during the Enlightenment in eighteenth century Europe. His first major
philosophical work, A Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, was the
winning response to an essay contest conducted by the Academy of Dijon
in 1750. In this work, Rousseau argues that the progression of the
sciences and arts has caused the corruption of virtue and morality.
This discourse won Rousseau fame and recognition, and it laid much of
the philosophical groundwork for a second, longer work, The Discourse
on the Origin of Inequality. The second discourse did not win the
Academy's prize, but like the first, it was widely read and further
solidified Rousseau's place as a significant intellectual figure. The
central claim of the work is that human beings are basically good by
nature, but were corrupted by the complex historical events that
resulted in present day civil society.Rousseau's praise of nature is a
theme that continues throughout his later works as well, the most
significant of which include his comprehensive work on the philosophy
of education, the Emile, and his major work on political philosophy,
The Social Contract: both published in 1762. These works caused great
controversy in France and were immediately banned by Paris
authorities. Rousseau fled France and settled in Switzerland, but he
continued to find difficulties with authorities and quarrel with
friends. The end of Rousseau's life was marked in large part by his
growing paranoia and his continued attempts to justify his life and
his work. This is especially evident in his later books, The
Confessions, The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, and Rousseau: Judge
of Jean-Jacques.
Rousseau greatly influenced Immanuel Kant's work on ethics. His novel
Julie or the New Heloise impacted the late eighteenth century's
Romantic Naturalism movement, and his political ideals were championed
by leaders of the French Revolution.
1. Life
a. Traditional Biography
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was born to Isaac Rousseau and Suzanne Bernard
in Geneva on June 28, 1712. His mother died only a few days later on
July 7, and his only sibling, an older brother, ran away from home
when Rousseau was still a child. Rousseau was therefore brought up
mainly by his father, a clockmaker, with whom at an early age he read
ancient Greek and Roman literature such as the Lives of Plutarch. His
father got into a quarrel with a French captain, and at the risk of
imprisonment, left Geneva for the rest of his life. Rousseau stayed
behind and was cared for by an uncle who sent him along with his
cousin to study in the village of Bosey. In 1725, Rousseau was
apprenticed to an engraver and began to learn the trade. Although he
did not detest the work, he thought his master to be violent and
tyrannical. He therefore left Geneva in 1728, and fled to Annecy. Here
he met Louise de Warens, who was instrumental in his conversion to
Catholicism, which forced him to forfeit his Genevan citizenship (in
1754 he would make a return to Geneva and publicly convert back to
Calvanism). Rousseau's relationship to Mme. de Warens lasted for
several years and eventually became romantic. During this time he
earned money through secretarial, teaching, and musical jobs.
In 1742 Rousseau went to Paris to become a musician and composer.
After two years spent serving a post at the French Embassy in Venice,
he returned in 1745 and met a linen-maid named Therese Levasseur, who
would become his lifelong companion (they eventually married in 1768).
They had five children together, all of whom were left at the Paris
orphanage. It was also during this time that Rousseau became friendly
with the philosophers Condillac and Diderot. He worked on several
articles on music for Diderot and d'Alembert's Encyclopedie. In 1750
he published the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, a response to the
Academy of Dijon's essay contest on the question, "Has the restoration
of the sciences and arts tended to purify morals?" This discourse is
what originally made Rousseau famous as it won the Academy's prize.
The work was widely read and was controversial. To some, Rousseau's
condemnation of the arts and sciences in the First Discourse made him
an enemy of progress altogether, a view quite at odds with that of the
Enlightenment project. Music was still a major part of Rousseau's life
at this point, and several years later, his opera, Le Devin du Village
(The Village Soothsayer) was a great success and earned him even more
recognition. But Rousseau attempted to live a modest life despite his
fame, and after the success of his opera, he promptly gave up
composing music.
In the autumn of 1753, Rousseau submitted an entry to another essay
contest announced by the Academy of Dijon. This time, the question
posed was, "What is the origin of inequality among men, and is it
authorized by the natural law?" Rousseau's response would become the
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men. Rousseau himself
thought this work to be superior to the First Discourse because the
Second Discourse was significantly longer and more philosophically
daring. The judges were irritated by its length as well its bold and
unorthodox philosophical claims; they never finished reading it.
However, Rousseau had already arranged to have it published elsewhere
and like the First Discourse, it also was also widely read and
discussed.
In 1756, a year after the publication of the Second Discourse,
Rousseau and Therese Levasseur left Paris after being invited to a
house in the country by Mme. D'Epinay, a friend to the philosophes.
His stay here lasted only a year and involved an affair with a woman
named Sophie d'Houdetot, the mistress of his friend Saint-Lambert. In
1757, after repeated quarrels with Mme. D'Epinay and her other guests
including Diderot, Rousseau moved to lodgings near the country home of
the Duke of Luxemburg at Montmorency.
It was during this time that Rousseau wrote some of his most important
works. In 1761 he published a novel, Julie or the New Heloise, which
was one of the best selling of the century. Then, just a year later in
1762, he published two major philosophical treatises: in April his
definitive work on political philosophy, The Social Contract, and in
May a book detailing his views on education, Emile. Paris authorities
condemned both of these books, primarily for claims Rousseau made in
them about religion, which forced him to flee France. He settled in
Switzerland and in 1764 he began writing his autobiography, his
Confessions. A year later, after encountering difficulties with Swiss
authorities, he spent time in Berlin and Paris, and eventually moved
to England at the invitation of David Hume. However, due to quarrels
with Hume, his stay in England lasted only a year, and in 1767 he
returned to the southeast of France incognito.
After spending three years in the southeast, Rousseau returned to
Paris in 1770 and copied music for a living. It was during this time
that he wrote Rousseau: Judge of Jean-Jacques and the Reveries of the
Solitary Walker, which would turn out to be his final works. He died
on July 3, 1778. His Confessions were published several years after
his death; and his later political writings, in the nineteenth
century.
b. The Confessions: Rousseau's Autobiography
Rousseau's own account of his life is given in great detail in his
Confessions, the same title that Saint Augustine gave his
autobiography over a thousand years earlier. Rousseau wrote the
Confessions late in his career, and it was not published until after
his death. Incidentally, two of his other later works, the "Reveries
of the Solitary Walker" and "Rousseau Judge of Jean Jacques" are also
autobiographical. What is particularly striking about the Confessions
is the almost apologetic tone that Rousseau takes at certain points to
explain the various public as well as private events in his life, many
of which caused great controversy. It is clear from this book that
Rousseau saw the Confessions as an opportunity to justify himself
against what he perceived as unfair attacks on his character and
misunderstandings of his philosophical thought.
His life was filled with conflict, first when he was apprenticed,
later in academic circles with other Enlightenment thinkers like
Diderot and Voltaire, with Parisian and Swiss authorities and even
with David Hume. Although Rousseau discusses these conflicts, and
tries to explain his perspective on them, it is not his exclusive goal
to justify all of his actions. He chastises himself and takes
responsibility for many of these events, such as his extra-marital
affairs. At other times, however, his paranoia is clearly evident as
he discusses his intense feuds with friends and contemporaries. And
herein lays the fundamental tension in the Confessions. Rousseau is at
the same time trying both to justify his actions to the public so that
he might gain its approval, but also to affirm his own uniqueness as a
critic of that same public.
2. Background
a. The Beginnings of Modern Philosophy and the Enlightenment
Rousseau's major works span the mid to late eighteenth century. As
such, it is appropriate to consider Rousseau, at least
chronologically, as an Enlightenment thinker. However, there is
dispute as to whether Rousseau's thought is best characterized as
"Enlightenment" or "counter-Enlightenment." The major goal of
Enlightenment thinkers was to give a foundation to philosophy that was
independent of any particular tradition, culture, or religion: one
that any rational person would accept. In the realm of science, this
project has its roots in the birth of modern philosophy, in large part
with the seventeenth century philosopher, René Descartes. Descartes
was very skeptical about the possibility of discovering final causes,
or purposes, in nature. Yet this teleological understanding of the
world was the very cornerstone of Aristotelian metaphysics, which was
the established philosophy of the time. And so Descartes' method was
to doubt these ideas, which he claims can only be understood in a
confused way, in favor of ideas that he could conceive clearly and
distinctly. In the Meditations, Descartes claims that the material
world is made up of extension in space, and this extension is governed
by mechanical laws that can be understood in terms of pure
mathematics.
b. The State of Nature as a Foundation for Ethics and Political Philosophy
The scope of modern philosophy was not limited only to issues
concerning science and metaphysics. Philosophers of this period also
attempted to apply the same type of reasoning to ethics and politics.
One approach of these philosophers was to describe human beings in the
"state of nature." That is, they attempted to strip human beings of
all those attributes that they took to be the results of social
conventions. In doing so, they hoped to uncover certain
characteristics of human nature that were universal and unchanging. If
this could be done, one could then determine the most effective and
legitimate forms of government.
The two most famous accounts of the state of nature prior to
Rousseau's are those of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes contends
that human beings are motivated purely by self-interest, and that the
state of nature, which is the state of human beings without civil
society, is the war of every person against every other. Hobbes does
say that while the state of nature may not have existed all over the
world at one particular time, it is the condition in which humans
would be if there were no sovereign. Locke's account of the state of
nature is different in that it is an intellectual exercise to
illustrate people's obligations to one another. These obligations are
articulated in terms of natural rights, including rights to life,
liberty and property. Rousseau was also influenced by the modern
natural law tradition, which attempted to answer the challenge of
skepticism through a systematic approach to human nature that, like
Hobbes, emphasized self-interest. Rousseau therefore often refers to
the works of Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, Jean Barbeyrac, and
Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui. Rousseau would give his own account of the
state of nature in the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of
Inequality Among Men, which will be examined below.
Also influential were the ideals of classical republicanism, which
Rousseau took to be illustrative of virtues. These virtues allow
people to escape vanity and an emphasis on superficial values that he
thought to be so prevalent in modern society. This is a major theme of
the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts.
3. The Discourses
a. Discourse on the Sciences and Arts
This is the work that originally won Rousseau fame and recognition.
The Academy of Dijon posed the question, "Has the restoration of the
sciences and arts tended to purify morals?" Rousseau's answer to this
question is an emphatic "no." The First Discourse won the academy's
prize as the best essay. The work is perhaps the greatest example of
Rousseau as a "counter-Enlightenment" thinker. For the Enlightenment
project was based on the idea that progress in fields like the arts
and sciences do indeed contribute to the purification of morals on
individual, social, and political levels.
The First Discourse begins with a brief introduction addressing the
academy to which the work was submitted. Aware that his stance against
the contribution of the arts and sciences to morality could
potentially offend his readers, Rousseau claims, "I am not abusing
science…I am defending virtue before virtuous men." (First Discourse,
Vol. I, p. 4). In addition to this introduction, the First Discourse
is comprised of two main parts.
The first part is largely an historical survey. Using specific
examples, Rousseau shows how societies in which the arts and sciences
flourished more often than not saw the decline of morality and virtue.
He notes that it was after philosophy and the arts flourished that
ancient Egypt fell. Similarly, ancient Greece was once founded on
notions of heroic virtue, but after the arts and sciences progressed,
it became a society based on luxury and leisure. The one exception to
this, according to Rousseau, was Sparta, which he praises for pushing
the artists and scientists from its walls. Sparta is in stark contrast
to Athens, which was the heart of good taste, elegance, and
philosophy. Interestingly, Rousseau here discusses Socrates, as one of
the few wise Athenians who recognized the corruption that the arts and
sciences were bringing about. Rousseau paraphrases Socrates' famous
speech in the Apology. In his address to the court, Socrates says that
the artists and philosophers of his day claim to have knowledge of
piety, goodness, and virtue, yet they do not really understand
anything. Rousseau's historical inductions are not limited to ancient
civilizations, however, as he also mentions China as a learned
civilization that suffers terribly from its vices.
The second part of the First Discourse is an examination of the arts
and sciences themselves, and the dangers they bring. First, Rousseau
claims that the arts and sciences are born from our vices: "Astronomy
was born from superstition; eloquence from ambition, hate, flattery,
and falsehood; geometry from avarice, physics from vain curiosity;
all, even moral philosophy, from human pride." (First Discourse, Vol.
I, p. 12). The attack on sciences continues as Rousseau articulates
how they fail to contribute anything positive to morality. They take
time from the activities that are truly important, such as love of
country, friends, and the unfortunate. Philosophical and scientific
knowledge of subjects such as the relationship of the mind to the
body, the orbit of the planets, and physical laws that govern
particles fail to genuinely provide any guidance for making people
more virtuous citizens. Rather, Rousseau argues that they create a
false sense of need for luxury, so that science becomes simply a means
for making our lives easier and more pleasurable, but not morally
better.
The arts are the subject of similar attacks in the second part of the
First Discourse. Artists, Rousseau says, wish first and foremost to be
applauded. Their work comes from a sense of wanting to be praised as
superior to others. Society begins to emphasize specialized talents
rather than virtues such as courage, generosity, and temperance. This
leads to yet another danger: the decline of military virtue, which is
necessary for a society to defend itself against aggressors. And yet,
after all of these attacks, the First Discourse ends with the praise
of some very wise thinkers, among them, Bacon, Descartes, and Newton.
These men were carried by their vast genius and were able to avoid
corruption. However, Rousseau says, they are exceptions; and the great
majority of people ought to focus their energies on improving their
characters, rather than advancing the ideals of the Enlightenment in
the arts and sciences.
b. Discourse on the Origin of Inequality
The Second Discourse, like the first, was a response to a question put
forth by the academy of Dijon: "What is the origin of inequality among
men; and is it authorized by the natural law?" Rousseau's response to
this question, the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, is
significantly different from the First Discourse for several reasons.
First, in terms of the academy's response, the Second Discourse was
not nearly as well received. It exceeded the desired length, it was
four times the length of the first, and made very bold philosophical
claims; unlike the First Discourse, it did not win the prize. However,
as Rousseau was now a well-known and respected author, he was able to
have it published independently. Secondly, if the First Discourse is
indicative of Rousseau as a "counter-Enlightenment" thinker, the
Second Discourse, by contrast, can rightly be considered to be
representative of Enlightenment thought. This is primarily because
Rousseau, like Hobbes, attacks the classical notion of human beings as
naturally social. Finally, in terms of its influence, the Second
Discourse is now much more widely read, and is more representative of
Rousseau's general philosophical outlook. In the Confessions, Rousseau
writes that he himself sees the Second Discourse as far superior to
the first.
The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality is divided into four main
parts: a dedication to the Republic of Geneva, a short preface, a
first part, and a second part. The scope of Rousseau's project is not
significantly different from that of Hobbes in the Leviathan or Locke
in the Second Treatise on Government. Like them, Rousseau understands
society to be an invention, and he attempts to explain the nature of
human beings by stripping them of all of the accidental qualities
brought about by socialization. Thus, understanding human nature
amounts to understanding what humans are like in a pure state of
nature. This is in stark contrast to the classical view, most notably
that of Aristotle, which claims that the state of civil society is the
natural human state. Like Hobbes and Locke, however, it is doubtful
that Rousseau meant his readers to understand the pure state of nature
that he describes in the Second Discourse as a literal historical
account. In its opening, he says that it must be denied that men were
ever in the pure state of nature, citing revelation as a source which
tells us that God directly endowed the first man with understanding (a
capacity that he will later say is completely undeveloped in natural
man). However, it seems in other parts of the Second Discourse that
Rousseau is positing an actual historical account. Some of the stages
in the progression from nature to civil society, Rousseau will argue,
are empirically observable in so-called primitive tribes. And so the
precise historicity with which one ought to regard Rousseau's state of
nature is the matter of some debate.
Part one is Rousseau's description of human beings in the pure state
of nature, uncorrupted by civilization and the socialization process.
And although this way of examining human nature is consistent with
other modern thinkers, Rousseau's picture of "man in his natural
state," is radically different. Hobbes describes each human in the
state of nature as being in a constant state of war against all
others; hence life in the state of nature is solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short. But Rousseau argues that previous accounts such as
Hobbes' have all failed to actually depict humans in the true state of
nature. Instead, they have taken civilized human beings and simply
removed laws, government, and technology. For humans to be in a
constant state of war with one another, they would need to have
complex thought processes involving notions of property, calculations
about the future, immediate recognition of all other humans as
potential threats, and possibly even minimal language skills. These
faculties, according to Rousseau, are not natural, but rather, they
develop historically. In contrast to Hobbes, Rousseau describes
natural man as isolated, timid, peaceful, mute, and without the
foresight to worry about what the future will bring.
Purely natural human beings are fundamentally different from the
egoistic Hobbesian view in another sense as well. Rousseau
acknowledges that self-preservation is one principle of motivation for
human actions, but unlike Hobbes, it is not the only principle. If it
were, Rousseau claims that humans would be nothing more than monsters.
Therefore, Rousseau concludes that self-preservation, or more
generally self-interest, is only one of two principles of the human
soul. The second principle is pity; it is "an innate repugnance to see
his fellow suffer." (Second Discourse, Vol. II, p. 36). It may seem
that Rousseau's depiction of natural human beings is one that makes
them no different from other animals. However, Rousseau says that
unlike all other creatures, humans are free agents. They have reason,
although in the state of nature it is not yet developed. But it is
this faculty that makes the long transition from the state of nature
to the state of civilized society possible. He claims that if one
examines any other species over the course of a thousand years, they
will not have advanced significantly. Humans can develop when
circumstances arise that trigger the use of reason.
Rousseau's praise of humans in the state of nature is perhaps one of
the most misunderstood ideas in his philosophy. Although the human
being is naturally good and the "noble savage" is free from the vices
that plague humans in civil society, Rousseau is not simply saying
that humans in nature are good and humans in civil society are bad.
Furthermore, he is not advocating a return to the state of nature,
though some commentators, even his contemporaries such as Voltaire,
have attributed such a view to him. Human beings in the state of
nature are amoral creatures, neither virtuous nor vicious. After
humans leave the state of nature, they can enjoy a higher form of
goodness, moral goodness, which Rousseau articulates most explicitly
in the Social Contract.
Having described the pure state of nature in the first part of the
Second Discourse, Rousseau's task in the second part is to explain the
complex series of historical events that moved humans from this state
to the state of present day civil society. Although they are not
stated explicitly, Rousseau sees this development as occurring in a
series of stages. From the pure state of nature, humans begin to
organize into temporary groups for the purposes of specific tasks like
hunting an animal. Very basic language in the form of grunts and
gestures comes to be used in these groups. However, the groups last
only as long as the task takes to be completed, and then they dissolve
as quickly as they came together. The next stage involves more
permanent social relationships including the traditional family, from
which arises conjugal and paternal love. Basic conceptions of property
and feelings of pride and competition develop in this stage as well.
However, at this stage they are not developed to the point that they
cause the pain and inequality that they do in present day society. If
humans could have remained in this state, they would have been happy
for the most part, primarily because the various tasks that they
engaged in could all be done by each individual. The next stage in the
historical development occurs when the arts of agriculture and
metallurgy are discovered. Because these tasks required a division of
labor, some people were better suited to certain types of physical
labor, others to making tools, and still others to governing and
organizing workers. Soon, there become distinct social classes and
strict notions of property, creating conflict and ultimately a state
of war not unlike the one that Hobbes describes. Those who have the
most to lose call on the others to come together under a social
contract for the protection of all. But Rousseau claims that the
contract is specious, and that it was no more than a way for those in
power to keep their power by convincing those with less that it was in
their interest to accept the situation. And so, Rousseau says, "All
ran to meet their chains thinking they secured their freedom, for
although they had enough reason to feel the advantages of political
establishment, they did not have enough experience to foresee its
dangers." (Second Discourse, Vol. II, p. 54).
The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality remains one of Rousseau's
most famous works, and lays the foundation for much of his political
thought as it is expressed in the Discourse on Political Economy and
Social Contract. Ultimately, the work is based on the idea that by
nature, humans are essentially peaceful, content, and equal. It is the
socialization process that has produced inequality, competition, and
the egoistic mentality.
c. Discourse on Political Economy
The Discourse on Political Economy originally appeared in Diderot and
d'Alembert's Encyclopedia. In terms of its content the work seems to
be, in many ways, a precursor to the Social Contract, which would
appear in 1762. And whereas the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts and
the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality look back on history and
condemn what Rousseau sees as the lack of morality and justice in his
own present day society, this work is much more constructive. That is,
the Discourse on Political Economy explains what he takes to be a
legitimate political regime.
The work is perhaps most significant because it is here that Rousseau
introduces the concept of the "general will," a major aspect of his
political thought which is further developed in the Social Contract.
There is debate among scholars about how exactly one ought to
interpret this concept, but essentially, one can understand the
general will in terms of an analogy. A political society is like a
human body. A body is a unified entity though it has various parts
that have particular functions. And just as the body has a will that
looks after the well-being of the whole, a political state also has a
will which looks to its general well-being. The major conflict in
political philosophy occurs when the general will is at odds with one
or more of the individual wills of its citizens.
With the conflict between the general and individual wills in mind,
Rousseau articulates three maxims which supply the basis for a
politically virtuous state: (1) Follow the general will in every
action; (2) Ensure that every particular will is in accordance with
the general will; and (3) Public needs must be satisfied. Citizens
follow these maxims when there is a sense of equality among them, and
when they develop a genuine respect for law. This again is in contrast
to Hobbes, who says that laws are only followed when people fear
punishment. That is, the state must make the penalty for breaking the
law so severe that people do not see breaking the law to be of any
advantage to them. Rousseau claims, instead, that when laws are in
accordance with the general will, good citizens will respect and love
both the state and their fellow citizens. Therefore, citizens will see
the intrinsic value in the law, even in cases in which it may conflict
with their individual wills.
4. The Social Contract
a. Background
The Social Contract is, like the Discourse on Political Economy, a
work that is more philosophically constructive than either of the
first two Discourses. Furthermore, the language used in the first and
second Discourses is crafted in such a way as to make them appealing
to the public, whereas the tone of the Social Contract is not nearly
as eloquent and romantic. Another more obvious difference is that the
Social Contract was not nearly as well-received; it was immediately
banned by Paris authorities. And although the first two Discourses
were, at the time of their publication, very popular, they are not
philosophically systematic. The Social Contract, by contrast, is quite
systematic and outlines how a government could exist in such a way
that it protects the equality and character of its citizens. But
although Rousseau's project is different in scope in the Social
Contract than it was in the first two Discourses, it would be a
mistake to say that there is no philosophical connection between them.
For the earlier works discuss the problems in civil society as well as
the historical progression that has led to them. The Discourse on the
Sciences and Arts claims that society has become such that no emphasis
is put on the importance of virtue and morality. The Discourse on the
Origin of Inequality traces the history of human beings from the pure
state of nature through the institution of a specious social contract
that results in present day civil society. The Social Contract does
not deny any of these criticisms. In fact, chapter one begins with one
of Rousseau's most famous quotes, which echoes the claims of his
earlier works: "Man was/is born free; and everywhere he is in chains."
(Social Contract, Vol. IV, p. 131). But unlike the first two
Discourses, the Social Contract looks forward, and explores the
potential for moving from the specious social contract to a legitimate
one.
b. The General Will
The concept of the general will, first introduced in the Discourse on
Political Economy, is further developed in the Social Contract
although it remains ambiguous and difficult to interpret. The most
pressing difficulty that arises is in the tension that seems to exist
between liberalism and communitarianism. On one hand, Rousseau argues
that following the general will allows for individual diversity and
freedom. But at the same time, the general will also encourages the
well-being of the whole, and therefore can conflict with the
particular interests of individuals. This tension has led some to
claim that Rousseau's political thought is hopelessly inconsistent,
although others have attempted to resolve the tension in order to find
some type of middle ground between the two positions. Despite these
difficulties, however, there are some aspects of the general will that
Rousseau clearly articulates. First, the general will is directly tied
to Sovereignty: but not Sovereignty merely in the sense of whomever
holds power. Simply having power, for Rousseau, is not sufficient for
that power to be morally legitimate. True Sovereignty is directed
always at the public good, and the general will, therefore, speaks
always infallibly to the benefit of the people. Second, the object of
the general will is always abstract, or for lack of a better term,
general. It can set up rules, social classes, or even a monarchial
government, but it can never specify the particular individuals who
are subject to the rules, members of the classes, or the rulers in the
government. This is in keeping with the idea that the general will
speaks to the good of the society as a whole. It is not to be confused
with the collection of individual wills which would put their own
needs, or the needs of particular factions, above those of the general
public. This leads to a related point. Rousseau argues that there is
an important distinction to be made between the general will and the
collection of individual wills: "There is often a great deal of
difference between the will of all and the general will. The latter
looks only to the common interest; the former considers private
interest and is only a sum of private wills. But take away from these
same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel each other out, and the
remaining sum of the differences is the general will." (Social
Contract, Vol. IV, p. 146). This point can be understood in an almost
Rawlsian sense, namely that if the citizens were ignorant of the
groups to which they would belong, they would inevitably make
decisions that would be to the advantage of the society as a whole,
and thus be in accordance with the general will.
c. Equality, Freedom, and Sovereignty
One problem that arises in Rousseau's political theory is that the
Social Contract purports to be a legitimate state in one sense because
it frees human beings from their chains. But if the state is to
protect individual freedom, how can this be reconciled with the notion
of the general will, which looks always to the welfare of the whole
and not to the will of the individual? This criticism, although not
unfounded, is also not devastating. To answer it, one must return to
the concepts of Sovereignty and the general will. True Sovereignty,
again, is not simply the will of those in power, but rather the
general will. Sovereignty does have the proper authority override the
particular will of an individual or even the collective will of a
particular group of individuals. However, as the general will is
infallible, it can only do so when intervening will be to the benefit
of the society. To understand this, one must take note of Rousseau's
emphasis on the equality and freedom of the citizens. Proper
intervention on the part of the Sovereign is therefore best understood
as that which secures the freedom and equality of citizens rather than
that which limits them. Ultimately, the delicate balance between the
supreme authority of the state and the rights of individual citizens
is based on a social compact that protects society against factions
and gross differences in wealth and privilege among its members.
5. The Emile
a. Background
The Emile or On Education is essentially a work that details
Rousseau's philosophy of education. It was originally published just
several months after the Social Contract. Like the Social Contract,
the Emile was immediately banned by Paris authorities, which prompted
Rousseau to flee France. The major point of controversy in the Emile
was not in his philosophy of education per se, however. Rather, it was
the claims in one part of the book, the Profession of Faith of the
Savoyard Vicar in which Rousseau argues against traditional views of
religion that led to the banning of the book. The Emile is unique in
one sense because it is written as part novel and part philosophical
treatise. Rousseau would use this same form in some of his later works
as well. The book is written in first person, with the narrator as the
tutor, and describes his education of a pupil, Emile, from birth to
adulthood.
b. Education
The basic philosophy of education that Rousseau advocates in the
Emile, much like his thought in the first two Discourses, is rooted in
the notion that human beings are good by nature. The Emile is a large
work, which is divided into five Books, and Book One opens with
Rousseau's claim that the goal of education should be to cultivate our
natural tendencies. This is not to be confused with Rousseau's praise
of the pure state of nature in the Second Discourse. Rousseau is very
clear that a return the state of nature once human beings have become
civilized is not possible. Therefore, we should not seek to be noble
savages in the literal sense, with no language, no social ties, and an
underdeveloped faculty of reason. Rather, Rousseau says, someone who
has been properly educated will be engaged in society, but relate to
his or her fellow citizens in a natural way.
At first glance, this may seem paradoxical: If human beings are not
social by nature, how can one properly speak of more or less natural
ways of socializing with others? The best answer to this question
requires an explanation of what Rousseau calls the two forms of
self-love: amour-propre and amour de soi. Amour de soi is a natural
form of self-love in that it does not depend on others. Rousseau
claims that by our nature, each of us has this natural feeling of love
toward ourselves. By contrast, amour-propre is an unnatural self-love
and is a negative product of the socialization process. Unlike amour
de soi, amour-propre is a love of self that depends on comparing
oneself with others. Essentially it consists in someone basing his or
her self-worth on a perceived superiority to another. It breeds
contempt, hostility, and frivolous competition. In fact, it is
precisely these negative consequences that are under attack in the
Discourse on the Sciences and Arts.
Rousseau's philosophy of education, therefore, is not geared simply at
particular techniques that best ensure that the pupil will absorb
information and concepts. It is better understood as a way of ensuring
that the pupil's character be developed in such a way as to have a
healthy sense of self-worth and morality. This will allow the pupil to
be virtuous even in the unnatural and imperfect society in which he
lives. The character of Emile begins learning important moral lessons
from his infancy, thorough childhood, and into early adulthood. His
education relies on the tutor's constant supervision. The tutor must
even manipulate the environment in order to teach sometimes difficult
moral lessons about humility, chastity, and honesty.
c. Women, Marriage, and Family
As Emile's is a moral education, Rousseau discusses in great detail
how the young pupil is to be brought up to regard women and sexuality.
He introduces the character of Sophie, and explains how her education
differs from Emile's. Hers is not as focused on theoretical matters,
as men's minds are more suited to that type of thinking. Rousseau's
view on the nature of the relationship between men and women is rooted
in the notion that men are stronger and therefore more independent.
They depend on women only because they desire them. By contrast, women
both need and desire men. Sophie is educated in such a way that she
will fill what Rousseau takes to be her natural role as a wife. She is
to be submissive to Emile. And although Rousseau advocates these very
specific gender roles, it would be a mistake to take the view that
Rousseau regards men as simply superior to women. Women have
particular talents that men do not; Rousseau says that women are
cleverer than men, and that they excel more in matters of practical
reason. These views are continually discussed among both feminist and
Rousseau scholars.
d. The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar
The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar is part of the fourth
Book of the Emile. In his discussion of how to properly educate a
pupil about religious matters, the tutor recounts a tale of an Italian
who thirty years before was exiled from his town. Disillusioned, the
young man was aided by a priest who explained his own views of
religion, nature, and science. Rousseau then writes in the first
person from the perspective of this young man, and recounts the
Vicar's speech.
The priest begins by explaining how, after a scandal in which he broke
his vow of celibacy, he was arrested, suspended, and then dismissed.
In his woeful state, the priest began to question all of his
previously held ideas. Doubting everything, the priest attempts a
Cartesian search for truth by doubting all things that he does not
know with absolute certainty. But unlike Descartes, the Vicar is
unable to come to any kind of clear and distinct ideas that could not
be doubted. Instead, he follows what he calls the "Inner Light" which
provides him with truths so intimate that he cannot help but accept
them, even though they may be subject to philosophical difficulties.
Among these truths, the Vicar finds that he exists as a free being
with a free will which is distinct from his body that is not subject
to physical, mechanical laws of motion. To the problem of how his
immaterial will moves his physical body, the Vicar simply says "I
cannot tell, but I perceive that it does so in myself; I will to do
something and I do it; I will to move my body and it moves, but if an
inanimate body, when at rest, should begin to move itself, the thing
is incomprehensible and without precedent. The will is known to me in
its action, not in its nature." (Emile, p. 282). The discussion is
particularly significant in that it marks the most comprehensive
metaphysical account in Rousseau's thought.
The Profession of Faith also includes the controversial discussion of
natural religion, which was in large part the reason why Emile was
banned. The controversy of this doctrine is the fact that it is
categorically opposed to orthodox Christian views, specifically the
claim that Christianity is the one true religion. The Vicar claims
instead that knowledge of God is found in the observation of the
natural order and one's place in it. And so, any organized religion
that correctly identifies God as the creator and preaches virtue and
morality, is true in this sense. Therefore, the Vicar concludes, each
citizen should dutifully practice the religion of his or her own
country so long as it is in line with the religion, and thus morality,
of nature.
6. Other Works
a. Julie or the New Heloise
Julie or the New Heloise remains one of Rousseau's popular works,
though it is not a philosophical treatise, but rather a novel. The
work tells the story of Julie d'Etange and St. Preux, who were one
time lovers. Later, at the invitation of her husband, St. Preux
unexpectedly comes back into Julie's life. Although not a work of
philosophy per se, Julie or the New Heloise is still unmistakably
Rousseau's. The major tenants of his thought are clearly evident; the
struggle of the individual against societal norms, emotions versus
reason, and the goodness of human nature are all prevalent themes.
b. Reveries of the Solitary Walker
Rousseau began writing the Reveries of the Solitary Walker in the fall
of 1776. By this time, he had grown increasingly distressed over the
condemnation of several of his works, most notably the Emile and the
Social Contract. This public rejection, combined with rifts in his
personal relationships, left him feeling betrayed and even as though
he was the victim of a great conspiracy. The work is divided into ten
"walks" in which Rousseau reflects on his life, what he sees as his
contribution to the public good, and how he and his work have been
misunderstood. It is interesting that Rousseau returns to nature,
which he had always praised throughout his career. One also recognizes
in this praise the recognition of God as the just creator of nature, a
theme so prevalent in the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar.
The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, like many of Rousseau's other
works, is part story and part philosophical treatise. The reader sees
in it, not only philosophy, but also the reflections of the
philosopher himself.
c. Rousseau: Judge of Jean Jacques
The most distinctive feature of this late work, often referred to
simply as the Dialogues, is that it is written in the form of three
dialogues. The characters in the dialogues are "Rousseau" and an
interlocutor identified simply as a "Frenchman." The subject of these
characters' conversations is the author "Jean-Jacques," who is the
actual historical Rousseau. This somewhat confusing arrangement serves
the purpose of Rousseau judging his own career. The character
"Rousseau," therefore, represents Rousseau had he not written his
collected works but instead had discovered them as if they were
written by someone else. What would he think of this author,
represented in the Dialogues as the character "Jean-Jacques?" This
self-examination makes two major claims. First, like the Reveries, it
makes clearly evident the fact that Rousseau felt victimized and
betrayed, and shows perhaps even more so than the Reveries, Rousseau's
growing paranoia. And second, the Dialogues represent one of the few
places that Rousseau claims his work is systematic. He claims that
there is a philosophical consistency that runs throughout his works.
Whether one accepts that such a system is present in Rousseau's
philosophy or not is a question that was not only debated during
Rousseau's time, but is also continually discussed among contemporary
scholars.
7. Historical and Philosophical Influence
It is difficult to overestimate Rousseau's influence, both in the
Western philosophical tradition, and historically. Perhaps his
greatest directly philosophical influence is on the ethical thought of
Immanuel Kant. This may seem puzzling at first glance. For Kant, the
moral law is based on rationality, whereas in Rousseau, there is a
constant theme of nature and even the emotional faculty of pity
described in the Second Discourse. This theme in Rousseau's thought is
not to be ignored, and it would be a mistake to understand Rousseau's
ethics merely as a precursor to Kant; certainly Rousseau is unique and
significant in his own respect. But despite these differences, the
influence on Kant is undeniable. The Profession of Faith of the
Savoyard Vicar is one text in particular that illustrates this
influence. The Vicar claims that the correct view of the universe is
to see oneself not at the center of things, but rather on the
circumference, with all people realizing that we have a common center.
This same notion is expressed in the Rousseau's political theory,
particularly in the concept of the general will. In Kant's ethics, one
of the major themes is the claim that moral actions are those that can
be universalized. Morality is something separate from individual
happiness: a view that Rousseau undoubtedly expresses as well.
A second major influence is Rousseau's political thought. Not only is
he one of the most important figures in the history of political
philosophy, later influencing Karl Marx among others, but his works
were also championed by the leaders of the French Revolution. And
finally, his philosophy was largely instrumental in the late
eighteenth century Romantic Naturalism movement in Europe thanks in
large part to Julie or the New Heloise and the Reveries of the
Solitary Walker.
Contemporary Rousseau scholarship continues to discuss many of the
same issues that were debated in the eighteenth century. The tension
in his political thought between individual liberty and
totalitarianism continues to be an issue of controversy among
scholars. Another aspect of Rousseau's philosophy that has proven to
be influential is his view of the family, particularly as it pertains
to the roles of men and women.
8. References and Further Reading
a. Works by Rousseau
Below is a list of Rousseau's major works in chronological order. The
titles are given in the original French as well as the English
translation. Following the title is the year of the work's first
publication and, for some works, a brief description:
* Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts (Discourse on the Sciences
and Arts), 1750.
o Often referred to as the "First Discourse," this work was
a submission to the Academy of Dijon's essay contest, which it won, on
the question, "Has the restoration of the sciences and arts tended to
purify morals?"
* Le Devin du Village (The Village Soothsayer), 1753.
o Rousseau's opera: it was performed in France and widely successful.
* Narcisse ou l'amant de lui-même (Narcissus or the lover of himself), 1753.
o A play written by Rousseau.
* Lettre sur la musique francaise (Letter on French music), 1753.
* Discours sur l'origine et les fondments de l'inegalite
(Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality), 1755.
o Often referred to as the "Second Discourse," this was
another submission to an essay contest sponsored by the Academy of
Dijon, though unlike the First Discourse, it did not win the prize.
The Second Discourse is a response to the question, "What is the
Origin of Inequality Among Men and is it Authorized by the Natural
Law?"
* Discours sur l'Économie politique (Discourse on Political Economy), 1755.
o Sometimes called the "Third Discourse," this work
originally appeared in the Encyclopédie of Diderot and d'Alembert.
* Lettre á d'Alembert sur les Spectacles (Letter to Alembert on
the Theater), 1758.
* Juli ou la Nouvelle Héloïse (Julie or the New Heloise), 1761.
o A novel that was widely read and successful immediately
after its publication.
* Du Contract Social (The Social Contract), 1762.
o Rousseau's most comprehensive work on politics.
* Émile ou de l'Éducation (Émile or On Education), 1762.
o Rousseau's major work on education. It also contains the
Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar, which documents Rousseau's
views on metaphysics, free will, and his controversial views on
natural religion for which the work was banned by Parisian
authorities.
* Lettre á Christophe de Beaumont, Archévêque de Paris (Letter to
Christopher de Beaumont, Archbishop of Paris), 1763.
* Lettres écrites de la Montagne (Letters Written from the Mountain), 1764.
* Dictionnaire de Musique (Dictionary of Music), 1767.
* Émile et Sophie ou les Solitaires (Émile and Sophie or the
Solitaries), 1780.
o A short sequel to the Émile.
* Considérations sur le gouverment de la Pologne (Considerations
on the Government of Poland), 1782.
* Les Confessions (The Confessions), Part I 1782, Part II 1789.
o Rousseau's autobiography.
* Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques, Dialogues (Rousseau judge of
Jean-Jacques, Dialogues), First Dialogue 1780, Complete 1782.
* Les Rêveries du Promeneur Solitaire (Reveries of the Solitary
Walker), 1782.
b. Works about Rousseau
The standard original language edition is Ouevres completes de Jean
Jacques Rousseau, eds. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, Paris:
Gallimard, 1959-1995. The most comprehensive English translation of
Rousseau's works is the Collected Writings of Rousseau, series eds.
Roger Masters and Christopher Kelly, Hanover: University Press of New
England, 1990-1997. References are given by the title of the work, the
volume number (in Roman Numerals), and the page number. The Collected
Works do not include the Emile. References to this work are from
Emile, trans. Barbara Foxley, London: Everyman, 2000. The following is
a brief list of widely available secondary texts.
* Cooper, Laurence D. Rousseau and Nature: The Problem of the Good
Life. Penn State UP, 1999. Cranston, Maurice. Jean-Jacques: The Early
Life and Work of Jean-Jacques, 1712- 1754. University of Chicago
Press, 1991.
* Cranston, Maurice. The Noble Savage: Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
1754-1762. University of Chicago Press, 1991.
* Cranston, Maurice. The Solitary Self: Jean-Jacques Rousseau in
Exile and Adversity. University of Chicago Press, 1997.
* Dent, N.J.H. Rousseau. Blackwell, 1988.
* Gourevitch, Victor. Rousseau: The 'Discourses' and Other Early
Political Writings. Cambridge UP, 1997.
* Gourevitch, Victor. Rousseau: The 'Social Contract' and Other
Later Political Writings. Cambridge UP, 1997.
* Melzer, Arthur. The Natural Goodness of Man: On the Systems of
Rousseau's Thought. University of Chicago Press, 1990.
* O'Hagan, Timothy. Rousseau. Routledge, 1999.
* Riley, Patrick, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau.
Cambridge UP, 2001.
* Reisert, Joseph. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Friend of Virtue.
Cornell UP, 2003.
* Rosenblatt, Helena. Rousseau and Geneva. Cambridge: Cabridge UP, 1997.
* Starobinski, Jean. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and
Obstruction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
* Wolker, Robert. Rousseau. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995.
* Wolker, Robert, ed. Rousseau and Liberty. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1995.
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