epistemology and so is part of philosophy of science. Other
naturalistic approaches include sociological, historical and
anthropological explanations of knowledge. What makes EE specific is
that it subscribes to the idea that cognition is to be understood
primarily as a product of biological evolution. What does this mean
exactly? Biological evolution is regarded as the precondition of the
variety of cognitive, cultural, and social behavior that an organism,
group or species can portray. In other words, biological evolution
precedes (socio-)cultural (co-)evolution. Conversely, (socio-)cultural
(co-)evolution originates as a result of biological evolution.
Therefore:
1. EE studies the origin, evolution and current mechanisms of all
cognitive capacities of all biological organisms from within
biological (evolutionary) theory. Here cognition is broadly conceived,
ranging from the echolocation of bats, to human-specific symbolic
thinking;
2. Besides studying the cognitive capacities themselves, EE
investigates the ways in which biological evolutionary models can be
used to study the products of these cognitive capacities. The
cognitive products studied include, for example, the typical
spatiotemporal perception of objects of all mammals, or more
human-specific cognitive products such as science, culture and
language. These evolutionary models are at minimum applied on a
descriptive level, but can also be used as explanations for the
behavior under study. In other words, the cognitive mechanisms and
their products are understood to be either comparative with, or the
result of, biological evolution.
3. Within EE it is sometimes assumed that biological evolution
itself is a cognitive process.
1. Overview
A general account of the meaning and history of the term "evolutionary
epistemology" is given in sections 1 and 2 below. It is important to
understand in advance that different kinds of evolutionary
epistemology (EE) can be distinguished, but all forms share the
following assumption: that cognition –to a greater or lesser extent-
needs to be studied from within evolutionary theory. Disagreements
arise about:
1. where to draw the line between the cognitive and the non-cognitive,
2. which aspects of cognition should be studied from within
evolutionary theory, and
3. which aspects of evolutionary theory should apply to the study
of cognition.
Evolutionary theory itself is far from synonymous with the theory of
evolution by natural selection. Rather, heterogeneous views on
evolution arise when one takes the units and levels of selection
debate (sections 3 through 6) as points of departure. Different
perspectives on evolution emerge when one looks at evolution from the
point of the environment (section 4), the organism (section 5), and
genes (section 6). The development of different EEs parallels this
perspectivism. That is, based on these different viewpoints, different
EEs have been put forward. The adaptationist approach to evolution is
the basis of traditional EE. Non-adaptationist approaches to EE have
been based on the constructivist approach to evolution. The "gene's
eye view" of evolution has resulted in a quest for universal
evolutionary epistemological mechanisms.
2. Context of use
The concept "evolutionary epistemology" was first introduced by Donald
T. Campbell (1974). However, he repeatedly refused to be called the
founding father of EE since he saw himself as denoting "… something
that has sprung up all over for a hundred years or more" (Campbell in
Callebaut, 1993: 289).
If EE were to have a motto, it might come from Michael Ruse's (1988)
famous book title Taking Darwin Seriously. This means that when one
adheres to an evolutionary view of life, one needs to understand all
biological processes not only as the outcome of evolution, but also as
something that can only be investigated adequately by making use of
evolutionary theory.
Evolutionary epistemology understands epistemology to be a product of
biological evolution. Therefore, epistemology is studied from within
evolutionary biology. Cognition is no longer understood to be
linguistic (propositional) or a human-bounded characteristic. Rather,
all organisms can show behavior that is cognitively based.
Hence, the first major quest of evolutionary epistemologists is
distinguishing between the different cognitive processes that
biological organisms from all major kingdoms of life can display.
Second, they investigate how these cognitive capacities evolved from
unicellular organisms onwards.
Third, the products of cognition (on the one hand, the perception of
light, or color, on the other hand, science, culture and language) are
understood from within an evolutionary approach.
The use of biological theories and mechanisms to comprehend cognition
is either meant to be descriptive or explanatory. In this context,
Ruse (1988: 32) differentiates between an "analogy-as-heuristic" and
an "analogy-as-justification." The former term refers to using
metaphors and analogies from evolutionary theory to describe, for
example, the evolution of science loosely and to discover new
approaches to research. The latter research strategy involves applying
evolutionary analogies to justify and thus to validate such things as
the evolution of science.
In sum, the underlying view of EE is thus that there is a universal
evolutionary mechanism that lead first to the evolution of life in
general, and second, that this mechanism is also at work within the
evolution of cognition, and within the products of cognition such as
language, science and culture.
Some evolutionary epistemologists such as Campbell (1974), therefore
also assume that this evolutionary mechanism in its own workings
portrays an evolutionary mechanism. This concept will be discussed
later.
The concept "EE" today is commonly used as a synonym for selection
theory on the one hand, and, on the other hand, as part of the EEM and
EET program.
a. EE and selection theory
EE has strong affinities with selection theory (Campbell, 1997). The
latter is a theory that adheres to the view that all and only
selectionist —as opposed to instructionist (behaviorist) —
explanations of an organism's traits (including cognitive ones) are
valid. Behaviorist explanations state that it suffices to describe the
visible, external behavior that an organism portrays in order to
develop adequate explanations of that behavior. Selectionist accounts,
by contrast, also examine internal elements that underlie a certain
trait (such as genes, for example) and the evolutionary emergence of
that trait. The term selection theory was first introduced by Simmel
and Baldwin in the 19th century (Campbell, 1997). Today, however, a
wide range of biologists, neurologists, and evolutionary
epistemologists are selectionists (for an example, see Cziko 1995),
but these scholars do not recognize or accept any direct influence of
Simmel and Baldwin's selection theory.
Throughout this article, the more general term EE is maintained. The
reason is twofold. First, not all topics that are investigated by
selectionists are relevant for the study of cognition. Second, not
every Evolutionary Epistemologist defends a solely selectionist
account of cognition. Rather, other evolutionary principles such as
self-organization, for example, are also included to comprehend (the
products of) cognition (as will be discussed in section 5). Finally,
analogies are not only drawn between evolutionary theory and the
evolution of science and knowledge. Culture, language, economics etc.
can also be interpreted from within these evolutionary epistemological
frameworks.
b. The EEM and EET program
A useful distinction within EE is made by Bradie (1986). Two different
programs are identified, the EEM and the EET program. Within the
Evolution of Epistemological Mechanisms, the evolution of cognition
and cognitive knowledge mechanisms is investigated from within the
Modern Synthesis. The Modern Synthesis is the standard paradigm within
evolutionary biology on how evolution occurs. This is based on the
principle of evolution by natural selection as first introduced by
Charles Darwin.
Furthermore, the products of cognitive evolution, such as language,
science, or culture, are also understood to be the result of
biological evolution, and it is assumed that in their emergence or
structure an evolutionary pattern can also be found. The following
example can illustrate this: the evolution of language or culture is
at least partly the result of biological evolution. Hence, the same
evolutionary mechanisms that are used to describe the evolution of
cognition are also applicable to the products of cognition, such as
language or culture. The EET program (Bradie, 1986) was introduced
specifically for epistemological or scientific theories. The ways in
which analogies are drawn between the evolution of science on the one
hand and natural selection on the other are investigated within
Evolution of Epistemological Theories.
Different evolutionary epistemologists are active within the above
mentioned various fields and within extra-philosophical scientific
fields, which makes it difficult to pinpoint the common assertions
made by all evolutionary epistemologists. Adherents of an EEM
position, for example, can object to the widely subscribed idea that
science also needs to be explained from within evolutionary
epistemology, as adherents of the EET program state. What binds
evolutionary epistemologists is the idea that evolutionary theory, to
some extent, can explain aspects of cognition.
3. EE and naturalized epistemology
What is so different about EE that it can be distinguished from all
other epistemological endeavors? To answer this question, we need to
first situate, and secondly, evaluate EE in relation to other
philosophical frameworks.
EE is part of the naturalistic turn. The naturalistic turn itself is a
larger movement that emphasizes the importance of a sociology of
knowledge, anthropology of knowledge, and the historical study of
knowledge. Evolutionary Epistemology in turn emphasizes the importance
of the biology of knowledge. More specifically, the study of
biological evolution is the precondition of all investigations into
cognition (Wuketits, 1984: 2-19). Therefore, it explains evolution
itself as a cognitive process.
Furthermore, within EE, knowledge and cognition are no longer
conceived of as necessarily proposition-like or language-like or
human-bounded. As such, EE stands opposed to traditional philosophical
approaches to cognition (such as empiricist and rationalist ones that
understand knowledge to be language-like), and it also goes beyond
Quine's Naturalized Epistemology. In order to understand this, first
naturalized epistemology is briefly discussed and then the difference
with EE is explained.
Naturalized epistemology was first introduced by Quine (1969), who
stressed that the study of science and scientific thinking should
revolve around how knowledge is processed, rather than what knowledge
is in itself. Therefore, he emphasized that we should reject the idea
of a first philosophy. Within a first philosophy, it is assumed that
philosophy can make claims about science without using the sciences.
If one would make use of the sciences, this would be understood as
circular. Quine, however, stressed that we should investigate
epistemology from within the natural sciences, more specifically,
psychology:
The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence
anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of
the world. Why not see how this construction really proceeds? Why not
settle for psychology?" (Quine, 1969: 269-70) […] [A]t this point it
may be more useful to say that epistemology still goes on, though in a
new setting and a clarified status. Epistemology, or something like
it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of
natural science. (Quine 1969: 273-4)
Epistemology is defined as that discipline which studies exactly how
our sense organs construct a picture of the world. The study of
knowledge involves the investigation into (1) the relation between
neural input and observational sentences, and (2) an investigation
into the relation between theoretical and observational sentences.
Hence, according to Quine, knowledge, or more specifically, cognition,
is still understood to be language-like: it is assumed that somehow
our neural input is transformed into verbal output. A rather
behaviorist position is taken by Quine, because the study of how our
neurological abilities relate to language is not assessed. Somehow the
relation between sensory input and language is assumed to be direct.
Neurology today, however, has shown us multiple times that at the
neurological or cognitive level, there is no direct, and certainly no
necessary relation between our categorizations and our language
(Changeaux 1985; Gazzaniga 1994, 2000; Damasio 1996 and 1999; Ledoux
1998).
Furthermore, because of the rise of ethology and ecology (the study of
the external behavior of animals in relation to their natural
settings), cognition as a scientific concept has been broadened to
include non-linguistic behavior as well.
It is here that evolutionary epistemology makes its entrée. Konrad
Lorenz (1958) for example, was one of the founding fathers (together
with Nikolas Tinbergen) of ethology. Lorenz stressed the importance of
a cognitivist approach of behavior, hereby also including internal
behavior.
In contrast to Naturalized Epistemology, EE does not only examine the
relation between human, language-like knowledge and the world. Any
type of relation that an organism engages in with its environment is
understood as a knowledge relation, irrespective of whether or not
these organisms have language.
Munz (2001: 9) points out that what makes EE unique is that knowledge
is comprehended as a cognitive relation between an organism and its
environment. Empiricists for example understood knowledge to be a
relation between a knower and something knowable by induction, while
rationalists define knowledge as a relation between a knower and
something known because of deduction. Even within the sociology of
knowledge movement, knowledge is not understood from within its
relation between an organism and its environment, rather here it is
comprehended as a relation between different knowers.
What makes EE different from all other naturalistic approaches within
philosophy, is that it does not regard epistemology as a mere study of
how a human knower comes to know what is knowable. Rather EE studies
how knowledge about the environment is gained across different
species, and what knowledge-gaining mechanisms arise in biological
organisms through time enabling these organisms to cope with their
environment. This means that within EE not only human cognition but
all sorts of behavior that organisms at all levels in biological
evolution display (ranging from instinctive behavior to cultural
behavior or even chemotaxis – that is to say, communication between
cells) are regarded as devices that are put to use to gain knowledge.
And equally important, these mechanisms themselves are also
comprehended as knowledge in and of themselves.
Within EE, contrary to behaviorism, internal factors that determine
behavior and cognition are also included. Because biological evolution
led to the rise and acquisition of different cognitive/knowledge
processes, this evolution itself is explained as a knowledge process.
4. Different EEs: The units and levels of selection debate
The units and levels of selection debate is taken as the point of
departure to distinguish between different types of EE. EEs draw on
evolutionary theory to explain epistemology or cognition. However,
there are disagreements on what evolution in general is. Therefore
different, sometimes complementary evolutionary theories are put
forward by evolutionary biologists. It is only logical that this
results in different evolutionary epistemologies. Three different
perspectives are described to understand evolution and the different
EEs that arise when using these perspectives:
1. Evolution from the point of view of the environment, which lead
to traditional, adaptationist approaches to EE;
2. Evolution from the point of view of the organism, which lead to
non-adaptationist, constructivist approaches; and
3. Evolution from the point of view of genes, which opens the quest
for universal selection formulas.
How did the units and levels of selection debate get started?
The Modern Synthesis (Ayala, 1978, Maynard-Smith, 1993, Mayr, 1978),
which is the standard paradigm on how biological evolution occurs,
states very strictly that the phenotype (the visible organism) is the
unit of selection. This phenotype either is selected at the level of
the environment, if this visible organism is adapted to that
environment, or the organism dies out, if it is maladaptive.
With the rise of Postneodarwinian theory on the one hand, and Systems
Theory on the other, the debate over the units and levels of selection
was introduced first in biology, and later within evolutionary
epistemology. In this discussion the primary question asked is whether
there are units and levels of selection other than the phenotype and
the environment. The concept "units of selection" was coined by the
biologist Richard Lewontin in his famous homonymous article of 1970.
The concept "levels of selection" was introduced by Robert Brandon in
his 1982 article by the same name. However the discussion dates back
to scientific debates concerning the possibility of group selection in
the 1960s between William Hamilton (1964) and George C. Williams
(1966, chapter 4), and still even further back in time to the 19th
century when Herbert Spencer introduced and applied the "survival of
the fittest" idea to human populations and society.
5. The environment, the adaptationist program and traditional EE
a. The adaptationist program
The concept "adaptationist program," was first introduced by Gould and
Lewontin (1979) — but is not subscribed to by these authors
themselves. The adaptationist program regards " […] natural selection
as so powerful and the constraints upon it so few that direct
production of adaptation through its operation becomes the primary
cause of nearly all organic form, function, and behavior" (Gould and
Lewontin, 1979:584-5).
To understand this, the distinction between ontogeny (the development
of an organism from conception until death) and phylogeny (the
evolution of species) is in order. Within Lamarckian theory, no strict
separation between ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes is adhered
to. Within this paradigm, also known as the inheritance of acquired
characteristics, traits acquired during the lifetime of an individual
can be passed on immediately to the next generation.
With the introduction of Darwin's principle of natural selection, for
the first time in history it was possible to distinguish between
ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes, because of the distinction
that is made between the inner and the outer world of the organism
(Lewontin: 2000: 42-3). The inner milieu of the organism is, according
to Darwin, subjected to, amongst other things, developmental growth
processes that are not themselves subjected to evolution by natural
selection. The outer environment, by contrast, is the sole scene where
evolution by natural selection occurs. Here the environment either
does or does not select an organism. Regarding the inner milieu of the
organism, Darwin himself quite often made use of Lamarck's theory. He
used it as an explanation for how novel individual variation arises.
Natural selection was never interpreted by Darwin as being the cause
of the variation; in fact, he did not know how variation occurred.
Therefore, he invoked Lamarck's principle of the inheritance of
acquired characteristics. Natural selection only selected amongst the
given variation.
These ideas were later incorporated into the Modern Synthesis.
Organisms vary. This variety is the result of, on the one hand, the
specific combinations of genetic material that an organism carries,
and on the other hand, possible random mutations that occur within
these genes. One acquires the genetic material that one carries
through birth, thus no child can choose its specific genetic code.
And, the genetic mutations that sometimes occur, occur randomly, they
are blind. That is to say, mutations are random errors that occurred
during the copying of this genetic material. The genetic material that
one carries can be neutral, adaptive or maladaptive for the carrier in
the "struggle for existence." The point, however, is that from this
perspective, the organism itself cannot by any means whatsoever
influence the genetic material that it carries. Eventually, it is the
environment that indirectly selects adaptive organisms through the
elimination of the unfit. Thus, the Modern Synthesis views this
selection process as taking place between the phenotype and the
environment. And the selection process itself is said to occur only
externally: the "level of selection" is the external environment, and
the selection of the "unit of selection," the organism, occurs
independently of internal processes such as developmental growth.
ev-ep-diagram1
Figure 1. The adaptationist approach focuses on the external relation
between the environment and the organism.
Thus, within the adaptationist approach the organism and the
environment are conceived as two separate entities that only interact
during the selection process but develop independently from one
another (fig. 1).
Adaptation is literally the process of fitting an object to a
pre-existing demand… Organisms adapt to the environment because the
external world had acquired its properties independently of the
organism, which must adapt or die. (Lewontin, 2000: 43)
In other words, Neodarwinian theory adheres to a strict dualistic
viewpoint (Gontier, 2006) between organism and environment: the
organism is passively selected, or not, by an active environment. The
organism cannot influence its chances of survival or fitness. For this
reason, according to Lewontin (1978), one can defend the position that
because of the emphasis these scholars lay on adaptation,
Neodarwinians explain evolution from the point of view of the
environment. Hence, they actually give a description of the
environment through the organism, rather than describing the organism
itself.
b. Traditional EE
It is the latter position that has been one of the basic tenets of
traditional EE, namely, that one is able to gain knowledge about the
environment by studying the organisms that live in it, because
organisms literally "re-present" the outer world.
What does this mean? Logical empiricism failed in providing a
non-arbitrary relation between the world and human language. However,
the search for such a non-arbitrary relation between the outer world
and the organisms that inhabit that world was continued from within
the adaptationist approach. In this position it is assumed that there
is an unchangeable outer world to which organisms adapt. If it is true
that organisms are adapted to the outer world, and that all and only
the fit survive and reproduce in the long run, then these adaptive
organisms can tell us something about that environment. An ant, for
example, can tell us something about the soil.
This section provides an overview of the major traditional
evolutionary epistemologies and how they developed out of the
adaptationist view of evolution.
i. Karl Popper
Beginning with Sir Karl Popper's (1963) ideas concerning conjectures
and refutations (also called trials and errors), the following
position is defended within traditional EE: there is a growth of
(scientific) knowledge which is comparable with the succession of
adaptations in evolution. The task of EE thus becomes explaining this
growth.
Adhering to the strict distinction made between ontogeny and
phylogeny, it is argued that at no stage during evolution does an
organism receive knowledge from the outer world. Bold conjectures are
made about the outer world and if these hypotheses are not falsified
by experiments performed by the scientific community, they survive. In
the long run, unfit theories are eliminated by the process of
falsification, and there is a growth in knowledge. Theories that
survive longer than others are understood to tentatively corroborate
the truth. The analogy with biological evolution is clear: a
selectionist account is preferred over an instructionist one. This
means that at no point does an organism choose its genetic endowment.
However, if this organism, with the genetic endowment that it is born
with, stands the test of the environment, that is, if it survives long
enough so that it can reproduce, than the organism's genetic traits
survive, and it is said that it is adapted to its environment. In the
long run, only the fit survive; maladaptive organisms are not able to
survive long enough to reproduce and spread their genes in the gene
pool again, and therefore die out.
Thus, just as the Modern Synthesis stresses that an organism can by no
means directly receive instructions from the environment, Popper
(1963: 46) emphasizes that we force our interpretations upon the world
prior to our observations: "Without waiting, passively, for
repetitions to impress regularities upon us, we actively try to impose
regularities upon the world." These are the conjectures that are put
forward for trial, to be selected or eliminated according to the
test-results. Scientific theories are thus not the result of
observations, but of wild hypotheses. Although Popper himself is not
part of the field of EE, his work on conjectures and refutations is
often regarded as a first account on EE.
ii. Konrad Lorenz
Konrad Lorenz is also a representative of traditional EE, since he too
worked within the adaptationist program. Lorenz (1941, 1985) is famous
for reinterpreting Kant's synthetic a priori claims. No longer are the
inborn categories regarded as evidently true, rather, they are
understood to be "ontogenetically a priori and phylogenetically a
posteriori." This means that an individual organism is born with
innate dispositions. These innate dispositions are acquired
phylogenetically, through the evolution of the species, by means of
the mechanism of natural selection. Most importantly, these
dispositions are fallible, because they are the result of selection,
not instruction. That is, these dispositions are adaptations, and
natural selection only weeds out maladaptive organisms, which results
in the survival of the adaptive ones. According to the Modern
Synthesis, at no time in evolution does natural selection actually
cause or create the adaptive traits that are presented to the
environment (again because of the strict distinction made between
ontogeny, where natural selection does not work, and phylogeny, where
it does.
According to Lorenz, and contrary to Kant, the thing in itself (Das
Ding an Sich) is knowable through the categories of the knower, not
the characteristics of the thing in itself, and selection results in a
partial isomorphism through adaptation. Lorenz states that:
The central nervous apparatus does not prescribe the laws of
nature any more than the hoof of the horse prescribes the form of the
ground. Just as the hoof of the horse, this central nervous apparatus
stumbles over unforeseen changes in its task. But just as the hoof of
the horse is adapted to the ground of the steppe which it copes with,
so our central nervous apparatus for organizing the image of the world
is adapted to the real world with which man has to cope. (In Campbell,
1974: 447)
Thus, through adaptation, there is a correspondence between our images
of the world and the world in itself, or between organism and
environment, or between theories and the world. This is of course not
a 1-to-1 correspondence; our image of a tree is not like a real tree,
but because our cognitive apparatus is adapted to the world, there is
a partial isomorphism between the two. Adaptations thus become a
description of the world in a biological language (Lorenz, 1977).
The reinterpretation of Kant's synthetic a priori claims is not solely
the work of Lorenz; rather it dates as far back as Herbert Spencer.
For the most complete overview of authors who have reinterpreted
Kant's ideas in this way, see Campbell (1974).
iii. Donald Campbell
Donald T. Campbell (1974) goes one step further than Lorenz because he
rethought the distinction between ontogeny and phylogeny. No longer is
natural selection something that solely works on the level of the
environment; natural selection is internalized as well. Furthermore,
the mechanism of natural selection, in its own workings, is said to
work selectively as well.
Campbell's (1959: 153-5) main goal was to develop an empirical science
of induction (not to be confused with behaviorist instruction; see
section 1). This empirical science consisted of a comparative study of
the psychology of knowledge, a biological science of cognition, a
sociology of knowledge, and a science of history. In other words, he
wanted to build a science of science, which Campbell (1974) termed EE.
This discipline had to be compatible with evolutionary biology and
social evolution (Campbell, 1974: 413). In his 1959 paper he
characterized biology as the study of "progressive adaptation."
Therefore, he made an abstraction of the mechanism of natural section
by introducing the blind-variation-and-selective-survival mechanism
(Campbell, 1959). Later he would call it the
blind-variation-and-selective-retention scheme (Campbell (1960).
Campbell's (1959: 156-8) EE is based upon six philosophical assumptions:
1. Hypothetical realism: EE acknowledges as a hypothesis the
existence of an external world where entities exist and processes
occur. This differs from Popper's critical realism in that the
existence of the world in itself also needs to be proven through
observation.
2. No first philosophy: EE rejects the idea of a first philosophy,
subscribing rather to the view that knowledge needs to be explained
using scientific knowledge.
3. No distinction between human beings and animals is adhered to.
On the contrary, it is fully acknowledged that human beings are
animals.
4. EE is an "epistemology of the other one" as Campbell (1974: 448)
calls it. This means that EE raises the question of how organisms come
to know, not how a knower acquires knowledge. That is to say, it
studies the relationship between an organism's cognitive capacities
and the environment that it is selected to cognize.
5. Epistemological dualism: there is a difference between what is
knowable and what is known. Knowledge always constitutes indirect and
fallible constructions that never completely correspond with the thing
in itself.
6. Perspectivism: each of the different hypotheses that are formed
provides another perspective. These can partially overlap, but also
differ from one another. In the latter case, different positions can
be regarded as equal.
According to Campbell, science was only one aspect of a general
knowledge process and this process was hierarchical in nature.
Knowledge is no longer merely language-like and human bounded. On the
contrary, different biological and social layers can be distinguished
which, each on its own, encompasses a different aspect of knowledge.
And here too, the focus lies on the acquisition and growth of
knowledge.
In his 1959 article, Campbell distinguishes between 12 knowledge
processes. These include machines on the one hand, but also
bisexuality, heterozygosis, and meiotic cell division, on the other.
In his 1960 article Campbell discusses creative thinking as a separate
learning process.
Finally, in his 1974 article he distinguishes ten different levels
that are applicable to biological and social evolution. This is the
last and most canonized hierarchy that Campbell (1974: 422-435)
introduced and it are these ten levels that are now discussed.
(i) Non-mnemonic problem solving
Organisms that engage in non-mnemonic problem solving do not have
a memory. Bacteria, for example, are such organisms. They blindly
search for food until they find it: they cannot remember previous food
sources, and they cannot voluntarily go to one. They are just swept
away by the wind.
(ii) Vicarious locomotor devices
Examples are the echolocation of bats, or a blind man's cane. They
replace the blind exploration of the surrounding space by trial and
error movements.
(iii) Habit and (iv) Instinct
Habit, instinct, and visual diagnosis are all closely related to
each other, according to Campbell. Both instincts and habits are
mostly founded upon visual stimuli that trigger a learned or innate
response. Innate knowledge does not represent innate ideas; rather it
corresponds to expectations or hypotheses that have no prior validity.
Therefore, the distinction between "primitive instincts" and "learned
habits" is false: all instincts are fine-tuned by learning processes
and all learning makes use of inborn knowledge mechanisms. And both
are hypotheses that need to be tested. Furthermore, Campbell
introduces the popular habit-to-instinct view of his time, namely that
by means of natural selection, habits will become instincts (without
explaining how this takes place).
(v) Visually supported thought
This can be thought of as insightful problem-solving. Organisms
endowed with this knowledge process are able to perform insightful
behavior when they can visually perceive their surrounding
environment. Campbell offers as an example the Köhler experiments,
where primates are capable of showing some kind of "aha" experience.
(vi) Mnemonically supported thought
Organisms with memory capacities can re-present the environment,
thereby replacing the need for a constant visually perceivable
environment. Because one can imagine the environment, one can also
have creative and intelligent thoughts, of unseen or unexperienced
things (such as a mermaid).
(vii) Socially vicarious exploration: observational learning and imitation
Trial and error exploration by one member of the community can
replace the trial and error exploration by all the other members of
society. This is because certain organisms are able to learn by
observing others. Imitating other's behavior reduces the possibility
that each individual on its own needs to invent a certain behavior.
This implies that we live in a shared world; a solipsistic view is
impossible. Campbell also stresses that learned behavior cannot jump
from brain to brain; rather it needs to be learned in turn by trial
and error. So a memetic position is not feasible in Campbell's view.
(viii) Language
Language overlaps with (vi) and (vii) and is broadly conceived as
including human language but also other communication systems such as
bee language and pheromones. With language, the environment is
represented by words that are contingently chosen (they don't
necessarily correspond with the world; the relation is indirect).
Language acquisition too, does not merely encompass the direct passing
on of words to children. Children, through trial and error, learn to
correctly use the words they hear to describe certain objects and/or
events, which again implies a strictly behavioristic model.
(ix) Cultural transmission
Changes in technology and culture also represent a blind variation
and selective retention scheme. Complete social organizations or
either selected or not and their respective leaders replace the
behavior of the members of the community.
(x) Science
Science is part of cultural evolution. And also science reveals a
trial and error pattern.
Many of the above mentioned knowledge mechanisms that Campbell
introduced are today further divided or re-defined. Nevertheless it
was Campbell who for the first time in history so clearly
distinguished between different knowledge processes. Thus he showed
that knowledge is not to be understood in a uniform manner.
Campbell's more general blind-variation-and-selective-retention
scheme, that is supposed to run through all levels of the hierarchy,
is still applied today.
All increases in knowledge or adaptivity are an inductive process, and
adaptivity is also comprehended as knowledge (Campbell, 1960). This
differs from an instructionist process, because at no time is the
organism a blank slate that is written upon by the environment. While
natural selection does not cause blind variation, in a way it does
cause indirect selective retention, through the elimination of the
unfit. "At no stage has there been any transfusion of knowledge from
the outside, not of mechanisms of knowing, nor of fundamental
certainties." (Campbell, 1974: 413). Therefore, according to Campbell
(1960: 380-381):
1. All knowledge-gaining-processes or inductive achievements are
the result of a blind-variation-and-selective-retention scheme. The
latter is thus a universal schema or heuristic that can account for
the evolution of these different processes.
2. Furthermore, within the course of evolution, one can distinguish
between many later-evolved processes that shortcut full
blind-variation-and-selective-retention processes. Vision, for
example, shortcuts blind trial and error locomotion. Such new
mechanisms are also inductively achieved (by natural selection). The
process by which these inductively achieved mechanisms shortcut and
accelerate earlier mechanisms is called vicarious selection. This
concept is derived from the Christian vicar, because such shortcuts
substitute earlier mechanisms in a way that a vicar substitutes God.
What is important is that knowledge mechanisms that are acquired later
are (again because they are inductively achieved) not necessarily more
accurate; they are only more efficient (Campbell, 1959: 162). These
shortcuts themselves evolved through a process of
blind-variation-and-selective-retention. And later stages partly
determine earlier stages of knowledge processes which Campbell (1974)
termed downward causation.
3. Finally, these shortcuts have not only evolved by
blind-variation-and-selective-retention. In the operation of these
shortcuts, a blind-variation-and-selective-retention process can also
be detected. Thus it is Campbell who is the first to state clearly
that not only does a selection process lie at the basis of evolution,
but also that this selection process itself adheres to such a
selection process.
In his 1995 article (published posthumously in 1997 by Heyes and
Frankel), Campbell rejected his earlier ideas about treating
adaptations as knowledge and he restricted knowledge to be those
vicarious selectors. In fact, the whole adaptationist approach became
more and more problematic to Campbell (1987: 140) in his later
writings and he started to emphasize that Panglossian adaptationism
needs to be avoided at all times within EE. Retention is equally
important, just as variation and selection are, especially when
science is concerned.
iv. Stephen Toulmin
Specifically regarding scientific thinking, especially in the works of
Stephen Toulmin (1972), a strong analogy is drawn with natural
selection. Ideas and concepts are the results of scientific thinking
and these are, by analogy with the gene pool, introduced into the pool
of scientists through science journals, conferences, books etc.,
leading to the rise of competition between different ideas. Only the
fittest ideas survive while the less fit die out. However, this
"fitness" is not solely the result of the scientific value of the
idea; other factors enter into the equation. For example, sociological
reasons are included as causal factors for why an idea is or is not
rejected.
v. Peter Munz
Peter Munz, another author working within the adaptationist program,
calls his version of EE, "Philosophical Darwinism" (2001). Contrary to
the previous authors discussed, Munz states that even variation, which
is normally conceived of as being blind (the result of random
mutations and genetic recombinations), is the result of a selective
process. Inspired by the works of Popper, he goes so far as to state
that organisms are "embodied theories," and theories are "disembodied
organisms."
According to Munz (2001: 151-160), every organism is a theory about
its environment. That is, an organism primarily gives knowledge about
the environment. Moreover, an organism can be regarded as a definition
of that environment. An organism mirrors its environment because of
selective adaptation. Therefore, an organism literally becomes a not
yet falsified theory of a certain aspect of the environment, its
Umwelt/niche, and thus it becomes a provisionally true hypothesis. A
theory/organism — the two are synonymous in Munz's view — has certain
expectancies about its environment, and if these are met, then the
organism/theory survives; if not, the organism/theory is falsified.
The longer an organism/theory survives, the more truth is
approximated.
The behavior of a fish and the functioning of a theory of water
are exactly identical. The fish represents water by its structure and
its functioning. Both features define an initial condition (for
example, the degree of viscosity of water) which, when spotted or
sensed, trigger off a prognosis or behavioral response which, in case
of a fish, fails to be falsified. By contrast, a bird does not
represent water. (Munz, 2001: 155) .
Thus, an organism is an embodied theory about its environment. An
organism re-presents that part of the world that it is adapted to and
this representation is thus no longer verbal or conscious. Embodied
theories, according to Munz, are also no longer expressed in language,
but in anatomical structures or reflex responses, etc.
Besides regarding organisms as embodied theories, theories become
disembodied organisms in Munz's view. A human being is both because it
possesses linguistic knowledge. Linguistically expressed theories,
according to Munz (2001: 160-8), are also the result of a process of
variation and selective retention. Here too, linguistically expressed
theories are literally organisms. In the wake of Popper, Munz stresses
that theories should be reified. Linguistic theories are built up from
language, and there exists no causal link between this language and
the causal impact that the world has upon the non-linguistic body.
Therefore, language and consciousness create uncertainty: expressions
can only be hypothetical. In addition, at first language appears to be
maladaptive, since it delays non-linguistic, embodied responses.
Nevertheless, such expressions are adaptive as well, because they
enable variation. Selection can only work when there is variation
which it can select from, and therefore, for Munz, the growth of
scientific linguistic knowledge is possible.
In contrast to previous adaptationist EEs, according to Munz, this
variation is also the result of selectionist processes. Eventually,
Munz (2001: 184) stresses that his theory results in an antropic
principle. With the origin and evolution of life, the world represents
itself, onto itself, through disembodied organisms and embodied
theories. Contrary to physics, it is biology that can give us a valid
picture of how the world is.
In summary, within traditional evolutionary epistemological accounts,
the strict distinction between phenotype and environment, as put
forward by adherents of the Modern Synthesis, is adhered to. This
leads to the possibility that one can gain knowledge about the
environment by studying organisms that are adaptive to that
environment. Thus, within this tradition it is assumed that organisms
can provide a non-arbitrary relation, not between language and the
outer world, but between whole organisms (their bodies) and the outer
world. This position however encounters problems when one takes an
organismic point of view, a position that will be discussed in the
next section.
6. Evolution from the point of view of the organism
When evolution is regarded from within an organismic point of view, a
constructivist account emerges which in turn leads to the
non-adaptationist approach within EE. Therefore, first the
constructivist approach is examined. Secondly, the elements that are
subtracted from this approach for the development of the
non-adaptationist approach to EE are outlined.
a. The constructivist approach
Following Lewontin and Gould's critical review of the adaptationist
program, evolutionary theory was interrogated from less adaptationist
perspectives as well. Opposed to the strict adaptationist account, the
systems theoretical approach defends the following constructivist
position.
…[T]he claim that the environment of an organism is causally
independent of the organism, and the changes in the environment are
autonomous and independent of changes in the species itself, is
clearly wrong. It is bad biology, and every ecologist and evolutionary
biologist knows that it is bad biology. The metaphor of adaptation,
while once an important heuristic for building evolutionary theory, is
now an impediment to a real understanding of the evolutionary process
that needs to be replaced by another. Although all metaphors are
dangerous, the actual process of evolution seems best captured by the
process of construction. (Lewontin: 2000: 48)
Instead of portraying organisms as passive elements that are subjected
to selection, Lewontin (2000: 51-64) introduces a more constructivist
approach to evolution in which five different aspects of the
organism-environment relation are distinguishable.
1. Organisms partly determine by themselves which elements from the
external environment belong to their environment or niche, and they
determine to a large extent how these different elements relate to one
another. A shrub, for example, can be part of the habitat of a
butterfly, while a tree is not.
2. Organisms not only largely choose what is part of their
environment; they also literally construe the environment that
surrounds them. This process is called niche construction. Beavers,
for example, build their own dams.
3. Furthermore, organisms constantly change their environment in an
active manner; every act of consumption is an act of production. The
first photosynthetic organisms, for example, changed earth
dramatically from an oxygen-low to an oxygen-rich planet.
4. Through time, organisms learn to anticipate the external
conditions that the environment provides. For instance, according to
certain environmental conditions, certain chordates are able to switch
from a sexual to an asexual form. Other organisms hoard food for the
winter.
5. Finally, according to Lewontin, organisms modify signals that
are coming from their surrounding by their biological build-up. That
is to say, they modify external signals into internal signals to which
their bodies are able to react. For example, if the external
temperature rises, the molecules that form the organisms do not start
to tremble. Rather, an internal signal in the brain will lead to the
release of certain hormones that cool the body down so that it does
not get overheated.
Hence, from within the systems theoretical approach, the relation
between an organism and its environment is understood from within a
dialectical point of view (Callebaut & Pinxten, 1987: 41, Gontier,
2006).
ev-ep-diagram2
Figure 2. Within systems theory, the focus lies not only on the mutual
relation between the organism and
its environment, rather internal processes specific to the organism
and/or the environment are taken into account.
An organism not only is determined by the external environment, the
organism can also, to a certain extent, determine its environment by
construing and reconstruing it in an active manner (fig. 2).
Therefore, the concept "environment" is also broadened to include the
inner environment where inner homeostatic, self-regulating processes
are responsible for an organism's survival (point 4 and 5 above).
Because of this, it is said that the constructivist approach explains
evolution from the organismic point of view (Gutmann and Weingarten
1990; Wuketits, 2006).
b. The non-adaptationist approach within EE
The non-adaptationist approach to EE was first introduced by Franz
Wuketits (1989). All adaptationist approaches to EE adhere to the view
that it is possible, to an extent, to develop a correspondence theory.
A correspondence theory states that there is a 1-to-1 correspondence
between the environment and the organisms that live in it, or between
theories and the world. For instance, the ant can tell us something
about the soil. In order to make this claim feasible, natural
selection needs to be reduced to, or at a minimum the emphasis should
rest heavily on, the mechanism of adaptation. It is only through the
mechanism of adaptation that such correspondence can be obtained.
In the wake of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, one of the founders of systems
theory, the importance of the study of the whole organism is stressed,
next to the study of the (adaptive) relation between the organism and
the environment. Within systems theory, organisms are conceived of as
partly open, partly closed systems. That is to say, organisms
constantly take matter and energy from, and give matter and energy to,
their environment, while they themselves maintain a "steady state"
(Wuketits, 2002: 193). Later on, Prigogine (1996) would introduce the
concept of "dissipative structures." A whirlpool, for example,
maintains its form while the water of which it is composed, constantly
changes. But once the water flow stops, the whirlpool no longer
exists. Organisms are more than such dissipative structures. They are
homeostatic systems, because not only can they self-regulate and
self-organize, they can also maintain themselves to a certain extent.
That is why it is said that organisms are partly open, partly closed
systems; they receive and donate matter and energy to and from their
environment. They also distinguish themselves from that environment
and are able to construct their environment as well.
Developmental systems theory (DST) (Maturana and Varela 1980; Oyama
2000a and b; Dupré 2001) grew out of systems theory and, as the
concept suggests, it focuses on developmental processes. It
understands organisms to be autocatalytic systems, systems which are
able to self-organize and self-maintain, not so much because they are
adapted to the environment they live in, but because they are able to
self-maintain, sometimes even despite the environment, due to the
inner mechanisms they develop in order to survive. Therefore, these
inner mechanisms of self-organization and self-regulation are
comprehended as causal factors that need to be part of the explanation
of why organisms behave in a certain manner.
Within the non-adaptationist tradition of EE, being adapted does not
mean that there is a one-to-one correspondence with the environment.
Instead, being adapted implies having the ability to change the
environment to make it livable for the organism, and thus to enhance
survival. Adaptation thus becomes only one aspect that needs to be
studied, together with non-adaptationist approaches. Wuketits (2006:
38-9):
… a nonadaptationist view of cognition and knowledge and a
nonadaptationist version of evolutionary epistemology (…) is mainly
based on the following assumptions: (1) Cognition is the function of
active bio-systems and not of blind machines that just respond to the
outer world. (2) Cognition is not a reaction to the outer world but
results from complex interactions between the organism and its
surroundings. (3) Cognition is not a linear process of step-by-step
accumulation of information but a complex process of continuous error
elimination.
In sum, an EE based upon systems theoretical evolutionary theory is
not anti-adaptationist (Wuketits 1995: 359-60). It is
non-adaptationist because the world constantly changes because of the
organisms that inhabit it. This makes it difficult to approximate a
one-to-one correspondence.
Instead of adhering to such a correspondence theory, the
non-adaptationist approach puts forward a coherence theory. Because of
these processes of inner self-organization, self-regulation and the
possibility for an organism to partially (re)construct its
environment, an organism is partly capable of creating its own
habitat. Different organisms develop different habitats because they
have evolved differently and have different inner mechanisms which
enable them to cope with, and interact with, the outer world. Here,
according to Wuketits (2006), it is not useful to ask which habitat is
more real or more in correspondence with the world in itself (an
sich), because every organism capable of surviving has proven that it
is adequate. Therefore a coherence theory adheres to a functional
notion of reality. What an organism, according to its own inner
mechanisms of perception, perceives as real, is real for that organism
in its struggle for existence. If that organism is able to survive
because of the way it perceives things, it is able to reproduce and
reintroduce its genes into the gene pool. Wuketits (2006: 43):
First, organisms do not simply get a picture of (parts of)
reality, but develop, as was already hinted at, a particular scheme of
reaction. … Second, the notion of a world-in-itself becomes obsolete
or at least redundant. What counts for any organism is that it copes
with its own world properly.
7. Evolution from the point of view of genes
Thus far we have examined the "organismic point of view" towards
evolution defended by the systems theoretical approach, and the
description of evolution from the "point of view of the environment"
as is the case with the Modern Synthesis. A third and final
alternative for describing evolution is the "gene's eye view." The
gene's eye view was introduced by Richard Dawkins (1976), following
Williams (1966).
This approach opened the discussion concerning universal Darwinism
(section 7) and introduced the important concept of a "replicator," a
concept that is often used within universal selectionism.
According to Dawkins (1982: 162) the unit of selection is not the
phenotype, but the replicator: "… any entity in the universe of which
copies are made" and this replicator, contrary to the vehicles that
temporarily house them "…is potentially immortal… the rationale is
that an entity must have a low rate of spontaneous, endogenous change,
if the selective advantage of its phenotypic effects over those of
rival ('allelic') entities is to have any significant effect."
(Dawkins, 1982: 164).
A replicator carries information that can be copied. An example par
excellence is genetic material that, according to the specific
sequence of nucleotides (the building blocks of genes), encodes for
certain characteristics. Organisms, according to Dawkins, are mere
vehicles that temporarily accommodate such information-carrying
replicators. In the long run, because of their longevity, fecundity
and copying-fidelity, these "selfish genes" outlive their temporary
housing. Therefore, the emphasis for Dawkins should lie on the
replicator, not the individual organism. That is not to say that the
environmental approach so characteristic of the Modern Synthesis is
wrong, according to Dawkins, rather it should be complemented with the
gene's point of view of evolution.
…[t]here are two ways in which we can characterize natural
selection. Both are correct: they simply focus on different aspects of
the same process. Evolution results from the differential survival of
replicators. Genes are replicators; organisms and groups of organisms
are not replicators, they are vehicles in which replicators travel
about. Vehicle selection is the process by which some vehicles are
more successful than other vehicles in ensuring the survival of their
replicators. (Dawkins, 1982: 162)
It is the organism's job to deliver its genes as quickly and
faithfully as possible within the gene pool. "Vehicle selection is the
differential success of vehicles in propagating the replicators that
ride inside them." (Dawkins, 1982: 166) Every behavior an organism
displays that is not reducible to the benefit of its genetic material
is, from the point of view of the gene, futile and even unnecessarily
costly. Organisms are only important in so far as they are able to
propagate their genes. Therefore, although this view can be
complemented with the Modern Synthesis, it stands opposed to the
"organismic point of view."
8. Universal selection mechanisms repeated and extended
Thus far we have seen that the units and levels of selection debate
that started within biology also set off an evolutionary
epistemological debate concerning the different units and levels of
selection in science.
One of the main goals set forward by many Evolutionary Epistemologists
is the development of a normative and explanatory framework that is
based upon, and is at the least analogical to, evolutionary thinking.
The quest for universal selection formulas that was already launched
as early as the nineteenth century was spurred again by this units and
levels of selection debate. The goal of such a uniform universal
formula is that it not only explains biological evolution, but also
the evolution of science, culture, the brain, economics, etc.
Scientists and philosophers alike have introduced different formulas
that generalize and universalize natural selection and other
evolutionary theories. Discussions in the field revolve around the
question of whether there exists one universal selection formula which
can be utilized to interpret all other kinds of evolutionary processes
(including the evolution of culture, psychology, immunology, language,
etc.), or whether such formulas can only help at a descriptive, and
therefore, merely analogical, level. In what follows, different
evolutionary frameworks are briefly touched upon so that the
interested reader has an idea of where to look for different
applications of these schemas.
a. Lewontin's "logical skeleton" of natural selection
Lewontin (1970: 1) was the first to make an abstraction of natural
selection. He argued that "the logical skeleton" of Darwin's theory is
"a powerful predictive system for changes at all levels of biological
organization." Lewontin distinguishes between three principles:
phenotypic variation, differential fitness (because of different
environments) and the heritability of that fitness. Lewontin (1970: 1)
introduced this logical skeleton to pinpoint "different units of
Mendelian, cytoplasmic, or cultural inheritance." He distinguished
between the selection of molecules (regarding the origin of life),
cell organelles (regarding cytoplasmic evolution), cellular selection
(different cell types divide at different rates, comparable with what
today is called epigenetics), gametic selection, individual selection,
kin selection and population selection.
b. Universal Darwinism
Dawkins (1983: 15) states that wherever life originates, that life can
only be explained by using Darwin's theory of natural selection.
According to Dawkins, the most important property of life is that it
is adapted to its environment, and adaptation requires a Darwinist
explanation. Dawkins (1983: 16) states: "I agree with Maynard Smith
[…] that 'The main task of evolution is to explain complexity, that
is, to explain the same set of facts which Paley used as evidence of a
Creator.'"
Organisms are "adaptively complex" (Dawkins, 1983: 17). This means
that a complex structure like the eye, for example, evolved by natural
selection for vision. Organisms or organismal traits are adapted to
the environment and also evolved to enable adaptation towards that
environment. Thus, through adaptation, an organism possesses
information about that environment (Dawkins, 1983: 21). Selection
refers to "…the non-random selection of randomly varying replicating
entities by reason of their 'phenotypic' effects" (Dawkins, 1983: 32).
It can be further divided into "one-off selection" and "cumulative
selection." The former relates to the selection of a stable
configuration, a universally occurring process. The latter enables
complex adaptation, because the next generation builds upon earlier
generations through such things as the passing on of genes, but not
solely by this mechanism.
Most importantly, for Dawkins, it is replicators that are selected.
The reason that he introduces the concept "replicator" is twofold.
First, he wants to extend the Modern Synthesis by introducing the
gene's eye view. Second, he introduces the term replicator, instead of
gene, because he wants to universalize the principle of natural
selection. The unit of selection, according to Dawkins, is the
replicator, but replicator is a generic term; not only genes
(individual genes or whole chunks of the chromosome), but also memes
–which he defines as "… brain structures whose 'phenotypic'
manifestation as behavior or artifact is the basis of their [cultural]
selection," are replicators (Dawkins, 1982: 164). The idea of memetics
was later expanded by Blackmore (1999).
c. Blind variation and selective retention
Campbell's scheme is a formula that can be universalized. Every
relationship that an organism engages in with its environment is a
knowledge relation. Variation is blind, either because of random
mutations and genetic recombinations, or, in the case of the
development of scientific theories, blind trials result in blind
variation.
Selection does not only occur at the level of the interaction between
phenotype and environment, for selection is also internalized by the
process of vicarious selection (see above). And trial and error
learning has always been somewhat synonymous with
blind-variation-and-selective-retention, according to Campbell.
In his earlier writings, Campbell (1959, 1960) emphasizes the notion
of variation, because only when there is sufficient variation will
there be competition and selection. Later, he emphasized the selective
retention-part of his theory: those traits that are already adaptive
also need to be retained by the current generation in order to keep
being adaptive. In science as well, existing theories must be retained
and passed on to the next generation through learning, or this
information dies out. Hence tradition within culture or science, for
example, also became a more important element in Campbell's later
writings (1987).
d. Universal selectionism
The concept "universal selectionism" was first introduced by Gary
Cziko (1995) and roughly corresponds with Campbell's
blind-variation-and-selective-retention scheme, although he prefers
the term selectionism. In his 1995 book, Cziko explains this scheme as
being applicable not only to biological evolution, but also to the
evolution and growth of knowledge, immunology, and the development of
the brain, thinking and culture. Selectionism is the only theory that,
according to Cziko (1995: 13- 26), can explain the fit of an organism
with its environment. Throughout history, providentialism and
instructionism have also been assumed to explain this fit, but only
selectionism can explain the mechanism of adaptation.
e. Replication, variation and environmental interaction
The replication, variation, and environmental interaction scheme was
first introduced by David Hull (1980) as a critique on Dawkins's
notion of replicators and vehicles. In Dawkins's view, organisms are
mere vehicles that temporarily accommodate the selfish genes that ride
inside them and an organism can actually be equated with the workings
of its genes. Hull's theory differs from Dawkins's, because the former
states that organisms can display behavior that is not reducible to
their genes. On a more general level, Hull introduced the notion of an
interactor to complement Dawkins's view (1980). Thus, he basically
re-introduced the common assumption held by the Modern Synthesis that
what interacts with the environment are organisms, not genes. But the
notion of interaction can also be universalized. The most recent
account of this formula is given in Hull, Langman and Glenn (2001).
For selection to occur, three conditions need to be met: replication,
variation, and environmental interaction. Replication is dependent on
the interaction between the organism and its environment (Hull,
Langman and Glenn, 2001: 511). The formula they propose should be
equally applicable to biology, immunology and operant behavior,
although it should not be identical to biological selection theory.
All three sorts of evolution share certain properties but also have
their own peculiarities. Changes in operant behavior, for example, are
not transmitted immediately to the next generation.
In contrast to Campbell and Plotkin, Hull, Langman, and Glenn (2001:
513) define selection as "[The] repeated cycles of replication,
variation, and environmental interaction so structured that
environmental interaction causes replication to be differential. The
net effect is the evolution of the lineages produced by this process."
Within postneodarwinian theory, variation is either perceived as part
of the selection process, or as a precondition for selection to occur.
If variation occurs, this results either from mutations that occur in
the sex cells at the biological level, or from different behavioral
patterns that in their own right are the result of environmental
interaction. Replication, according to these authors (Hull, Langman
and Glenn, 2001: 514-6), concerns the repetition/copying of
"information."
Finally, environmental interaction is characterized as causing
replication to differ because certain replicators are more frequently
selected than others, which in turn has nothing to do with the
introduction of new variation. Only at the level of interaction
between the organism and the environment does selection occur.
Hull's scheme is one of the few schemes that has already been
implemented in extra-philosophical and extra-biological fields.
William Croft (2000, 2002) for instance uses it for the study of
language change.
f. Generate-test-regenerate / Replicator-interactor-lineage
Plotkin prefers the notion of "universal Darwinism" over universal
selectionism (1995, chapter 3). He distinguishes between two universal
formulas. The first, the generate-test/selection-regenerate formula is
more general. It does not a priori say anything about the mechanisms
or units that cause this generating and testing. This formula is again
very close to Campbell's scheme. as well as Lewontin's (Plotkin, 1995:
84). A second formula does specify the units and mechanisms:
replication, interaction and lineages. The reason Plotkin
distinguishes between the two is that he wants to avoid having to
pinpoint a priori a replicator in cultural evolution.
Selection processes, according to Plotkin, always take place in three
steps: first, there is the generation of variation, and the nature of
variation does not in itself need to be specified (genes, phenotypes,
theories etc. all can vary). This phase is always followed by a test
phase, where natural selection is of course the prototypical way in
which there occurs selection based upon the test results. Finally,
there is regeneration of old and newly evolved varieties (Plotkin,
1995: 84). While it is obvious that Plotkin mainly has the selection
of genetic material in mind here, he also sees his formula appropriate
in order to explain learning and intelligence. How information is
transmitted is not determined a priori, rather it is important that
old variations are regenerated throughout time.
The replicator-interactor-lineage formula is first an elaboration and
specialization of Plotkin's first formula since it combines Dawkins's
notion of a replicator with Hull's notions of an interactor and
lineage, the latter term referring to "… entities that can change
indefinitely through time as a result of replication and interaction."
(Plotkin, 1995: 97). Hull himself defines lineages as "…
spatiotemporal sequences of entities that causally produce one
another. Entities in the sequence are in some sense 'descended' from
those earlier in the sequence" (1981: 146).
According to Plotkin (1995: xv), adaptation and knowledge are related
in two ways: first the capacity to acquire knowledge is in itself an
adaptation, and secondly, adaptations are also a form of knowledge.
Adaptations are "in-formed" by the environment. Therefore, adaptation
is knowledge (Plotkin, 1995: 116) and there can be a tentative growth
of knowledge.
g. Universal symbiogenesis
SET, the Serial Endo-symbiogenetic Theory of Lynn Margulis and Dorian
Sagan (2002), is a theory that describes the origin of the five
kingdoms. In brief, different bacteria merged and evolved into
multi-cellular life. What is interesting here is that different
bacteria literally merged and thus that evolution does not exclusively
occur according to speciation models. The physicist Freeman Dyson
(1992) therefore introduces the principle of universal symbiogenesis,
where symbiotic mergings and speciation models intertwine. Throughout
the evolution of life, which is the same for the evolution of the
universe, there is an increase in diversification on the one hand and
symbiogenesis on the other. Different structures originate and then
later merge to form new structures. Within the evolution of life,
there was the origin of the first microbial organisms, which than
merged again and evolved into multi-cellular organisms.
Dyson defines universal symbiogenesis as "the reattachment of two
structures, after they have been detached from each other and have
evolved along separate paths for a long time, so as to form a combined
structure with behavior not seen in the separate components" (Dyson,
1998: 121).
In conclusion, it can be said that the specific theory of evolution
that one adheres to also partly determines what kind of evolutionary
epistemology can be adhered to. Since evolutionary epistemology bases
itself first on the sciences, no attempt is made by different
evolutionary epistemologists to put forward one all-encompassing
theory or program that all evolutionary epistemologists should adhere
too. On the contrary, the diversity of evolutionary epistemologies is
championed by scholars working in the field.
9. References and Further Reading
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* Bradie, Michael, 1986. "Assessing Evolutionary Epistemology."
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* Brandon, Robert N. 1982. "The Levels of Selection." In: Brandon,
Robert N.; and Burian, Richard M. (eds). 1984. Genes, Organisms,
Populations: Controversies over the units of selection 133-9.
Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
* Brandon, Robert N.; and Burian, Richard M. (eds). 1984. Genes,
Organisms, Populations: Controversies over the Units of Selection.
Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
* Callebaut, Werner; and Pinxten, Rik. 1987. "Evolutionary
Epistemology Today: Converging Views from Philosophy, the Natural and
Social Sciences." In: Callebaut, Werner; and Pinxten, Rik, (eds.).
1987. Evolutionary Epistemology: A Multiparadigm Program With a
Complete Evolutionary Epistemology Bibliography 3-55. Dordrecht:
Reidel.
* Callebaut, Werner. 1993. Taking The Naturalistic Turn or How
Real Philosophy of Science Is Done. Chicago IL: The University of
Chicago Press.
* Campbell, Donald T. 1959. "Methodological Suggestions from a
Comparative Psychology of Knowledge Processes." Inquiry 2 (3): 152-83.
* Campbell, Donald T. 1960. "Blind Variation and Selective
Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes."
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* Campbell, Donald T. 1974. "Evolutionary Epistemology." In:
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Illinois: La Salle.
* Campbell, Donald T. 1987. "Selection Theory and the Sociology of
Scientific Validity." In: Callebaut, Werner; and Pinxten, Rik (eds),
Evolutionary Epistemology 139-58. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing
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* Campbell, Donald T. 1997. "From Evolutionary Epistemology Via
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* Changeaux, Jean-Pierre. 1985. Neuronal Man: The Biology of Mind.
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* Dawkins, Richard. 1982. "Replicators and Vehicles." In: Brandon,
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* Gazzaniga, Michael S. 2000. The Mind's Past. California:
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Research for this article was supported by the Fund for Scientific
Research – Flanders (F.W.O.-Vlaanderen) and the Centre for Logic and
Philosophy of Science, where the author is a Research Assistant.
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