Ethnoepistemology

As a species of naturalized epistemology, ethnoepistemology treats all
human epistemological activities as fully natural phenomena to be
described, understood, and evaluated from a broadly anthropological
and fully a posteriori perspective. In this spirit it examines the
entire gamut of human epistemological activities ranging from those of
ordinary folk and cognitive specialists (for example, diviners,
shamans, priests, magicians, and scientists) to those of
epistemologists themselves. Ethnoepistemology includes both domestic
and non-domestic epistemological practices, and accordingly regards
Western epistemological practices as simply one among many
alternative, contingent epistemological projects advanced by and hence
available to human beings. In this manner it aims to decenter and
provincialize the definitions, aims, assumptions, methods, problems,
and claims of Western epistemology.

Ethnoepistemology rejects what it considers to be the double standard
embraced by most Western epistemology that exempts itself from the
same kind of anthropological scrutiny that the epistemologies of
non-Western cultures receive at the hands of Western ethnographers.
And it also rejects the double standard that characterizes the
epistemological activities of non-Western thinkers as mere
ethnoepistemologies while characterizing the epistemological
activities of Western thinkers as epistemology proper.
Ethnoepistemologists argue that there is a dualism that is commonly
expressed by the assertion that thinkers in other cultures practice
mere "ethnoepistemology" or "ethnophilosophy." What others do is
thereby marginalized as mere anthropological curiosity, and those
practicing it are deemed unqualified to participate in the West's
"genuinely" philosophical conversation. Indeed, the customary use of
the terms "ethnophilosophy" and "ethnoepistemology" by Western
philosophers is objectionable to ethnoepistemologists because it
assumes that Western philosophy is the benchmark by which all other
cultures' philosophies and reflective activities are to be understood
and measured, and that Western philosophy is philosophy simpliciter
rather than one among many ethnophilosophies. The more broadly
ecumenical and non-ethnocentric use of the term "ethnoepistemology"
avoids this shortcoming since it includes all epistemological
activities, be they African, East Asian, European, Native American,
and so forth. And that is how the term will be used in this article.
All epistemological activities are instances of ethnoepistemology in
this broad sense; and all ethnoepistemologies are instances of
epistemology. Finally, ethnoepistemology reflects critically upon the
nature, method(s), aim(s), province and very definition of
epistemology itself from the broadly anthropological, fully a
posteriori perspective.

1. General Characterization

Ethnoepistemology is a species of naturalized epistemology devoted to
the a posteriori, anthropological style of investigation of all human
epistemological activities, both domestic and non-domestic. (For an
overview of naturalized epistemology, see Maffie (1990); Kitcher
(1992); and Kornblith (1997.). Ethnoepistemology regards human
epistemological activities as wholly natural phenomena susceptible to
description, understanding, and evaluation from a broadly
anthropological and fully a posteriori perspective. It examines the
entire gamut of human epistemological activities ranging from those of
ordinary folk and cognitive specialists to those of epistemologists
themselves. What's more, it examines not only non-domestic
epistemological practices but also domestic Western epistemological
practices, and regards the latter as constituting merely one among
many alternative and contingent epistemological projects pursued by
and available to human beings. In this manner, ethnoepistemology
serves to de-center and provincialize the aims, assumptions, problems,
methods, and conclusions of Western epistemology. The conception of
ethnoepistemology sketched here thus differs from the dominant
conception in contemporary Western academic discourse, which conceives
ethnoepistemology as the study of non-Western epistemologies only.
Lastly, ethnoepistemology reflects critically upon the nature, aims,
and province of epistemology, from the selfsame broadly
anthropological and fully a posteriori perspective.

As a species of naturalized epistemology, ethnoepistemology rejects
epistemology as First Philosophy, i.e. epistemology conceived as an
autonomous, a priori enterprise prior to and normative for all other
inquiry. It rejects, for example, such mainstay principles of
traditional Western epistemologyies, which assert that epistemology
employs sui generis, a priori methods and evidence; epistemology
employs evidential norms and standards epistemologically firmer or
higher than those of the sciences; epistemology proceeds from a
vantage point making no use of the substantive findings of the
sciences; epistemology yields results epistemologically firmer or
higher than those of the sciences; and epistemology is
epistemologically prior to the sciences.

Ethnoepistemology conceives its own activities as continuous with the
sciences. It endeavors to create such continuity by extending the
epistemology of the sciences — e.g. their a posteriori evidential
practices, styles of reasoning, and modes of explanation — as well as
the substantive findings of the sciences into the ethnoepistemological
study of epistemology. In short, ethnoepistemology is conducted within
the sciences and as part of the sciences.

Ethnoepistemology thus construes inquiry into human epistemological
activities as consisting of "scientific questions about a species of
primates" (Quine 1975:68). It seeks an account of these activities
that is compatible with creatures possessing the biology, history,
cultures, and psychology of Homo Sapiens. Ethnoepistemology thus
adopts a broadly interdisciplinary perspective that incorporates the
findings of anthropology of knowledge, cultural anthropology,
cognitive anthropology, cognitive psychology, indigenized psychology,
the sociology of belief and knowledge, linguistics, history,
evolutionary biology, etc., and unifies these under a single umbrella:
one aptly characterized as "anthropology." In this manner, its
approach to human epistemological activities parallels anthropological
approaches to other cultural practices such as morality, magic,
shamanism, religion, and law. It regards all epistemological
activities — ranging from the less reflective and less critical
activities of ordinary folk to the more self-conscious, abstract, and
reflective activities of epistemologists — as no different in
principle from the aforementioned cultural activities. Epistemological
activities are simply one among many natural phenomena, simply one
among many human endeavors, and as such properly studied by
anthropology. Ethnoepistemology thus considers epistemological
activities — e.g. epistemological intuitions, judgments, concepts,
norms, and goals — as amenable to the same methods of inquiry as
employed by the sciences.

Ethnoepistemology approaches human epistemological activities as
historically and contingently constituted natural phenomena conducted
by reflective human beings. The nature, aims, norms, theories,
concepts, and province of human epistemological activities are to be
understood in terms of the life context in which these activities are
organically rooted and sustained, rather than in terms of divine
imperative, rationality per se, or pre-existing epistemological facts
or principles. Epistemological goals, notions, principles, and
theories are human postulates and fabrications. Epistemology is
fashioned by humans and for humans. However, humans do not fashion
their epistemologies in circumstances of their own choosing, and
therefore do not fashion their epistemologies entirely as they please.
External reality plays a role in the process. Humans fashion their
ends and norms as a particular organism with a specific objective
make-up, environment, and relationship to that environment which are
not of its choosing and which transcend its wishes, language games,
culturally-adopted evidential practices, and so forth. Consequently,
that which instrumentally promotes the epistemic ends of human beings
need not be necessarily socially constructed. In other words,
ethnoepistemology (and naturalized epistemology generally) remains
neutral between un-realist (constructivist) vs. realist theories
regarding the ontological status of epistemological properties. (For
supporting argument, see Maffie 1990, 1993, 1995, 1999.)

Ethnoepistemology embraces several methodological principles. The
first is Reflexivity, which states that its own manner of description,
explanation, and evaluation must be in principle applicable to itself.
The practice of ethnoepistemology as proposed herein is itself an
instance of ethnoepistemological activity and as such amenable to
ethnoepistemological investigation. The second is Symmetry, according
to which ethnoepistemology is symmetrical in style of explanation and
evaluation. The same kinds of explanations and criteria of evaluation
are employed regarding both true and false belief, justified and
unjustified belief, and knowledge and ignorance. The third is
Impartiality, that is to say, ethnoepistemology is impartial with
respect to true and false belief, justified and unjustified belief,
and knowledge and ignorance. Both sides of these dichotomies require
explanation. Ethnoepistemology thus rejects the various dualisms
commonly assumed by traditional epistemology that contradict these
three methodological principles. (For related discussion, see Bloor
1991, and Maffie 1999.)

Ethnoepistemology examines all levels of epistemological activity
conducted by all epistemological agents in all places. Therefore,
ethnoepistemology is universal in scope in this threefold sense.
First, it studies the epistemic practices of ordinary people,
cognitive specialists such as shamans, priests, jurists and
scientists, and of philosophers themselves. Philosophical activity
does not transcend naturalistic (e.g., sociological, anthropological,
etc.) investigation. It is one species of natural activity alongside
cooking, childrearing, and counting. Professional academic philosophy,
in particular, is no exception and is thus subject to anthropological
scrutiny as well. Academic philosophers are simply one among many
groups or subcultures alongside Roman Catholic priests, Yakut shamans,
Mesoamerican curanderas, and Yoruba onisegun.

Second, ethnoepistemology studies the epistemological activities of
both alien and domestic cultures, and thus incorporates non-domestic
and domestic Western anthropology as well as non-domestic and domestic
non-Western anthropology. Members of the American Philosophical
Association along with the editors and referees of professional
journals such as Philosophical Review and Mind are simply one group
among many other cultural groups, and as such, are not exempt from
anthropological scrutiny. Phenomena for domestic ethnoepistemological
research include: (a) professional boundary-work, such as constructing
the dominant epistemological canon and tradition, which includes
questions such as, who is included in official histories and textbooks
of epistemology, who is considered a "serious" epistemologist, and
what is a "genuine" epistemological problem; and (b) professional
gate-keeping activities such as editorial and investigative, and
hiring and promotion decisions.

Ethnoepistemology thus rejects the tacit dualism and double standard
of Western epistemology that exempts domestic (i.e. Western)
epistemological practices from the same kind of anthropological
scrutiny that the epistemological practices of non-Western cultures
are subject to. Both are to be studied in the same manner, using the
same kinds of methods, norms, and evidence. In addition,
ethnoepistemology rejects the kindred dualism and double standard that
characterizes the epistemological activities of non-Western cultures
as ethnoepistemologies while characterizing the epistemological
activities of Western culture as epistemology proper. This view is
commonly expressed by the assertion that thinkers in other cultures
practice mere "ethnoepistemology" or "ethnophilosophy," whereas
Western academic philosophers practice real epistemology or real
philosophy. (This attitude is widespread in Western academia.
Ethnoastronomy, for example, is commonly conceived as the study of
non-Western astronomies, but not Western astronomy! Western astronomy
is immune to anthropological examination because it is "real"
astronomy, astronomy simpliciter. The same holds for ethnobotany,
ethnomusicology, etc.) What non-Western thinkers do is thereby
marginalized as mere anthropological curiosity (e.g. as mythologizing,
poetizing, or storytelling), and they are deemed unqualified to
participate in the "genuinely" philosophical discourse of the West.
What thinkers in other cultures do is endemic and of local interest
only. What they think is not universally relevant since it does not
apply to humankind in general or reflect the human condition as such.
It is simply assumed that this is not the case with Western
philosophers.

Indeed, the customary use of the terms "ethnophilosophy" and
"ethnoepistemology" by Western philosophers is objectionable, since it
assumes that Western philosophy is the standard by which all other
cultures' philosophies and reflective activities are to be understood
and measured, and that Western philosophy is philosophy simpliciter
rather than one among many ethnophilosophies. (For a recent expression
of this view, see Rorty 1991, 1992, 1993.) The more broadly ecumenical
and non-ethnocentric use of the term "ethnoepistemology" employed
here, however, avoids this shortcoming since it includes all
epistemological activities, whether they African, East Asian, European
or Latin American. All epistemological activities are instances of
ethnoepistemology (in this broad sense); and all ethnoepistemologies
are instances of epistemology.

Finally, the scope of ethnoepistemology is universal in the third
sense that it subjects to anthropological scrutiny what Anglo-American
analytic epistemologists call normative (or basic) level as well as
meta-level epistemological activities. Normative level epistemology
determines the correct theory of knowledge as well as the scope and
sources of human knowledge. It also evaluates and prescribes cognitive
behavior. Meta-epistemology investigates the semantics, metaphysics,
and epistemology of knowledge claims. It determines the cognitive and
epistemic status of epistemic judgments, the reference of epistemic
expressions, the ontological status of epistemic properties, and so
on. Meta-epistemology also inquires into the nature and content of
epistemic ends. Ethnoepistemology examines epistemic agents' normative
level epistemological concepts, judgments, norms, and theories as well
as their meta-level theories about the epistemology of epistemology,
the ends of epistemology, etc.

2. Some Questions Addressed by Ethnoepistemology

Some of the questions that ethnoepistemology addresses include the
following: How shall we define epistemology? What is the nature and
province of epistemology? What is it about the biological constitution
as well as social, cultural, and physical circumstances of humans that
engender epistemic judgment, reflection, and theorizing? Why do humans
practice epistemological inquiry? How do humans actually practice
epistemological inquiry? What explains the importance of knowledge
claims and knowledge holders (e.g. sages, scientists, priests) in the
lives of humans?

What do humans actually care about when inquiring into epistemological
questions? Do human epistemological activities vary across history,
culture, class, race, gender, etc.? What is the ontological status of
epistemic properties? Are there any nontrivial and cross-cultural
generalizations regarding the epistemological landscape of humankind?
Is humankind characterized by epistemological unity or relativity? Is
epistemology unique to Western culture? Should humans continue to ask
epistemological questions?

The foregoing questions are to be resolved a posteriori rather than by
appeal to a priori intuitions, transcendental arguments, divine
imperatives, rationality per se, or pre-existing epistemological facts
or principles (as is customary with non-naturalist epistemologies).
Ethnoepistemology regards these strategies as clever ways of begging
the question with all the advantages of theft over hard empirical
toil. Ethnoepistemology considers its answers to the above questions
as scientific hypotheses, that is to say, fallible and corrigible.

Ethnoepistemology addresses these questions within the context of the
fallible and corrigible, a posteriori, and social scientific finding
that critical reflection and "the unusually stubborn attempt to think
clearly" (as William James characterized philosophy) are indeed global
endeavors (e.g., see Deloria et al. 1999; Deutsche and Bontekoe (eds.)
1997; Hester, Jr. and McPherson 1997; Oruka 1990; Leon-Portilla 1963;
Radin 1957; and Scharfstein 1993). Let's briefly consider two pressing
questions facing ethnoepistemology.

a. How Shall We Define Epistemology?

Perhaps the most daunting issue facing ethnoepistemology is: How shall
we define epistemology itself? When an intuition, concept, judgment,
norm, theory or goal is epistemological, and what makes it so? When
are critical reflection and "the unusual attempt to think clearly"
epistemological? What definition or criterion shall
ethnoepistemologists bring into the field when attempting to identify
epistemological activities — as opposed to prima facie
non-epistemological activities such as moral, aesthetic, prudential,
parental or agricultural activities? Can we assume at the outset that
epistemological activities are in principle distinct from moral,
aesthetic, and other activities? Are we justified in assuming that
there is even a distinctly epistemological — as opposed to moral,
aesthetic or prudential — point of view?

How we answer these questions bears crucially upon our answers to
other key questions such as: How do we avoid ethnocentrically begging
the question in favor of our own domestic, meta-epistemological
conception of epistemology and against alternative, nonequivalent
conceptions advanced by other cultures? How do we avoid arbitrarily
rejecting ex hypothesi alternative conceptions of the epistemological
on the grounds that they are not genuinely epistemological? Bluntly
put, how do we avoid the dismissive ethnocentrism — and the arrogant
provincialism that typically underlies it — expressed by such
prominent Western philosophers as: Edmund Husserl, who claimed that
the expression "Western philosophy" is tautalogous, and the expression
"non-western philosophy,"is oxymoronic (Gupta and Mohanty (eds.),
2000:xi); Emmanuel Levinas, who is quoted as having remarked, "I
always say — but in private — that the Greeks and the Bible are all
that is serious in humanity. Everything else is dancing" (Bernasconi,
1997:185); and Richard Rorty, (1991, 1992, 1993), who claims that
looking for philosophy outside of the West is "pointless" since
philosophy is unique to Western culture (quoted in Hallen, 1995:17).

i. A "Thin" Conception of Epistemology

As a start, let's approach this issue by adopting a rather "thin"
conception of epistemology. Although this conception is rooted in our
own practices, it may nevertheless serve us well. After all, as
contextualism has long urged, we cannot begin from scratch; we have no
access to a presuppositionless, Archimedean standpoint from which to
conduct inquiry. We can begin only from where we presently are.

According to this conception, epistemology consists of reflection upon
the nature, source(s), and limits of knowledge. Epistemological
intuitions, judgments, norms, theories, and ends are those concerned
with the nature, source, and limits of knowledge. Ethnoepistemology
regards this definition as a contingent, fallible, a posteriori
anthropological hypothesis about the nature of our own practices — not
a deliverance of a priori, rational insight into Platonic concepts or
preexisting necessary truths, for example. This conception has the
virtue of being sufficiently "thin" so as to enable us to capture a
wide range of activities as being epistemological. When we encounter
individuals, groups, or cultures and find they reflect, wonder,
puzzle, or theorize about — in one degree or another, in one manner or
another — the nature, source, and limits of knowledge — then we may
claim that they practice epistemology. We may find them using, for
example, epistemological notions such as knowledge, wisdom, and
evidence or what we regard as their interpretive-translational
equivalents. On the other hand, however, this conception appears
sufficiently "thick" to warrant our excluding a wide range of
activities from counting as epistemological such as farming, cooking,
and playing chess. Hence, if we encounter individuals, groups, or
cultures who do not reflect upon the nature, limits, and source of
knowledge, we may claim they do not practice epistemology.

But is this definition too permissive? Does it allow us to distinguish
epistemology from other human endeavors, such as morality and
aesthetics, for example? Doesn't it raise the concern that everything
now qualifies as epistemology? If a culture defines right belief,
evidence, or knowledge in terms of moral or aesthetic notions such as
living a morally upright, genuinely human, or beautiful life, is it
doing epistemology? Does it have an epistemology as opposed to an
ethics or aesthetics of belief?

ii. A "Thick" Conception of Epistemology

By way of answering this question, let's consider a "thicker"
conception of epistemology. According to "thick" views, doing
epistemology, having a genuinely epistemological conception of
knowledge, making genuinely epistemological judgments, etc., requires
that one embraces a specific definition (theory) of justification or
knowledge, a specific conception of the end(s) of cognition from the
epistemological point of view. "Thick" views certainly enable us to
better uphold our familiar domestic distinctions between epistemology,
on the one hand, and aesthetics, prudence and morality, on the other.
But what is the cost?

One leading "thick" view places decisive weight on the role of truth.
Many Western philosophers view correspondence truth as occupying the
center stage of Western epistemology's theories of knowledge and
justification since Plato and Aristotle. The most prominent
contemporary defender of this view is the North American philosopher
Alvin Goldman. Goldman (1999) defends what he calls "veritism," i.e.,
the thesis that humans across culture and history uniformly seek
truth, epistemic notions such as justification and knowledge are
properly defined in terms of truth, the aim of cognition from the
epistemological point of view is truth, and a single concept of truth
is cross-culturally present (namely, correspondence truth). Goldman is
not alone in defending veritism, as it represents an enduring view
upheld by the majority of twentieth-century Anglo-American
epistemologists from William Alston and Roderick Chisholm to Bertrand
Russell and Barry Stroud.

According to veritism, those who conceive of knowledge
non-veritistically, as well as those who dismiss the importance or
even relevance of correspondence truth to epistemological concepts,
are simply not doing epistemology. They are doing something else
instead, perhaps morality, aesthetics, pragmatics, etc. Therefore,
even if we encounter terms in a target culture's language that prima
facie translate into English terms such as "knowledge" and "evidence,"
they may not be properly translated in strictly epistemological terms.
Such cultures are using "knowledge," etc. in some alien,
non-epistemological sense. For instance, they may be using the terms
in a prudential or practical sense, where "to know" really means "know
how," not "know that." Such cultures thus have a notion of practical
knowledge or "knowledge how" but lack a notion of theoretical
knowledge or "knowledge that." It is the latter that is the proper
focus of epistemology as such.

Goldman and others defend veritism in the face of a daunting pantheon
of Western philosophers including David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche,
Martin Heidegger, William James, John Dewey, W.V.O. Quine, Nelson
Goodman, and Richard Rorty, who reject the relevance of correspondence
truth to epistemology, reject veritistic epistemologies, and propose
alternative, non-veritistic epistemologies. What do veritists say
about these philosophers? Presumably that they have abandoned
epistemology per se in favor of some other activity such as reflecting
upon the rightness of belief from the moral or pragmatic point of view
(e.g., see Goldman, 1999).

Let's consider this question from the broader perspective of
comparative world philosophy. From this perspective, truth clearly
appears to be merely one among many ends governing the regulation of
belief (or cognition) and merely one among many ends in terms of which
knowledge (or wisdom) is conceived. Non-veritistic cognitive ends
include: living a life of balance and beauty; becoming a genuinely
human; moral rectitude and purity; promoting social harmony;
coexisting in harmony with nature; respect for nature; and conformity
with sacred text (to name only a few). Let's briefly review several
studies.

Ben-Ami Scharfstein (2001) surveys Bhartriharian, Confucian, European
Existentialist, Gangeshan, Neoplatonic, Inuit, !Kung, Navajo, and
Taoist (among others) reflections upon the nature of truth and on this
basis argues that no single conception of truth is shared universally
by all the world's philosophies. Humans define truth as:
correspondence between verbal assertion (or language) and reality;
practical utility; the sum-total of ideas that accords with reality;
the way things really are (independently of verbal assertion and
language); and accurate verbal articulation of what cannot be
reasonably doubted because it ought not to be morally doubted.

David Hall (2001), David Hall and Roger Ames (1987, 1998), and Chad
Hansen (1992), argue that classical, pre-Han Dynasty Taoist and
Confucian epistemologies are not concerned with truth, true belief or
truthful representation. Rather, they are concerned with identifying
the proper path or appropriate model of conduct that enables humans to
live the kind of life suitable for human beings. According to
Confucianism, for example, the proper life consists of living
harmoniously with one's social surroundings. Correspondence truth
plays no role in attaining or maintaining this life. One aims at
living a life characterized by authenticity, genuineness, rectitude
and wholeness — not knowledge defined as justified true belief.
Confucian epistemology seeks to identify the kind of knowledge that is
needed for following this path, i.e., knowledge that is performative
and participatory rather than representational. Classical Chinese
epistemologies seek right or appropriate belief — not true belief. If
truth is relevant, it is defined in terms of genuineness or
authenticity — not correspondence.

Indigenous North American philosophers Vine Deloria, Jr. (DeLoria, Jr.
(1994) and DeLoria, et al (eds.), 1999) and Lee Hester (Hester and
Cheney 2001), contend that indigenous North American philosophies
treat cognitive states as maps rather than as beliefs. Hester claims
Native American philosophy does not focus upon belief and as a
consequence does not worry about the correspondence-truth of belief.
Native Americans focus upon actions and practices, and adopt an
attitude of non-belief (that is, neither belief nor disbelief) towards
actions and practices. This attitude is rooted in the idea that one is
defined by one's actions, not one's beliefs. Adopting the metaphor of
"the map and the territory," Hester maintains Native Americans adopt
an agnostic attitude of epistemological humility regarding the
correspondence-truth of their map. They are concerned with the utility
of their map as a practical action-guide. Knowledge has a practical
not theoretical focus; it concerns concrete experiences and narratives
of actual lives in the world. Knowledge is not a species of belief.

Jim Cheney (Cheney 1998, Hester and Cheney 2001) argues that
Indigenous North American philosophies conceive truth in moral terms
such as responsibility, goodness and human well-being. This view of
truth is a component of an ethical-epistemological orientation Cheney
calls an "epistemology of respect" rather than an "epistemology of
control." Truth must responsibly guide action in the sense of
promoting the well-being of everyone. It must be rooted in the world
of concrete everyday practices and experiences in a way that makes
possible human flourishing.

Willard Gingerich (1987), Miguel Leon-Portilla (1963), and James
Maffie (2000b, 2002, 2003) maintain that pre-Hispanic indigenous
Nahuatl-speaking philosophers of the High Central Plateau of Mexico
conceived knowledge in non-veritistic terms such as balance,
well-groundednness, moral uprightness, authenticity, and
disclosingness. Correspondence truth played no role in their notions
of wisdom, knowledge, proper belief, etc. Gordon Brotherston (2001)
likewise argues that indigenous Amazonian philosophy conceives
knowledge pragmatically in terms of the trustworthy, responsible, and
careful ordering and arranging of things. It eschews broad,
overarching, abstract conceptions of truth such as correspondence
between propositions and world.

But what, exactly, does this survey of world philosophies show?
Veritists will argue it shows very little. Regardless of what the
preceding philosophers may think they are doing, they are simply not
doing epistemology proper. They are doing something else: morality,
aesthetics, pragmatics, or perhaps some aboriginal activity, that
fails to make the necessary conceptual distinctions between the
epistemological point of view, on the one hand, and the moral,
aesthetic, etc., points of view, on the other.

Non-veritists, however, contend that the preceding shows veritism is a
posteriori false. Goldman's "thick" veritistic conceptions of
knowledge, epistemology, and the epistemological point of view do not,
as a matter of contingent fact, enjoy global acceptance. This fact
demonstrates that Goldman's veritism is simply too "thick" as a
definition of the epistemological. Veritism excludes too many human
activities across history and culture that are plausibly
translated/interpreted as epistemological, and is therefore too
restrictive to serve as an acceptable criterion for the
epistemological when doing ethnoepistemology.

Furthermore, rather than simply assuming that non-veritist
epistemologies mistakenly fail to draw a conceptually necessary or
intrinsically rational distinction between the epistemological and the
moral or aesthetic points of view, ethnoepistemology's status as
fallible, hypothetical, and a posteriori enterprise commits us to
remain open to the possibilities that non-veritistic epistemologies
have simply pursued an alternative path of epistemological development
(one that may at some level even be incommensurable with the
veritistic path), or that non-veritistic epistemologies have simply
not committed the mistake of balkanizing the epistemological from the
moral or aesthetic — i.e. the mistake of falsely drawing a distinction
where there is no distinction to be made. After all, by naturalist
lights, whether there is a distinction to be made is a contingent and
a posteriori matter. The veritist's putative distinction between these
various points of view is not rooted in rationality per se,
pre-existing non-natural epistemological reality, or a priori
conceptual reality. In this regard, therefore, ethnoepistemologists
need to be wary of a yet another version of ethnocentrism, namely,
philosophical whiggism or the tendency to treat the claims and
distinctions of the Western philosophical present not only as correct
but as the inevitable, developmental destiny of all philosophical
reflection. Comparative world philosophy clearly supports the idea
that there is more than one philosophical (and epistemological)
trajectory taken by humankind (see Deutsche and Bontekoe (eds.), 1997;
Eze (ed.), 1996; Nuccetelli and Seay (eds.), 2004; Scharfstein, 1998;
and Waters (ed.), 2004).

iii. Some Considerations Favoring a "Thin" Conception

How shall ethnoepistemology resolve this question? The "thin"
conception of epistemology seems more attractive on several grounds.
First, it leaves as open a posteriori question the nature and aims of
knowledge and epistemology. Second, it is more inclusive. It
recognizes a wider variety of possible answers to our questions
concerning the nature and aims of knowledge and epistemology. Third,
it achieves this inclusiveness in a manner that simultaneously
respects the differences between world epistemologies. That is, it
creates a common ground for world philosophers (and philosophies)
without making all philosophers (and philosophies) the image of
Western philosophers (philosophies). Alternatively put, it does not
affirm that the non-Western "other" is doing epistemology by demanding
that the non-Western "other" do precisely what Western epistemologists
do and thus be indistinguishable from Western epistemologists.

Fourth, it avoids the subtle yet significant error committed by
"thick" accounts such as Goldman's. Goldman confounds normative and
meta-levels of epistemology by construing his normative level
definition of knowledge as a meta-epistemological constraint upon the
nature of epistemology per se. As we've seen, Anglo-American
philosophers distinguish meta- and normative levels of epistemological
inquiry. Normative-level inquiry pursues such issues as the correct
definition (or theory) of knowledge. Goldman's normative-level theory
of knowledge, for example, defines correspondence truth as a necessary
condition knowledge. Meta-epistemological inquiry investigates the
semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of knowledge claims as well
as the nature of epistemology itself. Goldman moves illegitimately
from the normative level claim that truth is a necessary (defining)
condition of knowledge to the logically distinct meta-level claim that
truth is a necessary (defining) condition of epistemology proper. This
leads Goldman to reject all non-veritistic conceptions of epistemology
not on the grounds that they advocate a posteriori false theories of
knowledge but on the grounds that they fail ex hypothesi to be
epistemology per se.

In doing so, Goldman illegitimately construes his own peculiar
meta-level theory about the correct ends of cognition from an
epistemological point of view as a general definition of epistemology
per se. Rather than being willing to see his view as one among many
possible ways of conceiving knowledge, epistemic ends, etc., Goldman
treats his way as the one and only way. In doing so, he forecloses ex
hypothesi the possibility of genuine epistemological alternatives to –
as well as legitimate dissent from – his own veritism.

Fifth, the "thin" conception leaves open the possibility of relativism
concerning definitions of the proper ends of cognition from the
epistemological point of view as well as relativism concerning
definitions of knowledge, justification, evidence, right (good)
belief. "Thicker" approaches, such as veritism, rule out relativism ex
hypothesi; anyone who disagrees is simply not doing epistemology. Yet
relativism should remain an open and contingent question; one to be
resolved via a posteriori inquiry — not by conceptual fiat prior to
inquiry.

Lastly, the "thin" view is less ethnocentric than the "thick." While
it is true that the "thin" view requires that others engage in the
same kinds of reflective processes that we do on pain of not doing
epistemology, it does not require that others arrive at the same
substantive conclusions that we do in the way that "thicker" views
require. Indeed, the "thin" view includes every cognitive practice we
might feel inclined to translate/interpret as "epistemology." In
addition, it turns out that in most, if not all, cultures, individuals
practice epistemology as "thinly" conceived.

In sum, ethnoepistemology strives to conceive epistemology as broadly,
ecumenically, and open-endedly as possible without lapsing into
triviality. In light of this, it adopts the "thin" definition above
(at least until something better comes along).

iv. Two Further Issues

Implicit in the discussion above are two further closely related
issues. First, does epistemology enjoy a metaphysical essence that
necessarily distinguishes it from ethics, soccer, cooking, and
pragmatics? In brief, it would seem not. Naturalism appears to afford
us no such metaphysical underpinnings for human activities and no
transcendental assurances concerning the eternal essence of
epistemology, the ends of cognition from the epistemological point of
view, or epistemology's distinctness from other human activities such
as doing science, playing chess or raising children. There is no
pre-existing sui generis epistemological reality for humans to seek to
discover through epistemology. Similarly, epistemology (like other
human activities) does not appear to qualify as a natural kind like
say, H2O, quark, and humanness. Rather, epistemology is a contingent
enterprise fashioned by humans and for humans. Our conceptions of
knowledge, justification and evidence as well as of epistemology
itself are all contingent human fabrications.

However, this fact entails neither epistemological relativism nor
metaphysical irealism regarding the ontological status of
epistemological properties. Whether humankind's epistemological
activities are characterized by unity or relativity remains an open
factual question to be settled a posteriori. Similarly,
anti-essentialism regarding the essence of the enterprise of
epistemology is compatible with realism regarding epistemic properties
such as justification. (For supporting argument, see Maffie 1990,
1993, 1995, 1999).

Second, if epistemology is underpinned neither by a metaphysical
essence nor by a natural kind, can we maintain that there is a
pre-existing fact of the matter whether someone in another culture is
really doing epistemology as opposed to something else? Can we
maintain that it is precisely such facts that an adequate
ethnoepistemology must capture? On the other hand must we deny the
existence of such facts and maintain instead that whether or not
someone is doing epistemology is ultimately a matter of our
translation/interpretation of their behavior? (For relevant
discussion, see Quine 1960; Davidson 1984; and Roth 1987).

b. What is the Nature of the Object of Epistemological Evaluation?

A second set of a posteriori issues confronting ethnoepistemology
concerns the nature of the object of epistemological evaluation.
First, assuming we define epistemology as concerned with evaluating
whether or not some item qualifies as knowledge, how shall we construe
the nature of knowledge: as something psychological, sociological,
biological, behavioral, or ecological? Shall we think of knowledge as
an entity one apprehends and possesses, as a map one uses, as an
appellation bestowed by one's social peers or as a way of acting in
the world? Finally, does the actual practice of epistemology require
that one construes knowledge in one of these ways rather than
another?Ethnoepistemology ought to remain neutral regarding these
questions in order to be as inclusive as possible regarding the
variety of possible epistemologies in the world. There appears to be
no compelling reason to think that the practice of epistemology proper
requires that knowledge be defined as a private, mental entity as
opposed to a behavioral or practical disposition; or that it be
theorized as an entity to be acquired and possessed as opposed to a
way of conducting one's life, etc.

Second, if epistemology is concerned with knowledge, how shall we
understand knowledge: in propositional or sentential terms (that is,
as "theoretical knowledge" or "knowledge that"), or in practical terms
(that is, as "practical knowledge" or "know how")? Should we even
accept this distinction? Similarly, if epistemology evaluates
cognitive attitudes such as belief, should such cognitive attitudes be
defined sententially, propositionally, or practically? Finally, how
does this question bear upon whether a group or culture may be said to
do epistemology?

Western epistemology has traditionally focused upon theoretical to the
exclusion of practical knowledge. If one agrees and defines the proper
concern of epistemological evaluation to be propositional knowledge
(or belief), then it would appear to follow that those individuals,
groups, and cultures that conceive knowledge (and belief)
non-propositionally must a fortiori fail to be doing epistemology.
Whatever they are doing, it simply is not epistemology.

Yet classical Chinese thought (as embodied in pre-Han Taoist and
Confucian traditions) focused upon neither propositional (sentential)
and theoretical attitudes nor propositional and theoretical
(sentential) knowledge. Chinese linguistic theory is pragmatic, not
semantic. According to Hansen, it is concerned with the assertability
of "words, phrases, sentences, arguments and even whole dialogues"
(Hansen 1992:44), rather than the truth of sentences or propositions.
Chinese epistemology discusses zhi (knowledge) but interprets zhi
non-propositionally.

The grammatical object of zhi (know) is always a noun or phrase,
not a subject-predicate sentence. The kind of knowing that makes sense
of Chinese views is knowing-how to do something, knowing-to-do
something, or knowing-of (about) something (Hansen 1992:44).

According to Roger Ames, zhi is a way of acting in the world; it is
"knowing…the 'way'…" (Ames 1997:259). A host of indigenous North and
Mesoamerican philosophies embrace remarkably similar pragmatic
accounts of knowledge (and belief) (e.g., see Deloria, et al (eds.),
1999: Hester and Cheney, 2001: Gingerich, 1987: Maffie, 2002: and
Waters (ed.), 2004).

Shall we conclude that East Asian and indigenous North and
Mesoamerican philosophers cannot be said to be doing epistemology
since they define knowledge in non-propositional, behavioral terms —
that is, because they define knowledge incorrectly according to (some)
Western philosopheis? Doing so clearly appears too restrictive, and
ethnoepistemology therefore adopts a more ecumenical approach. We are
simply confronted with different kinds of epistemologies: those
concerned with propositional knowing, those concerned with
non-propositional knowing, and those which reject the propositional
vs. non-propositional dichotomy when characterizing knowing.
Furthermore, defining the practice of epistemology per se in terms of
a particular normative level theory about the nature of knowledge
commits the fallacy of treating a normative level claim as a
meta-epistemological level claim (see above).

c. How Important is Belief to Epistemology?

A third issue facing ethnoepistemology concerns the relevance of
belief. Western epistemologists have commonly defined knowledge in
terms of justified true belief, and commonly construed epistemology as
being concerned with evaluating the epistemic credentials of belief.
If we accept this account, what happens if there is no such thing as
belief? Does epistemology go out of business? If beliefs exist but
turn out to be a culturally specific cognitive phenomenon such that
individuals in some cultures do not have beliefs, can they be said to
practice epistemology?

Rodney Needham persuasively argues against the idea that "the
institutions of…belief…express a distinct and universal mode of stable
experience (Needham 1972:217), and hence the idea that belief is
natural kind that cuts across culture. He quotes E.E. Evans-Pritchard
as saying, "There is…no word in the Nuer language which could stand
for 'I believe'" (Needham 1972:23); no word with which to express
belief. Whatever mental states, cognitive attitudes or sentiments the
Nuer adopt towards the existence of, say, their gods or cosmologies,
Evans-Pritchard denies they are felicitously translated/interpreted
into English as "believe." People in other cultures appear to employ
different folk psychologies when characterizing their mental states
(just as they employ different folk physics when characterizing their
environments), and these folk psychologies need not include belief. As
a consequence, we should not expect individuals in other cultures to
have beliefs. Belief is simply not a useful notion in representing the
mental states of individuals in (at least some) other cultures.

If Needham is correct, then it would seem that the epistemologies of
such cultures as the Nuer, for example, focus upon evaluating some
mental state or cognitive attitudes other than belief. But would this
endeavor still qualify as epistemology? Does epistemology require that
one evaluates belief specifically?

Hallen and Sodipo (1997) contend the most plausible
translation/interpretation of Yoruba linguistic behavior containing
abstract terms and concepts used in the evaluation and grading of
information yields a reading which does not map neatly onto the
English terms "belief" and "knowledge." The Yoruba's notions of gbagbo
and mo are not logically equivalent to the English notions of belief
and knowledge, respectively. Yoruba epistemological concepts and
distinctions simply do not map neatly onto Anglo-American
epistemological concepts and distinctions. In so arguing, the authors
make a strong prima facie case for the non-universality of
propositional attitudes as well as the non-universality of
epistemological concepts (e.g., the concept of knowledge as justified
true belief). Is the Yoruba's evaluation of information properly
characterized as epistemology? Does epistemology cease to exist in a
culture wherein there is no belief to evaluate?

Chad Hansen argues that classical Chinese does not possess the notion
of belief as a propositional or sentential attitude:

[It] has no grammatically parallel verb for propositional belief….
The closest counterparts to belief…focus on the term, not the
sentence. Where we would say, "He believes it is good," classical
Chinese would use a structure something like, "He goods it" or He
yi…(with regard to) that, wei (deems) [it] good" (Hansen 1992:44).

The closest counterparts to belief are best understood as
"dispositions to use a term of some object" (Hansen 1992:44) rather
than as propositional attitudes. Is epistemology possible under these
circumstances?

Finally, Paul Churchland (1979, 1981), Patricia Churchland (1986,
1987), and Stephen Stich (1983) contend that the notion of belief is a
theoretical constituent of Western culture's folk psychology about
what is the nature of mind. Western folk psychology will undoubtedly
be supplanted by neuroscience, just as Western folk physics has been
supplanted by Western scientific physics. In the process, they
predict, the notion of belief will simply be eliminated, tossed into
the rubbish bin of outmoded folk theoretical notions alongside
unicorns, faeries, and leprechauns. If this is correct, will
epistemology go out of business, or will it shift its focus to the
evaluation of neurological states instead?

On this issue ethnoepistemology ought to remain neutral so as to be as
inclusive as possible regarding the variety of possible world
epistemologies. There are no compelling reasons for requiring that
individuals have specific cognitive attitudes such as belief in order
for there to be epistemology.

3. Three Areas of Ethnoepistemological Inquiry

Ethnoepistemology examines the epistemological activities of three
groups of epistemic agents: ordinary folk, cognitive specialists
(e.g., scientists and diviners), and epistemologists. In what follows,
these are called "the ethnoepistemology of folk epistemology," "the
ethnoepistemology of cognitive specialists," and "the
ethnoepistemology of epistemology," respectively. The three exist
along a continuum since their activities differ in degree, not in
kind. They differ in terms of their degree of critical
self-reflection, abstraction and generality of theorizing. In one
degree or another, and from time to time, ordinary folk as well as
cognitive specialists engage in epistemological reflection. Reflection
upon the general nature of evidence, justification, and knowledge is
by no means the monopoly of professional philosophers (For supporting
argument, see Maffie 1995, 1999).

Ethnoepistemology's examination of each group admits of descriptive
and critical as well as domestic and non-domestic varieties. Domestic
ethnoepistemologies examine the evidential practices of one's own
culture; whereas non-domestic ethnoepistemologies examine those of
alien cultures. Descriptive studies aim to describe and report
faithfully the goals, norms and methodologies of various human
epistemic activities. Critical studies aim to evaluate and critically
reflect upon these practices. They also issue in critical or
prescriptive reforming accounts of human epistemic norms, theories,
and judgments.

a. The Ethnoepistemology of Ordinary Folk

The ethnoepistemology of ordinary folk examines what Goldman (1992)
calls the "epistemic folkways" — i.e., the largely pre-reflective,
untutored, and uncritical workaday epistemic concepts, intuitions,
judgments, and norms of ordinary people.

Descriptive studies aim to describe faithfully the intuitions,
judgments, standards, and goals of some particular folk epistemic
practice. Such studies issue in reported accounts of epistemic
folkways. They include (among others): Belenky, et al. (eds.), (1986),
Code (1991), Coetze and Roux (eds.), (1998), P. Collins (1991), Crick
(1982), Deloria et al (eds.), (1999), Eze (ed.), (1996), Goldman,
(1986, 1992), Hallen and Sodipo, (1986), Lopez Austin, (1988),
Kitchener (ed.), (2002), Radin, (1957), and Waters (ed.), (2004).

Critical studies reflect critically upon epistemic folkways and
typically issue in critical evaluations of these folkways or reforming
and prescriptive accounts of folk epistemic norms and concepts. Such
projects include the naturalized epistemologies of Code (1991), P.
Collins (1991), Goldman (1986, 1992, 1999) and Kornblith (ed.) (1997).

Incidentally, from the perspective of ethnoepistemology,
self-proclaimed non-naturalist epistemologists such as Bonjour (1985)
and Chisholm (1977) unwittingly practice descriptive or critical
domestic ethnoepistemology of their epistemic folkways. After all,
they rely upon ordinary intuitions and concepts, common sense
judgments, etc., as the raw data for their a priori reflections and
theories. Yet as Stephen Stich (1991:209) points out, their studies
constitute "a sort of domestic cognitive anthropology which records
and formalizes our culture's commonsense epistemic notions." Moreover,
their projects are epistemologically flawed because their use of
intuitions, judgments and thought-experiments amounts to little more
than an appeal to anecdotal evidence.

b. The Ethnoepistemology of Cognitive Specialists

The ethnoepistemology of cognitive specialists examines the
epistemological activities of curers, shamans, diviners, priests,
scientists, etc. Cognitive specialists are individuals who cultivate
the use of one (or more) specific method or style (e.g., altered
states of consciousness, intuition, reason or observation) in the
formation and regulation of cognitive attitudes. Trained in a specific
cognitive method, they tend to be more self-conscious about their use
of evidence, rules of evidence, evidential goals, etc., than most
ordinary folk.

Descriptive studies aim to describe faithfully the epistemological
concepts, judgments, norms and goals of cognitive specialists in
various cultures. They may examine the practices of domestic or
non-domestic cognitive specialists. Such studies include: Biagioli
(1990), Bloor (1976), Deloria et al (eds.) (1999), Evans-Pritchard
(1976), Goonatilake (1998), Horton (1993), Latour and Woolgar (1986),
Leon-Portilla (1963, 1988), Lopez Austin (1988), Middleton (ed.)
(1967), Peek (ed.) (1991), Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Sivan (1995),
Turnbull (1993-1994), Watson-Verran and Turnbull (1995), and Wylie
(2002).

Critical studies reflect critically upon the evidential concepts,
norms, etc. of cognitive specialists. Such studies include: Bloor
(1991), Callebaut (1993), Harding (1997, 1998), Harding (ed.) (1987,
1993), Latour and Woolgar (1986), Keller (1985), Quine (1951, 1969,
1975), Roth (1987, 1989) and Wylie (2002).

c. The Ethnoepistemology of Epistemologists

The ethnoepistemology of epistemologists examines the epistemological
activities of epistemologists, i.e., individuals who reflect
critically, abstractly, systematically, theoretically, and generally
upon the nature, source and limits of knowledge per se — as opposed to
the nature, source and limits of knowledge as conceived within the
limits of some cognitive practice (e.g., science, religion, etc.). The
ethnoepistemology of epistemologists is undoubtedly the most
controversial area of ethnoepistemology since it conceives the
activity of epistemologists as a straightforward natural phenomenon
susceptible to a posteriori examination by cognitive psychologists,
anthropologists, sociologists of knowledge, etc. Much like priests and
shamans, epistemologists (and philosophers generally) typically
maintain their activities and claims reside beyond the limits of
naturalistic explanation since they fancy themselves able to transcend
the natural realm by dint of special, non-natural cognitive faculties
that provide them with privileged access to non-natural metaphysical
truths, principles or facts. Ethnoepistemology insists upon studying
the activities of philosophers in the same manner as anthropology
studies the activities of priests, shamans, and scientists.

Descriptive ethnoepistemologies of epistemologists aim to describe
faithfully the epistemological theories, intuitions, judgments, and
goals of epistemologists. Such studies may be domestic or
non-domestic. They include: Coetze and Roux (eds.) (1998), R. Collins
(1998), Deutsche and Bontekoe (eds.) (1997), Deloria, et al (eds.)
(1999), Eze (ed.) (1996), Gingerich (1987), Hall and Ames (1987,
1998), Hallen and Sodipo (1986), Kusch (1995), Leon-Portilla (1963),
Maffie (2000b, 2002, 2003), Maffie (ed.) (2001), Nuccetelli and Seay
(eds.) (2004), Oruka (1990), Presbey et al (eds.) (2002), Scharfstein
(1998) and Waters (ed.) (2004).

Critical ethnoepistemologies of epistemologists engage critically with
the epistemological concepts, principles, theories, etc., of
epistemologists, both domestic and non-domestic. Such studies include:
Code (1991), P. Collins (1991), Deloria et al (eds.) (1999), Deloria,
Jr. and Wildcat (2001), Hall and Ames (1987, 1988), Harding (1991,
1998), Harding (ed.) (1987, 1993), Maffie (1995, 2000a, 2002, 2003),
Maffie (ed.) (2001), Nuccetelli and Seay (eds.) (2004), Presbey et al
(eds.) (2002), Roth (1987, 1989), Scharfstein (1993, 1998, 2001) and
Waters (ed.) (2004).

Critical ethnoepistemology of epistemologists also involves high level
philosophical reflection concerning the nature, aims and province of
as well as motivations for epistemology. It is here that the questions
enumerated above are most fruitfully addressed. How do we define
epistemology itself? Is there a unique epistemological point of view,
and if so what is it? How do we avoid begging the question in favor of
our domestic definition? Is humankind characterized by epistemological
unity or relativity? Seeing as these questions remain largely
unanswered, there is much research yet to be done by
ethnoepistemology.

4. References and Further Reading

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