considered by many scholars to be one of the founders of sophism, a
movement traditionally associated with philosophy, that emphasizes the
practical application of rhetoric toward civic and political life. The
sophists were itinerant teachers who accepted fees in return for
instruction in oratory and rhetoric, and many claimed they could teach
anything and its opposite (thesis and antithesis). Another aspect of
their method was the ability to make the weaker argument the stronger.
The term sophist in classical Greek was a general appellation denoting
a "wise man." They were important figures in Greece in the 4th and 5th
centuries, and their social success was great. Plato was the first to
use the term rhêtorikê, while the sophists termed their "art" logos .
Nevertheless, Gorgias is commonly associated with the development of
rhetoric in classical Greece. The democratic process in Athens
supplied the need for instruction in both rhetoric and philosophy.
1. Life and WorksGorgias (483-375 B.C.E.) came to Greece from Leontini
in Sicily. Little is known of his life before he arrived in Athens in
427 B.C.E. as a political ambassador seeking military assistance
against Syracuse, a city-state in Sicily. He delivered a series of
speeches that dazzled the Athenian audiences and won him fame and
admiration. Upon completion of his mission, he traveled throughout
Greece as a teacher of rhetoric and as an orator, and according to
Aristotle, spoke at the Panhellenic festivals (Art of Rhetoric
1414b29). He was a student of Empedocles, and according to Quintilian
and others, was the teacher of Isocrates. Plato identifies Meno (Meno
76Aff) among the students of Gorgias, and he may have been one of
Aspasia's instructors as well. Many of the sophists set up schools and
charged fees in return for instruction in rhetoric, and Gorgias was no
exception. Philostratus (Lives of the Sophists I 9, I) tells us that
Gorgias began the practice of extemporaneous oratory, and that he had
the boldness to say "'suggest a subject' …he was the first to proclaim
himself willing to take the chance, showing apparently that he knew
everything and would trust the moment to speak on any subject." He
died at the age of 108 at Larissa in Thessaly.
Four works are attributed to Gorgias: On the Nonexistent or On Nature,
the Apology of Palamedes, the Encomium on Helen, and the Epitaphios or
Athenian Funeral Oration. The original text of On Nature has been
lost, and survives only in two different paraphrases, one in Sextus
Empiricus' Against the Professors and another in an anonymous work
entitled Melissus, Xenophanes, Gorgias. There are two different
manuscripts of Palamedes and Helen (the Cripps and Palatine versions),
one slightly different than the other. Legal historians consider the
Defense of Palamedes to be an important contribution to dicanic
[explanatory] argumentation, and some cultural historians believe the
Epitaphios was used as a stylistic and genre source for Plato's
Menexenus (Cosigny 2). Gorgias' rhyming style is highly poetic, and he
viewed the orator as an individual leading a kind of group
incantation. He employs metaphor and figurative expressions to
illustrate his assertions, and even uses humor as one instrument of
refutation. The term macrologia (using more words than necessary in an
effort to appear eloquent) is sometimes used to describe his
oratorical technique (Kennedy 63).
2. Philosophy
Any student of Gorgias must immediately mark the distinction between
his philosophy as expressed by Plato in the dialogue Gorgias (see
below) and his philosophy found within the three works: On the
Nonexistent, the Apology of Palamedes, and the Encomium on Helen.
a. Ontology & Epistemology
Nowhere is Gorgias' sophistical love of paradox more evident than in
the short treatise On the Nonexistent or On Nature. The subject of
this work is ontological (concerning nature of being), but it also
deals with language and epistemology (the study of the nature and
limitations of knowledge). In addition to this, it can be understood
as an exercise in sophistical rhetoric; Gorgias tackles an argument
that is seemingly impossible to refute, namely that, after considering
our world, we must come to the conclusion that "things exist." His
powerful argument to the contrary proves his abilities as a master of
oratory, and some believe the text was used as an advertisement of his
credentials.
Gorgias begins his argument by presenting a logical contradiction, "if
the nonexistent exists, it will both exist and not exist at the same
time" (B3.67) (a violation of the principle of non-contradiction). He
then denies that existence (to on) itself exists, for if it exists, it
is either eternal or generated. If it is eternal, it has no beginning,
and is therefore without limit. If it is without limit, it is
"nowhere" (B3.69), and hence does not exist. And if existence is
generated, it must come from something, and that something is
existence, which is another contradiction. Likewise, nonexistence (to
mê on) cannot produce anything (B3.71). The sophist then explains that
existence can neither be "one" (hen) or "many" (polla), since if it
were one, it would be divisible, and therefore not one. If it were
many, it would be a "composite of separate entities" (B3.74) and no
longer the thing known as existence.
Gorgias then turns his attention to what is knowable and
comprehensible. He remarks, "if things considered [imagined or
thought] in the mind are not existent, the existent is not considered"
(B3.77), that is to say, existence is incomprehensible. This
supposition is backed up by the fact that one can imagine chariots
racing in the sea, but that does not make such a thing happen. The
operation of the mind (intellection) is fundamentally distinct from
what happens in the real world; "the existent is not an object of
consideration and is not apprehended" (B3.82). It is helpful to think
of apprehension here in Aristotelian terms, as simple apprehension,
the first operation of reasoning (logic) in which the intellect
"grasps" or "apprehends" something. Simple apprehension happens when
the mind first forms a concept of something in the world, and is
anterior to judgment.
Finally, Gorgias proclaims that even if existence could be
apprehended, "it would be incapable of being conveyed to another"
(B3.83). This is because what we reveal to another is not an external
substance, but is merely logos (from the Greek verb lego, "to say"–see
below). Logos is not "substances and existing things" (B3.84).
External reality becomes the revealer of logos (B3.85); while we can
know logos, we cannot apprehend things directly. The color white, for
instance, goes from a property of a thing, to a mental representation,
and the representation is different than the thing itself. In its
summation, this nihilistic argument becomes a "trilemma":
i. Nothing exists
ii. Even if existence exists, it cannot be known
iii. Even if it could be known, it cannot be communicated.
This argument has led some to label Gorgias as either an ontological
skeptic or a nihilist (one who believes nothing exists, or that the
world is incomprehensible, and that the concept of truth is
fictitious). But it can also be interpreted as an assertion that it is
logos and logos alone which is the proper object of our inquiries,
since it is the only thing we can really know. On Nature is sometimes
seen as a refutation of pre-Socratic essentialist philosophy
(McComiskey 37).
b. Rhetorical Theory
Most of what we know concerning Gorgias' views on rhetoric comes from
the Encomium. This work can be understood as a sophistical effort to
rehabilitate the reputation of Helen of Troy. In it, Gorgias attempts
to take the weaker argument and make it the stronger one, by arguing
for a position contrary to well-established opinion: in this case, the
opinion that Helen was to blame for the Trojan War. Gorgias argues
that Helen succumbed either to (a) physical force (Paris' abduction),
(b) love (eros), or (c) verbal persuasion (logos), and in any
instance, she cannot be blamed for her actions. According to Gorgias,
logos is a powerful force that can be used nefariously to convince
people to do things against their own interests. It can take the form
of poetry (metrical language), divine incantations, or oratory. Logos
is described as a "powerful lord" (B11.8) and "[t]he effect of speech
upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of drugs
over the nurture of bodies" (B11.14). This should be contrasted with
the view of Isocrates that logos is a "chief" or "commander" (Nicoles
5-9). The difference here is subtle, but Gorgias' dynastic concept of
logos clearly turns it into a despotic overlord, while Isocrates'
"commander" is a leader with delegated authority, an individual who
fights along side his troops.
Examples of persuasive speech, according to Gorgias, are the
"conflicts among the philosophers' arguments in which the swiftness of
demonstration and judgment make the belief in any opinion changeable"
(B11.13). This is similar to the assertion of Sextus Empiricus that
equally convincing arguments can be formed against, or in favor of,
any subject. Gorgias may have believed in a relative notion of truth
that was contingent upon a particular kairos (an opportune moment or
"opening"), that is to say, truth can only be found within a given
moment. He seems to reject the idea of truth as a philosophically
universal principle, and thus comes into conflict with Plato and
Aristotle. Nevertheless, the rhetor (orator) is ethically obligated to
avoid deception, and it is "the duty of the same man both to declare
what he should rightly and to refute what has been spoken falsely"
(B11.2). Ultimately, Gorgias' opinion concerning truth is difficult to
ascertain, but from his writings, we can conclude that he was more
concerned with rhetorical argument than the truth of any given
proposition or assertion.
In the epideictic speech Defense of Palamedes, Gorgias uses a mythical
narrator (Palamedes) to further illustrate his rhetorical technique
and philosophy. In the Odyssey, Palamedes was responsible for
revealing Odysseus' "madness" as a fiction, an act for which the
latter never forgave him. Ultimately, Palamedes was executed for
treason, after Odysseus accused him of conspiring with the Trojans.
Gorgias focuses on the invention of arguments (topoi) necessary to
exonerate Palamedes within the setting of a fictional trial, all of
which depend upon probability. Palamedes could not have committed
treason with a foreign power since he speaks no language other than
Greek (B11a.6-7), and no Greek desires social power among barbarians
(B11a.13). In the second example, we see that topoi "embody the values
of the community, in the sense that they comprise what the community
considers important" (Cosigny 84). A fundamental difference between
the topoi found within Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric and Gorgias' topoi
is that Aristotle's are "acontextual, while Gorgias places his in the
narrative context of the Palamedes myth" (McComiskey 49). Therefore,
there is a direct relationship between kairos and invention.
Gorgias rejects the use of pathos (emotional appeal) in his Defense,
with the assertion that "among you, who are the foremost of the Greeks
…there is no need to persuade such ones as you with the aid of friends
and sorrowful prayers and lamentations" (B11a.33). He prefers to use
ethos (ethical appeal, or arguments from character) and logos, as his
instruments of persuasion.
3. Critics
Gorgias' most famous critic is Plato. In the dialogue Gorgias, Plato
(through his mentor Socrates) expresses his contempt for sophistical
rhetoric; all rhetoric is "a phantom of a branch of statesmanship
(463d) …a kind of flattery …that is contemptible," because its aim is
simply pleasure rather than the welfare of the public. Nor can
rhetoric be considered an art (technê), since it is irrational (465a).
The end result of rhetoric is a cosmetic alteration of language that
conceals truth and falsity (465b). Furthermore, rhetoric is "designed
to produce conviction, but not educate people, about matters of right
or wrong (455a). The character of Gorgias in the dialogue is forced to
admit that his "art" deals with opinion (doxa) rather than knowledge
(epistemê); that its intention is to persuade rather than to instruct,
and that rhetoric deals with language without regard to content.
Gorgias is portrayed as a man with an ambivalent attitude towards
truth, a relativist, who boldly asserts that it does not matter if one
truly has knowledge of any given subject, only that he is perceived by
others to have knowledge, and that "[r]hetoric is the only area of
expertise you need to learn. You can ignore all the rest and still get
the better of the professionals!" (459c).
There are a number of explanations for Plato's antipathy towards
sophistic rhetoric. The first is simply philosophical; Plato was not a
relativist, nor did he believe rhetoric had a pedagogical value. But
there is also a political element to be considered. Bruce McComiskey
points out that Plato believed in an "oligarchic government" for
Athens, while many of the sophists "favored the Athenian Democracy the
way it was" (20). It is important to point out that during Gorgias'
lifetime, both Leontini and Athens were democratic city states and a
loose alliance existed between the two. On a more practical level, the
Greek city states also served as a market for those who would sell
instruction in rhetoric.
Aristotle dismisses Gorgias as a "frigid" stylist who indulges in
excessive use of compound words such as "begging-poet-flatterers" and
"foresworn and well-sworn" (Art of Rhetoric 1405b34). He also faults
Gorgias for overly poetic language (1406b4), and we can see examples
of this in Gorgias' description of logos as a great dynast or lord
(B11.8) and as a "drug" (B11.14). The sophist compares orators to
"frogs croaking in water"(B3.30), and philosophers to the "suitors of
Penelope" (B3.29).
Despite efforts by G.W.F Hegel and George Grote toward rehabilitating
the reputations of Gorgias and the other sophists in the 19th century,
the sophists still had a foul reputation well into the 20th century
(as evidenced by the pejorative term "sophistry"). In 1930, French
philosopher Jacques Maritain remarked "[s]ophistry is not a system of
ideas, but a vicious attitude of the mind;" the sophists "came to
consider as the most desirable form of knowledge the art of refuting
and disproving by skillful arguments" (32-33). In recent years,
however, modernists and post-structuralists have found great value in
the philosophy of Gorgias, especially his theories on truth and
language.
————————————-
Note: the citations above regarding Gorgias' statements follow the
alpha-numeric system used by Sprague (see below) in the text The Older
Sophists (B3=On Non-Being, B11=Encomium on Helen, B11a=Defense of
Palamedes).
4. References and Further Reading
Aristotle. The Art of Rhetoric. Trans. John Henry Freese. London: WM
Heinemann, 1967.
Barrett, Harold. The Sophists: Rhetoric, Democracy, and Plato's Idea
of Sophistry. Novata: Chandler & Sharp, 1987.
Consigny, Scott. Gorgias: Sophist and Artist. Columbia: University of
South Carolina, 2001.
Freeman, Kathleen. Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers.
Cambridge: Harvard, 1948.
Gorgias. Encomium of Helen. Trans. Douglas MacDowell. Glasgow: Bristol
Classics, 1982.
Isocrates. Isocrates. 3 vols. Trans. George Norlin and LaRue Van Hook.
Cambridge: Harvard, 1968.
Jarratt, Susan. "The First Sophists and the Uses of History." Rhetoric
Review 6 (1987): 67-77.
Jarratt, Susan C. Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured
. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press,
1991.
Kennedy, George. The Art of Persuasion in Greece. Princeton N.J.:
Princeton University, 1963.
Kerferd, G.B. "The First Greek Sophists." Classical Review 64 (1950): 8-10.
Marias, Julian. History of Philosophy. New York: Dover, 1967.
Maritain, Jacques. Introduction to Philosophy. Westminster MD:
Christian Classics, 1991.
McComiskey, Bruce. Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric. Carbondale:
Southern Illinois, 2002.
Plato. Gorgias. Trans. Robin Waterford. Oxford: Oxford, 1994.
Poulakos, John. Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece. Columbia:
University Of South Carolina, 1995.
Schiappa, Edward. "Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage?" Rhetoric
Review 10 (1991):5-18.
Sprague, Rosamund Kent, ed. The Older Sophists. Columbia: University
of South Carolina, 1972.
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