Moral Egalitarianism

Egalitarianism is the position that equality is central to justice. It
is a prominent trend in social and political philosophy and has also
become relevant in moral philosophy (moral egalitarianism) since the
late twentieth century. In social and political philosophy, the main
focus of the debate is on two different trends, the Equality-of-What
trend and the Why-Equality trend. The authors of the older, first
trend focused on the main question, what the goods of distribution
(resources, equality of opportunity for welfare, and so forth.) are
and according to which standard one should distribute the goods. The
question, in the late twentieth century is, whether equality is the
most or one of the most important part(s) of justice or whether it has
no or nearly no importance for the nature of justice at all.
Egalitarians believe that justice and equality are closely connected;
prioritarians, instead, emphasise that the two concepts are unrelated.
This article gives an overview of the main arguments and objections in
the Why-Equality debate. These are the by-product objection of
equality, the objection of inhumanity, the objection of complexity,
the argument of the presumption of equality, and the argument for a
pluralistic egalitarianism.

1. Preliminary Distinctions

Egalitarianism is the position that equality is central to justice. It
is a prominent trend in social and political philosophy and has also
become relevant in moral philosophy (moral egalitarianism) since the
late twentieth century. The very question is, whether equality is the
most or one of the most important part(s) of justice or whether it has
no or nearly no importance for the nature of justice at all
('Why-Equality'). Egalitarians believe that justice and equality are
closely connected; prioritarians, instead, emphasise that both
concepts are not related.

Egalitarians think, firstly, that unfair life prospects should be
equalized. Secondly, that equality is the most or one of the most
important irreducible intrinsic or constitutive worth(s) of justice.
Thirdly, that welfare should be increased. Fourthly, that justice is
comparative. Fifthly, that inequalities are just when otherwise
advantages are destroyed in the name of justice. Lastly, that there
are certain absolute humanitarian principles like autonomy, freedom or
human dignity.

Prioritarians think, firstly, that equality itself cannot be a
foundation of justice and that it is no important irreducible aim of
justice, it has no intrinsic moral worth (Frankfurt 1997) and it has
no or at least no fundamental importance with regard to the
justification of justice, it is rather a by-product although it has
some importance as reducible worth (Raz 1986). Secondly, the
fulfilment of absolute standards like human dignity, respect, or
citizenship are of utmost importance to give people the opportunity to
live a human being-worthy life and not a life in miserable
circumstances (Walzer 1983; Raz 1986; Frankfurt 1997; Parfit 1998;
Anderson 1999). Thirdly, people should have access to food and
shelter, medical basic supply, or should have private and political
autonomy, and so forth. Fourthly, equality has some importance i.) in
being a by-product, ii.) or in being one part among other parts as a
comparative factor, e.g., in equality before the law, concerning equal
chances, or with regard to the prohibition of discrimination, iii.) or
in being a precondition for the fulfilment of certain absolute
standards like political autonomy, social affiliation, and liberty of
exchange (Krebs 2000, 2003).
2. On some Difficulties within the Why-Equality Debate

The main question, whether egalitarianism or prioritarianism has the
most plausible conception of the relation between 'justice' and
'equality,' has not been successfully answered, yet. There had been
attacks from both sides, which show that they did not attack the
strongest but a weak version of the opponents' view. A second mistake
is the fact that the notions justice and equality are also discussed –
to a great extent – under the heading of questions of distributions,
although this had been the main point of the 'Equality-of-What'
debate, e.g. 'equality of resources' (Rawls 1971, 1993; Dworkin 1981;
Rakowski 1991; van Parijs 1995), 'equality of opportunity for welfare'
(Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989; Roemer 1996, 1998), or 'equality of
capability to function' (Sen 1992). This is a misleading focus,
especially, if one wants to determine the relation between these two
important notions with regard to the question of justification.
Questions of distributions are just one part of the story. Thirdly,
the two most extreme assumptions (i.) justice is equality and (ii.)
justice has nothing to do with equality are unsound, since common
sense can easily show, that these assumptions are out of sight right
from the beginning. The interesting and more appropriate ones are
situated right in-between. Equality should not be discussed in
socioeconomic circumstances, only, but also in the moral and political
realm.
3. Objections to Moral Egalitarianism

The main objections against the egalitarians made by the prioritarians
are, firstly, the by-product objection of equality (Raz 1986;
Frankfurt 1987, 1997; Parfit 1998), secondly, the objection of
inhumanity (Anderson 1999) and, thirdly, the objection of complexity
(Walzer 1983).
a. The By-Product Objection of Equality

Firstly, the egalitarian view that equality is the central aim or one
of the most important aims of justice and should not be seen as a mere
by-product had been a mayor point of criticism on the prioritarian
side (Raz 1986: 218-221, 227-229; Frankfurt 1987: 32-34 and 1997: 7
and 11; Parfit 1998: 13-15). They think that equality is a mere
by-product and it is due to absolute standards like human dignity or
respect, and so forth, whereas egalitarian equality is due to
relational standards.

Prioritarians argue that in cases of people's hunger and illness or
deficiency of goods they should be helped because hunger, illness, and
deficiency of goods are terrible circumstances for every human being
and not because other people are in a better condition. The hunger and
illness of other people or the deficiency of goods directly put us in
the situation to help these people without making any comparison
between them and those people who are better off. Frankfurt says that
substantial – and not formal – definitions certainly have genuine
moral importance and that it depends on human beings who live a good
life and not on how their life is with regard to other human beings'
lives (Frankfurt 1997: 6). It seems that prioritarians think that
egalitarians worship equality for the sake of equality only. In cases
of illness, hunger and deficiency of goods the role of equality is not
that simple as prioritarians want to make other people believe. Their
objection loses its power, if one acknowledges that people in cases of
illness, hunger or deficiency of goods should be treated equally as
human beings if they get supply, that means there is no primarily
discrimination ongoing. Equality has many faces and impartiality is
one of it. There is room for proportional equality in cases of, for
instance, deficiency of goods. This is no contradiction within the
egalitarian view – proportional equality is part of equality. The idea
that equality always means arithmetical equality is not justified.

The second example is Parfit's 'levelling down objection' (Parfit
1998: chapter 4). Given, that inequalities as such are bad their
disappearance would be, in one respect, a change to something, which
is better. If, so Parfit, the better off people lose all their
additional resources by a natural disaster and thus are in the same
terrible situation than the other people, it will be something that
teleological egalitarians may welcome, though some people lost all of
their additional resources and nobody else could profit. Or, in the
famous example given by Parfit: 'Similarly, it would be in one way an
improvement if we destroyed the eyes of the sighted, not to benefit
the blind, but only to make the sighted blind. These implications can
be more plausibly regarded as monstrous, or absurd.' (Parfit 1998:
chapter 4). Parfit knows that this would be not enough to criticize
the egalitarians by using this objection, 'it is not enough to claim
that it would be wrong to produce equality by levelling down.'
Therefore he states: 'Our objection must be that, if we achieve
equality by levelling down, there is nothing good about what we have
done. Similarly, if some natural disaster makes everyone equally badly
off, that is not in any way good news.' (Parfit 1998: chapter 4). It
seems to be that Parfit thinks of an opponent who does everything for
his worshipping of equality – that means equality for the sake of
equality. Plain egalitarians claim that inequalities are justified, if
the only means to remove inequality would be to 'level down' the
better off people to the standard of the badly off people, without any
improvement with regard to the badly off people. The destruction of
advantages in the name of justice is also unacceptable on the
egalitarian view. There is a lot of rhetoric in this kind of
objection. Parfit makes a distinction between the teleological and the
deontic egalitarianism in this passage. And, it is only the
teleological egalitarianism, in Parfit's view, that is open for
criticism. The deontic egalitarian, unlike the teleological
egalitarian, has no problem with the view that inequality itself is
not bad in a way. But, so Parfit, 'we may find it harder to justify
some of our beliefs' when adopting the deontic view. A sound
egalitarianism should incorporate teleological and deontic aspects.
b. The Objection of Inhumanity

The objection of inhumanity, which had been brought into the
discussion by Anderson (1999) is one of the main arguments against
egalitarianism. Anderson's version of the argument has three different
parts, firstly, the 'fault is-up-to-them' objection (Anderson 1999:
295-302; also Barry 1991: 149 and MacLeod 1998: 75p.), secondly, the
objection of stigmatizing (Anderson 1999: 302-307; also MacLeod 1998:
106-108), and thirdly, the tutelage objection (Anderson 1999: 310;
also Hayek 1960: 85-102).
i. The Fault is-Up-to-Them Objection

The first part is an objection against the (supposed) egalitarian view
that people who are responsible for their own terrible situation
should be left alone with their problems, no matter what happens to
them. The second part is an objection against the kind of reasons
egalitarians have in order to help people who are in a terrible
situation, which did not arise through their own fault. The third part
is an objection against the decision-making of the state – in which
category a misery should be placed – and the investigation of the
citizens in order to get the relevant information for the state. This
would be, in Anderson's view, a case of putting the citizens under the
tutelage of the state and harming their private sphere.

Proponents of luck egalitarianism want to equalize undeserved life
prospects, the people should be responsible for their decisions, that
means, strictly speaking, they have no justified demands for supply,
if they get into a miserable situation on their own fault. Anderson
criticises Rakowski's view (1991), who states that it would be all
right to let a guilty car driver die in a hospital, who has no
insurance and illegally made a turn over on the street which causes a
serious accident. The guilty car driver, so Rakowski, has no legal
demands to be kept on the artificial respiration apparatus, any
longer. Others argue that society should help people no matter whether
they caused their own disaster or not, they are human beings and this
is the best reason to give them a helping hand if they lost the right
track. This may be seen as a true milestone of the development in
human history. To be part of a "real" community means to help those
needy people. What about the idea of humanity and charity, the idea to
show compassion with members of ones own community, or with the
conception of beneficence? To neglect helpless people seems
inappropriate for a community which is devoted to the idea of human
flourishing – the basic concept of each sound community.

People who lived a jet-set life should not have a (legal) demand to
live such a life again, if they caused a disaster and lost everything
and the only way to be better off again would be to let society pay
for it. This demand seems unsound but they should live a human being
worthy life and society has to pay for it, no matter what the price
is. And this account does not contradict with a sophisticated version
of a pluralistic egalitarianism. On this point, Anderson cites Arneson
who thinks that it might be unfair to make people responsible for
their actions in all circumstances since responsible decisions are
dependent on necessary capacities – foresight, steadfastness, ability
to calculate, strong will, self-confidence – which are partly due to
one's genes or the luck to have good parents. Therefore, those people
have a demand on a special paternalistic protection by society with
regard to their own bad decisions. Arneson thinks that this could be
financed by an obligatory social contribution of the people to a
pension scheme. Others, so Anderson, hold the view that a strict
compensation of welfare should also be modified by paternalistic
intervention. That means only paternalistic reasons could make social
contributions obligatory and could justify the distribution of a
monthly guaranteed income. Anderson disputes the fact that luck
egalitarians show the necessary respect for citizens since they state
that people, who had hard luck by virtue of their own fault, 'earn'
it. She seems to be on the wrong path when she criticises other
egalitarians who want to help the badly off people by social
insurances on paternalistic reasons. These paternalistic reasons – in
order to justify obligatory social insurances – are, in her opinion, a
sign of taking citizens to be silly and to be unable to organise their
own lives. It is hard to see, so Anderson, how one can expect from
citizens not to lose their self-esteem by accepting this kind of
justification.

Amy Gutmann criticises Anderson on two points, firstly, she states
that even egalitarians should be able to argue that there are special
cases – like the guilty car driver case – which are so badly that
these people should be helped, even if they got into the miserable
situation on their own fault. Secondly, paternalism could be an
honourable and compelling principle of legislation. Hence, it must not
be humiliating for the state to make laws, for instance, on wearing
safety belts, insofar the laws are due to a democratic process.
Although Anderson shares the intention of these arguments, she states
on the first point that the very idea to guarantee special kind of
goods would contradict with the spirit of luck egalitarianism. It
might be that this line of argument speaks against luck egalitarianism
but not against a sophisticated version of a pluralistic
egalitarianism. The safety belt case, so Anderson, is not a good
example for restricting the citizen's liberty with regard to cases in
which their liberty is restricted to a great amount, like in cases of
coercive partaking of social insurances. The society's justification
should be much stronger than the claim that society knows the
citizen's interests better than they do. There should be no problem
for citizens to take part in a social insurance when it is reasonable
for them. Under the 'veil of ignorance,' to take up Rawl's famous
thought-experiment, everybody would agree on a social insurance if the
advantages, for instance not to die in a hospital by virtue of having
no insurance at all, rule out the disadvantage of coercive partaking.
It seems right that just a few people would like to live in a society
where people have to die, because they have not got a social
insurance, for whatever reasons. And, if the price for it is to take
part in a social insurance, even if it is a liability, one should not
hesitate to do so. But, if a person decided not to take part and she
is the guilty car driver, she should be helped, no matter what the
costs are. This is due to human dignity and there is no sound
counterargument why pluralistic egalitarians should not be able to
integrate this idea in their conception without losing their track.
There is, of course, a practical necessity for every society not to
pay for everyone; the social insurances of the state could only
finance a limited number of people who do not have – for whatever
reasons – a social insurance. Hence, it should be in everybody's
interest, in order to relieve society of high extra costs, to pay for
one's own social insurance. Therefore, it is in society's interest –
and this means in the end in the interest of everybody – to force the
people by law to have their own social insurances. In this case,
nothing speaks against being forced to one's own luck.
ii. The Objection of Stigmatizing

The objection of stigmatizing is an objection against the kind of
reasons egalitarians have in order to help people who are in terrible
situations, which did not arise through their own fault ('bad brute
luck'), for instance, disabled people from birth, or people who became
disabled by virtue of an illness or an accident, or people with (very)
poor natural talents, and so forth. Anderson thinks, firstly, that
there is no care for all badly off people, if one looks at the rules,
which lay down who belongs to the 'bad brute luck' people, and
secondly, the reasons to help the 'bad brute luck' people are
discriminating for them. The reasons offered to distribute extra
resources to handicapped people, so Anderson on the egalitarian view,
are wrong because '[p]eople lay claim to the resources of egalitarian
redistribution in virtue of their inferiority to others, not in virtue
of their equality to others' (Anderson 1999: 306). The principles of
distribution are based on pity, which is in her view incompatible with
the respect for human dignity. Her main question is, whether a theory
of justice, which is based on contemptuous pity for the alleged
beneficiaries, could serve egalitarian standards, that equal respect
of each human being is the basis of justice. She comes to the
conclusion that luck egalitarianism disregards the basic requirements,
which every sound egalitarian theory should have.

One might argue that the concern of the 'equality of
fortune'-theorists is based on humanitarian compassion and not on
contemptuous pity, but even than, so Anderson, one has to keep the
distinctions between the two notions in mind: 'Compassion is based on
an awareness of suffering, an intrinsic condition of a person. Pity,
by contrast, is aroused by a comparison of the observer's condition
with the condition of the object of pity' (Anderson 1999: 306p.). In
Anderson's view, 'compassion' says that the person in question is
badly off and 'pity' says that the person in question is worse off
than oneself ('she is sadly inferior to me'). Both can move one to
help others, who are in need, 'but only pity is condescending.' But,
even for the sake of argument, to take 'humanitarian compassion' as a
starting point, this would be no sound basis for egalitarian
principles of distribution, because compassion aims at relieving
suffering and not equalizing it. She states, according to Raz (1986:
242), that once people are relieved of their suffering and neediness,
compassion could not generate a further need of an equality of
condition. The equality of fortune does not express compassion, it is
not about the absolute misery of the person in question, it is about
the gap between the best off and the worse off people. The better off
people – who are guided by the considerations of luck egalitarianism –
have a certain kind of feeling of superiority towards people, who are
in need and, vice versa, the badly off people are envious and seek for
an equal distribution of resources. Their criterion is an envy-free
distribution (Anderson 1999: 306p.).

This may have some plausibility on the first sight, but a second
glance shows that she mixed up two aspects, which should be sharply
divided, the 'factum' of equality and the feeling of inferiority. In
detail, her claim that pity is incompatible with human dignity is
unsound and the only reason why this claim seems to be justified is
that her notion of 'pity' is of a certain kind. Anderson's definition
of pity rests on her assumption that 'pity' is something that is due
to a comparison between the conditions of the people involved and the
feeling of those people, who help others who are in need, but, there
is no necessity that those, who help others who are in need, have a
certain kind of feeling, like, 'she is really inferior to me'. It
might be that some people feel like that, but most people would refuse
this kind of talk. They would say that one has to help others who are
in need because they are human beings, equal to me, and they did not
deserve it to be left alone with their handicap. If one were one of
them – one might argue – one would not like to be left alone, either.
Anderson's special definition is incompatible with human dignity, but
there are other definitions. But even, so Anderson, if one agrees on
humanitarian compassion as starting point for an egalitarian
distribution, it would not be enough, since 'compassion' aims to
'relieve suffering' and not to 'equalize' it. According to the
compassion view there is no 'moral judgment on those who suffer'
(Anderson 1999: 307) and there is no further distribution in sight if
the suffering of the people has been relieved. This is no objection
against the compassion view at all. Firstly, there is no necessity to
have a certain kind of feeling, like, 'she is really inferior to me,'
and secondly, if disabled people are cured, there is no further reason
to give them extra resources. They are in a good healthy condition
again. Anderson's main point is that luck egalitarianism claim that
disabled people get extra resources by virtue of their inferiority and
not by virtue of their equality to other people. One has to
differentiate between i.) the improper special feeling of certain kind
of people, who help others who are in need ('she is really inferior to
me') and their motivation to help the needy people, and ii.) the
'true' reason why, for instance, disabled people should be treated
equally and differently at the same time. Differently, because they
get extra resources according to proportional equality, and equally,
because they are human beings and should be treated morally equal,
according to arithmetical equality. All versions of egalitarianism
have one main aspect in common and it may be that Anderson overlooks
this important aspect in her talk about what the reasons are to help
people who are in need.
iii. The Tutelage Objection

The tutelage objection is against the decision-making of the state –
in which category a misery should be placed – and the investigation of
the citizens in order to get the relevant information for the state's
decision. This would be, in Anderson's view, a case of putting the
citizens under the tutelage of the state and harming their private
sphere (Anderson 1999: 310; also Hayek 1960: 85-102). 'Equality of
fortune,' so Anderson, says 'that no one should suffer from undeserved
misfortune' (Anderson 1999: 310). But, in order to determine which
people are allowed to get special treatment (res. extra resources) the
state must make judgments on the people's moral responsibility
concerning their situation to brute or option luck. In citing Hayek
(1960: 95-97) who states that '(…) in order to lay a claim to some
important benefit, people are forced to obey other people's judgments
of what uses they should have made of their opportunities, rather than
following their own judgments' (Anderson 1999: 310) Anderson concludes
that such a system would require the state to make 'grossly intrusive,
moralizing judgments of individual's choices' (Anderson 1999: 310).
Hence, equality of fortune contradicts with citizen's privacy and
liberty. This is in Korsgaard's view (1993: 61), on which Anderson is
affirmatively referring to, a disrespectful behaviour of the state:
'But it is disrespectful for the state to pass judgment on how much
people are responsible for their expensive tastes or their imprudent
choices' (Anderson 1999: 310).

Her objection against the function of the state to decide which people
are morally responsible for their situation according to brute or
option luck seems plausible. For the sake of argument, let everybody
agree on the point to help people, who suffer from undeserved
misfortune. The very question is, then, how the state could organise a
system, which treats everyone fairly and with respect. It is a
practical necessity that the state decides which people get extra
resources financed by the social community. And, it should be no
problem to say that, if the state is spending public money, someone
has to prove the legitimacy of requests. Therefore, the state needs
information and this has nothing to do with harming the people's
liberty or private sphere. It is a hard thing to decide how far this
gathering of information by the state should go, of course, no one
would like to live in a state where Big Brother is watching you all
the time, but one must acknowledge the simple fact that the state has
to take precautions not to be deceived by social cheaters. If a person
wants public money, she should better have a sound reason, if not, she
might be a cheater. It is not about 'expensive tastes' or 'imprudent
choices' (Korsgaard 1993), rather it is about the question if one
suffers from undeserved misfortune or not. Anderson is right in
stating that there are cases, which could be very complex and, for
this reason, might 'undermine' the system of distribution. Life is not
simple and one has also to cope with those extreme cases. But this
special problem always appears according to penumbra cases, the only
way out is trying to make well-informed decisions. Not to distribute
extra resources to people, who are in need by virtue of undeserved
misfortune, might be the wrong decision.
c. The Objection of Complexity

The objection of complexity, which had been brought into the
discussion by Lucas (1965, 1977) and Rescher (1966), could also be
found in the first chapter of Walzer's book 'Spheres of Justice. A
Defence of Pluralism and Equality' (1983: 3-30). His criticism is
powerful and illuminating. The main point against egalitarianism is
his assumption that the 'spheres of justice' are much more complicated
than egalitarians believe. Their assumption that equality is the only
– or most important – aim (res. principle) of justice is a false
monism. There are, according to the prioritarians, other principles of
distribution like the principle of merit or desert, the principle of
efficiency, or the principle of qualification, and so forth. Nearly
every sphere of conduct has special principles of distribution.

Not 'all' egalitarians pursue an improper account of egalitarianism. A
sophisticated account of pluralistic egalitarianism is much more
harder to attack as a simple travesty. Walzer's 'relevant reasons
approach' (or theory of 'complex equality') is very suitable with
regard to different spheres of justice because his account considers
special circumstances of the subjects in question. The main difference
between his account and luck egalitarianism is, according to the
'relevant reasons approach,' that equality is only a by-product of the
fulfilment of complex standards of justice and not the aim of justice.
There seems to be no strong argument to support the extreme view, that
egalitarianism is bound to the assumption that equality is the only
aim of justice and not also a by-product; it just had been taken for
granted since Feinberg's famous paper 'Noncomparative Justice' (1974,
for a critical discussion on Feinberg's account, see Kane 1996:
380pp.). The objection of complexity tells us that there is no
possibility for egalitarians to use different kinds of principles of
distribution without losing their egalitarian track (e.g. Krebs 2000:
28p.). This assumption seems to be wrong. Firstly, pluralistic
egalitarians are not bound to one principle, only; they could also
integrate other principles like the principle of autonomy, the
principle of liberty and so on without betraying themselves. Secondly,
the idea of equality is not restricted to a simple version of result
equality (Gosepath 2003: 276), rather to a sophisticated version of
proportional equality, which covers different kinds of principles.
Hence, there seems to be a close connection to Walzer's theory of
'complex equality,' although one would rather say that his theory is a
non-egalitarian account.
4. Two Egalitarian Arguments

One of the main arguments with regard to the egalitarian view is the
presumption of equality argument (Berlin 1955/56; Tugendhat 1997;
Gosepath 2001) and the argument of pluralistic egalitarianism (Gordon
2006).
a. The Egalitarians' Assumption of the Presumption of Equality

What about the egalitarians' assumption of 'the presumption of
equality'? Isaiah Berlin stated in his famous paper 'Equality as an
Ideal' (1955/56) that equality does not need any justification, but
only inequality does. He gives the following example to make his
assumption plausible: If someone has a cake and there are 10 people to
be taken into account, than, there is no need of justification,
automatically, if every person is getting a tenth part. But, if the
distributor is not acting according to the principle of equal
distribution, he has to give some special reasons for his decision.

Even if common sense justifies Berlin's 'argument,' one has to take
into account that the equal distribution – in the example given by
Berlin – has no moral advantage with regard to the unequal
distribution. Although Frankfurt hold the same view as Berlin does –
that the cake should be divided into ten equal parts – he gives a
different justification concerning this distribution. The important
point is, so Frankfurt, that the distributor in this example has no
special reasons to divide the cake in equal parts nor to divide the
cake in unequal parts. In one word, he does not know, whether the
people should be treated equally concerning a special respect, which
could justify an equal distribution, or vice versa. The distributor
has no relevant information at all. There are just few philosophers
who give reasons why equality needs no justification, others – as
Berlin does – take it for granted and/or call for common sense or
intuitions. The famous German philosopher Ernst Tugendhat (1997)
claims that only inequality needs special reasons. According to
Tugendhat, egalitarianism in the strict sense is not about material
equal distribution, but about the simple fact that all people have
equal moral rights (5), albeit their empirical differences (10).
Prioritarians think that there are good reasons to restrict equality
(14). Egalitarianism and prioritarianism are not on the same level,
since egalitarians – unlike prioritarians – claim for a special
proposition. Prioritarians, so Tugendhat, are not bound to a special
proposition; their accounts are unlimited concerning the variety of
different 'Konfigurationen,' (that is the description of duties and
rights of a certain moral community, Tugendhat 1997: 5) and hence,
prioritarianism claims not for a certain proposition (11). This is the
background, according to Tugendhat, for having the justified believe
that there is a certain presumption of equality with regard to
inequality in the moral realm, albeit this presumption is very 'thin,'
but it doubtlessly exists (11). In more detail: Regarding an unequal
distribution one gives always some reasons why the distribution should
not be equal; one is not able to do so concerning an equal
distribution (13, 14). If one accepts Tugendhat's assumption that the
primacy of equality is, lastly, due to the structure of moral
justification – according to Tugendhat (1997), 'moral justification'
means that it is an equal justification with respect to all people.
The only case of a legitimate justification of inequality is the case,
which could be justified with regard to all people (18). Every just
distribution has to be equal, unless one is able to justify the
reasons concerning the unequal distribution to all people (19) – and
not due to a false understanding of an apriori or a dark notion of
reason, one might come to the conclusion that his explication is
sound. Of course, there are other accounts of philosophers (e.g.
Kant's kingdom of ends, Bentham's all count as one, Gewirth's
principle of generic consistency, or Boylan's argument for the moral
rights of basic goods), but Tugendhat's account is by virtue of
several reasons particularly interesting and illuminating: firstly, he
states that egalitarianism is about moral rights in the strict sense
of the notion, secondly, he argues that egalitarianism and
prioritarianism are not on the same level, and thirdly, he holds the
assumption that the primacy of equality is due to the structure of
moral justification.
b. Pluralistic Egalitarianism

The extreme 'egalitarian' view that equality – in the special sense of
comparative equality – is the only aim of justice is wrong, but the
other extreme 'prioritarian' view that equality has nothing to do with
justice is also wrong. The truth is somewhere in-between. There are,
at least, four different aspects, which show that justice and equality
are (closely) connected with each other: Firstly, according to
prioritarians equality is important as a by-product for the fulfilment
of absolute standards, for instance, human dignity. Secondly,
relational (res. comparative) equality is one aspect of justice among
others; one need relational equality in order to yield e.g. legal
equality, equality of chances, or antidiscrimination laws. Thirdly,
equality is indispensable in being a joint starting point with regard
to political autonomy, social membership, or liberty of exchange
because absolute standards presuppose that people's life prospects are
more or less the same. Fourthly, equality is (also) a result of
political autonomy insofar as there seem to exist special cases
according to which an equal distribution is rightly demanded (e.g. the
Norwegian public oil reserves).

It seems that the opposition between philosophers who are egalitarians
and philosophers who are prioritarians according to Miller (1990) is a
false one, and better be 'understood as a debate about whether one
particular kind of equality – economic equality, say – should be
pursued or not' (Miller 1997: 222). He may be right in stating that
'there are two different kinds of valuable equality, one connected
with justice, and the other standing independently' (Miller 1997:
224). He suggests a so-called third way: 'Equality of the first kind
is distributive in nature. It specifies that benefits of a certain
kind – rights, for instance – should be distributed equally, because
justice requires this. The second kind of equality is not in this
sense distributive. It does not specify directly any distribution of
rights or resources. Instead it identifies a social ideal, the ideal
of a society in which people regard and treat one another as equals,
in other words a society that is not marked by status divisions such
that one can place different people in hierarchically ranked
categories, in different classes for instance. We can call this second
kind of equality equality of status, or simply social equality.'
(Miller 1997: 224). Miller seems right in saying that the two
different notions of equality are not closely enough separated in the
debate. According to Nagel (1979: chapter 3-6) everybody think that
moral equality – or mutatis mutandis 'social equality' in Miller's
words – is something all people acknowledge, but the crux is that the
interpretations diverge, for instance, with regard to utilitarians
(chapter 4), the position of individual rights (chapter 5), and
egalitarians (chapter 6). A plausible social ethics, so Nagel, would
be influenced by all three accounts (chapter 7). Miller's assumption
that social equality is something that is not part of justice seems
premature. Tugendhat seems right in stating that egalitarianism in the
strict sense is about moral rights, hence, social equality as such is
one part of justice. If one restricts a person's moral rights, one
better give sound reasons why one does not treat her equally according
to others, if one is not able to give a plain justification, one
treats her unjustly. This has nothing to do with any kind of
distributions, although Miller seems to hold the claim that moral
rights could also be distributed. Some egalitarians cite Aristotle's
famous propositions that, firstly, it is just that equal people get
equal shares and unequal people get unequal shares, and secondly, it
is unjust that equal people get unequal shares and unequal people get
equal shares (EN V, 6) to back up their main hypothesis that the
presumption of equality follows directly from Aristotle's account of
formal equality. It is apparent that they did not analyse the whole
context of these propositions. The argument of 'the presumption of
equality' should not be based on this passage. Instead, the passage
could be turned against the prioritarian view that egalitarians are
bound to a form of result equality.

'And the same equality will exist between the persons and between the
things concerned; for as the latter – the things concerned – are
related, so are the former; if they are not equal, they will not have
what is equal, but this is the origin of quarrels and complaints –
when either equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals
equal shares. Further, this is plain from the fact that awards should
be according to merit; for all men agree that what is just in
distribution must be according to merit in some sense, though they do
not all specify the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with
the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with
noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence.'
(Aristotle EN V, 6 1131a20-1131a29)

Aristotle states that there is always trouble if unequals get equal
shares, that means, if equals get unequal shares or unequals get equal
shares. But, there is no claim in the cited passage, which says that
all people should be treated equally (presumption of equality), rather
all people should be treated equally according to a special axia,
namely the political virtue. According to Aristotle's account of
justice in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics one has to acknowledge the
fact that the proposition 'equals should get equal shares' is due to
the principle of proportional equality (distributional justice), and
should not be seen under the heading of 'justice in exchanges'
(Aristotle EN V, 5 1131a) – where the principle of arithmetical
equality exists – which is about justice concerned with exchanges
according to reciprocity (EN V, 8) and retributive justice (EN V, 7).
To put it in a nutshell, the formal principle of equality – equals
should get equal shares or in a different formula equal cases should
be treated equally – is empty, and the prioritarians, on the one hand,
are right in saying that egalitarians are wrong in their assumption
that the presumption of equality is due to this formal principle.
Aristotle's approach to fill it is his account of proportional
equality. On the other hand, there is hardly any sound argument – with
respect to the debate between egalitarians and prioritarians – that
would claim for the special proposition that egalitarians are
restricted to 'result equality,' and not also to 'proportional
equality' within a sophisticated version of pluralistic egalitarianism
(e.g. Gosepath 2004). Some prioritarians forget the simple point that
there are two ways of taking other people's condition into account,
firstly, by proportional equality, and secondly, by stipulating
absolute standards of justice.

Equality as the only aim of justice or as a mere by-product of justice
is an unhappy distinction to follow. Justice cannot be reduced to
equality alone and the importance of equality is too great to be a
mere appendage. The prioritarians are right in their criticism that it
would be absurd to strive for equality for its own sake; but they
forgot that hardly any sophisticated version of egalitarianism is
doing so (or would do so). It seems unsound, when people hold the view
that all human beings should be treated equally by virtue of the
simple fact that the ideal of equality should be fulfilled for its own
sake. Instead, the demand of treating people morally equal may give
some hints for equal distributions in other spheres (see also Gosepath
2001). But, as Walzer nicely puts it, nearly each sphere needs its own
standard, and therefore, it might be right not to choose between the
egalitarian or prioritarian view but to combine both accounts.
According to this, Gosepath (2001) suggests that proportional equality
could be a good basis for a sound discussion between egalitarian and
prioritarian theories of justice.

There is a close connection between justice and equality, firstly, a
conceptual connection, and secondly, a normative connection. First,
equality is a necessary condition for justice, since one is not able
to give a full explication on the notion of justice without taking
formal and proportional equality into account (see Aristotle EN V).
The stipulation of absolute standards of justice, for instance human
dignity, is something, which should be incorporated. But it should be
clear that the stipulation of absolute standards is not enough, one
should also take the egalitarian model into account. Second, in his
famous example of a ruler who fries his subjects in oil and,
afterwards, also fries himself Frankena (1962: 1 and 17) is stating
that the ruler acts immorally but not against the ideal of equality.
This is the reason why formal and proportional justices form a
necessary but not a sufficient condition. The normative connection
between justice and equality tries to solve this problem and acts as a
shield against such and alike cases by providing a standard of
normative constraints (e.g. human rights).
5. Reference and Further Reading
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