Chinese thinker active from the late 5th to the early 4th centuries
BCE. He is best remembered for being the first major intellectual
rival to Confucius and his followers. Mozi's teaching is summed up in
ten theses extensively argued for in the text that bears his name,
although he himself is unlikely to have been its author. The most
famous of these theses is the injunction that one ought to be
concerned for the welfare of people in a spirit of "impartial concern"
(jian'ai) that does not make distinctions between self and other,
associates and strangers, a doctrine often described more
simplistically as "universal love." Mozi founded a quasi-religious and
paramilitary community that, apart from propagating the ten theses,
lent aid to small states under threat from military aggressors with
their expertise in counter-siege technology. Along with the
Confucians, the Mohists were one of the two most prominent schools of
thought during the Warring States period (403-221 BCE), although
contemporary sources such as the Hanfeizi and the Zhuangzi indicate
that the Mohists had divided into rival sects by this time. While
Mohist communities probably did not survive into the Qin dynasty
(221-206 BCE), Mohist ideas exerted a decisive influence upon the
thinkers of early China. Between the late 4th and late 3rd centuries
BCE, later Mohists wrote the earliest extant Chinese treatise on
logic, as well as works on geometry, optics and mechanics. Mohist
logic appears to have influenced the argumentative techniques of early
Chinese thinkers, while Mohist visions of meritocracy and the public
good helped to shape the political philosophies and policy decisions
of both the Qin and Han (202 BCE-220 CE) imperial regimes. In these
ways, Mohist ideas survived well into the early imperial era, albeit
by being absorbed into other Chinese philosophical traditions.
1. Historical Background
The details of Mozi's life are uncertain. Early sources identify him
variously as a contemporary of Confucius or as living after Confucius'
time. Modern scholars generally believe that Mozi was active from the
late 5th to the early 4th centuries BCE, before the time of the
Confucian philosopher Mencius, which places him in the early Warring
States period (403-221 BCE) of ancient Chinese history. Little can be
known of his personal life. Some early sources say that he, like
Confucius, was a native of the state of Lu (in modern Shandong) and at
one point served as a minister in the state of Song (in modern Henan).
According to tradition, he studied with Confucian teachers but later
rebelled against their ideas. As was the case with Confucius, Mozi
probably traveled among the various contending states to present his
ideas before their rulers in the hope of obtaining political
employment, with an equal lack of success.
Mozi founded a highly organized quasi-religious and military
community, with considerable geographical reach. Overseen by a "Grand
Master" (juzi), members of the community — "Mohists" (mozhe) — were
characterized by their commitment to ten theses ascribed to "Our
Teacher Master Mo" (zimozi), versions of which are articulated in the
"Core Chapters" of the eponymous text. Quite apart from propagating
the teachings of Mozi, the Mohist community also functioned as an
international rescue organization that dispatched members versed in
the arts of defensive military techniques to the aid of small states
under threat from military aggressors. This outreach presumably
stemmed from the Mohists' opposition to all forms of military
aggression.
Some scholars speculate that Mozi and the Mohists probably came from a
lower social class than, for instance, the Confucians, but the
evidence is inconclusive and at best suggestive. Nevertheless, if the
conjecture is true, it could well explain the often repetitive and
artless style in which much of the Mozi is composed and the
anti-aristocratic stance of much Mohist doctrine, as well as why the
Mohists paid such attention to the basic economic livelihood of the
common people.
2. The Core Chapters of the Mozi
The text known as the Mozi traditionally is divided into seventy-one
"chapters," some of which are marked "missing" in the received text.
Most scholars believe that the Mozi was probably not written by Master
Mo himself, but by successive groups of disciples and their followers.
No part of the text actually claims to be written by Mozi, although
many parts purport to record his doctrines and conversations.
While there remain intense and complicated scholarly disputes over the
exact dating and provenance of different parts of the Mohist corpus,
it is probable that chapters 8-37 (the so-called "core chapters")
derive either from the teachings of Mozi himself or from the formative
period of the Mohist community and contain doctrines that were
nominally adhered to by its members throughout much of the community's
existence. The core chapters are replete with the formula "the
doctrine of Our Teacher Master Mo says" (zimozi yan yue), prefixed to
sayings presented as records of Master Mo's teaching. (However, since
the text most likely was not written by Mozi himself, this entry will
refer to the doctrine presented in the core chapters in terms of "the
Mohists" and "Mohist doctrine" rather than "Mozi" and "Mozi's
doctrine.")
The core chapters consist of ten triads of essays, with seven chapters
marked "missing." Each triad of chapters correlates with one of the
ten Mohist theses. Traditionally, these triads correspond to the
"upper" (shang), "middle" (zhong) and "lower" (xia) versions of the
thesis in question; in Western scholarship, they are usually referred
to as versions "A," "B," and "C" of the corresponding thesis.
Intriguingly, the chapters that make up each triad often are very
close to each other in wording without being exactly identical, thus
raising questions about the precise relationship between them and with
how the text assumed its present shape. One influential theory in
recent times is Angus C. Graham's proposal that the triads correspond
to oral traditions of Mohist doctrine transmitted by the three Mohist
sects mentioned in the Hanfeizi, a third century BCE philosophical
text associated with a student of the Confucian thinker Xunzi.
Much of the core chapters is written in a style that is not calculated
to please. As Burton Watson puts it, the style is "marked by a
singular monotony of sentence pattern, and a lack of wit or grace that
is atypical of Chinese literature in general." But Watson also
concedes that the Mohists' arguments "are almost always presented in
an orderly and lucid, if not logically convincing fashion." Whether or
not the arguments of the core chapters are logically convincing can
only be determined on a case-by-case basis, but it is at least
possible that the artless style is the consequence of a deliberate
choice to prioritize clarity of argumentation.
3. The Ten Core Theses of Mohism
The contents of the ten triads and thus the outlines of the ten core
theses are briefly described below:
Chapters 8-10, "Elevating the Worthy" (shangxian), argue that the
policy of elevating worthy and capable people to office in government
whatever their social origin is a fundamental principle of good
governance. The proper implementation of such a policy requires that
the rulers attract the talented to service by the conferring of honor,
the reward of wealth and the delegation of responsibility (and thus
power). On the other hand, the rulers' practice of appointing kinsmen
and favorites to office without regard to their abilities is
condemned.
Chapters 11-13, "Exalting Unity" (shangtong), contain a
state-of-nature argument on the basis of which it is concluded that a
unified conception of what is morally right (yi) consistently enforced
by a hierarchy of rulers and leaders is a necessary condition for
social and political order. The thesis applies to the world community
as a whole, conceived as a single moral-political hierarchy with the
common people at the bottom, the feudal princes in the middle, and the
emperor at the summit, above whom is Heaven itself.
Chapters 14-16, "Impartial Concern" (jian'ai), argue that the cause of
the world's troubles lies in people's tendency to act out of a greater
regard for their own welfare than that of others, and that of
associates over that of strangers, with the consequence that they
often have no qualms about benefiting themselves or their own
associates at the expense of others. The conclusion is that people
ought to be concerned for the welfare of others without making
distinctions between self, associates and strangers.
Chapters 17-19, "Against Military Aggression" (feigong), condemn
military aggression as both unprofitable (even for the aggressors) and
immoral. Version C introduces a distinction between justified and
unjustified warfare, claiming that the former was waged by the
righteous ancient sage rulers to overthrow evil tyrants.
Chapters 20-21 (22 is listed as "missing"), "Frugality in
Expenditures" (jieyong), argue that good governance requires thrift in
the ruler's expenditures. Useless luxuries are condemned. The chapters
also argue for the clear priority of functionality over form in the
making of various human artifacts (clothing, buildings, armor and
weapons, boats and other vehicles).
Chapter 25 (23-24 are listed as "missing"), "Frugality in Funerals"
(jiezang), has the same theme as "Frugality in Expenditures," but
applies it to the specific case of funeral rituals. The aristocratic
practices of elaborate funerals and prolonged mourning are condemned
as "not morally right" (buyi) because they are not only useless to
solving the world's problems, but add to the people's burdens. Here,
the Mohists target practices beloved by their Confucian
contemporaries, for whom the maintenance of harmonious moral order in
society is best accomplished through strict fidelity to ritual codes.
Chapters 26-28, "Heaven's Will" (Tianzhi), argue that the will of
Heaven (Tian) — portrayed as if it is a personal deity and
providential agent who rewards the good and punishes the wicked — is
the criterion of what is morally right. Here again, the Mohists
contrast themselves with the Confucians, who regard Heaven as a moral
but mysterious force that does not intervene directly in human
affairs.
Chapter 31 (29-30 are listed as "missing"), "Elucidating the Spirits"
(minggui), claims that a loss of belief in the existence, power and
providential character of spirits — supernatural agents of Tian tasked
with enforcing its sanctions — has led to widespread immorality and
social and political chaos. The chapter consists of an exchange with
certain skeptics, whom Mozi answers with arguments purporting to prove
that providential spirits exist, but also that widespread belief in
their existence brings great social and political benefit.
Chapter 32 (33-34 are listed as "missing"), "Against Music" (feiyue),
condemns the musical displays of the aristocracy as immoralon the same
basis according to which elaborate funerals and prolonged mourning are
condemned in "Frugality in Funerals." Just as in that chapter, here
again the Mohists attack practices that are particularly dear to their
Confucian rivals, who believe that music, if properly performed
according to ancient canons, can play a vital role in the regulation
of moral order and the cultivation of virtue.
Chapters 35-37, "Against Fatalism" (feiming), argue against the
doctrine of fatalism (the thesis that human wisdom and effort have no
effect on the outcomes of human endeavor) as pernicious and harmful in
that widespread belief in it will lead to indolence and chaos. The
chapters also contain crucial discussions on the general conditions or
criteria (traditionally called the "Three Tests of Doctrine") that
must be met by any doctrine if it is to be considered sound. (See
Section 5: "Moral Epistemology" below.)
4. The Aims and Character of Mohist Doctrine
As in the case of many other philosophical conceptions in early China,
Mohist doctrine is deeply rooted in the thinkers' response to the
social and political problems that are perceived to beset the world
(tianxia, "all beneath Heaven"). In particular, the Mohists are
concerned to offer a practical solution to the chaos (luan) of the
world so as to restore it to good order (zhi). A way to characterize
the Mohists' concern is to say that they (like many early Chinese
philosophers) seek and to put the Way (dao, the right way to live and
to conduct the community's affairs) into practice rather than merely
to discover and state the Truth about the universe. But there are also
several more distinctively Mohist twists to this underlying concern.
First, the Mohists tend to equate the Way with a conception of what is
morally right (yi or renyi ). For them, good order obtains when "right
rules" (yizheng) rather than "might rules" (lizheng) in the world, and
"right rules" when agents (both individual and groups) conduct
themselves in a manner that is morally right. A way by which we might
make sense of the Mohists' project is to see it as concerned with
promoting the public good, where the public good is defined in terms
of social and political justice.
Second, Mohist doctrine is almost exclusively concerned with moral
behavior rather than moral character although, to be more precise,
the main object of moral evaluation in Mohist doctrine is usually a
way of conduct (for the individual) or a policy (for the state),
rather than individual acts. In line with this focus on behavior,
concepts that are naturally understood to be virtues or desirable
qualities of agents (e.g., benevolence and filial piety) in Confucian
texts often are discussed as if they are reducible to the moral
rightness of conduct. In "Frugality in Funerals," for instance, "the
business of the filial son" is abandoned in favor of benefiting the
world, which is in turn, a criterion of moral rightness (see the next
section).
Third, the Mohists see the morally right as conceptually distinct from
the customary or traditional. An argument that appeals to the
distinction can be found in "Frugality in Funerals." The Mohists
point to the variety between burial customs among the tribal peoples
on the periphery of the Chinese world and note that, although what the
tribes practice is customary within their communities, these practices
also are all understood by an elite Chinese audience to be barbaric
and immoral. The Mohists thus urge that, just because elaborate
funerals and lengthy mourning are customary practices among the
gentlemen of the central states, this fact alone will not secure their
consistency with moral rightness.
Fourth, for the Mohists, the Way is the subject of explicit expression
in the form of "doctrine" (yan). Before proceeding with this point,
it must be stressed that the term yan in the core chapters and other
texts contemporary to the period ( the Mencius for instance) is often
not best taken as "language" or "speech" in any generic sense. Rather,
it often means "doctrine" or "maxim of conduct," a verbal package
meant to guide individual conduct and state policy. In other words, we
can take yan in the core chapters as the verbal counterpart to a
conception of the Way, a linguistic formula that identifies a Way of
life and guiding the conduct of those who hold to it.
Not only are Mozi and the Mohists concerned to advance a Way, they are
explicit in verbalizing their Way as doctrine, offering arguments for
it and defending it against rival doctrines. In disputation, they
often first formulate their rivals' positions as opposing doctrines
before attempting to refute them. They also often identify rivals by
the doctrines they supposedly "hold to" (for instance, they speak of
"the doctrine of those who hold to [the thesis that] ("fate exists'"
in "Against Fatalism"). There is even a tendency to see the
problematic conduct of people as largely springing from wrong
doctrine, quite apart from the concern to offer arguments against
various opponent positions. In addition, when the Mohists evaluate a
practice or way of conduct, they sometimes speak in terms of
evaluating the doctrinethat (putatively) corresponds to that practice
(see, for instance, "Frugality in Funerals").
The "Ten Theses" as a whole can thus be taken as presenting the sum of
Mohist doctrine, which is itself the verbal or linguistic counterpart
to their Way, their conception of what is morally right. The
characteristically Mohist tendency to see the Way as open to
linguistic formulation puts them in sharp contrast with "Daoist"
traditions such as those associated with Laozi and Zhuangzi. In fact,
as Robert Eno has argued, the Mohist focus on doctrine very likely
forms the polemical background to the critique against language in
texts such as the "Discourse on Making Things Equal" chapter in the
Zhuangzi.
5. Moral Epistemology
One of the philosophically most interesting aspects of the Mohist
concern with doctrine is their explicit discussion of criteria for
evaluating doctrine in the "Against Fatalism" chapters. The "Three
Tests of Doctrine" are introduced as the "standards" or "gnomons" (yi)
without which doctrinal disputes become futile. As version C puts it:
"To expound doctrine without first establishing standards (yi) is like
telling time using a sundial that has been placed on a spinning
potter's wheel." The consequence is that the dispute will be
interminable.
Although each version of "Against Fatalism" lists three "Tests," the
lists differ and a total of four distinct "Tests" can be identified:
Conformity to the Will of Heaven and the Spirits — this criterion is
mentioned only in "Against Fatalism" B but forms the subject matter of
the "Heaven's Will" chapters. In those chapters, we can also find the
claim that Heaven's will is to Mozi like as "the compass is to a
wheelwright or the setsquare is to a carpenter." Just as the
wheelwright and carpenter use these tools to evaluate if some object
is properly considered round or square, so Mozi is said to lay down
Heaven's will as a model (fa) and establish it as a standard (yi) by
which conduct and doctrines can be evaluated.
Conformity to the teaching and practice of the ancient sage kings —
Varieties of this "Test" are reported in all versions of "Against
Fatalism" and its application can be seen throughout the core
chapters.
Good consequences for the welfare of the world (especially the
material wellbeing of the common people understood in terms of them
having food, shelter and rest) — Varieties of this "Test" are also
reported in all versions of "Against Fatalism" and a lengthy
elaboration can also be found in "Frugality in Funerals."
Confirmation by the testimony of the masses' sense of sight and
hearing — This "Test" is listed in "Against Fatalism" A and C, and
there are only two certain applications" in the core chapters: in the
"Elucidating Ghosts" chapter as part of the proof that providential
ghosts exist, and in "Against Fatalism" B as part of the argument
against the doctrine of fatalism.
There seems to be a widespread temptation to construe the different
"Tests" in the following way: if a doctrine (yan) passes a "Test," it
is true. On this interpretation, the third "Test" might suggest a
pragmatic conception of truth (or at least a pragmatic conception of
the justification of truth claims). But such a reading is at best
underdetermined by the text. It is also unnecessary as long as we keep
in mind that the sort of yan at stake in the Core Chapters is usually
such doctrine as is meant to guide conduct.
With that background in mind, we can at least see the first three
"Tests" as being meant precisely for evaluating such yan as are
naturally evaluated in terms of whether they correctly guide human
conduct, rather than whether they make a true factual claim. This
means that these "Tests" are best taken as criteria for assessing the
soundness of normative rather than descriptive claims. Now given that
Mohist doctrine is meant to be the verbal correlate of their
conception of the Way, which in turn can be taken as their conception
of what is morally right, it follows that "sound doctrine" in the
context of Mohist thought is ultimately doctrine that enjoins morally
right conduct and in this specific sense correctly guides human
conduct. This also implies that each of these "Tests" can be
understood as a criterion for moral rightness.
As for the fourth "Test," while it seems natural to take it as a
criterion for evaluating factual, rather than normative claims, it
should still be kept in mind that the Mohists appear to be primarily
interested in the normative or policy implications of the (putatively
factual) claims involved.
6. The Foundations of Mohist Morality
An intriguing question concerns how the different "Tests of Doctrine"
(and thus the criterion of moral rightness to which each corresponds)
relate to each other and whether any among them is the ultimate
criterion to which the others can be reduced.
Of the three main "Tests," the second one (conformity to the teaching
and practice of the ancient sage kings), is most easily shown to be
derivative. The core chapters define the sage (and the related
"benevolent man," which means roughly "ideal ruler" in context) as
someone whose business it is to bring about order to the world
("Impartial Concern" A) or to promote the world's welfare and
eliminate things that harm it ("Impartial Concern" B, C, "Frugality in
Funerals," "Against Music"). In "Heaven's Will," on the other hand,
the ancient sages are cited as examples of those who conducted
themselves in accordance with Heaven's will. In summary, the ancient
sages are presented by the Mohists as widely acknowledged exemplars of
past rulers who successfully conducted themselves according to the
Way, and the very reason why they are acknowledged to be sage kings is
precisely because they taught sound doctrine and practiced the Way.
Given the wider cultural setting and prevailing rhetorical
conventions, the Mohists' extensive appeal to the example and
authority of the ancient sages is entirely understandable. Whatever
their actual attitudes concerning the deeds and writings of the
ancient sages as constituting a criterion of sound doctrine, the
Mohists present themselves as addressing people who take the moral
example of the ancient sages seriously. In this, their rhetorical
practices do not differ from those of the Confucians. The two groups
even share an overlapping taste in their choice of favored ancient
sages: Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, and Wu.
This leaves Heaven's Will and good consequences for the welfare of the
world as criteria of sound doctrine. There is a strong tradition of
modern interpreters, such as Fung Yu-lan, Angus C. Graham, and
Benjamin Schwartz, who see the latter as primary and take Mohist
doctrine to exemplify a form of utilitarianism. Other scholars, such
as Dennis M. Ahren, David E. Soles, and Augustine Tseu, see the former
as suggesting a divine command theory of morality, although this
interpretation has been criticized by Kristopher Duda among others.
This controversy is not well framed if it is stated purely in terms of
the modern and somewhat alien categories of command theory and
utilitarianism (or consequentialism). But this criticism aside, the
genuine question remains as to how "Heaven's Will" and "good
consequences" relate to each other as criteria of the morally right.
In favor of the position that the criterion of good consequences is
ultimate, it may be pointed out that even within the "Heaven's Will"
chapters, the Mohists argue on the basis that certain ways of conduct
are in accordance with Heaven's Will because they promote the public
good. It is further claimed that Heaven desires that people do certain
sorts of things or conduct themselves in a certain manner because such
conduct will promote the public good, an outcome that Heaven desires.
These considerations suggest that the criterion of Heaven's Will might
ultimately be reducible to that of good consequences.
In response, it is at least possible that while the question what ways
of conduct are morally right? is always answerable in terms of whether
or not a way of conduct promotes good consequences, the separate
question of why these ways of conduct (picked out using the criterion
of good consequences) are ultimately obligatory is answered with
reference to Heaven's Will. If this is right, then there is a sense
in which the two criteria neither reduce to each other nor potentially
conflict, as they answer to different concerns altogether.
In any case, almost all of the Mohists' proposals are explicitly
defended on the basis that adopting them will promote the public good.
We might thus modestly conclude that whatever the final status of
Heaven's Will as a criterion of the morally right, good consequences
for the world is the operational criterion by which the Mohists
evaluate various doctrines and the ways of conduct they verbalize.
This conclusion is lent further support by the fact that Heaven's Will
almost never features as an explicit part of the Mohists' arguments
for their specific proposals outside of the "Heaven's Will" chapters.
7. Impartial Concern
Whether "Heaven's will" or "good consequences for the world" forms the
ultimate criterion of the morally right, the most salient first-order
ethical injunction in Mohist doctrine remains that of "impartial
concern" (jian'ai). This is an injunction that is argued for both on
the basis that it exemplifies Heaven's Will (in the "Heaven's Will"
triad) and that it is conducive to the order and welfare of the world
(in the "Impartial Concern" triad). In addition, the presentation of
the doctrine (in all versions of "Impartial Concern") strongly
suggests that it is meant to be the panacea for all that is seriously
wrong with the world and, to that extent, identifies the main
substance of the Mohists' Way.
As earlier indicated, "impartial concern" might be stated as the
injunction that people ought to be concerned for the welfare of others
without making distinctions between self and others, associates and
strangers. Scrutiny of the core chapters, however, suggests both more
and less stringent interpretations of what it entails by way of
conduct. At one extreme, the injunction seems to require that people
ought (to seek) to benefit strangers as much as they do associates,
and others, as much as they do themselves. At the other extreme, it
only requires that people refrain from harming strangers as much as
they do associates, and others, as much as they do themselves. A
third, intermediate possibility says that people ought (to seek) to
help strangers with urgent needs as much as they do associates, and
others, as much as they do themselves.
The least stringent interpretation is implied by passages (in all
versions of "Impartial Concern") where the injunction is argued for on
the basis that adopting it will put a stop to the violent
inter-personal and inter-group conflicts that beset the world, since
on the Mohist account, it is people's tendency to act on the basis of
a greater regard for their own welfare over that of others, and that
of their associates over that of strangers, that led them to have no
qualms about benefiting themselves or their own associates at the
expense of others and even to do so using violent means. The
injunction of "impartial concern" is meant to be a reversal of this
tendency. On the other hand, the more demanding interpretations are
suggested especially by "Impartial Concern C," in which it is said
that if the doctrine is adopted b people, then not only will people
not fight, the welfare of the weak and disadvantaged will be taken
care of by those better endowed.
Whichever interpretation is taken, the basic injunction points toward
an underlying notion of impartiality. We can take "impartial concern"
as making explicit the notion that the common benefit of the world is,
in some sense, impartially the benefit of everyone.
In "Impartial Concern" C, the Mohists put forward an interesting
thought experiment ostensibly to show that even people who are
committed to being more concerned for the welfare of self that for
that of others, and associates than strangers have some reason to
value impartial concern. They described a scenario in which the
audience is asked to imagine that they are about to go on a long
journey and need to put their family members in the care of another.
The Mohists claim that the obvious and rational choice would be to put
one's family members in the care of an impartialist rather than a
partialist (that is, someone who is committed to "impartial concern"
as opposed to someone who is committed to the opposite).
There are several problems with this argument. It seems to involve a
false dilemma since the options of impartialist and partialist hardly
exhaust the range of possible choices. Even if the Mohists were
correct to claim that the impartialist is the obvious and rational
choice, all it shows is that partialists have good reason to prefer
that other people conduct themselves according to the dictates of
impartial concern, rather than that they have reason to so conduct
themselves, as Chad Hansen and Bryan W. Van Norden have pointed out.
In defense of the Mohists, however, it might be the case that they are
ultimately only concerned to establish that even partialists have
reason to propagate the Mohists' doctrine of impartial concern, a
conclusion that could follow from their argument.
8. Moral Psychology and Human Nature
Mohist doctrine as it is presented in the core chapters does not
contain explicit discussions of the psychological aspects of the
ethical life. "Human nature" (xing), a term that plays an important
role in the thinking of the Confucian thinkers Mencius and Xunzi, as
well as Yang Zhu, does not even appear in the core chapters.
Nonetheless, various aspects of Mohist doctrine might well entail
commitments to potentially controversial positions in moral psychology
and the theory of human nature.
Consider the Mohists' reply to the main objection raised against their
doctrine of "impartial concern" — that the doctrine is overly
demanding, given that people in general just do not have the
motivational resources to act according to its dictates ("Impartial
Concern" B and C). Citing historical accounts, the Mohists respond
that the requirements of "impartial concern" are no harder than the
sorts of things that rulers in the past had been able to demand and
get from their subjects, such as reducing one's diet, wearing coarse
clothing, and charging into flames at the ruler's command. It was
because the rulers delighted in such actions and offered suitable
incentives to encourage them that they were done, even on a regular
basis. The Mohists conclude that people in general can be made to
practice "impartial concern" as long as rulers delight in it and offer
the right incentives to encourage it.
On the basis of passages such as this one, David S. Nivison and Bryan
W. Van Norden argue that either the Mohists held the view that human
nature is infinitely malleable or they thought that there is no human
nature. Such a reading focuses on the extravagant claim made in the
text that as long as the rulers delight in "impartial concern" and
offer the right incentives, human beings (especially the structure of
their motivations) can be radically changed "within a single
generation." While this interpretation certainly is compatible with
the tenor of the text, it is not necessarily the only possible
interpretation. After all, all that is needed for the Mohists to make
their reply is the thought that people — given their nature — can be
made to practice "impartial concern" through offering them the right
leadership and incentives. They hardly need the stronger (and less
plausible) claim that people can be remolded in any fashion whatsoever
given the right leadership and incentives. Furthermore, at least some
of the historical examples cited by the Mohists suggest that they are
thinking more of the people responding to incentives in the
environment (e.g., the comfort-loving courtier wearing coarse clothing
or going on a diet so as to please the ruler) rather than more radical
changes to the structure of their motivations (as might be suggested
by the story of the soldiers who have been conditioned to charge into
flames on the ruler's command).
A weaker and to that extent more defensible interpretation is that the
Mohists do not consider the Way in a Mencian sense — as "the
realization of certain inclinations that human beings already share,"
as Shun Kwong-loi puts it. To be more precise, the Mohists do not
appear to have considered the inclinations and predispositions that
people already have as pointing to the contents of the Way. But they
need not deny that these inclinations might, under suitable conditions
(e.g., under a suitable regime of incentives), furnish the
motivational resources for an agent to conduct himself well (the
"Mohist" Yi Zhi in Mencius 3A5 seems to have taken a version of such a
position) — as long as it is recalled that what counts as "conducting
oneself well" is given by something else other than those inclinations
or their development: sound doctrine established by rational
arguments. Seen this way, the Mohists would be in direct opposition to
Mencius, insofar as Mencius regards those "inclinations that human
beings already share" (explicitly construed within the context of an
account of human nature) as providing both the contents of morality
and the motivational resources for moral cultivation.
9. Government
The Mohists' political ideal is most prominently stated in the
"Elevating the Worthy" and "Exalting Unity" chapters, which include
the only theses that are explicitly said to identify "fundamentals of
governance" (wei zheng zhi ben).
The "Exalting Unity" triad of chapters contains a "state of nature"
argument that bears comparison both with ideas found in the Confucian
philosopher Xunzi and perhaps more remotely, Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan
and the social contract tradition of early modern European thought. As
with the latter, it is at least arguable that even though the account
is couched as if making historical claims about how human beings were
like in a distant past "before there were any laws and criminal
punishment" (version A) or "before there were rulers or leaders"
(versions B and C), its logic is better appreciated if taken as a
thought experiment of what things would be like were certain
hypothetical conditions to hold.
The most important implications of such a hypothesis, for the Mohists,
is that people will hold to different and conflicting opinions about
what is morally right (yi), on the basis of which they will condemn
each other. The end result is a state of violent conflict and chaos.
This chaos is fully resolved only with the installment of a hierarchy
of rulers and leaders consistently enforcing a unified conception of
what is morally right through surveillance and incentives. The
conclusion of the argument is that such a solution is a necessary
condition for social and political order.
The "Elevating the Worthy" triad of chapters, on the other hand,
proposes that good governance requires that the state cultivate worthy
and capable people and employ them as officials, whatever their social
origin. This doctrine opposes a form of meritocracy to the nepotism
and cronyism prevalent among the rulers. It also insists that if the
doctrine is to be successfully carried though, the rulers need to
confer high rank, generous stipend and real power upon the worthy.
Interestingly, in arguing for the doctrine, version B both traces it
to the practices of the ancient sage kings and also says that the
ancients were modeling their regime upon Heaven, thus suggesting that
an application of the criterion of "Heaven's will" in involved.
Nonetheless, the main thrust of all three versions remains that
meritocracy will bring great benefits to the state.
10. Frugality
Three of the ten core Mohist theses are related to the virtue of
frugality: "Frugality in Expenditures," "Frugality in Funerals," and
"Against Music." For the most part, the arguments in these chapters
are paradigmatic cases of "good consequences to the welfare of the
world" as criterion of the morally right. (As mentioned earlier, a
lengthy elaboration of the criterion can be found in the opening parts
of "Frugality in Funerals.") In "Frugality in Expenditures," the
criterion is applied positively through showing that the preferred
policy of government thrift brings about beneficial consequences. In
the other two triads, the criterion is applied negatively through
detailing the harmful consequences that attend elaborate funerals and
prolonged mourning, and extravagant music displays of the aristocracy.
One interesting feature of the arguments in these chapters is the
weight given to the welfare of the common people in the Mohists'
calculation of the benefit and harm that result from the policy under
assessment. This aspect of Mohist doctrine is especially prominent in
"Against Music," where a large part of what counts as the "good
consequences" of a policy is articulated in terms of the common people
receiving enough to eat, being protected from the elements and having
sufficient rest. It thus seems that, despite their commitment to
"impartial concern," the Mohists have a partisan concern for the
interests of the lower social classes. The more charitable
interpretation, however, is that they are accommodating concerns in
the region of distributive justice. That is, the common benefit of the
world is in some sense impartially and equally the benefit of
everyone; but since the Mohists — like most thinkers in ancient China
— do not envision a radical elimination of the vast social, economic
and political inequalities that are simply a fact of life in Warring
States China, the distributive concerns are met by giving extra weight
to the interests of the disadvantaged. This reading is also consonant
with their claim that were "impartial concern" to be widely practice,
the welfare of the weak and disadvantaged will be taken care of by
those better endowed (in "Impartial Concern C").
A more serious charge against the Mohists, however, is that their
doctrine on frugality commits them to an overly restrictive and hence
highly implausible conception of the good. The Confucian thinker Xunzi
defends elaborate Confucian funeral rituals and musical displays
against Mohist attacks by claiming that they given form to, and meet,
the emotional needs of people. Conversely, Mohist doctrine simply
fails to take into account aspects of the human good not reducible to
material livelihood. Insofar as Mohist doctrine does imply such a
reduced conception of the human good, this is a cogent objection.
But insofar as the main weight of the Mohist arguments lies in the
thought that it is unjust of the aristocrats to provide for their own
emotional needs (through elaborate funerals and prolonged mourning) or
refined enjoyment (though elaborate musical displays) through an
imposition upon the labor of the common people, the objection is not
decisive. Interestingly enough, that this what the Mohists have in
mind is indicated in "Against Music." The text apologizes for
attacking the aristocracy's musical displays by conceding that while
music and other refinements are "delightful," they bring no benefit to
the common people and, in fact, harm their livelihood.
11. Just War
The Mohists reserved some of their most trenchant condemnations
against military aggression, asserting that offensive war is harmful
to the welfare of the world and contrary to Heaven's will. One
argument (two variations of which can be found in "Against Military
Aggression" A and "Heaven's Will" C) proceeds by claiming that there
is an analogy between the actions of a military aggressor and those of
people who steal or rob others or who murder. And since (as even the
audience agrees) stealing, robbing and murdering are morally wrong,
and since actions that cause greater harm to others are, to that
extent, greater wrongs, military aggression is a great wrong indeed.
Another series of arguments (in "Against Military Aggression" B and C)
proceeds by pointing out in some detail the economic and human cost of
military aggression even to the aggressors. To the reply that some of
the Warring States appear to have greatly profited from their
aggressive ways, the Mohists point out that they are the rare
exceptions and seeking profit by such means is tantamount to calling a
medication effective that cured four or five out of myriads.
Perhaps as befits the difference in addressee, the second set of
arguments appears more pragmatic as it appeals to the "war-loving"
rulers' sense of self-interest. The earlier argument, on the other
hand, appears to aim showing the gentlemen of the world that they
ought to condemn military aggression if they are to be consistent with
their own normative convictions — if they know that stealing, robbing
and murdering is wrong and blameworthy, they ought also to consider
military aggression wrong and blameworthy.
The objection is raised in "Against Military Aggression" C that the
ancient sage kings waged war, and since they are supposed to be models
of moral rectitude, it follows that war cannot be unqualifiedly wrong.
In response, the Mohists introduce a distinction between justified and
unjustified warfare, claiming that the former was waged by the
righteous ancient sage rulers to overthrow evil tyrants. The precise
criterion of the distinction between the two forms of warfare,
however, is not explicitly spelled out in that chapter. Instead,
justified warfare is associated with supernatural signs indicating
that Heaven has given the ruler a mandate to wage war so as to visit
condign punishment upon some wicked tyrant. This is surprising since
elsewhere ("Impartial Concern" C), the Mohists present the sage Yu's
military campaigns to pacify the unruly Miao tribes as an example of
his "impartial concern" for the welfare of the people of the world.
This suggests that there are ample resources within Mohist doctrine to
spell out the distinction in less exotic terms. But since they did
connect the distinction between justified and unjustified warfare to
Heaven and the spirits, a discussion of the Mohists' religious views
is in order.
12. Heaven and Spirits
Within the core chapters, the Mohists consistently portray Heaven as
if it possesses personal characteristics and exists separately from
human beings, though intervening in their affairs. In particular, they
present Heaven if it is an entity having will and desire, and
concerned about the welfare of the people of the world, even a
providential agent that rewards the just and punishes the wicked
through its control of natural phenomena or by means of its superhuman
intermediaries, the spirits (guishen). Finally, Heaven and the spirits
are also portrayed as the objects of reverence, sacrificial offerings
and supplication ("Heaven's Will" B).
Apart from the earlier mentioned role of Heaven's will in providing a
criterion for what is morally right, the Mohists also blame people's
loss of belief in the existence, power and providential character of
spirits for the perceived immorality and chaos of their time. This
motivates them to argue that such spirits do exist in "Elucidating the
Spirits." But the Mohists' considered position with regards to the
existence of providential spirits as opposed to the usefulness of a
widespread belief in their existence is an ambiguous one at best.
While the first parts of "Elucidating the Spirits" seem aimed at
establishing that the spirits exist (by appealing to the testimony of
people sense of sight and hearing), the bulk of the arguments in the
chapter are better taken as attempts to show that it is socially and
politically beneficial that people in general believe in the existence
of providential spirits and that the government organize its affairs
on the basis that they exist. As the text puts it:
If the fact that ghosts and spirits reward the worthy and punish the
evil can be made a cornerstone of policy in the state and impressed
upon the common people, it will provide a means to bring order to the
state and benefit to the people.
In this regard, an argument that appears towards the end of the
chapter is most telling. To the objection that the doctrine on spirits
entails the need to sacrifice to them, which in turn interferes with
one's duties towards one's living parents, the Mohists reply that if
the spirits do exist, then the sacrifices cannot be considered a waste
of resources; but if they do not exist, then the community can still
come together to share in the communion of the sacrificial wine and
millet and the sacrifice will still serve a socially useful function.
The argument implies that what the Mohists are ultimately concerned to
argue for is neutral with respect to whether or not providential
spirits actually exist, as the author and Benjamin Wong have pointed
out.
13. References and Further Reading
Ahern, Dennis M. "Is Mo Tzu a Utilitarian?" Journal of Chinese
Philosophy 3 (1976): 185-193.
Duda, Kristopher. "Reconsidering Mo Tzu on the Foundations of
Morality." Asian Philosophy 11/1 (2001): 23-31.
Fung Yu-lan. A History of Chinese Philosophy. 2 vols. Trans. Derk
Bodde. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952-53.
Graham, Angus C. Divisions in Early Mohism Reflected in the Core
Chapters of Mo-tzu. Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies,
1985.
Graham, Angus C. Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science. Hong Kong:
Chinese University Press / London: School of Oriental and African
Studies, 1978; reprinted 2003.
Hansen, Chad. A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical
Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Hsiao Kung-chuan. A History of Chinese Political Thought, Vol. 1: From
the Beginnings to the Sixth Century A. D. Trans. F. W. Mote.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Hu Shih. The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China. 2nd
edition. New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1963.
Ivanhoe, Philip J. "Mohist Philosophy." In Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (London and New York: Routledge, 1998),
6:451-458.
Knoblock, John, trans. Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete
Works. 3 vols. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988-94.
Lai, Whalen. "The Public Good that does the Public Good: A New Reading
of Mohism." Asian Philosophy 3/2 (1993): 125-141.
Lowe, Scott. Mo Tzu's Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia: The
Will and the Way. Ontario: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992.
Loy, Hui-chieh. "On a Gedankenexperiment in the Mozi Core Chapters."
Oriens Extremus 45 (2005): 141-158.
Maeder, Erik W. "Some Observations on the Composition of the €˜Core
Chapters' of the Mozi." Early China 17 (1992): 27-82.
Mei, Yi-pao. Mo-tse, the Neglected Rival of Confucius. London: Arthur
Probsthain, 1934.
Mei, Yi-pao. The Ethical and Political Works of Motse. London: Arthur
Probsthain, 1929.
Nivison, David S. The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese
Philosophy. Ed. Bryan W. Van Norden. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1996.
Pines, Yuri. Foundations of Confucian Thought: Intellectual life in
the Chunqiu Period, 722-453 B.C.E. Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 2002.
Schwartz, Benjamin. The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press, 1985.
Shaughnessy, Edward L., and Michael Loewe, eds. The Cambridge History
of Ancient China: From the Beginnings of Civilization to 221 b.c.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Shun, Kwong-loi. Mencius and Early Chinese Thought. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1997.
Soles, David E. "Mo Tzu and the foundations of Morality." Journal of
Chinese Philosophy 26/1 (1999): 37-48.
Taylor, Rodney L. "Religion and utilitarianism: Mo Tzu on spirits and
funerals." Philosophy East and West 29/3 (July 1979): 337-346.
Tseu, Augustine. The Moral Philosophy of Mozi. Taipei: China Printing
Limited, 1965.
Van Norden, Bryan W. "A Response to the Mohist Arguments in
€˜Impartial Caring.'" In The Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and
Western Approaches, eds. Kim-chong Chong, Sor-Hoon Tan and C. L. Ten
(Chicago: Open Court, 2003), 41-58.
Vorenkamp, Dirck. "Another Look at Utilitarianism in Mo Tzu's
Thought." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 19 (1992): 423-443.
Watson, Burton, trans. Mo Tzu: Basic Writings. Columbia University Press, 1963.
Wong, Benjamin, and Hui-chieh Loy. "War and Ghosts in Mozi's Political
Philosophy." Philosophy East and West 54/3 (2004): 343-363.
Wong, David B. "Mohism: The Founder, Mozi (Mo Tzu)." In Encyclopedia
of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Antonio S. Cua (London and New York:
Routledge, 2003), 453-461.
Wong, David B. "Universalism versus Love with Distinctions: An
Ancient Debate Revived." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16/3-4
(September-December 1989): 251-272.
Yates, Robin D.S. "The Mohists on Warfare: Technology, Technique, and
Justification." Journal of the AmericanAcademy of Religion 47 (1979):
549-603.
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