natural sciences by arguing that natural selection has instilled human
beings with a moral sense, a disposition to be good. If this were
true, morality could be understood as a phenomenon that arises
automatically during the evolution of sociable, intelligent beings and
not, as theologians or philosophers might argue, as the result of
divine revelation or the application of our rational faculties.
Morality would be interpreted as a useful adaptation that increases
the fitness of its holders by providing a selective advantage. This is
certainly the view of Edward O. Wilson, the 'father' of sociobiology,
who believes that "scientists and humanists should consider together
the possibility that the time has come for ethics to be removed
temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized"
(Wilson, 1975: 27). The challenge for evolutionary biologists such as
Wilson is to define goodness with reference to evolutionary theory and
then explain why human beings ought to be good.
1. Key Figures and Key Concepts
a. Charles Darwin
The biologization of ethics started with the publication of The
Descent of Man by Charles Darwin (1809-1882) in 1871. In this
follow-up to On the Origin of Species, Darwin applied his ideas about
evolutionary development to human beings. He argued that humans must
have descended from a less highly organized form–in fact, from a
"hairy, tailed quadruped … inhabitant of the Old World" (Darwin, 1930:
231). The main difficulty Darwin saw with this explanation is the high
standard of moral qualities apparent in humans. Faced with this
puzzle, Darwin devoted a large chapter of the book to evolutionary
explanations of the moral sense, which he argued must have evolved in
two main steps.
First, the root for human morality lies in the social instincts (ibid.
232). Building on this claim by Darwin, today's biologists would
explain this as follows. Sociability is a trait whose phylogenetic
origins can be traced back to the time when birds 'invented' brooding,
hatching, and caring for young offspring. To render beings able to
fulfill parental responsibilities required social mechanisms
unnecessary at earlier stages of evolutionary history. For example,
neither amoebae (which reproduce by division) nor frogs (which leave
their tadpole-offspring to fend for themselves) need the social
instincts present in birds. At the same time as facilitating the
raising of offspring, social instincts counterbalanced innate
aggression. It became possible to distinguish between 'them' and 'us'
and aim aggression towards individuals that did not belong to one's
group. This behavior is clearly adaptive in the sense of ensuring the
survival of one's family.
Second, with the development of intellectual faculties, human beings
were able to reflect on past actions and their motives and thus
approve or disapprove of others as well as themselves. This led to the
development of a conscience which became "the supreme judge and
monitor" of all actions (ibid. 235). Being influenced by
utilitarianism, Darwin believed that the greatest-happiness principle
will inevitably come to be regarded as a standard for right and wrong
(ibid. 134) by social beings with highly evolved intellectual
capacities and a conscience.
Based on these claims, can Darwin answer the two essential questions
in ethics? First, how can we distinguish between good and evil? And
second, why should we be good? If all his claims were true, they would
indeed support answers to the above questions. Darwin's distinction
between good and evil is identical with the distinction made by
hedonistic utilitarians. Darwin accepts the greatest-happiness
principle as a standard of right and wrong. Hence, an action can be
judged as good if it improves the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, by either increasing pleasure or decreasing pain. And the
second question–why we should be good–does not pose itself for Darwin
with the same urgency as it did, for instance, for Plato (Thrasymachus
famously asked Socrates in the Republic why the strong, who are not in
need of aid, should accept the Golden Rule as a directive for action).
Darwin would say that humans are biologically inclined to be
sympathetic, altruistic, and moral as this proved to be an advantage
in the struggle for existence (ibid. 141).
b. Herbert Spencer
The next important contribution to evolutionary ethics was by Herbert
Spencer (1820-1903), the most fervent defender of that theory and the
creator of the theory of Social Darwinism. Spencer's theory can be
summarized in three steps. As did Darwin, Spencer believed in the
theory of hedonistic utilitarianism as proposed by Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill. In his view, gaining pleasure and avoiding pain
directs all human action. Hence, moral good can be equated with
facilitating human pleasure. Second, pleasure can be achieved in two
ways, first by satisfying self-regarding impulses and second by
satisfying other-regarding impulses. This means that eating one's
favorite food and giving food to others are both pleasurable
experiences for humans. Third, mutual cooperation between humans is
required to coordinate self- and other-regarding impulses, which is
why humans develop principles of equity to bring altruistic and
egoistic traits into balance (Fieser, 2001, 214).
However, Spencer did not become known for his theory of mutual
cooperation. On the contrary, his account of Social Darwinism is
contentious to date because it is mostly understood as "an apology for
some of the most vile social systems that humankind has ever known,"
for instance German Nazism (Ruse, 1995: 228). In short, Spencer
elevated alleged biological facts (struggle for existence, natural
selection, survival of the fittest) to prescriptions for moral conduct
(ibid. 225). For instance, he suggested that life is a struggle for
human beings and that, in order for the best to survive, it is
necessary to pursue a policy of non-aid for the weak: "to aid the bad
in multiplying, is, in effect, the same as maliciously providing for
our descendants a multitude of enemies" (Spencer, 1874: 346).
Spencer's philosophy was widely popular, particularly in North America
in the 19th century, but declined significantly in the 20th century.
Which answers could he give to the two essential questions in ethics?
How can we distinguish between good and evil and why should we be
good? Spencer's answer to question one is identical to Darwin's (see
above) as they both supported hedonistic utilitarianism. However, his
answer to question two is interesting, if untenable. Spencer alleged
that evolution equaled progress for the better (in the moral sense of
the word) and that anything which supported evolutionary forces would
therefore be good (Maxwell, 1984: 231). The reasoning behind this was
that nature shows us what is good by moving towards it; and hence,
"evolution is a process which, in itself, generates value" (Ruse,
1995: 231). If evolution advances the moral good, we ought to support
it out of self-interest. Moral good was previously identified with
universal human pleasure and happiness by Spencer. If the evolutionary
process directs us towards this universal pleasure, we have an
egoistic reason for being moral, namely that we want universal
happiness. However, to equate development with moral progress for the
better was a major value judgement which cannot be held without
further evidence, and most evolutionary theorists have given up on the
claim (Ruse, 1995: 233; Woolcock, 1999: 299). It also is subject to
more conceptual objections, namely deriving 'ought' from 'is,' and
committing the naturalistic fallacy.
c. The Is-Ought Problem
The first philosopher who persistently argued that normative rules
cannot be derived from empirical facts was David Hume (1711-1776)
(1978: 469):
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the
ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God or makes
observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd
to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is,
and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an
ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however,
of the last consequence.
It is this unexplained, imperceptible change from 'is' to 'ought'
which Hume deplores in moral systems. To say what is the case and to
say what ought to be the case are two unrelated matters, according to
him. On the one hand, empirical facts do not contain normative
statements, otherwise they would not be purely empirical. On the other
hand, if there are no normative elements in the facts, they cannot
suddenly surface in the conclusions because a conclusion is only
deductively valid if all necessary information is present in the
premises.
How do Darwin and Spencer derive 'ought' from 'is'? Let us look at
Darwin first, using an example which he could have supported.
1. Child A is dying from starvation.
2. The parents of child A are not in a position to feed their child.
3. The parents of child A are very unhappy that their child is
dying from starvation.
4. Therefore, fellow humans ought morally to provide food for child A.
Darwin (1930: 234) writes that "happiness is an essential part of the
general good." Therefore, those who want to be moral ought to promote
happiness, and hence, in the above case, provide food. However, the
imperceptible move from 'is' to 'ought' which Hume found in moral
systems, is also present in this example. Thus, Darwin derives ought
from is when he moves from the empirical fact of unhappiness to the
normative claim of a duty to relieve unhappiness.
The same can be said for Spencer whose above argument about the
survival of the fittest could be represented as follows:
1. Natural selection will ensure the survival of the fittest.
2. Person B is dying from starvation because he is ill, old, and poor.
3. Therefore, fellow humans ought to morally avoid helping person
B so that the survival of the fittest is guaranteed.
Even if both premises were shown to be true, it does not follow that
we ought to morally support the survival of the fittest. An additional
normative claim equating survival skills with moral goodness would be
required to make the argument tenable. Again, this normative part of
the argument is not included in the premises. Hence, Spencer also
derives 'ought' from 'is.' Thomas Huxley (1906: 80) objects to
evolutionary ethics on these grounds when he writes:
The thief and the murderer follow nature just as much as the
philantropist. Cosmic evolution may teach us how the good and the evil
tendencies of man may have come about; but, in itself, it is
incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is
preferable to what we call evil than we had before.
d. The Naturalistic Fallacy
But evolutionary ethics was not only attacked by those who supported
Hume's claim that normative statements cannot be derived from
empirical facts. A related argument against evolutionary ethics was
voiced by British philosopher G.E. Moore (1873-1958). In 1903, he
published a ground-breaking book, Principia Ethica, which created one
of the most challenging problems for evolutionary ethics–the
'naturalistic fallacy.' According to Michael Ruse (1995: 223), when
dealing with evolutionary ethics, "it has been enough for the student
to murmur the magical phrase 'naturalistic fallacy,' and then he or
she can move on to the next question, confident of having gained full
marks thus far on the exam." So, what is the naturalistic fallacy and
why does it pose a problem for evolutionary ethics?
Moore was interested in the definition of 'good' and particularly in
whether 'good' was a simple or a complex property. Simple properties,
according to Moore, are indefinable as they cannot be described
further using more basic properties. Complex properties, on the other
hand, can be defined by outlining their basic properties. Hence,
'yellow' cannot be defined in terms of its constituent parts, whereas
'colored' can be explained further as it consists of several
individual colors.
'Good,' according to Moore, is a simple property which cannot be
described using more basic properties. Committing the naturalistic
fallacy is attempting to define 'good' with reference to other
natural, i.e. empirically verifiable, properties. This understanding
of 'good' creates serious problems for both Darwin and Spencer.
Following Bentham and Mill, both identify moral goodness with
'pleasure.' This means they commit the naturalistic fallacy as good
and pleasant are not identical. In addition, Spencer identifies
goodness with 'highly evolved,' committing the naturalistic fallacy
again. (Both Moore's claim in itself as well as his criticism of
evolutionary ethics can be attacked, but this would fall outside the
scope of this entry).
e. Sociobiology
Despite the continuing challenge of the naturalistic fallacy,
evolutionary ethics has moved on with the advent of sociobiology. In
1948, at a conference in New York, scientists decided to initiate new
interdisciplinary research between zoologists and sociologists.
'Sociobiology' was the name given to the new discipline aiming to find
universally valid regularities in the social behavior of animals and
humans. Emphasis was put on the study of biological, i.e.
non-cultural, behavior. The field did, however, not get off the ground
until Edward Wilson published his Sociobiology: The New Synthesis in
1975. According to Wilson (1975: 4), "sociobiology is defined as the
systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior."
In Wilson's view, sociobiology makes philosophers, at least
temporarily, redundant, when it comes to questions of ethics (see
quote in introduction). He believes that ethics can be explained
biologically when he writes (ibid. 3 – my emphasis):
The hypothalamus and limbic system … flood our consciousness with all
the emotions – hate, love, guilt, fear, and others – that are
consulted by ethical philosophers who wish to intuit the standards of
good and evil. What, we are then compelled to ask, made the
hypothalamus and the limbic system? They evolved by natural selection.
That simple biological statement must be pursued to explain ethics.
Ethics, following this understanding, evolved under the pressure of
natural selection. Sociability, altruism, cooperation, mutual aid,
etc. are all explicable in terms of the biological roots of human
social behavior. Moral conduct aided the long-term survival of the
morally inclined species of humans. According to Wilson (ibid. 175),
the prevalence of egoistic individuals will make a community
vulnerable and ultimately lead to the extinction of the whole group.
Mary Midgley agrees. In her view, egoism pays very badly in genetic
terms, and a "consistently egoistic species would be either solitary
or extinct" (Midgley, 1980: 94).
Wilson avoids the naturalistic fallacy in Sociobiology by not equating
goodness with another natural property such as pleasantness, as Darwin
did. This means that he does not give an answer to our first essential
question in ethics. What is good? However, like Darwin he gives an
answer to question two. Why should we be moral? Because we are
genetically inclined to be moral. It is a heritage of earlier times
when less morally inclined and more morally inclined species came
under pressure from natural selection. Hence, we do not need divine
revelation or strong will to be good; we are simply genetically wired
to be good. The emphasis in this answer is not on the should, as it is
not our free will which makes us decide to be good but our genetic
heritage.
One of the main problems evolutionary ethics faces is that ethics is
not a single field with a single quest. Instead, it can be separated
into various areas, and evolutionary ethics might not be able to
contribute to all of them. Let us therefore look at a possible
classification for evolutionary ethics, which maps it on the field of
traditional ethics, before concluding with possible criticisms.
2. The Place of Evolutionary Ethics in Contemporary Ethical Theory
For philosophy students, ethics is usually divided into three areas:
metaethics, normative ethical theory, and applied ethics. Metaethics
looks for possible foundations of ethics. Are there any moral facts
out there from which we can deduce our moral theories? Normative
ethical theories suggest principles or sets of principles to
distinguish morally good from morally bad actions. Applied ethics
looks at particular moral issues, such as euthanasia or bribery.
However, this classification is not adequate to accommodate
evolutionary ethics in its entirety. Instead, a different three-fold
distinction of ethics seems appropriate: descriptive ethics, normative
ethics, and metaethics. Descriptive ethics outlines ethical beliefs as
held by various people and tries to explain why they are held. For
instance, almost all human cultures believe that incest is morally
wrong. This belief developed, it could be argued, because it provides
a survival advantage to the group that entertains it. Normative
ethical theories develop standards to judge which actions are good and
which actions are bad. The standard as defended by evolutionary ethics
would be something like "Actions that increase the long-term capacity
of survival in evolutionary terms are good and actions that decrease
this capacity are bad." However, the field has not yet established
itself credibly in normative ethics. Consequentialism, deontology,
virtue ethics, and social contracts still dominate debates. This is
partly due to the excesses of Social Darwinism but also due to the
unintuitive nature of the above or similar standards. Evolutionary
ethics has been more successful in providing interesting answers in
metaethics. Michael Ruse (1995: 250), for instance, argues that
morality is a "collective illusion of the genes, bringing us all in…
We need to believe in morality, and so, thanks to our biology, we do
believe in morality. There is no foundation 'out there' beyond human
nature."
Descriptive ethics seems, as yet, the most interesting area for
evolutionary ethics, a topic particularly suitable for anthropological
and sociological research. Which ethical beliefs do people hold and
why? But in all three areas, challenges are to be faced.
3. Challenges for Evolutionary Ethics
# How can a trait that was developed under the pressure of natural
selection explain moral actions that go far beyond reciprocal altruism
or enlightened self-interest? How can, for instance, the action of
Maximilian Kolbe be explained from a biological point of view? (Kolbe
was a Polish priest who starved himself to death in a concentration
camp to rescue a fellow prisoner.)
# Could not human beings have moved beyond their biological roots and
transcended their evolutionary origins, in which case they would be
able to formulate goals in the pursuit of goodness, beauty, and truth
that "have nothing to do directly with survival, and which may at
times militate against survival?" (O'Hear, 1997: 203).
# Morality is universal, whereas biologically useful altruism is
particular favoring the family or the group over others. 'Do not kill'
does not only refer to one's own son, but also to the son of
strangers. How can evolutionary ethics cope with universality?
# Normative ethics aims to be action-guiding. How could humans ever
judge an action to be ensuring long-term survival? (This is a
practical rather than conceptual problem for evolutionary ethics.)
# Hume's 'is-ought' problem still remains a challenge for evolutionary
ethics. How can one move from 'is' (findings from the natural
sciences, including biology and sociobiology) to 'ought'?
# Similarly, despite the length of time that has passed since the
publication of Principia Ethica, the challenge of the 'naturalistic
fallacy' remains.
Evolutionary ethics is, on a philosopher's time-scale, a very new
approach to ethics. Though interdisciplinary approaches between
scientists and philosophers have the potential to generate important
new ideas, evolutionary ethics still has a long way to go.
4. References and Further Reading
Darwin, Charles (1871, 1930) The Descent of Man, Watts & Co., London.
Fieser, James (2001) Moral Philosophy through the Ages, Mayfield
Publishing Company, Mountain View California), Chapter 12
"Evolutionary Ethics."
Hume, David (1740, 1978) A Treatise of Human Nature, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Maxwell, Mary (1984) Human Evolution: A Philosophical Anthropology,
Croom Helm, London.
Midgley, Mary (1980) Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature, Methuen, London.
O'Hear, Anthony (1997) Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits
of Evolutionary Explanation, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Ruse, Michael (1995) Evolutionary Naturalism, Routledge, London.
Spencer, Herbert (1874) The Study of Sociology, Williams & Norgate, London.
Wilson, Edward O. (1975) Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Woolcock, Peter G. (1999) "The Case Against Evolutionary Ethics
Today," in: Maienschein, Jane and Ruse, Michael (eds) Biology and the
Foundation of Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.
276-306.
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