defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior.
Philosophers today usually divide ethical theories into three general
subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics.
Metaethics investigates where our ethical principles come from, and
what they mean. Are they merely social inventions? Do they involve
more than expressions of our individual emotions? Metaethical answers
to these questions focus on the issues of universal truths, the will
of God, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of
ethical terms themselves. Normative ethics takes on a more practical
task, which is to arrive at moral standards that regulate right and
wrong conduct. This may involve articulating the good habits that we
should acquire, the duties that we should follow, or the consequences
of our behavior on others. Finally, applied ethics involves examining
specific controversial issues, such as abortion, infanticide, animal
rights, environmental concerns, homosexuality, capital punishment, or
nuclear war.
By using the conceptual tools of metaethics and normative ethics,
discussions in applied ethics try to resolve these controversial
issues. The lines of distinction between metaethics, normative ethics,
and applied ethics are often blurry. For example, the issue of
abortion is an applied ethical topic since it involves a specific type
of controversial behavior. But it also depends on more general
normative principles, such as the right of self-rule and the right to
life, which are litmus tests for determining the morality of that
procedure. The issue also rests on metaethical issues such as, "where
do rights come from?" and "what kind of beings have rights?"
1. Metaethics
The term "meta" means after or beyond, and, consequently, the notion
of metaethics involves a removed, or bird's eye view of the entire
project of ethics. We may define metaethics as the study of the origin
and meaning of ethical concepts. When compared to normative ethics and
applied ethics, the field of metaethics is the least precisely defined
area of moral philosophy. It covers issues from moral semantics to
moral epistemology. Two issues, though, are prominent: (1)
metaphysical issues concerning whether morality exists independently
of humans, and (2) psychological issues concerning the underlying
mental basis of our moral judgments and conduct.
a. Metaphysical Issues: Objectivism and Relativism
Metaphysics is the study of the kinds of things that exist in the
universe. Some things in the universe are made of physical stuff, such
as rocks; and perhaps other things are nonphysical in nature, such as
thoughts, spirits, and gods. The metaphysical component of metaethics
involves discovering specifically whether moral values are eternal
truths that exist in a spirit-like realm, or simply human conventions.
There are two general directions that discussions of this topic take,
one other-worldly and one this-worldly.
Proponents of the other-worldly view typically hold that moral values
are objective in the sense that they exist in a spirit-like realm
beyond subjective human conventions. They also hold that they are
absolute, or eternal, in that they never change, and also that they
are universal insofar as they apply to all rational creatures around
the world and throughout time. The most dramatic example of this view
is Plato, who was inspired by the field of mathematics. When we look
at numbers and mathematical relations, such as 1+1=2, they seem to be
timeless concepts that never change, and apply everywhere in the
universe. Humans do not invent numbers, and humans cannot alter them.
Plato explained the eternal character of mathematics by stating that
they are abstract entities that exist in a spirit-like realm. He noted
that moral values also are absolute truths and thus are also abstract,
spirit-like entities. In this sense, for Plato, moral values are
spiritual objects. Medieval philosophers commonly grouped all moral
principles together under the heading of "eternal law" which were also
frequently seen as spirit-like objects. 17th century British
philosopher Samuel Clarke described them as spirit-like relationships
rather than spirit-like objects. In either case, though, they exist in
a sprit-like realm. A different other-worldly approach to the
metaphysical status of morality is divine commands issuing from God's
will. Sometimes called voluntarism (or divine command theory), this
view was inspired by the notion of an all-powerful God who is in
control of everything. God simply wills things, and they become
reality. He wills the physical world into existence, he wills human
life into existence and, similarly, he wills all moral values into
existence. Proponents of this view, such as medieval philosopher
William of Ockham, believe that God wills moral principles, such as
"murder is wrong," and these exist in God's mind as commands. God
informs humans of these commands by implanting us with moral
intuitions or revealing these commands in scripture.
The second and more this-worldly approach to the metaphysical status
of morality follows in the skeptical philosophical tradition, such as
that articulated by Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus, and denies the
objective status of moral values. Technically, skeptics did not reject
moral values themselves, but only denied that values exist as
spirit-like objects, or as divine commands in the mind of God. Moral
values, they argued, are strictly human inventions, a position that
has since been called moral relativism. There are two distinct forms
of moral relativism. The first is individual relativism, which holds
that individual people create their own moral standards. Friedrich
Nietzsche, for example, argued that the superhuman creates his or her
morality distinct from and in reaction to the slave-like value system
of the masses. The second is cultural relativism which maintains that
morality is grounded in the approval of one's society – and not simply
in the preferences of individual people. This view was advocated by
Sextus, and in more recent centuries by Michel Montaigne and William
Graham Sumner. In addition to espousing skepticism and relativism,
this-worldly approaches to the metaphysical status of morality deny
the absolute and universal nature of morality and hold instead that
moral values in fact change from society to society throughout time
and throughout the world. They frequently attempt to defend their
position by citing examples of values that differ dramatically from
one culture to another, such as attitudes about polygamy,
homosexuality and human sacrifice.
b. Psychological Issues in Metaethics
A second area of metaethics involves the psychological basis of our
moral judgments and conduct, particularly understanding what motivates
us to be moral. We might explore this subject by asking the simple
question, "Why be moral?" Even if I am aware of basic moral standards,
such as don't kill and don't steal, this does not necessarily mean
that I will be psychologically compelled to act on them. Some answers
to the question "Why be moral?" are to avoid punishment, to gain
praise, to attain happiness, to be dignified, or to fit in with
society.
i. Egoism and Altruism
One important area of moral psychology concerns the inherent
selfishness of humans. 17th century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes
held that many, if not all, of our actions are prompted by selfish
desires. Even if an action seems selfless, such as donating to
charity, there are still selfish causes for this, such as experiencing
power over other people. This view is called psychological egoism and
maintains that self-oriented interests ultimately motivate all human
actions. Closely related to psychological egoism is a view called
psychological hedonism which is the view that pleasure is the specific
driving force behind all of our actions. 18th century British
philosopher Joseph Butler agreed that instinctive selfishness and
pleasure prompt much of our conduct. However, Butler argued that we
also have an inherent psychological capacity to show benevolence to
others. This view is called psychological altruism and maintains that
at least some of our actions are motivated by instinctive benevolence.
ii. Emotion and Reason
A second area of moral psychology involves a dispute concerning the
role of reason in motivating moral actions. If, for example, I make
the statement "abortion is morally wrong," am I making a rational
assessment or only expressing my feelings? On the one side of the
dispute, 18th century British philosopher David Hume argued that moral
assessments involve our emotions, and not our reason. We can amass all
the reasons we want, but that alone will not constitute a moral
assessment. We need a distinctly emotional reaction in order to make a
moral pronouncement. Reason might be of service in giving us the
relevant data, but, in Hume's words, "reason is, and ought to be, the
slave of the passions." Inspired by Hume's anti-rationalist views,
some 20th century philosophers, most notably A.J. Ayer, similarly
denied that moral assessments are factual descriptions. For example,
although the statement "it is good to donate to charity" may on the
surface look as though it is a factual description about charity, it
is not. Instead, a moral utterance like this involves two things.
First, I (the speaker) I am expressing my personal feelings of
approval about charitable donations and I am in essence saying "Hooray
for charity!" This is called the emotive element insofar as I am
expressing my emotions about some specific behavior. Second, I (the
speaker) am trying to get you to donate to charity and am essentially
giving the command, "Donate to charity!" This is called the
prescriptive element in the sense that I am prescribing some specific
behavior.
From Hume's day forward, more rationally-minded philosophers have
opposed these emotive theories of ethics (see non-cognitivism in
ethics) and instead argued that moral assessments are indeed acts of
reason. 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant is a case in
point. Although emotional factors often do influence our conduct, he
argued, we should nevertheless resist that kind of sway. Instead, true
moral action is motivated only by reason when it is free from emotions
and desires. A recent rationalist approach, offered by Kurt Baier
(1958), was proposed in direct opposition to the emotivist and
prescriptivist theories of Ayer and others. Baier focuses more broadly
on the reasoning and argumentation process that takes place when
making moral choices. All of our moral choices are, or at least can
be, backed by some reason or justification. If I claim that it is
wrong to steal someone's car, then I should be able to justify my
claim with some kind of argument. For example, I could argue that
stealing Smith's car is wrong since this would upset her, violate her
ownership rights, or put the thief at risk of getting caught.
According to Baier, then, proper moral decision making involves giving
the best reasons in support of one course of action versus another.
iii. Male and Female Morality
A third area of moral psychology focuses on whether there is a
distinctly female approach to ethics that is grounded in the
psychological differences between men and women. Discussions of this
issue focus on two claims: (1) traditional morality is male-centered,
and (2) there is a unique female perspective of the world which can be
shaped into a value theory. According to many feminist philosophers,
traditional morality is male-centered since it is modeled after
practices that have been traditionally male-dominated, such as
acquiring property, engaging in business contracts, and governing
societies. The rigid systems of rules required for trade and
government were then taken as models for the creation of equally rigid
systems of moral rules, such as lists of rights and duties. Women, by
contrast, have traditionally had a nurturing role by raising children
and overseeing domestic life. These tasks require less rule following,
and more spontaneous and creative action. Using the woman's experience
as a model for moral theory, then, the basis of morality would be
spontaneously caring for others as would be appropriate in each unique
circumstance. On this model, the agent becomes part of the situation
and acts caringly within that context. This stands in contrast with
male-modeled morality where the agent is a mechanical actor who
performs his required duty, but can remain distanced from and
unaffected by the situation. A care-based approach to morality, as it
is sometimes called, is offered by feminist ethicists as either a
replacement for or a supplement to traditional male-modeled moral
systems.
2. Normative Ethics
Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate
right and wrong conduct. In a sense, it is a search for an ideal
litmus test of proper behavior. The Golden Rule is a classic example
of a normative principle: We should do to others what we would want
others to do to us. Since I do not want my neighbor to steal my car,
then it is wrong for me to steal her car. Since I would want people to
feed me if I was starving, then I should help feed starving people.
Using this same reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any
possible action is right or wrong. So, based on the Golden Rule, it
would also be wrong for me to lie to, harass, victimize, assault, or
kill others. The Golden Rule is an example of a normative theory that
establishes a single principle against which we judge all actions.
Other normative theories focus on a set of foundational principles, or
a set of good character traits.
The key assumption in normative ethics is that there is only one
ultimate criterion of moral conduct, whether it is a single rule or a
set of principles. Three strategies will be noted here: (1) virtue
theories, (2) duty theories, and (3) consequentialist theories.
a. Virtue Theories
Many philosophers believe that morality consists of following
precisely defined rules of conduct, such as "don't kill," or "don't
steal." Presumably, I must learn these rules, and then make sure each
of my actions live up to the rules. Virtue ethics, however, places
less emphasis on learning rules, and instead stresses the importance
of developing good habits of character, such as benevolence (see moral
character). Once I've acquired benevolence, for example, I will then
habitually act in a benevolent manner. Historically, virtue theory is
one of the oldest normative traditions in Western philosophy, having
its roots in ancient Greek civilization. Plato emphasized four virtues
in particular, which were later called cardinal virtues: wisdom,
courage, temperance and justice. Other important virtues are
fortitude, generosity, self-respect, good temper, and sincerity. In
addition to advocating good habits of character, virtue theorists hold
that we should avoid acquiring bad character traits, or vices, such as
cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity. Virtue theory
emphasizes moral education since virtuous character traits are
developed in one's youth. Adults, therefore, are responsible for
instilling virtues in the young.
Aristotle argued that virtues are good habits that we acquire, which
regulate our emotions. For example, in response to my natural feelings
of fear, I should develop the virtue of courage which allows me to be
firm when facing danger. Analyzing 11 specific virtues, Aristotle
argued that most virtues fall at a mean between more extreme character
traits. With courage, for example, if I do not have enough courage, I
develop the disposition of cowardice, which is a vice. If I have too
much courage I develop the disposition of rashness which is also a
vice. According to Aristotle, it is not an easy task to find the
perfect mean between extreme character traits. In fact, we need
assistance from our reason to do this. After Aristotle, medieval
theologians supplemented Greek lists of virtues with three Christian
ones, or theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. Interest in
virtue theory continued through the middle ages and declined in the
19th century with the rise of alternative moral theories below. In the
mid 20th century virtue theory received special attention from
philosophers who believed that more recent approaches ethical theories
were misguided for focusing too heavily on rules and actions, rather
than on virtuous character traits. Alasdaire MacIntyre (1984) defended
the central role of virtues in moral theory and argued that virtues
are grounded in and emerge from within social traditions.
b. Duty Theories
Many of us feel that there are clear obligations we have as human
beings, such as to care for our children, and to not commit murder.
Duty theories base morality on specific, foundational principles of
obligation. These theories are sometimes called deontological, from
the Greek word deon, or duty, in view of the foundational nature of
our duty or obligation. They are also sometimes called
nonconsequentialist since these principles are obligatory,
irrespective of the consequences that might follow from our actions.
For example, it is wrong to not care for our children even if it
results in some great benefit, such as financial savings. There are
four central duty theories.
The first is that championed by 17th century German philosopher Samuel
Pufendorf, who classified dozens of duties under three headings:
duties to God, duties to oneself, and duties to others. Concerning our
duties towards God, he argued that there are two kinds:
a theoretical duty to know the existence and nature of God, and
a practical duty to both inwardly and outwardly worship God.
Concerning our duties towards oneself, these are also of two sorts:
duties of the soul, which involve developing one's skills and talents, and
duties of the body, which involve not harming our bodies, as we might
through gluttony or drunkenness, and not killing oneself.
Concerning our duties towards others, Pufendorf divides these between
absolute duties, which are universally binding on people, and
conditional duties, which are the result of contracts between people.
Absolute duties are of three sorts:
avoid wronging others,
treat people as equals, and
promote the good of others.
Conditional duties involve various types of agreements, the principal
one of which is the duty is to keep one's promises.
A second duty-based approach to ethics is rights theory. Most
generally, a "right" is a justified claim against another person's
behavior – such as my right to not be harmed by you (see also human
rights). Rights and duties are related in such a way that the rights
of one person implies the duties of another person. For example, if I
have a right to payment of $10 by Smith, then Smith has a duty to pay
me $10. This is called the correlativity of rights and duties. The
most influential early account of rights theory is that of 17th
century British philosopher John Locke, who argued that the laws of
nature mandate that we should not harm anyone's life, health, liberty
or possessions. For Locke, these are our natural rights, given to us
by God. Following Locke, the United States Declaration of Independence
authored by Thomas Jefferson recognizes three foundational rights:
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Jefferson and others
rights theorists maintained that we deduce other more specific rights
from these, including the rights of property, movement, speech, and
religious expression. There are four features traditionally associated
with moral rights. First, rights are natural insofar as they are not
invented or created by governments. Second, they are universal insofar
as they do not change from country to country. Third, they are equal
in the sense that rights are the same for all people, irrespective of
gender, race, or handicap. Fourth, they are inalienable which means
that I ca not hand over my rights to another person, such as by
selling myself into slavery.
A third duty-based theory is that by Kant, which emphasizes a single
principle of duty. Influenced by Pufendorf, Kant agreed that we have
moral duties to oneself and others, such as developing one's talents,
and keeping our promises to others. However, Kant argued that there is
a more foundational principle of duty that encompasses our particular
duties. It is a single, self-evident principle of reason that he calls
the "categorical imperative." A categorical imperative, he argued, is
fundamentally different from hypothetical imperatives that hinge on
some personal desire that we have, for example, "If you want to get a
good job, then you ought to go to college." By contrast, a categorical
imperative simply mandates an action, irrespective of one's personal
desires, such as "You ought to do X." Kant gives at least four
versions of the categorical imperative, but one is especially direct:
Treat people as an end, and never as a means to an end. That is, we
should always treat people with dignity, and never use them as mere
instruments. For Kant, we treat people as an end whenever our actions
toward someone reflect the inherent value of that person. Donating to
charity, for example, is morally correct since this acknowledges the
inherent value of the recipient. By contrast, we treat someone as a
means to an end whenever we treat that person as a tool to achieve
something else. It is wrong, for example, to steal my neighbor's car
since I would be treating her as a means to my own happiness. The
categorical imperative also regulates the morality of actions that
affect us individually. Suicide, for example, would be wrong since I
would be treating my life as a means to the alleviation of my misery.
Kant believes that the morality of all actions can be determined by
appealing to this single principle of duty.
A fourth and more recent duty-based theory is that by British
philosopher W.D. Ross, which emphasizes prima facie duties. Like his
17th and 18th century counterparts, Ross argues that our duties are
"part of the fundamental nature of the universe." However, Ross's list
of duties is much shorter, which he believes reflects our actual moral
convictions:
Fidelity: the duty to keep promises
Reparation: the duty to compensate others when we harm them
Gratitude: the duty to thank those who help us
Justice: the duty to recognize merit
Beneficence: the duty to improve the conditions of others
Self-improvement: the duty to improve our virtue and intelligence
Nonmaleficence: the duty to not injure others
Ross recognizes that situations will arise when we must choose between
two conflicting duties. In a classic example, suppose I borrow my
neighbor's gun and promise to return it when he asks for it. One day,
in a fit of rage, my neighbor pounds on my door and asks for the gun
so that he can take vengeance on someone. On the one hand, the duty of
fidelity obligates me to return the gun; on the other hand, the duty
of nonmaleficence obligates me to avoid injuring others and thus not
return the gun. According to Ross, I will intuitively know which of
these duties is my actual duty, and which is my apparent or prima
facie duty. In this case, my duty of nonmaleficence emerges as my
actual duty and I should not return the gun.
c. Consequentialist Theories
It is common for us to determine our moral responsibility by weighing
the consequences of our actions. According to consequentialism,
correct moral conduct is determined solely by a cost-benefit analysis
of an action's consequences:
Consequentialism: An action is morally right if the consequences of
that action are more favorable than unfavorable.
Consequentialist normative principles require that we first tally both
the good and bad consequences of an action. Second, we then determine
whether the total good consequences outweigh the total bad
consequences. If the good consequences are greater, then the action is
morally proper. If the bad consequences are greater, then the action
is morally improper. Consequentialist theories are sometimes called
teleological theories, from the Greek word telos, or end, since the
end result of the action is the sole determining factor of its
morality.
Consequentialist theories became popular in the 18th century by
philosophers who wanted a quick way to morally assess an action by
appealing to experience, rather than by appealing to gut intuitions or
long lists of questionable duties. In fact, the most attractive
feature of consequentialism is that it appeals to publicly observable
consequences of actions. Most versions of consequentialism are more
precisely formulated than the general principle above. In particular,
competing consequentialist theories specify which consequences for
affected groups of people are relevant. Three subdivisions of
consequentialism emerge:
Ethical Egoism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that
action are more favorable than unfavorable only to the agent
performing the action.
Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if the consequences of
that action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone except the
agent.
Utilitarianism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that
action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone.
All three of these theories focus on the consequences of actions for
different groups of people. But, like all normative theories, the
above three theories are rivals of each other. They also yield
different conclusions. Consider the following example. A woman was
traveling through a developing country when she witnessed a car in
front of her run off the road and roll over several times. She asked
the hired driver to pull over to assist, but, to her surprise, the
driver accelerated nervously past the scene. A few miles down the road
the driver explained that in his country if someone assists an
accident victim, then the police often hold the assisting person
responsible for the accident itself. If the victim dies, then the
assisting person could be held responsible for the death. The driver
continued explaining that road accident victims are therefore usually
left unattended and often die from exposure to the country's harsh
desert conditions. On the principle of ethical egoism, the woman in
this illustration would only be concerned with the consequences of her
attempted assistance as she would be affected. Clearly, the decision
to drive on would be the morally proper choice. On the principle of
ethical altruism, she would be concerned only with the consequences of
her action as others are affected, particularly the accident victim.
Tallying only those consequences reveals that assisting the victim
would be the morally correct choice, irrespective of the negative
consequences that result for her. On the principle of utilitarianism,
she must consider the consequences for both herself and the victim.
The outcome here is less clear, and the woman would need to precisely
calculate the overall benefit versus disbenefit of her action.
i. Types of Utilitarianism
Jeremy Bentham presented one of the earliest fully developed systems
of utilitarianism. Two features of his theory are noteworty. First,
Bentham proposed that we tally the consequences of each action we
perform and thereby determine on a case by case basis whether an
action is morally right or wrong. This aspect of Bentham's theory is
known as act-utilitiarianism. Second, Bentham also proposed that we
tally the pleasure and pain which results from our actions. For
Bentham, pleasure and pain are the only consequences that matter in
determining whether our conduct is moral. This aspect of Bentham's
theory is known as hedonistic utilitarianism. Critics point out
limitations in both of these aspects.
First, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally wrong to
waste time on leisure activities such as watching television, since
our time could be spent in ways that produced a greater social
benefit, such as charity work. But prohibiting leisure activities
doesn't seem reasonable. More significantly, according to
act-utilitarianism, specific acts of torture or slavery would be
morally permissible if the social benefit of these actions outweighed
the disbenefit. A revised version of utilitarianism called
rule-utilitarianism addresses these problems. According to
rule-utilitarianism, a behavioral code or rule is morally right if the
consequences of adopting that rule are more favorable than unfavorable
to everyone. Unlike act utilitarianism, which weighs the consequences
of each particular action, rule-utilitarianism offers a litmus test
only for the morality of moral rules, such as "stealing is wrong."
Adopting a rule against theft clearly has more favorable consequences
than unfavorable consequences for everyone. The same is true for moral
rules against lying or murdering. Rule-utilitarianism, then, offers a
three-tiered method for judging conduct. A particular action, such as
stealing my neighbor's car, is judged wrong since it violates a moral
rule against theft. In turn, the rule against theft is morally binding
because adopting this rule produces favorable consequences for
everyone. John Stuart Mill's version of utilitarianism is
rule-oriented.
Second, according to hedonistic utilitarianism, pleasurable
consequences are the only factors that matter, morally speaking. This,
though, seems too restrictive since it ignores other morally
significant consequences that are not necessarily pleasing or painful.
For example, acts which foster loyalty and friendship are valued, yet
they are not always pleasing. In response to this problem, G.E. Moore
proposed ideal utilitarianism, which involves tallying any consequence
that we intuitively recognize as good or bad (and not simply as
pleasurable or painful). Also, R.M. Hare proposed preference
utilitarianism, which involves tallying any consequence that fulfills
our preferences.
ii. Ethical Egoism and Social Contract Theory
We have seen (in Section 1.b.i) that Hobbes was an advocate of the
methaethical theory of psychological egoism—the view that all of our
actions are selfishly motivated. Upon that foundation, Hobbes
developed a normative theory known as social contract theory, which is
a type of rule-ethical-egoism. According to Hobbes, for purely selfish
reasons, the agent is better off living in a world with moral rules
than one without moral rules. For without moral rules, we are subject
to the whims of other people's selfish interests. Our property, our
families, and even our lives are at continual risk. Selfishness alone
will therefore motivate each agent to adopt a basic set of rules which
will allow for a civilized community. Not surprisingly, these rules
would include prohibitions against lying, stealing and killing.
However, these rules will ensure safety for each agent only if the
rules are enforced. As selfish creatures, each of us would plunder our
neighbors' property once their guards were down. Each agent would then
be at risk from his neighbor. Therefore, for selfish reasons alone, we
devise a means of enforcing these rules: we create a policing agency
which punishes us if we violate these rules.
3. Applied Ethics
Applied ethics is the branch of ethics which consists of the analysis
of specific, controversial moral issues such as abortion, animal
rights, or euthanasia. In recent years applied ethical issues have
been subdivided into convenient groups such as medical ethics,
business ethics, environmental ethics, and sexual ethics. Generally
speaking, two features are necessary for an issue to be considered an
"applied ethical issue." First, the issue needs to be controversial in
the sense that there are significant groups of people both for and
against the issue at hand. The issue of drive-by shooting, for
example, is not an applied ethical issue, since everyone agrees that
this practice is grossly immoral. By contrast, the issue of gun
control would be an applied ethical issue since there are significant
groups of people both for and against gun control.
The second requirement for in issue to be an applied ethical issue is
that it must be a distinctly moral issue. On any given day, the media
presents us with an array of sensitive issues such as affirmative
action policies, gays in the military, involuntary commitment of the
mentally impaired, capitalistic versus socialistic business practices,
public versus private health care systems, or energy conservation.
Although all of these issues are controversial and have an important
impact on society, they are not all moral issues. Some are only issues
of social policy. The aim of social policy is to help make a given
society run efficiently by devising conventions, such as traffic laws,
tax laws, and zoning codes. Moral issues, by contrast, concern more
universally obligatory practices, such as our duty to avoid lying, and
are not confined to individual societies. Frequently, issues of social
policy and morality overlap, as with murder which is both socially
prohibited and immoral. However, the two groups of issues are often
distinct. For example, many people would argue that sexual promiscuity
is immoral, but may not feel that there should be social policies
regulating sexual conduct, or laws punishing us for promiscuity.
Similarly, some social policies forbid residents in certain
neighborhoods from having yard sales. But, so long as the neighbors
are not offended, there is nothing immoral in itself about a resident
having a yard sale in one of these neighborhoods. Thus, to qualify as
an applied ethical issue, the issue must be more than one of mere
social policy: it must be morally relevant as well.
In theory, resolving particular applied ethical issues should be easy.
With the issue of abortion, for example, we would simply determine its
morality by consulting our normative principle of choice, such as
act-utilitarianism. If a given abortion produces greater benefit than
disbenefit, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally
acceptable to have the abortion. Unfortunately, there are perhaps
hundreds of rival normative principles from which to choose, many of
which yield opposite conclusions. Thus, the stalemate in normative
ethics between conflicting theories prevents us from using a single
decisive procedure for determining the morality of a specific issue.
The usual solution today to this stalemate is to consult several
representative normative principles on a given issue and see where the
weight of the evidence lies.
a. Normative Principles in Applied Ethics
Arriving at a short list of representative normative principles is
itself a challenging task. The principles selected must not be too
narrowly focused, such as a version of act-egoism that might focus
only on an action's short-term benefit. The principles must also be
seen as having merit by people on both sides of an applied ethical
issue. For this reason, principles that appeal to duty to God are not
usually cited since this would have no impact on a nonbeliever engaged
in the debate. The following principles are the ones most commonly
appealed to in applied ethical discussions:
Personal benefit: acknowledge the extent to which an action produces
beneficial consequences for the individual in question.
Social benefit: acknowledge the extent to which an action produces
beneficial consequences for society.
Principle of benevolence: help those in need.
Principle of paternalism: assist others in pursuing their best
interests when they cannot do so themselves.
Principle of harm: do not harm others.
Principle of honesty: do not deceive others.
Principle of lawfulness: do not violate the law.
Principle of autonomy: acknowledge a person's freedom over his/her
actions or physical body.
Principle of justice: acknowledge a person's right to due process,
fair compensation for harm done, and fair distribution of benefits.
Rights: acknowledge a person's rights to life, information, privacy,
free expression, and safety.
The above principles represent a spectrum of traditional normative
principles and are derived from both consequentialist and duty-based
approaches. The first two principles, personal benefit and social
benefit, are consequentialist since they appeal to the consequences of
an action as it affects the individual or society. The remaining
principles are duty-based. The principles of benevolence, paternalism,
harm, honesty, and lawfulness are based on duties we have toward
others. The principles of autonomy, justice, and the various rights
are based on moral rights.
An example will help illustrate the function of these principles in an
applied ethical discussion. In 1982, a couple from Bloomington,
Indiana gave birth to a baby with severe mental and physical
disabilities. Among other complications, the infant, known as Baby
Doe, had its stomach disconnected from its throat and was thus unable
to receive nourishment. Although this stomach deformity was
correctable through surgery, the couple did not want to raise a
severely disabled child and therefore chose to deny surgery, food, and
water for the infant. Local courts supported the parents' decision,
and six days later Baby Doe died. Should corrective surgery have been
performed for Baby Doe? Arguments in favor of corrective surgery
derive from the infant's right to life and the principle of
paternalism which stipulates that we should pursue the best interests
of others when they are incapable of doing so themselves. Arguments
against corrective surgery derive from the personal and social
disbenefit which would result from such surgery. If Baby Doe survived,
its quality of life would have been poor and in any case it probably
would have died at an early age. Also, from the parent's perspective,
Baby Doe's survival would have been a significant emotional and
financial burden. When examining both sides of the issue, the parents
and the courts concluded that the arguments against surgery were
stronger than the arguments for surgery. First, foregoing surgery
appeared to be in the best interests of the infant, given the poor
quality of life it would endure. Second, the status of Baby Doe's
right to life was not clear given the severity of the infant's mental
impairment. For, to possess moral rights, it takes more than merely
having a human body: certain cognitive functions must also be present.
The issue here involves what is often referred to as moral personhood,
and is central to many applied ethical discussions.
b. Issues in Applied Ethics
As noted, there are many controversial issues discussed by ethicists
today, some of which will be briefly mentioned here.
Biomedical ethics focuses on a range of issues which arise in clinical
settings. Health care workers are in an unusual position of
continually dealing with life and death situations. It is not
surprising, then, that medical ethics issues are more extreme and
diverse than other areas of applied ethics. Prenatal issues arise
about the morality of surrogate mothering, genetic manipulation of
fetuses, the status of unused frozen embryos, and abortion. Other
issues arise about patient rights and physician's responsibilities,
such as the confidentiality of the patient's records and the
physician's responsibility to tell the truth to dying patients. The
AIDS crisis has raised the specific issues of the mandatory screening
of all patients for AIDS, and whether physicians can refuse to treat
AIDS patients. Additional issues concern medical experimentation on
humans, the morality of involuntary commitment, and the rights of the
mentally disabled. Finally, end of life issues arise about the
morality of suicide, the justifiability of suicide intervention,
physician assisted suicide, and euthanasia.
The field of business ethics examines moral controversies relating to
the social responsibilities of capitalist business practices, the
moral status of corporate entities, deceptive advertising, insider
trading, basic employee rights, job discrimination, affirmative
action, drug testing, and whistle blowing.
Issues in environmental ethics often overlaps with business and
medical issues. These include the rights of animals, the morality of
animal experimentation, preserving endangered species, pollution
control, management of environmental resources, whether eco-systems
are entitled to direct moral consideration, and our obligation to
future generations.
Controversial issues of sexual morality include monogamy versus
polygamy, sexual relations without love, homosexual relations, and
extramarital affairs.
Finally, there are issues of social morality which examine capital
punishment, nuclear war, gun control, the recreational use of drugs,
welfare rights, and racism.
4. References and Further Reading
Anscombe,Elizabeth "Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy, 1958, Vol.
33, reprinted in her Ethics, Religion and Politics (Oxford: Blackwell,
1981).
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in Barnes, Jonathan, ed., The Complete
Works of Aristotle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1984).
Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1946).
Baier, Kurt, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics
(Cornell University Press, 1958).
Bentham, Jeremy, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation (1789), in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, edited by John
Bowring (London: 1838-1843).
Hare, R.M., Moral Thinking, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
Hare, R.M., The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952).
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, ed., E. Curley, (Chicago, IL: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1994).
Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), eds. David Fate
Norton, Mary J. Norton (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press,
2000).
Kant, Immanuel, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, tr, James W.
Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985).
Locke, John, Two Treatises, ed., Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1963).
MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue, second edition, (Notre Dame: Notre
Dame University Press, 1984).
Mackie, John L., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, (New York: Penguin
Books, 1977).
Mill, John Stuart, "Utilitarianism," in Collected Works of John Stuart
Mill, ed., J.M. Robson (London: Routledge and Toronto, Ont.:
University of Toronto Press, 1991).
Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903).
Noddings, Nel, "Ethics from the Stand Point Of Women," in Deborah L.
Rhode, ed., Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1990).
Ockham, William of, Fourth Book of the Sentences, tr. Lucan Freppert,
The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1988).
Plato, Republic, 6:510-511, in Cooper, John M., ed., Plato: Complete
Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).
Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1762), tr. Of the Law of
Nature and Nations
Samuel Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem
(1673), tr., The Whole Duty of Man according to the Law of Nature
(London, 1691).
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trs. J. Annas and J. Barnes,
Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Stevenson, Charles L., The Ethics of Language, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1944).
Sumner, William Graham, Folkways (Boston: Guinn, 1906).
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