stands for a tradition of Indian philosophical thinking. However, it
could be interpreted as designating one comprehensive philosophical
doctrine, shared by all Hindu thinkers. The term "Hindu philosophy" is
often used loosely in this philosophical or doctrinal sense, but this
usage is misleading. There is no single, comprehensive philosophical
doctrine shared by all Hindus that distinguishes their view from
contrary philosophical views associated with other Indian religious
movements such as Buddhism or Jainism on issues of epistemology,
metaphysics, logic, ethics or cosmology. Hence, historians of Indian
philosophy typically understand the term "Hindu philosophy" as
standing for the collection of philosophical views that share a
textual connection to certain core Hindu religious texts (the Vedas),
and they do not identify "Hindu philosophy" with a particular
comprehensive philosophical doctrine.
Hindu philosophy, thus understood, not only includes the philosophical
doctrines present in Hindu texts of primary and secondary religious
importance, but also the systematic philosophies of the Hindu schools:
Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta. In total,
Hindu philosophy has made a sizable contribution to the history of
Indian philosophy and its role has been far from static: Hindu
philosophy was influenced by Buddhist and Jain philosophies, and in
turn Hindu philosophy influenced Buddhist philosophy in India in its
later stages. In recent times, Hindu philosophy evolved into what some
scholars call "Neo-Hinduism," which can be understood as an Indian
response to the perceived sectarianism and scientism of the West.
Hindu philosophy thus has a long history, stretching back from the
second millennia B.C.E. to the present.
1. Introduction
"Hinduism" is a term used to designate a body of religious and
philosophical beliefs indigenous to the Indian subcontinent. Hinduism
is one of the world's oldest religious traditions, and it is founded
upon what is often regarded as the oldest surviving text of humanity:
the Vedas. It is a religion practiced the world over. Countries with
Hindu majorities include Bali, India, Mauritius and Nepal, though
countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas have sizable
minorities of practicing Hindus.
For historical and doctrinal reasons, some modern Indologists have
adopted the convention of distinguishing between traditional Hinduism
and "Neo-Hinduism" (cf. Hacker; Halbfass, India and Europe). Against
this distinction, "Hinduism" is often reserved for some traditional
philosophical and religious beliefs indigenous to the Indian
subcontinent, and "Neo-Hinduism" is reserved for a modern set of
religious and philosophical beliefs articulated by Indians who defined
their religious views in contrast to a perceived Western preoccupation
with scientism and sectarianism. For many Western educated individuals
in the world today (particularly those who count themselves as
"Hindus"), the philosophy captured under the term "Neo-Hinduism"
designates their religious and philosophical belief set. While
Neo-Hinduism is no doubt a part of the Hindu philosophical tradition,
it constitutes a distinct development within the tradition. Here the
terms "Neo-Hindu" and "Neo-Hinduism" will be used to single out this
recent development of Hindu thought. "Hindu" and "Hinduism" will be
used to designate any portion of the tradition. The label "Hindu
philosophy" will be reserved for the philosophical elements of
Hinduism.
The history of Hindu philosophy can be divided roughly into three,
largely overlapping stages:
1. Non-Systematic Hindu Philosophy, found in the Vedas and
secondary religious texts (beginning in the 2nd millennia B.C.E.)
2. Systematic Hindu Philosophy (beginning in the 1st millennia B.C.E.)
3. Neo-Hindu Philosophy (beginning in the 19th century C.E.)
Hindu philosophy is difficult to narrow down to a definite doctrine
because Hinduism itself, as a religion, resists identification with
any well worked out doctrine. This may not be so surprising when we
consider that the term "Hinduism" itself is not in traditional,
pre-colonial Hindu literature. Prior to the modern period of history,
authors that we think of as Hindus did not identify themselves by that
title. The term itself is not rooted in any Indian language, but
likely derives from the Persian term "sindhu," cognate with the Latin
"Indus," used to refer to inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent (cf.
Monier-Williams p.1298). Its historical usage is thus an umbrella term
that identifies many related religious and philosophical traditions
that are not clearly part of another Indian tradition, such as
Buddhism and Jainism.
Owing to the geographical proximity of the views grouped under the
term "Hinduism" we might expect that such views have some
comprehensive doctrinal similarities. However, many of the ideas and
practices commonly associated with Hinduism can be found in adjacent
Indian religio-philosophical traditions, such as Buddhism and Jainism.
Moreover, some of them are not common to all Hindu thinkers. The rich
diversity of views within the Hindu tradition that overlap with
non-Hindu views makes identifying "Hinduism" on the basis of a shared,
comprehensive doctrine difficult if not impossible.
a. Defining Hinduism: Salient Features and False Starts
i. Karma
A common thesis associated with Hinduism is the view that events in a
person's life are determined by karma. The term literally means
"action," but in this context it denotes the moral, psychological
spiritual and physical causal consequences of morally significant past
choices. If it were the case that a belief in karma is common to all
Hindu philosophies, and only Hindu philosophies, then we would have a
clear doctrinal criterion for identifying Hinduism. This approach is
unsuccessful because a belief in karma is common to many of India's
religious traditions—including Buddhism and Jainism. Moreover, it is
not evident that it is embraced by all sources that we consider Hindu.
For instance, the doctrine of karma seems to be absent from much of
the Vedas. Karma is not a sufficient criterion of Hinduism, and it
likely is not a necessary condition either.
ii. Polytheism
Polytheism, or the worship of many deities, is often identified as a
distinctive feature of Hinduism. However, it is not true that all
Hindus are polytheists. Indeed, many Hindus belong to sectarian
traditions (such as Vaiṣṇavism, or Śaivism) that specify that only one
deity (Viṣṇu, in the first case, or Śiva, in the second), or a very
small set of deities, are genuine Gods, and subordinate the rest of
the pantheon associated with Hinduism to the status of exalted beings.
We could identify Hinduism as the set of religious views that
recognize the divinity or exalted status of a core set of Indic
deities, but this too would not provide a way to separate Hinduism
from Buddhism and Jainism. Many "Hindu" deities, such as Brahmā (the
Creator God), are recognized and treated as exalted beings and deities
in the Buddhist Pāli Canon (cf. Majjhima Nikāya II.130; Saṃyutta
Nikāya I.421-23). Likewise, the popular Hindu deity Kṛṣṇa is treated
in the early Jain tradition as a Jain Ford Maker, and a tradition of
worshiping the Goddess Lakṣmī (a goddess revered by Hindus as the
consort of Viṣṇu) continues amongst Jains today (see Dundas pp. 98,
183). Belief in certain deities might constitute a necessary condition
of Hinduism, but it is not a sufficient criterion.
iii. Puruṣārthas : dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa
Hinduism might be identified with a core set of values, commonly known
in Hindu literature as the puruṣārthas , or ends of persons. The
puruṣārthas are a set of four values: dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa.
"Dharma" in the Puruṣārtha scheme and throughout much of Hindu
literature stands for the ethical or moral (in action, or in
character, hence it is often translated as "duty"), "artha" for
economic wealth, "kāma" for pleasure, and "mokṣa" for soteriological
liberation from rebirth and imperfection. Hinduism, one might argue,
is any religious view from the Indian subcontinent that recognizes
that human beings ought to maximize the puruṣārthas at the appropriate
time and in the appropriate ways. This approach will not do, for not
all views that we consider Hindu recognize the validity of all of
these values. While many of the systematic Hindu philosophical schools
seem to be critical of kāma, understood as sensual pleasure, the early
stage of one Hindu philosophical school—Pūrvamīmāṃsā—does not
recognize the idea that there is anything like liberation as a
possible end for individuals.
The puruṣārthas are important for any study of Indian thought,
however, for they constitute the value-theoretic backdrop against
which Indian thinkers articulated their views: typically, most all
Indian philosophers recognized the validity of all four values, though
some, like the Materialists (Cārvāka) are on record as holding that
kāma or sensual pleasure is the only dharma or morality (Guṇaratna
p.276), and that there is no such thing as liberation. Others such as
the early Pūrvamīmāṃsā ignore the idea of personal liberation but
emphasizes the importance of dharma. As all Hindu philosophical
schools appear to recognize something that might count as "dharma" or
morality, we might attempt to understand Hinduism in terms of its
allegiance to a particular moral theory. This attempt to define
Hinduism in terms of a simple doctrine fails, for some of what passes
for dharma (ethics, morality or duty) in the context of particular
schools of Hindu philosophical thought share much with non-Hindu, but
Indian schools of thought. This is particularly apparent with in the
case of the Hindu philosophical school of , whose moral theory shares
much with Jainism, and with Buddhist Mahāyāna thought. Also, there is
sufficient variation amongst the schools of Hindu philosophy on moral
matters that makes defining Hindu philosophy solely on the basis of a
shared moral doctrine impossible. If there is a core moral theory
common to all Hindu schools, it is likely to be so thin that it will
also be found as a component of other Indian religions. Thus, an
ethical theory might be a necessary criterion of Hinduism, but it is
insufficient.
iv. Varna (Caste)
Finally, one might attempt to identify Hinduism with the institution
of a caste system that carves society into a specified set of classes
whose natures dispose them and obligate them to certain occupations in
life. More specifically, one might argue that Hinduism is any belief
system wedded to the idea that any well ordered society is composed of
four castes: Brahmins (priestly or scholarly caste), Kṣatriya (marshal
or royal caste), Vaiśyas (merchant caste) and Sūdras (labor caste).
This approach to defining Hinduism is essentially a rehabilitation of
the idea that some core moral doctrine cements Hinduism together.
There are two problems with this approach that renders it unhelpful to
identifying Hinduism. First, anyone familiar with Indian society will
know that caste ("varna," or more commonly "jāti") is an Indian
phenomenon that is not restricted to Hindu sections of society. One
might argue that the approving use of the term "Brahmin" in Buddhist
and Jain texts shows that even these socially critical movements were
comfortable with a caste structured society provided that obligations
and privileges accorded to the various castes were justly distributed
(cf. Dhammapada ch. XXVI; cf. Sūtrakṛtānga I.xii.11-21). Secondly, and
more importantly, it is not clear that caste is philosophically
important to many schools that are conventionally understood under the
heading of "Hindu philosophy." Some schools, such as Yoga, appear to
be implicitly critical of life in conventional society guided by the
values of social and ecological domination, while some schools, such
as Advaita Vedānta, are openly critical of the idea that caste
morality has any relevance to a spiritually serious aspirant.
b. A Textual Definition of Hinduism and Hindu Philosophy
Because the term "Hinduism" has no roots in the self-conceptualization
of people that we in retrospect label as "Hindus," we are unlikely to
find anything very significant in the way of philosophical doctrine
that is essential to Hinduism. Yet, the term continues to be useful
because it centers on a stance that separates Hindu thinkers from
Buddhist, Jain, or Sikh thinkers. The stance in question is openness
to the provisional validity of a core set of Hindu texts. At the
center of the canon of Hindu texts is the Vedas, followed by a large
body of literature of secondary religious importance, which largely
derive their legitimacy from Vedic thought. Non-systematic Hindu
philosophy is comprised of the philosophical elements of the primary
and secondary bodies of canonical Hindu texts, while the systematic
Hindu philosophies, which also adopt the congenial disposition towards
the Vedas, find their definitive expressions in formal philosophical
texts authored by professional philosophers. Finally, Neo-Hindu
philosophy of late likewise adopts a positive disposition to the
Vedas, and hence constitutes the latest offering in the history of
Hindu philosophy.
2. Stage One: Non-Systematic Hindu Philosophy: The Religious Texts
a. The Four Vedas
The Vedas are a large corpus, originally committed to memory and
transmitted orally from teacher to student. The term "veda" means
"knowledge" or "wisdom" and embodies what was likely regarded by its
original attendants as the sum-total of the knowledge of their people.
On the basis of linguistic variations in the corpus, contemporary
scholars are of the opinion that the Vedas were composed at various
points during approximately a 900 year span that can be no later than
1500 B.C.E. to 600 B.C.E.. The Vedas are composed in an Indo-European
language that is loosely referred to as Sanskrit, but much of it is in
an ancient precursor to Sanskrit, more properly called Vedic.
The Vedic corpus is comprised of four works each called "Vedas." The
four Vedas are Ṛg Veda, Sāma Veda, Yajur Veda and Atharva Veda,
respectively. Each of the four Vedas is edited into four distinct
sections: Mantras, Brāhmanas, Āraṇyakas, and Upaniṣads.
i. Karma Khaṇḍa or Action Section of the Vedas
The main portion of the Veda (which the term "Veda" most properly
refers to) consists of mantras, or sacred chants and incantations. A
section called the Brāhmanas, which contains ritual instruction, and
speculative discussions on the meaning of Vedic rituals, follows this.
These first two portions comprise what is often called the karma
khaṇḍa or "action portion" of the Vedas, or alternatively, the
Pūrvamīmāṃsā ("former inquiry"). (The philosophical school of
Pūrvamīmāṃsā takes its name from its focus on the early part of the
Vedas.)
Many of the hymns of the karma khaṇḍa ask for special favors from
deities, and emphasize the worldly rewards of artha (economic
prosperity) and kāma (sensual pleasure) that come from propitiating
gods through prescribed sacrifices. However, the earlier portion of
the Vedas is not entirely devoid of lofty or philosophical
significance. Many of the mantras resurface in the latter portion of
the Vedas as dense expressions of metaphysical theses. Moreover, many
portions of the karma khaṇḍa elaborate the significance of the various
Vedic deities, which surpass the role that could be attributed to them
in a polytheistic context. Instead, what one finds frequently is the
elevation of a single deity to the level of the cosmic soul (for
example, see the Śrī Rudra).
A recurrent cosmological and ethical vision appears to emerge in the
karma khaṇḍa. This is the idea that the universe is a closed ethical
system, supported by a system of reciprocal sacrifice and obligation.
In this context, the karma khaṇḍa promotes the practice of animal
sacrifices to the gods, to ensure that conditions on earth are livable
and fruitful for all of its inhabitants. A related doctrine that
begins to emerge in portions of the karma khaṇḍa is the four-fold
caste system that sets out strict obligations for all to fulfill,
along with the idea that the caste-social order is divinely ordained.
This is most clearly related in the Puruṣa Sūkta, a section of mantras
from the Ṛg Veda. According to the Puruṣa Sūkta, the universe, as we
know it, is a result of the self-sacrifice of a Cosmic Person (an
ultimate God, later identified with Viṣṇu or Śiva, depending upon
sectarian contexts). Upon being bound and sacrificed by the gods, the
various portions of the Cosmic Person become the various castes: the
head becomes the Brahmins, the arms become the Ksatriya caste, the
thighs become the Vaiśya caste, and the feet become the Sūdra caste.
While the caste system may be a pervasively Indian phenomenon, the
idea that the caste system is divinely ordained appears to be found in
Hindu philosophies in proportion to the weight they give to the
authority of the karma khaṇḍa.
ii. Jñana Khaṇḍa or Knowledge Section of the Vedas
The karma khaṇḍa is followed by the Āraṇyakas, or forest books, which
for the most part eschew rituals, and are far more speculative. After
the Āraṇyakas come the section of the Vedas known as the " Upaniṣads,"
which consist of a dialogue between a teacher and student on
metaphysical, axiological and cosmological issues. Whereas the goal of
the early portion of the Vedas is action, the goal of the latter
portion of the Vedas is jñāna (knowledge) of Brahman (a neuter term
for the Ultimate, depicted in the Upaniṣads as the ultimate God).
Further, the Upaniṣads identify Brahman with Ātma (Self) and suggest
that knowing this entity will save one from all sorrow (cf. Muṇdaka
Upaniṣad 7) and result in liberation. Brahman or Ātma is additionally
presented as the omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent entity hidden
from plain view, but known through philosophical speculation that is
driven by dissatisfaction with earthly rewards. This latter part of
the Vedas is often referred to as the uttara mīmāṃsā ("higher
inquiry"), or the vedānta, which means "end of the Vedas."
Alternatively, it is known as the jñāna khaṇḍa, or "knowledge portion"
of the Vedas. (The Hindu schools known as Vedānta take their name from
their focus on this portion of the Vedas). The sustained theme of the
uttara mīmāṃsā is that the cosmos as we know it is the result of the
causal efficacy of Brahman, or Ātma, that the results of works are
ephemeral, and that knowledge of reality brings everlasting reward.
The uttara mīmāṃsā is characterized by a pervasive dissatisfaction
with ritual (cf. Muṇdaka Upaniṣad I.ii.10).
The specific relationship between the individual and Brahman, or Ātma,
is a matter of controversy amongst commentators on the latter portions
of the Vedas. Four major commentarial schools evolved to interpret the
import of the later portions of the Vedas. This confirms the suspicion
that the actual position of the Upaniṣads is less than clear, or at
least debatable. (See Vedānta.)
b. Secondary Texts: Smṛti Literature
On many traditional Hindu accounts (specifically the account found in
the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta schools), the Vedas are regarded as
"śruti", "heard" or revealed texts, and are contrasted with smṛti or
remembered texts. The smṛti texts are far more numerous, but purport
to be based upon the learning of the Vedas. Unlike the Vedas, the
smṛtis were traditionally regarded as appropriate for general
consumption, while the Vedas were regarded as the sole preserve of the
high castes. The smṛti literature, as a rule, was originally authored
in Sanskrit. Over time, however, translations into vernacular
languages became popular, and additional texts were authored in
vernaculars.
The tradition of smṛti literature stretches back to the end of the
Vedic period, and in some ways is still very much alive today. The
smṛti texts can all be read as attempting to unify the seemingly
divergent goals of the action section of the Vedas (being morality, or
dharma) and the knowledge section of the Vedas (being liberation or
mokṣa). The overall strategy offered in the various smṛti texts is to
affirm a moral scheme known traditionally as varna āśrama dharma, or
the morality of caste (varna) and station in life (āśrama). This
scheme reconciles the demands of dharma and mokṣa, as well as artha
and kāma, by apportioning different stages of life to the pursuit of
different ends. At the end of childhood, and before the beginning of
adolescence, an individual is typically expected to be a celibate
student (brahmacarya), and learn one caste's ways. Then at an
appropriate age they are to marry and become a householder (gṛhastha).
During this stage an individual is permitted and expected to pursue
the ends of kāma or sensual pleasure through married life and artha or
economic prosperity through caste occupations. After raising a family,
a couple is to retire to the forest and become forest dwellers
(vānaprastha), to facilitate their transition from a life focused on
kāma and artha to a life geared towards liberation. Finally,
individuals give up all possessions, renounce society and become a
ascetic (sannyāsa) at which point they are to focus solely on mokṣa or
spiritual liberation.
There are three prominent varieties of smṛti literature that are
important to the study of Hindu philosophy. Though they for the most
part express and extol the doctrine of varna āśrama dharma, they are
composed in different styles, and with different audiences in mind.
i. Itihāsas
The best known of the smṛti literature are the great Hindu epics, such
as the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyana. The focal plot of the Mahābhārata is
a fratricidal war between the children of two princes. The deity Kṛṣṇa
figures prominently in this epic, as a mutual cousin of both warring
factions, though he is not the protagonist. The Rāmāyana is an account
of the life story of the crown prince Rāma up until he vanquishes the
tyrant King Rāvana and successfully rescues his wife and the crown
princess Sītā from Rāvana's grips. Both Kṛṣṇa and Rāma are
traditionally regarded as human incarnations of Viṣṇu. Both the
Mahābhārata and Rāmāyana are grouped under the heading of itihāsa
('thus spoken') literature. The focal events of the two epics likely
occurred between 1000 B.C.E. and 700 A.D. (Thapar p. 31) though the
epics themselves appear to have gone through a long process of
revision and evolution before their final Sanskrit versions appear on
the scene in the first two centuries of the common era.
Itihāsas, though recorded in the form of a narrative, are littered
with philosophical discussions on cosmology, and ethics. The most
philosophically famous portion of the itihāsa literature is the
Bhagavad Gītā. The Bhagavad Gītā forms a portion of the Mahābhārata,
but owing to its importance in the tradition it is often regarded as a
stand-alone text.
ii. Bhagavad Gītā
The Bhagavad Gītā consists of a discourse given by Kṛṣṇa on the eve of
the battle of the fratricidal war of the Mahābhārata to his cousin
Arjuna, who becomes despondent at the thought of engaging in a war
whose main aim is resting control over the throne, at the expense of
the destruction of his family. Kṛṣṇa exhorts Arjuna to do his duty as
a Ksatriya and fight the war that he has been charged with (Bhagavad
Gītā 2:31). For "[b]etter is one's own duty, though ill done, than the
duty of another well done…." (Bhagavad Gītā 18:47; cf. Manu X. 97). In
keeping with the general theme of the smṛti literature, Kṛṣṇa focuses
on reconciling the goal of mokṣa with that of dharma. Kṛṣṇa's first
solution to the problem of the conflict of dharma and mokṣa involves
doing one's duty with a strong deontological consciousness, which
attends to duty for duty's sake, and not for its rewards. This
deontological attitude not only perfects moral action, on Kṛṣṇa's
account, but it also constitutes true renunciation, which is a
prerequisite to mokṣa. Kṛṣṇa calls the deontological renunciation of
rewards of dutiful action karma yoga, or the discipline (yoga) of
action (karma) (Bhagavad Gītā ch.3). This is not the only type of yoga
that Kṛṣṇa prescribes. He also propounds what he identifies as
distinct yogas (Bhagavad Gītā chs. 4-11) that might be grouped under
the heading of jñāna yoga, or the discipline (yoga) of knowledge
(jñāna), whereby one develops a detached attitude towards the fruits
of works through knowledge of the excellences and unchanging nature of
the transcendent (sometimes spoken of as "Brahman" in this text), and
the ephemeral and temporary nature of worldly accomplishments. To this
end, Kṛṣṇa calls upon the philosophy of Sāṅkhya and Yoga, as well as
the philosophical concepts of the Upaniṣads to explicate the nature of
the changing and the transcendent. Finally, Kṛṣṇa also prescribes what
he calls bhakti yoga or the "discipline (yoga) of devotion (bhakti)"
(Bhagavad Gītā chs. 12-18). Whereas in karma yoga, one merely gives up
fruits of actions, in bhakti yoga one offers the fruits of one's
actions to God. Whereas in jñāna yoga one pursues knowledge for its
own sake, in bhakti yoga one pursues knowledge for the sake of a
loving relationship with the Ultimate. Kṛṣṇa appears to hold that any
of the ways that he prescribes will result in liberation for all three
varieties of yogas will ensure that the obstacle to
liberation—attachment to fruits of actions—is over come.
iii. Purāṇas
"Purāna" means history and is the term applied to a group of texts
that share a few features: (a) they typically provide a detailed
history of the origin of the various gods and the Universe, and (b)
they are written in praise of the exploits of a particular deity.
Unlike the itihāsas, the Purāṇas are not restricted to incarnations of
deities, but describe the activities of the deities, including their
incarnations. The Purāṇa literature comes down to us from a time that
post dates the composition of the Vedas, though their precise dates of
composition are not known (cf. Thapar p.29). There are many Purāṇas,
though the most famous is likely the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.
The Bhāgavata Purāṇa is distinguished amongst Purāṇas for being
regarded by Gaudiya Vaiṣṇavism, founded by the medieval Bengali saint
Caitanya, as the ultimate revelation on all doctrinal matters. This
tradition has come into prominence in recent times in the form of the
International Society for Kṛṣṇa Consciousness, commonly known as the
Hare Kṛṣṇa movement. According to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Ultimate
(Brahman) is both identical with and distinct from creation: on this
account, Brahman converts itself into the universe but maintains a
distinct identity all the same. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa also identifies
Viṣṇu with Brahman, and holds that bhakti (devotion) is the chief
means of attaining liberation, which consists in the personal
absorption of the individual (jīva) in Brahman. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa
thus presents one of the famous and enduring theistic expressions of
the Bhedābheda philosophy. In the way of ethics, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa
strays little from the Varna āśrama dharma found in most smṛti
literature (Bhāgavata Purāṇa I.ii.9-12), though it advocates what it
calls "bhāgavata dharma" (bhāgavata ethic) which is a combination of
the karma yoga and bhakti yoga of the Gītā supplemented with an
emphasis on living the life characteristic of a devotee of Kṛṣṇa as
described in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (XI.iii.23-31).
iv. Dharmaśāstra
The term "dharmaśāstra" literally means treaties or science (śāstra)
of dharma. The term refers to a corpus of literature clearly authored
by Brahmins with the aim of reinforcing a particular conception of
Varna āśrama dharma: a moral theory that critics will note ensures
that Brahmins are allotted a privileged or crowning position in the
caste scheme. The dharmaśāstras contain many features of other smṛti
literature that make them philosophically interesting.
Like the Purāṇa literature, many of the dharmaśāstras provide accounts
of the origins of the universe, and sometimes they delve into the
question of the means to liberation. Their dominant concern however is
to prescribe the specific duties and privileges of each caste. After
attending to the political question of the proper ordering of society,
the dharmaśāstras typically focus on the matter of prayaścitta, or
ritual expiation (see Kane vol.4 ch.1 pp. 1-40).
The idea of ritual expiation can be understood as a procedure
concerned with alleviating ritual impurity. However, it also has clear
moral implications: prayaścittas are prescribed for every manner of
offence, and if an agent undertakes the appropriate prayaścitta, they
can atone for their moral transgressions. A prayaścitta can take the
form of a ritual, an act of charity, or corporal punishment. The idea
that one can ritually atone for moral transgressions is unique to the
dharmaśāstras, and related texts in the history of Hindu philosophy.
3. Stage Two: Systematic Hindu Philosophy: the Darśanas
Core Hindu canonical texts—the Vedas—form the textual backdrop against
which many of the systematic Hindu philosophies are articulated.
However, they do not exhaust the import of Hindu philosophy for two
main reasons. First, the Vedas are not composed with the intention of
being systematic treaties on philosophical issues. They leave many
issues of philosophy relatively untouched. Secondly, the core Hindu
canonical texts are not canonical in the same way for all Hindus. By
and large, those we tend to regard as Hindu accord some type of
provisional authority to both the Vedas, and the secondary Vedic
literature. However, the authority accorded is something that Hindu
thinkers have disagreed upon. Some of the foundational works in
systematic Hindu philosophy do not explicitly mention the Vedas (for
example, the Sāṅkhya Kārikā), leaving the impression that these
schools were tolerant of the authority of the Vedas, but not
philosophically wedded to it in any deep sense.
The term "darśana" in Sanskrit translates as "vision" and is
conventionally regarded as designating what we are inclined to look
upon as systematic philosophical views. The history of Indian
philosophy is replete with darśanas. The number of darśanas to be
found in the history of Indian philosophy depends largely on the
organizational question of how one is to enumerate darśanas: how much
difference between expressions of philosophical views can be tolerated
before we are inclined to count texts as expressing distinct darśanas?
The question seems particularly pertinent in cases like Buddhist and
Jain philosophy, which have all had rich philosophical histories. The
issue is relatively easier to settle in the context of Hindu
philosophy, for a convention has developed over the centuries to count
systematic Hindu philosophy as being comprised of six (āstika, or Veda
recognizing) darśanas. The six darśanas are: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika,
Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrvamīmāṃsā, and Vedānta.
As a rule, systematic Indian philosophy (Hinduism, Jainism and
Buddhism) was recorded in Sanskrit, the pan-Indian language of
scholarship, after the end of the Vedic period. While scholars are
confident about the approximate dates that the texts of systematic
Indian philosophy handed down to us were written (cf. Potter,
"Bibliography," Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies, vol.1) scholars
are not in many cases as confident about the age of the schools
themselves. Moreover, most of the schools of Hindu philosophy have
existed side by side. Thus, the order of explication of the systematic
schools of Hindu philosophy follows the conventional order of
explication and not any particular historical order.
a. Nyāya
The term "nyāya" traditionally had the meaning "formal reasoning,"
though in later times it also came to be used for reasoning in
general, and by extension, the legal reasoning of traditional Indian
law courts. Opponents of the Nyāya school of philosophy frequently
reduce it to the status of an arm of Hindu philosophy devoted to
questions of logic and rhetoric. While reasoning is very important to
Nyāya, this school also had important things to say on the topic of
epistemology, theology and metaphysics, rendering it a comprehensive
and autonomous school of Indian philosophy.
The Nyāya school of Hindu philosophy has had a long and illustrious
history. The founder of this school is the sage Gautama (2nd cent.
C.E.)—not to be confused with the Buddha, who on many accounts had the
name "Gautama" as well. Nyāya went through at least two stages in the
history of Indian philosophy. At an earlier, purer stage, proponents
of Nyāya sought to elaborate a philosophy that was distinct from
contrary darśanas. At a later stage, some Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors
(such as Śaṅkara-Misra, 15th cent. C.E.) became increasingly
syncretistic and viewed their two schools as sister darśanas. As well,
at the latter stages of the Nyāya tradition, the philosopher Gaṅgeśa
(14th cent. C.E.) narrowed the focus to the epistemological issues
discussed by the earlier authors, while leaving off metaphysical
matters and so initiated a new school, which came to be known as Navya
Nyāya, or "New" Nyāya. Our focus will be mainly on classical,
non-syncretic, Nyāya.
According to the first verse of the Nyāya-Sūtra, the Nyāya school is
concerned with shedding light on sixteen topics: pramāna
(epistemology), prameya (ontology), saṃśaya (doubt), prayojana
(axiology, or "purpose"), dṛṣṭānta(paradigm cases that establish a
rule), Siddhānta (established doctrine), avayava (premise of a
syllogism), tarka (reductio ad absurdum), nirnaya (certain beliefs
gained through epistemically respectable means), vāda (appropriately
conducted discussion), jalpa (sophistic debates aimed at beating the
opponent, and not at establishing the truth), vitaṇḍa(a debate
characterized by one party's disinterest in establishing a positive
view, and solely with refutation of the opponent's view), hetvābhāsa
(persuasive but fallacious arguments), chala (unfair attempt to
contradict a statement by equivocating its meaning), jāti (an unfair
reply to an argument based on a false analogy), and nigrahasthāna
(ground for defeat in a debate) (Nyāya-Sūtra and Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya
I.1.1-20).
With respect to the question of epistemology, the Nyāya-Sūtra
recognizes four avenues of knowledge: these are perception, inference,
analogy, and verbal testimony of reliable persons. Perception arises
when the senses make contact with the object of perception. Inference
comes in three varieties: pūrvavat (a priori), śeṣavat (a posteriori)
and sāmanyatodṛṣṭa (common sense) (Nyāya-Sūtra I.1.3–7).
The Nyāya's acceptance of both arguments from analogy and testimony as
means of knowledge, allows it to accomplish two theological goals.
First, it allows Nyāya to claim that the Veda's are valid owing to the
reliability of their transmitters (Nyāya-Sūtra II.1.68). Secondly, the
acceptance of arguments from analogy allows the Nyāya philosophers to
forward a natural theology based on analogical reasoning.
Specifically, the Nyāya tradition is famous for the argument that
God's existence can be known for (a) all created things resemble
artifacts, and (b) just as every artifact has a creator, so too must
all of creation have a creator (Udayanācārya and Haridāsa Nyāyālaṃkāra
I.3-4).
The metaphysics that pervades the Nyāya texts is both realistic and
pluralistic. On the Nyāya view the plurality of reasonably believed
things exist and have an identity independently of their contingent
relationship with other objects. This applies as much to mundane
objects, as it does to the self, and God. The ontological model that
appears to pervade Nyāya metaphysical thinking is that of atomism, the
view that reality is composed of indecomposable simples (cf.
Nyāya-Sūtra IV.2.4.16).
Nyāya's treatment of logical and rhetorical issues, particularly in
the Nyāya Sūtra, consists in an extended inventory acceptable and
unacceptable argumentation. Nyāya is often depicted as primarily
concerned with logic, but it is more accurately thought of as being
concerned with argumentation.
b. Vaiśeṣika
The Vaiśeṣika system was founded by the ascetic, Khaṇḍa (1st cent.
C.E.). His name translates literally as "atom-eater." On some accounts
Khaṇḍa gained this name because of the pronounced ontological atomism
of his philosophy (Vaiśeṣika Sūtra VII.1.8), or because he restricted
his diet to grains picked from the field. If the Nyāya system can be
characterized as being predominantly concerned with matters of
argumentation, the Vaiśeṣika system can be characterized as
overwhelmingly concerned with metaphysical questions. Like Nyāya,
Vaiśeṣika in its later stages turned into a syncretic movement, wedded
to the Nyāya system. Here the focus will be primarily on the early
Vaiśeṣika system, with the help of some latter day commentaries.
Khaṇḍa's Vaiśeṣika Sūtra's opening verses are both dense and very
revealing about the scope of the system. The opening verse states that
the topic of the text is the elaboration of dharma (ethics or
morality). According to the second verse, dharma is that which results
not only in abhyudaya but also the Supreme Good (niḥreyasa), commonly
known as mokṣa (liberation) in Indian philosophy (Vaiśeṣika Sūtra
I.1.1-2). The term "abhyudaya" designates the values extolled in the
early, action portion of the Vedas, such as artha (economic
prosperity) and kāma (sensual pleasure). From the second verse it thus
appears that the Vaiśeṣika system regards morality as providing the
way for the remaining puruṣārthas . A reading of the obscure third
verse provided by the latter day philosopher Śaṅkara-Misra (15th cent.
C.E.) states that the validity of the Vedas rests on the fact that it
is an explication of dharma. (Misra's alternative explanation is that
the phrase can be read as asserting that the validity of the Vedas
derives from the authority of its author, God—this is a syncretistic
reading of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, influenced by Nyāya philosophy.)
(Śaṅkara-Misra's Vaiśeṣika Sūtra Bhāṣya I.1.2, p.7).
From the densely worded fourth verse, it appears that the Vaiśeṣika
system regards itself as an explication of dharma. The Vaiśeṣika
system holds that the elaboration or knowledge of the particular
expression of dharma (which is the Vaiśeṣika system) consists of
knowledge of six categories: substance (dravya), attribute (guṇa),
action (karma), genus (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa), and the
relationship of inherence between attributes and their substances
(samavāya) (Vaiśeṣika Sūtra I.1.4).
The dense fourth verse of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra gives expression to a
thorough going metaphysical realism. On the Vaiśeṣika account,
universals (sāmānya) as well as particularity (viśeṣa) are realities,
and these have a distinct reality from substances, attributes,
actions, and the relation of inherence, which all have their own
irreducible reality.
The metaphysical import of the fourth verse potentially obscures the
fact that the Vaiśeṣika system sets itself the task of elaborating
dharma. Given the weight that the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra gives to ontological
matters, it is inviting to treat its insistence that it seeks to
elaborate dharma as quite irrelevant to its overall concern. However,
subsequent authors in the Vaiśeṣika tradition have drawn attention to
the significance of dharma to the overall system.
Śaṅkara-Misra suggests that dharma understood in its particular
presentation in the Vaiśeṣika system is a kind of sagely forbearance
or withdrawal from the world (Śaṅkara-Misra's Vaiśeṣika Sūtra Bhāṣya
I.1.4. p.12). In a similar vein, another commentator, Chandrakānta
(19th cent. C.E.), states:
Dharma presents two aspects, that is under the characteristic of
Pravṛitti or worldly activity, and the characteristic of Nivṛitti or
withdrawal from worldly activity. Of these, Dharma characterized by
Nivṛitti, brings forth tattva–jñana or knowledge of truths, by means
of removal of sins and other blemishes. (Chandrakānta p.15.)
Thus the view of the commentators appears to be that the Vaiśeṣika
system, which yields "knowledge of truths," "knowledge of the
categories," or "knowledge of the essences" (cf. Śaṅkara-Misra, p.5)
is a moral virtue of the person who is initiated into the system—that
is, a "particular dharma" of that person. Hence, in elaborating the
nature of reality, the Vaiśeṣika system seeks to extinguish the
ignorance that obstructs the effects of dharma, and it thus also
constitutes a moral virtue of the proponent of the Vaiśeṣika system.
This virtue will not only yield the fruits of works, such as kāma and
artha (which the Vaiśeṣika sage will know to appreciate at a distance)
but it will also yield the highest good: mokṣa.
c. Sāṅkhya
The term "Sāṅkhya" means 'enumeration' and it suggests a methodology
of philosophical analysis. On many accounts, Sāṅkhya is the oldest of
the systematic schools of Indian philosophy. It is attributed to the
legendary sage Kapila of antiquity, though we have no extant work left
to us by him. His views are recounted in many smṛti texts, such as the
Bhāgavata Purāṇa and the Bhagavad Gītā, but the Sāṅkhya system appears
to stretch back to the end of the Vedic period itself. Key concepts of
the Sāṅkhya system appear in the Upaniṣads (Kaṭha Upaniṣad I.3.10–11),
suggesting that it is an indigenous Indian philosophical school that
developed congenially in parallel with the Vedic tradition. Its
relative antiquity appears to be confirmed by the references to the
school in classical Jain writings (for instance, Sūtrakṛtānga
I.i.1.13), which are known for their antiquity. Unlike many of the
other systematic schools of Hindu philosophy, the Sāṅkhya system does
not explicitly attempt to align itself with the authority of the Vedas
(cf. Sāṅkhya Kārikā 2).
The oldest systematic writing on Sāṅkhya that we have is Īśvarakṛṣna's
Sāṅkhya Kārikā (4th cent. C.E.). In it we have the classic Sāṅkhya
ontology and metaphysic set out, along with its theory of agency.
According to the Sāṅkhya system, the cosmos is the result of the
mutual contact of two distinct metaphysical categories: Prakṛti
(Nature), and Puruṣa (person). Prakṛti, or Nature, is the material
principle of the cosmos and is comprised of three guṇas, or
"qualities." These are sattva, rajas, and tamas. Sattva is
illuminating, buoyant and a source of pleasure; rajas is actuating,
propelling and a source of pain; tamas is still, enveloping and a
source of indifference (Sāṅkhya Kārikā 12-13).
Puruṣa, in contrast, has the quality of consciousness. It is the
entity that the personal pronoun "I" actually refers to. It is
eternally distinct from Nature, but it enters into complex
configurations of Nature (biological bodies) in order to experience
and to have knowledge. According to the Sāṅkhya tradition, mind,
mentality, intellect or Mahat (the Great one) is not a part of the
Puruṣa, but the result of the complex organization of matter, or the
guṇas. Mentality is the closest thing in Nature to Puruṣa, but it is
still a natural entity, rooted in materiality. Puruṣa, in contrast, is
a pure witness. It lacks the ability to be an agent. Thus, on the
Sāṅkhya account, when it seems as though we as persons are making
decisions, we are mistaken: it is actually our natural constitution
comprised by the guṇas that make the decision. The Puruṣa does nothing
but lend consciousness to the situation (Sāṅkhya Kārikā 12-13, 19,
21).
The contact of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, on the Sāṅkhya account, is not a
chance occurrence. Rather, the two principles make contact so that
Puruṣa can come to have knowledge of its own nature. A Puruṣa comes to
have such knowledge when sattva, the illuminating guṇa, assumes a
governing position in a bodily constitution. The moment that this
knowledge comes about, a Puruṣa becomes liberated. The Puruṣa is no
longer bound by the actions and choices of its body's constitution.
However, liberation consists in the end of karma tying the Puruṣa to
Prakṛti: it does not coincide with the complete annihilation of past
karma, which would consist in the disentangling of a Puruṣa from
Prakṛti. Hence, the Sāṅkhya Kārikā likens the self-realization of the
Puruṣa to a potter's wheel, which continues to spin down, after the
potter has ceased putting energy to keep the wheel in motion (Sāṅkhya
Kārikā 67).
Students of ancient Western philosophy are apt to note that the
Sāṅkhya guṇas, and the dualistic theory of personhood, appear to have
echos in Plato (4th cent. B.C.E.). Plato held that the body is the
casing of the soul (though Plato, at Phaedo 81 and Phaedrus 250c
suggests it is a prison, which the Sāṅkhya system does not), and that
the embodied soul is composed of three characteristics: an earthy
quality geared toward menial tasks that is appetitive (corresponding
to bronze), a high-spirited quality geared towards accomplishment and
competition (silver), and a reflective or rational portion that is in
a position to put in order the constitution of the soul (gold)
(Republic 3.415, 4.435–42). Prima facie, the bronze quality appears to
correspond to tamas, silver to rajas, and sattva to gold. Owing to the
antiquity of the Sāṅkhya system, it is historically implausible that
it was influenced by Platonistic thought. This of course invites the
contrary proposal, that Plato was influenced by the Sāṅkhya system.
While Indian philosophers had an important impact on the course of
ancient Greek philosophy (through Pyrrho of Elis, who traveled to
India in the 3rd cent. B.C.E. and was impressed by a type of dialectic
nihilism characteristic of some Buddhist philosophies, promoted by
gymnosophists—naked wise people—who resemble Jain monks) (see
Flintoff), there is no historical evidence to suggest that Sāṅkhya
thought made its way to ancient Greece. This suggests that both Plato
(4th cent. B.C.E.), and the Sāṅkhya system (dating back to the 6th
cent. B.C.E. in the Vedas) articulate an ancient Indo-European
philosophical perspective that predates both Plato and the Sāṅkhya
system, if the similarities between the two are not purely
coincidental.
d. Yoga
The Yoga tradition shares much with the Sāṅkhya darśana. Like the
Sāṅkhya philosophy, traces of the Yoga tradition can be found in the
Upaniṣads. While the systematic expression of the Yoga philosophy
comes to us from Patañjali's Yoga Sūtra, it comes relatively late in
the history of philosophy (at the end of the epic period, roughly 3rd
century C.E.), the Yoga philosophy is also expressed in the Bhagavad
Gītā. The Yoga philosophy shares with Sāṅkhya its dualistic cosmology.
Like Sāṅkhya, the Yoga philosophy does not attempt to explicitly
derive its authority from the Vedas. However, Yoga departs from
Sāṅkhya on an important metaphysical and moral point—the nature of
agency—and from Sāṅkhya in its emphasis on practical means to achieve
liberation.
Like the Sāṅkhya tradition, the Yoga darśana holds that the cosmos is
the result of the interaction of two categories: Prakṛti (Nature) and
Puruṣa (Person). Like the Sāṅkhya tradition, the Yoga tradition is of
the opinion that Prakṛti, or Nature, is comprised of three guṇas, or
qualities. These are the same three qualities extolled in the Sāṅkhya
system—tamas, rajas, and sattva—though the Yoga Sūtra refers to many
of these by different terms (cf. Yoga Sūtra II.18). As with the
Sāṅkhya system, liberation in the Yoga system is facilitated by the
ascendance of sattva in a person's mind, which permits enlightenment
on the nature of the self.
A relatively important point of cosmological difference is that the
Yoga system does not consider the Mind or the Intellect (Mahat) to be
the greatest creation of Nature. A major difference between the two
schools concerns Yoga's picture of how liberation is achieved. On the
Sāṅkhya account, liberation comes about by Nature enlightening the
Puruṣa, for Puruṣas are mere spectators (cf. Sāṅkhya Kārikā 62). In
the contexts of the Yoga darśana, the Puruṣa is not a mere spectator,
but an agent: Puruṣa is regarded as the "lord of the mind" (Yoga Sūtra
IV.18): for Yoga it is the effort of the Puruṣa that brings about
liberation. The empowered account of Puruṣa in the Yoga system is
supplemented by a detail account of the practical means by which
Puruṣa can bring about its own liberation.
The Yoga Sūtra tells us that the point of yoga is to still
perturbations of the mind—the main obstacle to liberation (Yoga Sūtra
I.2). The practice of the Yoga philosophy comes to those with energy
(Yoga Sūtra I.21). In order to facilitate the calming of the mind, the
Yoga system prescribes several moral and practical means. The core of
the practical import of the Yoga philosophy is what it calls the
Astāṅga yoga (not to be confused with a tradition of physical yoga
also called Astāṅga Yoga, popular in many yoga centers in recent
times). The Astāṅga yoga sets out the eight (aṣṭa) limbs (anga) of the
practice of yoga (Yoga Sūtra II.29). The eight limbs include:
* yama – abstention from evil-doing, which specifically consists
of abstention from harming others (Ahiṃsā), abstention from telling
falsehoods (asatya), abstention from acquisitiveness (asteya),
abstention from greed/envy (aparigraha); and sexual restraint
(brahmacarya)
* niyamas – various observances, which include the cultivation of
purity (sauca), contentment (santos) and austerities (tapas)
* āsana – posture
* prāṇāyāma – control of breath
* pratyāhāra – withdrawal of the mind from sense objects
* dhāranā– concentration
* dhyāna – meditation
* samādhi – absorption [in the self] (Yoga Sūtra II.29-32)
According to the Yoga Sūtra, the yama rules "are basic rules…. They
must be practiced without any reservations as to time, place, purpose,
or caste rules" (Yoga Sūtra II.31). The failure to live a morally pure
life constitutes a major obstacle to the practice of Yoga (Yoga Sūtra
II.34). On the plus side, by living the morally pure life, all of
one's needs and desires are fulfilled:
When [one] becomes steadfast in… abstention from harming others,
then all living creatures will cease to feel enmity in [one's]
presence. When [one] becomes steadfast in… abstention from falsehood,
[one] gets the power of obtaining for [oneself] and others the fruits
of good deeds, without [others] having to perform the deeds
themselves. When [one] becomes steadfast in… abstention from theft,
all wealth comes.… Moreover, one achieves purification of the heart,
cheerfulness of mind, the power of concentration, control of the
passions and fitness for vision of the Ātma [self, or Puruṣa]. "(Yoga
Sūtra II.35–41)
The steadfast practice of the Astāṅga yoga results in counteracting
past karmas. This culminates in a milestone-liberating event:
dharmameghasamādhi (or the absorption in the cloud of virtue). In this
penultimate state, the aspirant has all their past sins washed away by
a cloud of dharma (virtue, or morality). This leads to the ultimate
state of liberation for the yogi, kaivalya (Yoga Sūtra IV.33).
"Kaivalya" translates as "aloneness."
Critics of the Yoga system charge that it cannot be accepted on moral
grounds for it has as its ultimate goal a state of isolation. On this
view, kaivalya is understood literally as a state of social isolation
(see Bharadwaja). The defender of the Yoga Sūtra can point out that
this reading of "kaivalya" takes the final event of liberation in the
Yoga system out of context. The penultimate event that paves way for
the state of kaivalya is a wholly moral event (dharmameghasamādhi) and
the path that leads to this morally perfecting event is itself an
intrinsically moral endeavor (Astāṅga yoga, and particularly the
yamas). If the concept of 'kaivalya' is to be understood in the
context of the Yoga system's preoccupation with morality, it seems
that it must be understood as a function of moral perfection. Given
the uncommon journey that the yogi takes, it is also natural to
conclude that the state of kaivalya is the state characterized by
having no peers, owing to the radical shift in perspective that the
yogi attains through yoga. The yogi, at the point of kaivalya, no
longer sees things from the perspective of individuals in society, but
from the perspective of the Puruṣa. This arguably is the yogi's
loneliness.
e. Pūrvamīmāṃsā
The Pūrvamīmāṃsā school of Hindu philosophy gains its name from the
portion of the Vedas that it is primarily concerned with: the earlier
(pūrva) inquiry (Mīmāṃsā), or the karma khaṇḍa. In the context of
Hinduism, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school is one of the most orthodox of the
Hindu philosophical schools because of its concern to elaborate and
defend the contents of the early, ritually oriented part of the Vedas.
Like many other schools of Indian philosophy, Pūrvamīmāṃsā takes
dharma ("duty" or "ethics") as its primary focus (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra
I.i.1). Unlike all other schools of Hindu philosophy, Pūrvamīmāṃsā did
not take mokṣa, or liberation, as something to extol or elaborate
upon. The very topic of liberation is nowhere discussed in the
foundational text of this tradition, and is recognized for the first
time by the medieval Pūrvamīmāṃsā author Kumārila (7th cent. C.E.) as
a real objective worth pursuing in conjunction with dharma (Kumārila
V.xvi.108–110).
The school of philosophy known as Pūrvamīmāṃsā has its roots in the
Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, written by Jaimini (1st cent. C.E.). The Mīmāṃsā Sūtra,
like the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, begins with the assertion that its main
concern is the elaboration of dharma. The second verse tells us that
dharma (or the ethical) is an injunction (codana) that has the
distinction (lakṣaṇa) of bringing about welfare (artha) (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra
I.i.1-2).
The Pūrvamīmāṃsā system is distinguished from other Hindu
philosophical schools—but for the Vedānta systems—in its view that the
Vedas are epistemically foundational. Foundationalism is the view that
certain knowledge claims are independently valid (which means that no
further justificatory reasons are either possible or necessary to
justify these claims), and moreover, that these independently valid
knowledge claims are able to serve as justifications for beliefs that
are based upon them. Such independently valid knowledge claims are
thought to be justificatory foundations of a system of beliefs. While
all Hindu philosophical schools recognize the validity of the Vedas,
only the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta systems explicitly regard the Vedas
as foundational, and being in no need of further justification: "…
instruction [in the Vedas] is the means of knowing it
(dharma)—infallible regarding all that is imperceptible; it is a valid
means of knowledge, as it is independent…" (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra I.i.5). The
justificatory capacity of the Vedas serves to ground the smṛti
literature, for it is the sacred tradition based on the Vedas (Mīmāṃsā
Sūtra I.iii.2). If a smṛti text conflicts with the Vedas, the Vedas
are to be preferred. When there is no conflict, we are entitled to
presume that the Vedas stand as support for the smṛti text (Mīmāṃsā
Sūtra I.iii.3).
Pūrvamīmāṃsā perhaps more than any other school of Indian philosophy
made a sizable contribution to Indian debates on the philosophy of
language. Some of Pūrvamīmāṃsā's distinctive linguistic theses impact
on theological matters. One distinctive thesis of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā
tradition is that the relationship between a word and its referent is
"inborn" and not mediated by authorial intention (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra
I.i.5). The second view is that words, or verbal units (śabda), are
eternal existents. This view contrasts sharply with the view taken by
the Nyāya philosophers, that words have a temporary existence, and are
brought in and out of existence by utterance (Nyāya Sūtra II.ii.13,
cf. Mīmāṃsā Sūtra I.i.6-11). The commentator Śabara (5th cent. C.E.)
explains the Pūrvamīmāṃsā view thus:
…the word is manifested (not produced) by human effort; that is to
say, if, before being pronounced, the word was not manifest, it
becomes manifested by the effort (or pronouncing). Thus it is found
that the fact of words being "seen after effort" is equally compatible
with both views.… The Word must be eternal;—why?—because its utterance
is for the purpose of another…. If the word ceased to exist as soon as
uttered then no one could speak of any thing to others…. Whenever the
word "go" (cow) is uttered, there is a notion of all cows
simultaneously. From this it follows that the word denotes the Class.
And it is not possible to create the relation of the Word to a Class;
because in creating the relation, the creator would have to lay down
the relation by pointing to the Class; and without actually using the
word "go" (which he could not use before he has laid down its relation
to its denotation) in what manner could he point to the distinct class
denoted by the word "go"…. (Śabara Bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsā Sūtra I.i.12-19,
pp. 33–38)
Hence, the only solution to the problem of how words have their
meaning, on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā account, is that they have them
eternally. If they do not have their meaning eternally and independent
of subjective associations between referents and words, communication
would be impossible. These strikingly Platonistic positions on the
nature of meaning allows the Pūrvamīmāṃsā tradition to argue that the
Vedas are an eternally existing, unauthored corpus, and that it's
validity is beyond reproach: "… if the Veda be eternal its denotation
cannot but be eternal; and if it be non-eternal (caused), then it can
have no validity…" (Kumārila XXVII–XXXII, cf. V.xi.1).
Views in the history of Hindu philosophy that contrast with the
Pūrvamīmāṃsā view, on the question of the source and nature of the
Vedas, is the view implicit in the Nyāya Sūtra, and stated more
clearly by the later syncretic Vaiśeṣika (and Nyāya) author
Śaṅkara-Misra (Vaiśeṣika Sūtra Bhāṣya, p.7): the Vedas is the
testimony of a particular person (namely God). This is a view that
also appears to be echoed in the theistic schools of Vedānta, such as
Viśiṣṭādvaita, where God is alluded to as the author of the Vedas (cf.
Rāmānuja's Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya 18:58).
f. Vedānta
Like the Pūrvamīmāṃsā tradition, the Vedānta school is concerned with
explicating the contents of a particular portion of the Vedas. While
the Pūrvamīmāṃsā concerns itself with the former portion of the Vedas,
the Vedānta school concerns the end (anta) of the Vedas. Whereas the
principal concern of the earlier portion of the Vedas is action and
dharma, the principal concern of the latter portion of the Vedas is
knowledge and mokṣa.
Philosophies that count technically as expressions of the Vedānta
philosophy find their classical expression in a commentary on a
synopsis of the Upaniṣads. The synopsis of the contents of the
Upaniṣads is called the Vedānta Sūtras, or the Brahma Sūtras, and its
author is Bādarāyana (1st cent. C.E.). The latter portion of the Vedas
is a vast corpus that does not elaborate a single doctrine in the
manner of a monograph. Rather, it is a collection of speculative texts
of the Vedas with overlapping themes and images. A common thread that
runs through most of the Upaniṣads is a concern to elaborate the
nature of the Ultimate, or Brahman, Ātma or the Self (often equated in
these texts with Brahman) and what in the subsequent tradition is
known as the jīva, or the individual psychological unity. The
Upaniṣads are relatively clear that Brahman stands to creation as its
source and support, but its unsystematic nature leaves much to be
specified in the way of doctrine. While Bādarāyana's Brahma Sūtra is
the systematization of the teachings of the Upaniṣads, many of the
verses of the Brahma Sūtra are obscure and unintelligible without a
commentary.
Owing to the cryptic nature of the Brahma Sūtra itself, many
commentarial subtraditions have evolved in Vedānta. As a result, it is
possible to misleadingly use the term "Vedānta" as though it stood for
one comprehensive doctrine. Rather, the term "Vedānta" is best
understood as a term embracing within it divergent philosophical views
that have a common textual connection: their classical expression as a
commentary on Bādarāyana's text.
There are three famous commentaries (Bhāṣyas) on the Brahma Sūtra that
shine in the history of Hindu philosophy. These are the 8th century
C.E. commentary of Śaṅkara (Advaita) the 12th century C.E. commentary
of Rāmānuja (Viśiṣṭādvaita) and the 13th century C.E. commentary by
Madhva (Dvaita). These three are not the only commentaries. There
appears to have been no less than twenty-one commentators on the
Brahma Sūtra prior to Madhva (Sharma, vol.1 p.15), and Madhva is by no
means the last commentator on the Brahma Sūtra either. Important names
in the history of Indian theology are amongst the latter day
commentators: Nimbārka (13th cent. C.E.), Śrkaṇṭha(15th cent. C.E.),
Vallabha (16th cent. C.E.), and Baladeva (18th cent. C.E.). However,
the majority of the commentaries prior to Śaṅkara have been lost to
history. The philosophical positions expressed in the various
commentaries fall into four major camps of Vedānta: Bhedābheda,
Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita. They principally differ on the
metaphysics of individual selves and Brahman, though there are also
some striking ethical differences between these schools as well.
i. Bhedābheda
According to the Bhedābheda view, Brahman converts itself into the
created, but yet maintains a distinct identity. Thus, the school holds
that Brahman is both different (bheda) and not different (abheda) from
creation and the individual jīva.
The philosophical persuasion that has produced the most commentaries
on the Brahma Sūtra is the Bhedābheda philosophy. Textual evidence
suggests that all of the commentaries authored prior to Śaṅkara's
famous Advaita commentary on the Brahma Sūtra subscribed to a form of
Bhedābheda, which one historian calls "Pantheistic Realism" (Sharma,
pp. 15-7). And on natural readings, it appears that most of the
remaining commentators (but for the three famous commentators) also
promulgate an interpretation of the Brahma Sūtra that falls within the
Bhedābheda camp.
ii. Commonalities of the Three Famous Commentaries
While the three major commentators on the Brahma Sūtra's differ on
important metaphysical questions like the nature and relationship of
Brahman to creation and jīvas, or the important moral questions on the
priority of Vedic morality, there are some common views that they all
share.
All of the three major schools of Vedānta hold that the Vedas are the
ultimate source of knowledge of Brahman, and that the Vedas have an
independent validity, not reducible or contingent upon the validity of
any other means of knowledge (Śaṅkara's, Rāmānuja's and Madhva's
Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣyas, I.i.1-3). This interpretation of the Brahma
Sūtra pits the Vedānta tradition against the Nyāya optimism about
natural theology. For the major schools of Vedānta, natural reason
cannot, on its own, arrive at knowledge of the existence of God
(Brahman). (For a detailed criticism of the Nyāya natural theology,
see Rāmānuja's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya pp. 162-74.)
Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara both regard the individual jīva as being
uncreated, and having no beginning (Śaṅkara's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya
II.iii.16; Rāmānuja's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya II.iii.18). Madhva concurs
that individual souls are eternal, but yet insists that it is correct
to regard Brahman as the source of individual souls (Madhva's Brahma
Sūtra Bhāṣya II.iii.19).
The three major commentators on the Brahma Sūtra see eye to eye on the
nature of the individual as agent. According to Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and
Madhva, the individual, or jīva, is an agent, with desires and goals.
However, in and of itself, it has no power to make its will manifest.
Brahman, on all three accounts, steps in and grants the fruits of the
desires of an individual. Thus while on this account individuals are
agents, they are really also quite impotent. (Śaṅkara's and Rāmānuja's
Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣyas I.iii.41; Madhva's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya
II.iii.42). All three authors are sensitive to the fact that Brahman's
help in bringing about the fruits of desires of individuals implicates
Brahman in the evils of the world, and hence opens up the problem of
evil. The theodicy of all three relies upon the doctrine of the
eternality of the individual jīva. Since there is always some prior
choice and action on the part of the individual according to which
Brahman has to dispense consequences, at no point can Brahman be
accused of partiality, cruelty, or making persons choose the things
that they do (Śaṅkara's and Rāmānuja's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣyas II.i.34;
Madhva Bhāṣya II.i.35, iii.42).
Finally, Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara both appear to take a position on the
propriety of animal sacrifices as prescribed in the Vedas that is
reminiscent of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā deferral to the Vedas on all matters
of morality. According to both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, animal sacrifices
cannot be regarded as evils for they are enjoined in the Vedas, and
the Vedas is the ultimate authority on such matters (Śaṅkara's and
Rāmānuja's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya III.i.25). Madhva in contrast is
reputed to have been a staunch opponent of animal sacrifices, who held
that such rituals are a result of a corruption of the Vedic tradition.
He interprets the Brahma Sūtra in such a way that the question of
animal sacrifices does not arise.
iii. Advaita
Combining the negative particle "a" with the term "dvaita" creates the
term "advaita". The term "dvaita" is often translated as "dualism" as
the term "advaita" is often translated as "non-dualism." In the case
of Dvaita Vedānta, this convention of translation is misleading, for
Dvaita Vedānta does not, like the Sāṅkhya system, propound a
metaphysical dualism. Indeed, Dvaita Vedānta holds an explicitly
pluralistic metaphysics. Rather, "dvaita" in the context of Vedānta
nomenclature is an ordinal, meaning "secondness." Dvaita Vedānta,
thus, holds that there is such a thing as secondness—something extra,
that comes after the first: Brahman. Advaita Vedānta, in contrast,
holds that Brahman is one without a second. "Advaita" can thus be
translated as "monism," "non-duality" or most perspicuously as
"non-secondness" (Hacker p.131n21).
The principal author in the Advaita tradition is Śaṅkara. In addition
to writing several philosophical works, Śaṅkara the commentator on the
Brahma Sūtra, set up four monasteries in the four corners of India.
Successive heads of the monasteries, according to tradition, take
Śaṅkara's name. This has contributed to great confusion about the
views that Śaṅkara, the commentator on the Brahma Sūtras held, for
many of his successors also authored philosophical works with the same
name. On the basis of comparing writing style, vocabulary, and the
colophons of the various works attributed to "Śaṅkara," the German
philologist and scholar of Indian philosophy, Paul Hacker, has
concluded that only a portion of the works attributed to Śaṅkara are
by the author of the commentary on the Brahma Sūtras (Hacker pp.
41-56). These genuine works include commentaries on the Upaniṣads, and
a commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā. The following explication will be
restricted to such works.
It is commonly held that Śaṅkara argued that the common sense,
empirical world as we know it is an illusion, or māyā. The term "māyā"
does not figure prominently in the genuine writings of Śaṅkara.
However, it is an accurate assessment that Śaṅkara holds that the
majority of our beliefs about the reality of a plurality of objects
and persons are ultimately false.
Śaṅkara's philosophy and criticism of common sense rests on an
argument unique to him in the history of Indian philosophy—an argument
that Śaṅkara sets at the outset of his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra.
From this argument from superimposition, the ordinary human psyche
(which self identifies with a body, a unique personal history, and
distinguishes itself from a plurality of other persons and objects)
comes about by an erroneous superimposition of the characteristics of
subjectivity (consciousness, or the sense of being a witness), with
the category of objects (which includes the characteristics of having
a body, existing at a certain time and place and being numerically
distinct from other objects). According to Śaṅkara, these categories
are opposed to each other as night and day. And hence, the conflation
of the two categories is fallacious. However, it is also a creative
mistake. As a result of this superimposition, the jīva (individual
person) is constructed complete with psychological integrity, and a
natural relationship with a body (Śaṅkara Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya,
Preamble to I.i.1). All of this is brought about by beginningless
nescience (avidyā)—a creative factor at play in the creation of the
cosmos.
In reality, all there really is on Śaṅkara's account is Brahman:
objects of its awareness, such as the entire universe, exist within
the realm of its consciousness. The liberation of the individual jīva
occurs when it undoes the error of superimposition, and no longer
identifies itself with a body, or a particular person with a natural
history, but with Brahman.
It is worth stressing that Śaṅkara's view is not a form of subjective
idealism, or solipsism in any ordinary sense. For those sympathetic to
Śaṅkara's account, superimposition is an objective occurrence that
happens most anywhere there is an ordinary organism with a living
body. However, Śaṅkara's system is properly characterized as a form of
Absolute Idealism, for on its account only the undifferentiated
Absolute is ultimately real, while affairs of the world are its
thoughts.
Śaṅkara's Advaita tradition is known for giving a nuanced, and
two-part account of the 'self' and 'Brahman.' On Śaṅkara's account,
there is a lower and higher self. The lower self is the jīva, while
the higher self (the real referent of the personal pronoun "I," used
by anyone) is the one real Self: Ātma, which on Śaṅkara' s account is
Brahman. Likewise, on Śaṅkara's account, there is a lower and a higher
Brahman (Śaṅkara Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya IV.3.16. pp. 403-4). The lower
Brahman is the personal God that pious devotees pray to and meditate
on, while the Higher Brahman is devoid of most all such qualities, is
impersonal, and is characterized as being essentially bliss (ānanda)
(Śaṅkara Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya III.3.14) truth (satyam) knowledge
(jñānam) and infinite (anantam) (cf. Śaṅkara, Taittitrīya Upaniṣad
Bhāṣya II.i.1.). The lower Brahman, or the personal God that people
pray to, can be afforded the title of "Brahman" owing to its proximity
to the Highest Brahman: in the world of plurality, it is the closest
thing to the Ultimate (Śaṅkara Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya IV.3.9). However,
it too, like the concept of the individual person, is a result of the
error of superimposing the qualities of objectivity and subjectivity
on each other (Śaṅkara, Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya IV.3.10). In the Advaita
tradition, the lower Brahman is known as the saguṇa Brahman (or
Brahman with qualities) while the highest Brahman is known as the
nirguṇa Brahman (or Brahman without qualities) (Śaṅkara Brahma Sūtra
Bhāṣya III.2.21).
Śaṅkara takes a skeptical attitude towards the importance of dharma,
or morality. On Śaṅkara's account, so long as one exists as a
construction of necessience, operating under the erroneous assumption
that one is a distinct object from Brahman and other objects, then one
ought to follow the Vedas and its injunctions regarding dharma for it
will help form tendencies to look within (Śaṅkara, Bhagavad Gītā
Bhāṣya on 18:66). However, for the serious aspirant, Śaṅkara regards
dharma as an impediment to liberation—it too must be abandoned, lest
an individual reinforce their self-identification with a body in
contradistinction to other bodies and persons (Śaṅkara, Bhagavad Gītā
Bhāṣya on 4:21). Those sympathetic to Śaṅkara's philosophy often
regard Śaṅkara's skepticism about dharma as a liberal and progressive
aspect to his philosophy, for it devalues the importance of Vedic
dharma, which contains within it caste morality. Critics of Śaṅkara
are likely to regard Śaṅkara's skepticism about the importance of
dharma as troubling, not because it implies that we should forsake
Vedic dharma, but because it suggests that we ought to give up moral
concerns, altogether, for the sake of spiritual pursuits (lest we fall
back into the fallacy of superimposition).
iv. Viśistādvaita
The term "Viśiṣṭādvaita" is often translated as "Qualified
Non-Dualism." An alternative, and more informative, translation is
"Non-duality of the qualified whole," or perhaps 'Non-duality with
qualifications." The principal exponent of this school of Vedānta is
Rāmānuja, who attempted to eschew the illusionist implications of
Advaita Vedānta, and the perceived logical problems of the Bhedābheda
view while attempting to reconcile the portions of the Upaniṣads that
affirmed a substantial monism and those that affirmed substantial
pluralism. Rāmānuja's solution to his problematic is to argue for a
theistic and organismic conception of Brahman.
The theism of Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita shows up in his insistence that
Brahman is a specific deity (Viṣṇu, also known as "Nārāyana") who is
an abode of an infinite number of auspicious qualities. The organismic
aspect of Rāmānuja's model consists in his view that all things that
we normally consider as distinct from Brahman (such as individual
persons or jīvas, mundane objects, and other unexalted qualities)
constitute the Body of Brahman, while the Ātman spoken of in the
Upaniṣads is the non-body, or mental component of Brahman. The result
is a metaphysic that regards Brahman as the only substance, but yet
affirms the existence of a plurality of abstract and concrete objects
as the qualities of Brahman's Body and Soul (Vedārthasaṅgraha §2).
Rāmānuja holds that in the absence of stains of passed karma the jīva
(individual person) resembles Brahman in being of the nature of
consciousness and knowledge (Rāmānuja, Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, I.i.1.
"Great Siddhānta" pp. 99-102). Past actions cloud our true nature and
force us to act out their consequences. On Rāmānuja's account, the
prime way of extricating ourselves from the beginningless effects of
karma involves bhakti, or devotion to God. But bhakti on its own is
not sufficient, or at least, bhakti if it is to bring about liberation
must either be combined with the karma yoga mentioned in the Bhagavad
Gītā, or it must turn into bhakti yoga. For attending to one's dharma
(duty) is the chief means by which one can propitiate God, on
Rāmānuja's account (Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya, XVIII.47 p.583). Moreover,
in attending to one's dharma in the deontological spirit
characteristic of karma yoga and consonant with bhakti yoga one
prevents the development of new karmic dispositions, and can allow the
past stores of karma to be naturally extinguished. This will have the
effect of unclouding the individual jīva's omniscience, and bringing
the jīva closer to a vision of God, which alone is an unending source
of joy (Vedārthasaṅgraha §241). Unlike Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja insists that
dharma is never to be abandoned (Rāmānuja, Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya
XVIII.66, p.599).
v. Dvaita
Madhva is one of the principal theistic exponents of Vedānta. On his
account, Brahman is a personal God, and specifically He is the Hindu
deity Viṣṇu.
According to Madhva, reality is characterized by a five fold
difference: (i) jīvas (individual persons) are different from God;
(ii) jīvas are also different from each other; (iii) inanimate objects
are different from God; (iv) inanimate objects are different from
other inanimate objects; (v) inanimate objects are different from
jīvas (Mahābhāratatātparnirnayaḥ, I. 70-71). The number of types of
entities on Madhva's account appears thus to be three: God, jīvas, and
inanimate objects. However, the actual number of objects on Madhva's
account appears to be very high. This substantial pluralism sets
Madhva apart from the other principle exponents of Vedānta.
A distinctive doctrine of Madhva's Vedānta is his view that jīvas fall
into a hierarchy, with the most exalted jīvas occupying a place below
Viṣṇu (such as Viṣṇu's companions in his eternal abode) to the lowest
jīvas, who occupy dark hell regions. Moreover, on Madhva's account,
the ranking of jīvas is eternal, and hence those who occupy the lowest
hells are eternally damned. Amongst the middle level jīvas, the Gods
and the most virtuous of humans are eligible for liberation. The
average amongst the middle rung jīvas transmigrate forever, while the
lowest amongst the middle level jīvas find themselves in the upper
hells (Mahābhāratatātparnirnayaḥ I.85-88).
Madhva holds that liberation comes to those who appreciate the five
fold differences and the hierarchy of the jīvas
(Mahābhāratatātparnirnayaḥ, 81-2). However, ultimately, whether one is
liberated or not is completely at the discretion of Brahman, and
Brahman is pleased by nothing more than bhakti, or devotion
(Mahābhāratatātparnirnayaḥ I.117).
g. Classical Hindu Philosophy in the Context of Indian Philosophy
Hindu philosophy did not develop in a vacuum. Rather, it is an
inextricable part of the history of Indian philosophy. Hence, other
Indian philosophical movements did not only influence Hindu
philosophy, but it also arguably had an influence on their development
as well.
The most salient manner in which Hindu philosophy was influenced by
other Indian philosophical developments is in the realm of ethics. In
its infancy, Hindu philosophy as set out in the action portion of the
Vedas was wedded to the practice of animal sacrifices (see Aitareya
Brāhmana, book II.1-2). Buddhism and Jainism were both critical of the
practice. Buddhism as a philosophy devoted to the alleviation of
suffering is disposed to see animal sacrifices as involving
unnecessary suffering. Jainism, in contrast, had made Ahiṃsā, or
non-harmfulness, its chief moral virtue. Jainism might very well have
been the first religio-philosophical movement in India staunchly
wedded to vegetarianism. And while vegetarianism was alien to early
Hindu practice, it has become an integral part of Hindu orthodoxy in
many parts of India. Now, for many Hindus, the very idea of eating
meat is the very archetype of immoral and irreligious behavior. This
attitude can be found amongst the most orthodox followers of both
Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, who, as noted, defended the propriety of animal
sacrifices. The shift in the general attitude of many Hindus arguably
goes to the credit of Jainism, a once prevalent religion in India,
which has been a source of tireless criticism of violence.
A case might also be made for the influence of Jainism on the Yoga
darśana. Specifically, the yama rules found in the Yoga darśana, which
include Ahiṃsā, are identical to the five Great vows of Jainism
(Ācāraṅga Sūtra II.15.i.1–v.1). While it is possible that these
precepts have a third common source, or that they are indigenous to
the Yoga tradition, it is also highly probable that they were
incorporated, early on, into the Yoga tradition by way of influence of
Jain thought. The Yoga tradition also shows the mark of being
influenced by Mahāyāna Buddhism in its account of
"dharmameghasamādhi"—a term that shows up in many latter day Buddhist
texts (see Klostermaier).
In the realm of metaphysics, a controversial argument can be made that
Hindu philosophy, as found in the Upaniṣads, has exercised a profound
effect on the development of latter day Indian Buddhist thought.
Increasingly, in the context of latter Indian Buddhism, there is a
movement away from a seeming agnosticism to an affirmation of the
Ultimate in terms of a master concept, which designates both the
grounding and the source of all. For Buddhist Idealism (Yogācāra, or
Vijñānavāda) the master concept is that of Consciousness-Only, and in
the context of Mādhyamika Buddhism of Nāgārjuna (2nd cent. C.E.) the
master concept is that of Emptiness, or Śūnyatā. Such a move towards a
master concept resembles the Upaniṣad's employment of the concept
"Brahman" and is arguably an adaptation of some elements of the
metaphysical picture of the Upaniṣads into Buddhist philosophy.
Similarly, a case might also be made that the notion of "Two-Truths"
(the doctrine that there is a distinction to be drawn between
conventional truth that operates in ordinary, domestic discourse that
recognizes diversity, and Truth from the perspective of the Ultimate
which rejects diversity) operative in latter Buddhist thought is also
a doctrine that can be found in the Upaniṣads (cf. Muṇdaka Upaniṣad,
I.i. 5-6). While this doctrine gets its clearest explication in the
context of latter day Buddhist thought in India, it seems that it has
its precursor in Vedic speculation.
4. Stage Three: Neo-Hinduism
The term "Neo-Hinduism" refers to a conception of the Hindu religion
formed by recent authors who were learned in traditional Indian
philosophy, and English. Famous Neo-Hindus include Swami Vivekānanda
(1863-1902) the famous disciple of the traditional Hindu saint
Rāma-Kṛṣṇa, and India's first president, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
(1888-1975) a professional philosopher who held academic posts at
various universities in India and Oxford, in the UK.
A famous formulation of the doctrine of Neo-Hinduism is the simile
that likens religions to rivers, and the oceans to God: as all rivers
lead to the ocean so do all religions lead to God. Similarly, Swami
Nirvenananda in his book Hinduism at a Glance writes:
All true religions of the world lead us alike to the same goal,
namely, to perfection if, of course, they are followed faithfully.
Each of them is a correct path to Divinity. The Hindus have been
taught to regard religion in this light. (Nivernananda, p.20.)
Frequently, Neo-Hindu authors identify Hinduism with Vedānta in their
elaboration of Neo-Hindu doctrine, and in this formulation we find
another tenet of Neo-Hinduism: Hinduism is not simply another
religion, but a meta-religion, or the philosophy of religion. Hence,
we find Vivekānanda writes:
Ours is the universal religion. It is inclusive enough, it is
broad enough to include all the ideals. All the ideals of religion
that already exist in the world can be immediately included, and we
can patiently wait for all the ideals that are to come in the future
to be taken in the same fashion, embraced in the infinite arms of the
religion of Vedānta. (Vivekānanda, vol. III p.251-2.)
Similarly, Radhakrishnan holds "[t]he Vedānta is not a religion, but
religion itself in its most universal and deepest significance"
(Radhakrishnan, 35).
The view identified as Neo-Hinduism here might be understood as a form
of Universalism or liberal theology that attempts to ground religion
itself in Hindu philosophy. Neo-Hinduism must be distinguished from
another theological view that has a long history in India, which we
might call Inclusivist Theology. According to Inclusivist Theology,
there are elements in any number of religious practices that are
consonant with the one true religion, and if a practitioner of a
contrary religion holds fast to those elements in their religion that
are correct, they will eventually attain the Ultimate. Often, this
view finds expression in the widespread Hindu view that all the
various deities are really lower manifestations of one true deity (for
example, a Vaiṣṇava who held an Inclusivist theology might interpret
all deities, in so far as they are consonant with the qualities
attributed to Viṣṇu, to be lower manifestations of Viṣṇu, and thus
good first steps to conceptualizing the Ultimate). Neo-Hinduism, in
contrast, makes no distinction between deities, religions, or elements
within religions, for all religions operate at the level of the
practical, while the Ultimate, ex hypothesi, is transcendent. There is
no religion, or no portion of any religion, which is incorrect, on
this view, for all are equally human efforts to strive for the Divine.
Neo-Hindus do not typically regard themselves as forming a new
philosophy or religion, though the doctrine expressed by Neo-Hinduism
is characterized by theses and concerns not clearly expressed in
classical Hindu philosophy. As a rule, Neo-Hinduism is a reformulation
of Advaita Vedānta, which emphasizes the implicit liberal theological
tendencies that follow from the two-fold account of Brahman.
Recall that on Śaṅkara's account a distinction is to be drawn between
a lower and higher Brahman. Higher Brahman (nirguṇa Brahman) is
impersonal and lacks much of what is normally attributed to God. In
contrast, lower Brahman (saguṇa Brahman) has personal characteristics
attributed to deities. While the higher Brahman is the eternally
existing reality, lower Brahman is a result of the same creative error
that results in the construction of normal integrated egos in bodies:
superimposition. Neo-Hinduism takes note of the fact that this account
of lower Brahman's nature implies that the deities normally worshiped
in a religious context are really natural artefacts, or projections of
aesthetic concerns on the Ultimate: they are images of the Ultimate
formulated for the sake of religious progress. Neo-Hinduism thus
reasons that no one's personal God is any more the real God than
another religion's personal God: rather, all are equally
approximations of the one real, impersonal Brahman that transcends the
domestic qualities attributed to it. While personal deities are
considerably devalued on this account, the result is a liberal
theology that is closed to no religious tradition, in principle, for
any religion that personalizes God will be approaching the highest
Brahman through the lens of superimposed characteristics of
object-qualities on Brahman.
Critics of Neo-Hinduism have noted that while Neo-Hinduism aspires to
shun the sectarianism that characterises the history of religion in
the West through a spirit of Universalism, Neo-Hinduism itself engages
in a sectarianism, in so far as it identifies Hinduism with the true
perspective that understands the quality-less nature of the Ultimate
(cf. Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection pp. 51-86). In defense of
Neo-Hinduism, it could be argued that it is a genuine, modern attempt
to re-understand the philosophical implications of earlier Hindu
thought, and not an attempt to reconcile the various religions of the
world.
Critics might also argue that Neo-Hinduism is bad history: many
philosophers that we today regard as Hindu (such as Rāmānuja or
Madhva) would not accept the idea that all deities are equal, and that
God is ultimately an impersonal entity. Moreover, Śaṅkara, the
commentator on the Brahma Sūtras did not argue for the type of
Universalism characteristic of Neo-Hinduism, which regards all
religious observance as equally valid (though this arguably is an
implication of his philosophy). Neo-Hinduism, the critic might argue,
is historical revisionism. In response, Neo-Hinduism might defend
itself by insisting that it is not in the business of providing an
account of the history of all of Hindu philosophy, but only a certain
strand that it regards as the most important.
5. Conclusion: the Status of Hindu Philosophy
Hindu philosophers have taken varied views on many important issues in
philosophy. Hindu philosophers, for instance, are not in agreement as
to whether God is a person. They have not all agreed upon the nature
and scope of the epistemic validity of the Vedas, nor have they all
agreed on basic questions of axiology, such as the content of
morality. Some affirm the importance of Vedicly prescribed acts, such
as animal sacrifices, while others, such as the Yoga philosopher
Patañjali, appear to suggest that violence is always to be avoided.
Likewise, some Hindu philosophers hold that the content of the Vedas
as always binding, such as Rāmānuja. Others, such as Śaṅkara, regard
it as constituting provisional obligations, subject to a person not
being serious about liberation. All Hindu philosophers are not in
agreement on whether there is anything like liberation. Most recognize
the existence of liberation, while the early Pūrvamīmāṃsā does not.
While all Hindu philosophers hold that there is something like an
individual self, they differ radically in their account of the reality
and nature of this individual. This difference in ontology reflects
the rich metaphysical diversity amongst Hindu philosophers: some
affirm the existence of a plurality of objects; qualities and
relations (such as the Vaiśeṣika, Dvaita Vedānta) while others do not
(Advaita Vedānta). Such differences have made Hindu philosophy into a
sub-tradition of philosophy within Indian philosophy, and not simply
one comprehensive philosophical view amongst many. Hindu philosophy is
not a static doctrine, but a growing tradition rich in diverse
philosophical perspectives. Contrary to some popular accounts, what is
presented as Hindu philosophy in recent times is not simply an
elaboration of ancient tradition, but a re-evaluation and dialectical
evolution of Hindu philosophical thought. Far from detracting from the
authority or authenticity of recent Hindu speculation, what this shows
is that Hindu philosophy is a living and vibrant tradition that shows
no sign of being fossilized into a curiosity from the past, any time
soon.
6. References and Further Readings
a. Primary Sources
* Ācāraṅga Sūtra. Trans. Harmann Georg Jacobi. Jaina Sūtras. Ed.
Harmann Georg Jacobi. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Delhi: AVF Books, 1987.
* Aiterya Brāhmana. Aiterya Brāhmana of the Ṛg Veda. Trans. Martin
Haug. Sacred Books of the Hindus. Ed. B.D. Basu. Allahabad: Sudhindra
Nath Vasu, 1922.
* Bhāgavata Purāṇa. Śrīmad Bhāgavatam. Trans. Tapasyānanda.
Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1981.
* Chandrakānta. Vaiśeṣika Sūtra (Gloss). Trans. Nandal Sinha.
Allahabad: Sudhindra Nath Basu, 1923.
* Dhammapada. A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Eds. S.
Radhakrishnan and Charles Alexander Moore. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1967. 292-325.
* Gautama. Nyāya Sūtra. Trans. Satisa Chandra Viyabhusana. Sacred
Books of the Hindus. Ed. Nandalal Sinha. 2nd rev. and enl. ed. Vol. 8.
Allahabad: Panini Office, 1930.
* Gautama, Vātsyāyana, and Uddyotakara. The Nyāya-Sūtras of
Gautama: with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārtika of Uddyotakara.
Trans. Ganganatha Jha. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.
* Gītā. Śrīmad Bhagavad Gītā; the Scripture of Mankind. Trans. and
Ed. Swāmi Tapasyānanda. Madras: Śrī Ramakrishna Math, 1986.
* Guṇaratna. Tarkarahasyadīpika. Cārvāka/Lokāyata: an Anthology of
Source Materials and Some Recent Studies. Ed. Debiprasad
Chattopadhyaya. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research in
association with Rddhi-India Calcutta, 1990.
* Īśvarakrsna. Sāṅkhya Kārikā. Trans. S.S. Suryanārāyana-Sastri.
Madras University Philosophical Series. no. 3. Ed. S.S.
Suryanārāyana-Sastri. 2nd rev. ed. Madras: University of Madras, 1948.
* Jaimini. Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. Trans. and Ed. Mohan Lal Sandal. Sacred
Books of the Hindus. Vol. 27. Allahabad: Sudhindre Nath Basu, 1923.
* Khaṇḍa. Vaiśeṣika Sūtra. Trans. and Ed. Nandalal Sinha. Sacred
Books of the Hindus. Ed. Nandal Sinha. 2nd rev. and enl. ed. Vol. 6.
Allahabad: Sudhindra Nath Basu, Panini Office, 1923.
* Kaṭha Upaniṣad. Trans. and Ed. Swami Gambirananda. Eight
Upaniṣads, With the Commentary of Śankarācārya. Ed. Swami
Gambirananda. Vol. 2: Advaita Ashrama, 1977. 91-220.
* Kumārila. Ślokavārtika. 1909 Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta:
Asiatic Society. Trans. Ganganatha Jha. Śrī Garib Das Oriental Series.
Vol. 8. Delhi: Śrī Satguru, 1983.
* Madhva. Mahābhāratātparyanirnayah. Trans. and Ed. K.T.
Pandurang. Vol. 1. Chirtanur: Sriman Madhva Siddhantonnanhini Sabha,
1993. Madhva. Vedānta Sūtras with the commentary of Śrī Madhwacharya
(Madva Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya). Trans. S. Subba Rau. Madras: Thompson and
Co., 1904.
* Majjhima Nikāya. The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings.
Trans. I. B. Horner. Pali Text Society Translation Series. Vol. 29–31.
3 vols. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Luzac, 1957.
* Manu. The Laws of Manu (Manavadharmaśāstra). Trans. G.Buhler.
Sacred Books of the East. Ed. Max Müller. Vol. xxv. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1886.
* Muṇdaka Upaniṣad. Trans. and Ed. Swami Gambirananda. Eight
Upaniṣads, With the Commentary of Śankarācārya. Vol. 2: Advaita
Ashrama, 1977. 77-172.
* Patañjali. Yoga Sūtra. Trans. and Ed. Swāmi Prabhavananda.
Madras: Ramakrishna Math., 1953.
* Plato. Phaedo. Trans. Hugh Tredennick. The Collected Dialogues
of Plato, Including the Letters. Bollingen Series 71. Eds. Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books, 1966. 40-99.
* Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. R. Hackforth. The Collected Dialogues of
Plato, Including the Letters. Bollingen Series 71. Eds. Edith Hamilton
and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books, 1966. 475-525.
* Plato. Republic. Trans. Paul Shorey. The Collected Dialogues of
Plato, Including the Letters. Bollingen Series 71. Eds. Edith Hamilton
and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books, 1966. 575-844.
* Puruṣa Sūkta. Śrī Rudram and Puruṣasūktam. Trans. and Ed. Swami
Amritananda. Ed. Swami Amritananda. Chennai: Sri Ramakrishna Math,
1997.
* Radhakrishnan, S. The Hindu View of Life. Books that matter.
London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1961.
* Radhakrishnan, S., and Charles Alexander Moore, eds. A Source
Book in Indian Philosophy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1967.
* Rāmānuja. Śrī Rāmānuja Gītā Bhāṣya. Trans. and Ed. Swāmi
Ādidevānada. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1991.
* Rāmānuja. Vedānta Sūtras with the commentary of Rāmānuja
(Rāmānuja Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya; Śrī Bhāṣya). Trans. George Thibaut.
Sacred Books of the East. Vol. 48. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1996.
* Rāmānuja. Vedārthasaṅgraha. Trans. and Ed. S.S. Ragavachar.
Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1968.
* Ṛg Veda. Vedic hymns. Trans. Hermann Oldenberg. Sacred books of
the East. Ed. F. Max Müller. Vol. 32, 46. 2 vols. Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1891.
* Śabara. Śabara Bhāṣya. Trans. Ganganatha Jha. Gaekwad's Oriental
Series. Vol. 66, 70, 73. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1933.
* Saṃyutta Nikāya. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha : a New
Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya; translated from the Pāli. Trans.
Bhikkhu Bodhi. 2 vols. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2000.
* Śaṅkara (ācārya). Bhagavad Gītā with the commentary of
Śankarācārya. Trans. Swāmi Gambhirānanda. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama,
1991.
* Śaṅkara (ācārya). "Taittitrīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya." Trans. Swami
Gambirananda. Eight Upaniṣads, With the Commentary of Śankarācārya.
Vol. 1: Advaita Ashrama, 1977. 3-29.
* Śaṅkara (ācārya). The Vedānta Sūtras (Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya).
Sacred books of the East, vol.38. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994.
* Śaṅkara-Misra. Vaiśeṣika Sūtra Bhāṣya. Trans. Nandalal Sinha.
Sacred Books of the Hindus. Ed. Nandal Sinha. 2nd rev. and enl. ed.
Vol. 6. Allahabad: Sudhindra Nath Basu, Panini Office, 1923.
* Sūtrakṛtānga . Trans. Harmann Georg Jacobi. Jaina Sūtras. Ed.
Harmann Georg Jacobi. Vol. 2. Delhi: AVF Books, 1987. 235–436.
* Tapasyānanda, Swāmi. Bhakti Schools of Vedānta. Madras:
Ramakrishna Math, 1990.
* Udayanācārya and Haridāsa Nyāyālamkāra. The Kusumāñjali: or,
Hindu Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being (10th Century).
(Udayanācārya's Nyāyausumāñjali with Haridāsa's Nyāyālaṃkāra's
Vyākhyā). Trans. and Ed. E.B. Cowell. Varanasi: Bharat-Bharati, 1980.
* Vivekānanda. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekānanda. Mayavati
memorial ed. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1964.
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* Bharadwaja, V.K. "A Non-Ethical Concept of Ahiṃsā." Indian
Philosophical Quarterly. xi.2 (1984): 171-77.
* Chaterjee, Satischandra, and Dhirendramohan Data. An
Introduction to Indian Philosophy. Calcutta: University of Calcutta,
1960.
* Dasgupta, Surendranath. A History of Indian Philosophy. 5 vols.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1975.
* Deutsch, Eliot. Advaita Vedānta: a Philosophical Reconstruction.
1st ed. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1969.
* Dundas, Paul. The Jains. New York: Routledge, 1992.
* Flintoff, Everard. "Pyrrho and India." Phronesis 25 (1980): 88-106.
* Fox, Michael W. Bringing Life to Ethics: Global Bioethics for a
Humane Society. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.
* Hacker, Paul. Philology and Confrontation. Ed. Wilhelm Halbfass.
Albany: State Universisty of New York, 1995.
* Halbfass, Wilhelm. India and Europe: an Essay in Understanding.
Indien und Europa: Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung. Basel;
Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1981. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York
Press, 1988.
* Halbfass, Wilhelm. Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in
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* Jha, Ganganatha. Purva Mīmāṃsā in its Sources. Trans. Jha,
Ganganatha. Library of Indian Philosophy and Religion. Benares:
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* Kane, Pandurang Vaman. History of Dharmaśāstra: Ancient and
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Class B. no. 6. 2nd rev. and enl. ed. 5 vols. Poona: Bhandarkar
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