some of the more interesting in the history of philosophy, for he
consistently denied that there is any genuine causal interaction
between finite substances. And yet from another perspective, he sought
to integrate both old and new causal taxonomies: On the one hand,
Leibniz put forth a theory of causation that would accommodate the
Scientific Revolution's increasing mathematization of nature, one
according to which efficient causes played a dominant role. On the
other hand, Leibniz also sought to integrate certain aspects of
traditional Aristotelian causation into his philosophy. In particular,
while many of Leibniz's contemporaries were rejecting Aristotelian
final causes, Leibniz insisted that the pursuit of final causes was
worthwhile. Indeed, they played a crucial role in his philosophical
system. The result is that Leibniz produced a system with a complex
integration of both old and new––of both final and efficient
causes––while simultaneously denying there was any real causal
interaction between substances at the most basic level. The resulting
metaphysics is sufficient to secure him a significant place in the
history of the philosophy of causation, one worthy of serious
attention.
In introducing his views on causation, Leibniz nearly always pivoted
his theory against what he saw as its main rivals, occasionalism and
physical influx theory (influxus physicus). He thought both were
unacceptable, and that his own theory was the only viable option. In
presenting Leibniz's own theory, the famous "preestablished harmony,"
this article follows his lead by considering, in the first section,
why Leibniz deemed the competitors unacceptable. The article then
discusses the details of Leibniz's positive views on causation.
1. The Negative Stance: Leibniz against Physical Influx and Occasionalism
When it came to introducing his theory of causation, preestablished
harmony, Leibniz was fond of presenting it via an argument by
elimination: he would set the argument up against its main
competitors; reasoning that neither of them was intelligible and so
each must be false. Consequently, since the preestablished harmony is
entirely intelligible according to Leibniz, and more worthy of a
divine creator, it must be the true theory of causation. The following
passage from 1698, written with particular attention to mind–body
causation, is typical of Leibniz's presentation:
I have pointed out that we can imagine three systems to explain
the intercourse which we find between body and soul, namely, (1) the
system of mutual influence of one upon the other, which when taken in
the popular sense is that of the Scholastics, and which I consider
impossible, as do the Cartesians; (2) that of a perpetual supervisor
who represents in the one everything which happens in the other, a
little as if a man were charged with constantly synchronizing two bad
clocks which are in themselves incapable of agreement –– this is the
system of occasional causes; and (3) that of the natural agreement of
two substances such as would exist between two very exact clocks. I
find this last view fully as possible as that of a supervisor and more
worthy of the author of these substances, clocks or automata. (GP IV,
520 [L 494])
This highly metaphorical passage presents Leibniz's own view, the last
of the three options, as both "possible," and "more worthy" than its
competitors of being the product of divine invention. The first view,
which Leibniz refers to as the "system of mutual influence," is also
labeled by him "the theory of physical influence" (A VI, 6, 135 [NE
135]), and "the hypothesis of influx" (C 521 [L 269]), among other
labels. Leibniz's claim about this theory of causation is that it is
simply impossible. The other main competitor, occasionalism (or "the
system of occasional causes") is possible according to Leibniz, but it
is not worthy, and so it is at least implausible. Why did Leibniz
consistently make such claims about the rival theories of causation?
a. Against Physical Influx
While the history of the influx theory is complex and often unclear,
it seems to have originated in the Neoplatonic tradition and was put
to work by a number of medieval Scholastic philosophers (see O'Neill,
1993). The details of the history and various formulations of the
influx model need not concern us here however, for what is important
is that Leibniz rejects any model of causation that involves a
transmission of parts between substances, that is, a passing on of
something from one substance (the cause) to another (the effect). And
Leibniz uses the terminology "influx" or "influence" to refer to any
model of causation that involves passing properties, or "accidents,"
from one substance to another, or from one "monad"––the term for
Leibnizian substances––to another. The best–known passage containing
Leibniz's rejection of this model is from Monadology 7:
There is, furthermore, no way to explain how a monad could be
altered or changed in its inner make-up by some other created being.
For one can transpose nothing in it, nor conceive in it any internal
motion that could be excited, directed, increased, or diminished
within it, as can happen in composites where there is change among the
parts. Monads have no windows through which something can enter into
or depart from them. Accidents cannot be detached, nor wander about
outside of substances, as the sensible species of the Scholastics
formerly did. And so, neither substance nor accident can enter a monad
from without. (GP VI, 607f. [AG 213f.])
The Scholastic model of causation involved properties of things
("species") leaving one substance, and entering another. Consider what
happens when one looks at a red wall: one's sensory apparatus is
causally acted upon. According to the target of this passage, this
involves a sensible property of the wall (a "sensible species")
entering into the mind's sensorium. According to Leibniz, "nothing
ever enters into our mind naturally from the outside" (GP IV, 607 [AG
214]). Leibniz's message is clear enough: since substances as he
conceives of them are "windowless"––that is, indivisible, partless,
immaterial, soul-like entities––there is no place for anything to
enter into it, or leave it. As a result, one cannot conceive of a
property or part of something entering a monad and transposing its
parts, for monads have no parts and thus have no portals in which to
enter and exit. Given that monads have no parts or windows, it is, as
we have seen Leibniz claim, impossible for this theory to be true.
Hence, it is not true, according to Leibniz.
b. Against Occasionalism
It is clear that Leibniz viewed occasionalism––Malebranche's theory of
causation––as the leading contender, for he addressed it in a number
of published and unpublished writings spanning the course of decades.
According to occasionalism, God is the only truly causally efficacious
being in the universe. According to Leibniz, Malebranche's "strongest
argument for why God alone acts" (ML 412) is roughly as follows. A
true cause, for Malebranche, is one according to which there is a
necessary connection between it and its effect. Since bodies cannot
move themselves, it must be minds that move bodies. But since there is
no necessary connection between the will of a finite mind and what it
wills, it follows that the only true cause is the will of God, that
is, the only will for which there is a necessary connection between it
and what it wills (that is, its effects). Hence, what appear to be
causally efficacious acts of will by finite beings are mere occasions
for God––the only true cause––to exercise his efficacious will.
Leibniz used three arguments against occasionalism. First, he argued
that occasionalism consistently violates "the great principle of
physics that a body never receives a change in motion except through
another body in motion that pushes it." According to Leibniz, this
principle has "been violated by all those who accept souls or other
immaterial principles, including here even all of the Cartesians [such
as Malebranche]" (GP VI, 541 [L 587]). In other words, Leibniz
believed that occasionalism, by claiming that a material object can be
put into motion by something other than another material object,
namely, the occasional cause of a finite will and the true cause of
the divine will, violated a fundamental principle of physics. As we
shall see, Leibniz believed the preestablished harmony did not do so,
since every non-initial state of a body in motion has, as a real
cause, some state of a body in motion.
Second, Leibniz often argued that occasionalism involved "perpetual
miracles." Consider the following from a letter to Antoine Arnauld of
30 April 1687:
[I]f I understand clearly the opinions of the authors of
occasional causes, they introduce a miracle which is no less one for
being continual. For it seems to me that the concept of the miracle
does not consist of rarity. … I admit that the authors of occasional
causes may be able to give another definition of the term, but it
seems that according to usage a miracle differs intrinsically through
the substance of the act from a common action, and not by an external
accident of frequent repetition, and that strictly speaking God
performs a miracle whenever he exceeds the forces he has given to
creatures and maintains in them. (GP II, 92f. [LA 116])
Notice that Leibniz's objection is not simply that occasionalism is
miraculous because God is constantly acting in the course of nature.
Rather, his objection is that according to occasionalism, there is
nothing in the nature of objects to explain how bodies behave. All
change on Malebranche's system is explained by appeal to God, and not
by the natures or intrinsic forces of created things. Finite bodies on
this view are merely extended hunks of matter with no nature by appeal
to which one can explain motion. Thus, there is no natural explanation
for natural change (no naturally inner cause of motion), and hence
such change is supernatural, that is, miraculous.
Finally, this second argument is closely connected with a third
argument. Throughout all of his later years, Leibniz sought to
distance himself from Spinoza. His primary way of doing so was to
insist that there are genuine finite substances, a claim at odds with
Spinoza's monism. According to Leibniz, the very nature of a substance
consists in force, or its ability to act, for if it has no such
ability, then it is a mere modification of God, the only other
substance who could act. Leibniz believed that occasionalism was in
danger of reducing into the view of Spinoza—a doctrine inconsistent
with traditional theology, and in any event, according to Leibniz, one
at odds with the common sense view that creatures are genuine
individuals:
I have many other arguments to present and several of them serve
to show that according to the view which completely robs created
things of all power and action, God would be the only substance, and
created things would be only accidents or modifications of God. So
those who are of this opinion will, in spite of themselves, fall into
that of Spinoza, who seems to me to have taken furthest the
consequences of the Cartesian doctrine of occasional causes. (GP IV,
590 [WF 164])
Because occasionalism makes God the principle of activity in created
substances, it makes God the very nature of created substances. Hence,
there is only one substance (God), and created individuals are
modifications of God. So, Leibniz argued that occasionalism has the
dangerous consequence of collapsing into Spinozism. (For
considerations of Leibniz' treatments of occasionalism, see
Rutherford, 1993; Sleigh 1990.)
2. The Positive Stance: Leibniz's Preestablished Harmony
Leibniz maintained that created substances were real causes, that God
was not the only causally efficacious being (that is, that
occasionalism was false), and that intersubstantial causation could
not be understood in terms of a physical influx. So, what was
Leibniz's account of causation?
Leibniz's account of causation was in terms of his famous doctrine of
the preestablished harmony. This doctrine contains three main
ingredients:
(1) No state of a created substance has as a real cause some state
of another created substance (that is, a denial of intersubstantial
causality).
(2) Every non-initial, non-miraculous, state of a created
substance has as a real cause some previous state of that very
substance (that is, an affirmation of intrasubstantial causality).
(3) Each created substance is programmed at creation such that all
its natural states and actions are carried out in conformity with––in
preestablished harmony with––all the natural states and actions of
every other created substance.
Consider the above claims in application to the mind-body relation.
Leibniz held that for any mental state, the real cause of that state
is neither a state of a body nor the state of some other mind. And for
any bodily state, the real cause of that state is neither a state of a
mind nor the state of some other body. Further, every non-initial,
non-miraculous, mental state of a substance has as a real cause some
previous state of that very mind, and every non-initial,
non-miraculous, bodily state has as a real cause some previous state
of that very body. Finally, created minds and bodies are programmed at
creation such that all their natural states and actions are carried
out in mutual coordination, with no intersubstantial mind-body
causation involved.
For example, suppose that Troy is hit in the head with a hammer (call
this bodily state Sb) and pain ensues (call this mental state Sm), a
case of apparent body to mind causation. Leibniz would say that in
such a case some state of Troy's mind (soul) prior to Sm was the real
cause of Sm, and Sb was not a real causal factor in the obtaining of
Sm. Suppose now that Troy has a desire to raise his arm (call this
mental state Sm), and the raising of his arm ensues (call this bodily
state Sb), a case of apparent mind to body causation. Leibniz would
say that in such a case some state of Troy's body prior to Sb was the
real cause of Sb and Sm was not a causal factor in the obtaining of
Sb. So although substances do not causally interact, their states
accommodate one another as if there were causal interaction among
substances.
Mind-body causation was merely one case of causation, for Leibniz
believed that a similar analysis is to be given in any case of natural
causation. When one billiard ball in motion causes another one to
move, there exists, metaphysically speaking, no real interaction
between them. Rather, the struck billiard ball moved spontaneously
upon contact by the billiard ball in motion. It did so in perfect
harmony, that is, in such a way that it appears as though the first
causes the second to move. All of this is summarized in Leibniz's New
System of Nature (1695), right after his rejection of occasionalism
and physical influx:
Therefore, since I was forced to agree that it is not possible for
the soul or any other true substance to receive something from without
… I was led, little by little, to a view that surprised me, but which
seems inevitable, and which, in fact, has very great advantages and
rather considerable beauty. That is, we must say that God originally
created the soul (and any other real unity) in such a way that
everything must arise for it from its own depths, through a perfect
spontaneity relative to itself, and yet with a perfect conformity
relative to external things. … There will be a perfect agreement among
all these substances, producing the same effect that would be noticed
if they communicated through the transmission of species or qualities,
as the common philosophers imagine they do. (GP IV, 484 [AG 143f.])
In the last sentence of the above passage, Leibniz refers to what the
"common philosophers imagine." As we have seen, Leibniz is here
referring to those who endorse influx theory, the view that postulates
"the transmission of species or qualities" (see Against Influx Theory
above). Although Leibniz clearly found this theory unacceptable at the
end of the day, he did nonetheless indicate that it is an acceptable
way of understanding phenomenal nature. It is worth underscoring this
point as it helps to highlight what exactly Leibniz has in mind. He
writes in the New System:
Besides all the advantages that recommend this hypothesis [that
is, preestablished harmony], we can say that it is something more than
a hypothesis, since it hardly seems possible to explain things in any
other intelligible way, … Our ordinary ways of speaking may also be
easily preserved. For we may say that the substance whose state
explains a change in an intelligible way (so that we may conclude that
it is this substance to which the others have in this respect been
adapted from the beginning, in accordance with the order of the
decrees of God) is the one which, so far as this change goes, we
should therefore think of as acting upon the others. Furthermore, the
action of one substance on another is neither the emission nor the
transplanting of an entity, as commonly conceived, and it can be
reasonably understood only in the way I have just described. It is
true that we can easily understand in connection with matter both the
emission and receiving of parts, by means of which we quite properly
explain all the phenomena of physics mechanically. But a material mass
is not a substance, and so it is clear that action as regards an
actual substance can only be as I have described. (GP IV, 487 [WF 20];
my emphasis)
There are at least two points worth emphasizing in this passage.
First, Leibniz was clearly aware that his theory was at odds with
common sense, that is, it is at odds with "our ordinary ways of
speaking." As the above passage indicates, he was concerned to
preserve our usual ways of speaking about causal interactions. As a
result, Leibniz held that there was a sense in which one could say,
for example, that mental events influence bodily events, and
vice-versa. He wrote to Antoine Arnauld that although "one particular
substance has no physical influence on another … nevertheless, one is
quite right to say that my will is the cause of this movement of my
arm …; for the one expresses distinctly what the other expresses more
confusedly, and one must ascribe the action to the substance whose
expression is more distinct" (GP II, 71 [LA 87]). In this passage,
Leibniz sets forth what he believed the metaphysical reality of
apparent intersubstantial causation amounts to. We begin with the
thesis that every created substance perceives the entire universe,
though only a portion of it is perceived distinctly, most of it being
perceived unconsciously, and, hence, confusedly. Now consider two
created substances, x and y (x not identical to y), where some state
of x is said to be the cause of some state of y. Leibniz's analysis is
this: when the causal state of affairs occurred, the relevant
perceptions of substance x became more distinct, while the relevant
perceptions of substance y became more confused. Insofar as the
relevant perceptions of x become increasingly distinct, it is
"causally" active; insofar as the relevant perceptions of substance y
become increasingly confused, it is passive. In general, causation is
to be understood as an increase in distinctness on the part of the
causally active substance, and an increase in confusedness on the part
of the passively effected substance. Again, each substance is
programmed at creation to be active/passive at the relevant moment,
with no occurrence of real substantial interaction. Thus, ordinary
ways of speaking are preserved on the grounds that it is true
according to the "distinct/confused analysis" to say that one object
is the cause of another.
Second, the above passage indicates that when it comes to a mechanical
study of phenomenal nature––that is, when it comes to natural
philosophy––the influx model may be used. In a way this is not
surprising, for as Leibniz makes clear in this passage, the objects of
mechanics are physical masses, and these objects have parts (they have
"windows") via which parts can enter and exit and cause change. They
are not substances, which again, have no such parts. So, it appears to
be Leibniz's view that at the level of the most real, the level of
substances (monads), preestablished harmony is the correct view.
However, the influx model is acceptable at the phenomenal level of
mechanics, perhaps as an abstraction from, or idealization of the
underlying reality. But note that this level is indeed phenomenal,
that is, only an appearance, and any analysis on this level is not the
end of the story. Still, for Leibniz, the fact that it is acceptable
when it comes to mechanics preserves our ordinary ways of speaking,
since it is a model of genuine intersubstantial causation. But such a
way of speaking, for Leibniz, is certainly not metaphysically
rigorous.
3. Efficient and Final Causation
This last point about different Leibnizian metaphysical levels relates
to another unique characteristic of Leibniz's system. Although at the
deepest level of analysis, preestablished harmony reigns supreme in
Leibniz's metaphysics, it is also true that Leibniz embraced a
specific taxonomy of types of naturally operative causes, one that
incorporated both ancient and modern conceptions of causation.
Specifically, Leibniz maintained, in accordance with his belief that
the phenomenal level can be treated as engaging in intersubstantial
causation, that "laws of efficient causes" govern bodies. Consider the
following from the Monadology:
The soul follows its own laws and the body likewise follows its
own; and they agree by virtue of the preestablished harmony among all
substances, because they are all representations of one self-same
universe.
Souls act according to the laws of final causes through
appetition, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of
efficient causes or of motions. And the two realms, that of efficient
causes and that of final causes, are harmonious with one another. (GP
VI, 620 [AG 223])
In accordance with the mechanical philosophy that prevailed during
Leibniz's lifetime, he held that the motions of bodies are to be
understood as engaging in efficient causal relations, or behaving
according to "laws of efficient causes." But Leibniz also believed, as
the above passage indicates, that final causation was prevalent in the
world, and that it operated in harmony with the realm of efficient
causation. Indeed, in the passage above, Leibniz presented his usual
bifurcation of the world into two realms: the bodily realm is governed
by efficient causation, and the realm of souls (individual substances)
is governed by final causation.
A final cause of some activity is that for which that activity occurs;
it is a goal, or end, or purpose of some activity. In claiming that
souls act according to final causes, Leibniz seems to have in mind
that they are essentially goal driven entities. Any given substance
(such as a soul), according to Leibniz, is endowed with two powers:
perception and appetite. Leibniz characterizes appetition thus: "The
action of the internal principle which brings about the change or the
passage from one perception to another may be called appetition" (GP
VI, 609 [AG 215]). Appetitions are the ultimate principles of change
in the Leibnizian universe, as they are responsible for the activity
of the ultimately real things, substances. In claiming, therefore,
that substances are governed by laws of final causes, Leibniz has in
mind that appetitions lead a substance to strive for certain future
perceptual states:
[S]ince the nature of a simple substance consists of perception
and appetite, it is clear that there is in each soul a series of
appetites and perceptions, through which it is lead from the end to
the means, from the perception of one object to the perception of
another. (C 14 [MP 175])
It is a matter of some controversy whether Leibniz held that
appetitive states of a substance are intrasubstantial productive
causes of change (that is, efficient causes of change), and there are
texts that can be brought to bear on both sides of the issue. (See
Carlin, 2004, 2006; Davidson, 1998; Murray, 1995, 1996; Paull, 1992.)
In some passages, Leibniz separates the world into what appear to be
functionally autonomous causal realms:
Souls act according to the laws of final causes through
appetition, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of
efficient causes or of motions. And the two realms, that of efficient
causes and that of final causes, are harmonious with one another. (GP
VI, 620 [AG 223])
But in other texts, Leibniz seems clearly to suggest that final causes
are a species of efficient cause, and hence are productive causes of
change. Consider the following:
[T]he present state of body is born from the preceding state
through the laws of efficient causes; the present state of the soul is
born from its preceding state through the laws of final causes. The
one is the place of the series of motion, the other of the series of
appetites; the one is passed from cause to effect, the other from end
to means. And in fact, it may be said that the representation of the
end in the soul is the efficient cause of the representation in the
same soul of the means. (Dut, II, 2, 134; my emphasis)
Thus, in this text, Leibniz suggests that final causes themselves
produce future perceptions by way of efficient causation.
In this connection, it is worth noting that there is a sense in which
final causation is operative at the level of phenomenal bodies as
well. "There is," Leibniz writes in the New Essays, "a moral and
voluntary element in what is physical, through its relation to God. .
. . [B]odies do not choose for themselves, God having chosen for them"
(A VI, 6, 179 [NE 179]). Mechanical bodies, understood as phenomenal
hunks of matter, do not exhibit intentionality. Thus, they do not
frame their own ends in the way that immaterial substances do. Still,
there is a sense in which they are subject to final causes, for they
act for the ends that God has set for them, and they do so by way of
mechanical efficient causation. Thus, there is some suggestion that
Leibniz held that both efficient and final causation permeated the
universe at multiple ontological levels.
But whether or not Leibniz believed that both types of causes operated
at multiple ontological levels, he did nonetheless believe that the
harmony of efficient and final causes explained the ordinary conscious
activity of substances, including that sort of activity often cited as
involving free will:
[T]he laws that connect the thoughts of the soul in the order of
final causes and in accordance with the evolution of perceptions must
produce pictures that meet and harmonize with the impressions of
bodies on our organs; and likewise the laws of movements in the body,
which follow one another in the order of efficient causes, meet and so
harmonize with the thoughts of the soul that the body is induced to
act at the time when the soul wills it. (GP VI, 137 [T 62])
Although it might appear to some that such a view is inconsistent with
freedom of the will, Leibniz did not think so, for he repeatedly
maintained that human souls, though governed by preestablished laws of
final causes, act with freedom of the will (e.g. GP VII, 419 [L
716f.]). (Whether he was entitled to such a view is another matter.)
It is also worth noting that in a number of passages, Leibniz argues
that this harmony between types of causation accounts for the very
union of the human body and soul (cf. GP VI, 599 [AG 208]).
Finally, Leibniz does not restrict his doctrine of final causation to
the conscious activity of rational agents, for he seems to recognize
final causal activity everywhere in his system. Consider the following
from his Notes on Stahl:
[T]hat motion is not improperly called voluntary, which is
connected with a known distinct appetite, where we notice the means at
the hands of our soul, being adapted to the end itself; although in
other [non-voluntary] movement also, appetites proceed to their own
ends through means, albeit they are not noticed by us. (Dut II, 2,
136; my emphasis)
Here Leibniz claimed that final causes operate at the level of the
unconscious: a mental state can function as a final cause without our
being aware of it. In a letter of 8 May 1704 to Sophie Charlotte,
Leibniz made essentially the same point: "So that even in our
instinctive or involuntary actions, where it seems only the body plays
a part, there is in the soul an appetite for good or an aversion to
evil which directs it, even though our reflection is not able to pick
it out in the confusion" (GP III, 347 [WF 224f.]). It seems to follow
that the preestablished harmony between efficient and final causes has
wider application than one might suppose at first glance.
4. Divine Conservation and Concurrence
Although Leibniz maintained against the occasionalists and Spinoza
that created substances were genuine sources of their own activity,
and that it is not true that God alone is the source of all natural
activity, he did nonetheless believe in a doctrine of divine
conservation and concurrence. Briefly, according to the latter, God is
not an absentee creator, but is involved in every aspect of the
natural world, including the causal activity of created substances.
Since Leibniz held that creatures are real causes of their own
actions, this means that both God and creatures concur in bringing
about the effects of the actions of created substances.
Although the texts on this aspect of Leibniz's theory of natural
causation are notoriously thorny, the following passage seems to
represent what is his considered view:
The concurrence of God consists in giving us continually whatever
there is of reality in us and our actions, insofar as it contains some
perfection; but what there is therein of limitation or imperfection is
a consequence of preceding limitations, which are originally in the
creature. (GP VI, 340 [T 377])
In general, the idea seems to be this: creatures are real causes of
the imperfections in actions, while God is responsible for the
perfection contained in the action. But this general idea seems
clearly inconsistent with a number of other doctrines put forth by
Leibniz. For example, there is reason to believe that he holds that a
substance can be said to act only insofar as it tends towards
perfection (cf. GP VI, 615 [AG 219]). If this is the case, then in
conjunction with the passage above, it appears that God is the only
active agent. Moreover, Leibniz, along with many other seventeenth
century thinkers, held that divine conservation of the world amounts
to a continual recreation of every substance and all their states. If
this is the case, one is left wondering how not to slip into the
occasionalism of Malebranche, for it would seem once again that
creatures are not producing anything. This notoriously difficult topic
has recently spawned a body of secondary literature, as commentators
have struggled with the apparent inconsistencies. (Adams, 1994; Lee,
2004; Sleigh, 1990)
5. References and Further Reading
a. Primary Sources
References to works of Leibniz are cited by abbreviation according to
the key below. Each one is cited by page number unless otherwise
noted. ASämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Multiple volumes in seven
series. Edited by the German Academy of Sciences. Darmstadt and
Berlin: Berlin Academy, 1923–. Cited by series, volume, and page.
AG
Philosophical Essays. Edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel
Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989.
Dut
Opera Omnia. Edited by L. Dutens. Geneva: Fratres De Tournes, 1768.
Cited by volume, and page.
GP
Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. 7 vols.
Edited by C.I. Gerhardt. Berlin: Weidman, 1875-1890. Cited by volume
and page.
L
Philosophical Papers and Letters. Edited by Leroy Loemker, 2nd ed.
Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969.
LA
The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence. Translated and edited by H.T.
Mason. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1967.
MP
Philosophical Writings. Translated and edited by Mary Morris and
G.H.R. Parkinson. London: Dent, 1973.
NE
New Essays on Human Understanding. Translated and edited by Peter
Remnant and Jonathon Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982. The
original French text is in A VI, 6.
T
Theodicy. Edited by Austin Farrer and translated by E.M. Huggard. New
Haven: Yale UP, 1952. Cited by section number as in GP VI.
WF
Leibniz's 'New System' and Associated Contemporary Texts. Translated
and edited by R.S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks. Oxford: Oxford UP,
1997.
b. Secondary Sources
Adams, Robert. 1994. Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford: Oxford UP.
A classic and thorough discussion of Leibniz's views on a number
of topics, including human and divine causation. The book consults a
wealth of primary sources.
Gregory Brown, 1992. "Is There a Pre-Established Harmony of Aggregates
in the Leibnizian Dynamics, or Do Non-Substantial Bodies Interact?,"
Journal of the History of Philosophy 30, pp. 53-75.
This article argues that Leibnizian aggregates do not interact in
Leibniz's physics, and also discusses the importance of distinguishing
ontological levels in Leibniz's philosophy.
Carlin, Laurence. 2006. "Leibniz on Final Causes," Journal of the
History of Philosophy 44 (2), pp. 217-233.
This paper argues that for Leibniz, final causes are species of
efficient cause, and are therefore just as productive as efficient
causes.
Carlin, Laurence. 2004. "Leibniz on Conatus, Causation, and Freedom,"
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4), pp. 365–379.
This paper argues that Leibniz was a causal determinist by
focusing on his treatment of causation in relation to his concept of
conatus, or his concept of force in his physics.
Cover, Jan and Mark Kulstad, eds. 1990. Central Themes in Early Modern
Philosophy. Indianapolis:Hackett.
This is an anthology that contains a number of articles of
causation in early modern philosophy, including an article on the
relationship between Leibniz and occasionalism.
Davidson, Jack. 1998. "Imitators of God: Leibniz on Human Freedom,"
Journal of the History of Philosophy 36, pp. 387–421.
This paper argues that Leibniz was a causal determinist on the
grounds that his model of human volition imitates the model of divine
agency.
Garber, Daniel. 1994. "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy" in Jolley,
ed., The Cambridge Companion to Philosophy, pp. 270-352.
This article is a sustained treatment on Leibniz's views of the
interaction between dynamical bodies, the laws of nature, and
efficient and final causation.
Jolley, Nicholas. 1994. The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP.
This anthology contains articles on many aspects of Leibniz's
philosophy. It is written by leading scholars, and could very well be
the first place to look for someone new to Leibniz.
Kulstad, Mark. 1990. "Appetition in the Philosophy of Leibniz." In A.
Heinkemp, W. Lenzen, and M. Schneider, eds., Mathesis Rationis, pp.
133-151.
This is a through examination of Leibniz's concept of appetition,
and is particularly helpful in relating appetition to his physics and
to human volition.
Lee, Sukjae. 2004. "Leibniz on Divine Concurrence." Philosophical
Review 113 (2), pp. 203-248.
This paper is a close and controversial examination on Leibniz's
doctrines of divine conservation and concurrence.
Murray, Michael. 1995. "Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future
Contingents and Human Freedom." Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 55: 75-108.
This article argues that Leibniz was not a causal determinist,
contrary to what others have argued.
Murray, Michael.. 1996. "Intellect, Will, and Freedom: Leibniz and His
Precursors." The Leibniz Society Review 6: 25-60.
This paper develops the interpretation in Murray (1995) by drawing
on a wealth of historical sources, including medieval philosophers'
treatment of the concept of moral necessity.
Nadler, Steven, ed. 1993. Causation in Early Modern Philosophy.
University Park: Penn State UP.
This collection of papers is the classic source for papers on
causation in early modern philosophy.
O'Neill, Eileen. (1993) "Influxus Physicus." In Nadler, Steven, ed.
Causation in Early Modern Philosophy, pp. 27-57.
This paper traces the history of the physical influx theory, and
analyses its main tenets. It has become the classic treatment of the
issue.
Paull, R. Cranston. 1992. "Leibniz and the Miracle of Freedom," Nous
26: 218-235.
This paper contains an argument for the conclusion that Leibniz
was not a causal determinist. It draws attention to certain passages
that appear troubling for the causal determinist reading.
Rutherford, Donald. 1995. Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
This book contains excellent discussions of Leibniz's views on the
properties of the best possible world, and is particularly helpful on
the topic of how the level of efficient causes relates to the level of
final causes.
Rutherford, Donald. 1993. "Natures, Laws, and Miracles: The Roots of
Leibniz's Critique of Occasionalism" in Nadler, Steven, ed. Causation
in Early Modern Philosophy, pp. 135-158.
A clear discussion of exactly why Leibniz disagrees with
Malebranche's occasionalism. The article challenges some scholars'
interpretations.
Sleigh, Robert C. 1990. Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their
Correspondence. New Haven: Yale UP.
This book examines a number of Leibniz's views on contingent,
substance, and causation in the context of Leibniz's classic exchange
with Antoine Arnauld. It also contains helpful discussions of
Leibniz's treatment of occasionalism.
Sleigh, Robert C.1990. "Leibniz on Malebranche on Causality" in Cover
and Kulstad, eds. Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, pp.
161-194.
This is a helpful discussion of Leibniz's reaction to
Malebranche's occasionalism.
Wilson, Margaret. 1976. "Leibniz's Dynamics and Contingency in Nature"
in Machamer and Turnbull, eds., Motion and Time, Space and Matter, pp.
264-289.
This is a discussion of Leibniz's belief that the causal laws of
nature must be grounded in considerations about final causes.
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