fought. The justification can be either theoretical or historical. The
theoretical aspect is concerned with ethically justifying war and the
forms that warfare may or may not take. The historical aspect, or the
"just war tradition," deals with the historical body of rules or
agreements that have applied in various wars across the ages. For
instance, international agreements such as the Geneva and Hague
conventions are historical rules aimed at limiting certain kinds of
warfare which lawyers may refer to in prosecuting transgressors, but
it is the role of ethics to examine these institutional agreements for
their philosophical coherence as well as to inquire into whether
aspects of the conventions ought to be changed. The just war tradition
may also consider the thoughts of various philosophers and lawyers
through the ages and examine both their philosophical visions of war's
ethical limits (or absence of) and whether their thoughts have
contributed to the body of conventions that have evolved to guide war
and warfare.
1. Introduction
Historically, the just war tradition–a set of mutually agreed rules of
combat—may be said to commonly evolve between two culturally similar
enemies. That is, when an array of values are shared between two
warring peoples, we often find that they implicitly or explicitly
agree upon limits to their warfare. But when enemies differ greatly
because of different religious beliefs, race, or language, and as such
they see each other as "less than human", war conventions are rarely
applied. It is only when the enemy is seen to be a people, sharing a
moral identity with whom one will do business in the following peace,
that tacit or explicit rules are formed for how wars should be fought
and who they should involve and what kind of relations should apply in
the aftermath of war. In part, the motivation for forming or agreeing
to certain conventions, can be seen as mutually benefiting—preferable,
for instance, to the deployment of any underhand tactics or weapons
that may provoke an indefinite series of vengeance acts, or the kinds
of action that have proved to be detrimental to the political or moral
interests to both sides in the past.
Regardless of the conventions that have historically formed, it has
been the concern of the majority of just war theorists that the lack
of rules to war or any asymmetrical morality between belligerents
should be denounced, and that the rules of war should apply to all
equally. That is, just war theory should be universal, binding on all
and capable in turn of appraising the actions of all parties over and
above any historically formed conventions.
The just war tradition is indeed as old as warfare itself. Early
records of collective fighting indicate that some moral considerations
were used by warriors to limit the outbreak or to rein in the
potential devastation of warfare. They may have involved consideration
of women and children or the treatment of prisoners (enslaving them
rather than killing them, or ransoming or exchanging them). Commonly,
the earlier traditions invoked considerations of honor: some acts in
war have always been deemed dishonorable, whilst others have been
deemed honorable. However, what is "honorable" is often highly
specific to culture: for instance, a suicidal attack or defense may be
deemed the honorable act for one people but ludicrous to another.
Robinson (2006) notes that honor conventions are also contextually
slippery, giving way to pragmatic or military interest when required.
Whereas the specifics of what is honorable differ with time and place,
the very fact that one moral virtue is alluded to in the great
literature (for example, Homer's Iliad) is sufficient for us to note
that warfare has been infused with some moral concerns from the
beginning rather than war being a mere Macbethian bloodbath.
The just war theory also has a long history. Parts of the Bible hint
at ethical behavior in war and concepts of just cause, typically
announcing the justice of war by divine intervention; the Greeks may
have paid lip service to the gods, but, as with the Romans, practical
and political issues tended to overwhelm any fledgling legal
conventions: that is, interests of state or Realpolitik (the theory
known as political realism would take precedence in declaring and
waging war. Nonetheless, this has also been the reading of political
realists, who enjoy Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War as an
example of why war is necessarily the extension of politics and hence
permeated by hard-nosed state interest rather than "lofty" pretensions
to moral behavior.
Although St Augustine provided comments on the morality of war from
the Christian perspective (railing against the love of violence that
war can engender) as did several Arabic commentators in the
intellectual flourishing from the 9th to 12th centuries, but the most
systematic exposition in the Western tradition and one that still
attracts attention was outlined by Saint Thomas Aquinas in the 13th
century. In the Summa Theologicae, Aquinas presents the general
outline of what becomes the traditional just war theory as discussed
in modern universities. He discusses not only the justification of war
but also the kinds of activity that are permissible (for a Christian)
in war (see below). Aquinas's thoughts become the model for later
Scholastics and Jurists to expand and to gradually to universalize
beyond Christendom – notably, for instance, in relations with the
peoples of America following European incursions into the continent.
The most important of these writers are: Francisco de Vitoria
(1486-1546), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645),
Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1704), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), and Emerich
de Vattel (1714-1767).
In the twentieth century, just war theory has undergone a revival
mainly in response to the invention of nuclear weaponry and American
involvement in the Vietnam war. The most important contemporary texts
include Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars (1977), Barrie Paskins
and Michael Dockrill The Ethics of War (1979), Richard Norman Ethics,
Killing, and War (1995), Brian Orend War and International Justice
(2001) and Michael Walzer on War and Justice (2001), as well as
seminal articles by Thomas Nagel "War and Massacre", Elizabeth
Anscombe "War and Murder", and a host of others, commonly found in the
journals Ethics or The Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs.
Since the terrorist attacks on the USA on 9/11 academics have turned
their attention to just war once again with international, national,
academic, and military conferences developing and consolidating the
theoretical aspects of the conventions – just war theory has become a
popular topic in International Relations, Political Science,
Philosophy, Ethics, and Military History courses. Conference
proceedings are regularly published, offering readers a breadth of
issues that the topic stirs: for example, Alexander Moseley and
Richard Norman, eds. Human Rights and Military Intervention, Paul
Robinson, ed., Just War in a Comparative Perspective, Alexsander
Jokic, ed., War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing. What has been of
great interest is that in the headline wars of the past decade, the
dynamic interplay of the rules and conventions of warfare not only
remain intact on the battlefield but their role and hence their
explication have been awarded a higher level of scrutiny and debate.
In the political circles, justification of war still requires even in
the most critical analysis a superficial acknowledgement of
justification. On the ground, generals have extolled their troops to
adhere to the rules, soldiers are taught the just war conventions in
the military academies (for example, explicitly through military
ethics courses or implicitly through veterans' experiences). Yet
despite the emphasis on abiding by war's conventions, war crimes
continue – genocidal campaigns have been waged by mutually hating
peoples, leaders have waged total war on ethnic groups within or
without their borders, and individual soldiers or guerilla bands have
committed atrocious, murderous, or humiliating acts on their enemy.
But, arguably, such acts do remain atrocities by virtue of the just
war conventions that some things in war are deemed to be inexcusable,
regardless of the righteousness of the cause or the noise and fog of
battle.
Yet increasingly, the rule of law – the need to hold violators and
transgressors responsible for their actions in war and therefore after
the battle – is making headway onto the battlefield. In chivalrous
times, the Christian crusader could seek priestly absolution for
atrocities committed in war, a stance supported by Augustine for
example; today, the law courts are seemingly less forgiving: a
violation of the conventions assumes that the soldier is responsible
and accountable and should be charged for a crime. Nonetheless, the
idealism of those who seek the imposition of law and responsibility on
the battlefield (cf. Geoffrey Robertson's Crimes Against Humanity),
often runs ahead of the traditions and customs, or plain state
interests, that demean or weaken the justum bellum that may exist
between warring factions. And in some cases, no just war conventions
and hence no potential for legal acknowledgement of malfeasance, exist
at all; in such cases, the ethic of war is considered, or is
implicitly held to be, beyond the norms of peaceful ethics and
therefore deserving a separate moral realm where "fair is foul and
foul is fair" (Shakespeare, Macbeth I.i). In such examples (e.g,
Rwanda, 1994), a people's justification of destructiveness and killing
to whatever relative degree they hold to be justifiable triumphs over
attempts to establish the laws of peaceful interaction into this
separate bloody realm; and in some wars, people fighting for their
land or nation prefer to pick up the cudgel rather than the rapier, as
Leo Tolstoy notes in War and Peace (Book 4.Ch.2), to sidestep the
etiquette or war in favor securing their land from occupational or
invading forces.
The continued brutality of war in the face of conventions and courts
of international law lead some to maintain that the application of
morality to war is a nonstarter: state interest or military exigency
would always overwhelm moral concerns. But there are those of a more
skeptical persuasion who do not believe that morality can or should
exist in war: its very nature precludes ethical concerns. But as there
are several ethical viewpoints, there are also several common reasons
laid against the need or the possibility of morality in war.
Generally, consequentialists and act utilitarians may claim that if
military victory is sought then all methods should be employed to
ensure it is gained at a minimum of expense and time. Arguments from
'military necessity' are of this type; for example, to defeat Germany
in World War II, it was deemed necessary to bomb civilian centers, or
in the US Civil War, for General Sherman to burn Atlanta. However,
intrinsicists (who claim that there are certain acts that are good or
bad in themselves) may also decree that no morality can exist in the
state of war: they may claim that it can only exist in a peaceful
situation in which, for instance, recourse exists to conflict
resolving institutions. Alternatively, intrinsicists may claim that
possessing a just cause (the argument from righteousness) is a
sufficient condition for pursuing whatever means are necessary to gain
a victory or to punish an enemy. A different skeptical argument, one
advanced by Michael Walzer, is that the invention of nuclear weapons
alters war so much that our notions of morality—and hence just war
theories—become redundant. However, against Walzer, it can be
reasonably argued that although such weapons change the nature of
warfare (for example, the timing, range, and potential devastation)
they do not dissolve the need to consider their use within a moral
framework: a nuclear warhead remains a weapon and weapons can be
morally or immorally employed.
Whilst skeptical positions may be derived from consequentialist and
intrinsicist positions, they need not be. Consequentialists can argue
that there are long-term benefits to having a war convention. For
example, by fighting cleanly, both sides can be sure that the war does
not escalate, thus reducing the probability of creating an incessant
war of counter-revenges. Intrinsicists, on the other hand, can argue
that certain spheres of life ought never to be targeted in war; for
example, hospitals and densely populated suburbs.
The inherent problem with both ethical models is that they become
either vague or restrictive when it comes to war. Consequentialism is
an open-ended model, highly vulnerable to pressing military or
political needs to adhere to any code of conduct in war: if more will
be gained from breaking the rules than will be lost, the
consequentialist cannot but demur to military "necessity." On the
other hand, intrinsicism can be so restrictive that it permits no
flexibility in war: whether it entails a Kantian thesis of dutifully
respecting others or a classical rights position, intrinsicism
produces an inflexible model that would restrain warriors' actions to
the targeting of permissible targets only. In principle such a
prescription is commendable, yet the nature of war is not so clean cut
when military targets can be hidden amongst civilian centers.
Against these two ethical positions, just war theory offers a series
of principles that aim to retain a plausible moral framework for war.
From the just war (justum bellum) tradition, theorists distinguish
between the rules that govern the justice of war (jus ad bellum) from
those that govern just and fair conduct in war (jus In bello) and the
responsibility and accountability of warring parties after the war
(jus post bellum). The three aspects are by no means mutually
exclusive, but they offer a set of moral guidelines for waging war
that are neither unrestricted nor too restrictive. The problem for
ethics involves expounding the guidelines in particular wars or
situations.
2. The Jus Ad Bellum Convention
The principles of the justice of war are commonly held to be: having
just cause, being a last resort, being declared by a proper authority,
possessing right intention, having a reasonable chance of success, and
the end being proportional to the means used. One can immediately
detect that the principles are not wholly intrinsicist nor
consequentialist—they invoke the concerns of both models. Whilst this
provides just war theory with the advantage of flexibility, the lack
of a strict ethical framework means that the principles themselves are
open to broad interpretations. Examining each in turn draws attention
to the relevant problems.
Possessing just cause is the first and arguably the most important
condition of jus ad bellum. Most theorists hold that initiating acts
of aggression is unjust and gives a group a just cause to defend
itself. But unless "aggression" is defined, this proscription is
rather open-ended. For example, just cause resulting from an act of
aggression can ostensibly be a response to a physical injury (for
example, a violation of territory), an insult (an aggression against
national honor), a trade embargo (an aggression against economic
activity), or even to a neighbor's prosperity (a violation of social
justice). The onus is then on the just war theorist to provide a
consistent and sound account of what is meant by just cause. Whilst
not going into the reasons why the other explanations do not offer a
useful condition of just cause, the consensus is that an initiation of
physical force is wrong and may justly be resisted. Self-defense
against physical aggression, therefore, is putatively the only
sufficient reason for just cause. Nonetheless, the principle of
self-defense can be extrapolated to anticipate probable acts of
aggression, as well as in assisting others against an oppressive
government or from another external threat (interventionism).
Therefore, it is commonly held that aggressive war is only permissible
if its purpose is to retaliate against a wrong already committed (for
example, to pursue and punish an aggressor), or to pre-empt an
anticipated attack. In recent years, the argument for preemption has
gained supporters in the West: surely, the argument goes, it is right
on consequentialist grounds to strike the first blow if a future war
is to be avoided? By acting decisively against a probable aggressor, a
powerful message is sent that a nation will defend itself with armed
force; thus preemption may provide a deterrent and a more peaceful
world. However, critics complain that preemptive strikes are based on
conjectured rather than impending aggression and in effect denounce
the moral principle that an agent is presumed innocent – posturing and
the building up of armaments do not in themselves constitute
aggression, just a man carrying a weapon is not a man using a weapon,
Consequentialist critics may also reject preemption on the grounds
that it is more likely to destabilize peace, while other realists may
complain that a preemptive strike policy is the ploy of a tyrannical
or bullying power that justifies other nations to act in their
self-interest to neutralize either through alliances or military
action – such is the principle behind the "balance of power" politics
in which nations constantly renew their alliances and treatises to
ensure that not one of them becomes a hegemonic power. It is also
feared that the policy of preemption slips easily into the
machinations of "false flag operations" in which a pretext for war is
created by a contrived theatrical or actual stunt – of dressing one's
own soldiers up in the enemy's uniforms, for instance, and having them
attack a military or even civilian target so as to gain political
backing for a war. Unfortunately, false flag operations tend to be
quite common. Just war theory would reject them as it would reject
waging war to defend a leader's "honor" following an insult. Realists
may defend them on grounds of a higher necessity but such moves are
likely to fail as being smoke screens for political rather than moral
interests.
War should always be a last resort. This connects intimately with
presenting a just cause – all other forms of solution must have been
attempted prior to the declaration of war. It has often been
recognized that war unleashes forces and powers that soon get beyond
the grips of the leaders and generals to control – there is too much
"fog" in war, as Clausewitz noted, but that fog is also a moral haze
in which truth and trust are early casualties. The resulting damage
that war wrecks tends to be very high for most economies and so
theorists have advised that war should not be lightly accepted: once
unleashed, war is not like a sport that can be quickly stopped at the
blow of a whistle (although the Celtic druids supposedly had the power
to stop a battle by virtue of their moral standing) and its
repercussions last for generations. Holding "hawks" at bay though is a
complicated task – the apparent ease by which war may resolve
disputes, especially in the eyes of those whose military might is
apparently great and victory a certainty, does present war as a low
cost option relative to continuing political problems and economic or
moral hardship. Yet the just war theorist wishes to underline the need
to attempt all other solutions but also to tie the justice of the war
to the other principles of jus ad bellum too.
The notion of proper authority seems to be resolved for most of the
theorists, who claim it obviously resides in the sovereign power of
the state. But the concept of sovereignty raises a plethora of issues
to consider here. If a government is just, i.e., most theorists would
accept that the government is accountable and does not rule
arbitrarily, then giving the officers of the state the right to
declare war is reasonable, so the more removed from a proper and just
form a government is, the more reasonable it is that its claim to
justifiable political sovereignty disintegrates. A historical example
can elucidate the problem: when Nazi Germany invaded France in 1940 it
set up the Vichy puppet regime. What allegiance did the people of
France under its rule owe to its precepts and rules? A Hobbesian
rendition of almost absolute allegiance to the state entails that
resistance is wrong (so long as the state is not tyrannical and
imposes war when it should be the guardian of peace); whereas a
Lockean or instrumentalist conception of the state entails that a
poorly accountable, inept, or corrupt regime possesses no sovereignty,
and the right of declaring war (to defend themselves against the
government or from a foreign power) is wholly justifiable. The notion
of proper authority therefore requires thinking about what is meant by
sovereignty, what is meant by the state, and what is the proper
relationship between a people and its government.
The possession of right intention is ostensibly less problematic. The
general thrust of the concept being that a nation waging a just war
should be doing so for the cause of justice and not for reasons of
self-interest or aggrandizement. Putatively, a just war cannot be
considered to be just if reasons of national interest are paramount or
overwhelm the pretext of fighting aggression. However, "right
intention" masks many philosophical problems. According to Kant,
possessing good intent constitutes the only condition of moral
activity, regardless of the consequences envisioned or caused, and
regardless, or even in spite, of any self interest in the action the
agent may have. The extreme intrinsicism of Kant can be criticized on
various grounds, the most pertinent here being the value of
self-interest itself. At what point does right intention separate
itself from self-interest – is the moral worthiness of intent only
gained by acting in favor of one's neighbor, and if so, what does that
imply for moral action – that one should woo one's neighbor's spouse
to make him/her feel good? Acting with proper intent requires us to
think about what is proper and it is not certain that not acting in
self interest is necessarily the proper thing to do. On the one hand,
if the only method to secure a general peace (some thing usually held
to be good in itself) is to annex a belligerent neighbor's territory,
political aggrandizement becomes intimately connected with the proper
intention of maintaining the peace for all or the majority. On the
other hand, a nation may possess just cause to defend an oppressed
group, and may rightly argue that the proper intention is to secure
their freedom, yet such a war may justly be deemed too expensive or
too difficult to wage; i.e., it is not ultimately in their
self-interest to fight the just war. On that account, the realist may
counter that national interest is paramount: only if waging war on
behalf of freedom is also complemented by the securing of economic or
other military interests should a nation commit its troops. The issue
of intention raises the concern of practicalities as well as
consequences, both of which should be considered before declaring war.
The next principle is that of reasonable success. This is another
necessary condition for waging just war, but again is insufficient by
itself. Given just cause and right intention, the just war theory
asserts that there must be a reasonable probability of success. The
principle of reasonable success is consequentialist in that the costs
and benefits of a campaign must be calculated. However, the concept of
weighing benefits poses moral as well as practical problems as evinced
in the following questions. Should one not go to the aid of a people
or declare war if there is no conceivable chance of success? Is it
right to comply with aggression because the costs of not complying are
too prohibitive? Would it be right to crush a weak enemy because it
would be marginally costless? Is it not sometimes morally necessary to
stand up to a bullying larger force, as the Finns did when Russia
invaded in 1940, for the sake of national self-esteem or simple
interests of defending land? Historically, many nations have overcome
the probability of defeat: the fight may seem hopeless, but a
charismatic leader or rousing speech can sometimes be enough to stir a
people into fighting with all their will. Winston Churchill offered
the British nation some of the finest of war's rhetoric when it was
threatened with defeat and invasion by Nazi Germany in 1940. For
example: "Let us therefore brace ourselves to do our duty, and so bear
ourselves that, if the British Commonwealth and its Empire lasts for a
thousand years, men will still say, 'This was their finest hour.'"
….And "What is our aim?….Victory, victory at all costs, victory in
spite of all terror; victory, however long and hard the road may be;
for without victory, there is no survival." (Speeches to Parliament,
1940). However, the thrust of the reasonable success principle
emphasizes that human life and economic resources should not be wasted
in what would obviously be an uneven match. For a nation threatened by
invasion, other forms of retaliation or defense may be available, such
as civil disobedience, or even forming alliances with other small
nations to equalize the odds.
The final guide of jus ad bellum is that the desired end should be
proportional to the means used. This principle overlaps into the moral
guidelines of how a war should be fought, namely the principles of jus
In bello. With regards to just cause, a policy of war requires a goal,
and that goal must be proportional to the other principles of just
cause. Whilst this commonly entails the minimizing of war's
destruction, it can also invoke general balance of power
considerations. For example, if nation A invades a land belonging to
the people of nation B, then B has just cause to take the land back.
According to the principle of proportionality, B's counter-attack must
not invoke a disproportionate response: it should aim to retrieve its
land and not exact further retribution or invade the aggressor's
lands, or in graphic terms it should not retaliate with overwhelming
force or nuclear weaponry to resolve a small border dispute. That goal
may be tempered with attaining assurances that no further invasion
will take place, but for B to invade and annex regions of A is
nominally a disproportionate response, unless (controversially) that
is the only method for securing guarantees of no future reprisals. For
B to invade and annex A and then to continue to invade neutral
neighboring nations on the grounds that their territory would provide
a useful defense against other threats and a putative imbalance of
power is even more unsustainable.
On the whole the principles offered by jus ad bellum are useful
guidelines for reviewing the morality of going to war that are not
tied to the intrinsicist's absolutism or consequentialist's
open-endedness. Philosophically however they invoke a plethora of
problems by either their independent vagueness or by mutually
inconsistent results – a properly declared war may involve improper
intention or disproportionate ambitions. But war is a complicated
issue and the principles are nonetheless a useful starting point for
ethical examination and they remain a guide for both statesmen and
women and for those who judge political proceedings.
3. The Principles Of Jus In Bello
The rules of just conduct within war fall under the two broad
principles of discrimination and proportionality. The principle of
discrimination concerns who are legitimate targets in war, whilst the
principle of proportionality concerns how much force is morally
appropriate. A third principle can be added to the traditional two,
namely the principle of responsibility, which demands an examination
of where responsibility lies in war.
One strong implication of the justice of warfare being a separate
topic of analysis to the justice of war is that the theory thus
permits the judging of acts within war to be dissociated from it
cause. This allows the theorist to claim that a nation fighting an
unjust cause may still fight justly, or a nation fighting a just cause
may be said to fight unjustly. It is a useful division but one that
does not necessarily sever all ties between the two great principles
of warfare: the justice of a cause remains a powerful moral guide by
which warfare is to be judged, for what does it matter, it can be
asked, if a nation wages a war of aggression but does so cleanly?
In waging war it is considered unfair and unjust to attack
indiscriminately since non-combatants or innocents are deemed to stand
outside the field of war proper. Immunity from war can be reasoned
from the fact that their existence and activity is not part of the
essence of war, which is the killing of combatants. Since killing
itself is highly problematic, the just war theorist has to proffer a
reason why combatants become legitimate targets in the first place,
and whether their status alters if they are fighting a just or unjust
war. Firstly, a theorist may hold that being trained and/or armed
constitutes a sufficient threat to combatants on the other side and
thereby the donning of uniform alters the person's moral status to
legitimate target; whether this extends to peaceful as well as war
duties is not certain though. Voluntarists may invoke the boxing ring
analogy: punching another individual is not morally supportable in a
civilized community, but those who voluntarily enter the boxing ring
renounce their right not to be hit. Normally, a boxer does not retain
the right to hit another boxer outside of the ring, yet perhaps a
soldier's training creates a wholly different expectation governing
his or her status and that wearing the uniform or merely possessing
the training secures their legitimacy as a target both on and off the
battlefield. Such an argument would imply that it is right to attack
unarmed soldiers or soldiers who have surrendered or who are enjoying
the normality of civilian life, which just war theorists and
historical conventions have traditionally rejected on the claim that
when a soldier lays down his weapons or removes his uniform, he or she
returns to civilian life and hence the status of the non-combatant
even if that return is temporary. Conversely, in joining an army the
individual is said to renounce his or her rights not to be targeted in
war – the bearing of arms takes a person into an alternative moral
realm in which killing is the expectation and possible norm: it is
world removed from civilian structures and historically has evolved
rites of passage and exit that underline the alteration in status for
cadets and veterans; all analogies to the fair play of sports fail at
this juncture, for war involves killing and what the British Army call
"unlimited liability." On entering the army, the civilian loses the
right not to be targeted, yet does it follow that all who bear uniform
are legitimate targets, or are some more so than others – those who
are presently fighting compared to those bearing arms but who are
involved in supplies or administration, for instance?
Others, avoiding a rights analysis for it produces many problems on
delineating the boundaries of rights and the bearers, may argue that
those who join the army (or who have even been pressed into
conscription) come to terms with being a target, and hence their own
deaths. This is argued for example by Barrie Paskins and Michael
Dockrill in The Ethics of War (1979). However, since civilians can
just as readily come to terms with their own deaths and it is not
necessarily the case that a soldier has, their argument, although
interesting, is not sufficient to defend the principle of
discrimination and why soldiers alone should be targeted legitimately
in war. In turn, rights-based analyses may be more philosophically
productive in giving soldiers and critics crucial guidelines,
especially those analyses that focus on the renouncing of rights by
combatants by virtue of their war status, which would leave nominally
intact a sphere of immunity for civilians. Yet what is the status of
guerrilla fighters who use civilian camouflage in order to press their
attacks or to hide? Similarly, soldiers on covert operations present
intricate problems of identification and legitimization: is there a
difference between the two? Referring back to the fighters' cause (for
example, the guerrilla is a "freedom fighter" and thus carries a moral
trump card) creates its own problems, which the just war theory in
dividing the justice of the cause from the justice of the manner in
which war is fought attempts to avoid: the guerrilla fighter may
breach codes of conduct just as the soldier on a politically sensitive
covert operations may avoid targeting the wrong people.
Walzer, in his Just and Unjust Wars (1977) claims that the lack of
identification does not give a government the right to kill
indiscriminately—the onus is on the government to identify the
combatants, and so, the implication goes, if there is any uncertainty
involved then an attack must not be made. Others have argued that the
nature of modern warfare dissolves the possibility of discrimination:
civilians are just as necessary causal conditions for the war machine
as are combatants, therefore, they claim, there is no moral
distinction in targeting an armed combatant and a civilian involved in
arming or feeding the combatant. The distinction is, however, not
closed by the nature of modern economies, since a combatant still
remains a very different entity from a non-combatant, if not for the
simple reason that the former is presently armed (and hence has
renounced rights or is prepared to die, or is a threat), whilst the
civilian is not. On the other hand, it can be argued that being a
civilian does not necessarily mean that one is not a threat and hence
not a legitimate target. If Mr Smith is the only individual in the
nation to possess the correct combination that will detonate a device
that could kill thousands, then he becomes not only causally
efficacious in the firing of a weapon of war, but also morally
responsible; reasonably he also becomes a legitimate military target.
His job effectively militarizes his status even though he does not
bear arms.
The underlying issues that ethical analysis must deal with involve the
logical nature of an individual's complicity and the aiding and
abetting the war machine, with greater weight being imposed on those
logically closer than those logically further from the war machine in
their work. At a deeper level, one can consider the role that
civilians play in supporting an unjust war: to what extent are they
morally culpable, and if they are culpable in giving moral, financial,
or economic support to some extent, does that mean they may become
legitimate targets? This invokes the issue of collective versus
individual responsibility that is in itself a complex topic but one
that the principle of discrimination tries to circumvent by presenting
guidelines for soldiers that keep their activity within the realms of
war and its effects rather than murder. It would be wrong, on the
principle of discrimination, to group the enemy into one targetable
mass of people – some can not be responsible for a war or its
procedures, notably children. Yet, on the other hand, if a civilian
bankrolls a war or initiates aggression as a politician, surely he or
she bears some moral responsibility for the ensuing deaths: some may
argue that the war's justification rests upon such shoulders but not
the manner in which it is fought, while others may prefer to saddle
the leader or initiator with the entire responsibility for how a war
is fought on the argument that each combatant is responsible for those
below him or her in rank – so the political or civilian leaders are
analogously responsible for all operating in the military field.
The second principle of just conduct is that any offensive action
should remain strictly proportional to the objective desired. This
principle overlaps with the proportionality principle of just cause,
but it is distinct enough to consider it in its own light.
Proportionality for jus In bello requires tempering the extent and
violence of warfare to minimize destruction and casualties. It is
broadly utilitarian in that it seeks to minimize overall suffering,
but it can also be understood from other moral perspectives, for
instance, from harboring good will to all (Kantian ethics), or acting
virtuously (Aristotelian ethics). Whilst the consideration of
discrimination focuses on who is a legitimate target of war, the
principle of proportionality deals with what kind of force is morally
permissible. In fighting a just war in which only military targets are
attacked, it is still possible to breach morality by employing
disproportionate force against an enemy. Whilst the earlier
theoreticians, such as Thomas Aquinas, invoked the Christian concepts
of charity and mercy, modern theorists may invoke either
consequentialist or intrinsicist prescriptions, both of which remain
problematic as the foregoing discussions have noted. However, it does
not seem morally reasonable to completely gun down a barely armed
albeit belligerent tribe. At the battle of Omdurman in 1898 in the
Sudan, six machine gunners killed thousands of dervishes—the gunners
may have been in the right to defend themselves, but the principle of
proportionality implies that a battle end before it becomes a
massacre. Similarly, following the battle of Culloden in 1746 in
Scotland, Cumberland ordered "No Quarter", which was not only a breach
of the principle of discrimination, for his troops were permitted to
kill the wounded as well as supporting civilians, but also a breach of
the principle of proportionality, since the battle had been won, and
the Jacobite cause effectively defeated on the battle field.
What if a war and all of its suffering could be avoided by highly
selective killing? Could just war theory endorse assassination for
instance? Assassination programs have often been secretly accepted and
employed by states throughout the centuries and appeal, if challenged,
is often to a "higher" value such as self-defense, killing a target
guilty of war crimes and atrocities, or removing a threat to peace and
stability. The CIA manual on assassination (1954, cf. Belfield),
sought to distinguish between murder and assassination, the latter
being justifiable according to the higher purposes sought. This is
analogous to just war theorists seeking to put mass killing on a
higher moral ground than pure massacre and slaughter and is fraught
with the same problems raised in this article and in the just war
literature. On grounds of discrimination, assassination would be
justifiable if the target were legitimate and not, say, the wife or
children of a legitimate target. On grounds of proportionality, the
policy would also be acceptable, for if one man or woman (a legitimate
target by virtue of his or her aggression) should die to avoid further
bloodshed or to secure a quicker victory, then surely assassination is
covered by the just war theory? The founder of the Hashshashin society
(c.11-13thC), Hasan ibn el Sabah preferred to target or threaten
warmongers rather than drag innocents and noncombatants into bloody
and protracted warfare: his threats were often successful for he
brought the reality of death home to the leaders who otherwise would
enjoy what lyricist Roger Waters calls "the bravery of being out of
range." In recent years, the US and UK proclaimed that the war in the
Gulf was not with the Iraqi people but with its leader and his regime;
the US government even issued a bounty on the heads of key agents in
the Ba'ath party; indeed, Saddam Hussein's sons, Uday and Qusay with a
bounty of £15m, were killed in a selective hunt and destroy mission
rather than being captured and brought to trial for the crimes
asserted of them. Assassination would apparently clear the two hurdles
of discrimination and proportionality, yet the intrinsicist wing of
just war theorists would reasonably claim that underhand and covert
operations, including assassination, should not form a part of war on
grounds that they act to undermine the respect due one's enemy (not
matter how cruel he or she is) as well as the moral integrity of the
assassin; the consequentialists would also counter that such policies
also encourage the enemy to retaliate in similar manner, and one of
the sustaining conclusions of just war theory is that escalation or
retaliatory measures (tit for tat policies) should be avoided for
their destabilizing nature. Once initiated, assassination tends to
become the norm of political affairs – indeed, civil politics would
thus crumble into fearful and barbaric plots and conspiracies (as did
Rome in its last centuries) in a race to gain power and mastery over
others rather than to forge justifiable sovereignty.
The principles of proportionality and discrimination aim to temper
war's violence and range; while they may ostensibly imply the
acceptance of some forms of warfare, their malleability also implies
that we continuously look afresh upon seemingly acceptable acts.
Accordingly, they are complemented by other considerations that are
not always explicitly taken up in the traditional exposition of jus In
bello, this is especially true in the case of the issue of
responsibility.
Jus in bello requires that the agents of war be held responsible for
their actions. This ties in their actions to morality generally. Some,
such as Saint Augustine argues against this assertion: "who is but the
sword in the hand of him who uses it, is not himself responsible for
the death he deals." Those who act according to a divine command, or
even God's laws as enacted by the state and who put wicked men to
death "have by no means violated the commandment, 'Thou shalt not
kill.'" Whilst this issue is connected to the concepts of just cause,
it does not follow that individuals waging a just, or unjust war,
should be absolved of breaching the principles of just conduct.
Readily it can be accepted that soldiers killing other soldiers is
part of the nature of warfare for which soldiers ought to be prepared
and trained, but when soldiers turn their weapons against
non-combatants, or pursue their enemy beyond what is reasonable, then
they are no longer committing legitimate acts of war but acts of
murder. The principle of responsibility re-asserts the burden of
abiding by rules in times of peace on those acting in war to remind
them that one day they will once more take up civilian status and
should be prepared to do so conscientiously, free of any guilt from
war crimes. The issues that arise from this principle include the
morality of obeying orders (for example, when one knows those orders
to be immoral), as well as the moral status of ignorance (not knowing
of the effects of one's actions either reasonably or literally).
Responsibility for acts of war relate back to the tenets of jus ad
bellum as well as jus in bello, for the justification of going to war
involves responsibility as well as the acts ordered and committed in
war. In reviewing the stories from military ethics readers, the acts
of bravery that attract our attention involve soldiers standing up to
do the "right thing" against either the prevailing momentum of the
platoon or the orders from higher up; the realist rejects such acts as
infrequent or unnecessary performances that do not alter the main
characteristic of war and its innate brutality, yet such acts also
remind the critic as well as the soldier of the importance of
returning to the civilian mode with good conscience.
The aftermath of war involves the relinquishing of armed conflict as a
means of resolving disputes and the donning of more civil modes of
conduct but it also raises questions concerning the nature of the post
bellum justice.
4. Jus post bellum
Following the cessation of a war, three possibilities emerge: either
the army has been defeated, has been victorious, or it has agreed to a
ceasefire. Principles of justice may then be applied to each
situation. Orend presents a useful summary of the principles of jus
post bellum : the principle of discrimination should be employed to
avoid imposing punishment on innocents or non-combatants; the rights
or traditions of the defeated deserve respect; the claims of victory
should be proportional to the war's character; compensatory claims
should be tempered by the principles of discrimination and
proportionality; and, controversially, the need to rehabilitate or
re-educate an aggressor should also be considered.
It has often been remarked that justice, like history, is written by
the victors. A defeated army and indeed the civilian body from which
the army stems should thus be prepared to subject itself to the
imposition of rules and forms of punishments, humiliation, and even
retributions that it would not otherwise agree to. The lives, values,
and resources that have been fought for must now be handed over to the
conquerors. When put this way, when one readily imagines one's own
country's army falling to an aggressive enemy, the terms immediately
appear fearful and unjust and may stir a greater endeavor to make the
victory hollow by the raising of guerrilla or even terrorist
organizations to thwart the conquerors' designs.
Yet when one's own army is victorious, the partiality of victory can
be so easily dismissed on the enthusiastic wave that accompanies
triumph: victory is so often associated with the greater right when
one's own country vanquishes its enemy, and assumedly with that right
comes the justification to impose conditions upon the vanquished. In
so many wars in history, both ancient and modern, victory has provided
the winners with the means of exploiting the defeated nation and for
claiming rights over its lands and people whether in the form of
enslavement or in monopolistic mercantile contracts; sometimes an
appeal to divine justice is made; at other times the supremacy of
one's nation, race, creed, or political order is lauded over the
defeated. Economic exploitation is not the only means of subjugating
the defeated: new political or religious frameworks can also be
imposed sometimes as a means of "rehabilitating the defeated" or as a
means to avoid the circumstances (political or economic) that may
bring about further warfare; the philosopher must naturally inquire as
to the justice of such measures.
The just war theorist is keen to remind warriors and politicians alike
that the principles of justice following war should be universalizable
and morally ordered and that victory should not provide a license for
imposing unduly harsh or punitive measures or that state or commercial
interests should not dictate the form of the new peace. Similarly,
imposing an alternative political or religious is not likely to be
conducive to peace, as Edmund Burke prophetically warned about
decreeing for the "rights of man" in an unprepared culture;
re-educating a defeated military or bureaucracy may seem reasonable
and arguably was successful in post-war Germany (1945), yet such a
program may also be so superficial or condescending as to have only
short term and illusory benefits or act to further humiliate the
defeated into seething desire for revenge. In post-war Iraq
(2003-date), the rehabilitation programs have met with mixed success
and have often been criticized for favoring some ethnic groups over
others, i.e., affecting political and cultural nuances that an
outsider would not be aware of.
Criticism may stem from either intrinsicist reasons (that the defeated
should still be viewed as a people deserving moral respect and their
traditions held as sacrosanct) or consequentialist reasons (that
punitive impositions are likely to produce a backlash); but again it
is worth reminding that just war theory tends to merge the two to
avoid awkward implications derived from either position singly.
At this point, the attraction for jus post bellum thinkers is to
return to the initial justice of the war. Consider a war of
self-defense: this is considered by most, except absolute pacifists,
to be the most justifiable of all wars. If the people are defeated but
their cause remains just, should they then continue the fight to rid
their country of all the vestiges of occupation? What if fighting is
impossible? Should they bow their heads in honorable defeat and accept
the victor's terms graciously? Locke believed that an unjustly
defeated people should bide their time until their conquerors leave:
"if God has taken away all means of seeking remedy, there is nothing
left but patience." (Second Treatises, §177); however, the right
always remains with those who fought against an unjust war but they do
not gain any moral right to attack indiscriminately or
disproportionately (such as terrorizing the invader's own civilians or
soldiers at rest), although they may carry on their claim for freedom
over the generations. A realist, however, may ask how a people are to
regain their freedom if they do not raise arms against their sea of
troubles? Nonetheless, if the "good fight" is to continue, most
theorists follow Locke and prohibit breaches of the jus in bello
principles: while it would be wrong to bow to a tyrant or conquering
army, it would be immoral to target their families in order to
encourage the occupying army to leave. Others may counsel civil
disobedience and other forms of intransigence to signal displeasure.
If, on the other hand, the victors have won a just war against an
aggressor, Locke argues that the victor's right does not extend to the
aggressive nation's civilian population, but that it does extend to
all those engaged in the aggression and that it extends absolutely:
that is, the just conqueror has absolute rights of life and death over
the defeated aggressors. The aggressor, one who initiates war, puts
the individual or the community into a state of war, he argues, and so
the defender has an absolute prerogative to use whatever force
necessary to secure freedom and peace: accordingly, in victory, the
victors may enslave or kill the aggressors. Locke's is an extreme
although not logically incoherent position and his exhortations may be
compared to other moral positions (often emerging from religious
thinking) to temper the justice in favor of other virtues such as
charity, liberality, and justice. Indeed, King Alfred the Great of
Wessex (c.878AD) defeated the Viking invader Guthrum in battle and
rather than executing him as the Vikings would have done Alfred, he
ordered them to join the Christian religion and then, and probably
more importantly, offered them a stake in the land: toleration merged
with prudence and self-interest ensured Guthrum was no longer a
threat. Indeed, Machiavelli warned that killing an opponent's family
is likely to raise their ire but taking away their land is guaranteed
to continue the fight over generations. It may be reasonably held that
the aggressors deserve punishment of some sort, although Alfred's
example highlights an alternative view of dealing with an enemy, one
that reminds the theorist that peace not further war remains the goal.
But what if the defeated aggressors are guilty of atrocities, surely
they should be made to stand trial to send a signal to other "war
criminals" as well as to punish them for their own misdeeds? Here we
enter the debates regarding punishment: does punishing a violator make
any sense except to exact either retribution, revenge, or to promote a
deterrence? Can the victors be sure of their claim to punish the
aggressors and what good could possibly flow from bringing more
violence or enslavement to the world? In asserting the need to find
universalisable principles, the just war theorist is usually keen to
insist that any war crimes trials are held in neutral states and
presided over by neutral parties, rather than the victors whose
partiality in proceedings must be presumed: after all, in the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, no allied generals or politicians were
held accountable for the atrocities created by bombing civilian
centers in Germany and Japan and the dropping of nuclear bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The end game and hence the jus post bellum certainly merit attention
before the battles are lost or won: what should be the ruling affairs
once the peace is proclaimed? Should the terms of war's end be
elaborated and publicly pronounced as to ensure all parties are aware
of the costs of defeat? Is it right that an army should demand
unconditional surrender, for instance, when such a policy may entail a
protracted war for no incentive is given to the other side to
surrender; on the other hand, unconditional surrender implies a
derogatory view of the enemy as one not to be respected either in or
after war. Yet if an unconditional surrender policy does suitably
raise the stakes of fighting war it may act as a sufficient deterrent
against possible aggressors or act as a useful diplomatic tool to
bring a worried enemy back to peaceful overtures. Similarly, is it
right that an army should demand reparations in advance rather than
leave them undisclosed and thereby risk the uncertainty of punishment
creating a backlash from the defeated, who may not wish to be so
subjected? To keep the expected conditions of war's end secretive does
not seem a wise move in that uncertainty generates fear, and fear can
generate a harder campaign than otherwise would be necessary; but if
the publicized conditions appear onerous to the enemy, then they have
good reasons to prolong and/or intensify their own fight. Of course,
if promises of an amnesty or fair treatment of prisoners is reneged on
by the victor, then all trust for future arrangements is lost and the
consequences imply embedding hatreds and mistrust for generations.
Assume that victory is given, that the army has defeated its enemy on
the battlefield so attention turns to the nature of the post bellum
justice of dealing with the defeated regardless of its intentions
beforehand. Arguably, the very nature of the warring participants'
vision of each other and of themselves will color the proceedings both
politically and morally. A victorious side, for instance, that sees
itself as rightfully triumphant is more likely to impose its will and
exactions upon the defeated in a more stringent manner in which a
victorious side that sees itself as its enemy's equal; but
universality demands seeing one's enemy as oneself and understanding
not just the Realpolitik of state interests and state gains in victory
but also the conventions of magnanimity and honor in victory (or
defeat).
Consider the demands for reparations. A defeated aggressor may just be
asked to pay for the damage incurred by the war (as justice demands of
criminals that they pay for their crimes). But to what extent should
the reparations extend? Should there be demands for retribution and
deterrence added in, so that those deemed responsible for their
aggression should be put on trial and suitably punished (and what
would "suitable" mean in this instance – that Saddam Hussein stand
trial for his invasion of Kuwait implies that George W Bush similarly
stand trial for his invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq?). In forming
the conditions of defeat, should neutral third parties be turned to so
as to avoid later accusations of "victor's justice" and the partiality
that such justice can invoke or imply, or does victory present the
victor with the ultimate moral wreath to justify whatever demands seen
appropriate or fitting?
Should a war be indecisive though, the character of the peace would
presumably be formed by the character of the ceasefire – namely, the
cessation of fighting would imply a mere hiatus in which the
belligerents regain the time and resources to stock their defenses and
prepare for further fighting. As such, a ceasefire would be merely a
respite for the military to regain its strengths. However, just war
theory also acts to remind contenders that war is a last resort and
that its essential aim is always peace, so if peace is forthcoming in
any guise, it is morally critical for all parties to seek a return to
a permanent peace rather than a momentary lapse of war.
5. Conclusion
This article has described the main tenets of the just war theory, as
well as some of the problems that it entails. The theory bridges
theoretical and applied ethics, since it demands an adherence, or at
least a consideration of meta-ethical conditions and models, as well
as prompting concern for the practicalities of war. A few of those
practicalities have been mentioned here. Other areas of interest are:
hostages, innocent threats, international blockades, sieges, the use
of weapons of mass destruction or of anti-personnel weapons (for
example, land mines), and the morality and practicalities of
interventionism.
6. References and Further Reading
Anscombe, Elizabeth. (1981) "War and Murder". In Ethics, Religion, and
Politics. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 51-71.
Aquinas, St Thomas. (1988). Politics and Ethics. Norton.
Augustine, St. (1984). City of God. Penguin.
Belfield, Richard (2005). Assassination: The Killers and their
Paymasters Revealed. Magpie Books.
Burke, Edmund (1986). Reflections on the Revolution in France. Penguin.
Dockrill, Michael and Barrie Paskins (1979). The Ethics of War.
Hobbes, Thomas (1988). Leviathan. Penguin.
Jokic Alexsander, and Anthony Ellis eds., War Crimes and Collective
Wrongdoing. WileyBlackwell.
Locke, John (1963). Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge University Press.
Machiavelli, Nicolo (1988). The Prince. Cambridge University Press.
Minear, Richard (1971). Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Princeton.
Moseley, Alexander and Richard Norman, eds. (2001) Human Rights and
Military Intervention. Ashgate.
Moseley, Alexander (2006). An Introduction to Political Philosophy. Continuum.
Nagel, Thomas. "War and Massacre." Philosophy and Public Affairs .
Vol. 1, pp. 123-44.
Norman, Richard (1995). Ethics, Killing, and War.
Orend, Brian (2001). War and International Justice. Wilfrid Laurier Press.
Orend, Brian (2006). The Morality of War. Broadview.
Robertson, Geoffrey (1999). Crimes Against Humanity.
Robinson, Paul ed., (2003) Just War in a Comparative Perspective. Ashgate.
Robinson, Paul. (2006). Military Honour and the Conduct of War. Routledge.
Thucydides (1974). History of the Peloponnesian War. Penguin.
Tolstoy, Leo (1992). War and Peace. Everyman.
Walzer, Michael (1978). Just and Unjust Wars. Basic Books.
No comments:
Post a Comment