be substantially different than they are today if there had been no
David Hume (1711-1776). Hume challenged traditional philosophical
beliefs in ways that shocked the readers of his day and have demanded
the attention of philosophers ever since. Several classic
philosophical problems are now permanently associated with his name:
the analysis of causality, the problem of personal identity, and the
problem of induction. Hume is also a permanent voice in ongoing
disputes about knowledge of the external world, free will and
determinism, and meaning and verification. The aspects of Hume's
metaphysical and epistemological theories that we find interesting
today were largely the same issues that captivated Hume's early
critics. Although most of Hume's philosophy in some way touches on
issues of metaphysics and epistemology, this article is largely
restricted to portions of three of Hume's writings: (1) Books 1 and 2
of the Treatise of Human Nature (1739); (2) An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding (1748); and (3) the "Dissertation on the Passions"
(1757). For additional articles on Hume in this encyclopedia see the
following: David Hume: Life and Writings, David Hume: Moral Theory,
David Hume: Writings on Religion, and David Hume: Essays, Moral,
Political and Literary.
1. Hume's Influences
In a 1737 letter, Hume himself lists his philosophical influences,
which include Nicolas Malebranche, George Berkeley, Pierre Bayle, and
René Descartes:
I shall submit all my Performances to your Examination, & to make
you enter into them more easily, I desire of you, if you have Leizure,
to read once over le Recherche de la Verité of Pere Malebranche, the
Principles of Human Knowledge by Dr Berkeley, some of the more
metaphysical Articles of Baile's Dictionary; such as those of Zeno, &
Spinoza. Des-Cartes Meditations wou'd also be useful, but I don't know
if you will find it easily among your Acquaintances. These Books will
make you easily comprehend the metaphysical Parts of my Reasoning. And
as to the rest, they have so little Dependence on on [sic] all former
Systems of Philosophy, that your natural Good Sense will afford you
Light enough to judge of their Force & Solidity. [Hume to Michael
Ramsay, August 26, 1737]
Chronologically, the first philosopher on Hume's list is René
Descartes (1596–1650). In his Meditations on the First Philosophy
(1641), Descartes combats sceptics who doubt the existence of the
external world and the reliability of our senses. To accomplish his
task, Descartes himself provisionally plays the role of a sceptic and
doubts everything that can possibly be doubted. Descartes then arrives
at one absolute truth – his own existence – and uses this as a
foundation for demonstrating all knowledge. Hume was probably
influenced by Descartes's provisional doubting process, as Hume
himself doubted the sources of human knowledge. Throughout Hume's
philosophical writings, though, he also reacted against the more
speculative metaphysical views that Descartes developed.
The remaining three philosophers listed in Hume's letter –
Malebranche, Bayle, and Berkeley – were controversial figures when
their writings first appeared, and they share the conviction that the
true nature of the world is not as evident as we ordinarily think.
French Catholic philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) was a
follower of Descartes and is most remembered for his Search After
Truth (1674–1675). Two themes stand out in that work, both of which
influenced Hume. First, Malebranche wrestled with how our minds
receive perceptual images from external objects. For example, as I
stand in front of a tree, I have a visual image of that tree. How does
the tree itself cause that image in my mind? For Malebranche, the tree
is physical in nature, yet my perceptual image is spiritual in nature,
and, so, something like a miracle must take place to convert the one
to the other. After rejecting various theories of perception,
Malebranche concludes that God possesses mental/spiritual images of
all external things, and that he implants these ideas in our minds at
the appropriate time – when I stand before the tree, for example. In
short, according to Malebranche, we see external objects by viewing
their images as they reside in God. Hume did not adopt Malebranche's
theological solution to this problem, but perhaps Hume learned from
Malebranche that there is a great gulf between external objects and
our perceptions of them, and that it is exceedingly difficult to
explain the connection between the two.
The second major theme in Malebranche concerns the nature of
causality, or, more specifically, how two events (such as the motion
of a stick that strikes and moves a ball) are causally connected.
Malebranche argues that physical objects by themselves simply cannot
be the cause of motion in other objects; only spirits can do that. So,
when a stick strikes a ball, some spiritual force must intervene and
actually cause the ball to move. Malebranche concludes that God is the
true cause of the ball's motion, and that the movement of the stick is
only the occasion, the occasional cause, of the ball's motion.
Malebranche pushes this theory further and argues that God is also the
true cause behind human bodily motion. For example, when I wilfully
pick up a book, my will is only the occasional cause, and God is the
true cause. Again, Hume did not adopt Malebranche's theological
solution to the problem of causality, but it was perhaps through
Malebranche that Hume became aware of the difficulty of explaining the
nature of causal connections.
Although Malebranche raised questions about our knowledge of external
objects and causality, he was nevertheless optimistic about the
ability of our human reason to unravel these philosophical mysteries.
However, influenced by the ancient Greek sceptical traditions, French
philosopher Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) was much more pessimistic about
our rational abilities. A philosophy and history professor, Bayle made
a lasting mark in philosophy with his monumental Historical and
Critical Dictionary (Dictionaire historique et critique, 1692). The
Dictionary contains hundreds of articles on notable figures from
ancient through modern times, and in lengthy footnotes to these
articles Bayle presents his own original and often radical views. In
the letter cited above, Hume mentions "the more metaphysical Articles
of Baile's Dictionary" and cites two particular articles: Zeno of Elea
and Spinoza.
Zeno (c. 450 BCE) was a follower of Greek philosopher Parmenides and,
like his teacher, Zeno argued that our ordinary notions of the world
are illusions. Zeno presents a series of logical paradoxes that show
the inherently contradictory nature of motion and space. Bayle
comments extensively on Zeno's paradoxes and suggests that space is
composed of one of three possible things: mathematical points,
indivisible physical points, or infinitely divisible parts. Bayle
sceptically concludes that all three of these views are absurd, and,
so, no adequate explanation of space is possible. Drawing on Bayle's
discussion, Hume concludes with an almost equally sceptical assessment
regarding our notions of space and time. Benedict de Spinoza
(1632–1677) – another controversial modern philosopher – argued that
God is the single substance of the entire universe. What appear to be
individual objects, such as rocks and trees, are in fact only
modifications of God's single-substance. Bayle treats Spinoza
contemptuously and argues that it is counterintuitive to see all
physical things as modifications of a single substance. In the
Treatise Hume extends Bayle's critique further and argues that
theologians are equally counterintuitive when they say, for example,
that my diverse mental images are really unified in my single
spirit-mind.
A third metaphysical article in Bayle that certainly had an impact on
Hume is that on Pyrrho (c. 365–c. 275 BCE). Pyrrho was the founder of
one of the Greek sceptical traditions, which survives principally in
the writings of Sextus Empiricus (. c. 200 CE). In his article on
Pyrrho, Bayle discusses the Pyrrhonian assault on both perceptual
knowledge and knowledge of self-evident truths. Bayle largely agrees
with Pyrrho and argues further that human reason collapses under the
weight of its own inherent paradoxes. Ultimately, for Bayle, we must
reject reason as a guide for truth and rely instead on religious
faith. It is probably from Bayle that Hume learned to use faith as a
shield to protect him from accusations of atheism or any other
negative consequence of sceptical philosophy. In the same article
Bayle discusses the common philosophical distinction between what
Locke later dubbed primary and secondary qualities; Bayle argues that
they are both ultimately spectator-dependent. This is a line of
reasoning that Hume also offers.
The last philosopher that Hume mentions in the letter is Anglican
Bishop George Berkeley (1685–1753), published two of his key works
while in his tewnties, namely A Treatise Concerning the Principles of
Human Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous
(1713). In both of these works Berkeley argues against the existence
of an external material world. For Berkeley, our experience of
external reality is nothing more than a continuing stream of
perceptions, nor can we say anything intelligible about any physical
substance that supposedly causes these perceptions. Berkeley concludes
that we must reject the theory of physical reality and instead
recognise that God directly feeds us perceptions of external things.
Although rejecting Berkeley's theological solution, Hume adopts
Berkeley's arguments showing our inability to access some external
world behind our perceptions. Berkeley also critically discusses the
view that there is no reality to our individual minds beyond the
stream of perceptions that we experience. Berkeley rejects this view
and instead argues that individual minds do exist; however, Hume seems
to advance a similar problem, while denying Berkeley's solution.
In addition to the writings of Descartes, Malebranche, Bayle, and
Berkeley, there were undoubtedly other philosophers that directly
influenced Hume's metaphysical views. An avid admirer of the Roman
philosopher Cicero (106–43 BCE), Hume was familiar with Cicero's
Academica, a dialogue on the nature and possibility of acquiring
knowledge. Perhaps most importantly, Hume was influenced by An Essay
concerning Human Understanding (1690) of John Locke (1632–1704). In
this work Locke argues that the root of all knowledge lies in
experience; Hume shares this view with Locke.
2. Summary of the Treatise Book 1
In his short autobiography, "My Own Life," Hume notes that he composed
his Treatise in his mid-twenties while on retreat for three years in
France. It is a long and complex book that systematically re-thinks a
wide range of philosophical issues. The first two books of the
Treatise appeared simultaneously in 1739. We will briefly look at some
of the major themes in both books.
Book 1, titled "Of the Understanding," opens analysing various
categories of mental events, which roughly follow this scheme:
* Perceptions
o A. Ideas
+ 1. From memory
+ 2. From imagination
# a. From fancy
# b. From understanding
* (1) Involving relations of ideas
* (2) Involving matters of fact
o B. Impressions
+ 1. Of sensation (external)
+ 2. Of reflection (internal)
He first divides all mental perceptions between ideas (thoughts) and
impressions (sensations and feelings), and then makes two central
claims about the relation between ideas and impressions. First,
adopting what is commonly called Hume's copy thesis, he argues that
all ideas are ultimately copied from impressions. That is, for any
idea we select, we can trace the component parts of that idea to some
external sensation or internal feeling. This claim places Hume
squarely in the empiricist tradition, and throughout Book 1 he uses
this principle as a test for determining the content of an idea under
consideration. Second, adopting what we may call Hume's liveliness
thesis, he argues that ideas and impressions differ only in terms of
liveliness. For example, my impression of a tree is simply more vivid
than my idea of that tree. His early critics pointed out an important
implication of the liveliness thesis, which Hume himself presumably
hides. Most modern philosophers held that ideas reside in our
spiritual minds, whereas impressions originate in our physical bodies.
So, when Hume blurs the distinction between ideas and impressions, he
is ultimately denying the spiritual nature of ideas and instead
grounding them in our physical nature. In short, these critics argue
that, for Hume, all of our mental operations – including our most
rational ideas – are physical in nature.
Hume next notes that there are several mental faculties that are
responsible for producing our various ideas. He initially divides
ideas between those produced by the memory, and those produced by the
imagination. The memory is a faculty that conjures up ideas based on
experiences as they happened. For example, the memory I have of my
drive to the store is a comparatively accurate copy of my previous
sense impressions of that experience. The imagination, by contrast, is
a faculty that breaks apart and combines ideas, thus forming new ones.
He uses the familiar example of a golden mountain: this idea is a
combination of an idea of gold and an idea of a mountain. As our
imagination chops up and forms new ideas, it is directed by three
principles of association, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and cause
and effect. For example, by virtue of resemblance, the sketch of a
person leads me to an idea of that actual person. The ideas of the
imagination are further divided between two categories. Some
imaginative ideas represent flights of the fancy, such as the idea of
a golden mountain; other imaginative ideas, though, represent solid
reasoning, such as predicting the trajectory of a thrown ball. The
fanciful ideas are derived from the faculty of the fancy, and are the
source of fantasies, superstitions, and bad philosophy. By contrast,
the good ideas are derived from the faculty of the understanding – or
reason – and roughly involve either mathematical demonstration or
factual predictions. Hume notes that, when we imaginatively exercise
our understanding, our minds are guided by seven philosophical or
"reasoning" relations, which are divided as follows:
Principles of reasoning concerning relations of ideas (yielding
demonstration):
(1) resemblance, (2) contrariety, (3) degrees in quality, and (4)
proportions in quantity or number
Principles of reasoning concerning matters of fact (yielding
judgments of probability):
(5) identity, (6) relations in time and place, and (7) causation
Armed with the above conceptual distinctions, he turns his attention
to an array of standard philosophical problems. As he examines them
one by one, he repeatedly does three things. First, he sceptically
argues that we are unable to gain complete knowledge of some important
philosophical notion under consideration. Second, he shows more
positively how the understanding gives us a very limited idea of the
notion under consideration. Third, he explains how some erroneous
views of that notion are grounded in the fancy, and he accordingly
recommends that we reject those ideas. For convenience, we will follow
this three-part scheme as we consider Hume's discussions.
Space. (1) On the topic of space, Hume argues that we have no ideas of
infinitely divisible space (1.2.2.2). (2) When accounting for the idea
we do have of space, he argues that "the idea of space is convey'd to
the mind by two senses, the sight and touch; nor does any thing ever
appear extended, that is not either visible or tangible" (1.2.3.15).
Further, he argues that these objects – which are either visible or
tangible – are composed of finite atoms or corpuscles, which are
themselves "endow'd with colour and solidity." These impressions are
then "comprehended" or conceived by the imagination; it is from the
structuring of these impressions that we obtain our idea of space. (3)
In contrast to this idea of space, Hume argues that we frequently
presume to have an idea of space that lacks visibility or solidity. He
accounts for this erroneous notion in terms of a mistaken association
that people naturally make between visual and tactile space
(1.2.5.21).
Time. (1) Hume's treatment of our idea of time is like his treatment
of the idea of space. He first maintains that we have no idea of
infinitely divisible time (1.2.4.1). (2) He then notes Locke's point
that our minds operate at a range of speeds that are "fix'd by the
original nature and constitution of the mind, and beyond which no
influence of external objects on the senses is ever able to hasten or
retard our thought" (1.2.3.7). The idea of time, then, is not a simple
idea derived from a simple impression; instead, it is a copy of
impressions as they are perceived by the mind at its fixed speed
(1.2.3.10). (3) In contrast to this account of time, he argues that we
frequently entertain a faulty notion of time that does not involve
change or succession. The psychological account of this erroneous view
is that we mistake time for the cause of succession instead of seeing
it as the effect (1.2.5.29).
Necessary connection between causes and effects. (1) Hume sceptically
argues that we cannot get an idea of necessary connection through
abstraction or by observing it through sensory experiences (1.3.14.12
ff.). (2) The idea we have of necessary connection arises as follows:
we experience a constant conjunction of events A and B – that is,
repeated sense experiences where events resembling A are always
followed by events resembling B. This produces a habit such that upon
any further appearance of A, we expect B to follow. This, in turn,
produces an internal feeling "to pass from an object to the idea of
its usual attendant," which is the impression from which the idea of
necessary connection is copied (1.3.14.20). (3) A common but mistaken
notion on this topic is that necessity resides within the objects
themselves. He explains this mistaken belief by the natural tendency
we have to impute subjectively perceived qualities to objects
(1.3.14.24).
External objects. (1) Hume's sceptical claim here is that we have no
conception of the existence of external objects (1.2.6.9). (2)
Nevertheless, he argues, we do have an unavoidable "vulgar" or common
belief in the continued existence of objects, and this idea he
accounts for. His explanation is lengthy, but involves the following
features. Perceptions of objects are disjointed and have no unity of
themselves (1.4.2.29). In an effort to organize our perceptions, we
first naturally assume that there is no distinction between our
perceptions and the objects that are perceived (this is the so-called
"vulgar" view of perception). We then conflate all ideas (of
perceptions), which put our minds in similar dispositions (1.4.2.33);
that is, we associate resembling ideas and attribute identity to their
causes. Consequently, we naturally feign the continued and external
existence of the objects (or perceptions) that produced these ideas
(1.4.2.35). Lastly, we go on to believe in the existence of these
objects because of the force of the resemblance between ideas
(1.4.2.36). Although this belief is philosophically unjustified, Hume
feels he has given an accurate account of how we inevitably arrive at
the idea of external existence. (3) In contrast to the previous
explanation of this idea, he recommends that we doubt a more
sophisticated but erroneous notion of existence – the so-called
philosophical view – which distinguishes between perceptions and
external objects that cause perceptions. The psychological motivation
for accepting this view is this: our imagination tells us that
resembling perceptions have a continued existence, yet our reflection
tells us that they are interrupted. Appealing to both forces, we
ascribe interruption to perceptions and continuance to objects
(1.4.2.52).
Personal identity. (1) Hume's sceptical claim on this issue is that we
have no experience of a simple, individual impression that we can call
the self (1.4.6.2) – where the "self" is the totality of a person's
conscious life. (2) Nevertheless, we do have an idea of personal
identity that must be accounted for. He begins his explanation of this
idea by noting that our perceptions are fleeting, and he concludes
from this that all we are is a bundle of different perceptions
(1.4.6.4). Because of the associative principles, though, the
resemblance or causal connection within the chain of our perceptions
gives rise to an idea of oneself, and memory extends this idea past
our immediate perceptions (1.4.6.18 ff.). (3) A common abuse of the
notion of personal identity occurs when the idea of a soul or
unchanging substance is added to give us a stronger or more unified
concept of the self (1.4.6.6).
In all of these discussions, Hume performs an interesting balancing
act between making sceptical attacks (step 1) and offering positive
theories (step 2). In the conclusion to Book 1, though, he appears to
elevate his scepticism to a higher level and exposes the inherent
contradictions in even his best philosophical theories. He notes three
such contradictions. One centres around what we call induction. Our
judgments based on past experience all contain elements of doubt; we
are then impelled to make a judgment about that doubt, and – since
this too is based on past experience – this in turn will produce a new
doubt. Once again, though, we are impelled to make a judgment about
this second doubt, and the cycle continues. He concludes that "no
finite object can subsist under a decrease repeated in infinitum." A
second contradiction involves a conflict between two theories of
external perception – our natural inclination to direct realism vs.
the copy theory of perception of philosophers. The third contradiction
involves a conflict between causal reasoning and belief in the
continued existence of matter. After listing these contradictions,
Hume despairs over the failure of his metaphysical reasoning:
The intense view of these manifold contradictions and
imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my
brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can
look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another.
[1.4.7.8]
He then subdues his despair by recognizing that nature forces him to
set aside his philosophical speculations and return to the normal
activities of common life. He recognizes, though, that in time he will
be drawn back into philosophical speculation in order to attack
superstition and educate the world.
3. Summary of the Treatise Book 2
Book 2 of the Treatise is a study of impressions of reflection, in
contrast with impressions of sensation. Locke had discussed ideas of
reflection as "being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its
own operations within itself" (Essay 2.2.4). For Locke, these are
introspective experiences of our mental faculties such as remembering,
willing, discerning, reasoning, and judging. Immediately parting
company with Locke, reflective impressions for Hume are passions –
that is, emotions – and not introspective experiences of our mental
faculties. Book 2 is largely a study of the various passions.
Hume opens Book 2 offering a taxonomy of types of passions, which we
may outline here:
Reflective Impressions
1. Calm (reflective pleasures and pains)
2. Violent
1. Direct (desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope, fear)
2. Indirect (love, hate, pride, humility)
Hume initially divides passions between the calm and the violent. He
concedes that this distinction is somewhat fuzzy, but he explains that
people commonly distinguish between types of passions in terms of
their degrees of forcefulness. Adding more precision to this common
distinction, for Hume calm passions are emotional feelings of pleasure
and pain associated with moral and aesthetic judgments. For example,
according to Hume, when I see a person commit a horrible deed, I will
experience a feeling of pain. When I view a good work of art, I will
experience a feeling of pleasure.In contrast to the calm passions,
violent ones constitute the bulk of our emotions, and violent passions
divide between direct and indirect passions. For Hume, "direct
passions" are so called because they arise immediately – without
complex reflection on our part – whenever we see something good or
bad. For example, if I consider an unpleasant thing, such as being
burglarised, then I will feel the passion of aversion. The key direct
passions are desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope, and fear. He suggests
that sometimes these passions are sparked instinctively – as by, for
example, my desire for food when I am hungry. Others, though, are not
connected with instinct and are more the result of social
conditioning. There is an interesting logic to the six direct
passions, which Hume borrowed from a tradition that can be traced to
ancient Greek Stoicism. We can diagram the relation between the six
with this chart:
* When good/bad objects are considered abstractly
o desire (towards good objects)
o aversion (towards evil objects)
* When good/bad objects are actually present
o joy (towards good objects)
o grief (towards evil objects)
* When good/bad objects are only anticipated
o hope (towards good objects)
o fear (towards evil objects)
Compare, for example, the passions that I will experience regarding
winning the lottery vs. having my house burglarized. Suppose that I
consider them purely in the abstract – or "consider'd simply" as Hume
says (2.3.9.6). I will then desire to win the lottery and have an
aversion towards being burglarized. Suppose that both situations are
actually before me; I will then experience joy over winning the
lottery and sorrow over being burglarized. Suppose, finally, that I
know that at some unknown time in the future I will win the lottery
and be burglarized. I will then experience hope regarding the lottery
and fear of being burglarized.Hume devotes most of Book 2 to an
analysis of the indirect passions, and this analysis is his unique
contribution to theories of the passions. The four principal passions
are love, hate, pride, and humility. These passions are called
"indirect" since they are the secondary effects of a previous feeling
of pleasure and pain. Suppose, for example, that I paint a picture,
which gives me a feeling of pleasure. Since I am the artist, I will
then experience an additional feeling of pride. Hume explains in great
detail the psychological process that triggers indirect passions such
as pride. Specifically, he notes that these passions arise from a
double relation between ideas and impressions, which we can illustrate
here with the passion of pride:
1. I have an initial idea of some possession (or "subject"), such
as my painting, and this idea gives me pleasure.
2. Through the associative principle of resemblance, I then
immediately associate this feeling of pleasure with a resembling
feeling of pride; this association constitutes the first relation in
the double relation.
3. This feeling of pride then causes me to have an idea of myself
(as the "object" of pride).
4. Through some associative principle such as causality, I then
associate the idea of myself with the idea of my painting (which is
the "subject" of my pride); this association constitutes the second
relation in the double relation.
According to Hume, the three other principal indirect passions arise
in parallel ways. For example, if my painting is ugly and causes me
pain, then I will experience the secondary passion of "humility" –
perhaps more accurately expressed as humiliation. By contrast, if
someone else paints a pleasing picture, then this will trigger in me a
feeling of "love" for that artist – perhaps more accurately expressed
as esteem, which is another term that Hume uses. If the artist paints
a painfully ugly picture, then this will trigger in me a feeling of
"hatred" towards the artist – perhaps more accurately expressed as
disesteem.
The most lasting contribution of Book 2 of the Treatise is Hume's
argument that human actions must be prompted by passion, and never can
be motivated by reason. Thus, Hume concludes that "Reason is, and
ought only to be, the slave of the passions" (2.3.3.4). Looking more
closely at the motivations behind our actions, he examines the issue
of liberty and necessity, and he comes down strongly on the side of
necessity. Hume's discussion here follows the three-step scheme that
he used in Book 1. (1) He rejects the notion of liberty that denies
necessity and causes (2.3.1.18). (2) He then argues that all mental or
physical actions produced by the will arise from antecedent motives,
tempers, and circumstances (2.3.1.5 ff.). Making use of his
definitions of causality, he argues that these motives produce actions
(mental or physical) that have the same causal necessity that we
observe in external objects. (3) Lastly, he explains why people
commonly believe in an uncaused will (2.3.2.1 ff.). Among other causes
of this mistaken belief is the fact that people erroneously believe
that they have an experience of liberty owing to a mistaken
association: first, people have an idea of liberty (or lack of
determination); next, when performing actions they experience a
"looseness" which resembles their idea of liberty.
4. Summary of the Enquiry, and the "Dissertation on the Passions"
In "My Own Life," Hume states his opinion that the Treatise failed
largely because of its style, rather than its content:
I had always entertained a notion, that my want of success in
publishing the Treatise of Human Nature, had proceeded more from the
manner than the matter, and that I had been guilty of a very usual
indiscretion, in going to the press too early. I, therefore, cast the
first part of that work anew in the Enquiry concerning Human
Under-standing, which was published while I was at Turin.
Accordingly, Hume reworked some of the contents of Books 1 and 2 into
his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding – although he included much
additional material that does not appear in the Treatise. Hume's
Enquiry was first published anonymously in 1748 under the title
Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding. The title page
ascribes the work to "the author of the Essays moral and political;"
Hume's authorship, though, was no secret since the 1748 edition of the
Essays includes his name. We do not know precisely when Hume began
this book, although we know from a correspondence that he was working
on it in 1745. Prior to publication, he circulated a manuscript of the
book among his friends for comments. A close friend Henry Home, later
Lord Kames (1696–1782), tried to talk Hume out of publishing the work
because of its sceptical content and the controversy that it would
provoke. Hume ignored the advice and in a letter to Home wrote that he
did not care about the consequences:
The other work [soon to be published] is the Philosophical Essays
[i.e., the Enquiry], which you dissuaded me from printing. I won't
justify the prudence of this step, any other way than by expressing my
indifference about all the consequences that may follow. [Hume to
Henry Home, February 9, 1748]
The style of the Enquiry is in fact quite different than that of the
Treatise. It is much shorter, more informal, and does not aim to
present a comprehensive theory of human nature. Its original title –
Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding – reflects its
place within the 18th century genre of essay writing. That is, it is a
collection of twelve loosely related philosophical essays. The
underlying theme that ties the twelve essays together is the
importance of experience and causal inference in establishing our
ideas. Briefly, these are the central themes of the Enquiry's twelve
sections.
1. Of the Different Species of Philosophy: Hume describes two styles
of philosophical writing: an easy-reading philosophy grounded in
common life, and a difficult-reading philosophy grounded in abstract
concepts. He explains the value of both and proposes to mix elements
of the two styles in his Enquiry.
2. Of the Origin of Ideas: Hume argues that ideas differ from
impressions only by being less lively, and that all ideas are copied
from impressions. He concisely states his test for meaning: to see if
"a philosophical term is employed without any meaning … we need but
enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?"
3. Of the Association of Ideas: Hume argues that the only three
principles of association of ideas are resemblance, contiguity, and
cause and effect. Unlike in the Treatise, which describes these as
principles of the imagination, here Hume states more generally that
they apply in the operations of both the memory and imagination. All
editions of the Enquiry except that of 1777 – containing Hume's final
revisions – include a lengthy discussion of the use of associative
principles in epic poetry writing and history writing.
4. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding:
Hume notes that the objects of the faculty of understanding (or
reason) are either relations of ideas or matters of fact. He devotes
this section to uncovering the foundations of our reasoning concerning
matters of fact. Such reasoning is based on cause and effect
relations, which in turn are based on experience, without the aid of
reason or our imagination (that is, the fancy). This in turn raises
the question of how we make inductive generalizations in experience.
5. Sceptical Solution of these Doubts: Hume goes on to argue that
inductive generalizations in experience result from the principle of
"custom or habit." He next examines how belief arises. For Hume,
belief is a more vivid conception of an object than we would otherwise
have through the imagination (that is, the fancy) alone. The ideas in
which we believe become more "intense and steady" through habit and
custom. He concludes showing how the principles of association can
intensify an idea and thus produce belief.
6. Of Probability: Hume explains the difference between chances and
probability. Chances involve situations in which there are at least
two possible outcomes, each of which may occur equally. Probability,
on the other hand, entails that we have experienced one event to occur
more frequently than another. He then shows how belief arises with
both chance and probability.
7. Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion: Hume explains the origin of our
idea of causal power using his copy thesis. He first argues that
necessary connection does not arise from an outward sense impression.
Neither does it arise from an internal impression – from, that is, a
"reflection on the operations of our own minds;" (Hume here follows
Locke's notion of reflective impressions rather than the notion found
in the Treatise). Specifically, it does not arise from reflecting on
willed bodily motions encountering a resistive physical force, the
willed creation of thoughts, or the experience of God as the true
cause (as the Occasionalists claim). Ultimately, the idea of causal
power is based on the "customary transition of the imagination from
one object to its usual [i.e., constantly conjoined] attendant." He
concludes by offering two definitions of causality based on his notion
of causal power.
8. Of Liberty and Necessity: Hume defends the necessitarian point of
view by arguing that all human actions are caused by antecedent
motives. He offers several illustrations of the connection between
motives and actions that fit his two definitions of causality. He
reconciles necessity with liberty by defining liberty as "a power of
acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will" –
which is similar to Locke's definition. Hume notes the criticism that
necessity undermines morality since it eliminates moral choice. In
response he argues that we rely on necessity to link a person's
actions with his motives and thus pass moral judgment on that person's
actions. He also notes the criticism that necessity forces us to trace
all evil human actions back through a causal chain to God. He suggests
possible solutions to this problem, but concludes that it is a mystery
that human reason is not fit to handle.
9. Of the Reason of Animals: Hume argues that what he has said about
cause and effect, induction, habit and belief is confirmed by
observing the same processes in animals. In a footnote he lists nine
points that distinguish degrees of human intelligence from animal
intelligence and that also distinguish the degrees of the reasoning
ability of intelligent humans and not-so-intelligent humans.
10. Of Miracles: Hume argues that empirical judgments – including
those based on testimony – involve weighing evidence for and against a
given claim. According to Hume, the empirical testimony of uniform
laws of nature will always outweigh the testimony of any alleged
miracle. Hume notes four factors that count against the credibility of
most miracle testimonies: the witnesses lack integrity; we have a
propensity to sensationalize; miracle testimonies abound in barbarous
nations; and miracles support rival religious systems. However, he
continues, even the most credible miracle testimonies (which
presumably are not decisively weakened by these four factors) are
still outweighed by the evidence of consistent laws of nature.
Although people typically see miracles as the foundation of their
religion, Hume argues that this is unreasonable. He suggests that
Christianity in particular is better founded on faith, rather than on
miracle testimony. Christianity indeed requires belief in miracles,
but such belief should involve an act of faith and not reason.
11. Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State: Originally
titled "Of the Practical Consequences of Natural Religion," this
section presents a fictional conversation in which two characters
examine some of the traditional philosophical arguments about the
nature and existence of God. The sceptical character principally
attacks the design argument and the argument that God rewards or
punishes human actions either in this life or the next.
12. Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy: Hume describes
different kinds of scepticism, defending some types and rejecting
others. He associates Pyrrhonian scepticism with blanket attacks on
all reasoning about the external world, abstract reasoning about space
and time, or causal reasoning about matters of fact. He argues,
though, that we must reject such scepticism since "no durable good can
ever result from it." Instead, Hume recommends a more moderate or
Academic scepticism that tempers Pyrrhonism by, first, exercising
caution and modesty, and, second, restricting our speculations to
abstract reasoning and matters of fact.
In 1757 Hume published a work titled Four Dissertations, the second
item in which was titled "Of the Passions." Hume later incorporated
this piece into his Essays and Treatises, and, paralleling the
arrangement of the three Books of the Treatise, he placed it between
the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and the Enquiry Concerning
the Principles of Morals. This brief work – titled "Dissertation on
the Passions" – is an abbreviated version of much of Book 2 of the
Treatise, and many parts of it are taken word for word from that
earlier work.
5. Overview of Early Responses
When Books 1 and 2 of the Treatise appeared in 1739, little immediate
interest was shown in it. Hume reflects on this unfortunate fact in
"My Own Life": "Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my
Treatise of Human Nature. It fell dead-born from the press, without
reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmur among the
zealots." Indeed, it did not generate a flurry of critical responses
by pamphleteers or offended clergymen. However, within a year of
publication, four reviews of the Treatise did in fact appear in
scholarly review journals. All of the reviews were restricted to the
contents of Book 1 of the Treatise, with no discussion of Hume's
theory of the passions from Book 2. Only one of these – in The History
of the Works of the Learned – was in English, and this was executed by
a reviewer who himself admits that he was not philosophically up to
the task of grasping a work as complex as the Treatise. The reviewer
was severely critical and, among his comments, he argued that the
causal proofs for God's existence are "utterly demolished" by Hume's
rejection of the principle that "whatever begins to exist, must have a
cause of existence." The reviewer's point is a recurring theme among
Hume's early critics, and even today some philosophers discuss the
extent to which the causal proofs for God's existence are affected by
Hume's notion of causality. The short review from the German
Göttingische Zeitungen was also critical. The French review journal
Bibliothèque raisonnée published a generally positive review heavily
dependent on Hume's own Abstract of the Treatise. The French review
journal Nouvelle bibliothèque published a neutral review that
consisted mainly of a translation of passages from the Treatise.
Aside from review journals, the first early response to Hume's
metaphysical views was a brief article, in 1740, in Common Sense: or
the Englishman's Journal. The anonymous author criticized Hume's view
of necessity for its dangerous implication that our behaviour is
beyond our control. In 1745 Hume's sceptical and antireligious views
in the Treatise came under fire when Hume became a candidate for the
chair of moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. A list of
charges drawn up by William Wishart was circulated. These were
incorporated into Hume's response and published as A Letter from a
Gentleman by Henry Home in 1745.
The Enquiry first appeared in 1748 and, in "My Own Life," Hume notes
that, like the Treatise, the Enquiry did not at first draw critical
attention:
But this piece was at first little more successful than the
Treatise of Human Nature. On my return from Italy, I had the
mortification to find all England in a ferment, on account of Dr.
Middleton's Free Enquiry, while my performance was entirely overlooked
and neglected.
Not only were there no immediate critical responses to the Enquiry,
but the work does not appear to have even been reviewed in any British
periodical. The absence of such reviews is not surprising since there
were no scholarly review journals in Great Britain at the time, and
more popular periodicals only sporadically included reviews. Within
two years, though, critical responses to "Of Miracles" appeared, and
these soon brought notoriety to the Enquiry as a whole. Although the
Enquiry was not reviewed in Great Britain, it was in fact reviewed
twice in the German Göttingische Zeitungen. The first of these
reviews, which appeared in 1749, was favourable, but a review
appearing in 1753 was mixed, with especially critical comments on "Of
Miracles."
In 1751 Hume wrote in a letter that he rejected the Treatise as an
immature work:
I believe the philosophical Essays [i.e., the Enquiry] contain
every thing of Consequence relating to the Understanding, which you
woud meet with in the Treatise; & I give you my Advice against reading
the latter. By shortening & simplifying the Questions, I really render
them much more complete. Addo dum minuo. The philosophical Principles
are the same in both: But I was carry'd away by the Heat of Youth &
Invention to publish too precipitately. So vast an Undertaking, plan'd
before I was one and twenty, & compos'd before twenty five, must
necessarily be very defective. I have repented my Haste a hundred, & a
hundred times. [Hume to Gilbert Eliot, March or April 1751]
Contrary to Hume's wishes, critical discussions of the Treatise
continued to appear with more frequency. One of these was in Essays on
the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (1751) by Henry Home.
Although respecting Hume's philosophical abilities, in this work Home
critically discusses Hume's theory of belief and personal identity.
Around this time Hume became one of the secretaries of the
Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, first founded in 1731. He held
this post probably until 1763 and during that time was coeditor with
Alexander Monro of two volumes of Essays and Observations that were
read at the Society's meetings. The first volume appeared in 1754 and
opened with an essay by Henry Home titled "Of the Laws of Motion" (pp.
1–69). The second item in the collection is a critical and somewhat
abusive discussion of Home's essay by John Stewart (d. 1766) titled
"Some Remarks on the Laws of Motion, and the Inertia of Matter." In
this essay, Stewart includes a brief paragraph criticizing Hume's view
of causality and personal identity:
That something may begin to exist, or start into being without a
cause, hath indeed been advanced in a very ingenious and profound
system of the sceptical philosophy; but hath not yet been adopted by
any of the societies for the improvement of knowledge. Such sublime
conceptions are far above the reach of an ordinary genius; and could
not have entered into the head of the greatest physiologist on earth.
The man who believes that a perception may subsist without a
percipient mind or a perceiver, may well comprehend, that an action
may be performed without an agent, or a thing produced without any
Cause of the production. And the author of this new and wonderful
doctrine informs the world, that, when he looked into his own mind, he
could discover nothing but a series of fleeting perceptions; and that
from thence he concluded, that he himself was nothing but a bundle of
such perceptions. [Pages 70–140]
A note to this paragraph states, "Treatise on Human Nature, 3 vols.
octavo. This is the system at large, a work suited only to the
comprehension of Adepts. An excellent compend or sum whereof, for the
benefit of vulgar capacities, we of this nation enjoy in the
Philosophical Essays, and the Essays Moral and Political."Prior to its
publication, Hume read Stewart's essay and was bothered by Stewart's
contemptuous tone towards both Home and Hume himself. In a letter to
Stewart, Hume suggests – and probably bluffs – that as editor of the
volume Hume could have equally abused Stewart in the Preface to the
work. However, Hume states "I am so great a Lover of Peace, that I am
resolv'd to drop this Matter altogether, & not to insert a Syllable in
the Preface, which can have a Reference to your Essay." Hume continues
in the letter objecting on philosophical grounds to Stewart's
distortion of Hume's actual views:
But allow me to tell you, that I never asserted so absurd a
Proposition as that any thing might arise without a Cause: I only
maintain'd, that our Certainty of the Falshood of that Proposition
proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another
Source. That Caesar existed, that there is such an Island as Sicily;
for these Propositions, I affirm, we have no demonstrative nor
intuitive Proof. Woud you infer that I deny their Truth, or even their
Certainty? There are many different kinds of Certainty; and some of
them as satisfactory to the Mind, tho perhaps not so regular, as the
demonstrative kind.Where a man of Sense mistakes my Meaning, I own I
am angry: But it is only at myself: For having exprest my Meaning so
ill as to have given Occasion to the Mistake.
In a tone similar to his letter to Elliot above, Hume next tells
Stewart that he regrets publishing his Treatise at all:
That you may see I wou'd no way scruple of owning my Mistakes in
Argument, I shall acknowledge (what is infinitely more material) a
very great Mistake in Conduct, viz my publishing at all the Treatise
of human Nature, a Book, which pretended to innovate in all the
sublimest Parts of Philosophy, & which I compos'd before I was five &
twenty. Above all, the positive Air, which prevails in that Book, &
which may be imputed to the Ardor of Youth, so much displeases me,
that I have not Patience to review it. [Hume to John Stewart, c.
February 1754]
Two years after the conflict with Stewart, the Philosophical Society
published their second volume of Essays and Observations, which
included an essay by Thomas Melvill (1726–1753) titled "Observations
on Light and Colours," which includes a criticism of Hume's view of
the indivisibility of extension. Around the same time John Leland
criticized Hume's view of causality in his A View of the Principal
Deistical Writers (1755–1756).
In 1757 Hume's Four Dissertations appeared; this included his
"Dissertation on the Passions." Although none of the earlier reviews
of the Treatise discussed Book 2, three reviews of Four Dissertations
discuss "Of the Passions." Two of the reviews are not very
enthusiastic. The Literary Magazine states "The second essay is on the
passions, in which, as in the former case, we do not perceive any
thing new. This we should not mention if we were not talking of an
author fond of novelty." The Critical Review similarly concludes its
discussion by saying, "This whole dissertation, to say the truth,
appears to us very trite and superficial; and unworthy of so eminent a
writer. But no authors are always equal to themselves." William Rose's
review in the Monthly Review states more positively that what Hume
"says upon the subject, is extremely ingenious, and deserves the
philosophical reader's attentive perusal."
The publication of Thomas Reid's An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764)
marks a turning point in early discussions of Hume's metaphysics.
Although no less critical of Hume than earlier respondents, Reid
nevertheless had deep respect for Hume's philosophical abilities and
saw him as "the greatest Metaphysician of the Age." According to Reid,
Hume's ruthlessly sceptical philosophy is the logical outcome of a
philosophical stance that began with Descartes, and which Reid calls
the "theory of ideas." According to this theory, we do not perceive
external things directly, but instead we only experience perceptual
images – or "ideas" – of external things. The sceptical consequence of
this is that we must question the existence of everything except these
perceptual images
– including external objects and even the human mind, which
allegedlyhouses these perceptions. And, according to Reid, this is
what Hume did. As Reid himself became an important philosophical
figure throughout Europe and America, many writers perpetuated his
interpretation of Hume. We find, for example, a condensed statement of
Reid's view in the following by George L. Scott:
Locke had admitted matter, spirit, and ideas. By many passages,
one would be apt to thing that he saw no absurdity in material Spirit,
or in spiritual Matter. Berkeley comes, sees the difficulty, and
strikes out matter. Then comes a Paresian Egoist, who strikes out all
spirit, but his own. And, lastly, our friend Hume, strikes out even
his own spirit, and leaves nothing but Ideas! [George L. Scott to Lord
Monboddo, April 3, 1773]
Aside from Reid, in the final two decades of Hume's life, a variety of
other philosophers wrote in reaction to his metaphysical views.
Richard Price, in his Review of the Principal Questions and
Difficulties in Morals (1758) criticizes Hume's discussion of
induction in the Treatise. Joseph Highmore published a brief essay
against Hume's view of necessity in his Essays, Moral, Religious, and
Miscellaneous (1766). Scottish philosophers were particularly
interested in responding to Hume. James Balfour's Philosophical Essays
(1768) criticizes Hume's view of academic scepticism and necessary
connection. In his Appeal to Common Sense (1766–1772), James Oswald
attacks a variety of sceptical and anti-religious themes within Hume's
writings. The most prominent critic of this period was James Beattie
who devoted a large portion of his Essay on the Nature and
Immutability of Truth (1770) to refuting many of Hume's philosophical
views. In the first volume of his Origin and Progress of Language
(1773) James Burnett, Lord Monboddo criticized Hume's distinction
between ideas and impressions.
Although Hume's Enquiry was the most common target of attack by these
philosophers, some also pointed their guns at offending portions of
the Treatise. Near the close of his life in 1775, Hume composed an
advertisement to the second half of his collected philosophical works,
Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, in which he officially
denounced his Treatise, and expressed his wish to be remembered on the
basis of his Essays and Treatises:
Most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this volume,
were published in a work in three volumes, called A Treatise of Human
Nature: A work which the Author had projected before he left College,
and which he wrote and published not long after. But not finding it
successful, he was sensible of his error in going to the press too
early, and he cast the whole anew in the following pieces, where some
negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression, are,
he hopes, corrected. Yet several writers who have honoured the
Author's Philosophy with answers, have taken care to direct all their
batteries against that juvenile work, which the author never
acknowledged, and have affected to triumph in any advantages, which,
they imagined, they had obtained over it: A practice very contrary to
all rules of candour and fair-dealing, and a strong instance of those
polemical artifices which a bigotted zeal thinks itself authorised to
employ. Henceforth, the Author desires, that the following Pieces may
alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and
principles.
Hume offers here an inaccurate chronology as to when he projected the
Treatise. Hume "left college" at around age 14, and, according to his
letter to Elliot, he began his work on the Treatise at age 21. The
change in chronology is apparently in effort to distance himself from
the Treatise into an increasingly remote past. Hume here refers to
"several writers" who attacked the views found in the Treatise. Of the
early critics listed so far, Reid and Beattie come the closest to
matching Hume's description of writers who have directed "all their
batteries against that juvenile work." In spite of Hume's public
disavowal, philosophers continued to challenge the views of the
Treatise. In the first two volumes of his Ancient Metaphysics (1779,
1782), Monboddo continued his attack on Hume. Reid similarly developed
his criticisms of Hume in his two great works, Essays on the
Intellectual Powers of Man (1785) and Essays on the Active Powers of
Man (1788). Joseph Priestley, who throughout his voluminous writings
regularly comments on Hume, had mixed views of Hume's metaphysics. In
his Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever (1780), Priestley attacked
the Enquiry section by section, hoping to put Hume's unjustified fame
in proper perspective. On the other hand, in his Doctrine of
Philosophical Necessity Illustrated (1777), Priestley largely endorsed
Hume's view of necessity and in the preface to that work recommends to
readers "some things very well written on it by Mr. Hume, and Lord
Kaims." Priestley's defence of necessity was so successful that it
overshadowed Hume's view in the free will and determinism debate in
the late 18th century. An exception to this, though, was James
Gregory's Philosophical and Literary Essays (1792), which, in a 300
page introductory essay, attacks Hume's account of necessity. In his
Illustrations of Mr. Hume's Essay Concerning Liberty and Necessity
(1795), John Allen defends Hume against Gregory.
As the 19th century approached, philosophers narrowed their interest
in Hume's metaphysics largely to his notion of causality. We see this
in George Gleig's article on "Metaphysics" in the third edition of the
Encyclopædia Britannica (1797), Henry James Richter's article "Hume's
View of Necessary Connection" in the Monthly Magazine (1797), and
Richard Kirwan's Remarks (1801). Two events around this time drew
further interest to Hume's view of causality. The first is Immanuel
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781), which by 1800 was gaining
notice in Great Britain. In the Critique and later in the Prolegomena
(1783), Kant describes his metaphysical system as an attempt to answer
the problem that Hume raised about causality. This sparked immediate
interest in Hume's theory within Germany. Although it was some time
before Kant's writings were translated into English, a few primers on
Kant appeared in English and these drew attention to Kant's
intellectual debt to Hume. One of these was A.F.M. Willich's Elements
of the Critical Philosophy (1798), which translates Kant's discussion
of Hume in the Prolegomena.
The second event surrounding interest in Hume's theory of causality
was political in nature. In 1805, Scottish scientist John Leslie was a
candidate for the chair of Mathematics at the University of Edinburgh.
Several local clergy who opposed Leslie's appointment exploited the
fact that he endorsed Hume's view of causality, a view which they
believed undermined the causal proof for God's existence. Two
prominent Scottish philosophers came to Leslie's rescue and published
works defending Hume's view of causality. Dugald Stewart published a
pamphlet titled A Short Statement of Some Important Facts, Relative to
the Late Election of a Mathematical Professor in the Univ. of
Edinburgh (1805). In this Stewart lists respected scholars who adopted
Hume's view of causality and notes that "I found that the passage [on
causality] objected to contained nothing… but what I myself, and many
others much wiser and better than me, had openly avowed as their
opinions." Thomas Brown also published several pamphlets during the
controversy, and compiled a two-volume collection titled Tracts,
Historical and Philosophical… Respecting the Election of Mr. Leslie to
the Professorship of Mathematics (1806). A year later, Brown greatly
expanded one of his pamphlets as Observations on the Nature and
Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume (1806). Brown's work is an
insightful and sophisticated early discussion of Hume's view of
causality, of great merit even by contemporary standards. Brown's
Humean view of causality was adopted by physician William Lawrence in
his Lectures on physiology (1817).
Amidst the dominant focus on his view of causality, occasional
discussions of other topics in Hume appeared. Thomas Cogan, in his
Treatise on the Passions (1807), criticized different aspects of
Hume's theory of the passions. Cogan also published a
section-by-section critical commentary of Hume's Enquiry in his
Ethical Questions (1817). Dugald Stewart discussed Hume's account of
why we venerate the past in Philosophical Essays (1810) and Hume's
scepticism in Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy (1821). In
Biographia Literaria (1817), Samuel Taylor Coleridge drew attention to
the similarities between the views of Aquinas and Hume on the
association of ideas, and thereby sparked a discussion in Blackwood's
Magazine (1818). Thomas Brown also discussed Hume's principles of
association in Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1820).
By the middle of the 19th century, two short books devoted to Hume's
theory of causality had appeared, namely, Mary Shepherd's Essay upon
the Relation of Cause and Effect (1824) and George Tucker's Essay on
Cause and Effect (1850). Although both of these works are critical of
Hume's theory, the Humean view of causality became more widely adopted
in other metaphysical discussions of causality. For example, although
Mill does not mention Hume by name, he nevertheless clearly espouses a
Humean conception of causality in his Examination of Sir William
Hamilton's Philosophy:
And how, or by what evidence does experience testify to it [the
causation hypothesis]? Not by disclosing any nexus between the cause
and effect, any sufficient reason in the cause itself why the effect
should follow it. No philosopher now makes this supposition, and Sir
W. Hamilton positively disclaims it. What experience makes known is
the fact of an invariable sequence between every event and some
special combination of antecedent conditions, in such sort that
wherever and whenever that union of antecedents exists the event does
not fail to occur. [Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy,
26]
The Humean view of causality received an additional boost from Auguste
Comte (1798-1857) in his six-volume Cours de philosophie positive (The
Positive Philosophy) (1830–1842). At the outset of that work, Comte
acknowledges Hume as one of his precursors. In an 1868 discussion of
Comte's work, the Edinburgh Review explains more precisely how Hume
fully anticipated Comte's positivism:
This is the method of Positive inquiry now universally recognised
in every department of science, although as yet imperfectly carried
out in some. It was formally announced by Bacon, and is commonly
associated with his name, although in truth it was but imperfectly
understood and applied by that great teacher of Method. It received
definite impulse from the speculations of Hume, who, carrying to their
legitimate conclusions the philosophy of his day, showed that we could
get nothing from nature, or sense-experience, but ideas of coexistence
and a succession; or, in other words, of facts, and the sequences
which connect them; and who attempted to prove that this was equally
true of the world of mind as of matter. From the one realm as well as
the other he cast out all ideas of substance and cause, and left
nothing but phenomena and their relations of association. Hume is,
therefore, the principal precursor of Comte, as he himself
acknowledges. He anticipated to the full the fundamental principle of
the Comtean philosophy. He did more than this. For he saw clearly the
use that could be made of it polemically; the sceptical or negative
bearings of the principle are equally to be found in his writings. So
far, therefore, there is nothing original in Positivism. The Scottish
sceptic had already anticipated the nature of its attacks against
theological philosophy. [Edinburgh Review, April 1868, Vol. 127, p.
322]
As history of philosophy survey books appeared in the second half of
the 19th century, Hume found a place in the development of
metaphysics, typically standing between the great figures of Berkeley
and Kant. An example of this is George Henry Lewes's Biographical
History of Philosophy (1873), which devotes a lengthy chapter to Hume.
Discussions of Hume also appeared in more specialized histories of
philosophy, such as James McCosh's The Scottish Philosophy (1875) and
Leslie Stephen's History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century
(1876).
Towards the end of the 19th century, academic writings in the history
of philosophy became more "scholarly" in the sense that we understand
that term today. T.H. Green wrote a detailed, 400-page study of Hume's
Treatise, which was published as an introduction to the edition of
Hume's Works (1874), edited by Green and Thomas Grose. Shortly after,
three introductory books on Hume's philosophy appeared that contained
chapters on Hume's metaphysics, namely, Thomas Huxley's Hume (1879),
William Knight's Hume (1886), and Henry Calderwood's David Hume
(1898). As academic philosophy journals emerged, scholarly articles on
Hume appeared, such as those by J.A. Cain (1885) and William W.
Carlile (1896).
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