working in the neo-Hegelian tradition that dominated British
philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century. At the time, this
tradition was divided into two main camps: personal idealism and
absolute idealism. Joachim was affiliated with the latter camp, whose
most prominent representative was F. H. Bradley. Although Joachim has
frequently been characterized as a mere disciple and promulgator of
Bradley's views, there are instances in which Joachim parts ways with
Bradley, showing himself to be an independent and original thinker.
These instances will be highlighted below.
Apart from a series of extensive commentaries on individual works by
Aristotle, Spinoza and Descartes and an important English translation
of Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione, Joachim's most important
work was The Nature of Truth (1906), in which he argued for a
coherence theory of truth on the basis of his idealist metaphysics.
Joachim's theory and others like it became a principal foil for G.E.
Moore and Bertrand Russell as they began to break with the
neo-Hegelian (a.k.a British Idealist) tradition, and to move toward
what eventually became Analytic Philosophy. This dynamic between the
neo-Hegelian tradition and the emerging Analytic tradition will be
illustrated below by considering Bertrand Russell's criticisms of
Joachim's theory of truth.
1. Biography
Harold Henry Joachim (1868-1938) was born in London on 28 May 1868,
the son of Henry Joachim, a wool merchant, and his wife, Ellen
Margaret (née Smart). Joachim's father had come to England from
Hungary as a child. Both sides of his family were musical—his uncle
was the famous violinist, Joseph Joachim, and his maternal grandfather
was the organist and composer, Henry Thomas Smart—and Joachim himself
was a talented violinist: talented enough to stand in occasionally for
absent members of his uncle's quartet. Early in life Joachim had
thought of becoming a professional violinist, but he seems to have
been too intimidated by his uncle's reputation. As a don at Oxford,
however, he played frequently, organized his own amateur quartet, and
was president of the University Musical Club. Musical examples and
analogies appear frequently in his philosophical writings.
Joachim was educated at Harrow School and at Balliol College, Oxford,
where he studied with the neo-Hegelian philosopher, R.L. Nettleship.
He gained a first in classical moderations in 1888 and in literae
humaniores in 1890. In 1890 he was elected to a prize fellowship at
Merton College. He lectured in moral philosophy at St. Andrews
University from 1892 to 1894, returned to Balliol as a lecturer in
1894, and in 1897 became a fellow and tutor in philosophy at Merton.
In 1919 he moved to New College in consequence of his appointment to
the Wykeham professorship of logic, a position he held until his
retirement in 1935. In 1907 he married his first cousin, Elisabeth
Anna Marie Charlotte Joachim, the daughter of his famous uncle. They
had two daughters and one son. Brand Blanshard, who was one of his
students, described him as 'a slender man with a mat of curly reddish
hair, thick-lensed glasses, a diffident manner, and a gentle, almost
deferential way of speaking' (Blanshard, 1980, p. 19). Joachim was
elected fellow of the British Academy in 1922. He died at Croyde,
Devon on 30 July 1938.
2. The Influence of F.H. Bradley
Joachim was a minor philosopher working within the neo-Hegelian
idealist movement which dominated British philosophy at the end of the
nineteenth century (cf. the article on Analytic Philosophy, section
1). Joachim's contributions to neo-Hegelianism came late in the day,
when the movement was already in decline, and this has meant that,
although his work (especially the work he did before the First World
War) was taken seriously when it appeared, it did not have the lasting
significance that its initial reception suggested.
In Joachim's day, Neo-Hegelianism was divided into two broad camps:
the personal idealists, like J.M.E. McTaggart, who held that reality
consisted of a multiplicity of inter-related individual spirits; and
the absolute idealists, led by F.H. Bradley, who held that it
consisted of a single, relationless, spiritual entity, the Absolute.
Joachim belonged firmly in the absolutist camp.
There is no doubt that the strongest philosophical influence on
Joachim was F.H. Bradley. T.S. Eliot, one of Joachim's students, wrote
that Joachim was 'the disciple of Bradley who was closest to the
master' (Eliot, 1964, p. 9) and this seems to have been a widely held
opinion. There is, indeed, a degree of truth in this, but it should
not be exaggerated. Bradley and Joachim had a long professional
association: Joachim's most productive years as a philosopher were
spent at Bradley's college, Merton, where they had neighbouring rooms.
(G.R.G. Mure (1961), reported that Joachim would shut the windows when
Mure started to criticize Bradley, lest the great man hear.)
Nonetheless, there does not seem to have been a close personal
relationship between the two philosophers, for Joachim was diffident
and Bradley was overbearing. Since Bradley did no teaching, students
who went to Oxford to learn Bradley's philosophy usually ended up
learning it from Joachim (who probably did a better job of teaching it
than Bradley would have done, for Joachim was, by all accounts, an
able teacher). After Bradley's death, it was Joachim who edited
Bradley's Collected Essays and who was responsible for completing
Bradley's famous final essay on relations which was included in that
collection. A number of letters from Bradley to Joachim have been
preserved, but only one from Joachim to Bradley (Bradley 1999).
Joachim's reputation as Bradley's closest acolyte was a mixed
blessing. On the one hand, so long as Bradley remained a force to be
reckoned with in philosophy, it ensured that Joachim's work received
careful attention; but once Bradley became a figure of mainly
historical interest, Joachim's own contributions to philosophy were
largely forgotten.
While there is no denying Bradley's influence on Joachim, it should
not be thought that Joachim's own philosophical writings were merely
elaborations of Bradley's position. In particular, the widely held
view that Joachim's most important original work, The Nature of Truth
(1906), was an elucidation (or at most an extension) of Bradley's
views on truth, is a mistake, and one which has led to decades of
misunderstanding about the theory of truth that Bradley actually held.
Joachim's theory is plainly one that is tenable only within a broadly
Bradleian metaphysics, and at the time Joachim wrote no other such
theory had been elaborated in detail. Nonetheless, Joachim himself was
far too careful a commentator to suggest that the coherence theory of
truth he put forward in The Nature of Truth was actually held by
Bradley. Moreover, when Bradley himself started writing about truth
(at about the time Joachim's book was published), he made hardly any
reference to Joachim. His collection of papers on the topic, Essays on
Truth and Reality, contain exactly one reference to Joachim: he says
merely that Joachim's book is 'interesting' and that Joachim 'did …
well to discuss once more that view [which both of them rejected] for
which truth consists in copying reality' (Bradley, 1914, p.107). This
is surely a case of damning by faint praise. And it is not
insignificant that Joachim's work on Bradley's Nachlass (his
posthumously published collected papers) mentioned above was assigned
to him not by Bradley himself, but by Bradley's sister, who was his
literary executor. Thus there is no indication that Bradley thought
his mantle should be passed to Joachim.
And there is at least one important respect in which Joachim would
have wanted to disown Bradley's mantle. Right at the end of his
posthumously published Logical Studies he ventures a fundamental
criticism of Bradley's metaphysics for not being Hegelian enough.
Bradley's Appearance and Reality ends, famously, with a chapter called
'Ultimate Doubts'. The title might seem ironical for a chapter in
which he says that 'our conclusion is certain, and … to doubt it
logically is impossible' (Bradley 1893, p. 459), but there is one
respect in which the doubt is real. While Bradley maintains that he
has proven that the Absolute is a perfect system in which 'every
possible suggestion' has its logically ordained place, yet this
'intellectual ideal' is impossible for us to grasp: 'The universe in
its diversity has been seen to be inexplicable…. Our system throughout
its detail is incomplete' (ibid., p. 458). In this respect, Joachim
maintains, Bradley's Absolute differs from Hegel's, and Hegel's is
much to be preferred (Joachim 1948, pp. 284-92). In this, Joachim
sides with the many neo-Hegelian critics of Bradley who objected to
his generally sceptical conclusions: indeed, Bradley himself described
his book as 'a sceptical study of first principles' (Bradley 1893, p.
xii). Such scepticism was not for Joachim, though there is nothing in
his entire corpus which indicates how the Absolute might, in detail,
be made explicable.
3. Writings
A complete list of Joachim's philosophical publications appears at the
end of this article. Here we will survey his most significant
writings.
Joachim's most important original work in philosophy was The Nature of
Truth (1906), a defence of the coherence theory of truth. Truth was
also the topic of three of the six papers he published in Mind.
Joachim's views on truth will be the subject of the next section, we
will forego further commentary on them here.
Apart from his work on truth, almost all his other work consisted of
scholarly studies of particular works of ancient or early modern
philosophers. His first book was an important commentary on Spinoza's
Ethics (1901), and he followed this with two translations and
commentaries (De Lineis Insecabilibus and De Generatione et
Corruptione) for W.D.Ross's edition of Aristotle's works in English
(1908, 1922). These Aristotle translations were probably his most
enduring work. His translation of De Generatione et Corruptione
remains in print, having been reprinted as recently as 1999, and it
was for many years the standard translation, being superseded only in
1982 by C.J.F. Williams' translation in the Clarendon Aristotle
Series.
The only other works he published in his lifetime were three papers
(two on scholarly points in ancient philosophy), his inaugural lecture
as Wykeham professor (a work scathingly reviewed by Russell, 1920), a
book review, and a letter to the editor of Mind.
Considerably more work appeared after his death than he had published
in his lifetime. The posthumous works were based upon the meticulously
written out lecture courses he had given at Oxford over many years.
With one exception, Logical Studies (1948), the posthumous volumes
were all scholarly studies of specific works of other philosophers: a
commentary on Spinoza's Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (1940), a
study of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (1951), and a study of
Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1957). In these
commentaries, Joachim was concerned primarily with an exact
explication de texte, and they are renowned for their meticulous
attention to detail. Stuart Hampshire (1951, pp. 9-10) said that
Joachim had written two of the three 'most careful studies of Spinoza
in English'. The carefulness of their exposition makes them well-worth
reading even today, though the philosophical language in which they
are couched and the philosophical presuppositions underlying it belong
to the largely forgotten era of late nineteenth-century idealism.
While they remain valuable commentaries, their neo-Hegelian ambiance
can be intrusive: there are occasions where Joachim seems to suggest
that if Spinoza had been a better metaphysician he would have been
Bradley.
There is no doubt that Joachim found the close reading of classic
philosophical texts especially congenial. He seems to have started the
practice as an undergraduate under the guidance of J.A. Smith at
Balliol. His relationship with Smith was close: starting in the 1890s,
they frequently worked together on the interpretation of Greek
philosophical texts and from 1923 to 1935 they gave a class each week
during term devoted to the reading of selected texts from Aristotle
(Joseph, 1938, pp. 417-20). During the vacations, Joachim prepared for
these classes with extraordinary thoroughness. Smith recalled that he
was often prepared to suggest improvements to the text, especially as
regards punctuation. Indeed, T.S. Eliot (1938) credited his
understanding of the importance of punctuation to Joachim's exposition
of the Posterior Analytics. Rather more surprising, Eliot also said
that Joachim taught that 'one should avoid metaphor wherever a plain
statement can be found'. This is surprising because Joachim's own
works, like Bradley's, are replete with metaphors, often in places
where a plain statement is imperatively demanded. Indeed, his style
seems to me a serious weakness, especially in his original
philosophical work. Where argument is called for, he has a tendency to
rhapsodize instead.
As mentioned above, only one of Joachim's posthumous books was a work
of original philosophy. This was his Logical Studies (1948), edited by
L.J. Beck from the fully written-out lectures Joachim delivered as
Wykeham professor from 1927 to 1935. Although Beck in the Preface
reports Joachim's opinion that these are 'the fullest written
expression of his own philosophical opinion', they are, frankly,
disappointing. It is indeed astonishing that material like this should
have been taught as logic at a major university as late as the 1930s.
Although it was no doubt inevitable that the major advances in formal
logic of the previous fifty years would not have featured in the
lectures of Oxford's professor of logic, it is notable that he did not
cover any of the main topics of traditional logic either – topics like
induction and deduction, names, propositions, inference, and modality;
the sort of material to be found in W.E. Johnson's Logic, which came
out about the time Joachim took up his chair. The material Joachim
covers is much more concerned with metaphysics and epistemology than
with logic.
The work contains three studies. The first deals with the question
'What is Logic?' After a long discussion, Joachim concludes that it is
'the Synthetic-Analysis or Analytic-Synthesis of Knowledge-or-Truth'
(1948, p. 43). It is impossible to make adequate sense of this
cumbersome phrase without an extended discussion of the metaphysics of
Absolute Idealism, but such a discussion falls beyond the scope of
this article (see the articles on Analytic Philosophy and G.E. Moore
for brief descriptions of the metaphysics of Idealism). Suffice it to
say that, by 'Synthetic-Analysis or Analytic-Synthesis', Joachim meant
a certain kind of mental activity that was simultaneously analytic and
synthetic:
… it brings out, makes distinct, the items of a detail by bringing
out and making distinct the modes of their connexion, the structural
unity (plan) of that whole, of which they are the detail; in a word,
so far as it is a two-edged discursus, analysing by synthesizing and
synthesizing by analysing. (p. 38)
and that, by 'Knowledge-or-Truth', he meant reality and mind
considered together as an internally-related whole:
It is truth … in the sense of reality disclosing itself and
disclosed to mind – to any and every mind; and, being truth, it is
also and eo ipso knowledge – i.e. the whole theoretical movement, the
entirety of cognizant activities, wherein the mind (any and every mind
qua intelligent) fulfils and expresses itself by co-operating with,
and participating in, the disclosure. (p. 55)
Any greater clarity on these matters is, as already stated, impossible
to achieve without a protracted discussion of Idealist metaphysics;
but even with such a discussion there remain questions about the
ultimate cogency of these views.
The second (and longest) study is an attack on the distinction between
immediate and mediate (or, as Joachim puts it, discursive) knowledge.
The bulk of the study is taken up with an attack on the notion of the
given (a datum), whether derived from introspection, sense-experience
or conceptual intuition, on which immediate knowledge could be
founded. The final study concerns truth and falsehood, and reprises
the views he set forth in The Nature of Truth. Joachim's views on
truth as presented in both of these texts will be considered in the
next section.
4. The Nature of Truth
By far, Joachim's most important contribution to philosophy was his
book The Nature of Truth (1906), in which he defends a coherence
theory of truth. Even so, nowadays the book is probably best known for
having provoked a long response from Bertrand Russell (Russell, 1907),
in which Russell set forth most of what have become the standard
arguments against coherence theories of truth.
Joachim's book had four chapters: the first was a critique of the
correspondence theory of truth; the second a critique of Russell's and
Moore's early identity theory of truth 'as a quality of independent
entities' (see the article on G.E. Moore, section 2b); the third put
forward Joachim's own coherence theory; and the fourth dealt with the
problem of error. The third part of Joachim's Logical Studies dealt
with essentially the same material in the same order, but from a
slightly different point of view.
In Logical Studies Joachim approached the topic through an
investigation of the nature of judgements (or propositions) as the
bearers of the predicates 'true' and 'false'. He first rejects, on
grounds drawn mainly from the first chapter of Bradley's Principles of
Logic, the view that a proposition is a mental fact which represents
an external reality (this is the sort of view that gives rise to the
correspondence theory of truth). Bradley's argument, which Joachim
repeats, was that beliefs, considered purely naturalistically as
mental states, could not be considered to represent or be about
anything outside themselves, any more than any other natural state
could.
Secondly, he attacks the view that a proposition is an objective,
mind-independent complex—the view which underlies the Russell-Moore
identity theory. Against the Russell-Moore view, he has two
objections: first, that the theory can give no account of how the mind
can access the proposition; second, that the theory is forced to
postulate false propositions as having the same mind-independent
complexity as true ones. There is an interesting shift of emphasis
here from his treatment in The Nature of Truth. In that earlier work,
Joachim emphasized the first objection and based it firmly in his
neo-Hegelian doctrine of internal relations—for which he was roundly
criticized by Russell (1907; see below). In Logical Studies, the
doctrine of internal relations is more or less ignored, and Joachim
concentrates on the strangeness of Russell's and Moore's propositions,
especially the strangeness of false propositions.
The third view, which Joachim endorses, is the idealist view in which
the judgement is, to put it entirely in his own words, 'the ideal
expansion of a fact – its self-development in the medium of the
discursus which is thought, and therefore through the co-operative
activity of a judging mind'. A judgement is true 'because, and in so
far as, it stands or falls with a whole system of judgements which
stand or fall with it' (Joachim, 1948, p. 262).
This account, though lacking a good deal in precision, is actually
clearer than that given in The Nature of Truth, where readers are
bewildered by a variety of different accounts, and are left to work
out for themselves how these might be regarded as descriptions of a
single concept of truth rather than of several different concepts. It
is worth quoting a few of Joachim's differing statements from The
Nature of Truth, since it will give a taste of the exegetic
difficulties involved in his work. In one place he says that anything
is true which is 'a "significant whole", or a whole possessed of
meaning for thought' (Joachim 1906, p. 66). Later he says that truth
is a 'process of self-fulfilment' and 'a living and moving whole'
(ibid., p. 77). Again later he says that it is 'the systematic
coherence which characterizes a significant whole' and 'an ideally
complete experience' (ibid., p. 78).
All of this is considerably less helpful than it might be, though it
does serve to introduce what can be taken as the central notion of
Joachim's theory, that of a 'significant whole'. Unfortunately,
Joachim gives two different accounts of even that central notion: on
pages 76 and 78 it is 'an organized individual experience,
self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled'; on p. 66, however, 'A
"significant whole" is such that all its constituent elements
reciprocally involve one another, or reciprocally determine one
another's being as contributory features in a single concrete
meaning.'
This latter account is clearer and more helpful in understanding his
actual view. The idea that all the elements of a significant whole
'reciprocally involve' one another amounts to the claim that the
intrinsic properties of each part determine the intrinsic properties
of all the others. It is the intrinsic properties of each element that
are determined because Joachim, in common with other neo-Hegelians,
subscribes to a doctrine of internal relations, according to which
relations are grounded in the intrinsic properties (or 'natures', to
use Joachim's word) of their terms. So the relations of the various
parts are determined once the intrinsic properties are.
Bertrand Russell, in his critique of Joachim's theory, argues that
Joachim's version of the coherence theory of truth entails and is
entailed by the doctrine of internal relations:
It follows at once from [the doctrine of internal relations] that
the whole of reality or of truth must be a significant whole in Mr.
Joachim's sense. For each part will have a nature which exhibits its
relations to every other part and to the whole; hence, if the nature
of any one part were completely known, the nature of the whole and of
every other part would also be completely known; while conversely, if
the nature of the whole were completely known, that would involve
knowledge of its relations to each part, and therefore of the
relations of each part to each other part, and therefore of the nature
of each part. It is also evident that, if reality or truth is a
significant whole in Mr. Joachim's sense, the axiom of internal
relations must be true. Hence the axiom is equivalent to the monist
theory of truth. (Russell 1907, p. 140)
Russell's argument is swift, but, when unpacked fully, can be shown to
be valid (see Griffin 2008). Russell, of course, rejects the doctrine
of internal relations, which he goes on to criticize at length, but he
also has several other criticisms to make of the theory which are
independent of the theory of relations.
One serious problem faced by all coherence theories of truth is that
of eliminating the possibility of there being two distinct significant
wholes, i.e., two competing, but equally coherent, systems of
propositions, for then the theory would entail that there were two
incompatible sets of truths. Joachim tries to avoid this by requiring
that a significant whole which constitutes truth must have 'absolutely
self-contained significance' (Joachim 1906, p. 78); he maintains that
there can be only one such significant whole, the Absolute itself.
It is hardly certain that this follows, but, even if it does, the
result is still problematic. If the Absolute is the only significant
whole, then only what is part of the Absolute can be true. Now, as we
have seen, Joachim (at least in his late work) rejects the
ineffability with which Bradley shrouded the Absolute. And yet he also
rejects the possibility that the significant wholes into which we
compose our actual beliefs ever coincide exactly with the Absolute. It
follows then—and Joachim accepts the implication—that all our actual
beliefs are false. But he holds also that they are all, also, to some
degree true, since each to some degree coheres with the others. This
'degrees of truth' doctrine is the expected, if somewhat
counter-intuitive, consequence of a coherence theory of truth: since
coherence comes in degrees, so, too, must truth (Joachim, 1948, pp.
262-3). It seems, then, that all our beliefs are more or less true,
according as they form significant wholes which come more or less
close to coinciding with the Absolute. This is certainly an
intelligible view, but ultimately it does not look like a coherence
theory: truth simpliciter consists in the coincidence of belief with
the Absolute, and 'coincidence' here looks very much like another name
for correspondence; coherence is merely a measure of verisimilitude,
the degree to which beliefs approach coincidence with the Absolute.
Nor is it a theory which would have Bradley's acceptance, for
Bradley's argument for the claim that it is logically impossible to
doubt his account of the Absolute, rests on the claim that any idea
'which seems hostile to our scheme … [is] an element which really is
contained within it' (Bradley, 1893, p. 460), that the Absolute
contains every possible 'idea'. But if this is the case, then, on
Joachim's theory of truth, either all beliefs are absolutely true or
else the Absolute is not absolutely coherent.
Joachim is thus faced with two problems: (i) the problem of accounting
for error in a theory in which every belief is to some degree true;
and (ii) the problem (as Joachim puts it, 1948, pp. 266-9) of deciding
whether, given that the Absolute must be absolutely coherent, our
beliefs are true because they are stages in an unending dialectical
movement towards the Absolute or because they are part of the
timelessly complete Absolute itself.
Joachim's response to (i), in The Nature of Truth, is to claim that
error consists in 'an insistent belief in the completeness of my
partial knowledge' (1906, p. 144): '[t]he erring subject's confident
belief in the truth of his knowledge distinctively characterizes
error, and converts a partial truth into falsity' (ibid., p. 162).
This is hardly satisfactory. Russell's rebuttal is too brief and too
amusing not to quote:
Now this view has one great merit, namely, that it makes error
consist wholly and solely in rejection of the monistic theory of
truth. As long as this theory is accepted, no judgment is an error; as
soon as it is rejected, every judgment is an error…. If I affirm, with
a 'confident belief in the truth of my knowledge', that Bishop Stubbs
used to wear episcopal gaiters, that is an error; if a monistic
philosopher, remembering that all finite truth is only partially true,
affirms that Bishop Stubbs was hanged for murder, that is not an
error. (Russell 1907, p. 135)
As regards (ii), in The Nature of Truth Joachim finds the problem
insoluble: 'We must be able to conceive the one significant whole,
whose coherence is perfect truth, as a self-fulfilment, in which the
finite, temporal, and contingent aspect receives its full recognition
and its full solution as the manifestation of the timeless and
complete' (1906, p. 169). But 'the demands just made cannot be
completely satisfied by any metaphysical theory' and we must recognize
'that certain demands both must be and cannot be completely satisfied'
(p. 171). Moreover, as he goes on to point out, since the coherence
theory cannot satisfy these demands, it cannot itself be coherent, and
thus cannot be true (p. 176). This is a somewhat surprising end to his
discussion.
In Logical Studies he is slightly, but only slightly, more sanguine.
There, as we have seen, he appeals, over Bradley's head, to the
Hegelian dialectic to reconcile the timeless ideal with the temporal
approximation. But how this effect is achieved he doesn't say.
5. References and Further Reading
a. Primary Sources
The following list includes all Joachim's philosophical writings.
i. Books
A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901).
The Nature of Truth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906).
De Lineis Insecabilibus (translation, with full footnotes) in The
Works of Aristotle, ed. by W.D. Ross, vol. 6 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1908.
Immediate Experience and Mediation. Inaugural Lecture. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1919).
De Generatione et Corruptione. (translation, with a few footnotes.) in
The Works of Aristotle, ed. by W.D. Ross, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1922).
Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away. A revised text of the De
Generatione et Corruptione with introduction and commentary. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1922).
Spinoza's Tractatus De Intellectus Emendatione: A Commentary (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1940).
Logical Studies, ed. by L.J. Beck (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948).
Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics. A Commentary, ed. by D.A. Rees
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951).
Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind, ed. by Errol Harris
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1957).
ii. Articles
1903. 'Aristotle's Conception of Chemical Combination', The Journal of
Philology, vol. 29, pp. 72-86.
1905. '"Absolute" and "Relative" Truth', Mind, vol. 14, n.s., pp. 1-14.
1907. Review of Dr. S.R.T. Ross's edition of Aristotle's De Sensu et
Memoria. (Text and Translation, with Introduction and Commentary:
Cambridge University Press, 1906.) Mind, vol. 16, n.s., pp. 266-71.
1907. 'A Reply to Mr. Moore', Mind, vol. 16, n.s., pp. 410-15.
1909. 'Psychical Process', Mind, vol. 18, n.s., pp. 65-83.
1911. 'The Platonic Distinction between "True" and "False" Pleasures
and Pains', Philosophical Review, vol. 20, pp. 471-97.
1914. 'Some Preliminary Considerations on Self-Identity', Mind, vol.
23, n.s., pp. 41-59.
1919. 'The "Correspondence-Notion" of Truth', Mind, vol. 27, n.s., pp. 330-5.
1920. 'The Meaning of "Meaning"' (Symposium), Mind, vol. 29, n.s., pp. 385-414.
1927. 'The Attempt to conceive the Absolute as a Spiritual Life', The
Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 2, pp. 137-52.
1931. '"Concrete" and "Abstract" Identity' (Letter), Mind, vol. 40,
n.s., p. 533.
b. Secondary Sources
Blanshard, Brand (1980), 'Autobiography', in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The
Philosophy of Brand Blanshard (Chicago: Open Court), pp. 2-185.
Bradley, F.H. 1893, Appearance and Reality. A Metaphysical Essay
(Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2nd edn., 9th impression, 1930).
[The work which most strongly influenced Joachim's philosophy.]
Bradley, F.H. (1914), Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Bradley, F.H. (1999) The Collected Works of F.H. Bradley, vols. 4 and
5, ed. by Carol A. Keene (Bristol: Thoemmes) [Contains Bradley's
letters to Joachim, but only one of Joachim's to Bradley.]
Connelly, James and Rabin, Paul (1996), 'The Correspondence between
Bertrand Russell and Harold Joachim', Bradley Studies, 2, pp. 131-60.
[Transcribes most of the extant correspondence between Joachim and
Russell; most of it connected with the theory of truth.]
Eliot, T.S. (1938), 'Prof. H.H. Joachim' The Times, 4 August 1938.
Eliot, T.S. (1964), 'Preface' to Eliot, Knowledge and Experience in
the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley, (New York: Farrar, Straus). [This was
Eliot's Harvard doctoral dissertation completed in 1916 and written
under Joachim's supervision.]
Eliot, T.S. (1988) The Letters of T.S. Eliot, vol. 1, 1898-1922,
edited by Valerie Eliot (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich).
[Eliot's letters from Oxford, especially to his former Harvard
professor, J.H. Woods, contain much information about Joachim's
classes.]
Griffin, Nicholas 2008, 'Bertrand Russell and Harold Joachim',
Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, n.s. 27, pp. [A
survey, biographical and philosophical, of Joachim's relations with
Russell, his most persistent critic.]
Hampshire, Stuart (1951), Spinoza (Harmsworth: Penguin).
Joseph, H.W.B. (1938), 'Harold Henry Joachim, 1868-1938', Proceedings
of the British Academy, 24 (1938), pp. 396-422. [The best published
source for biographical information about Joachim.]
Khatchadourian, Haig 1961, The Coherence Theory of Truth: A Critical
Examination (Beirut: American University) [A careful critique of a
number of coherence theories of truth, including Joachim's.]
Moore, G.E. (1907), 'Mr. Joachim's Nature of Truth', Mind, n.s. 16
(1907), pp. 229-35. [Reply to The Nature of Truth.]
Mure, G.R.G. (1961) 'F.H. Bradley – Towards a Portrait', Encounter,
16: pp. 28-35.
Mure, G.R.G. and Schofield, M.J. (2004), 'Joachim, Harold Henry
(1868-1938)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford
University Press).
Rabin, Paul (1997), 'Harold Henry Joachim (1868-1938)', presented at
the Anglo-Idealism Conference, Oxford, July 1997. [A good compilation
of biographical information about Joachim from various sources;
unfortunately never published.]
Russell, Bertrand (1906), 'What is Truth?', The Independent Review
(June, 1906), pp. 349-53. [Review of Joachim's The Nature of Truth.]
Russell, Bertrand (1906a), 'The Nature of Truth', Mind, 15 (1906), pp.
528-33. [Reply to Joachim's criticisms of Russell's early identity
theory of truth.]
Russell, Bertrand, (1907) 'The Monistic Theory of Truth' in Russell's
Philosophical Essays (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968; 1st edn.
1910), pp. 131-46. [The most important critique of Joachim's coherence
theory of truth.]
Russell, Bertrand (1920), 'The Wisdom of our Ancestors', The Collected
Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 9, Essays on Language, Mind and
Matter, 1919-26, edited by John G. Slater (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988),
pp. 403-6. [Review of Joachim's inaugural lecture.]
Vander Veer, Garrett L. 1970, Bradley's Metaphysics and the Self (New
Haven: Yale University Press), pp. 81-90. [An unusual discussion of
Joachim as a critic of Bradley, based on the final pages of Logical
Studies.]
Walker, Ralph (2000), 'Joachim on the Nature of Truth' in W.J. Mander
(ed.), Anglo-American Idealism, 1865-1927 (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood
Press, 2000), pp. 183-97. [One of the few recent articles on Joachim's
coherence theory of truth.]
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