the explanations of science are governed by two fundamental principles
of reason, namely, the principle of lawfulness and the principle of
causality. While the contents of explanations change through history
as the explanatory theories of science move from early atomism and
qualitative theories to relativity physics and quantum mechanics, the
form of thought stays the same, Meyerson said. The following article
provides an overview of his life, influence, philosophy of science,
and writings.
1. Life
Emile Meyerson was born in Lublin Poland on February 12, 1859. In
1870, he traveled to Heidelberg, Germany, to study chemistry with
Wilhelm Bunsen and Hermann Kopp, and to Berlin to study chemistry with
Liebermann. He came to France at age 22 and spent two years
(1882-1884) at the Schulzenberger laboratory of the College de France
to complete his studies in chemistry. In 1884 he served as Director of
a dye factory in Argenteuil, but after a bitter disappointment with
applied chemistry (see, Frédéric Lefevre, 'Une heure avec M. Emile
Meyerson' In Les Nouvelles Littéraires, Saturday, Nov. 6, 1926) he
left in 1889 to read philosophy at the Nationale. He read Renouvier
(who taught him how to apply a scientific background to philosophy),
Kant (who taught him that the thing in itself was unknowable) and
Descartes (who taught him about the mathematical nature of science).
He read in the history of science for 19 years before publishing his
first book in 1908. During this period he supported himself by working
as foreign news correspondent with l'agence Havas (Meyerson was fluent
in the major European languages.) He became a naturalized French
citizen after the war. The greatest influences on his thought are
Auguste Comte, Boutroux and Bergson, Poincaré and Duhem, Descartes and
Kant. Meyerson labels himself an 'antipositivist'. He spent afternoons
at the library reading the history of science, and evenings at home in
conversation with the leading thinkers of the day; notably Lévy-Brühl,
Brunschvicg, Lalande, and Langevin (plagued by insomnia Meyerson
rarely slept more than four hours a day.) Whenever Einstein was in
Paris, he would make it a point to visit Meyerson. In 1897, Meyerson
was appointed Director General of the Jewish Colonization Association
(JCA). He viewed the appointment as an opportunity to encourage the
establishment of a Jewish settlement in Palestine. Meyerson shared
Spencer's belief that the rules of natural selection that govern the
animal world should apply equally to human societies. On Saturday,
December 2, 1933, in Paris, France, Meyerson died in his sleep of a
heart attack. He had been unwell for some time. An article by André
George commemorating Meyerson's contribution to the philosophy of
science appeared in Les Nouvelles Littéraires Dec 9, 1933.
The Central Zionist Archives (CZA) in Jerusalem contains 5.6 metres
(35 boxes) of material and many thousands of documents on Meyerson.
See 'Personal Papers' A 408 Emile Meyerson. (Rochelle Rubinstein,
2004).
2. Influence
The work of Emile Meyerson is an investigation into the psychological
principles that accompany scientific theories. His work forms an
important chapter in the history of science. From the first appearance
of Identité et réalité in 1908, Emile Meyerson has been acclaimed as
one of the most stimulating thinkers of our time. The title 'Profound
Philosopher,' which Bergson conferred upon him in 1909, never left
him. Einstein published an article in 1928 in which he expressed
approval and admiration for what Meyerson said about the psychology of
relativity physics. George Boas and André Metz are two of a long list
of philosophers that wrote major books on his philosophy. Boas spent
time with Meyerson getting to know him personally, while Metz is a
life-long disciple. J. Lowenberg hailed him as a new Kant and thought
that Meyerson had provided an important refutation of positivism. L.
Lichtenstein at the University of Leipzig and C. De Koninck at Laval
University developed courses on his philosophy. Scholars such as
Blumberg, Bachelard, Brunschvieg, Lalande, Maritain, Schlick, and Sée,
have been impressed by his work. Many doctoral dissertations are
written on Meyerson's work. André Bonnard, Charles De Koninck, T. R.
Kelly, Joseph La Lumia, George Mourélos, Henri Sée, C.G. Sterling, O.
Stumper, and W. A. Wallace have each written a book on his philosophy.
Meyerson's study of the history of scientific developments influenced
modern French historiography of science (Alexandre Koyré, Hélène
Metzger…)
3. Philosophy of Science
References to Meyerson's work are abbreviated IR (trans.) for Identity
and Reality; ES for De l'explication dans les sciences; DR for La
déduction relativiste; CP for Du cheminement de la pensée; RD for Réel
et déterminisme dans la physique quantique. These along with Essais, a
posthumous publication of his major articles, make up the whole of his
work.
Meyerson's work is a study of scientific inductions, past and present.
He examined the works of science to determine the psychological nature
of scientific thought. Whereas Auguste Comte had argued that the
'principle of lawfulness' (the description of phenomena) governs the
whole of thought, Meyerson's evidence suggested to him that this was
not the whole of thought. Science, he says, attempts equally to
explain phenomena. This explanation consists in the identification of
antecedent and consequent. His empirical study of scientific theories,
old and new, proposes that two innate principles of reason regulate
how the scientist views reality. The first rational principle
predisposes a scientist to expect that nature shall attend herself
with some degree of regularity. The second principle, leads a
scientist to expect that the identification of antecedent and
consequent shall explain the phenomena of observation. The name he
reserves for these two psychological principles is lawfulness and
causality, respectively. Meyerson claimed that the principles of
reason were factual rather than normative.
Meyerson said that Comte did not pursue explanations in science
because he limited the psychology of thought to the first of these
principles. Comte did this because he was convinced that a too
detailed investigation of nature would be counter-productive and lead
to incoherent or sterile results. For instance, he protested strongly
against the "abuse of microscopic research and the exaggerated merit
still too often accorded to a means of investigation so dubious." (IR
21). Comte expressed horror of all explanatory theory. Meyerson
expressed the fundamental distinction between the principles of reason
(and between Comte and himself) as follows:
The law states simply that, conditions happening to be modified in a
determined manner, the actual properties of the substance must undergo
an equally determined modification; whereas according to the causal
principle there must be equality between causes and effects—that is,
the original properties plus the change of conditions must equal the
transformed properties. (ibid.,41).
According to Meyerson, the ways of reason provide evidence that both
principles are in use whenever we think. In other words, science
expresses a belief that its proportionality relationships (the
principle of lawfulness) are grounded in an underlying structure (the
principle of causality) or what Meyerson calls 'ontology'. Thus, he
says, description or lawfulness is not the only business of science.
The concern for structure cannot remain foreign to science. Meyerson's
argument was based on a detailed study of the psychological principles
that accompany all scientific inductions, past and present.
Meyerson's research proposes that his work (which is essentially
philosophy of mind; see Essais 59-105) shows that the psychological
need to identify phenomena (the effect of the causal postulate)
explains the developments of science. For instance, he says it
generates the atomic theories of science. The focus of explanation is
on positing the persistence of identities (to think is to identify),
not on the nature of the persistent residuum. While science no longer
thinks of the atom as being an irreducible unit, the causal postulate
pushes the search for identities to an investigation for smaller
constituents within the atom. Meyerson suggested that the same
rational tendency to identify matter created the principles of
conservation and ultimately lead to the elimination of time. The
identification of antecedent and consequent of a change eliminated the
difference between them, and therefore time. He claimed (following
Spencer) that matter as eternal is just as it has to be to satisfy the
ways of reason. Meyerson writes that the causal postulate creates the
concept of the unity of matter and leads to 'the assimilation of this
latter with space' (IR Ch. 7). The causal postulate ultimately leads
to the annihilation of the external world. Meyerson explained this
feat as a two-step movement of the causal postulate. The first
movement of explanation identifies antecedent and consequent and
thereby explains differences away. This step halts the movement of
time because when nothing happens (a consequence of the identification
of antecedent and consequent) time does not exist. Eternal matter is
reduced to space. However, the march of the causal postulate is
ongoing as the explanations of reason and the search for identities
enter a second phase. In this case, Meyerson claims that the
sufficient reason of matter is traced to the space that envelops it.
The causal postulate establishes identity between matter and space. At
this point nothing is left because space now empty of contents
vanishes in turn.
The causal postulate and the tendency to reduce the whole of reality
to an all-inclusive identity proposition failed. Science reacted, says
Meyerson, and this reaction was expressed by Carnot's principle
(Meyerson calls Carnot the 'hero of science'). The 'irrationals' of
science such as transitive action and impact arise because reality
does not lend itself to the (Eleatic) goal of total identification. We
do not have the identities of antecedent and consequent supposed by
the causal postulate. Carnot's principle saves science. He reminds us
that it costs energy to do work and the fully reversible reaction of
rational mechanics is an illusion. Meyerson described the
'irrationals' of science as places of recalcitrance in reality, places
that refuse to lend themselves to the formula of identification.
At this point, Meyerson introduced the distinction between
identification and identities. We hope for full explanations
(identification) of reality but achieve only partial explanations
(identities). Meyerson fuses the convergence and divergence of reason
and reality into what he terms the 'plausible propositions' of science
(ibid., 148). He says that all scientific theories are generated this
way as they reveal a mix of an a priori tendency to identify and the a
posteriori elements of experience that resist total identification.
The 'plausible' propositions of science are best expressed through
mathematics since it provides a mechanism to preserve diversity while
expressing identity. For instance, the proposition 7 plus 5 equals 12
expresses identity while accounting for the differences between
antecedent and consequent. Meyerson attributes the discovery of this
application (the mathematical method) to René Descartes.
CP extends the causal postulate to the world of common sense. The
world we see upon awakening each morning is the result of the activity
of the causal postulate. Reason must have its identities and cannot
tolerate the fleetingness of sensations. We create the world as a
place to house sensations in their absence. The world of common sense
arises out of the hypostasis of sensations. This action provides an
ontological foundation for science. Science purifies the world of
common sense by subjecting it to additional layers of identification.
Meyerson said that the constructs of science—electrons, atoms—are more
real than the objects of common sense because they arise out of
several coatings of identification.
The formula of identification recognizes that diversity is itself an
irrational. Reason cannot know the real without reducing it to
something other than itself. Meyerson is in full agreement with the
Kantian view that reality is essentially unknowable or noumenal. The
thing in itself cannot be known since the ways of reason spontaneously
transform diversity into identity (RD 21.) The explanatory structure
of science depends on the discovery of identities in diversity. But
that discovery leads to the (Kantian) conclusion that reality in
itself is unknowable. Does this mean that (lawfulness) description
remains the only business of science? Not at all! Meyerson does not
change his mind about the insufficiencies of positivistic
epistemology. He reminds us that the causal postulate is factual
rather than normative. The point about causality is that something
must persist. The irrational nature of diversity means that some
aspect of reality will always remain unknown. Error comes out of
hastily constructed theories, theories with few instances of
identifications, not the causal postulate. The principles of
lawfulness and causality are the core structure of reason. To explain
is to identify. Meyerson says that to identify is to discover
sufficient reasons, as was clear to Leibniz; "Things are thus because
they were already previously thus" (IR 43). Meyerson said there is no
evidence to suggest that the way we think will ever change. In the
past, the human mind has never modified its essence. Thus, this form
of thought will shape the future of scientific developments. However,
he explained the evolution of science as a two-pronged movement of
reason. First, science is an attempt to generate a theory of
everything through the discovery of increasingly comprehensive
identity propositions. Second, we experience changes in the
relationship between reason and reality. For instance the shift from
the Newtonian view of homogeneous space to the heterogeneous space of
relativity physics (see DR) arose because the concept space has been
shown to obtain a posteriori. Experience (now) teaches us that space
is not the same everywhere and therefore the concept cannot come from
reason (is not a priori). Meyerson's criticism of positivistic
epistemology (and the 'Copenhagen' view of quantum theory) earned
Einstein's approval because it explained how the forms of reason lead
to the reducibility of matter and time to heterogeneous space (see
'the success of relativism' In DR Ch. 16—133: 'La réussite du
relativisme'.)
4. Works
a. Books
(1908) Identité et réalité. Paris: F. Alcan. xix and 571 pages.
The second edition appears in 1912, and the third edition in 1926. The
third edition is translated into English by Kate Lowenberg. (1930)
Identity and Reality. George Allen & Unwin Limited. (1960). New York,
N.Y.: Dover Publications, Inc. This book is an inductive study of the
theories generated by scientific thought—from their first beginnings
in the works of the early Atomists to their latest developments in
quantum physics—to uncover the psychological principles that accompany
all scientific inductions.
(1921) De l'explication dans les sciences. 2 volumes. Paris:Payot. 784
pages. The Second Edition appears in 1927. The book is translated into
English by Mary-Alice and David A. Sipfle. (1991) Explanation in the
Sciences. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. No. 128.
Hingham, Mass: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 648 pages.
Meyerson says that IR is inductively based whereas this book is more
philosophical because it moves deductively from the application of
principles uncovered in that first book to their application in
scientific developments.
(1924) La déduction relativiste. Paris: Payot. 396 pages.
Meyerson had been accused of dealing with pre 20th century science, so
in this work he applies the principles uncovered in IR to current
scientific thought. His work did not go unnoticed. In 1928, Einstein
expressed admiration for Meyerson's epistemological perspective,
citing DR as a penetrating and exacting study of relativity physics.
Einstein notes the presence of 'ce démon de l'explication' in his own
work; "Eh bien j'ai lu votre livre, et je vous l'avoue, je suis
convaincue" (ah yes, I read your book, I admit it, I am convinced.)
See Albert Einstein, 1928, 'A propos de la déduction relativiste de M.
Emile Meyerson. In Revue Philosophique, 105, mars-avril, 161-166.
(1931) Du cheminement de la pensée. Three volumes. Paris: F. Alcan.
xxvii and 1036 pages, (vol 3 is reserved for notes).
The work moves beyond science to focus on the application of
principles of reason to the realm of common sense.
(1933) Réel et déterminisme dans la physique quantique. Paris:
Hermann. 49 pages.
This small special study moves ahead to apply the psychological
structure of thought (lawfulness and causality) to quantum mechanics.
The book's Preface is by Louis de Broglie.
(1936) Essais. Paris: J. Vrin. xvi and 272 pages.
A posthumous publication of Meyerson's major articles. Meyerson
prepared the list of articles to be included in the book. The Preface
is by Louis de Broglie, and the Foreword is by L. Lévy-Bruhl.
b. Articles
i. Articles included in Essais
(1884) Jean Rey et la loi de la conservation de la matière. Revue
scientifique. 33, jan-juillet, pp 299-303.
(1888) Théodore Turquet de Mayerne et la découverte de l'hydrogène.
Revue scientifique. 42, nov. pp. 665-670.
(1891) La coupellation chez les anciens Juifs. Revue scientifique. 47,
juin, pp. 756-758.
(1914) Y-a-t-il un rythme dans le progrès intellectuel? Bulletin de la
société française de philosophie. 14. Séance des 29 janvier et 5
février, pp. 61-140.
(1923) Le sens commun vise-t-il la connaissance? Revue de métaphysique
et de morale. 30, 15 mars, pp. 13-21.
(1923) Le sens commun et la quantité. Journal de psychologie. 30, 15
mars, pp. 206-217.
(1923) Hegel, Hamilton, Hamelin et le concept de cause. Revue
philosophique. 96, juillet-aout, pp. 33-55.
(1933) La notion de l'identique. Recherches philosophiques. 3, pp. 1-17.
(1934) Le savoir et l'univers de la perception immédiate. Journal de
psychologie, pp. 3-4.
(1934) Philosophie de la nature et philosophie de l'intellect. Revue
de métaphysique et de morale. 41, avril, pp. 59-105.
(1934) Les mathématiques et le divers. Revue philosophique. 117,
mai-juin, pp. 321-334.
(1934) De l'analyse des produits de la pensée. Revue philosophique.
118, sept.-oct. , pp. 135-170.
ii. Other Articles
(1890) Les travaux de M. Charles Henry sur une theorie mathématique de
l'expression. Bulletin scientifique. 16, pp. 3-5.
(1891) Paracelsus et la découverte de l'hydrogne. Revue scientifique.
47, juin, p. 796.
(1911) L'histoire du problème de la connaissance de M. E. Cassirer.
Revue de métaphysique et de morale. 19, janvier, pp. 100-129.
(1916) La science et les systèmes philosophiques. Revue de
métaphysique et de morale. 23 janvier, pp. 203-242.
(1924) La tendance apriorique et l'expérience. Revue philosophique.
97, jan-juin, pp.161-179.
(1930) Le physicien et le primitif. Revue philosophique. 109,
jan.-juin, pp. 321-358.
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