, if much of the evil in the world is due
to our free choices, then there is significant gratuitous evil that
serves no further purpose. To those who believe that much of the evil
in the world is indeed gratuitous, Open Theism provides an
understanding of God's general project that explains why He allows us
to exercise our freedom in ways that sadden Him. He does this because
He must do so in order to also allow us the freedom to reciprocate His
unfailing love for us.
Not everyone finds this kind of free will defense against the problem
of evil comforting. If Open Theism is true, then there is no guarantee
that everything will work out as God wants in the end. Open Theists
may trust and hope in God's wisdom and power, but they recognize that
there are limitations on what God can effect if we stubbornly refuse
to aid Him. Some persons find it easier to have faith in an
inscrutable secret will of God that is furthered by the evil we
witness. This response to evil also has the advantage of applying to
natural evil as well as evil events that result from our actions.
While Open Theists may point out that much of the "natural" evil in
the world is exacerbated by our poor stewardship of the earth, they
must also seek additional explanations for God's allowance of the
devastation and suffering brought about by natural disasters.
Just as one's views of freedom and of whether the past is fixed in
such a way to rule out counterfactual power over it are good
predictors of whether one finds Open Theism plausible, one's reaction
to evil is also a reliable indicator of how one thinks of Open Theism.
If one cannot imagine that a good and loving God would intend that
genocide, torture, rape, and other horrendous evils occur for some
inscrutable good, then one is likely to find a free will theodicy, and
Open Theism, comforting. If instead one cannot imagine that God would
allow us to perform such horrible acts, or allow the massive suffering
caused by natural disasters, without there being some very great good
that they serve, then one is likely to put one's faith in the
mysterious but certain goodness of God's meticulous governance of
creation.
One of the advantages of Open Theism against any theology that affirms
divine foreknowledge or foreordination is that prayer can genuinely
influence God's decisions. Because the future is open and not yet
determined, we may pray that God will exercise His influence in ways
we desire. We may ask that He will aid ourselves or others. We may
easily make sense of James' assertion that "You do not have, because
you do not ask God." (Ja. 4:2b) In contrast, if God determines the
occurrence of each and every event, then He also determines whether
and how we pray. On a traditional view of God that affirms His
meticulous sovereignty, our prayer is ultimately brought about by God;
it cannot persuade God. And even if God merely foreknows our prayers
as part of His exhaustive foreknowledge, rather than bringing those
prayers about, He also foreknows His response to those prayers, so
that there is no greater room for our prayers to influence God's
decisions. Only if the future is open does prayer that God will act in
certain ways make sense. Since we often pray in this way, this is an
important consideration in favor of Open Theism.
However, proponents of more traditional views of sovereignty can
attempt to minimize the purported advantage that Open Theism has for
understanding prayer by asking what essential role prayer plays in
God's decision-making, even if Open Theism is true. Since God knows
everything about the past and present, and the probabilities of what
might occur in the future, can prayer really inform God of anything?
He already knows our every thought and desire, and whether our wants
are likely to be good for us. Given this, should we think of God as
waiting for us to pray to take whatever action seems best for those
for whom we pray? Perhaps. It may be that the action of making a
request is important – perhaps we do not really understand what it is
we would ask, until we bring ourselves to ask it. It also may be that
God sometimes grants requests that we make, even though He believes
that they are ill-advised, because He believes that we will learn
important lessons from pursuing the course of action we desire. Open
Theists may respond to the above line of criticism in various ways,
but it should be clear that the advantage that Open Theists have for
understanding prayer as a means of influencing God is not as great as
it initially appears.
The critical questions about how our prayers might influence the
actions God chooses to take in the world do not apply in the same way
to prayers for divine guidance. Here too, Open Theists have the
advantage of a view that allows God to genuinely guide and advise His
followers, because the future is not determinate. We may pray that God
would guide us in important choices that we must make, trusting in His
greater knowledge of the possible and probable effects of these
choices. This too is an important kind of prayer that we often
exercise, and so the advantage of being able to understand how God
might genuinely guide us in response to prayers that He do so is an
important benefit of affirming Open Theism. Molinists may say that God
chooses to create a world in which He always knows that and how we
will pray, in which He knows how He will respond to these prayers, and
in which He knows how we will respond to His "guidance." But assuming
that Open Theists are right to deny counterfactual power over the
past, God's responses to prayer given Molinism cannot constitute
advice that one may take or not, as it does given Open Theism,
precisely because Molinists view the future as determinate and known
by God once God has willed His initial creation.
Of course, God's guidance is limited to His knowledge of how things
will probably go if one thing is done rather than another. He cannot
know what will happen as a result of our decision so long as the
effects of that decision will be influenced by other free decisions.
And the further in the future we consider, the less certain that even
God can be of what will occur. So while God's advice about what to do
is certainly much better than any other person's, it is no guarantee
that everything will in fact go well. Furthermore, the idea of praying
for guidance is most easily understood on a dialogical model, in which
we speak with and hear from God. If one does not feel that God usually
communicates with us so directly, then it is harder to understand how
He might guide us in any precise way. It is important to note that
seeking "signs" of God's will for us is not likely to be particularly
reliable if those signs could also be brought about or blocked by
other free agents.
In light of the above discussion, we may conclude that Open Theists
can understand the efficacy of prayers that God will act in certain
ways and prayers for divine guidance in decision-making. In contrast,
those who affirm meticulous providence or exhaustive and settled
foreknowledge of what will contingently occur plausibly cannot
understand this efficacy, since there seems to be no room for our
prayers to affect God or for His response to them to affect our
decisions, if the decisions of both God and ourselves have always been
foreknown, and perhaps foreordained. But we have also seen that what
initially seems to be a clear advantage for Open Theism is tempered by
questions about how exactly we might influence God, and about how
exactly He might communicate His advice to us in response to prayers
for guidance.
The final theological implication of Open Theism that requires
discussion is the degree to which we have a greater responsibility for
our salvation if Open Theism is true. Traditionally, Christians have
emphasized that we are constrained by our sinful nature in such a way
that we cannot respond favorably to God without additional grace given
by Him. If this grace is both necessary and sufficient for a
"salvific" faith, then the ultimate cause of whether one is saved or
not is God's giving or withholding of that grace, rather than any
"choice" one makes. Open Theism claims that it is essential that the
choice for or against God that determines our salvation be genuinely
up to us. We must be free to choose to love or reject God, in order
for our choice to love Him to be genuine, and giving us that genuine
choice is the reason that God has given us libertarian freedom.
To what extent is God's glory diminished by His giving us a greater
role in our salvation, that of genuinely choosing whether or not to
follow Him? While some opponents of Open Theism have argued that any
attribution to human persons of an ability to determine a necessary
condition of salvation impugns God's sovereignty, it is not at all
clear that this is so. If Open Theism is true, we are still dependent
on God's gracious and freely-given invitation to us to love Him and
thereby be saved. Open Theists may even affirm a doctrine of sin that
predicates to us an inability to respond favorably to God without
further enabling grace. But they claim that God has extended this
enabling grace to all persons through Jesus Christ and the Holy
Spirit. The only thing that we do is decide whether or not to accept
the greatest gift imaginable. There is no cause for pride on our part
in making the right choice. If we truly appreciate God's glorious
sovereignty, rather than requiring that His sovereignty be understood
in particular ways, then the only appropriate response to God's
invitation involves humility.
The debate over whether Open Theism correctly portrays God's
relationship to His creation involves a complicated web of Biblical
data, philosophical arguments, and reflection on the practical
theological implications of the view. Certain points of contention
clearly divide those who might consider Open Theism from those who
will not: a belief that libertarian freedom is essential to moral
responsibility, a belief that the past is fixed in such a way that we
do not have the ability to bring it about that it was always
different, and a belief that evil should be attributed to our
imperfect human decisions rather than to a secret inscrutable will of
God. Of these three beliefs, it is the second that divides Open
Theists from Molinists, who also affirm libertarian freedom but
attempt to do so in concert with meticulous providence. Even if one
affirms all three of these beliefs, however, there remains the hard
work of slowly working through a detailed examination of Scripture and
reflection on the Christian life. This is the case for any theology,
and it is perhaps especially so for a relatively young theology such
as Open Theism.
5. References and Further Reading
a. For Open Theism
* David Basinger, The Case for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical
Assessment (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996).
o A brief consideration of freewill theism generally, and
open theism specifically, especially as applied to the topics of
omniscience, evil, and prayer.
* Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to
the Open View of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2000).
o A brief and easy to read consideration of the Biblical
case for Open Theism.
* Terence Fretheim, The Suffering of God: An Old Testament
Perspective, Overtures to Biblical Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1984).
o A study of the use of metaphors in describing God in the
Old Testament, and a case for predicating suffering, and thus genuine
responsiveness, to God.
* William Hasker, "Foreknowledge and Necessity," Faith and
Philosophy 2, no. 2 (April 1985), 121-157.
o An extended argument that foreknowledge is incompatible
with libertarian freedom.
* William Hasker, God, Time and Knowledge, Cornell Studies in the
Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).
o A book length exposition of the philosophical case for
Open Theism. Also a good place to start to get a sense of the
philosophical debate over the relationship of freedom and divine
foreknowledge.
* William Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God,
Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Routledge,
2004).
o A consideration of the strengths of Open Theism in
comparison with Calvinism, process theism, and Molinism, especially
with regard to the problem of evil and the question of divine action
within the world.
* Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God's Openness
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2001).
o An exposition of Open Theism in terms of the controlling
metaphor of God as love that treats in turn: the Scriptural
foundations for Open Theism, the development of traditional
Christianity influenced by Hellenic philosophy, the philosophical case
for Open Theism, and Open Theism's adequacy to the practical demands
of living one's faith.
* Clark H. Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker,
and David Basinger. The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the
Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity,
1994).
o The book that began the extensive debate over Open Theism.
A series of five essays that consider Biblical and historical
considerations in favor of Open Theism, what a systematic openness
theology amounts to, the philosophical case for this view, and its
practical implications. An appropriate starting point for anyone
interested in learning about Open Theism.
* Richard Rice, God's Foreknowledge and Man's Free Will (Eugene,
OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2004). Previously published as The
Openness of God: The Relationship of Divine Foreknowledge and Human
Free Will (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1980).
o An early argument for the present-knowledge or open view of God.
* John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence
(Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1998).
o The best exposition of Open Theism to date, especially
with respect to the Biblical case for the view, and in systematically
setting out openness theology. Also an excellent source of additional
references to texts related to Open Theism.
* Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, rev. ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993).
o A penetrating philosophical case for understanding theism
in a manner that accords with Open Theism's view, made prior to the
widespread use of that term.
b. Against Open Theism
* William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of
Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock
Publishers, 2000).
o An argument for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge
and human libertarian freedom based on Molinism's attribution to God
of middle knowledge of subjunctive conditionals about what free agents
will do in particular circumstances (counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom).
* Millard Erickson, What does God Know and When does He know it?:
The Current Controversy over Divine Foreknowledge (Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, 2003).
o An extended argument against Open Theism that also calls
for greater moderation and civility in the debate over the topic.
* Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
o The most thorough explication of Molinism, with critiques
of both orthodox Thomistic and Open Theistic views of divine
providence.
* John Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism
(Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2001).
o A critique of Open Theism based on a Reformed reading of Scripture.
* Norman L. Geisler and H. Wayne House, The Battle for God:
Responding to the Challenge of Neotheism, (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregal
Publications, 2001).
o Calling Open Theism "neotheism," this work argues that
Open Theism is dangerously far from traditional Christianity, and
seeks to explicate the orthodox view of God's attributes.
* Paul Helm, The Providence of God. Contours of Christian
Theology, (Downers Grove: IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994).
o A systematic explication of God's providence as risk-free
meticulous sovereignty.
* Beyond the Bounds: Open Theism and the Undermining of Biblical
Christianity, edited by John Piper, Justin Taylor, and Paul Helseth
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2003).
o A series of essays arguing that Open Theism is unorthodox
and not an acceptable form of Christianity.
* Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election,
Foreknowledge, and Grace, edited by Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A.
Ware (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2000).
o A series of essays explicating and defending the classical
view of divine sovereignty.
* Bruce A. Ware, God's Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open
Theism (Wheaton, Ill: Crossway Books, 2001).
o An argument, primarily based on his reading of Scripture,
that Open Theism is false and its consequences are dire.
* R. K. McGregor Wright, No Place for Sovereignty: What's Wrong
with Freewill Theism (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996).
o An attempt to show what's wrong biblically, theologically,
and philosophically with freewill theism, both in its contemporary
(Open Theism) and historical forms (Arminianism).
c. Multiple Views
* Predestination and Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty
and Human Freedom, edited by David Basinger and Randall Basinger
(Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986).
o Essays in favor of foreordination (John Feinberg),
foreknowledge (Norman Geisler), God's self-limited power (Bruce
Reichenbach), and God's self-limited knowledge (Clark Pinnock), with
responses by each author to the other essays.
* Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, edited by James Beilby and
Paul Eddy (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001).
o Essays in favor of Open Theism (Gregory Boyd), simple
foreknowledge (David Hunt), middle knowledge or Molinism (William Lane
Craig), and the Augustinian-Calvinist view (Paul Helm), with responses
by each author to the other essays.
* God and Time: Four Views, edited by Gregory Ganssle (Downer's
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001).
o Essays on divine timeless eternity (Paul Helm), eternity
as relative timelessness (Alan Padgett), timelessness and
omnitemporality (William Lane Craig), and unqualified divine
temporality (Nicholas Wolterstorff), with responses by each author to
the other essays.
* Christopher Hall and John Sanders, Does God Have a Future?: A
Debate on Divine Providence, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2003).
o The product of a year's dialogue via email between Hall,
who affirms a classical theism, and Sanders, an Open Theist, about
divine providence and foreknowledge.
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