G. W. F. Hegel: Social and Political Thought

hegelGeorg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) is one of the greatest
systematic thinkers in the history of Western philosophy. In addition
to epitomizing German idealist philosophy, Hegel boldly claimed that
his own system of philosophy represented an historical culmination of
all previous philosophical thought. Hegel's overall encyclopedic
system is divided into the science of Logic, the philosophy of Nature,
and the philosophy of Spirit. Of most enduring interest are his views
on history, society, and the state, which fall within the realm of
Objective Spirit. Some have considered Hegel to be a nationalistic
apologist for the Prussian State of the early 19th century, but his
significance has been much broader, and there is no doubt that Hegel
himself considered his work to be an expression of the
self-consciousness of the World Spirit of his time. At the core of
Hegel's social and political thought are the concepts of freedom,
reason, self-consciousness, and recognition. There are important
connections between the metaphysical or speculative articulation of
these ideas and their application to social and political reality, and
one could say that the full meaning of these ideas can be grasped only
with a comprehension of their social and historical embodiment. The
work that explicates this concretizing of ideas, and which has perhaps
stimulated as much controversy as interest, is the Philosophy of Right
(Philosophie des Rechts), which will be a main focus of this essay.

1. Biography

G.W.F. Hegel was born in Stuttgart in 1770, the son of an official in
the government of the Duke of Württemberg. He was educated at the
Royal Highschool in Stuttgart from 1777-88 and steeped in both the
classics and the literature of the European Enlightenment. In October,
1788 Hegel began studies at a theological seminary in Tübingen, the
Tüberger Stift, where he became friends with the poet Hölderlin and
philosopher Friedrich Schelling, both of whom would later become
famous. In 1790 Hegel received an M.A. degree, one year after the fall
of the Bastille in France, an event welcomed by these young idealistic
students. Shortly after graduation, Hegel took a post as tutor to a
wealthy Swiss family in Berne from 1793-96. In 1797, with the help of
his friend Hölderlin, Hegel moved to Frankfurt to take on another
tutorship. During this time he wrote unpublished essays on religion
which display a certain radical tendency of thought in his critique of
orthodox religion.

In January 1801, two years after the death of his father, Hegel
finished with tutoring and went to Jena where he took a position as
Privatdozent (unsalaried lecturer) at the University of Jena, where
Hegel's friend Schelling had already held a university professorship
for three years. There Hegel collaborated with Schelling on a Critical
Journal of Philosophy (Kritisches Journal der Philosophie) and he also
published a piece on the differences between the philosophies of
Fichte and Schelling (Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen
Systems der Philosophie) in which preference was consistently
expressed for the latter thinker. After having attained a
professorship in 1805, Hegel published his first major work, the
Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes, 1807) which was
delivered to the publisher just at the time of the occupation of Jena
by Napoleon's armies. With the closing of the University, due to the
victory of the French in Prussia, Hegel had to seek employment
elsewhere and so he took a job as editor of a newspaper in Bamberg,
Bavaria in 1807 (Die Bamberger Zeitung) followed by a move to
Nuremberg in 1808 where Hegel became headmaster of a preparatory
school (Gymnasium), roughly equivalent to a high school, and also
taught philosophy to the students there until 1816. During this time
Hegel married, had children, and published his Science of Logic
(Wissenschaft der Logik) in three volumes.

One year following the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo (1815), Hegel
took the position of Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Heidelberg where he published his first edition of the Encyclopedia of
the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (Encyklopädie der
philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, 1817). In 1818 he became
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin, through the
invitation of the Prussion minister von Altenstein (who had introduced
many liberal reforms in Prussia until the fall of Napoleon), and Hegel
taught there until he died in 1831. Hegel lectured on various topics
in philosophy, most notably on history, art, religion, and the history
of philosophy and he became quite famous and influential. He held
public positions as a member of the Royal Examination Commission of
the Province of Brandenberg and also as a councellor in the Ministry
of Education. In 1821 he published the Philosophy of Right
(Philosophie des Rechts) and in 1830 was given the honor of being
elected Rector of the University. On November 14, 1831 Hegel died of
cholera in Berlin, four months after having been decorated by
Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia.

2. Political Writings

Apart from his philosophical works on history, society, and the state,
Hegel wrote several political tracts most of which were not published
in his lifetime but which are significant enough in connection to the
theoretical writings to deserve some mention. (These are published in
English translation in Hegel's Political Writings and Political
Writings, listed in the bibliography of works by Hegel below.)

Hegel's very first political work was on "On the Recent Domestic
Affairs of Wurtemberg" (Über die neuesten innern Verhältnisse
Württembergs…, 1798) which was neither completed nor published. In it
Hegel expresses the view that the constitutional structure of
Wurtemberg requires fundamental reform. He condemns the absolutist
rule of Duke Ferdinand along with the narrow traditionalism and legal
positivism of his officials and welcomes the convening of the Estates
Assembly, while disagreeing with the method of election in the Diet.
In contrast to the existing system of oligarchic privilege, Hegel
argues that the Diet needs to be based on popular election through
local town councils, although this should not be done by granting
suffrage to an uneducated multitude. The essay ends inconclusively on
the appropriate method of political representation.

A quite long piece of about 100 pages, The German Constitution (Die
Verfassung Deutchlands) was written and revised by Hegel between 1799
and 1802 and was not published until after his death in 1893. This
piece provides an analysis and critique of the constitution of the
German Empire with the main theme being that the Empire is a thing of
the past and that appeals for a unified German state are
anachronistic. Hegel finds a certain hypocrisy in German thinking
about the Empire and a gap between theory and practice in the German
constitution. Germany was no longer a state governed by law but rather
a plurality of independent political entities with disparate
practices. Hegel stresses the need to recognize that the realities of
the modern state necessitate a strong public authority along with a
populace that is free and unregimented. The principle of government in
the modern world is constitutional monarchy, the potentialities of
which can be seen in Austria and Prussia. Hegel ends the essay on an
uncertain note with the idea that Germany as a whole could be saved
only by some Machiavellian genius.

The essay "Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of
Württemberg, 1815-1816″ was published in 1817 in the Heidelbergische
Jahrbücher. In it Hegel commented on sections of the official report
of the Diet of Württemberg, focusing on the opposition by the Estates
to the King's request for ratification of a new constitutional charter
that recognized recent liberalizing changes and reforms. Hegel sided
with King Frederick and criticized the Estates as being reactionary in
their appeal to old customary laws and feudal property rights. There
has been controversy over whether Hegel here was trying to gain favor
with the King in order to attain a government position. However,
Hegel's favoring a sovereign kingdom of Wurtemberg over the German
Empire and the need for a constitutional charter that is more rational
than the previous are quite continuous with the previous essays. A
genuine state needs a strong and effective central public authority,
and in resisting the Estates are trying to live in the feudal past.
Moreover, Hegel is not uncritical of the King's constitutional
provisions and finds deficiencies in the exclusion of members of
professions from the Estates Assembly as well as in the proposal for
direct suffrage in representation, which treats citizens like
unintegrated atomic units rather than as members of a political
community.

The last of Hegel's political tracts, "The English Reform Bill," was
written in installments in 1831 for the ministerial newspaper, the
Preussische Staatszeitung, but was interrupted due to censure by the
Prussian King because of the perception of its being overly critical
and anti-English. As a result, the remainder of the work was printed
independently and distributed discretely. Hegel's main line of
criticism is that the proposed English reforms of suffrage will not
make much of a difference in the distribution of political power and
may only create a power struggle between the rising group of
politicians and the traditional ruling class. Moreover, there are deep
problems in English society that cannot be addressed by the proposed
electoral reforms, including political corruption in the English
burroughs, the selling of seats in parliament, and the general
oligarchic nature of social reality including the wide disparities
between wealth and poverty, Ecclesiastical patronage, and conditions
in Ireland. While Hegel supports the idea of reform with its appeal to
rational change as against the "positivity" of customary law,
traditionalism and privilege, he thinks that universalizing suffrage
with a property qualification without a thorough reform of the system
of Common Law and the existing social conditions will only be
perceived as token measures leading to greater disenchantment among
the newly enfranchised and possibly inclinations to violent
revolution. Hegel claims that national pride keeps the English from
studying and following the reforms of the European Continent or
seriously reflecting upon and grasping the nature of government and
legislation.

There are several overall themes that reoccur in these political
writings and that connect with some of the main lines of thought in
Hegel's theoretical works. First, there is the contrast between the
attitude of legal positivism and the appeal to the law of reason.
Hegel consistently displays a "political rationalism" which attacks
old concepts and attitudes that no longer apply to the modern world.
Old constitutions stemming from the Feudal era are a confused mixture
of customary laws and special privileges that must give way to the
constitutional reforms of the new social and political world that has
arrived in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Second, reforms of
old constitutions must be thorough and radical, but also cautious and
gradual. This might sound somewhat inconsistent, but for Hegel a
reform is radical due to a fundamental change in direction, not the
speed of such change. Hegel suggests that customary institutions not
be abolished too quickly for there must be some congruence and
continuity with the existing social conditions. Hegel rejects violent
popular action and sees the principal force for reform in governments
and the estates assemblies, and he thinks reforms should always stress
legal equality and the public welfare. Third, Hegel emphasizes the
need for a strong central government, albeit without complete
centralized control of public administration and social relations.
Hegel here anticipates his later conception of civil society
(bürgerliche Gesellschaft), the social realm of individual autonomy
where there is significant local self-governance. The task of
government is not to thoroughly bureaucratize civil society but rather
to provide oversight, regulation, and when necessary intervention.
Fourth, Hegel claims that representation of the people must be popular
but not atomistic. The democratic element in a state is not its sole
feature and it must be institutionalized in a rational manner. Hegel
rejects universal suffrage as irrational because it provides no means
of mediation between the individual and the state as a whole. Hegel
believed that the masses lacked the experience and political education
to be directly involved in national elections and policy matters and
that direct suffrage leads to electoral indifference and apathy.
Fifth, while acknowledging the importance of a division of powers in
the public authority, Hegel does not appeal to a conception of
separation and balance of powers. He views the estates assemblies,
which safeguard freedom, as essentially related to the monarch and
also stresses the role of civil servants and members of the
professions, both in ministerial positions and in the assemblies. The
monarchy, however, is the central supporting element in the
constitutional structure because the monarch is invested with the
sovereignty of the state. However, the power of the monarch is not
despotical for he exercises authority through universal laws and
statutes and is advised and assisted by a ministry and civil service,
all members of which must meet educational requirements.

3. The Jena Writings (1802-06)

Hegel wrote several pieces while at the University of Jena that point
in the direction of some of the main theses of the Philosophy of
Right. The first was entitled "On the Scientific Modes of Treatment of
Natural Law–Its Place in Practical Philosophy and Its Relationship to
the Positive Science of Law" (Über die wissenschaftlichen
Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts…), published originally in the
Kritisches Journal der Philosophie in 1802, edited jointly by Hegel
and Schelling. In this piece, usually referred to as the essay on
Natural Law, Hegel criticizes both the empirical and formal approaches
to natural law, as exemplified in British and Kantian philosophy
respectively. Empiricism reaches conclusions that are limited by the
particularities of its contexts and materials and thus cannot provide
universally valid propositions regarding the concepts of various
social and political institutions or of the relation of reflective
consciousness to social and political experience. Formalist
conclusions, on the other hand, are too insubstantial and abstract in
failing to properly link human reason concretely to human experience.
Traditional natural law theories are based on an abstract rationalism
and the attempts of Rousseau, Kant, and Fichte to remedy this through
their various ethical conceptions fail to overcome abstractness. For
Hegel, the proper method of philosophical science must link concretely
the development of the human mind and its rational powers to actual
experience. Moreover, the concept of a social and political community
must transcend the instrumentalizing of the state.

Hegel's work entitled "The System of Ethical Life" (System der
Sittlichkeit) was written in 1802-03 and first published in its
entirety by Georg Lasson in 1913 in a volume entitled Schriften zur
Politik und Rechtsphilosophie. In this work, Hegel develops a
philosophical theory of social and political development that
correlates with the self-development of essential human powers.
Historically, humans begin in an immediate relation to nature and
their social existence takes the form of natürliche Sittlichkeit,
i.e., a non-selfconscious relation to nature and to others. However,
the satisfaction of human desires leads to their reproduction and
multiplication and leads to the necessity for labor, which induces
transformation in the human world and people's connections to it. This
process leads to a self-realization that undermines the original naïve
unity with nature and others and to the formation of overtly
cooperative endeavors, e.g., in the making and use of tools. Another
result of labor is the emergence of private property as an embodiment
of human personality as well as of sets of legal relationships that
institutionalize property ownership, exchange, etc., and deal with
crimes against property. Furthermore, disparities in property and
power lead to relationships of subordination and the use of the labor
of others to satisfy one's increasingly complex and expanded desires.
Gradually, a system of mutual dependence, a "system of needs,"
develops, and along with the increasing division of labor there also
develops class differentiations reflecting the types of labor or
activity taken up by members of each class, which Hegel classifies
into the agricultural, acquisitive, and administerial classes.
However, despite relations of interdependence and cooperation the
members of society experience social connections as a sort of blind
fate without some larger system of control which is provided by the
state which regulates the economic life of society. The details of the
structure of the state are unclear in this essay, but what is clear is
that for Hegel the state provides an increased rationality to social
practices, much in the sense that the later German sociologist Max
Weber (1864-1920) would articulate how social practices become more
rational by being codified and made more predictable.

The manuscripts entitled Realphilosophie are based on lectures Hegel
delivered at Jena University in 1803-04 (Realphilosophie I) and
1805-06 (Realphilosophie II), and were originally published by
Johannes Hoffmeister in 1932. These writings cover much of the same
ground as the System der Sittlichkeit in explicating a philosophy of
mind and human experience in relation to human social and political
development. Some of the noteworthy ideas in these writings are the
role and significance of language for social consciousness, for giving
expression to a people (Volk) and for the comprehending of and mastery
of the world, and the necessity and consequences of the fragmentation
of primordial social relationships and patterns as part of the process
of human development. Also, there is a reiteration of the importance
of property relations as crucial to social recognition and how there
would be no security of property or recognition of property rights if
society were to remain a mere multitude of families. Such security
requires a system of control over the "struggle for recognition"
through interpersonal norms, rules, and juridical authority provided
by the nation state. Moreover, Hegel repeats the need for strong state
regulation of the economy, which if left to its own workings is blind
to the needs of the social community. The economy, especially through
the division of labor, produces fragmentation and diminishment of
human life (compare Marx on alienation) and the state must not only
address this phenomenon but also provide the means for the people's
political participation to further the development of social
self-consciousness. In all of this Hegel appears to be providing a
philosophical account of modern developments both in terms of the
tensions and conflicts that are new to modernity as well as in the
progressive movements of reform found under the influence of Napoleon.

Finally, Hegel also discusses the forms of government, the three main
types being tyranny, democracy, and hereditary monarchy. Tyranny is
found typically in primitive or undeveloped states, democracy exists
in states where there is the realization of individual identity but no
split between the public and private person, and hereditary monarchy
is the appropriate form of political authority in the modern world in
providing strong central government along with a system of indirect
representation through Estates. The relation of religion to the state
is undeveloped in these writings, but Hegel is clear about the
supereminent role of the state that stands above all else in giving
expression to the Spirit (Geist) of a society in a sort of earthly
kingdom of God, the realization of God in the world. True religion
complements and supports this realization and thus cannot properly
have supremacy over or be opposed to the state.

4. The Phenomenology of Spirit

The Phenomenology of Spirit (Die Phänomenologie des Geistes),
published in 1807, is Hegel's first major comprehensive philosophical
work. Originally intended to be the first part of his comprehensive
system of science (Wissenschaft) or philosophy, Hegel eventually
considered it to be the introduction to his system. This work provides
what can be called a "biography of spirit," i.e., an account of the
development of consciousness and self-consciousness in the context of
some central epistemological, anthropological and cultural themes of
human history. It has continuity with the works discussed above in
examining the development of the human mind in relation to human
experience but is more wide-ranging in also addressing fundamental
questions about the meaning of perceiving, knowing, and other
cognitive activities as well as of the nature of reason and reality.
Given the focus of this essay, the themes of the Phenomenology to be
discussed here are those directly relevant to Hegel's social and
political thought.

One of the most widely discussed places in the Phenomenology is the
chapter on "The Truth of Self-Certainty" which includes a subsection
on "Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and
Bondage." This section treats of the (somewhat misleadingly named)
"master/slave" struggle which is taken by some, especially the
Marxian-inspired, as a paradigm of all forms of social conflict, in
particular the struggle between social classes. It is clear that Hegel
intended the scenario to typify certain features of the struggle for
recognition (Anerkennung) overall, be it social, personal, etc. The
conflict between master and slave (which shall be referred to
hereafter as lord and bondsman as more in keeping with Hegel's own
terminology and the intended generic meaning) is one in which the
historical themes of dominance and obedience, dependence and
independence, etc., are philosophically introduced. Although this
specific dialectic of struggle occurs only at the earliest stages of
self-consciousness, it nonetheless sets up the main problematic for
achieving realized self-consciousness–the gaining of self-recognition
through the recognition of and by another, through mutual recognition.

According to Hegel, the relationship between self and otherness is the
fundamental defining characteristic of human awareness and activity,
being rooted as it is in the emotion of desire for objects as well as
in the estrangement from those objects, which is part of the
primordial human experience of the world. The otherness that
consciousness experiences as a barrier to its goal is the external
reality of the natural and social world, which prevents individual
consciousness from becoming free and independent. However, that
otherness cannot be abolished or destroyed, without destroying
oneself, and so ideally there must be reconciliation between self and
other such that consciousness can "universalize" itself through the
other. In the relation of dominance and subservience between two
consciousnesses, say lord and bondsman, the basic problem for
consciousness is the overcoming of its otherness, or put positively,
the achieving of integration with itself. The relation between lord
and bondsman leads to a sort of provisional, incomplete resolution of
the struggle for recognition between distinct consciousnesses.

Hegel asks us to consider how a struggle between two distinct
consciousnesses, let us say a violent "life-or-death" struggle, would
lead to one consciousness surrendering and submitting to the other out
of fear of death. Initially, the consciousness that becomes lord or
master proves its freedom through willingness to risk its life and not
submit to the other out of fear of death, and thus not identify simply
with its desire for life and physical being. Moreover, this
consciousness is given acknowledgement of its freedom through the
submission and dependence of the other, which turns out paradoxically
to be a deficient recognition in that the dominant one fails to see a
reflection of itself in the subservient one. Adequate recognition
requires a mirroring of the self through the other, which means that
to be successful it must be mutual. In the ensuing relationship of
lordship and bondage, furthermore, the bondsman through work and
discipline (motivated by fear of dying at the hands of the master or
lord) transforms his subservience into a mastery over his environment,
and thus achieves a measure of independence. In objectifying himself
in his environment through his labor the bondsman in effect realizes
himself, with his transformed environment serving as a reflection of
his inherently self-realizing activity. Thus, the bondsman gains a
measure of independence in his subjugation out of fear of death. In a
way, the lord represents death as the absolute subjugator, since it is
through fear of this master, of the death that he can impose, that the
bondsman in his acquiescence and subservience is placed into a social
context of work and discipline. Yet despite, or more properly, because
of this subjection the bondsman is able to attain a measure of
independence by internalizing and overcoming those limitations which
must be dealt with if he is to produce efficiently. However, this
accomplishment, the self-determination of the bondsman, is limited and
incomplete because of the asymmetry that remains in his relation to
the lord. Self-consciousness is still fragmented, i.e., the
objectification through labor that the bondsman experiences does not
coincide with the consciousness of the lord whose sense of self is not
through labor but through power over the bondsman and enjoyment of the
fruits of the bondsman's labor. Only in a realm of ethical life can
self-determination be fully self-conscious to the extent that
universal freedom is reflected in the life of each individual member
of society.

Thus, in the Phenomenology consciousness must move on through the
phases of Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness before
engaging in the self-articulation of Reason, and it is not until the
section "Objective Spirit: The Ethical Order" that the full
universalization of self-consciousness is in principle to be met with.
Here we find a shape of human existence where all men work freely,
serving the needs of the whole community rather than of masters, and
subject only to the "discipline of reason." This mode of ethical life,
typified in ancient Greek democracy, also eventually disintegrates, as
is expressed in the conflict between human and divine law and the
tragic fate that is the outcome of this conflict illustrated in the
story of Antigone. However, the ethical life described here is still
in its immediacy and is therefore at a level of abstractness that
falls short of the mediation of subjectivity and universality which is
provided spiritually in revealed Christianity and politically in the
modern state, which purportedly provides a solution to human conflict
arising from the struggle for recognition. In any case, the rest of
the Phenomenology is devoted to examinations of culture (including
enlightenment and revolution), morality, religion, and finally,
Absolute Knowing.

The dialectic of self-determination is, for Hegel, inherent in the
very structure of freedom, and is the defining feature of Spirit
(Geist). The full actualization of Spirit in the human community
requires the progressive development of individuality which
effectively begins with the realization in self-consciousness of the
"truth of self-certainty" and culminates in the shape of a shared
common life in an integrated community of love and Reason, based upon
the realization of truths of incarnation, death, resurrection, and
forgiveness as grasped in speculative Religion. The articulation Hegel
provides in the Phenomenology, however, is very generic and is to be
made concrete politically with the working out of a specific
conception of the modern nation-state with its particular
configuration of social and political institutions. It is to the
latter that we must turn in order to see how these fundamental
dialectical considerations take shape in the "solution" to the
struggle for recognition in self-consciousness. However, before moving
directly to Hegel's theory of the state, and history, some discussion
of his Logic is in order.

5. Logic and Political Theory

The Logic constitutes the first part of Hegel's philosophical system
as presented in his Encyclopedia. It was preceded by his larger work,
The Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik), published in 1812-16 in
two volumes. The "Encyclopedia Logic" is a shorter version intended to
function as part of an "outline," but it became longer in the course
of the three published versions of 1817, 1827, and 1830. Also, the
English translation by William Wallace contains additions from the
notes of students who heard Hegel's lectures on this subject.
(Reference to the paragraphs of the Encyclopedia will be made with the
"¶" character.)

The structure of the Logic is triadic, reflecting the organization of
the larger system of philosophy as well as a variety of other motifs,
both internal and external to the Logic proper. The Logic has three
divisions: the Doctrine of Being, the Doctrine of Essence, and the
Doctrine of the Notion (or Concept). There are a number of logical
categories in this work that are directly relevant to social and
political theorizing. In the Doctrine of Being, for example, Hegel
explains the concept of "being-for-self" as the function of
self-relatedness in the resolving of opposition between self and other
in the "ideality of the finite" (¶ 95-96). He claims that the task of
philosophy is to bring out the ideality of the finite, and as will be
seen later Hegel's philosophy of the state is intended to articulate
the ideality of the state, i.e., its affirmative and infinite or
rational features. In the Doctrine of Essence, Hegel explains the
categories of actuality and freedom. He says that actuality is the
unity of "essence and existence" (¶ 142) and argues that this does not
rule out the actuality of ideas for they become actual by being
realized in external existence. Hegel will have related points to make
about the actuality of the idea of the state in society and history.
Also, he defines freedom not in terms of contingency or lack of
determination, as is popular, but rather as the "truth of necessity,"
i.e., freedom presupposes necessity in the sense that reciprocal
action and reaction provide a structure for free action, e.g., a
necessary relation between crime and punishment.

The Doctrine of the Notion (Begriff) is perhaps the most relevant
section of the Logic to social and political theory due to its focus
on the various dynamics of development. This section is subdivided
into three parts: the subjective notion, the objective notion, and the
idea which articulates the unity of subjective and objective. The
first part, the subjective notion, contains three "moments" or
functional parts: universality, particularity, and individuality (¶
163ff). These are particularly important as Hegel will show how the
functional parts of the state operate according to a progressive
"dialectical" movement from the first to the third moments and how the
state as a whole, as a functioning and integrated totality, gives
expression to the concept of individuality (in ¶198 Hegel refers to
the state as "a system of three syllogisms"). Hegel treats these
relationships as logical judgments and syllogisms but they do not
merely articulate how the mind must operate (subjectivity) but also
explain actual relationships in reality (objectivity). In objective
reality we find these logical/dialectical relationships in mechanism,
chemism, and teleology. Finally, in the Idea, the correspondence of
the notion or concept with objective reality, we have the truth of
objects or objects as they ought to be, i.e., as they correspond to
their proper concepts. The logical articulation of the Idea is very
important to Hegel's explanation of the Idea of the state in modern
history, for this provides the principles of rationality that guide
the development of Spirit in the world and that become manifested in
various ways in social and political life.

6. The Philosophy of Right

In 1821, Hegel's Philosophy of Right orginally appeared under the
double title Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaften in Grundrisse;
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Natural Law and the Science of
the State; Elements of the Philosophy of Right). The work was
republished by Eduard Gans in 1833 and 1854 as part of Hegel's Werke,
vol. viii and included additions from notes taken by students at
Hegel's lectures. The English language translation of this work by T.
M. Knox refers to these later editions as well as to an edition
published in 1923 by Georg Lasson, which included corrections from
previous editions.

The Philosophy of Right constitutes, along with Hegel's Philosophy of
History, the penultimate section of his Encyclopedia, the section on
Objective Spirit, which deals with the human world and its array of
social rules and institutions, including the moral, legal, religious,
economic, and political as well as marriage, the family, social
classes, and other forms of human organization. The German word Recht
is often translated as 'law', however, Hegel clearly intends the term
to have a broader meaning that captures what we might call the good or
just society, one that is "rightful" in its structure, composition,
and practices.

In the Introduction to this work Hegel explains the concept of his
philosophical undertaking along with the specific key concepts of
will, freedom, and right. At the very beginning, Hegel states that the
Idea of right, the concept together with its actualization, is the
proper subject of the philosophical science of right (¶ 1). Hegel is
emphatic that the study is scientific in that it deals in a systematic
way with something essentially rational. He further remarks that the
basis of scientific procedure in a philosophy of right is explicated
in philosophical logic and presupposed by the former (¶ 2).
Furthermore, Hegel is at pains to distinguish the historical or legal
approach to "positive law" (Gesetz) and the philosophical approach to
the Idea of right (Recht), the former involving mere description and
compilation of laws as legal facts while the latter probes into the
inner meaning and necessary determinations of law or right. For Hegel
the justification of something, the finding of its inherent
rationality, is not a matter of seeking its origins or longstanding
features but rather of studying it conceptually.

However, there is one sense in which the origin of right is relevant
to philosophical science and this is the free will. The free will is
the basis and origin of right in the sense that mind or spirit (Geist)
generally objectifies itself in a system of right (human social and
political institutions) that gives expression to freedom, which Hegel
says is both the substance and goal of right (¶ 4). This ethical life
in the state consists in the unity of the universal and the subjective
will. The universal will is contained in the Idea of freedom as its
essence, but when considered apart from the subjective will can be
thought of only abstractly or indeterminately. Considered apart from
the subjective or particular will, the universal will is "the element
of pure indeterminacy or that pure reflection of the ego into itself
which involves the dissipation of every restriction and every content
either immediately presented by nature, by needs, desires, and
impulses, or given and determined by any means whatever" (¶ 5). In
other words, the universal will is that moment in the Idea of freedom
where willing is thought of as state of absolutely unrestrained
volition, unfettered by any particular circumstances or limitations
whatsoever–the pure form of willing. This is expressed in the modern
libertarian view of completely uncoerced choice, the absence of
restraint (or "negative liberty" as understood by Thomas Hobbes). The
subjective will, on the other hand, is the principle of activity and
realization that involves "differentiation, determination, and
positing of a determinacy as a content and object" (¶ 6). This means
that the will is not merely unrestrained in acting but that it
actually can give expression to the doing or accomplishing of certain
things, e.g., through talent or expertise (sometimes called "positive
freedom"). The unity of both the moments of abstract universality (the
will in-itself) and subjectivity or particularity (the will
for-itself) is the concrete universal or true individuality (the will
in-and-for-itself). According to Hegel, preservation of the
distinction of these two moments in the unity (identity-in-difference)
between universal and particular will is what produces rational
self-determination of an ego, as well as the self-consciousness of the
state as a whole. Hegel's conception of freedom as self-determination
is just this unity in difference of the universal and subjective will,
be it in the willing by individual persons or in the expressions of
will by groups of individuals or collectivities. The "negative
self-relation" of this freedom involves the subordination of the
natural instincts, impulses, and desires to conscious reflection and
to goals and purposes that are consciously chosen and that require
commitment to rational principles in order to properly guide action.

The overall structure of the Philosophy of Right is quite remarkable
in its "syllogistic" organization. The main division of the work
corresponds to what Hegel calls the stages in the development of "the
Idea of the absolutely free will," and these are Abstract Right,
Morality, and Ethical Life. Each of these divisions is further
subdivided triadically: under Abstract Right there is Property,
Contract, and Wrong; under Morality falls Purpose and Responsibility,
Intention and Welfare, and Good and Conscience; finally, under Ethical
Life comes the Family, Civil Society, and the State. These last
subdivisions are further subdivided into triads, with fourth level
subdivisions occurring under Civil Society and the State. This triadic
system of rubrics is no mere description of a static model of social
and political life. Hegel claims that it gives expression to the
conceptual development of Spirit in human society based upon the
purely logical development of rationality provided in his Logic. Thus,
it is speculatively based and not derivable from empirical survey,
although the particularities of the system do indeed correspond to our
experience and what we know about ourselves anthropologically,
culturally, etc.

The transition in the Logic from universality to particularity to
individuality (or concrete universality) is expressed in the social
and political context in the conceptual transition from Abstract Right
to Morality to Ethical Life. In the realm of Abstract Right, the will
remains in its immediacy as an abstract universal that is expressed in
personality and in the universal right to possession of external
things in property. In the realm of Morality, the will is no longer
merely "in-itself," or restricted to the specific characteristics of
legal personality, but becomes free "for-itself," i.e., it is will
reflected into itself so as to produce a self-consciousness of the
will's infinity. The will is expressed, initially, in inner conviction
and subsequently in purpose, intention, and conviction. As opposed to
the merely juridical person, the moral agent places primary value on
subjective recognition of principles or ideals that stand higher than
positive law. At this stage, universality of a higher moral law is
viewed as something inherently different from subjectivity, from the
will's inward convictions and actions, and so in its isolation from a
system of objectively recognized legal rules the willing subject
remains "abstract, restricted, and formal" (¶ 108). Because the
subject is intrinsically a social being who needs association with
others in order to institutionalize the universal maxims of morality,
maxims that cover all people, it is only in the realm of Ethical Life
that the universal and the subjective will come into a unity through
the objectification of the will in the institutions of the Family,
Civil Society, and the State.

In what follows, we trace through Hegel's systematic development of
the "stages of the will," highlighting only the most important points
as necessary to get an overall view of this work.

a. Abstract Right

The subject of Abstract Right (Recht) is the person as the bearer or
holder of individual rights. Hegel claims that this focus on the right
of personality, while significant in distinguishing persons from mere
things, is abstract and without content, a simple relation of the will
to itself. The imperative of right is: "Be a person and respect others
as persons" (¶ 36). In this formal conception of right, there is no
question of particular interests, advantages, motives or intentions,
but only the mere idea of the possibility of choosing based on the
having of permission, as long as one does not infringe on the right of
other persons. Because of the possibilities of infringement, the
positive form of commands in this sphere are prohibitions.

(1) Property (the universality of will as embodied in things)

A person must translate his or her freedom into the external world "in
order to exist as Idea" (¶ 41), thus abstract right manifests itself
in the absolute right of appropriation over all things. Property is
the category through which one becomes an object to oneself in that
one actualizes the will through possession of something external.
Property is the embodiment of personality and of freedom. Not only can
a person put his or her will into something external through the
taking possession of it and of using it, but one can also alienate
property or yield it to the will of another, including the ability to
labor for a restricted period of time. One's personality is
inalienable and one's right to personality imprescriptible. This means
one cannot alienate all of one's labor time without becoming the
property of another.

(2) Contract (the positing of explicit universality of will)

In this sphere, we have a relation of will to will, i.e., one holds
property not merely by means of the subjective will externalized in a
thing, but by means of another's person's will, and implicitly by
virtue of one's participation in a common will. The status of being an
independent owner of something from which one excludes the will of
another is thus mediated in the identification of one's will with the
other in the contractual relation, which presupposes that the
contracting parties "recognize each other as persons and property
owners" (¶ 71). (Note the significant development here beyond the
dialectic of lord and bondsman.) Moreover, when contract involves the
alienation or giving up of property, the external thing is now an
explicit embodiment of the unity of wills. In contractual relations of
exchange, what remains identical as the property of the individuals is
its value, in respect to which the parties to the contract are on an
equal footing, regardless of the qualitative external differences
between the things exchanged. "Value is the universal in which the
subjects of the contract participate" (¶ 77).

(3) Wrong (the particular will opposing itself to the universal)

In immediate relations of persons to one another it is possible for a
particular will to be at variance with the universal through
arbitrariness of decision and contingency of circumstance, and so the
appearance (Erscheinung) of right takes on the character of a show
(Schein), which is the inessential, arbitrary, posing as the
essential. If the "show" is only implicit and not explicit also, i.e.,
if the wrong passes in the doer's eyes as right, the wrong is
non-malicious. In fraud a show is made to deceive the other party and
so in the doer's eyes the right asserted is only a show. Crime is
wrong both in itself and from the doer's point of view, such that
wrong is willed without even the pretense or show of right. Here the
form of acting does not imply a recognition of right but rather is an
act of coercion through exercise of force. It is a "negatively
infinite judgement" in that it asserts a denial of rights to the
victim, which is not only incompatible with the fact of the matter but
also self-negating in denying its own capacity for rights in
principle.

The penalty that falls on the criminal is not merely just but is "a
right established within the criminal himself, i.e., in his
objectively embodied will, in his action," because the crime as the
action of a rational being implies appeal to a universal standard
recognized by the criminal (¶ 100). The annulling of crime in this
sphere of immediate right occurs first as revenge, which as
retributive is just in its content, but in its form it is an act of a
subjective will and does not correspond with its universal content and
hence as a new transgression is defective and contradictory (¶ 102).
All crimes are comparable in their universal property of being
injuries, thus, in a sense it is not something personal but the
concept itself which carries out retribution.

Crime, as the will which is implicitly null, contains its negation in
itself, which is its punishment.

The nullity of crime is that it has set aside right as such, but since
right is absolute it cannot be set aside. Thus, the act of crime is
not something positive, not a first thing, but is something negative,
and punishment is the negation of crime's negation.

b. Morality

The demand for justice as punishment rather than as revenge, with
regard to wrong, implies the demand for a will which, though
particular and subjective, also wills the universal as such. In wrong
the will has become aware of itself as particular and has opposed
itself to and contradicted the universal embodied in rights. At this
stage the universally right is abstract and one-sided and thus
requires a move to a higher level of self-consciousness where the
universally right is mediated by the particular convictions of the
willing subject. We go beyond the criminal's defiance of the universal
by substituting for the abstract conception of personality the more
concrete conception of subjectivity. The criminal is now viewed as
breaking his own law, and his crime is a self-contradiction and not
only a contradiction of a right outside him. This recognition brings
us to the level of morality (Moralität) where the will is free both in
itself and for itself, i.e., the will is self-conscious of its
subjective freedom.

At the level of morality the right of the subjective will is embodied
in immediate wills (as opposed to immediate things like property). The
defect of this level, however, is that the subject is only for itself,
i.e., one is conscious of one's subjectivity and independence but is
conscious of universality only as something different from this
subjectivity. Therefore, the identity of the particular will and the
universal will is only implicit and the moral point of view is that of
a relation of "ought-to-be," or the demand for what is right. While
the moral will externalizes itself in action, its self-determination
is a pure "restlessness" of activity that never arrives at
actualization.

The right of the moral will has three aspects. First, there is the
right of the will to act in its external environment, to recognize as
its actions only those that it has consciously willed in light of an
aim or purpose (purpose and responsibility). Second, in my intention I
ought to be aware not simply of my particular action but also of the
universal which is conjoined with it. The universal is what I have
willed and is my intention. The right of intention is that the
universal quality of the action is not merely implied but is known by
the agent, and so it lies from the start in one's subjective will.
Moreover, the content of such a will is not only the right of the
particular subject to be satisfied but is elevated to a universal end,
the end of welfare or happiness (intention and welfare). The welfare
of many unspecified persons is thus also an essential end and right of
subjectivity. However, right as an abstract universal and welfare as
abstract particularity, may collide, since both are contingent on
circumstances for their satisfaction, e.g., in cases where claims of
right or welfare by someone may endanger the life of another there can
be a counter-claim to a right of distress. "This distress reveals the
finitude and therefore the contingency of both right and welfare" (¶
128). This "contradiction" between right and welfare is overcome in
the third aspect of the moral will, the good which is "the Idea as the
unity of the concept of the will with the particular will" (¶ 129).

In addition to the right of the subjective will that whatever it
recognizes as valid shall be seen by it as good, and that an action
shall be imputed to it as good or evil in accordance with its
knowledge of the worth which the action has in its external
objectivity (¶ 132), which together constitute a "right of insight,"
the will also must recognize the good as its duty, which is, to begin
with, duty for duty's sake, or duty formally and without content
(e.g., as expressed in the Kantian "categorical imperative"). Because
of this lack of content, the subjective will in its abstract
reflection into itself is "absolute inward certainty (Gewißheit) of
self," or conscience (Gewissen). While true or authentic conscience is
the disposition to will what is absolutely good, and thus correspond
with what is objectively right, purely formal conscience lacks an
objective system of principles and duties. Although conscience is
ideally supposed to mean the identity of subjective knowing and
willing with the truly good, when it remains the subjective inner
reflection of self-consciousness into itself its claim to this
identity is deficient and one-sided. Moreover, when the determinate
character of right and duty reduces to subjectivity, the mere
inwardness of the will, there is the potentiality of elevating the
self-will of particular individuals above the universal itself, i.e.,
of "slipping into evil" (¶ 139). What makes a person evil is the
choosing of natural desires in opposition to the good, i.e., to the
concept of the will. When an individual attempts to pass off his or
her action as good, and thus imposing it on others, while being aware
of the discrepancy between its negative character and the objective
universal good, the person falls into hypocrisy. This is one of
several forms of perverse moral subjectivity that Hegel discusses at
length in his remarks (¶ 140).

c. Ethical Life

Hegel's analysis of the moral implications of "good and conscience"
leads to the conclusion that a concrete unity of the objective good
with the subjectivity of the will cannot be achieved at the level of
personal morality since all attempts at this are problematic. The
concrete identity of the good with the subjective will occurs only in
moving to the level of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), which Hegel says
is "the Idea of freedom…the concept of freedom developed into the
existing world and the nature of self-consciousness" (¶ 142). Thus,
ethical life is permeated with both objectivity and subjectivity:
regarded objectively it is the state and its institutions, whose force
(unlike abstract right) depends entirely on the self-consciousness of
citizens, on their subjective freedom; regarded subjectively it is the
ethical will of the individual which (unlike the moral will) is aware
of objective duties that express one's inner sense of universality.
The rationality of the ethical order of society is thus constituted in
the synthesis of the concept of the will, both as universal and as
particular, with its embodiment in institutional life.

The synthesis of ethical life means that individuals not only act in
conformity with the ethical good but that they recognize the authority
of ethical laws. This authority is not something alien to individuals
since they are linked to the ethical order through a strong
identification which Hegel says "is more like an identity than even
the relation of faith or trust" (¶ 147). The knowledge of how the laws
and institutions of society are binding on the will of individuals
entails a "doctrine of duties." In duty the individual finds
liberation both from dependence on mere natural impulse, which may or
may not motivate ethical actions, and from indeterminate subjectivity
which cannot produce a clear view of proper action. "In duty the
individual acquires his substantive freedom" (¶ 149). In the
performance of duty the individual exhibits virtue when the ethical
order is reflected in his or her character, and when this is done by
simple conformity with one's duties it is rectitude. When individuals
are simply identified with the actual ethical order such that their
ethical practices are habitual and second nature, ethical life appears
in their general mode of conduct as custom (Sitten). Thus, the ethical
order manifests its right and validity vis-à-vis individuals. In duty
"the self-will of the individual vanishes together with his private
conscience which had claimed independence and opposed itself to the
ethical substance. For when his character is ethical, he recognizes as
the end which moves him to act the universal which is itself unmoved
but is disclosed in its specific determinations as rationality
actualized. He knows that his own dignity and the whole stability of
his particular ends are grounded in this same universal, and it is
therein that he actually attains these" (¶ 152). However, this does
not deny the right of subjectivity, i.e., the right of individuals to
be satisfied in their particular pursuits and free activity; but this
right is realized only in belonging to an objective ethical order. The
"bond of duty" will be seen as a restriction on the particular
individual only if the self-will of subjective freedom is considered
in the abstract, apart from an ethical order (as is the case for both
Abstract Right and Morality). "Hence, in this identity of the
universal will with the particular will, right and duty coalesce, and
by being in the ethical order a man has rights in so far as he has
duties, and duties in so far as he has rights" (¶ 155).

In the realm of ethical life the logical syllogism of
self-determination of the Idea is most clearly applied. The moments of
universality, particularity, and individuality initially are
represented respectively in the institutions of the family, civil
society, and the state. The family is "ethical mind in its natural or
immediate phase" and is characterized by love or the feeling of unity
in which one is not conscious of oneself as an independent person but
only as a member of the family unit to which one is bound. Civil
society, on the other hand, comprises an association of individuals
considered as self-subsistent and who have no conscious sense of unity
of membership but only pursue self-interest, e.g., in satisfying
needs, acquiring and protecting property, and in joining organizations
for mutual advantage. Finally, the constitution of the political state
brings together in a unity the sense of the importance of the whole or
universal good along with the freedom of particularity of individual
pursuits and thus is "the end and actuality of both the substantial
order and the public life devoted thereto" (¶ 157).

i. The Family

The family is characterized by love which is "mind's feeling of its
own unity," where one's sense of individuality is within this unity,
not as an independent individual but as a member essentially related
to the other family members. Thus, familial love implies a
contradiction between, on the one hand, not wanting to be a
self-subsistent and independent person if that means feeling
incomplete and, on the other hand, wanting to be recognized in another
person. Familial love is truly an ethical unity, but because it is
nonetheless a subjective feeling it is limited in sustaining unity
(pars. 158-59, and additions).

(A) Marriage

The union of man and woman in marriage is both natural and spiritual,
i.e., is a physical relationship and one that is also self-conscious,
and it is entered into on the basis of the free consent of the
persons. Since this consent involves bringing two persons into a
union, there is the mutual surrender of their natural individuality
for the sake of union, which is both a self-restriction and also a
liberation because in this way individuals attain a higher
self-consciousness.

(B) Family Capital

The family as a unit has its external existence in property,
specifically capital (Vermögen) which constitutes permanent and
secured possessions that allow for endurance of the family as "person"
(¶ 170). This capital is the common property of all the family
members, none of whom possess property of their own, but it is
administered by the head of the family, the husband.

(C) Education of Children & Dissolution of the Family

Children provide the external and objective basis for the unity of
marriage. The love of the parents for their children is the explicit
expression of their love for each other, while their immediate
feelings of love for each other are only subjective. Children have the
right to maintenance and education, and in this regard a claim upon
the family capital, but parents have the right to provide this service
to the children and to instill discipline over the wishes of their
children. The education of children has a twofold purpose: the
positive aim of instilling ethical principles in them in the form of
immediate feeling and the negative one of raising them out of the
instinctive physical level. Marriage can be dissolved not by whim but
by duly constituted authority when there is total estrangement of
husband and wife. The ethical dissolution of the family results when
the children have been educated to be free and responsible persons and
they are of mature age under the law. The natural dissolution of the
family occurs with the death of the parents, the result of which is
the passing of inheritance of property to the surviving family
members. The disintegration of the family exhibits its immediacy and
contingency as an expression of the ethical Idea (pars. 173-80).

ii. Civil Society

With civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) we move from the family
or "the ethical idea still in its concept," where consciousness of the
whole or totality is focal, to the "determination of particularity,"
where the satisfaction of subjective needs and desires is given free
reign (pars. 181-182). However, despite the pursuit of private or
selfish ends in relatively unrestricted social and economic activity,
universality is implicit in the differentiation of particular needs
insofar as the welfare of an individual in society is intrinsically
bound up with that of others, since each requires another in some way
to effectively engage in reciprocal activities like commerce, trade,
etc. Because this system of interdependence is not self-conscious but
exists only in abstraction from the individual pursuit of need
satisfaction, here particularity and universality are only externally
related. Hegel says that "this system may be prima facie regarded as
the external state, the state based on need, the state as the
Understanding (Verstand) envisages it" (¶ 183). However, civil society
is also a realm of mediation of particular wills through social
interaction and a means whereby individuals are educated (Bildung)
through their efforts and struggles toward a higher universal
consciousness.

(A) The System of Needs

This dimension of civil society involves the pursuit of need
satisfaction. Humans are different from animals in their ability to
multiply needs and differentiate them in various ways, which leads to
their refinement and luxury. Political economy discovers the necessary
interconnections in the social and universalistic side of need. Work
is the mode of acquisition and transformation of the means for
satisfying needs as well as a mode of practical education in abilities
and understanding. Work also reveals the way in which people are
dependent upon one another in their self-seeking and how each
individual contributes to the need satisfaction of all others. Society
generates a "universal permanent capital" (¶ 199) that everyone in
principle can draw upon, but the natural inequalities between
individuals will translate into social inequalities. Furthermore,
labor undergoes a division according to the complexities of the system
of production, which is reflected in social class divisions: the
agricultural (substantial or immediate); the business (reflecting or
formal); and the civil servants (universal). Membership in a class is
important for gaining status and recognition in a civil society. Hegel
says that "A man actualizes himself only in becoming something
definite, i.e., something specifically particularized; this means
restricting himself exclusively to one of the particular spheres of
need. In this class-system, the ethical frame of mind therefore is
rectitude and esprit de corps, i.e., the disposition to make oneself a
member of one of the moments of civil society by one's own act … in
this way gaining recognition both in one's own eyes and in the eyes of
others" (¶ 207).

The "substantial" agricultural class is based upon family
relationships whose capital is in the products of nature, such as the
land, and tends to be patriarchial, unreflective, and oriented toward
dependence rather than free activity. In contrast to this focus on
"immediacy," the business class is oriented toward work and
reflection, e.g., in transforming raw materials for use and exchange,
which is a form of mediation of humans to one another. The main
activities of the business class are craftsmanship, manufacture, and
trade. The third class is the class of civil servants, which Hegel
calls the "universal class" because it has the universal interests of
society as its concern. Members of this class are relieved from having
to labor to support themselves and maintain their livelihood either
from private resources such as inheritance or are paid a salary by the
state as members of the bureaucracy. These individuals tend to be
highly educated and must qualify for appointment to government
positions on the basis of merit.

(B) Administration of Justice

The principle of rightness becomes civil law (Gesetz) when it is
posited, and in order to have binding force it must be given
determinate objective existence. To be determinately existent, laws
must be made universally known through a public legal code. Through a
rational legal system, private property and personality are given
legal recognition and validity in civil society, and wrongdoing now
becomes an infringement, not merely of the subjective right of
individuals but also of the larger universal will that exists in
ethical life. The court of justice is the means whereby right is
vindicated as something universal by addressing particular cases of
violation or conflict without mere subjective feeling or private bias.
"Instead of the injured party, the injured universal now comes on the
scene, and … this pursuit consequently ceases to be the subjective and
contingent retribution of revenge and is transformed into the genuine
reconciliation of right with itself, i.e, into punishment" (¶ 220).
Moreover, court proceedings and legal processes must take place
according to rights and rules of evidence; judicial proceedings as
well as the laws themselves must be made public; trial should be by
jury; and punishment should fit the crime. Finally, in the
administration of justice, "civil society returns to its concept, to
the unity of the implicit universal with the subjective particular,
although here the latter is only that present in single cases and the
universality in question is that of abstract right" (¶ 229).

(C) The Police and the Corporation

The Police (Polizei) for Hegel is understood broadly as the public
authorities in civil society. In addition to crime fighting
organizations, it includes agencies that provide oversight over public
utilities as well as regulation of and, when necessary, intervention
into activities related to the production, distribution, and sale of
goods and services, or with any of the contingencies that can affect
the rights and welfare of individuals and society generally (e.g.,
defense of the public's right not to be defrauded, and also the
management of goods inspection). Also, the public authority
superintends education and organizes the relief of poverty. Poverty
must be addressed both through private charity and public assistance
since in civil society it constitutes a social wrong when poverty
results in the creation of a class of "penurious rabble" (¶ 245).
Society looks to colonization to increase its wealth but poverty
remains a problem with no apparent solution.

The corporation (Korporation) applies especially to the business
class, since this class is concentrated on the particularities of
social existence and the corporation has the function of bringing
implicit similarities between various private interests into explicit
existence in forms of association. This is not the same as our
contemporary business corporation but rather is a voluntary
association of persons based on occupational or various social
interests (such as professional and trade guilds, educational clubs,
religious societies, townships, etc.) Because of the integrating
function of the corporation, especially in regard to the social and
economic division of labor, what appear as selfish purposes in civil
society are shown to be at the same time universal through the
formation of concretely recognized commonalities. Hegel says that "a
Corporation has the right, under the surveillance of the public
authority, (a) to look after its own interests within its own sphere,
(b) to co-opt members, qualified objectively by requisite skill and
rectitude, to a number fixed by the general structure of society, (c)
to protect its members against particular contingencies, (d) to
provide the education requisite to fit other to become members. In
short, the right is to come on the scene like a second family for its
members …" (¶ 252). Furthermore, the family is assured greater
stability of livelihood insofar as its providers are corporation
members who command the respect due to them in their social positions.
"Unless he is a member of an authorized Corporation (and it is only by
being authorized that an association becomes a Corporation), an
individual is without rank or dignity, his isolation reduces his
business to mere self-seeking, and his livelihood and satisfaction
become insecure" (¶ 253). Because individual self-seeking is raised to
a higher level of common pursuits, albeit restricted to the interest
of a sectional group, individual self-consciousness is raised to
relative universality. Hence, "As the family was the first, so the
Corporation is the second ethical root of the state, the one planted
in civil society" (¶ 255).

iii. The State

The political State, as the third moment of Ethical Life, provides a
synthesis between the principles governing the Family and those
governing Civil Society. The rationality of the state is located in
the realization of the universal substantial will in the
self-consciousness of particular individuals elevated to consciousness
of universality. Freedom becomes explicit and objective in this
sphere. "Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its
members that the individual has objectivity, genuine individuality,
and an ethical life … and the individual's destiny is the living of a
universal life" (¶ 258). Rationality is concrete in the state in so
far as its content is comprised in the unity of objective freedom
(freedom of the universal or substantial will) and subjective freedom
(freedom of everyone in knowing and willing of particular ends); and
in its form rationality is in self-determining action or laws and
principles which are logical universal thoughts (as in the logical
syllogism).

The Idea of the State is itself divided into three moments: (a) the
immediate actuality of the state as a self-dependent organism, or
Constitutional Law; (b) the relation of states to other states in
International Law; (c) the universal Idea as Mind or Spirit which
gives itself actuality in the process of World-History.

1) Constitutional Law

(1) The Constitution (internally)

Only through the political constitution of the State can universality
and particularity be welded together into a real unity. The
self-consciousness of this unity is expressed in the recognition on
the part of each citizen that the full meaning of one's actual freedom
is found in the objective laws and institutions provided by the State.
The aspect of identity comes to the fore in the recognition that
individual citizens give to the ethical laws such that they "do not
live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act
of willing these they will the universal in the light of the
universal, and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the
universal end" (¶ 260). The aspect of differentiation, on the other
hand, is found in "the right of individuals to their particular
satisfaction," the right of subjective freedom which is maintained in
Civil Society. Thus, according to Hegel, "the universal must be
furthered, but subjectivity on the other hand must attain its full and
living development. It is only when both these moments subsist in
their strength that the state can be regarded as articulated and
genuinely organized" (¶ 260, addition).

As was indicated in the introduction to the concept of Ethical Life
above, the higher authority of the laws and institutions of society
requires a doctrine of duties. From the vantage point of the political
State, this means that there must be a correlation between rights and
duties. "In the state, as something ethical, as the inter-penetration
of the substantive and the particular, my obligation to what is
substantive is at the same time the embodiment of my particular
freedom. This means that in the state duty and right are united in one
and the same relation" (¶ 261). In fulfilling one's duties one is also
satisfying particular interests, and the conviction that this is so
Hegel calls "political sentiment" (politische Gesinnung) or
patriotism. "This sentiment is, in general, trust (which may pass over
into a greater or lesser degree of educated insight), or the
consciousness that my interest, both substantive and particular, is
contained and preserved in another's (that is, the state's) interest
and end, i.e., in the other's relation to me as an individual" (¶
268).

Thus, the "bond of duty" cannot involve being coerced into obeying the
laws of the State. "Commonplace thinking often has the impression that
force holds the state together, but in fact its only bond is the sense
of order which everybody possesses" (¶ 268, addition).

According to Hegel, the political state is rational in so far as it
inwardly differentiates itself according to the nature of the Concept
(Begriff). The principle of the division of powers expresses inner
differentiation, but while these powers are distinguished they must
also be built into an organic whole such that each contains in itself
the other moments so that the political constitution is a concrete
unity in difference. Constitutional Law is accordingly divided into
three moments: (a) the Legislature which establishes the universal
through lawmaking; (b) the Executive which subsumes the particular
under the universal through administering the laws; (c) the Crown
which is the power of subjectivity of the state in the providing of
the act of "ultimate decision" and thus forming into unity the other
two powers. Despite the syllogistic sequence of universality,
particularity, and individuality in these three constitutional powers,
Hegel discusses the Crown first followed by the Executive and the
Legislature respectively. Hegel understands the concept of the Crown
in terms of constitutional monarchy.

(a) The Crown

"The power of the crown contains in itself the three moments of the
whole, namely, (a) the universality of the constitution and the laws;
(b) counsel, which refers the particular to the universal; and (g) the
moment of ultimate decision, as the self-determination to which
everything else reverts and from which everything else derives the
beginning of its actuality" (¶ 275). The third moment is what gives
expression to the sovereignty of the state, i.e., that the various
activities, agencies, functions and powers of the state are not
self-subsistent but rather have their basis ultimately in the unity of
the state as a single self or self-organized organic whole. The
monarch is the bearer of the individuality of the state and its
sovereignty is the ideality in unity in which the particular functions
and powers of the state subsist. "It is only as a person, the monarch,
that the personality of the state is actual. Personality expresses the
concept as such; but the person enshrines the actuality of the
concept, and only when the concept is determined as a person is it the
Idea or truth" (¶ 279).

The monarch is not a despot but rather a constitutional monarch, and
he does not act in a capricious manner but is bound by a
decision-making process, in particular to the recommendations and
decisions of his cabinet (supreme advisory council). The monarch
functions solely to give agency to the state, and so his personal
traits are irrelevant and his ascending to the throne is based on
hereditary succession, and thus on the accident of birth. "In a
completely organized state, it is only a question of the culminating
point of formal decision … he has only to say 'yes' and dot the 'i' ….
In a well organized monarchy, the objective aspect belongs to law
alone, and the monarch's part is merely to set to the law the
subjective 'I will'" (¶ 280, addition). The "majesty of the monarch"
lies in the free asserting of 'I will' as an expression of the unity
of the state and the final step in establishing law.

(b) The Executive

The executive has the task of executing and applying the decisions
formally made by the monarch. "This task of merely subsuming the
particular under the universal is comprised in the executive power,
which also includes the powers of the judiciary and the police" (¶
287). Also, the executive is the higher authority that oversees the
filling of positions of responsibilities in corporations. The
executive is comprised of the civil servants proper and the higher
advisory officials organized into committees, both of which are
connected to the monarch through their supreme departmental heads.
Overall, government has its division of labor into various centers of
administration managed by special officials. Individuals are appointed
to executive functions on the basis of their knowledgibility and proof
of ability and tenure is conditional on the fulfillment of duties,
with the offices in the civil service being open to all citizens.

The executive is not an unchecked bureaucratic authority. "The
security of the state and its subjects against the misuse of power by
ministers and their officials lies directly in their hierarchical
organization and their answerability; but it lies too in the authority
given to societies and corporations …" (¶ 295). However, civil
servants will tend to be dispassionate, upright, and polite in part as
"a result of direct education in thought and ethical conduct" (¶ 296).
Civil servants and the members of the executive make up the largest
section of the middle class, the class with a highly developed
intelligence and consciousness of right. Moreover, "The sovereign
working on the middle class at the top, and Corporation-rights working
on it at the bottom, are the institutions which effectively prevent it
from acquiring the isolated position of an aristocracy and using its
education and skill as a means to an arbitrary tyranny" (¶ 297).

(c) The Legislature

For Hegel, "The legislature is concerned (a) with the laws as such in
so far as they require fresh and extended determination; and (b) with
the content of home affairs affecting the entire state" (¶ 298).
Legislative activity focuses on both providing well-being and
happiness for citizens as well as exacting services from them (largely
in the form of monetary taxes). The proper function of legislation is
distinguished from the function of administration and state regulation
in that the content of the former are determinate laws that are wholly
universal whereas in administration it is application of the law to
particulars, along with enforcing the law. Hegel also says that the
other two moments of the political constitution, the monarchy and the
executive, are the first two moments of the legislature, i.e., are
reflected in the legislature respectively through the ultimate
decision regarding proposed laws and an advising function in their
formation. Hegel rejects the idea of independence or separation of
powers for the sake of checks and balances, which he holds destroys
the unity of the state (¶ 300, addition). The third moment in the
legislature is the estates (Stände), which are the classes of society
given political recognition in the legislature.

In the legislature, the estates "have the function of bringing public
affairs into existence not only implicitly, but also actually, i.e.,
of bringing into existence the moment of subjective formal freedom,
the public consciousness as an empirical universal, of which the
thoughts and opinions of the Many are particulars" (¶ 301). Not only
do the estates guarantee the general welfare and public freedom, but
they are also the means by which the state as a whole enters the
subjective consciousness of the people through their participation in
the state. Thus, the estates incorporate the private judgment and will
of individuals in civil society and give it political significance.

The estates have an important integrating function in the state
overall. "Regarded as a mediating organ, the Estates stand between the
government in general on the one hand, and the nation broken up into
particulars (people and associations) on the other. … [I]n common with
the organized executive, they are a middle term preventing both the
extreme isolation of the power of the crown … and also the isolation
of the particular interests of persons, societies and Corporations" (¶
302). Also, the organizing function of the estates prevents groups in
society from becoming formless masses that could form anti-government
feelings and rise up in blocs in opposition to the state.

The three classes of civil society, the agricultural, the business,
and the universal class of civil servants, are each given political
voice in the Estates Assembly in accordance with their distinctiveness
in the lower spheres of civil life. The legislature is divided into
two houses, an upper and lower. The upper house comprises the
agricultural estate (including the peasant farmers and landed
aristocracy), a class "whose ethical life is natural, whose basis is
family life, and, so far as its livelihood is concerned, the
possession of land. Its particular members attain their position by
birth, just as the monarch does, and, in common with him, they possess
a will which rests on itself alone" (¶ 305). Landed gentry inherit
their estates and so owe their position to birth (primogeniture) and
thus are free from the exigencies and uncertainties of the life of
business and state interference. The relative independence of this
class makes it particularly suited for public office as well as a
mediating element between the crown and civil society.

The second section of the estates, the business class, comprises the
"fluctuating and changeable element in civil society" which can enter
politics only through its deputies or representatives (unlike the
agricultural estate from which members can present themselves to the
Estates Assembly in person). The appointment of deputies is "made by
society as a society" both because of the multiplicity of members but
also because representation must reflect the organization of civil
society into associations, communities, and corporations. It is only
as a member of such groups that an individual is a member of the
state, and hence rational representation implies that consent to
legislation is to be given not directly by all but only by
"plenipotentiaries" who are chosen on the basis of their understanding
of public affairs as well as managerial and political acumen,
character, insight, etc. Moreover, their charge is to further the
general interest of society and not the interest of a particular
association or corporation instead (¶ 308-10).

The deputies of civil society are selected by the various
corporations, not on the basis of universal direct suffrage which
Hegel believed inevitably leads to electoral indifference, and they
adopt the point of view of society. "Deputies are sometimes regarded
as 'representatives'; but they are representatives in an organic,
rational sense only if they are representatives not of individuals or
a conglomeration of them, but of one of the essential spheres of
society and its large-scale interests. Hence, representation cannot
now be taken to mean simply the substitution of one man for another;
the point is that the interest itself is actually present in its
representative, while he himself is there to represent the objective
element of his own being" (¶ 311).

The debates that take place in the Estates Assembly are to be open to
the public, whereby citizens can become politically educated both
about national affairs and the true character of their own interests.
"The formal subjective freedom of individuals consists in their having
and expressing their own private judgements, opinions, and
recommendations as affairs of state. This freedom is collectively
manifested as what is called 'public opinion', in which what is
absolutely universal, the substantive and the true, is linked with its
opposite, the purely particular and private opinions of the Many" (¶
316). Public opinion is a "standing self-contradiction" because, on
the one hand, it gives expression to genuine needs and proper
tendencies of common life along with common sense views about
important matters and, on the other, is infected with accidental
opinion, ignorance, and faulty judgment. "Public opinion therefore
deserves to be as much respected as despised — despised for its
concrete expression and for the concrete consciousness it expresses,
respected for its essential basis, a basis which only glimmers more or
less dimly in that concrete expression" (¶ 318). Moreover, while there
is freedom of public communication, freedom of the press is not
totally unrestricted as freedom does not mean absence of all
restriction, either in word or deed.

Hegel calls the class of civil servants the "universal class" not only
because as members of the executive their function is to "subsume the
particular under the universal" in the administration of law, but also
because they reflect a disposition of mind (due perhaps largely from
their education) that transcends concerns with selfish ends in the
devotion to the discharge of public functions and to the public
universal good. As one of the classes of the estates, civil servants
also participate in the legislature as an "unofficial class," which
seems to mean that as members of the executive they will attend
legislative assemblies in an advisory capacity, but this is not
entirely clear from Hegel's text. Also, given that the monarch and the
classes of civil society when conceived in abstraction are opposed to
each other as "the one and the many," they must become "fused into a
unity" or mediated together through the civil servant class. From the
point of view of the crown the executive is such a middle term,
because it carries out the final decisions of the crown and makes it
"particularized" in civil society. On the other hand, in order for the
classes of civil society to actually sense this unity with the crown a
mediation must occur from the other direction, so to speak, where the
upper house of the estates, in virtue of certain likenesses to the
Crown (e.g., role of birth for one's position) is able to mediate
between the Crown and civil society as a whole.

(2) Sovereignty vis-à-vis foreign States

The interpenetration of the universal with the particular will through
a complex system of social and political mediations is what produces
the self-consciousness of the nation-state considered as an organic
(internally differentiated and interrelated) totality or concrete
individual. In this system, particular individuals consciously pursue
the universal ends of the State, not out of external or mechanical
conformity to law, but in the free development of personal
individuality and the expression of the unique subjectivity of each.
However, individuality is not something possessed by particular
persons alone, or even primarily by such persons. The state as a
whole, i.e., the nation-state as distinct from the political state as
one of its moments, constitutes a higher form of individuality. In
principle, Mind or Spirit possesses a singleness in its "negative
self-relation," i.e., in the sense that unity in a being is a function
of setting itself off from other beings. "Individuality is awareness
of one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It
manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each
of which is autonomous vis-à-vis the others. This autonomy embodies
mind's actual awareness of itself as a unit and hence it is the most
fundamental freedom which a people possesses as well as its highest
dignity" (¶ 322). For any being to have self-conscious independence
requires distinguishing the self from any of its contingent
characteristics (inner self-negation), which externally is a
distinction from another being. This consciousness of what one is not
is for the nation-state its negative relation to itself embodied
externally in the world as the relation of one state to another.
However, this is not a mere externality, "But in fact this negative
relation is that moment in the state which is most supremely its own,
the state's actual infinity as the ideality of everything finite
within it" (¶ 323).

According to Hegel, war is an "ethical moment" in the life of a
nation-state and hence is neither purely accidental nor an inherent
evil. Because there is no higher earthly power ruling over
nation-states, and because these entities are oriented to preserving
their existence and sovereignty, conflicts leading to war are
inevitable. Also, defense of one's nation is an ethical duty and the
ultimate test of one's patriotism is war. "Sacrifice on behalf of the
individuality of the state is the substantial tie between the state
and all its members and so is a universal duty" (¶ 325). In making a
sacrifice for the sake of the state individuals prove their courage,
which involves a transcendence of concern with egoistic interests and
mere material existence. "The intrinsic worth of courage as a
disposition of mind is to be found in the genuine absolute, final end,
the sovereignty of the state. The work of courage is to actualize this
final end, and the means to this end is the sacrifice of personal
actuality" (¶ 328). Moreover, war, along with catastrophy, disease,
etc, highlights the finitude, insecurity, and ultimate transitoriness
of human existence and puts the health of a state to a test. Hegel
does not consider the ideal of "perpetual peace," as advocated by
Kant, a realistic goal towards which humanity can strive. Not only is
the sovereignty of each state imprescriptible, but any alliance or
league of states will be established in opposition to others.

2) International Law

"International law springs from the relations between autonomous
states. It is for this reason that what is absolute in it retains the
form of an ought-to-be, since its actuality depends on different wills
each of which is sovereign" (¶ 330). States are not private persons in
civil society who pursue their self-interest in the context of
universal interdependence but rather are completely autonomous
entities with no relations of private right or morality. However,
since a state cannot escape having relations with other states, there
must be at least some sort of recognition of each by the other.
International law prescribes that treaties between states ought to be
kept, but this universal proviso remains abstract because the
sovereignty of a state is its guiding principle, hence states are to
that extent in a state of nature in relation to each other (in the
Hobbesian sense of there being natural rights to one's survival with
no natural duties to others). "Their rights are actualized only in
their particular wills and not in a universal will with constitutional
powers over them. This universal proviso of international law
therefore does not go beyond an ought-to-be, and what really happens
is that international relations in accordance with treaty alternate
with the severance of these relations" (¶ 333). Obviously, if states
come to disagree about the nature of their treaties, etc., and there
is no acceptable compromise for each party, then matters will
ultimately be settled by war.

States recognize their own welfare as the highest law governing their
relations to one another, however, the claim by a state to recognition
of this welfare is quite different from claims to welfare by
individual person in civil society. "The ethical substance, the state,
has its determinate being, i.e., its right, directly embodied in
something existent … and the principle of its conduct and behavior can
only be this concrete existent and not one of many universal thoughts
supposed to be moral commands" (¶ 337). States recognize each other as
states, and even in war there is awareness of the possibility that
peace can be restored and that therefore war ought to come to an end,
as well as understandings about the proper limitations on the waging
of war. However, at most this translates into the jus gentium, the law
of nations understood as customary relationships, which remains a
"maelstrom of external contingency." The principles of the mind or
spirit (Volksgeist) of a nation-state are wholly restricted because
its particularity is already that of realized individuality,
possessing objective actuality and self-consciousness. Hence, the
reciprocal relations of states to one another partake of a "dialectic
of finitude" out of which arises the universal mind, "the mind of the
world, free from all restriction, producing itself as that which
exercises its right–and its right is the highest right of all–over
these finite minds in the 'history of the world which is the world's
court of judgment'" (¶ 340).

3) World History

To say that history is the world's court of judgment is to say that
over and above the nation-states, or national "spirits," there is the
mind or Spirit of the world (Weltgeist) which pronounces its verdict
through the development of history itself. The verdicts of world
history, however, are not expressions of mere might, which in itself
is abstract and non-rational. Rather than blind destiny, "world
history is the necessary development, out of the concepts of mind's
freedom alone, of the moments of reason and so of the
self-consciousness and freedom of mind" (¶ 342). The history of Spirit
is the development through time of its own self-consciousness through
the actions of peoples, states, and world historical actors who, while
absorbed in their own interests, are nonetheless the unconscious
instruments of the work of Spirit. "All actions, including
world-historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects
giving actuality to the substantial. They are the living instruments
of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are
therefore directly at one with that deed though it is concealed from
them and is not their aim and object" (¶ 348). The actions of great
men are produced through their subjective willing and their passion,
but the substance of these deeds is actually the accomplishment not of
the individual agent but of the World Spirit (e.g., the founding of
states by world-historical heroes).

Hegel says that in the history of the world we can distinguish several
important formations of the self-consciousness of Spirit in the course
of its free self-development, each corresponding to a significant
principle. More specifically, there are four world-historical epochs,
each manifesting a principle of Spirit as expressed through a dominant
culture. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel discusses these in a very
abbreviated way in paragraphs 253-260, which brings this work to an
end. Here we will draw from the more elaborated treatment in the
appendix to the introduction to Hegel's lectures on the Philosophy of
World History.

(1) The Oriental Realm (mind in its immediate substance)

Here Spirit exists in its substantiality (objectivity) without inward
differentiation. Individuals have no self-consciousness of personality
or of rights–they are still immersed in external nature (and their
divinities are naturalistic as well). Hegel characterizes this stage
as one of consciousness in its immediacy, where subjectivity and
substantiality are unmediated. In his Philosophy of History Hegel
discusses China, India, and Persia specifically and suggests that
these cultures do not actually have a history but rather are subject
to natural cyclical processes. The typical governments of these
cultures are theocratic and more particularly despotism, aristocracy,
and monarchy respectively. Persia and Egypt are seen as transitional
from these "unhistorical" and "non-political" states. Hegel calls this
period the "childhood" of Spirit.

(2) The Greek Realm (mind in the simple unity of subjective and objective)

In this realm, we have the mixing of subjective freedom and
substantiality in the ethical life of the Greek polis, because the
ancient Greek city-states give expression to personal individuality
for those who are free and have status. However, the relation of
individual to the state is not self-conscious but is unreflective and
based on obedience to custom and tradition. Hence, the immediate union
of subjectivity with the substantial mind is unstable and leads to
fragmentation. This is the period of the "adolescence" of Spirit.

(3) The Roman Realm (mind in its abstract universality)

At this stage, individual personality is recognized in formal rights,
thus including a level of reflection absent in the Greek realm of
"beautiful freedom." Here freedom is difficult because the universal
subjugates individuals, i.e., the state becomes an abstraction over
above its citizens who must be sacrificed to the severe demands of a
state in which individuals form a homogeneous mass. A tension between
the two principles of individuality and universality ensues,
manifesting itself in the formation of political despotism and
insurgency against it. This realm gives expression to the "manhood" of
Spirit.

(4) The Germanic Realm (reconciled unity of subjective and objective mind)

This realm comprises along with Germany and the Nordic peoples the
major European nations (France, Italy, Spain) along with England. The
principle of subjective freedom comes to the fore in such a way as to
be made explicit in the life of Spirit and also mediated with
substantiality. This involves a gradual development that begins with
the rise of Christianity and its spiritual reconciliation of inner and
outer life and culminates in the appearance of the modern
nation-state, the rational Idea of which is articulated in the
Philosophy of Right. (Along the way there are several milestones Hegel
discusses in his Philosophy of History that are especially important
in the developing of the self-consciousness of freedom, in particular
the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution.) One of
the significant features of the modern world is the overcoming of the
antithesis of church and state that developed in the Medieval period.
This final stage of Spirit is mature "old age."

In sum, for Hegel the modern nation-state can be said to manifest a
"personality" and a self-consciousness of its inherent nature and
goals, indeed a self-awareness of everything which is implicit in its
concept, and is able to act rationally and in accordance with its
self-awareness. The modern nation-state is a "spiritual individual,"
the true historical individual, precisely because of the level of
realization of self-consciousness that it actualizes. The development
of the perfected nation-state is the end or goal of history because it
provides an optimal level of realization of self-consciousness, a more
comprehensive level of realization of freedom than mere natural
individuals, or other forms of human organization, can produce.

7. Closing Remarks

In closing this account of Hegel's theory of the state, a few words on
a "theory and practice" problem of the modern state. In the preface to
the Philosophy of Right Hegel is quite clear that his science of the
state articulates the nature of the state, not as it ought to be, but
as it really is, as something inherently rational. Hegel's famous
quote in this regard is "What is rational is actual and what is actual
is rational," where by the 'actual' (Wirklich) Hegel means not the
merely existent, i.e., a state that can be simply identified
empirically, but the actualized or realized state, i.e., one that
corresponds to its rational concept and thus in some sense must be
perfected. Later in the introduction of the Idea of the state in
paragraph 258, Hegel is at pains to distinguish the Idea of the state
from a state understood in terms of its historical origins and says
that while the state is the way of God in the world we must not focus
on particular states or on particular institutions of the state, but
only on the Idea itself. Furthermore he says, "The state is no ideal
work of art; it stands on earth and so in the sphere of caprice,
chance, and error, and bad behavior may disfigure it in many respects.
But the ugliest of men, or a criminal, or an invalid, or a cripple, is
still always a living man. The affirmative, life, subsists despite his
defects, and it is this affirmative factor which is our theme here" (¶
258, addition). The issue, then, is whether the actual state — the
subject of philosophical science — is only a theoretical possibility
and whether from a practical point of view all existing states are in
some way disfigured or deficient. Our ability to rationally distill
from existing states their ideal characteristics does not entail that
a fully actualized state does, or will, exist. Hence, there is perhaps
some ambiguity in Hegel's claim about the modern state as an
actualization of freedom.

8. Bibliography

a. Works by Hegel in German and in English Translation

Below are works by Hegel that relate most directly to his social and
political philosophy.

Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Berlin
1830; ed. G. Lasson & O. Pöggler (Hamburg, 1959). In the third volume
of this work, The Philosophy of Spirit, the section on Objective
Spirit corresponds to Hegel's Philosophy of Right.

Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, ed. J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg, 1955.

Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 2nd edn. hrsg. G.
Lasson. Leipzig, 1921. This is the most recent edition referred to in
T. M. Knox's translation of 1952.

Hegel's Logic, trans. William Wallace. Oxford University Press, 1892.

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford University
Press, 1977.

Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace & A. V. Miller.
Oxford University Press, 1971.

Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox. Clarendon Press, 1952;
Oxford University Press, 1967.

Hegel's Political Writings, trans. T. M. Knox, with an introductory
essay by Z. A. Pelczynski. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. This
contains the following pieces: "The German Constitution," "On the
Recent Domestic Affairs of Wurtemberg …," "The Proceedings of the
Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Wurtemberg, 1815-1816," and "The
English Reform Bill."

Hegels sämtliche Werke, vol. VIII, ed. E. Gans. Berlin: 1833, 1st ed.;
1854, 2nd ed.. These were the first editions of the material of The
Philosophy of Right to incorporate additions culled from notes taken
at Hegel's lectures. T. M. Knox reproduces these in his 1952
translation.

Jenaer Realphilosophie I: Die Vorlesungen von 1803/4, ed. J.
Hoffmeister. Leipzig, 1913.

Jenaer Realphilosophie II: Die Vorlesungen von 1805/6, ed. J.
Hoffmeister. Hamburg, 1967.

Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, trans. H.
B. Nisbet, with an introduction by Duncan Forbes. Cambridge University
Press, 1975. This is based on the 1955 German edition by J.
Hoffmeister.

Natural Law, trans. T. M. Knox, with an introduction by H. B. Acton.
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977.

Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952.

The Philosophy of History, trans. J. B. Sibree. New York: Dover
Publications Inc., 1956. This is a reprint of the 1899 translation
(the first was done in 1857) of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of
History, published by Colonial House Press. The Dover edition has a
new introduction by C. J. Friedrich.

Political Writings. Eds. L. Dickie & H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge Texts in
the History of Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999.

Politische Schriften, Nachwort von Jürgen Habermas. Frankfurt/Main,
1966. A more recent edition of the material of the Schriften zur
Politik (see below).

Reason in History, trans. R. S. Hartman. New York, 1953. The
introduction to Hegel's lectures on the Philosophy of World History.

Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie, 2nd ed. hrsg. Georg
Lasson. Leipzig, 1923. This is the basis of T. M. Knox's translations
in Hegel's Political Writings, 1964.

System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. H. S.
Harris & T. M. Knox. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1979.

Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, ed. J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg, 1955.
This is the fourth edition of Hegel's lectures on the Philosophy of
World History given in Berlin from 1822-1830; the previous editions
were done by Eduard Gans (1837), Karl Hegel (1840), and Georg Lasson
(1917, 1920, 1930). In the 1930 edition, Lasson added additional
manuscript material by Hegel as well as lecture notes from students,
which are preserved in Hoffmeister's edition.

Werke. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970. This is the most recent and
comprehensive collection of Hegel's works. His social and political
writings are contained in various volumes.

b. Works on Hegel's Social and Political Philosophy

The books listed below either focus on one or more aspects of Hegel's
social and political thought or include some discussion in this area
and, moreover, are significant enough works on Hegel to be included.
The most comprehensive bibliography on Hegel is Hegel-Bibliographie
(München: K. G Saur Verlag, 1980). For books and articles in the last
25 years, consult the Philosopher's Index.

Avineri, Shlomo. Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Bosanquet, Bernard. The Philosophical Theory of the State. 4th
edition, London: Macmillan, 1930, 1951.

Cullen, Bernard. Hegel's Social and Political Thought: An
Introduction. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.

Findlay, John. Hegel: A Re-examination (1958). Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1976.

Foster, Michael B. The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935/1968.

Dickey, Laurence. Religion, Economics, and the Politics of Spirit.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Franco, Paul. Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2000.

Gray, Jesse Glen. Hegel And Greek Thought. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

Hardimon, Michael O. Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of
Reconciliation. Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Harris, H. S. Hegel's Development, vols. 1 & 2. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1972, 1983.

Haym, Rudolf. Hegel und seine Zeit. Berlin, 1857; Hildenshine, 1962).

Henrich, Dieter & R. P. Horstman. Hegels Philosophie des Rechts.
Stuttgart: Klett-Catta, 1982.

Hicks, Steven V. International Law and the Possibility of a Just World
Order: An Essay on Hegel's Universalism. Value Inquiry Book Series 78.
Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1999.

Hyppolite, Jean. Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of
Spirit (1946). Trans. S. Cherniak & J. Heckman. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1974.

Kainz, Howard P. Hegel's Philosophy of Right with Marx's Commentary.
The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974.

Kaufman, Walter A. Hegel's Political Philosophy. New York: Atherton Press, 1970.

________. Hegel: A Reinterpretation. New York: Anchor Books, 1966.

Kelly, George Armstrong. Hegel's Retreat From Eleusis: Studies In
Political Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Kojeve, Alexander. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (1947). Ed.
Allen Bloom, trans. J. H. Nichols. New York: Basic Books, 1969.

Lakeland, Paul. The Politics of Salvation: The Hegelian Idea of the
State. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1984.

MacGregor, David. The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1984.

___________. Hegel, Marx, and the English State. University of Toronto
Press, 1996.

Marcuse, Herbert. Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social
Theory. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960.

Mehta, V.R. Hegel and the Modern State. New Delhi: Associated
Publishing House, 1968.

Mitias, Michael. Moral Foundation of the State in Hegel's Philosophy
of Right. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1984.

Morris, George S. Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History.
Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co., 18871, 18922.

O'Brien, George Dennis. Hegel On Reason and History. Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1975.

O'Neil, John, ed. Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition: Texts
and Commentary. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996.

Paolucci, Henry. The Political Thought of G. W. F. Hegel. Whitestone,
NY: Griffon House, 1978.

Pelczynski, Z. A. (ed.). Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and
Perspectives. London: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

___________. The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Perkins, Robert L. (ed.). History and System: Hegel's Philosophy of
History. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984.

Plamenatz, John. Man and Society, vol. II. London: Longman, 1963.

Plant, Raymond. Hegel: An Introduction. London: Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
1972; Basil Blackwell, 1983.

Pepperzak, Adriaan T. Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary to the
Preface of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1987.

Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966.

Reyburn, Hugh A. The Ethical Theory of Hegel: A Study of the
Philosophy of Right. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921.

Riedel, Manfred. Between Tradition and Revolution: The Hegelian
Transformation of Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984.

Ritter, Joachim. Hegel and the French Revolution: Essays on 'The
Philosophy of Right'. trans. Richard Dien Winfield, Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 1982.

Rosenkranz, Karl. Hegel As The National Philosopher of Germany. trans.
G. S. Hall, St. Louis: Gray, Baker, 1874.

Rosenweig, Franz. Hegel und der Staat. Berlin/München, 1920; Aalen:
Scientia Verlag, 1982.

Shanks, Andrew. Hegel's Political Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991.

Shklar, Judith N. Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political
Ideas of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Mind'. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976.

Siebert, Rudolf J. Hegel's Concept of Marriage and Family: The Origin
of Subjective Freedom. Washington, D.C.: The University Press of
America, 1979.

_______. Hegel's Philosophy of History: Theological, Humanistic and
Scientific Elements. Washington: University Press of America, 1979.

Siep, Ludwig. Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktische Philosophie: Zur
Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes. München, Alber, 1979

Singer, Peter. Hegel. Past Masters Series (Oxford University Press, 1983).

Smith, Steven B. Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context.
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989.

Steinberger, Peter J. Logic and Politics: Hegel's Philosophy of Right.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

Stepelevich, L. S. & D. Lamb, (eds.). Hegel's Philosophy of Action.
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983.

Taylor, Charles. Hegel and Modern Society. New York and London:
Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Tunick, Mark. Hegel's Political Philosophy. Princeton University Press, 1992.

Verene, Donald Phillip (ed.). Hegel's Social and Political Thought:
The Philosophy of Objective Spirit. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities
Press/Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980.

Walsh, William Henry. Hegelian Ethics. London/Melbourne: Macmillan;
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969.

Wazek, Norbert. The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of
'Civil Society'. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.

Weil, Eric. Hegel et L'Etat. Paris, 1950.

Westphal, Merold. History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology. Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979.

Wilkins, Burleigh Taylor. Hegel's Philosophy of History. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1974.

Williams, Robert R. (ed.). Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism:
Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Proceedings of the 15th
Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America. SUNY Press, 2000.

Wood, Allen. Hegel's Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press, 1982.