contemporary discussion about epistemology. The basic idea of
internalism is that justification is solely determined by factors that
are internal to a person. Externalists deny this, asserting that
justification depends on additional factors that are external to a
person. A significant aspect of the I-E debate involves setting out
exactly what counts as internal to a person.
The rise of the I-E debate coincides with the rebirth of epistemology
after Edmund Gettier's famous 1963 paper, "Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge?" In that paper, Gettier presented several cases to show
that knowledge is not identical to justified true belief. Cases of
this type are referred to as "Gettier cases," and they illustrate "the
Gettier problem." Standard Gettier cases show that one can have
internally adequate justification without knowledge. The introduction
of the Gettier problem to epistemology required rethinking the
connection between true belief and knowledge, and the subsequent
discussion generated what became the I-E debate over the nature of
justification in an account of knowledge. Internalists maintained that
knowledge requires justification and that the nature of this
justification is completely determined by a subject's internal states
or reasons. Externalists denied at least one of these commitments:
either knowledge does not require justification or the nature of
justification is not completely determined by internal factors alone.
On the latter view, externalists maintained that the facts that
determine a belief's justification include external facts such as
whether the belief is caused by the state of affairs that makes the
belief true, whether the belief is counterfactually dependent on the
states of affairs that makes it true, whether the belief is produced
by a reliable belief producing process, or whether the belief is
objectively likely to be true. The I-E discussion engages a wide range
of epistemological issues involving the nature of rationality, the
ethics of belief, and skepticism.
1. The Logic of the I-E Debate
The simple conception of the I-E debate as a dispute over whether the
facts that determine justification are all internal to a person is
complicated by several factors. First, some epistemologists understand
externalism as a view that knowledge does not require justification
while others think it should be understood as an externalist view of
justification. Second, there is an important distinction between
having good reasons for one's belief (that is, propositional
justification) and basing one's belief on the good reasons one
possesses (that is, doxastic justification). This distinction matters
to the nature of the internalist thesis and consequently the I-E
debate itself. Third, there are two different and prominent ways of
understanding what is internal to a person. This bears on the nature
of the internalist thesis and externalist arguments against
internalism. This section explores these complications.
a. Knowledge and Justification
The traditional analysis of knowledge is that knowledge is justified
true belief. As Socrates avers in the Meno knowledge is more than true
belief. Superstitious beliefs that just turn out to be true are not
instances of knowledge. In the Theatetus Socrates proposes that
knowledge is true belief tied down by an account. Socrates' proposal
is the beginning of what epistemologists refer to as the justified
true belief (JTB) account of knowledge. A true belief tied down by an
account can be understood as a true belief for which one has adequate
reasons. On the JTB account having adequate reasons turns a true
belief into knowledge.
The JTB account was demolished by Gettier's famous 1963 article. As
explained in the introduction Gettier cases demonstrate that knowledge
is more than justified true belief. Suppose that Smith possesses a
good deal of evidence for the belief that someone in his office owns a
Ford. Smith's evidence includes such things as that Smith sees Jones
drive a Ford to work every day and that Jones talks about the joys of
owning a Ford. It turns out, however, that (unbeknownst to Smith)
Jones is deceiving his coworkers into believing he owns a Ford. At the
same time, though, someone else in Smith's office, Brown, does own a
Ford. So, Smith's belief that someone in his office owns a Ford is
both justified and true. Yet it seems to most people that Smith's
belief is not an instance of knowledge.
The Gettier problem led epistemologists to rethink the connection
between knowledge and true belief. An externalist position developed
that focused on causal relations or, more generally, dependency
relations between one's belief and the facts as providing the key to
turning true belief into knowledge (see Armstrong 1973). It is unclear
from this move alone whether externalism should be understood as the
view knowledge does not require justification or that justification
should be understood externally. Some externalists advocate the view
that knowledge doesn't require justification but that nonetheless
justification is epistemically important (see Sosa 1991b). Other
externalists hold that knowledge does require justification but that
the nature of the justification is amenable to an externalist analysis
(see Bergmann 2006).
A significant aspect of the issue of how one should understand
externalism is whether the term 'justification' is a term of logic or
merely a place-holder for a necessary condition for knowledge. If
'justification' is a term of logic then it invokes notions of
consistency, inconsistency, implication, and coherence. On this
conception of justification an externalist analysis of the nature of
justification is implausible. However, if 'justification' is merely a
place-holder for a condition in an account of knowledge then the
nature of justification might be amenable to an externalist analysis.
Externalists have defended both views. Some argue that 'justification'
is a term of logic and so their position is best understood as the
view that justification is not required for knowledge. However, other
externalists have argued that 'justification' is not a term of logic
but a term that occurs in connection with knowledge talk and so is
amenable to an externalist account. Many internalists, by contrast,
claim that justification is necessary for knowledge and that the
notion of justification may be (partially) explicated by the concepts
of consistency, implication, and coherence.
b. Justification and Well-foundedness
There is a significant difference between merely having good reasons
for one's belief that the Bears will win the Super Bowl and basing
one's belief on those reasons. Mike Ditka may have excellent reasons
for believing the Bears will win; they have a superior defense and an
excellent running back. Nevertheless Ditka may believe that the Bears
will win based on wishful thinking. In this case it's natural to make
a distinction in one's epistemic evaluation of Ditka's belief. Ditka's
belief is justified because he has good reasons for it. But Ditka's
believing the claim as he does is not justified because he bases his
belief on wishful thinking and not the good reasons he has. This marks
the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification.
Other epistemologists refer to the same distinction as that between
justification and well-foundedness (see Conee & Feldman 2004).
This leads to a second area of complication in the I-E debate.
Internalists claim that every condition that determines a belief's
justification is internal, but causal relations are typically not
internal. Since basing one's belief on reasons is a causal relation
between one's belief and one's reasons, internalists should not claim
that every factor that determines doxastic justification is internal
(see 1c below for further discussion of this). Accordingly,
internalism should be understood as a view about propositional
justification. Moreover, given that one cannot know unless one bases
one's belief on good reasons this implies that internalists will
understand the justification condition in an account of knowledge as
composed of two parts: propositional justification and some causal
condition (typically referred to as "the basing relation"). This
considerably complicates the I-E debate because there's not a
straightforward disagreement between internalist and externalist views
of doxastic justification, since externalists typically avoid
dissecting the justification condition. Common forms of externalism
build in a causal requirement to justification, for example, one's
belief that p is produced by a reliable method. Nevertheless it is
important to get the nature of the internalist thesis straight and
only then determine the nature of the externalist objections.
c. The Meaning of 'Internal'
The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification
allows us to bring into focus different notions of internal states.
Internalism is best understood as the thesis that propositional
justification, not doxastic justification, is completely determined by
one's internal states. But what are one's internal states? One's
internal states could be one's bodily states, one's brain states,
one's mental states (if these are different than brain states), or
one's reflectively accessible states. The two most common ways of
understanding internalism has been to take internal states as either
reflectively accessible states or mental states. The former view is
known as accessibilism and it has been championed by Roderick Chisholm
and Laurence BonJour (see also Matthias Steup (1999)). The latter view
is known as mentalism and it has been defended by Richard Feldman and
Earl Conee.
On an accessibilist view every factor that determines whether one's
belief is propositionally justified is reflectively accessible. Since
the causal origins of one's beliefs are not, in general, reflectively
accessible they do not determine whether one's belief is
propositionally justified. But whether or not one's belief that p and
one's belief that q are contradictory is reflectively accessible.
Since contradictory beliefs cannot both be justified one can ascertain
by reflection alone whether pairs of beliefs lack this devastating
epistemic property.
One should note that the above claim that the causal origins of one's
beliefs are not, in general, reflectively accessible is an
anti-Cartesian claim. Arguably, Descartes thought that one could
always discover the causal origins of one's beliefs. On the Cartesian
view causal relations that hold between beliefs and experiences and
beliefs are reflectively accessible. Many scholars, however, believe
this view is false. Stemming from Freud's work many now think that one
does not have the kind of access Descartes thought one had to the
causal origins of one's beliefs. Given this an accessibilist view
about doxastic justification—that is, propositional justification +
the causal origins of one's belief—is not feasible. Accessibilists
should only require that every factor that determines whether one's
belief is propositionally justified is reflectively accessible.
There are varieties of accessibilist views depending on how one
unpacks what states count as reflectively accessible. Are these states
that one is able to reflectively access now or states that one may
access given some time? If accessibilism is not restricted to current
mental states then it needs to explain where the cut off is between
states that count towards determining justificatory status and those
that don't count. Richard Feldman has a helpful article on this topic
in which he defends the strong thesis that it is only one's current
mental states that determine justificatory status (Feldman 2004b).
Another dimension apropos accessibilism is whether the justificatory
status of one's belief needs to be accessible as well. If it does then
one's inability to determine whether or not one's belief that p is
justified demonstrates that p is not justified for one. BonJour (1985,
chapter 2), for instance, is commonly cited as defending this strong
kind of accessibilism. This strong version of accessibilism is often
taken to be the purest form of internalism since internalism is not
uncommonly associated with a commitment to higher-order principles
such as one knows that p only if one knows that one knows that p.
Robert Nozick (1981, p. 281) takes internalism to be the thesis that
knowledge implies knowledge of all the preconditions of knowing.
The other prominent view of internal states is that they are mental
states. This view is known as mentalism (see Conee & Feldman 2004b).
Mentalism, like accessibilism, is a view about propositional
justification, not doxastic justification. One's mental states
completely determine the justificatory status of one's beliefs.
Mentalism is connected to accessibilism since according to the
Cartesian tradition one can determine which mental states one is in by
reflection alone. To the extent that mentalism is distinct from
accessibilism it allows that some non-reflectively accessible mental
states can determine whether one's belief is propositionally
justified.
A defender of a mentalist view needs to explain which mental states
determine justificatory status. Do all mental states—hopes, fears,
longings—determine propositional justification or just some mental
states, such as beliefs and experiences? Moreover, a defender of
mentalism needs to clarify whether both current and non-current mental
states can determine justificatory status. A non-current mental state
is a mental state that you do not currently host. For instance, you
believed a moment ago that 186 is greater than 86 but currently you
are not thinking about this.
One of the advantages of mentalism is that it upholds a clear
internalist thesis—justification is determined by one's mental
states—without appealing to the problematic notion of access. Many
understand the notion of access to be a thinly disguised epistemic
term (see, for instance, Fumerton (1995) p. 64). To have access to
some fact is just to know whether or not that fact obtains. This is
problematic for an accessibilist because he analyzes justification in
terms of access and then use the notion of justification to partially
explicate knowledge. In short, if 'access' is an epistemic term then
any analysis of knowledge that rests upon facts about access will be
circular. The mentalist escapes this problem. One's mental states
determine justification, and one does not explicate what one's mental
states are by appeal to the problematic notion of access. However,
mentalism does face the objection that since it eschews the notion of
access it is not a genuine form of internalism (see Bergmann 2006 for
a further examination of this issue).
d. Taking Stock
Before we press on to other issues in the I-E debate let us take stock
of what has been considered. Internalism is the view that all the
factors that determine propositional justification are either
reflectively accessible states (that is, accessibilism) or mental
states (that is, mentalism). Internalists also hold that doxastic
justification, which is propositional justification and a basing
requirement, is necessary for knowledge. We can think of internalism
as the view that all the factors that determine justification apart
from a basing requirement are internal. Let us call these
justification determining factors, minus the basing requirement, the
J-factors. Externalists about justification deny that the J-factors
are all internal. If, however, we view externalism merely as a
negative thesis then we lose sight of its distinctly philosophical
motivation. Externalists' positive views are grounded in the intuition
that the natural relations between one's beliefs and the environment
matter to a belief's justification. If, for example, a subject's
belief that there is a tiger behind the tall grass is caused by the
fact that there is a tiger there this fact seems significant to
determining the justificatory status of that belief, even though this
fact may not be reflectively accessible to one. At a certain level of
generality, externalism is best viewed as stressing the justificatory
significance of dependency relations between one's belief and the
environment.
2. Reasons for Internalism
This section examines prominent reasons for internalism. I will
discuss three motivations for internalism: the appeal to the
Socratic/Cartesian project; the appeal to deontology; and the appeal
to natural judgment about cases. These three motivations are
conspicuous in arguments for internalism. After giving each reason I
shall consider externalist responses.
a. The Socratic/Cartesian project
One common strategy internalists employ is to emphasize that epistemic
justification requires having good reasons for one's beliefs. As both
Socrates and Descartes stressed it's not rational to believe p without
possessing a good reason for believing p. Suppose I believe that the
Telecom's stock will drastically fall tomorrow. It's reasonable to ask
why I think that's true. Clearly it's wrong to repeat myself, saying
"I believe that's true because it is true." So it seems I must have a
reason, distinct from my original belief, for thinking that Telecom's
stock will fall. Also I cannot appeal to the causal origins of that
belief or to the reliability of the specific belief process. Those
sorts of facts are beyond my ken. Whatever I can appeal to will be
something I am aware of. Moreover, I can't merely appeal to another
belief, for example, Karen told me that Telecom's stock will fall. I
need a good reason for thinking that Karen is good indicator about
these sorts of things. Apart from that supporting belief it's not
rational to believe that Telecom's stock will fall. So rationality
requires good reasons that indicate a belief is true. The appeal to
the Socratic/Cartesian project is a way to motivate the claim that it
is a basic fact that rationality requires good reasons.
This requirement conflicts with externalism since externalism allows
for the possibility that one's belief is justified even though one has
no reasons for that belief. To draw out this commitment let us expand
on the above example. Suppose that my belief that Telecom's stock will
fall is based on my beliefs that Karen told me so and that Karen is a
reliable indicator of these things. But not every belief of mine is
supported by other beliefs I have. These kinds of beliefs are called
basic beliefs, beliefs that are not supported by other beliefs.
Consider your belief that there's a cube on the table. What reason do
you have for this belief? It might be difficult to say. Yet
internalism requires that you have some reason (typically, the content
of one's experience) that supports this belief if that belief is
rational. Externalists think that that is just too tall of an order.
In fact one of the early motivations for externalism was to handle the
justification of basic beliefs (see Armstrong 1973). In general,
externalists think that basic beliefs can be justified merely by the
belief meeting some external condition. One complication with this,
though, is that some externalists think a basic belief require reasons
but that reasons should be understood in an externalist fashion (see
Alston (1988)). I shall ignore this complication because on Alston's
analysis justification depends on factors outside one's ken. So, to
the extent that one is moved by the internalist intuition, one will
think that externalism falls. It allows for justification without good
reasons. One should also note that this appeal to the
Socratic/Cartesian project supports accessibilism.
A related argument used to support internalism appeals to the
inadequacy of externalism to answer philosophical curiosity (see
Fumerton 2006). If we take up the Socratic project then we are
interesting in determining whether our most basic beliefs about
reality are likely to be true. It seems entirely unsatisfactory to
note that if one's beliefs meet some specified external condition then
the beliefs are justified; for the natural question is whether one's
belief has met that external condition. This suggests that to the
extent that we are interested in whether our beliefs are epistemically
justified internalism is the only game in town. Externalist Response
One early externalist response was to note that internalists focus on
conditions they use to determine justificatory status but that this is
conceptually distinct from conditions that actually do determine
justificatory status. An adequate definition of albinos may be
entirely useless for finding actual albinos (see Armstrong 1973, p.
191). In a similar manner it's at least conceptually possible that
one's analysis of the nature of justification is not a useful tool for
determining whether or not one's beliefs are justified. What this
shows is that internalists need an additional argument from the fact
that we can appeal to only internal factors to determine justification
to the conclusion that only internal facts determine justification.
Another early response to this internalist tactic is to argue that
internalism fails to meet its own demands. Alvin Goldman (1980)
presents an argument of this kind, claiming that there is no definite
and acceptable set of internalistic conditions that determine what
cognitive attitude a subject should have given her evidence. Goldman
argues for this conclusion by supposing that there is some set of
internalistic conditions and then contenting that there no acceptable
way to accommodate this set of conditions within the constraints laid
down by internalists. For instance, Goldman reasons that one
internalistic constraint is that the correctness of these conditions
be reflectively accessible. But, if the correctness of this procedure
depends on its ability to get one to the truth more often than not,
then since that property isn't reflectively accessible, internalists
shouldn't understand the correctness of the procedure to consist in
its ability to be a good guide to the truth. Goldman then argues that
other accounts of the correctness of this procedure likewise fail. So
it is not possible for internalism to meet its own severe
restrictions. For a similar argument see Richard Foley (1993).
b. Deontology (The Ethics of Belief)
A prominent source of support for internalism is the allegedly
deontological character of justification (see Plantinga (1993),
chapter 1; this section relies heavily on Plantinga's discussion). The
language of 'justified' & 'unjustified' invokes concepts like
rightness & wrongness, blameless & blameworthy, and dutifulness &
neglect. Facts about justification are set in the larger context of
one's duties, obligations, and requirements. Descartes, for instance,
explains that false belief arises from the improper use of one's own
will. There is a two-fold implication to this. First, if one governs
one's believing as one ought then one is justified in one's
believings. Second, if one maintains proper doxastic attitudes one
will have (by and large) true beliefs. Locke, like Descartes, connects
justification with duty fulfillment. Locke maintains that though one
may miss truth, if one governs one's doxastic attitudes in accord with
duty then one will not miss the reward of truth (Essay, IV, xvii, 24).
The argument from the deontological character of justification to
internalism proceeds as follows. Justification is a matter of
fulfilling one's intellectual duties but whether or not one has
fulfilled one's intellectual duties is entirely an internal matter.
One fulfills one's intellectual duties when one has properly taken
into account the evidence one possesses. If Smith scrupulously
analyzes all the relevant information about Telecom's stock prices and
draws the conclusion that Telecom's prices will soar then Smith's
belief is justified. If it later comes to light that the information
was misleading this doesn't impugn our judgment about Smith's belief
at that time. Smith was intellectually virtuous in his believing and
drew the appropriate conclusion given the evidence he possessed. In
contrast if Jones is an epistemically reckless stock broker who does
not study the market before he makes his judgments, but happens to hit
on the true belief that Telecom's stock prices will fall then we do
not count his belief as justified since he ignored all the relevant
evidence. Jones should have believed otherwise.
The cases of Smith and Jones support the claim that fulfilling one's
intellectual duty is entirely a matter of what one is able to
determine by reflection alone. Both Smith and Jones are able to
determine that their evidence indicates Telecom's stock will soar.
Smith appropriately believes this and Jones does not. Since
externalists would require some other non-reflectively accessible
condition externalism is wrong. One should note that this argument
supports accessiblism, not mentalism. Externalist Response
Externalists have responded to this line of argument in two ways.
First, some externalists deny that facts about duties, rights, or
blameworthiness are relevant to the sense of justification necessary
for knowledge. Second, other externalists deny that the deontological
character of justification supports accessibilism. Arguments of the
first kind fall into two groups: (a) arguments that a necessary
condition for rights, duties, or blameworthiness is not met with
respect to belief and (b) arguments that facts about deontology are
not relevant to determining epistemic facts. The most common argument
for (a) is that beliefs are outside of an individual's control, and so
it does not make sense to consider an individual blameworthy for a
belief. This is the issue of doxastic voluntarism. Sosa (2003) and
Plantinga (1993) present arguments for (b). The basic idea in these
cases is that an individual may be deeply epistemically flawed but
nonetheless perfectly blameless in his or her belief. An individual
may, for instance, be "hardwired" to accept as valid instances of
affirming the consequent; nonetheless, a person's belief in A on the
basis of if A then B and B is not justified.
Michael Bergmann (2006, chapter 4) presents an argument of the second
type that the deontological character of justification does not
support accessibilism. The basic idea of Bergmann's argument is that
an appeal to the deontological character of justification only
supports the requirement that the person not be aware of any reasons
against the belief. It does not support the stronger requirement that
the person be aware of positive reasons for the belief. Bergmann then
argues the weaker requirement is consistent with externalism.
c. Natural Judgment about Cases
A different strategy to support internalism is to appeal to natural
judgment about cases. I shall consider two famous thought experiments
designed to elicit internalist intuitions: BonJour's Clairvoyant
cases, specifically the case of Norman (BonJour 1980) and the new evil
demon problem (Lehrer & Cohen 1983 & Cohen 1984). I shall present the
two cases and then offer an externalist response. As Sosa (1991a)
explains the two cases are related in that each is the mirror image of
the other. In the Norman case there is reliability without internal
evidence while in the new evil demon problem there is internal
evidence without reliability.
i. BonJour's Norman case
In BonJour's (1980) article he presents four clairvoyant cases to
illustrate the fundamental problem with externalism. Subsequent
discussion has focused mainly on the case of Norman. BonJour describes
the Norman case as follows:
Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a
completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of
subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or
against the general possibility of such a cognitive power, or for or
against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to
believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no
evidence either for or against his belief. In fact the belief is true
and results from his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in which
it is completely reliable. (p. 21)
Intuitively it seems that Norman's belief is not justified. Norman
doesn't have any reasons for thinking that the President is in New
York City. Norman just finds himself believing that. Were Norman to
reflect on his belief he would come to see that that belief is
unsupported. Yet in the situation imagined Norman's belief is the
product of a reliable process. Norman is not aware of this fact. But
nonetheless on some externalist analyses Norman's belief is justified
because it is produced by a reliable process.
The Norman case is used to illustrate a general problem with
externalism. Externalists hold that the justification of basic beliefs
requires only that the specified external condition is met (excluding
the complication with Alston's view, mentioned above). Yet where the
subject lacks any internally accessible reason for thinking the belief
is true it seems irrational for the subject to maintain that belief.
Rationality requires good reasons.
ii. The New Evil Demon Problem
The original evil demon problem comes from Descartes. In the
Meditations Descartes entertains the possibility that he is deceived
by a powerful demon in believing that (for example,) he has hands.
Descartes concludes that he needs to rule out this possibility by
providing good reasons for thinking that he is not deceived in this
way and that he can take the evidence of his senses at face value.
Most epistemologists think Descartes concedes too much by requiring
that he rule out this possibility in order to know that he has hands
on the basis of the evidence he possesses.
The new evil demon problem is different from Descartes' evil demon
problem. This problem does not require that one rule out the
possibility of massive deception in order to have knowledge. Rather
the problem is intended to illustrate the inadequacy of externalism.
The new evil demon problem was originally developed against
reliabilism, the view that a belief's justification consists in the
reliability of the process that produced it. The problem is that there
are possible individuals with the same evidence as we possess but
whose evidence is not truth indicative. For instance we can conceive
of individuals that have been placed in Matrix scenarios in which
their brains are stimulated to have all the same experiences we have.
When we seem to see a tree, normally a tree is present. However, when
these individuals in a Matrix scenario seem to see a tree, there is no
tree present. Their experiences are systematically misleading.
Nevertheless since they possess just the same evidence that we have,
the justificatory status of their beliefs is exactly the same as ours.
If our beliefs are justified then so are their beliefs, and if their
beliefs are not justified then our beliefs aren't justified. This
intuition reflects the key internalist claim that two individuals that
are alike mentally are alike with respect to justification. There's no
difference in justification unless there's some relevant mental
difference. Externalists are committed to denying this symmetry. Since
the individuals in the Matrix world fail to meet the relevant external
condition their beliefs are unjustified, but since our beliefs meet
the external condition our beliefs are justified.
The Externalist Response
Both the Norman case and the new evil demon problem have led to
significant modifications to externalism. At a very general level the
basic externalist move is that relative to our world Norman's belief
is unjustified and an individual's belief in the Matrix world is
justified. In our world clairvoyance is not a reliable belief-forming
method. A clairvoyant's belief that, for example, today is their lucky
day is not caused by the relevant fact. Furthermore, a clairvoyant's
belief is not objectively likely to be true. The externalist thinks
that justification tracks these actual facts and so accordingly our
judgment of Norman's belief is that it is unjustified.
Similarly in the new evil demon problem justification tracks the
actual facts. Since our perceptual beliefs meet the external condition
they are justified. When we consider possible individuals with the
same perceptual evidence that we have, we rightly consider their
beliefs justified. Granted that their beliefs do not meet the external
condition in that world, but in our world such beliefs do meet the
external condition.
Alvin Goldman (1993) develops this externalist response to the Norman
case. Goldman argues that Norman's belief is not justified because
relative to our list of epistemic virtues and vices clairvoyant
beliefs are unjustified. Goldman argues that justification is relative
to actual intellectual virtues, where the virtues are understood in a
reliabilist fashion. This is a departure from Goldman's earlier view
in which the reliability of a belief forming process in a world
determined the justificatory status of the belief. On that view
Goldman is saddled with the consequence that Norman's beliefs is
justified and the beliefs of the people in the Matrix world are
unjustified. On his (1993) view a belief's justification is determined
by the reliability of processes in our world. Goldman is not saddled
with those counterintuitive results but can instead maintain the
internalist's intuition without surrendering externalism. For other
instances of this relativization move see Sosa (1991a) and Bergmann
(2006).
3. Reasons for Externalism
The following is an examination of three prominent reasons for
externalism—the argument from the truth connection, the argument from
ordinary knowledge ascriptions, and the argument from the
implausibility of radical skepticism. Also included are the main
internalist responses.
a. The Truth Connection
A very powerful argument for externalism is that epistemic
justification is essentially connected to truth. Epistemic
justification differs from prudential or moral justification. One can
be prudentially justified in believing that one's close friend is a
good chap. One is prudentially justified in believing that this is
true. But it's possible that one has good epistemic reasons for
withholding this belief. So one is not epistemically justified in
believing one's close friend is a good fellow. How should we account
for this difference between prudential and epistemic justification?
The natural response is to hold that epistemic justification implies
that one's belief is objectively likely to be true whereas prudential
justification (or other non-epistemic forms of justification) does
not. However, whether one's belief is objectively likely to be true is
not determined by one's mental states or one's reflectively accessible
states. The objective likelihood of a belief given a body of evidence
is a matter of the strength of correlation in the actual world between
the truth of the belief and the body of evidence. If one applies some
liquid to a litmus paper and it turns red then the objective
likelihood that the liquid is acidic is very high. But the strong
correlation between red litmus paper and acidity is not reflectively
accessible. So, if epistemic justification implies that one's belief
is objectively likely to be true then justification is not determined
entirely by one's internal states.
Internalist Response
Internalists argue that the problem of the truth connection is a
problem for everyone. Epistemic justification is essentially connected
to the truth in a way that distinguishes it from, say, prudential
justification. But it is exceedingly difficult to note exactly what
this connection consists of. Internalists stress that the proposed
externalist solution that epistemic justification raises a belief's
objective likelihood of truth isn't as straightforward as it first
appears. The intuition in the new evil demon problem illustrates that
epistemic justification does not imply that one's belief is
objectively likely to be true. So to generate an argument against
internalism from the truth connection one needs to do more than appeal
to the intuition of a strong connection between justification and
truth. The problem of the truth connection for internalism is an
active area of research. See Lehrer & Cohen (1983) for the original
discussion of this problem.
b. Grandma, Timmy and Lassie
One of the most powerful motivations for externalism is that we
correctly attribute knowledge to unsophisticated persons, children,
and some animals. These individuals, though, lack internalist
justification. So either knowledge doesn't require justification or
justification should be understood externally. Grandma knows that she
has hands even though she can not rehearse an argument for that
conclusion and can not even think of anything else to defend the claim
that she does have hands. Timmy knows that it's a sunny day and Lassie
knows that there's water in the bowl. In each case it appears that the
subject is justified but lacks any internally accessible reason for
the belief. Reflection on these cases, and many others like them,
supports the externalist central contention that internalism is too
strong. Persons can know without possessing internalistic
justification.
The main problem with appeal to cases like Grandma, Timmy, and Lassie
is that the details of such cases are open to interpretation.
Internalists argue that when the cases are properly unpacked either
these are not cases of justification or there is internalist
justification (see "Internalist Response" immediately below). In an
attempt to strengthen the argument for externalism some externalists
appeal to non-standard cases. One non-standard case is the
chicken-sexer case. Chicken-sexers are individuals that possess the
unique ability to reliably sort male from female chickens. As the case
is described chicken-sexers do not know how they sort the chickens.
They report not being able to offer the criteria they use to sort the
chickens. Nonetheless they are very good at sorting chickens and their
beliefs that this is a male, this is a female, etc., are justified
even though they lack internalist justification.
Another non-standard case is the case of quiz-show knowledge. The case
envisions a contestant, call her Sally, on a popular quiz show that
gets all the answers right. When a clue is offered Sally rings in with
the correct answer. She's quite good at this. Intuitively Sally knows
the answers to the clues; yet from Sally's perspective the answers
just pop into her head. Moreover, Sally may believe that she does not
know the answer.
What should we say about this case? Sally is very reliable. Her
answers are objectively likely to be true. We can fill out the case by
stipulating her answers are caused in part by the relevant fact. She
learned the answer either by direct experience with the relevant
fact—she was in Tiananmen Square during the famous protests of 1989—or
through a reliable informant. Yet Sally lacks any internal
phenomenology usually associated with remembering an answer. The
answers just seem to come out of the blue. Moreover, Sally doesn't
take herself to know the answer. Yet given her excellent track record
it certainly seems right to say that Sally knows the answer. This is a
problematic case for internalists because it appears that no relevant
internal condition is present.
Internalist Response
The argument advanced by externalists above is a conjunction of two
claims: (i) these individuals have knowledge and (ii) no internalist
justification is present. In the cases of Grandma, Timmy, and Lassie
one response is to deny that these individuals have knowledge, but
that strikes many as incredibly implausible and too concessive to
skeptical worries. A much more plausible response is to argue that an
internalist justification is present. In the case of Grandma, for
instance, she has experiences and memories which attest that she had
hands. Though she doesn't cite that as a reason, it is nonetheless a
good reason for her to believe that she has hands. Similar points can
be made with respect to Timmy and Lassie. To the extent that our
judgments that Timmy and Lassie have knowledge are resilient we can
find appropriate experiences that indicate the truth of their beliefs.
In the chicken-sexer case internalists respond by either denying that
the subject has knowledge or claiming that there are features of the
chicken-sexer's experience that indicate the sex of the chicken. The
quiz-show case is more interesting. Given the description of the case
it's difficult to find a reason available to Sally that will meet
internalist strictures. The options for the internalists seem limited.
Since it's not plausible that there's a relevant internalist
justification present, internalists are saddled with the result that
Sally lacks knowledge. How plausible is this result? Richard Feldman
(2005a) argues that it's not apparent from the case that (for example)
Sally even believes the answer. Sally is encouraged to answer and she
goes with whatever pops in her head. Moreover, Feldman observes, the
contestant seems to lack any stable belief forming mechanism. Since
knowledge entails belief it appears then that Sally lacks knowledge
because she lacks belief. Furthermore, as another option, since Sally
may take herself not to know the answer she possesses a reason that
undermines her knowledge (see Feldman (2005a) for the role of
higher-order knowledge to defeat object-knowledge). The upshot is that
the case of quiz show knowledge is indecisive against internalism:
either Sally lacks the relevant belief or she possesses a reason that
defeats her knowledge.
c. The Scandal of Skepticism
Another main motivation for externalism is its alleged virtues for
handling skepticism in at least some of its varieties. One powerful
skeptical argument begins with the premise that we lack direct access
to facts about the external world. For any experiential justification
we have for believing some fact about the external world—for example,
there's a magnolia tree—it's possible to have that same justification
even though there's no such fact. The experience one has is caused by
a state of one's brain and it is possible that science could develop a
method to induce in one that brain state even though there are no
magnolia trees for hundreds of miles. The skeptic continues to argue
that since we lack direct access to facts about the external world we
lack non-inferential knowledge (or justification) for believing those
facts. The final step of the skeptic's argument is that we do lack
sufficient evidence for inferential knowledge (or inferential
justification) for believing those facts. Here the skeptic argues that
the evidence we possess for external world beliefs does not adequately
favor commonsense over a skeptical thesis. Any appeal to experiential
evidence will not decide the case against the skeptic and the skeptic
is happy to enter the fray over whether commonsense beats skepticism
with regard to the theoretical virtues, for example, coherence and
simplicity. Berkeley, for instance, argued that commonsense decidedly
lost the contest against a kind of skeptical thesis (Berkeley Three
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous).
Internalists find this kind of argument very difficult to rebut.
Internalists tend to focus on the final step and argue that even
though experience does not imply that skepticism is false it
nevertheless makes skepticism much less probable than commonsense.
This response is intuitive but it brings with it a number of
controversial commitments. The ensuing debate is too complex to
summarize here. The upshot though is that it is no easy task to
maintain this intuitive response. Consequently externalists think they
have a distinct advantage over internalism. Externalists tend to think
internalism lands in skepticism but that we have good reason to
suspect skepticism is false. Externalists eagerly point out that their
view can handle the skeptical challenge.
Externalists typically address the skeptic's argument by denying that
lack of direct access with a fact implies lack of non-inferential
knowledge (or justification). In terms of an early version of
externalism—D.M. Armstrong's causal theory (Armstrong 1973)—if one's
perceptual belief that p is caused by the fact that makes it true then
one knows that p. Other externalists unpack the externalist condition
differently (for example, reliability or truth-tracking), but the core
idea is that a lack of direct access doesn't preclude non-inferential
knowledge. Externalists press this virtue against internalist views
that are saddled with the claim that lack of direct access implies no
non-inferential knowledge (or justification). Assuming that the first
and final steps of the skeptical argument are good (a very
controversial assumption), internalism would imply that we lack
knowledge. Externalists thus see their analysis of knowledge as
aligning with commonsense (and against the skeptic) that we possess
lots of knowledge.
Internalist Response
One internalist response to this reason for favoring externalism is to
challenge the claim that internalism lands in skepticism. Some
internalists develop views that imply one does have direct access to
external world facts (see entry on direct realism). Another
internalist move is the abductivist response which challenges the
claim that we lack inferential knowledge or justification for
believing commonsense. The abductivist response gets its name from
Charles Sanders Peirce's description of abduction as a good form of
inductive reasoning that differs from standard inductive inference
(for example, enumerative induction—this swam is white, so is the next
one, so is this one as well, …, so, the general rule that all swans
are white). The abductivists argues, to put it very roughly, that
commonsense is the best explanation of the available data that we
possess. Accordingly, we do possess inferential justification for
believing that skepticism is false.
A different response to this alleged virtue of externalism is to argue
that externalism yields only a conditional response to skepticism. If
externalists maintain that some external condition, E, is sufficient
for non-inferential knowledge or justification then we get the result
that if E then one has non-inferential knowledge. For instance, if,
for example, perception is reliable then we have perceptual knowledge.
But, the internalist argues, we are not able to derive the
unconditional claim that we have perceptual knowledge. In order to
conclude that we would have to know that E obtains, but it seems all
the externalist can do is appeal to some other external condition, E1,
and argue that if E1 then we know that E obtains. This strategy looks
unpromising (see Stroud 1989).
4. The Significance of the I-E Debate
What is the I-E debate all about? Why has the debate garnered so much
attention? This section considers several proposals about the
significance of the I-E debate. Most everyone sees the I-E debate as
metaepistemological. The I-E debate concerns fundamental questions
about epistemology: what is nature and goals of epistemological
theorizing. The three proposals I examine in this section need not be
exclusive. Each proposal reflects facets of the I-E debate.
a. Disagreement over the Significance of the Thermometer Model
D.M. Armstrong introduced the "thermometer model" in epistemology as a
way of grasping his externalist theory (see Armstrong 1973). The
"thermometer model" compares non-inferential knowledge with a good
thermometer. A good thermometer reliably indicates the temperature,
that is, the temperature readings reliably indicate the actual
temperature. In a similar manner non-inferential knowledge is a matter
of a belief being reliably true. On the thermometer model a belief
that is reliably true need not meet any internalist conditions; if the
belief stands in the right relation to the truth of what is believed
then the belief is an item of knowledge.
The significance of the thermometer model is whether one should
understand non-inferential knowledge purely in terms of external
conditions. The driving motivation behind this model is that
non-inferential knowledge should be understood in just the same
naturalistic sense in which one understands a good thermometer. The
model aims to remove questions about non-inferential knowledge from
what might be called a rationalist framework in which all forms of
knowledge are explicated in terms of reasons. Given the rationalist
approach to noninferential knowledge one looks for some fact,
different from the original belief, that one is aware of and that
makes probable (or certain) the truth of one's belief. The thermometer
model cuts to the heart of this rationalistic project.
It is not at all surprising that the thermometer model met heavy
resistance. Laurence BonJour argued that stress on the thermometer
model would imply that Norman knows that the president is in New York.
BonJour observes that the thermometer model has us view epistemic
agents merely as "cognitive thermometers". If they reliably record the
facts then they have noninferential knowledge even though from their
own perspective their beliefs have little by way of positive support.
The metaepistemological issue about what to make of the thermometer
model is closely related to the issue of what to make of ordinary
knowledge ascriptions. It is a common practice to ascribe knowledge to
individuals that are in many respects like reliable thermometers. The
significant question is what to make of this fact. Do such individuals
meet internalistic conditions? Are our ascriptions of knowledge
correct in cases in which individuals don't meet any internalistic
conditions? These are areas of ongoing research. The issues here are
discussed in the contextualism literature.
b. Disagreement over the Guiding Conception of Justification
Another way to view the I-E debate is a disagreement over the guiding
conception of justification. Alvin Goldman (1980) distinguishes
between the regulative and theoretical conceptions of justification.
The regulative conception of justification takes as its aim to offer
practical advice to cognizers in order to improve their stock of
beliefs. This epistemological aim, Goldman notes, is prominent in
Descartes. The theoretical conception, by contrast, aims to offer a
correct analysis of justification, that is, to specify the features of
beliefs that confer epistemic status. Goldman sees our interest in a
theory of justification as driven by these two different conceptions.
One way of explaining the significance of the I-E debate is over the
role of regulative considerations in an account of justification. The
access internalist can be seen as stressing the significance of some
regulative conditions for a correct account of justification. This is
most clearly seen in the stress on the ethics of belief. If a
subject's belief is justified then, in some sense, the subject has
regulated her doxastic conduct appropriately. Externalists, by
contrast, want to draw a sharp distinction between regulative and
theoretical considerations to get the result that regulative
considerations do not enter into one's account of the nature of
justification.
c. Disagreement over Naturalism in Epistemology
Another proposal about the significance of the I-E debate is that it
is over the issue of whether to "naturalize" epistemology (see, for
instance, Fumerton 1995, p. 66). As we saw above with the "thermometer
model" a thread that runs through externalist analyses is the idea
that epistemic concepts—justification, evidence, and knowledge—can be
understood in terms of nomological concepts. Armstrong's account of
noninferential knowledge invokes the idea of a natural relation that
holds between a belief and the true state of affairs believed. When a
belief stands in this natural relation to the true state of affairs
believed then the belief is an instance of noninferential knowledge.
Moreover this natural relation is similar to the relation between a
thermometer reading and the actual temperature in a good thermometer.
Other externalist analysis invoke different nomological concepts:
Goldman's (1979) account makes use of the idea of reliability; Robert
Nozick's (1981) account appeals to the idea of truth-tracking which he
unpacks in terms of causal concepts; and Fred Dretske's (1981) account
makes use of a naturalistic concept of information processing.
It's important to stress the context in which these externalist
accounts arose. As we have seen the recognition that the traditional
justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge failed led
epistemologists to rethink the connection between true belief and
knowledge. It is widely recognized that the traditional JTB account
was largely explicated within a rationalist understanding of
justification. Justification, on this tradition, invoked concepts such
as implication, consistency, coherence, and more broadly, reasons of
which the subject was aware. The introduction of the Gettier problem
led epistemologists to question whether this traditional assumption
was correct. Externalist analyses attempted to explain how natural
relations like causation and reliability could provide the key to
understanding noninferential knowledge.
Internalists, by contrast, stress the significance of mental concepts
to understanding noninferential knowledge or basic justification.
These concepts need not be irreducible to physical concepts. But the
key idea for internalism is that mere external facts which a subject
lacks awareness of are not sufficient for analyzing epistemic
concepts. As Fumerton stresses (Fumerton (1995) p. 67) the key
epistemic concepts for internalist are concepts like Descartes'
clarity and distinctness, Russell's notion of direct acquaintance,
or—more elusively—Chisholm's basic notion of more reasonable than.
There are wide ranging issues with respect to naturalism in
epistemology. One main issue is whether the evidential relation is
contingent or necessary. Internalism can be understood as the view
that the most basic evidential relation is necessary and consequently
the theory of evidence is an a priori matter. Externalism, by
contrast, can be understood as affirming that evidential relations are
contingent (see, for example, Nozick (1981) Chapter 3 section III).
Another issue with respect to naturalism in epistemology is its
connection to naturalism in the philosophy of mind. The naturalist
aims to understand the mind as a physical system. Since physical
systems can be explained without invoking mental concepts a naturalist
in epistemology is weary of using questionable mental concepts to
elucidate the nature of epistemic concepts. Internalism in
epistemology is not necessarily at odds with naturalism as a
metaphysical view but the internalist's preferred concepts tend to
come from commonsense psychology rather than the natural sciences.
Externalists, by contrast, tend to stress natural concepts like
causation, reliability, and tracking because these set up better for a
naturalist view in the philosophy of mind.
5. Conclusion
The I-E debate develops out of the ruins of the traditional justified
true belief account of knowledge. As Edmund Gettier famously
illustrated knowledge is more than justified true belief. Attempts to
answer the Gettier problem generated the I-E debate. This debate
centers on a diverse group of issues: the significance of ordinary
knowledge attributions, the nature of rationality, the ethics of
belief, and the role of naturalism in epistemology.
6. References and Further Reading
Alston, W. 1983. "What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?" Synthese 55, 73-95.
Alston, W. 1986. "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology."
Philosophical Topics 14, 179-221.
Alston, W. 1988. "An Internalist Externalism." Synthese 74, 265-283.
Alston, W. 1995. "How to think about Reliability" Philosophical Topics 23, 1-29.
Alston, W. 2005. Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic
Evaluation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Armstrong, D.M. 1973. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. New York: Cambridge.
Bergmann, M. 2006. Justification without Awareness. New York: Oxford.
BonJour, L. 1980. "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge,"
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, 53-73. Reprinted in Kornblith 2001.
Page references are to the Kornblith reprint.
BonJour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Chisholm, R. 1988. "The Indispensability of Internal Justification."
Synthese 74:3, 285-296.
Cohen, S. 1984. "Justification and Truth." Philosophical Studies 46, 279-295.
Conee, E., and R. Feldman. 2004a. Evidentialism: Essays in
Epistemology. New York: Oxford.
Conee, E., and R. Feldman. 2004b. "Internalism Defended" in
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. New York: Oxford, 53-82.
Dretske, F. 1971. "Conclusive Reasons," Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 49, 1-22.
Dretske, F. 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Feldman, R. 2004a. "In Search of Internalism and Externalism." The
Externalist Challenge, ed. Richard Schantz. New York: Walter de
Gruyter. pp. 143-156.
Feldman, R. 2004b. "Having Evidence." in Conee & Feldman,
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. New York: Oxford, 219-241.
Feldman, R. 2005a. "Respecting the Evidence." Philosophical
Perspectives 19, 95-119.
Feldman, R. 2005b. "Justification is Internal." Contemporary Debates
in Epistemology. eds. Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa. Malden, MA:
Blackwell. pp. 270-284.
Foley, R. 1993. "What Am I to Believe?" in S. Wagner and R. Warner,
eds. Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press,
147-162.
Fumerton, R. 1988. "The Internalism/Externalism Controversy."
Philosophical Perspectives 2, 443-459.
Fumerton, R. 1995. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield.
Fumerton, R. 2004. "Inferential Internalism and the Presuppositions of
Skeptical Arguments." in The Externalist Challenge, ed. Richard
Schantz. New York: Walter de Gruyter. pp.157-167.
Fumerton, R. 2006. "Epistemic Internalism, Philosophical Assurance and
the Skeptical Predicament." in Knowledge and Reality: Essays in honor
of Alvin Plantinga, pp. 179-191.
Gettier, E. 1963. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23: 121-3
Goldman, A. 1967. "A Causal Theory of Knowing." The Journal of
Philosophy 64, 357-372.
Goldman, A. 1979. "What is Justified Belief?" in Justification and
Knowledge ed. G.S. Pappas. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 1-23.
Goldman, A. 1980. "The Internalist Conception of Justification,"
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, 27-51.
Goldman, A. 1993. "Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology,"
Philosophical Issues 3, 271-285.
Goldman, A. 1999. "Internalism Exposed." Journal of Philosophy 96, 271-93.
Kornblith, H. 1988. "How Internal Can You Get?" Synthese 74, 313-27.
Kornblith, H. (Ed.) 2001. Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism.
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Lehrer, K. and S. Cohen. 1983. "Justification, Truth, and Coherence."
Synthese 55, 191-207.
Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate. New York: Oxford.
Sosa, E. 1991a. "Reliabilism and intellectual virtue" in Knowledge in
Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 131-145.
Sosa, E. 1991b. "Knowledge and intellectual virtue" in Knowledge in
Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 225-244.
Sosa and BonJour, L. 2003. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs.
Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Steup, M. 1999. "A Defense of Internalism." in The Theory of
Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 373-84.
Steup, M. 2001. "Epistemic Duty, Evidence, and Internality." in
Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. ed. M. Steup. New York: Oxford.
Stroud, B. 1989. "Understanding Human Knowledge in General," in M.
Clay and K. Lehrer, eds., Knowledge and Skepticism. Boulder: Westview
Press.
Stroud, B. 1994. "Scepticism, 'Externalism', and the Goal of
Epistemology," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary
Volume 68: 291-307.
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