Environmental Ethics

The field of environmental ethics concerns human beings' ethical
relationship with the natural environment. While numerous philosophers
have written on this topic throughout history, environmental ethics
only developed into a specific philosophical discipline in the 1970s.
This emergence was no doubt due to the increasing awareness in the
1960s of the effects that technology, industry, economic expansion and
population growth were having on the environment. The development of
such awareness was aided by the publication of two important books at
this time. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, first published in 1962,
alerted readers to how the widespread use of chemical pesticides was
posing a serious threat to public health and leading to the
destruction of wildlife. Of similar significance was Paul Ehrlich's
1968 book, The Population Bomb, which warned of the devastating
effects the spiraling human population has on the planet's resources.
Of course, pollution and the depletion of natural resources have not
been the only environmental concerns since that time: dwindling plant
and animal biodiversity, the loss of wilderness, the degradation of
ecosystems, and climate change are all part of a raft of "green"
issues that have implanted themselves into both public consciousness
and public policy over subsequent years. The job of environmental
ethics is to outline our moral obligations in the face of such
concerns. In a nutshell, the two fundamental questions that
environmental ethics must address are: what duties do humans have with
respect to the environment, and why? The latter question usually needs
to be considered prior to the former. In order to tackle just what our
obligations are, it is usually thought necessary to consider first why
we have them. For example, do we have environmental obligations for
the sake of human beings living in the world today, for humans living
in the future, or for the sake of entities within the environment
itself, irrespective of any human benefits? Different philosophers
have given quite different answers to this fundamental question which,
as we shall see, has led to the emergence of quite different
environmental ethics.

1. Extending Moral Standing

As noted above, perhaps the most fundamental question that must be
asked when regarding a particular environmental ethic is simply, what
obligations do we have concerning the natural environment? If the
answer is simply that we, as human beings, will perish if we do not
constrain our actions towards nature, then that ethic is considered to
be "anthropocentric." Anthropocentrism literally means
"human-centeredness," and in one sense all ethics must be considered
anthropocentric. After all, as far as we know, only human beings can
reason about and reflect upon ethical matters, thus giving all moral
debate a definite "human-centeredness." However, within environmental
ethics anthropocentrism usually means something more than this. It
usually refers to an ethical framework that grants "moral standing"
solely to human beings. Thus, an anthropocentric ethic claims that
only human beings are morally considerable in their own right, meaning
that all the direct moral obligations we possess, including those we
have with regard to the environment, are owed to our fellow human
beings.

While the history of western philosophy is dominated by this kind
anthropocentrism, it has come under considerable attack from many
environmental ethicists. Such thinkers have claimed that ethics must
be extended beyond humanity, and that moral standing should be
accorded to the non-human natural world. Some have claimed that this
extension should run to sentient animals, others to individual living
organisms, and still others to holistic entities such as rivers,
species and ecosystems. Under these ethics, we have obligations in
respect of the environment because we actually owe things to the
creatures or entities within the environment themselves. Determining
whether our environmental obligations are founded on anthropocentric
or non-anthropocentric reasoning will lead to different accounts of
what those obligations are. This section examines the prominent
accounts of moral standing within environmental ethics, together with
the implications of each.
a. Human Beings

Although many environmental philosophers want to distance themselves
from the label of anthropocentrism, it nevertheless remains the case
that a number of coherent anthropocentric environmental ethics have
been elaborated (Blackstone, 1972; Passmore, 1974; O'Neill, 1997; and
Gewirth, 2001). This should be of little surprise, since many of the
concerns we have regarding the environment appear to be concerns
precisely because of the way they affect human beings. For example,
pollution diminishes our health, resource depletion threatens our
standards of living, climate change puts our homes at risk, the
reduction of biodiversity results in the loss of potential medicines,
and the eradication of wilderness means we lose a source of awe and
beauty. Quite simply then, an anthropocentric ethic claims that we
possess obligations to respect the environment for the sake of human
well-being and prosperity.

Despite their human-centeredness, anthropocentric environmental ethics
have nevertheless played a part in the extension of moral standing.
This extension has not been to the non-human natural world though, but
instead to human beings who do not yet exist. The granting of moral
standing to future generations has been considered necessary because
of the fact that many environmental problems, such as climate change
and resource depletion, will affect future humans much more than they
affect present ones. Moreover, it is evident that the actions and
policies that we as contemporary humans undertake will have a great
impact on the well-being of future individuals. In light of these
facts, some philosophers have founded their environmental ethics on
obligations to these future generations (Gewirth, 2001).

Of course, it is one thing to say that human beings in the future have
moral standing, it is quite another to justify the position. Indeed,
some philosophers have denied such standing to future people, claiming
that they lie outside of our moral community because they cannot act
reciprocally (Golding, 1972). So, while we can act so as to benefit
them, they can give us nothing in return. This lack of reciprocity, so
the argument goes, denies future people moral status. However, other
philosophers have pointed to the fact that it is usually considered
uncontroversial that we have obligations to the dead, such as
executing their wills and so on, even though they cannot reciprocate
(Kavka, 1978). While still others have conceded that although any
future generation cannot do anything for us, it can nevertheless act
for the benefit of its own subsequent generations, thus pointing to
the existence of a broader transgenerational reciprocity (Gewirth,
2001).

However, perhaps we do not have obligations to future people because
there is no definitive group of individuals to whom such obligations
are owed. This argument is not based on the simple fact that future
people do not exist yet, but on the fact that we do not know who they
will be. Derek Parfit has called this the "non-identity problem"
(Parfit, 1984, ch. 16). The heart of this problem lies in the fact
that the policies adopted by states directly affect the movement,
education, employment and so on of their citizens. Thus, such policies
affect who meets whom, and who has children with whom. So, one set of
policies will lead to one group of future people, while another set
will lead to a different group. Our actions impact who will exist in
the future, making our knowledge of who they will be incomprehensible.
Since there is no definitive set of future people to receive the
benefits or costs of our actions, to whom do we grant moral standing?
Secondly, and of particular importance for environmental ethics, how
could any future people legitimately complain that they have been
wronged by our environmentally destructive policies? For if we had not
conducted such policies, they would not even exist.

In response to the non-identity problem, it has been argued that while
we do not know exactly who will exist in the future, we do know that
some group of people will exist and that they will have interests. In
light of this, perhaps our obligations lie with these interests,
rather than the future individuals themselves (DesJardins, 2001, p.
74). As for the second aspect of the problem, we might claim that
although future generations will benefit from our environmentally
destructive policies by their very existence, they will nevertheless
have been harmed. After all, cannot one be harmed by a particular
action even if one benefits overall? To illustrate this point, James
Woodward gives the example of a racist airline refusing to allow a
black man on a flight that subsequently crashes (Woodward, 1986).
Isn't this man harmed by the airline, even though he benefits overall?

Even if we do decide to grant moral standing to future human beings,
however, that still leaves the problem of deciding just what
obligations we have to them. One set of difficulties relates to our
ignorance of who they are. For not only do we lack information about
the identity of future people, but we have neither knowledge of their
conceptions of a good life, nor what technological advances they may
have made. For example, why bother preserving rare species of animal
or oil reserves if humans in the future receive no satisfaction from
the diversity of life and have developed some alternative fuel source?
Our ignorance of such matters makes it very difficult to flesh out the
content of our obligations.

By way of reply to such problems, some philosophers have argued that
while we do not know everything about future people, we can make some
reasonable assumptions. For example, Brian Barry has argued that in
order to pursue their idea of the good life – whatever that happens to
be – future people will have need of some basic resources, such as
food, water, minimum health and so on (Barry, 1999). Barry thus argues
that our obligations lie with ensuring that we do not prevent future
generations from meeting their basic needs. This, in turn, forces us
to consider and appropriately revise our levels of pollution, resource
depletion, climate change and population growth. While this might seem
a rather conservative ethic to some, it is worth pointing out that at
no time in humanity's history have the needs of contemporaries been
met, let alone those of future people. This unfortunate fact points to
a further problem that all future-oriented anthropocentric
environmental ethics must face. Just how are the needs and interests
of the current generation to be weighed against the needs and
interests of those human beings in the future? Can we justifiably let
present people go without for the sake of future humans?

Clearly then, the problems posed by just a minimal extension of moral
standing are real and difficult. Despite this, however, most
environmental philosophers feel that such anthropocentric ethics do
not go far enough, and want to extend moral standing beyond humanity.
Only by doing this, such thinkers argue, can we get the beyond narrow
and selfish interests of humans, and treat the environment and its
inhabitants with the respect they deserve.
b. Animals

If only human beings have moral standing, then it follows that if I
come across a bear while out camping and shoot it dead on a whim, I do
no wrong to that bear. Of course, an anthropocentric ethic might claim
that I do some wrong by shooting the bear dead – perhaps shooting
bears is not the action of a virtuous individual, or perhaps I am
depleting a source of beauty for most other humans – but because
anthropocentrism states that only humans have moral standing, then I
can do no wrong to the bear itself. However, many of us have the
intuition that this claim is wrong. Many of us feel that it is
possible to do wrong to animals, whether that be by shooting innocent
bears or by torturing cats. Of course, a feeling or intuition does not
get us very far in proving that animals have moral standing. For one
thing, some people (hunters and cat-torturers, for example) no doubt
have quite different intuitions, leading to quite different
conclusions. However, several philosophers have offered sophisticated
arguments to support the view that moral standing should be extended
to include animals (see Animals and Ethics).

Peter Singer and Tom Regan are the most famous proponents of the view
that we should extend moral standing to other species of animal. While
both develop quite different animal ethics, their reasons for
according moral status to animals are fairly similar. According to
Singer, the criterion for moral standing is sentience: the capacity to
feel pleasure and pain (Singer, 1974). For Regan, on the other hand,
moral standing should be acknowledged in all "subjects-of-a-life":
that is, those beings with beliefs, desires, perception, memory,
emotions, a sense of future and the ability to initiate action (Regan,
1983/2004, ch. 7). So, while Regan and Singer give slightly different
criteria for moral standing, both place a premium on a form of
consciousness.

For Singer, if an entity possesses the relevant type of consciousness,
then that entity should be given equal consideration when we formulate
our moral obligations. Note that the point is not that every sentient
being should be treated equally, but that it should be considered
equally. In other words, the differences between individuals, and thus
their different interests, should be taken into account. Thus, for
Singer it would not be wrong to deny pigs the vote, for obviously pigs
have no interest in participating in a democratic society; but it
would be wrong to subordinate pigs' interest in not suffering, for
clearly pigs have a strong interest in avoiding pain, just like us.
Singer then feeds his principle of equal consideration into a
utilitarian ethical framework, whereby the ultimate moral goal is to
bring about the greatest possible satisfaction of interests. So there
are two strands to Singer's theory: first of all, we must consider the
interests of sentient beings equally; and secondly, our obligations
are founded on the aim of bringing about the greatest amount of
interest-satisfaction that we can.

Tom Regan takes issue with Singer's utilitarian ethical framework, and
uses the criterion of consciousness to build a "rights-based" theory.
For Regan, all entities who are "subjects-of-a-life" possess "inherent
value". This means that such entities have a value of their own,
irrespective of their good for other beings or their contribution to
some ultimate ethical norm. In effect then, Regan proposes that there
are moral limits to what one can do to a subject-of-a-life. This
position stands in contrast to Singer who feeds all interests into the
utilitarian calculus and bases our moral obligations on what satisfies
the greatest number. Thus, in Singer's view it might be legitimate to
sacrifice the interests of certain individuals for the sake of the
interest-satisfaction of others. For example, imagine that it is
proven that a particular set of painful experiments on half a dozen
pigs will lead to the discovery of some new medicine that will itself
alleviate the pain of a few dozen human beings (or other sentient
animals). If one's ultimate norm is to satisfy the maximum number of
interests, then such experiments should take place. However, for Regan
there are moral limits to what one can do to an entity with inherent
value, irrespective of these overall consequences. These moral limits
are "rights", and are possessed by all creatures who are
subjects-of-a-life.

But what does all this have to do with environmental ethics? Well, in
one obvious sense animal welfare is relevant to environmental ethics
because animals exist within the natural environment and thus form
part of environmentalists' concerns. However, extending moral standing
to animals also leads to the formulation of particular types of
environmental obligations. Essentially, these ethics claim that when
we consider how our actions impact on the environment, we should not
just evaluate how these affect humans (present and/or future), but
also how they affect the interests and rights of animals (Singer,
1993, ch. 10, and Regan, 1983/2004, ch. 9). For example, even if
clearing an area of forest were proven to be of benefit to humans both
in the short and long-term, that would not be the end of the matter as
far as animal ethics are concerned. The welfare of the animals
residing within and around the forest must also be considered.

However, many environmental philosophers have been dissatisfied with
these kinds of animal-centered environmental ethics. Indeed, some have
claimed that animal liberation cannot even be considered a legitimate
environmental ethic (Callicott, 1980, Sagoff, 1984). For these
thinkers, all animal-centered ethics suffer from two fundamental and
devastating problems: first of all, they are too narrowly
individualistic; and secondly, the logic of animal ethics implies
unjustifiable interference with natural processes. As for the first
point, it is pointed out that our concerns for the environment extend
beyond merely worrying about individual creatures. Rather, for
environmentalists, "holistic" entities matter, such as species and
ecosystems. Moreover, sometimes the needs of a "whole" clash with the
interests of the individuals that comprise it. Indeed, the
over-abundance of individuals of a particular species of animal can
pose a serious threat to the normal functioning of an ecosystem. For
example, many of us will be familiar with the problems rabbits have
caused to ecosystems in Australia. Thus, for many environmentalists,
we have an obligation to kill these damaging animals. Clearly, this
stands opposed to the conclusions of an ethic that gives such weight
to the interests and rights of individual animals. The individualistic
nature of an animal-centered ethic also means that it faces difficulty
in explaining our concern for the plight of endangered species. After
all, if individual conscious entities are all that matter morally,
then the last surviving panda must be owed just the same as my pet
cat. For many environmental philosophers this is simply wrong, and
priority must be given to the endangered species (Rolston III, 1985).

Animal-centered ethics also face attack for some of the implications
of their arguments. For example, if we have obligations to alleviate
the suffering of animals, as these authors suggest, does that mean we
must stop predator animals from killing their prey, or partition off
prey animals so that they are protected from such attacks (Sagoff,
1984)? Such conclusions not only seem absurd, but also inimical to the
environmentalist goal of preserving natural habitats and processes.

Having said all of this, I should not over-emphasize the opposition
between animal ethics and environmental ethics. Just because animal
ethicists grant moral standing only to conscious individuals, that
does not mean that they hold everything else in contempt (Jamieson,
1998). Holistic entities may not have independent moral standing,
according to these thinkers, but that does not equate to ignoring
them. After all, the welfare and interests of individual entities are
often bound up with the healthy functioning of the "wholes" that they
make up. Moreover, the idea that animal ethics imply large-scale
interferences in the environment can be questioned when one considers
how much harm this would inflict upon predator and scavenger animals.
Nevertheless, clashes of interest between individual animals and other
natural entities are inevitable, and when push comes to shove animal
ethicists will invariably grant priority to individual conscious
animals. Many environmental ethicists disagree, and are convinced that
the boundaries of our ethical concern need to be pushed back further.
c. Individual Living Organisms

As noted above, numerous philosophers have questioned the notion that
only conscious beings have moral standing. Some have done this by
proposing a thought experiment based on a "last-human scenario"
(Attfield, 1983, p. 155). The thought experiment asks us to consider a
situation, such as the aftermath of a nuclear holocaust, where the
only surviving human being is faced with the only surviving tree of
its species. If the individual chops down the tree, no human would be
harmed by its destruction. For our purposes we should alter the
example and say that all animals have also perished in the holocaust.
If this amendment is made, we can go further and say that no conscious
being would be harmed by the tree's destruction. Would this individual
be wrong to destroy the tree? According to a human or animal-centered
ethic, it is hard to see why such destruction would be wrong. And yet,
many of us have the strong intuition that the individual would act
wrongly by chopping down the tree. For some environmental
philosophers, this intuition suggests that moral standing should be
extended beyond conscious life to include individual living organisms,
such as trees.

Of course, and as I have mentioned before, we cannot rely only on
intuitions to decide who or what has moral standing. For this reason,
a number of philosophers have come up with arguments to justify
assigning moral standing to individual living organisms. One of the
earliest philosophers to put forward such an argument was Albert
Schweitzer. Schweitzer's influential "Reverence for Life" ethic claims
that all living things have a "will to live", and that humans should
not interfere with or extinguish this will (Schweitzer, 1923). But
while it is clear that living organisms struggle for survival, it is
simply not true that they "will" to live. This, after all, would
require some kind of conscious experience, which many living things
lack. However, perhaps what Schweitzer was getting at was something
like Paul W. Taylor's more recent claim that all living things are
"teleological centers of life" (Taylor, 1986). For Taylor, this means
that living things have a good of their own that they strive towards,
even if they lack awareness of this fact. This good, according to
Taylor, is the full development of an organism's biological powers. In
similar arguments to Regan's, Taylor claims that because living
organisms have a good of their own, they have inherent value; that is,
value for their own sake, irrespective of their value to other beings.
It is this value that grants individual living organisms moral status,
and means that we must take the interests and needs of such entities
into account when formulating our moral obligations.

But if we recognize moral standing in every living thing, how are we
then to formulate any meaningful moral obligations? After all, don't
we as humans require the destruction of many living organisms simply
in order to live? For example we need to walk, eat, shelter and clothe
ourselves, all of which will usually involve harming living things.
Schweitzer's answer is that we can only harm or end the life of a
living entity when absolutely necessary. Of course, this simply begs
the question: when is absolutely necessary? Taylor attempts to answer
this question by advocating a position of general equality between the
interests of living things, together with a series of principles in
the event of clashes of interest. First, the principles state that
humans are allowed to act in self-defense to prevent harm being
inflicted by other living organisms. Second, the basic interests of
nonhuman living entities should take priority over the nonbasic or
trivial interests of humans. Third, when basic interests clash, humans
are not required to sacrifice themselves for the sake of others
(Taylor, 1986, pp. 264-304).

As several philosophers have pointed out, however, this ethic is still
incredibly demanding. For example, because my interest in having a
pretty garden is nonbasic, and a weed's interest in survival is basic,
I am forbidden from pulling it out according to Taylor's ethical
framework. For some, this makes the ethic unreasonably burdensome. No
doubt because of these worries, other philosophers who accord moral
standing to all living organisms have taken a rather different stance.
Instead of adopting an egalitarian position on the interests of living
things, they propose a hierarchical framework (Attfield, 1983 and
Varner, 1998). Such thinkers point out that moral standing is not the
same as moral significance. So while we could acknowledge that plants
have moral standing, we might nevertheless accord them a much lower
significance than human beings, thus making it easier to justify our
use and destruction of them. Nevertheless, several philosophers remain
uneasy about the construction of such hierarchies and wonder whether
it negates the acknowledgement of moral standing in the first place.
After all, if we accept such a hierarchy, just how low is the moral
significance of plants? If it is low enough so that I can eat them,
weed them and walk on them, what is the point of granting them any
moral standing at all?

There remain two crucial challenges facing philosophers who attribute
moral standing to individual living organisms that have not yet been
addressed. One challenge comes from the anthropocentric thinkers and
animal liberationists. They deny that "being alive" is a sufficient
condition for the possession of moral standing. For example, while
plants may have a biological good, is it really good of their own?
Indeed, there seems to be no sense in which something can be said to
be good or bad from the point of view of the plant itself. And if the
plant doesn't care about its fate, why should we (Warren, 2000, p.
48)? In response to this challenge, environmental ethicists have
pointed out that conscious volition of an object or state is not
necessary for that object or state to be a good. For example, consider
a cat that needs worming. It is very unlikely that the cat has any
understanding of what worming is, or that he needs worming in order to
remain healthy and fit. However, it makes perfect sense to say that
worming is good for the cat, because it contributes to the cat's
functioning and flourishing. Similarly, plants and tress may not
consciously desire sunlight, water or nutrition, but each, according
to some ethicists, can be said to be good for them in that they
contribute to their biological flourishing.

The second challenge comes from philosophers who question the
individualistic nature of these particular ethics. As mentioned above,
these critics do not believe that an environmental ethic should place
such a high premium on individuals. For many, this individualistic
stance negates important ecological commitments to the interdependence
of living things, and the harmony to be found in natural processes.
Moreover, it is alleged that these individualistic ethics suffer from
the same faults as anthropocentric and animal-centered ethics: they
simply cannot account for our real and demanding obligations to
holistic entities such as species and ecosystems. Once again, however,
a word of caution is warranted here. It is not the case that
philosophers who ascribe moral standing to individual living things
simply ignore the importance of such "wholes". Often the equilibrium
of these entities is taken extremely seriously (See Taylor, 1986, p.
77). However, it must be remembered that such concern is extended only
insofar as such equilibrium is necessary in order for individual
living organisms to flourish; the wholes themselves have no
independent moral standing. In the next section, those philosophers
who claim that this standing should be extended to such "wholes" will
be examined.
d. Holistic Entities

While Albert Schweitzer can be regarded as the most prominent
philosophical influence for thinkers who grant moral standing to all
individual living things, Aldo Leopold is undoubtedly the main
influence on those who propose "holistic" ethics. Aldo Leopold's "land
ethic" demands that we stop treating the land as a mere object or
resource. For Leopold, land is not merely soil. Instead, land is a
fountain of energy, flowing through a circuit of soils, plants and
animals. While food chains conduct the energy upwards from the soil,
death and decay returns the energy back to the soil. Thus, the flow of
energy relies on a complex structure of relations between living
things. While evolution gradually changes these relations, Leopold
argues that man's interventions have been much more violent and
destructive. In order to preserve the relations within the land,
Leopold claims that we must move towards a "land ethic", thereby
granting moral standing to the land community itself, not just its
individual members. This culminates in Leopold's famous ethical
injunction: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it
tends otherwise" (Leopold, 1949/1989, pp. 218-225).

Several philosophers, however, have questioned Leopold's justification
of the land ethic. For one thing, it seems that Leopold jumps too
quickly from a descriptive account of how the land is, to a
prescriptive account of what we ought to do. In other words, even if
Leopold's accounts of the land and its energy flows are correct, why
should we preserve it? What precisely is it about the biotic community
that makes it deserving of moral standing? Unfortunately, Leopold
seems to offer no answers to these important questions, and thus no
reason to build our environmental obligations around his land ethic.
However, J. Baird Callicott has argued that such criticisms of Leopold
are unfair and misplaced. According to Callicott, Leopold lies outside
of mainstream moral theory. Rather than assign moral standing on the
identification of some particular characteristic, such as
consciousness or a biological good of one's own, Leopold is claimed to
accord moral standing on the basis of moral sentiment and affection.
Thus, the question is not, what quality does the land possess that
makes it worthy of moral standing? But rather, how do we feel about
the land (Callicott, 1998)? In this light, the land ethic can be seen
as an injunction to broaden our moral sentiments beyond self-interest,
and beyond humanity to include the whole biotic community. This, so
the argument goes, bridges the gap between the descriptive and the
prescriptive in Leopold's thought.

Of course, some have questioned whether sentiment and feelings are
suitable foundations for an environmental ethic. After all, there seem
to be plenty of people out there who have no affection for the biotic
community whatsoever. If Leopold's injunction is ignored by such
people, must we simply give up hope of formulating any environmental
obligations? In the search for more concrete foundations, Lawrence E.
Johnson has built an alternative case for according moral standing to
holistic entities (Johnson, 1993). Johnson claims that once we
recognize that interests are not always tied to conscious experience,
the door is opened to the possibility of nonconscious entities having
interests and thus moral standing. So, just as breathing oxygen is in
the interests of a child, even though the child has neither a
conscious desire for oxygen, nor any understanding of what oxygen is,
so do species have an interest in fulfilling their nature. This is
because both have a good of their own, based on the integrated
functioning of their life processes (ibid., p. 142). Children can
flourish as living things, and so too can species and ecosystems; so,
according to Johnson, both have interests that must be taken into
account in our ethical deliberations.

But even if we accept that moral standing should be extended to
holistic entities on this basis, we still need to consider how we are
then to flesh out our moral obligations concerning the environment.
For some, this is where holistic ethics fail to convince. In
particular, it has been claimed that holistic ethics condone
sacrificing individuals for the sake of the whole. Now while many
holistic philosophers do explicitly condone sacrificing individuals in
some situations, for example by shooting rabbits to preserve plant
species, they are reluctant to sacrifice human interests in similar
situations. But isn't the most abundant species destroying biotic
communities Homo sapiens? And if human individuals are just another
element within the larger and more important biotic community, is it
not necessary under holistic ethics to kill some of these "human
pests" for the sake of the larger whole? Such considerations have led
Tom Regan to label the implications of holistic ethics as
"environmental fascism" (Regan, 1983/2004, p. 362). In response,
proponents of such ethics have claimed that acknowledging moral
standing in holistic entities does not mean that one must deny the
interests and rights of human beings. They claim that granting moral
standing to "wholes" is not the same thing as taking it away from
individuals. While this is obviously true, that still leaves the
question of what to do when the interests of wholes clash with the
interests of individuals. If humans cannot be sacrificed for the good
of the whole, why can rabbits?

The answer that has been put forward by Callicott claims that while
the biotic community matters morally, it is not the only community
that matters. Rather, we are part of various "nested" communities all
of which have claims upon us. Thus, our obligations to the biotic
community may require the culling of rabbits, but may not require the
culling of humans. This is because we are part of a tight-knit human
community, but only a very loose human-rabbit community. In this way,
we can adjudicate clashes of interest, based on our community
commitments. This communitarian proposal certainly seems a way out of
the dilemma. Unfortunately, it faces two key problems: first, just who
decides the content and strength of our various community commitments;
and second, if human relationships are the closest, does all this lead
back to anthropocentrism? As for the first point, if deciding on our
community attachments is left up to individuals themselves, this will
lead to quite diverse and even repugnant moral obligations. For
example, if an individual believes that he has a much stronger
attachment to white males than to black women, does this mean that he
can legitimately favor the interests of the former over the latter? If
not, and an objective standard is to be imposed, we are left with the
enormous problem of discovering this standard and reaching consensus
on it. Secondly, if our moral commitments to the biotic community are
trumped by our obligations to the human community, doesn't this lead
us back down the path to anthropocentrism – the very thing the holist
wants to avoid?

Without doubt, extending moral standing to the degree of holistic
ethics requires some extremely careful argumentation when it comes to
working out the precise content of our environmental obligations.
2. Radical Ecology

Not all philosophers writing on our obligations concerning the
environment see the problem simply in terms of extending moral
standing. Instead, many thinkers regard environmental concerns to have
warranted an entirely new ideological perspective that has been
termed, after its biological counterpart, "ecology". While the ideas
and beliefs within this "radical ecology" movement are diverse, they
possess two common elements that separates them from the ethical
extensionism outlined above. First of all, none see extending moral
standing as sufficient to resolve the environmental crisis. They argue
that a broader philosophical perspective is needed, requiring
fundamental changes in both our attitude to and understanding of
reality. This involves reexamining who we are as human beings and our
place within the natural world. For radical ecologists, ethical
extensionism is inadequate because it is stuck in the traditional ways
of thinking that led to these environmental problems in the first
place. In short, it is argued that ethical extensionism remains too
human-centered, because it takes human beings as the paradigm examples
of entities with moral standing and then extends outwards to those
things considered sufficiently similar. Secondly, none of these
radical ecologies confine themselves solely to the arena of ethics.
Instead, radical ecologies also demand fundamental changes in society
and its institutions. In other words, these ideologies have a
distinctively political element, requiring us to confront the
environmental crisis by changing the very way we live and function,
both as a society and as individuals.
a. Deep Ecology

Deep ecology is perhaps most easily understood when considered in
opposition to its "shallow" counterpart. According to deep ecologists,
shallow ecology is anthropocentric and concerned with pollution and
resource depletion. Shallow ecology might thus be regarded as very
much the mainstream wing of environmentalism. Deep ecology, in
contrast, rejects anthropocentrism and takes a "total-field"
perspective. In other words, deep ecologists are not aiming to
formulate moral principles concerning the environment to supplement
our existing ethical framework. Instead, they demand an entirely new
worldview and philosophical perspective. According to Arne Naess, the
Norwegian philosopher who first outlined this shallow-deep split in
environmentalism, deep ecologists advocate the development of a new
eco-philosophy or "ecosophy" to replace the destructive philosophy of
modern industrial society (Naess, 1973). While the various
eco-philosophies that have developed within deep ecology are diverse,
Naess and George Sessions have compiled a list of eight principles or
statements that are basic to deep ecology:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on
Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent
worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the
non-human world for human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the
realization of these values and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity
except to satisfy vital needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a
substantially smaller population. The flourishing of non-human life
requiresa smaller human population.
5. Present human interference with the non-human world is
excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic
economic, technological and ideological structures. The resulting
state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
7. The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life
quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than
adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a
profound awareness of the difference between bigness and greatness.
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation
directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes
(Naess, 1986).

But while Naess regards those who subscribe to these statements as
supporters of deep ecology, he does not believe it to follow that all
such supporters will have the same worldview or "ecosophy". In other
words deep ecologists do not offer one unified ultimate perspective,
but possess various and divergent philosophical and religious
allegiances.

Naess's own ecosophy involves just one fundamental ethical norm:
"Self-realization!" For Naess, this norm involves giving up a narrow
egoistic conception of the self in favor of a wider more comprehensive
Self (hence the deliberate capital "S"). Moving to this wider Self
involves recognizing that as human beings we are not removed from
nature, but are interconnected with it. Recognizing our wider Self
thus involves identifying ourselves with all other life forms on the
planet. The Australian philosopher Warwick Fox has taken up this theme
of self-realization in his own eco-philosophy, "transpersonal
ecology". Fox does not regard environmental ethics to be predominantly
about formulating our moral obligations concerning the environment,
but instead views it as about the realization of an "ecological
consciousness". For Fox, as with Naess, this consciousness involves
our widest possible identification with the non-human world. The usual
ethical concern of formulating principles and obligations thus becomes
unnecessary, according to Fox, for once the appropriate consciousness
is established, one will naturally protect the environment and allow
it to flourish, for that will be part and parcel of the protection and
flourishing of oneself (Fox,1990).

Critics of deep ecology argue that it is just too vague to address
real environmental concerns. For one thing, in its refusal to reject
so many worldviews and philosophical perspectives, many have claimed
that it is difficult to uncover just what deep ecology advocates. For
example, on the one hand, Naess offers us eight principles that deep
ecologists should accept, and on the other he claims that deep ecology
is not about drawing up codes of conduct, but adopting a global
comprehensive attitude. Now, if establishing principles is important,
as so many ethicists believe, perhaps deep ecology requires more
precision than can be found in Naess and Sessions's platform. In
particular, just how are we to deal with clashes of interests?
According to the third principle, for example, humans have no right to
reduce the richness and diversity of the natural world unless to meet
vital needs. But does that mean we are under an obligation to protect
the richness and diversity of the natural world? If so, perhaps we
could cull non-native species such as rabbits when they damage
ecosystems. But then, the first principle states that non-human beings
such as rabbits have inherent value, and the fifth principle states
that human interference in nature is already excessive. So just what
should we do? Clearly, the principles as stated by Naess and Sessions
are too vague to offer any real guide for action.

However, perhaps principles are not important, as both Naess and Fox
have claimed. Instead, they claim that we must rely on the fostering
of the appropriate states of consciousness. Unfortunately, two
problems remain. First of all, it is not at all clear that all
conflicts of interest will be resolved by the adoption of the
appropriate state of consciousness. For even if I identify myself with
all living things, some of those things, such as bacteria and viruses,
may still threaten me as a discrete living organism. And if conflicts
of interest remain, don't we need principles to resolve them?
Secondly, and as we saw with Leopold's land ethic, just what are we to
do about those who remain unconvinced about adopting this new state of
consciousness? If there aren't any rational arguments, principles or
obligations to point to, what chance is there of persuading such
people to take the environmental crisis seriously?

At this point deep ecologists would object that such criticisms remain
rooted in the ideology that has caused so much of the crisis we now
face. For example, take the point about persuading others. Deep
ecologists claim that argument and debate are not the only means we
must use to help people realize their ecological consciousness; we
must also use such things as poetry, music and art. This relates back
to the point I made at the beginning of the section: deep ecologists
do not call for supplementary moral principles concerning the
environment, but an entirely new worldview. Whether such a radical
shift in the way we think about ourselves and the environment is
possible, remains to be seen.
b. Social Ecology

Social ecology shares with deep ecology the view that the foundations
of the environmental crisis lie in the dominant ideology of modern
western societies. Thus, just as with deep ecology, social ecology
claims that in order to resolve the crisis, a radical overhaul of this
ideology is necessary. However, the new ideology that social ecology
proposes is not concerned with the "self-realization" of deep ecology,
but instead the absence of domination. Indeed, domination is the key
theme in the writings of Murray Bookchin, the most prominent social
ecologist. For Bookchin, environmental problems are directly related
to social problems. In particular, Bookchin claims that the
hierarchies of power prevalent within modern societies have fostered a
hierarchical relationship between humans and the natural world
(Bookchin, 1982). Indeed, it is the ideology of the free market that
has facilitated such hierarchies, reducing both human beings and the
natural world to mere commodities. Bookchin argues that the liberation
of both humans and nature are actually dependent on one another. Thus
his argument is quite different from Marxist thought, in which man's
freedom is dependent on the complete domination of the natural world
through technology. For Bookchin and other social ecologists, this
Marxist thinking involves the same fragmentation of humans from nature
that is prevalent in capitalist ideology. Instead, it is argued that
humans must recognize that they are part of nature, not distinct or
separate from it. In turn then, human societies and human relations
with nature can be informed by the non-hierarchical relations found
within the natural world. For example, Bookchin points out that within
an ecosystem, there is no species more important than another, instead
relationships are mutualistic and interrelated. This interdependence
and lack of hierarchy in nature, it is claimed, provides a blueprint
for a non-hierarchical human society (Bookchin, 2001).

Without doubt, the transformation that Bookchin calls for is radical.
But just what will this new non-hierarchical, interrelated and
mutualistic human society look like? For Bookchin, an all powerful
centralized state is just another agent for domination. Thus in order
to truly be rid of hierarchy, the transformation must take place
within smaller local communities. Such communities will be based on
sustainable agriculture, participation through democracy, and of
course freedom through non-domination. Not only then does nature help
cement richer and more equal human communities, but transformed
societies also foster a more benign relationship with nature. This
latter point illustrates Bookchin's optimistic view of humanity's
potential. After all, Bookchin does not think that we should condemn
all of humanity for causing the ecological crisis, for instead it is
the relationships within societies that are to blame (Bookchin, 1991).
Because of this, Bookchin is extremely critical of the anti-humanism
and misanthropy he perceives to be prevalent in much deep ecology.

One problem that has been identified with Bookchin's social ecology is
his extrapolation from the natural world to human society. Bookchin
argues that the interdependence and lack of hierarchy within nature
provides a grounding for non-hierarchical human societies. However, as
we saw when discussing Aldo Leopold, it is one thing to say how nature
is, but quite another to say how society ought to be. Even if we
accept that there are no natural hierarchies within nature (which for
many is dubious), there are plenty of other aspects of it that most of
us would not want to foster in our human society. For example, weak
individuals and weak species are often killed, eaten and out-competed
in an ecosystem. This, of course, is perfectly natural and even fits
in with ecology's characterization of nature as interconnected.
However, should this ground human societies in which the weak are
killed, eaten and out-competed? Most of us find such a suggestion
repugnant. Following this type of reasoning, many thinkers have warned
of the dangers of drawing inferences about how society should be
organized from certain facts about how nature is (Dobson, 1995, p.
42).

Some environmental philosophers have also pointed to a second problem
with Bookchin's theory. For many, his social ecology is
anthropocentric, thus failing to grant the environment the standing it
deserves. Critics cite evidence of anthropocentrism in the way
Bookchin accounts for the liberation of both humans and nature. This
unfolding process will not just occur of its own accord, according to
Bookchin, rather, human beings must facilitate it. Of course, many
philosophers are extremely skeptical of the very idea that history is
inevitably "unfolding" towards some particular direction. However,
some environmental philosophers are more wary of the prominent place
that Bookchin gives to human beings in facilitating this unfolding. Of
course, to what extent this is a problem depends on one's point of
view. After all, if humans cannot ameliorate the environmental
problems we face, is there much point doing environmental ethics in
the first place? Indeed, Bookchin himself has been rather nonplussed
by this charge, and explicitly denies that humans are just another
community in nature. But he also denies that nature exists solely for
the purposes of humans. However, the critics remain unconvinced, and
believe it to be extremely arrogant to think that humans know what the
unfolding of nature will look like, let alone to think that they can
bring it about (Eckersley, 1992, pp. 154-156).
c. Ecofeminism

Like social ecology, ecofeminism also points to a link between social
domination and the domination of the natural world. And like both deep
ecology and social ecology, ecofeminism calls for a radical overhaul
of the prevailing philosophical perspective and ideology of western
society. However, ecofeminism is a broad church, and there are
actually a number of different positions that feminist writers on the
environment have taken. In this section I will review three of the
most prominent.

Val Plumwood offers a critique of the rationalism inherent in
traditional ethics and blames this rationalism for the oppression of
both women and nature. The fundamental problem with rationalism, so
Plumwood claims, is its fostering of dualisms. For example, reason
itself is usually presented in stark opposition to emotion.
Traditional ethics, Plumwood argues, promote reason as capable of
providing a stable foundation for moral argument, because of its
impartiality and universalizability. Emotion, on the other hand, lacks
these characteristics, and because it is based on sentiment and
affection makes for shaky ethical frameworks. Plumwood claims that
this dualism between reason and emotion grounds other dualisms in
rationalist thought: in particular, mind/body, human/nature and
man/woman. In each case, the former is held to be superior to the
latter (Plumwood, 1991). So, for Plumwood, the inferiority of both
women and nature have a common source: namely, rationalism. Once this
is recognized, so the argument goes, it becomes clear that simple
ethical extensionism as outlined above is insufficient to resolve the
domination of women and nature. After all, such extensionism is stuck
in the same mainstream rationalist thought that is the very source of
the problem. What is needed instead, according to Plumwood, is a
challenge to rationalism itself, and thus a challenge to the dualisms
it perpetuates.

However, while it is perfectly possible to acknowledge the rationalism
present in much mainstream ethical thinking, one can nevertheless
query Plumwood's characterization of it. After all, does rationalism
necessarily

promote dualisms that are responsible for the subjugation of women and
nature? Such a claim would seem odd given the many rationalist
arguments that have been put forward to promote the rights and
interests of both women and the natural world. In addition, many
thinkers would argue that rationalist thought is not the enemy, but
instead the best hope for securing proper concern for the environment
and for women. For as we have seen above, such thinkers believe that
relying on the sentiments and feelings of individuals is too unstable
a foundation upon which to ground a meaningful ethical framework.

Karen J. Warren has argued that the dualisms of rationalist thought,
as outlined by Plumwood, are not in themselves problematic. Rather,
Warren claims that they become problematic when they are used in
conjunction with an "oppressive conceptual framework" to
justifysubordination. Warren argues that one feature inherent within
an oppressive conceptual framework is the "logic of domination". Thus,
a list of the differences between humans and nature, and between men
and women, is not in itself harmful. But once assumptions are added,
such as these differences leading to the moral superiority

of humans and of men, then we move closer to the claim that we are
justified in subordinating women and nature on the basis of their
inferiority. According to Warren, just such a logic of domination has
been prevalent within western society. Men have been identified with
the realm of the "mental" and "human", while women have been
identified with the "physical" and the "natural". Once it is claimed
that the "natural" and the "physical" are morally inferior to the
"human" and "mental", men become justified in subordinating women and
nature. For Warren then, feminists and environmentalists share the
same goal: namely, to abolish this oppressive conceptual framework
(Warren, 1990).

Other ecofeminists take a quite different approach to Plumwood and
Warren. Rather than outlining the connections between the domination

of women and of nature, they instead emphasize those things that link
women and the natural world. Women, so the argument goes, stand in a
much closer relationship to the natural world due to their capacity
for child-bearing. For some ecofeminists, this gives women a unique
perspective on how to build harmonious relationships with the natural
world. Indeed, many such thinkers advocate a spiritualist approach in
which nature and the land are given a sacred value, harking back to
ancient religions in which the Earth is considered female (Mies &
Shiva, 1993).

For writers such as Plumwood, however, emphasizing women's
"naturalness" in this way simply reinforces the dualism that led to
women's oppression in the first place. Placing women as closer to
nature, according to Plumwood, simply places them closer to
oppression. Other critics argue that the adoption of a spiritualist
approach leads feminists to turn their attention inwards to themselves
and their souls, and away from those individuals and entities they
should be trying to liberate. However, in response, these ecofeminists
may make the same point as the deep ecologists: to resolve the
environmental problems we face, and the systems of domination in
place, it is the consciousness and philosophical outlook of
individuals that must change.
3. The Future of Environmental Ethics

Given the increasing concern for the environment and the impact that
our actions have upon it, it is clear that the field of environmental
ethics is here to stay.

However, it is less clear in what way the discipline will move
forward. Having said that,

there is evidence for at least three future developments. First of
all, environmental ethics needs to be and will be informed by changes
in the political efforts to ameliorate environmental problems.
Environmental ethics concerns formulating our moral obligations
regarding the environment. While this enterprise can be, and often is,
quite abstract, it is also meant to engage with the real world. After
all, ethicists are making claims about how they think the world ought
to be. Given this, the effectiveness of states and governments in
"getting there" will affect the types of ethics that emerge. For
example, the Kyoto Protocol might be regarded as the first real global
attempt to deal with the problem of climate change. However, without
the participation of so many large polluters, with the agreed
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions so small, and with many
countries looking like they may well miss their targets, many
commentators already regard it as a failure. Ethicists need to respond
not just by castigating those they blame for the failure. Rather they
must propose alternative and better means of resolving the problems we
face. For example, is it more important to outline a scheme of
obligations for individuals

rather than states, and go for a bottom-up solution to these problems?
Alternatively, perhaps businesses

should take the lead in tackling these problems. Indeed, it may even
be in the interests of big business to be active in this way, given
the power of consumers. It is quite possible then, that we will see
business ethics address many of the same issues that environmental
ethics has been tackling.

However, the effects of environmental ethics will not be limited to
influencing and informing business ethics alone, but will undoubtedly
feed into and merge with more mainstream ethical thinking.

After all, the environment is not something one can remove oneself
from. In light of this, once it is recognized that we have
environmental obligations, all areas of ethics are affected, including
just war theory, domestic distributive justice, global distributive
justice, human rights theory and many others. Take global distributive
justice as an example: if one considers how climate change will affect
people throughout the world so differently – affecting individuals'
homes, sanitation, resistance from disease, ability to earn a living
and so on – it is clear that consideration of the environment is
essential to such questions of justice. Part of the job of the
environmental ethicist will thus be to give such disciplines the
benefit of his or her expertise.

Finally, environmental ethics will of course be informed by our
scientific understanding of the environment. Whether it be changes in
our understanding of how ecosystems work, or changes in the evidence
concerning the environmental crisis, it is clear that such change will
inform and influence those thinkers writing on our environmental
obligations.
4. References and Further Reading

* Attfield, Robin, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1983).
* Barry, Brian, "Sustainability and Intergenerational Justice" in
Dobson, Andrew (ed.), Fairness and Futurity, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999): 93-117.
* Benson, John, Environmental Ethics: An Introduction with
Readings, (London: Routledge, 2001).
* Blackstone, William T., "Ethics and Ecology" in Blackstone,
William T. (ed.), Philosophy and Environmental Crisis, (Athens,
University of Georgia Press, 1972): 16-42.
* Bookchin, Murray, The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and
Dissolution of Hierarchy, (Palo Alto, CA: Cheshire Books, 1982).
* Bookchin, Murray, "What is Social Ecology?" in, Boylan, Michael
(ed.), Environmental Ethics, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001): 62-76.
* Bookchin, Murray and Foreman, Dave, Defending the Earth, (New
York: Black Rose Books, 1991).
* Boylan, Michael (ed.), Environmental Ethics, (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 2001).
* Brennan, Andrew and Lo, Yeuk-Sze, "Environmental Ethics", The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/ethics-environmental.
* Callicott, James Baird, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular
Affair", Environmental Ethics 2 (1980): 311-328.
* Callicott, James Baird, "The Conceptual Foundations of the Land
Ethic" in Zimmerman, Michael E.; Callicott, J. Baird; Sessions,
George; Warren, Karen J.; and Clark, John (eds.), Environmental
Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 2nd ed., 1998): 101-123.
* Carson, Rachel, Silent Spring, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).
* DesJardins, Joseph R., Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to
Environmental Philosophy, (Belmont CA: Wadsworth, 3rd ed., 2001).
* Dobson, Andrew, Green Political Thought, (London: Routledge, 2nd
ed., 1995).
* Eckersely, Robyn, Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward
an Ecocentric Approach, (London: UCL Press, 1992).
* Ehrlich, Paul, The Population Bomb, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968).
* Elliot, Robert, "Environmental Ethics" in, Singer Peter (ed.), A
Companion to Ethics, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1993):
284-293.
* Fox, Warwick, Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New
Foundations for Environmentalism (Boston: Shambhala Press, 1990).
* Gewirth, Alan, "Human Rights and Future Generations" in Boylan,
Michael (ed.), Environmental Ethics, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
2001): 207-211.
* Golding, Mark, "Obligations to Future Generations", Monist, 56
(1972): 85-99.
* Goodpaster, K. E., and Sayre, K. M., (eds.), Ethics and Problems
of the 21st Century, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame,
1979).
* Jamieson, Dale, "Animal Liberation is an Environmental Ethic",
Environmental Values, 7/1 (1998): 41-57.
* Johnson, Lawrence E., A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral
Significance and Environmental Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
* Kavka, Gregory, "The Futurity Problem" in Sikora, R. I., and
Barry, Brian (eds.), Obligations to Future Generations, (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1978): 186-203.
* Leopold, Aldo, A Sand County Almanac: And Sketches Here and
There, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Special Commemorative
Edition,1949/1989).
* Mies, Maria and Shiva, Vandana, Ecofeminism, (London: Zed Books, 1993).
* Naess, Arne, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology
Movement. A Summary", Inquiry 16 (1973): 95-100.
* Naess, Arne, "The Deep Ecological Movement Some Philosophical
Aspects", Philosophical Inquiry 8, (1986): 1-2.
* O'Neill, Onora, "Environmental Values, Anthropocentrism and
Speciesism", Environmental Values 6, No. 2 (1997): 127-142.
* Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
* Passmore, John, Man's Responsibility for Nature, New York:
Scribner's, 1974).
* Passmore, John, "Environmentalism", in Goodin, Robert E., and
Pettit, Philip (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political
Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1995): 471-488.
* Plumwood, Val, "Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism,
Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism", Hypatia 6,
1 (Spring, 1991): 3-27.
* Regan, Tom, The Case for Animal Rights, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2nd ed., 1983/2004).
* Rolston III, Holmes, "Duties to Endangered Species", Bioscience,
35 (1985): 718-726
* Sagoff, Mark, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad
Marriage, Quick Divorce", Osgoode Hall Law Journal 22, 2 (1984):
297-307.
* Schweitzer, Albert, (translated by Naish, John), Civilization
and Ethics: the Philosophy of Civilization Part II, (London: A & C
Black Ltd, 1923).
* Shrader-Frechette, Kristin, "Environmental Ethics" in
LaFollette, Hugh (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995): 188-215.
* Singer, Peter, "All Animals Are Equal", Philosophical Exchange,
Vol. 1. No. 5 (Summer, 1974): 243-257.
* Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2nd ed., 1993).
* Taylor, Paul W., Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental
Ethics, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
* Varner, Gary E., In Nature's Interests? Interests, Animal
Rights, and Environmental Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998).
* Warren, Karen J., "The Power and the Promise of Ecological
Feminism", Environmental Ethics 12, 3 (Summer, 1990): 124-126.
* Warren, Mary Anne, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and
Other Living Things, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
* Woodward, James, "The Non-Identity Problem", Ethics, 96 (July,
1986): 804-831.
* Zimmerman, Michael E.; Callicott, J. Baird; Sessions, George;
Warren, Karen J.; and Clark, John (eds.), Environmental Philosophy:
From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2nd
ed., 1998).