that emphasizes the application of methods, results, and theories from
the empirical sciences. It contrasts with approaches that emphasize a
priori conceptual analysis or insist on a theory of knowledge that is
independent of the particular scientific details of how mind-brains
work.
Varieties of naturalistic epistemology differ in terms of how they
conceive the relationship between empirical science and epistemology,
how much they rely on empirical science in theorizing about knowledge,
and which sciences they take to be particularly relevant to
epistemological questions. Naturalistic epistemologists such as W.V.
Quine regard epistemology as part of psychology while others such as
Alvin Goldman think it merely needs aid from the empirical sciences.
On the other hand, Thomas Kuhn thinks that the social sciences should
be applied to epistemology. Regardless, the importance of the sciences
to epistemology is undisputed among naturalistic epistemologists.
Among the topics within this discipline, the debate on the internal
and external theories for the justification of beliefs is one of the
main issues. Donald Davidson and John Pollock are major naturalistic
epistemologists that support internalism. Alvin Goldman, on the other
hand, supports externalism. The issue of a priori knowledge and the
problem of induction are also topics for debate within naturalistic
epistemology.
Lastly, naturalistic epistemology is not without criticism. Among the
problems for naturalistic epistemology are the circularity problem and
the problem of normativity. With regard to the aims of unifying
science and philosophy, solutions to these problems are of crucial
importance for naturalistic epistemologists.
1. Key Figures in Naturalistic Epistemology
a. W. V. Quine
W. V. Quine usually gets credit for initiating the contemporary wave
of naturalistic epistemology with his essay, "Epistemology
Naturalized." In that essay, he argues for conceiving epistemology as
a "chapter of psychology," and for seeing epistemology and empirical
science as containing and constraining one another.
Quine's argument depends on three potentially controversial
assumptions. First is confirmation holism – the view that only
substantial bodies of theory, rather than individual claims, are
empirically testable. Second, Quine assumes epistemology's main
problem is to explain the relationship between theories and their
observational evidence. Third, he assumes there are only two ways to
approach that problem. One is the psychological study of how people
produce theoretical "output" from sensory "input," and the other is
the logical reconstruction of our theoretical vocabulary in sensory
terms. In Quine's view, the second approach cannot succeed, and so we
are left with psychology.
The idea behind reconstructing theoretical vocabulary in sensory terms
is to model epistemology on studies in the foundations of mathematics.
Such studies show how to translate mathematical statements into the
language of logic and set theory, and they show how to deduce suitably
translated mathematical theorems from logical truths and set theoretic
axioms. This allows us to judge the strength of our justification in
believing mathematical claims: we are as justified in believing them
as we are in believing the logical truths and set-theoretic axioms.
Logical Empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap sought a similar account of
our justification for believing scientific theories. Given a
translation of theoretical claims into observational vocabulary, we
might be able to show how our theories could be derived logically from
observation sentences, logical truths, and set theory.
Such a project could not be a complete success. For one thing (as
Carnap was well aware), our theories cannot be derived logically from
observations – the theories include generalizations covering
unobserved cases. Nevertheless, such philosophers as Carnap thought
the translation of theory into observational terms would be useful. It
would allow us to see just how far our theories outstrip their
observational evidence.
Quine emphasizes a second reason why the reconstructive approach must
fail: Theoretical statements cannot, in general, be translated into
purely observational vocabulary. To effect such translations, we would
need to identify the observational conditions of verification (or
disconfirmation) for individual theoretical statements. But, as Quine
argues in his other most famous essay, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism,"
individual theoretical statements do not have unique conditions of
verification (or disconfirmation). Rather, we must test theoretical
statements in groups large enough to have observational consequences,
and the results confirm or disconfirm the groups as wholes. When the
observations a theory predicts do not pan out, there is typically a
wide range of adjustments we could make in response. We might, for
example, give up the claim that this liquid is an acid, or the claim
that this is a piece of litmus paper, or the claim we are not
hallucinating, etc.
So, Quine's assumption of confirmation holism undermines the
possibility of reconstructing theoretical vocabulary in observational
terms. Consequently, the reconstructionist approach cannot succeed.
Given Quine's other assumptions, then, the only method left for
epistemology is the psychological method: to study empirically how
people transform sensory input into theoretical output.
Knowledge thus approached is a natural phenomenon, the outcome of a
natural process whereby sensory stimulation leads to theories about
the world. To understand the connection between the stimulation and
the theories – and to understand how far beyond the stimulation our
theories go – we study the process scientifically. The point is not to
"reconstruct" the transition, but to understand it as it actually
occurs.
Quinian naturalistic epistemology is thus "contained" in psychology as
a subdiscipline. Quine also notes, however, that there is a sense in
which naturalistic epistemology "contains" the rest of science. Our
theories and beliefs about the world, which constitute our science,
are part of epistemology's subject matter. Because they "contain" one
another, epistemology and the rest of science can be mutually
constraining. Not only should our scientific theories pass epistemic
muster, but our epistemological theories must fit appropriately with
the rest of our scientific worldview. This conception of the
relationship between science and epistemology contrasts vividly with
the traditional view of epistemology as "queen of the sciences." It is
probably the most influential aspect of Quine's naturalism.
b. Alvin Goldman
Unlike Quine, Alvin Goldman is concerned with such traditional
epistemological problems as developing an adequate theoretical
understanding of knowledge and justified believing. Also in contrast
to Quine, he does not see epistemology as part of science. Instead,
Goldman thinks that answering traditional epistemological questions
requires both a priori philosophy and the application of scientific
results. As he often puts it, Goldman's naturalism is the view that
epistemology "needs help" from science.
Goldman's theory of knowledge is a form of causal reliabilism. On such
a view, a justified true belief counts as knowledge only if it is
caused in a suitably reliable way. To be "suitably reliable," a
belief-forming process must have a propensity to produce more true
beliefs than false ones, and the process's own causal ancestry must
have a greater propensity to produce reliable processes than
unreliable ones. Though Goldman argues for this view of knowledge on
primarily a priori grounds – e.g., by considering how well it captures
our intuitive classifications of beliefs as cases of knowledge or not
– the theory itself gives empirical science an important place in our
understanding of knowledge.
The most obvious place where psychology matters in this theory of
knowledge is in the identification and evaluation of belief-forming
processes. It is psychology that tells us what processes cause our
beliefs, and it is psychology that enables us to judge their
reliability. Consequently, the determination whether a particular
belief is a case of knowledge will turn on both philosophical and
psychological considerations. Philosophically, we can say that the
belief (if justified and true) is knowledge if it was caused in a
suitably reliable way. The question whether it was caused in such a
way, however, is a question for empirical science.
A related role for psychology is in addressing skeptical problems. If
true, causal reliabilism shows only that knowledge is logically
possible. (It is logically possible for a person to have justified,
true beliefs caused by suitably reliable processes.) The question
whether knowledge is humanly possible, and the question whether anyone
actually knows anything, are both questions whose answers depend on
which cognitive processes are available to humans, and on how reliable
those processes are.
Goldman's approach to epistemic justification is also reliabilist and
grounded in science. The core of his view is that justification is at
least partly a matter of beliefs' being produced by reliable cognitive
processes. Goldman has made numerous modifications to this view, and
he has worked out its details in various ways at different times.
The account of justification Goldman now favors has two components.
First, he thinks it is an important task of epistemology to clarify
and describe our "epistemic folkways," the set of our commonsense
epistemological concepts and principles, including the concept of
justified belief. The second component is a theory of what justified
believing is, based on the principles underlying our commonsense
judgments but perhaps departing from those judgments in certain cases.
To study our epistemic folkways, Goldman thinks it is necessary to
examine empirically the ways in which we apply and acquire our
epistemic concepts, in hopes of determining those concepts'
structures. He hypothesizes that we apply epistemic concepts to
individual cases in much the same way we apply most of our concepts:
by judging how similar or different a particular case is to
stereotypical instances of the concept. In the case of epistemic
justification, he thinks we compare the process whereby a person has
come to believe something with what we take to be typical
justification-conferring processes, such as perception or deduction.
He contends that we take such processes to confer justification
because we take them to be reliable.
Our commonsense understanding of what processes people use to arrive
at their beliefs, and our commonsense assessments of their
reliability, are apt to be quite different from the psychological
truth of the matter. So, in Goldman's view, it is necessary also to
construct a theory of what epistemic justification really is, as
opposed to how common sense takes it to be. That theory will be
grounded in our psychological understanding of how beliefs are formed,
and it will include assessments of those processes in terms of
reliability (as well as problem-solving power and speed, though
Goldman thinks those assessments are only loosely connected to
justification, if at all).
c. Thomas Kuhn
Much naturalistic epistemology looks to psychology and, in certain
cases, the natural sciences to develop an understanding of knowledge.
Especially in the philosophy of science, however, Thomas Kuhn's work
has inspired a naturalistic approach that applies the social sciences
to epistemological questions. Kuhn-inspired naturalism is not
incompatible with the naturalism that draws on psychology and the
natural sciences. Such naturalistic epistemologists as Alvin Goldman
and Philip Kitcher have fruitfully applied insights from both the
natural and the social sciences in the attempt to understand knowledge
as a simultaneously cognitive and social phenomenon.
In his highly influential book, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, Kuhn carefully examines the process of theory change in
science. Unlike earlier approaches, which might, in Carnapian style,
have tried to reconstruct theory changes as driven entirely by
evidence, Kuhn emphasizes how rare it is that scientists reject old
theories in favor of new ones on the basis of data alone. Especially
in the case of "revolutionary" changes – such as the transition from
Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy – the data available to scientists
can be highly ambiguous, and the data often fail to establish
determinately what theoretical framework should win out.
On Kuhn's view, scientific practice is guided by paradigms – theories,
methodologies, and conceptual frameworks that give scientists examples
of "good science" and shape their understanding not only of the world,
but of what science itself is supposed to be like. As paradigms age,
however, they build up not only a record of explanatory and predictive
success, but also a record of failures and unsolved problems.
Revolutions occur when scientists come to see some of the unsolved
problems as both very important and unsolvable from within the
reigning paradigms. New paradigms emerge, and debates rage about
whether to adopt them or to stick to the old way of doing things, in
hopes of eventually solving the threatening problems.
Debates about whether to give up on an old paradigm, Kuhn emphasizes,
cannot be settled by the available data. One reason for this is that
paradigms help scientists to decide what will and what will not count
as data, and they help to determine scientists' judgments about the
import or interpretation of data. Furthermore, it is at most only
rarely that a newly proposed paradigm is incremental in the sense that
it provides solutions to all or most of the problems solved by the old
paradigm, as well as the new problems that have raised questions about
the old paradigm. For example, Kuhn attacks the common view that
Newtonian mechanics is a limiting case of Relativistic mechanics.
Relativity, on his view, does not solve all the Newtonian problems and
others besides. Rather, it replaces the old problems with new ones it
can solve. Adopting a new paradigm, in such cases, is more like
changing the subject than being compelled by the rational force of
evidence.
Kuhn attempts to trace the social and political factors behind theory
changes in science. The available data do not unequivocally favor one
paradigm over others, and scientists do not choose paradigms on the
basis of data. Instead, Kuhn believes social and political forces
guide paradigm changes. Thus, an adequate explanation of scientific
revolutions will be an application of social, political, and
historical analysis, not the logical analysis of the relationship
between theories and evidence. To understand science in Kuhnian
fashion, it is at least as important to understand scientists and what
they do as it is to understand the theories they offer and the
experiments they conduct.
Kuhn's dual emphases on socio-political factors in theory choice and
understanding science by studying the practices of scientists have led
to several different strands of Kuhn-inspired naturalistic philosophy
of science.
The most radical strand is the so-called "sociology of scientific
knowledge," often identified with the "strong programme" of David
Bloor. At the heart of this program is a "symmetry principle," to the
effect that true and false, rational and irrational scientific beliefs
are to be explained in the same way. The explanation of scientific
beliefs is thus to be indifferent to the actual truth of those
beliefs. This agnosticism about the truth of scientific theories leads
strong programme advocates to attempt to explain almost everything
scientists do and say in sociological terms, specifically avoiding any
appeals to how the extra-social world is in explaining scientists'
behavior. The official agnosticism also sometimes appears to transform
itself into a form of constructivism, the view that scientists and
others make the world be as it is by adopting theories, instead of the
world determining (at least partly) what theories scientists will or
should adopt.
A much less radical strand of Kuhn-inspired philosophy of science
(which also owes a debt to Quine) is to be found in the work of Larry
Laudan. He offers a "reticulated model" of science, in which issues
concerning scientific theories, scientific methods, and scientific
aims interact with one another. On this model, theories are not
adopted independently of methodological and axiological commitments,
but neither are those commitments undertaken independently of
theoretical commitments. As one would expect from a naturalist, much
of Laudan's case turns on details concerning the actual unfolding of
the history of science.
In a somewhat similar spirit, such philosophers as Philip Kitcher and
Alvin Goldman have advocated a "social epistemology" partly inspired
by Kuhn. A psychological fact about the conduct of science is that it
is not the mere construction of theories in the face of evidence.
Rather, it is the construction of theories both in the face of
evidence and from within a social context. Scientists' theory choices
thus depend on what evidence they gather and also on social and
political factors, including the organization of the social structures
in which they pursue knowledge. To understand how science happens,
then, one must understand those social structures. As Kitcher and
Goldman emphasize, however, those structures themselves can be
evaluated in reliabilist terms; we can ask (and try to find out) how
well a given social structure promotes the aim of producing true
theories rather than false ones. Kitcher and Goldman have attempted to
answer such questions, and to describe what kinds of social structures
would be most conducive to the promotion of our epistemic and
scientific goals.
2. Naturalistic Epistemology and Current Controversies
Because naturalistic epistemologies can differ from one another so
much, there is rarely a single or standard "naturalistic" approach to
an issue in epistemology. Instead, different naturalists will take
different approaches, depending on their precise views of the
relationship between science and epistemology. This section describes
some naturalistic approaches to three current issues in epistemology:
the internalism/externalism debate, the problem of a priori knowledge,
and the problem of induction.
a. Internalism and Externalism
The debate between internalists and externalists concerns whether
anything besides mental states helps to constitute the justification
of beliefs. Internalists hold that a belief is justified only if it is
appropriately related to other mental states, and externalists hold
that justification comes at least partly from elsewhere, for example
from the reliability of the process that generated a belief.
Naturalistic epistemology is not committed to either internalism or
externalism. Many, perhaps most, naturalistic epistemologists endorse
reliabilist theories of justification or knowledge, and so they are
externalists. Goldman in particular has been a standard-bearer for
externalism.
Among naturalistic epistemologists who endorse internalism are Donald
Davidson and John Pollock. Davidson's naturalism is fairly weak, in
the sense that Davidson does not directly apply much hard science to
epistemological problems. Nevertheless, he does take seriously Quine's
admonition that epistemology is just one part of our going theory of
the world, and he feels free to take for granted such things as the
existence of the external world when it comes to explaining how we
could have knowledge concerning the external world. He also holds that
only another belief can justify a belief, and he thus sees
justification as arising from the relationships among one's beliefs.
Pollock endorses a view he calls "norm internalism." He holds that
beliefs are justified when formed in accord with certain internalized
rules concerning the correct ways to form beliefs. Those internalized
rules are, in his term, "psychologically real," contingent features of
our cognitive architecture. Nevertheless, he also thinks that
experimental studies of reasoning will not be very helpful in
determining the contents of the internalized rules. Rather, he thinks
the best way to learn their contents is by examining our intuitions
about what counts as knowledge or justified belief and what does not.
b. A priori Knowledge
A priori knowledge, if there is any, is knowledge obtained
independently of experience. Quine denies there is a priori knowledge.
To know something a priori, he thinks, it would have to be analytic
(that is, true in virtue of the meanings of the concepts involved),
but there is no analyticity. This rejection of the a priori and
analyticity is part of the package that includes Quine's confirmation
holism. In fact, Quine claims in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" that his
anti-reductionism (that is, his confirmation holism) is really the
same thing as his rejection of analytic truth and a priori knowledge.
It is unsurprising, then, that one might take naturalistic
epistemology to be radically empiricistic and committed to the
non-existence of a priori knowledge.
Recent work in naturalistic epistemology has been far more sympathetic
to the a priori than Quine's. Philip Kitcher has defended a
naturalistic account of a priori knowledge that turns on the
characteristics of the process that produces a belief. Roughly, he
claims that one's knowledge that p is a priori if and only if it comes
from the operation of a process that would have produced knowledge
that p no matter what particular experiences one might have had. It is
important to note here that we cannot simply reflect on the content of
a proposition to determine whether it is knowable a priori in this
sense. Rather, we have to take into account the actual facts about how
our minds work and see whether there is any process that would produce
knowledge of that proposition regardless of one's particular
experiences. It is also doubtful that this sort of a priori knowledge
could play the foundational role rationalists have typically assigned
to the a priori.
Alvin Goldman has outlined a similar account of a priori knowledge.
His account is based on two assumptions. First is his reliabilist
account of epistemic justification. Second is the general idea that a
priori knowledge is knowledge based on processes of "pure thought,"
which operate independently of experience or perception. If we are
able to discover that human beings have reliable innate mechanisms of
ratiocination and calculation – and there is some evidence that we do
– then those mechanisms are reasonably counted as conferring a priori
justification on beliefs. In particular, beliefs derived from the
operations of those mechanisms, without any reliance on perception,
are strong candidates for a priori knowledge.
c. The Problem of Induction
There is no standard naturalistic solution to the problem of
induction, but naturalism does provide a general strategy for dealing
with the problem. In broad strokes, the approach is to look at the
ways in which people actually do perform inductive inferences and to
evaluate those inductive methods along such dimensions as reliability.
One kind of inductive inference involves the projection of properties.
For example, one might believe that robins and sparrows have Factor X
in their blood, and one might then infer that cardinals also have
Factor X in their blood. Hilary Kornblith advocates a naturalistic but
metaphysical explanation for why such patterns of reasoning tend to be
reliable. The causal structure of the world, in his view, leads to a
"clustering" of properties in natural kinds. So, if bird is a natural
kind, then there will be a number of properties birds have in common,
and it is the causal structure of the world that "binds" those
properties together. Furthermore, claims Kornblith, our best
understanding of human inference points to the view that our minds are
natively equipped with mechanisms tuned to the world's causal
structure and to the clustering of properties in natural kinds. In
short, we are hard wired to project properties typically in cases
where the projections will work, owing to the world's causal
structure.
Another kind of inductive inference, however, is probabilistic
inference. For example, we might infer that the next card dealt from
the deck probably will not be a heart, since only one card in four is
a heart. A great deal of work has been done to study how people make
probabilistic inferences, much of it initiated by Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky. The news here has not all been good. Our probabilistic
inferences are often guided by heuristics and biases that lead us to
wrong answers. This could be a case in which investigation of commonly
used cognitive processes shows that they are not reliable or do not
produce justified beliefs. However, some recent work on so-called
"fast and frugal heuristics" aims to show that processes implementing
inference patterns that are formally fallacious – i.e., that violate
the probability calculus – can be effective, fast, and reasonably
reliable in the sorts of environments where those processes evolved.
3. Problems for Naturalistic Epistemology
Naturalistic epistemologies have it in common that they apply
scientific methods, results, and theories to epistemological problems,
though they differ in just which sciences they draw on and how central
a place they give to those sciences. Despite this variation among
naturalistic views, there are also some important objections to doing
epistemology naturalistically at all. Two of those objections center
on the Circularity Problem and the Problem of Normativity.
a. The Circularity Problem
Many philosophers suppose one of epistemology's most important tasks
is to answer the Cartesian skeptic. Such a skeptic denies we could
know most of the things we take ourselves to know, because we cannot
rule out the logical possibility that we are massively deceived about
the world. We might be victims of an evil demon, who is ultimately
responsible for the nature of our experiences, or we might be brains
in vats whose apparent experiences of an apparent external world come
from a scientist armed with electrodes and chemicals.
Naturalistic epistemology seeks to explain knowledge by applying our
best scientific understanding of the mind-brain. When the issue is
skepticism, however, it might appear that using science would be
viciously circular. Our scientific theories depend on our sensory
experience, and so (says the skeptic or the anti-naturalist) we cannot
legitimately appeal to those theories in explaining the possibility or
actuality of perceptual knowledge (for example).
This line of objection to naturalistic epistemology is old, and Quine
discusses it in "Epistemology Naturalized." In general, advocates of
naturalism have had two things to say about it.
First, they point out (as did Hume) that we simply cannot step outside
our going view of the world and evaluate it with no empirical
presuppositions. So, the skeptic's demand for an external validation
of science is misplaced. To understand what knowledge is and how it is
possible, it is necessary to show how the phenomenon of knowledge fits
into the rest of our understanding of things. The result will not be
certainty that our scientific theories are correct, but we do not need
that sort of certainty in order to get by.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, naturalistic epistemologists
sometimes contend the circularity involved is not vicious because it
does not beg the question. There is no guarantee our worldview will be
self-supporting in the sense that our best scientific understanding of
what knowledge is also shows that we do indeed have knowledge of the
external world. It could turn out that, by their own lights, our
scientific theories and our perceptual beliefs are not justified. Such
a result would be disastrous, but naturalistic epistemology does not
exclude it as a possibility. Even though we might not be able to
validate our knowledge of the external world a priori, the fact that
we can validate it at all is significant and non-trivial.
b. The Problem of Normativity
Advocates of naturalistic epistemology have typically countered by
emphasizing the role of our cognitive goals in normative epistemic
evaluations. For example, Goldman points to true belief as one of our
most important cognitive goals, and Quine discusses the "anticipation
of sensory stimulation" as providing a normative checkpoint for
science. Naturalistic epistemology can be normative, on this view,
because it can explain and detect the causal connections between our
belief-forming processes and our cognitive goals. So, one might claim,
epistemic justification is a "good" property of beliefs because
justified beliefs come from reliable processes, and reliable processes
are those whose use tends to promote the valuable goal of believing
what is true and not what is false.
Epistemic value, on this approach, is a form of instrumental value; it
derives from the causal ties between cognitive means and valuable
cognitive ends. Some critics of naturalistic epistemology, notably
Harvey Siegel, have argued that there must be some form of
non-instrumental epistemic value. In light of their criticisms,
advocates of naturalistic epistemology need either to show how a
scientific approach can accommodate non-instrumental value or to
explain why there is no need to do so.
4. Conclusion
Naturalistic epistemologists seek an understanding of knowledge that
is scientifically informed and integrated with the rest of our
understanding of the world. Their methods and commitments differ,
because they have varying views about the precise relationship between
science and epistemology and even about which sciences are most
important to understanding knowledge.
In addressing particular issues, naturalists often make one of two
general sorts of moves. The first is to try to show the issue is
empirical and then to apply scientific data, results, methods, and
theories to it directly. This is what happens when naturalists offer
accounts of a priori knowledge based on cognitive psychology, and even
when they offer naturalized conceptual analyses that they take to be
based on empirical information concerning how concepts are applied.
A second common naturalistic move is to undermine a problem's
motivation by showing it arises only on certain false,
non-naturalistic assumptions. This is what happens when naturalists
reject Cartesian skeptical problems, on the grounds those problems
presuppose that our beliefs about the external world require external
validation before they can be fully justified.
Despite its promise, naturalistic epistemology does face serious
challenges from the problems of circularity and normativity. It is far
from clear they are more serious than the challenges traditional, a
priori epistemology faces, but naturalists certainly need solutions to
the problems. Finding those solutions is one of the most important
philosophical projects in this field that aims to unify science and
philosophy.
5. References and Further Reading
Bloor, D. 1981. The strengths of the strong programme. Philosophy of
the social sciences, v. 11, pp. 199-213.
Davidson, D. 1984. A coherence theory of truth and knowledge. In his:
Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford, UK: Clarendon.
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P., and the ABC Research Group. 1999. Simple
heuristics that make us smart. New York: Oxford U P.
Goldman, A. 1967. A causal theory of knowing. Journal of philosophy,
v. 64, pp. 357-372.
Goldman, A. 1976. Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. Journal of
philosophy, v. 73, pp. 771-791.
Goldman, A. 1986. Epistemology and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U P.
Goldman, A. 1992. Liasons: Philosophy meets the cognitive and social
sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Goldman, A. 1999. a priori warrant and naturalistic epistemology. In:
Tomberlin, J. E., ed., Philosophical Perspectives, v. 13. Cambridge,
UK: Blackwell.
Goldman, A. 1999. Knowledge in a social world. Oxford, UK: Clarendon.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. Judgment under uncertainty:
Heuristics and biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U P.
Kim, J. 1988. What is "naturalized epistemology"? In: Tomberlin, J.
E., ed. Philosophical Perspectives, v. 2. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.
pp. 381-405.
Kitcher, P. 1980. a priori knowledge. The philosophical review, v. 86. pp. 3-23.
Kitcher, P. 1992. The naturalists return. Philosophical Review, v.
101, n. 1. pp. 53-114.
Kitcher, P. 1993. The advancement of science. New York: Oxford U P.
Kornblith, H. 1993. Inductive inference and its natural ground.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kornblith, H. ed. 1994. Naturalizing epistemology, 2d ed. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Kuhn, T. S. 1996. The structure of scientific revolutions, 3d ed.
Chicago: U of Chicago Press.
Lakatos, I. 1971. Philosophical papers. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U P.
Laudan, L. 1977. Progress and its problems. Berkeley: U of California Press.
Laudan, L. 1990. Normative naturalism. Philosophy of science, v. 57,
n. 1, pp. 44-59.
Pollock, J. and Cruz, J. 1999. Contemporary theories of knowledge, 2d
ed. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.
Quine, W. V. 1960. Word and object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Quine, W. V. 1969. Ontological relativity and other essays. New York:
Columbia U P.
Quine, W. V. 1980. From a logical point of view. 2d ed. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard U P.
Quine, W. V. 1992. Pursuit of truth. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U P.
Sellars, W. 1963. Science, perception, and reality. London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul.
Siegel, H.1990. Laudan's normative naturalism. Studies in history and
philosophy of science, v. 21, n. 2, pp. 295-313.
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