field of the philosophy of religion. He criticized the standard proofs
for God's existence, traditional notions of God's nature and divine
governance, the connection between morality and religion, and the
rationality of belief in miracles. He also advanced theories on the
origin of popular religious beliefs, grounding such notions in human
psychology rather than in rational argument or divine revelation. The
larger aim of his critique was to disentangle philosophy from religion
and thus allow philosophy to pursue its ends without either rational
over-extension or psychological corruption. Although we find religious
themes throughout Hume's publications, the discussion here are largely
restricted to six items: (1) "Of Miracles", (2) "Of a Particular
Providence and of a Future State", (3) "The Natural History of
Religion", (4) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, (5) "Of
Suicide", and, (6) "Of the Immortality of the Soul."
1. Hume's Place in Enlightenment Theories
During the Enlightenment, there were two pillars of traditional
Christian belief: natural and revealed religion. One of the more
routine charges brought against Hume by his early critics was that he
sought to undermine both of these pillars.
Rooted in both ancient and medieval philosophy, natural religion
involves knowledge of God drawn from nature through the use of logic
and reason. Philosophers of the middle ages developed a variety of
logical proofs regarding the existence and nature of God, three of
which were especially influential in the centuries to come. First, the
design argument (now called the teleological argument) infers the
existence of a divine designer from the presence of natural order in
the world. According to Aquinas's version of the argument, things in
nature exhibit a purpose – or final cause – and this implies that
there is an intelligence that guides things. Second, a collection of
proofs now called cosmological arguments contends that the causes (or
motion, or contingency) in the world around us must have an origin
that is uncaused (or unmoved, or necessary). The most sophisticated of
these is a causal argument that distinguishes between two kinds of
causal sequences, namely, those that occur over a period of time and
those that occur simultaneously. A classic example of a temporal
causal sequence is Abraham begetting Isaac, who in turn begets Jacob.
An example of a simultaneous causal sequence is a hand that moves a
stick that in turn moves a stone, all at the same time. Proponents of
the causal argument held that it is theoretically possible for a
temporal causal sequence of events to trace back through time to
infinity past. However, they argued, simultaneous causal sequences
must terminate in a first cause. The point of the argument is that God
is required at each moment to sustain the existence of the world. A
third argument – now dubbed the ontological argument – maintains that
the greatest possible being must exist since it is logically
contradictory to assert otherwise.
All three of these arguments were modified and strengthened during the
17th and 18th centuries. The design argument was bolstered with the
ever-growing body of scientific knowledge, particularly in the fields
of biology and astronomy. Parallels were pointed out between intricate
mechanisms of the cosmos and objects of human design, such as watches.
Four especially influential works in this genre were John Ray's The
Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation (1691), Richard
Bentley's A Confutation of Atheism from the Origin and Frame of the
World (1692), William Derham's Physico-Theology (1713) and Derham's
Astro-Theology (1715). Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke
presented a more precise and somewhat different causal argument. Like
their medieval predecessors, they agreed that it is theoretically
possible for temporal causal sequences to trace back to infinity past.
Nevertheless, they argued, an important fact still needs to be
explained: the fact that this infinite temporal sequence of causal
events exists at all. God, then, is the necessary cause of the whole
series. Hume appears to have been unfamiliar with the medieval
versions of the theistic proofs, and, like most of his British
contemporaries, does not even discuss the ontological argument. His
most direct source for the design and causal arguments were probably
Cicero and the more contemporary discussions by Clarke and others.
Revealed religion, the second pillar of traditional Christian belief,
involves knowledge of God contained in revelation, particularly the
Bible. During the Enlightenment, religious writers continually
defended the veracity of the Christian scriptures. Apologists argued
that the biblical prophesies and miracles were true instances of God's
intervention in earthly affairs, and this intervention confirmed the
Bible's message of salvation. Challenged by voyagers' accounts of
strange religions in the far corners of the world, some apologists
argued further that Christianity was not just another religion.
Instead, they believed, Christianity contains God's true revealed
message, and other idolatrous religions are the result of human
weakness or perhaps even demonic influence. Gerardus Joannes Vossius's
De Theologia Gentili (1641) is the most notable defense of this kind.
In spite of these valiant efforts to defend the Christian faith,
several philosophers and theologians chiseled away at the notions of
both natural and revealed religion. We know that Hume was acquainted
with many of these criticisms, and Hume's respondents quickly
associated his views with those of his forerunners.
Natural religion came under attack from two camps. First, within the
Christian mainstream itself, religious fideists – particularly from
the Augustinian tradition – argued that questions of God's existence
and nature are matters of religious faith, and not matters of human
reason. This is because of both the limits of human reason and the
infinitely incomprehensible nature of God himself. French philosopher
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) boldly makes this point here:
By faith we know God's existence. In the glorious state of heaven
we will know his nature. … If there is a God he is infinitely
incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, he has no
proportion to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what he is,
or whether he is. This being true, who will dare to undertake to
resolve this question? …Who, then, will blame those Christians who are
not able to give a reason for their belief insofar as they profess a
religion for which they can give no reason? [Thoughts]
Scotland in Hume's time was influenced by Calvinistic fideism, which
owed much of its theoretical position to Renaissance Augustinianism.
The other attack on natural religion came from philosophical skeptics
who – inspired by Sextus Empiricus and the Pyrrhonian septical
tradition – pointed out the bankruptcy of human reason. No arguments,
they contended, are immune from criticism, including theistic proofs.
This skeptical conviction was especially strong hamong the French
writers Michel Montaigne (1533-1592), Francois de la Mothe le Vayer
(1588-1669), and Pierre Bayle (1647-1706). Like traditional fideists,
many of these modern sceptics also held that questions of God's
existence were matters of faith, not reason. Bayle, in fact, argues
that skepticism is a wonderful preparation for religious faith:
If a person is first convinced that he can expect no satisfaction
from his philosophical studies, he will be more inclined to pray to
God; he will ask God for the conviction of the truths which he ought
to believe, rather than flattering himself with the success of his
reasoning and disputing. It is therefore a welcome inclination to
faith to know the defects of reason. ["Pyrrho", Dictionary]
Reassessments of revealed religion came in varying degrees from
writers connected with non- traditional theological movements.
Latitudinarianism – a movement within the Church of England –
advocated religious toleration and attempted to hold a middle ground
between religious dogmatism and scepticism. Although they were
believers in biblical miracles, Latitudinarians such as John Tillotson
(1730-1694) and Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699) established criteria
for distinguishing true miracles from false ones, particularly alleged
miracles within the Catholic tradition. These criteria were
influential in subsequent discussions of miracles. Perhaps the
strongest attacks on revealed religion came from Deism, a
heterogeneous movement which held that God created the universe, but
thereafter left it alone without further interfering in the
established course of nature. Deists had a notorious reputation for
denying that God intervened through revealed texts such as the Bible
or through miraculous suspensions of laws of nature. Whereas
Latitudinarians tried to distinguish the Gospel miracles from Catholic
ones, deists such as Thomas Chubb (1679-1747) often blurred the
distinction. Charles Blount (1654-1693) argues similarly that pagan
miracles have the same credibility as the Christian miracles. Their
point was either to discredit biblical miracles by association, or to
at least show that no religion has exclusive claim to miracles.
In addition to attacks on revealed religion from within these
religious movements, some more independent philosophers also joined in
the assault. Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677) argues that the very
facts attested in miracles count against them: "if anyone asserted
that God acts in contravention to the laws of nature, he, ipso facto,
would be compelled to assert that God acted against his own nature –
an evident absurdity" (Tractatus Theologico- Politicus, Sect. 6). A
similar attack appears in the posthumously published philosophical
essays of Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751) where he
argues that miracles "are incredible, because [they are] contrary to
all experience, and to the established course of Nature"
(Philosophical Works, 1754, Vol. 5, pp. 99-102). Andrew Michael Ramsay
(1686- 1743), in his posthumously published Philosophical Principles
of Natural and Revealed Religion (1748-1749), suggests that, to
someone outside the Christian faith, the Biblical miracle accounts are
inherently counter-intuitive.
2. Hume's Writings on Religion
To avoid being fined, imprisoned, or worse, critics of religion during
Hume's time needed to express themselves cautiously. Sometimes this
involved placing controversial views in the mouth of a character in a
dialogue. Other times it involved adopting the persona of a deist or
fideist as a means of concealing a more extreme religious skepticism.
Hume used all of the rhetorical devices at his disposal, and left it
to his readers to decode his most controversial conclusions.
His first sustained attack on natural and revealed religion appears in
his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), specifically in two
essays, "Of Miracles", and "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future
State." "Of Miracles" contains an assortment of attacks on the belief
in miracles; the thrust of the essay is that it is unreasonable for
anyone to believe in testimonies involving miraculous violations of
laws of nature. The first of this two- part essay contains the
argument for which Hume is most famous: uniform experience of natural
law outweighs the testimony of any alleged miracle. We might imagine a
scale with two balancing pans. In the first pan we place the strongest
evidence in support of the occurrence of a miracle. In the second we
place our life-long experience of consistent laws of nature. According
to Hume, the second pan will always outweigh the first. Regardless of
how strong the testimony is in favor of a given miracle, it can never
come close to counterbalancing the overwhelming experience of unvaried
laws of nature. Thus, proportioning one's belief to the evidence, the
wise person must reject the weaker evidence concerning the alleged
miracle. In a 1737 letter to Henry Home, Hume states that he intended
to include a discussion of miracles in his Treatise of Human Nature
(1739-1740), but ultimately left it out for fear of offending readers.
It is probably this main argument to which Hume refers.
The second part of "Of Miracles" presents a potpourri of criticisms.
Hume begins by offering four factors that count against the
credibility of most miracle testimonies: (1) witnesses of miracles
typically lack integrity; (2) we have a propensity to sensationalize,
which prompts us to uncritically perpetuate miracle stories; (3)
miracle testimonies abound in barbarous nations; and (4) miracles
support rival religious systems and thus discredit each other. Like
Chubb and Blount, Hume also discusses three non-biblical miracles that
are supported by reliable testimony – one from ancient Rome and two
recent Catholic miracles. Although they are backed by strong
testimony, Hume argues that we nevertheless reject these alleged
miracles since they are contrary to our consistent experience of laws
of nature. He concludes noting that theologians invite problems when
they attempt to ground their religion in miracles. Christianity, he
concludes, certainly requires belief in miracles, but such belief
should involve an act of faith and not reason.
As Hume's "Of Miracles" was an attack on revealed religion, he
followed this with an attack on natural religion in the essay "Of a
Particular Providence and of a Future State," which was originally
titled "Of the Practical Consequences of Natural Religion." The essay
presents a fictional conversation in which two characters examine the
design argument. The characters give three key criticisms. First,
our knowledge of God as creator is restricted to the effects that we
see in his creation; since the world (the effect) is imperfect, we
cannot conclude that God (the cause) is perfect. Second, justice in
the universe is restricted to the imperfect justice that we see around
us. Third, the singular and unparalleled nature of the universe
prevents us from making analogical inferences about the creator.
In 1757 Hume published a work titled Four Dissertations, the first and
longest essay of which was "The Natural History of Religion." The
essay is one of the first attempts to explain the causes of religious
belief solely in terms of psychological and sociological factors. We
might see the "Natural History" as an answer to a challenge, such as
the sort that William Adams poses here in his attack on Hume's "Of
Miracles":
Whence could the religion and laws of this people [i.e., the Jews]
so far exceed those of the wisest Heathens, and come out at once, in
their first infancy, thus perfect and entire; when all human systems
are found to grow up by degrees, and to ripen, after many
improvements; into perfection? [An Essay, Part 2]
According to Adams, only divine intervention can account for the
sophistication of the ancient Jewish religion. In the "Natural
History," though, Hume offers an alternative explanation, and one that
is grounded solely in human nature. His critics saw this work as an
attack on revealed religion, since it brushes aside the contention
that religious belief hinges on God's direct involvement within human
history. The work may be divided into three parts. In the first part
(Sections 1 and 4), Hume argues that polytheism, and not monotheism,
was the original religion of primitive humans. Monotheism, he
believes, was only a later development that emerged with the progress
of various societies. The standard theory in Judeo-Christian theology
was that early humans first believed in a single God, but as religious
corruption crept in, people lapsed into polytheism. Hume was the first
writer to systematically defend the position of original polytheism.
In the second part (Sections 2-3, 5-8), Hume establishes the
psychological principles that give rise to popular religious belief.
His thesis is that natural instincts – such as fear and the propensity
to adulate – are the true causes of popular religious belief, and not
divine intervention or rational argument. The third part of this work
(Sections 9-15) compares various aspects of polytheism with
monotheism, showing that one is no more superior than the other. Both
contain points of absurdity. From this he concludes that we should
suspend belief on the entire subject of religious truth.
Around the same time that Hume was composing his "Natural History of
Religion" he was also working on his Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion, which appeared in print two decades later, after his death.
The work is perhaps Hume's greatest philosophical writing, both in
terms of content and composition. There are three principal characters
in the Dialogues. A character named Cleanthes defends an a posteriori
design argument for God's existence. Next, a character named Demea
defends an a priori casual argument for God's existence, particularly
Leibniz's and Clarke's version. Finally, a character named Philo is a
skeptic who argues against both a posteriori and a priori proofs.
Philo offers a stream of criticisms against the design argument, many
of which are now standard in discussions of the issue. For Philo, the
design argument is based on a faulty analogy: we do not know whether
the order in nature was the result of design, since, unlike our
experience with the creation of machines, we did not witness the
formation of the world. The vastness of the universe also weakens any
comparison with human artifacts. Although the universe is orderly
here, it may be chaotic elsewhere. Similarly, if intelligent design is
exhibited only in a small fraction of the universe, then we cannot say
that it is the productive force of the whole universe. Philo also
contends that natural design may be accounted for by nature alone,
insofar as matter may contain within itself a principle of order. And
even if the design of the universe is of divine origin, we are not
justified in concluding that this divine cause is a single, all
powerful, or all good being. As to the causal argument, Philo argues
that once we have a sufficient explanation for each particular fact in
the infinite sequence of facts, it makes no sense to inquire about the
origin of the collection of these facts. That is, once we adequately
account for each individual fact, this constitutes a sufficient
explanation of the whole collection.
In 1755 Hume's essays "Of Suicide" and "Of the Immortality of the
Soul" were printed along with the "Natural History of Religion" in a
book titled Five Dissertations. When pre-release copies of Five
Dissertations provoked controversy among influential readers, Hume and
his publisher Andrew Millar agreed to have the two essays physically
removed from the printed copies. They were replaced with a more
innocent essay titled "Of the Standard of Taste," and the book of
essays appeared in 1757 under the title Four Dissertations. Rumors
about the two withdrawn essays circulated for years, and clandestine
copies appeared anonymously in French (1770) and later in English
(1777). In 1783 a reprint of the 1777 version was published more
openly, and this time with Hume's name attached. Along with Hume's two
essays, the anonymous editor of the 1783 edition included his own
critical notes to Hume's two pieces, and excerpts from Rousseau's La
Nouvelle Heloise on the subject of suicide. "Of Suicide" defends the
moral permissibility of suicide by arguing that it does not violate
our duties to God, oneself, or others. "Of the Immortality of the
Soul" disputes a series of metaphysical, moral, and physical arguments
for the soul's immortality. Pages of the original two essays as they
were printed in Five Dissertations are in the possession of the
National Library of Scotland. These contain nineteen corrections in
Hume's hand and are his final surviving revisions of the essays. He
sent the revised pages to his printer William Strahan, who then
suppressed them. It is only since the 20th century that these
revisions appear in editions of the two essays.
3. Overview of Early Responses to Hume's Writings on Religion
Only a few of Hume's early respondents were active philosophers; most,
instead, were theologians who believed that Hume posed a real threat
to religion and they accordingly responded as defenders of their
faith. These theologians fall into several groups. First, an initial
group were Anglican clergy or members of that theological camp.
Anthony Ellys, Thomas Rutherforth, Owen Manning, William Adams, and
William Samuel Powell were clergy of the Church of England; John
Douglas was a Scottish Episcopalian cleric, and Philip Skelton was a
cleric of the Church of Ireland. William Warburton was a polemicist
for this group. Second, there were dissenters who were members of
non-Anglican church bodies in England and Ireland. Most of these were
non-Calvinistic and classified as rational dissenters. William Rose
was a layman in this group. John Leland, Richard Price, Joseph
Priestley, and Thomas Cogan were ministers at different positions
along the theological spectrum. Third, there were ministers of the
Church of Scotland – a Presbyterian rather than an Episcopalian body.
Henry Home was a layman in this group. George Anderson, George
Campbell, and James Oswald were ministers.
The early responses to Hume's writings on religion differ from early
responses to his metaphysical and moral writings in three key ways.
First, there are many more responses to his religious writings,
undoubtedly because of the perceived threat that they posed. Second,
critics of Hume's other writings frequently misunderstood his views;
however, as professionally trained theologians, the respondents to
Hume's religious writings typically had a good grasp of his arguments,
even if they did not offer convincing refutations. Third, although all
early responses to Hume are intrinsically interesting, the responses
to his religious writings are invaluable for helping decipher Hume's
frequently concealed attacks on religion. Having the advantage of
living during Hume's time, early critics understood Hume's
implications better than we might today. And, in their responses, they
routinely interpret Hume's hidden meaning.
The first early response to "Of Miracles" appeared in 1749 by Philip
Skelton, and a steady stream of responses has continued to the present
time. The longest of these were by William Adams (1752), John Leland
(1755), and George Campbell (1762). Although Hume avoided responding
to his critics as a matter of principle, he nevertheless kept track of
printed criticisms as they appeared. In the last decade of his life he
wrote "I cou'd cover the Floor of a large Room with Books and
Pamphlets wrote against me." His interest in critical responses to "Of
Miracles" in particular started early. Writing to his friend Robert
Wallace in 1753, Hume stated that he saw three pamphlets that attacked
"Of Miracles," two of which he owned. Some time later, Hume told
Richard Kirwan that "twenty-two answers had been made [to "Of
Miracles"], hinting, that if any of them had been satisfactory any
other would have been judged superfluous" ("Remarks", included below).
In addition to works devoted exclusively to "Of Miracles", critics of
Hume's other writings on religion routinely included brief attacks on
that essay. Some critics attacked a single point in his essay, whereas
others carefully dissected the work sentence by sentence. The
respondents were typically acquainted with the critiques of Hume that
appeared prior to their own, and they often stated their intention to
offer a new angle in their attack.
The principal objections raised by respondents regarding "Of Miracles"
Part 1 are these. (1) Hume's use of the word "experience" is
ambiguous, sometimes meaning an individual's private experience, other
times meaning human collective experience. (2) Our limited experience
of natural laws does not make it unreasonable to believe that God
altered natural laws. (3) Miraculous intervention is reasonable to
believe when we recognise God's existence, God's nature, and God's
interest in redeeming humanity. (4) Contrary to Hume, it is perfectly
reasonable for the Indian prince to believe that water freezes, even
though his limited experience suggests otherwise. (5) Experience of
natural laws is not as weighty as Hume maintains since some commonly
believed laws are overturned by a single experiment. (6) Strong
testimony of miracles can in fact outweigh our experience of
consistent natural laws. (7) Hume misconstrues the notion of
probability when stating that we "subtract" contrary evidences from
each other. (8) Hume's argument tells us only that miracles are highly
unusual, which believers in miracles already acknowledge.
Concerning Part 2, these are the main objections. (1) The New
Testament miracles were not in fact reported by ignorant people in a
barbarous nation. (2) Miracle testimonies from rival religions do not
nullify each other; upon examination, the New Testament miracles are
the only ones that are credible. (3) Contrary to Hume, Muhammad never
claimed to have performed miracles. (4) The alleged miracle done by
Vespasian is not credible since it was done in front of gullible
people with a clear political aim. (5) The alleged miracle at
Saragossa was not thoroughly investigated by Cardinal de Retz, and it
is likely that the man in question had a wooden leg. (6) Hume
exaggerates the number and nature of the alleged miracles at the tomb
of the Abbé De Pâris; the most notable ones were either frauds or the
result of natural healings, as exposed by De Voeux in his Lettres sur
les Miracles (1735) and Critique Generale du livre de Mr. de Montgeron
(1741).
Early responses to "Of a Particular Providence" were more modest in
number, and written by some of Hume's most notable critics: Henry Home
(1751), George Anderson (1753), George Psalmanazar (1753), John Leland
(1755), James Beattie (1770), James Oswald (1772), Joseph Priestley
(1780), and Archibald Arthur (1803). Their main objection was with
Hume's claim that our knowledge of God as creator is limited to the
effects that we see in the creation. When Hume's "Natural History of
Religion" appeared in 1757, four reviews of that work shortly
followed, most of which found the work to be less original than Hume's
other writings. The most sustained critiques of the "Natural History
of Religion" were written by Caleb Fleming (1757), William Warburton
(1757), Thomas Stona (1758), Voltaire (1764-1769), and Duncan Shaw
(1776). Most of these writers focused on Hume's claim that polytheism
was the original religion of humanity.
When Hume's Dialogues was published in 1777, at least six reviews of
that work appeared, the majority of which were very critical.
Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, books, pamphlets and journal
articles appeared that analyzed different parts of the Dialogues, but
the most systematic studies of that work only appeared later in the
20th century. The early responses to the Dialogues presented in this
volume are by Thomas Hayter (1780), Joseph Priestley (1780), Joseph
Milner (1781), John Ogilvie (1783), Hugh Hamilton (1784), George Horne
(1784), Archibald Arthur (1803), and Alexander Crombie (1829). "Of
Suicide" and "Of the Immortality of the Soul" were openly published in
1783 with Hume's name attached, and most respondents were shocked by
these essays. In fact, we find here some of the most negative comments
about Hume that have appeared in print. Four review articles attacked
the work, and parts of the essays were analyzed by the anonymous An
Essay on the Immortality of the Soul (1784), and Charles Moore's A
Full Inquiry into the Subject of Suicide (1790). The most systematic
study of "Of Suicide" was presented by George Horne (1784).
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