the motivation and the goal of one's own action. Egoism has two
variants, descriptive or normative. The descriptive (or positive)
variant conceives egoism as a factual description of human affairs.
That is, people are motivated by their own interests and desires, and
they cannot be described otherwise. The normative variant proposes
that people should be so motivated, regardless of what presently
motivates their behavior. Altruism is the opposite of egoism. The term
"egoism" derives from "ego," the Latin term for the English word "I".
"Egoism" should be distinguished from "egotism," which means a
psychological overvaluation of one's own importance, or of one's own
activities.
People act for many reasons; but for whom, or what, do or should they
act—for themselves, for God, or for the good of the planet? Can an
individual ever act only according to her own interests without regard
for others' interests. Conversely, can an individual ever truly act
for others in complete disregard for her own interests? The answers
will depend on an account of free will. Some philosophers argue that
an individual has no choice in these matters, claiming that a person's
acts are determined by prior events which make illusory any belief in
choice. Nevertheless, if an element of choice is permitted against the
great causal impetus from nature, or God, it follows that a person
possesses some control over her next action, and, that, therefore, one
may inquire as to whether the individual does, or, should choose a
self-or-other-oriented action. Morally speaking, one can ask whether
the individual should pursue her own interests, or, whether she should
reject self-interest and pursue others' interest instead: to what
extent are other-regarding acts morally praiseworthy compared to
self-regarding acts?
1. Descriptive Egoism and Psychological Egoism
The descriptive egoist's theory is called "psychological egoism."
Psychological egoism describes human nature as being wholly
self-centered and self-motivated. Examples of this explanation of
human nature predate the formation of the theory, and, are found in
writings such as that of British Victorian historian, Macaulay, and,
in that of British Reformation political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes.
To the question, "What proposition is there respecting human nature
which is absolutely and universally true?", Macaulay, replies, "We
know of only one . . . that men always act from self-interest."
(Quoted in Garvin.) In Leviathan, Hobbes maintains that, "No man
giveth but with intention of good to himself; because gift is
voluntary; and of all voluntary acts the object to every man is his
own pleasure." In its strong form, psychological egoism asserts that
people always act in their own interests, and, cannot but act in their
own interests, even though they may disguise their motivation with
references to helping others or doing their duty.
Opponents claim that psychological egoism renders ethics useless.
However, this accusation assumes that ethical behavior is necessarily
other-regarding, which opponents would first have to establish.
Opponents may also exploit counterfactual evidence to criticize
psychological egoism— surely, they claim, there is a host of evidence
supporting altruistic or duty bound actions that cannot be said to
engage the self-interest of the agent. However, what qualifies to be
counted as apparent counterfactual evidence by opponents becomes an
intricate and debatable issue. This is because, in response to their
opponents, psychological egoists may attempt to shift the question
away from outward appearances to ultimate motives of acting
benevolently towards others; for example, they may claim that
seemingly altruistic behavior (giving a stranger some money)
necessarily does have a self-interested component. For example, if the
individual were not to offer aid to a stranger, he or she may feel
guilty or may look bad in front of a peer group.
On this point, psychological egoism's validity turns on examining and
analyzing moral motivation. But since motivation is inherently private
and inaccessible to others (an agent could be lying to herself or to
others about the original motive), the theory shifts from a
theoretical description of human nature–one that can be put to
observational testing–to an assumption about the inner workings of
human nature: psychological egoism moves beyond the possibility of
empirical verification and the possibility of empirical negation
(since motives are private), and therefore it becomes what is termed a
"closed theory."
A closed theory is a theory that rejects competing theories on its own
terms and is non-verifiable and non-falsifiable. If psychological
egoism is reduced to an assumption concerning human nature and its
hidden motives, then it follows that it is just as valid to hold a
competing theory of human motivation such as psychological altruism.
Psychological altruism holds that all human action is necessarily
other-centered, and other-motivated. One's becoming a hermit (an
apparently selfish act) can be reinterpreted through psychological
altruism as an act of pure noble selflessness: a hermit is not
selfishly hiding herself away, rather, what she is doing is not
inflicting her potentially ungraceful actions or displeasing looks
upon others. A parallel analysis of psychological altruism thus
results in opposing conclusions to psychological egoism. However,
psychological altruism is arguably just as closed as psychological
egoism: with it one assumes that an agent's inherently private and
consequently unverifiable motives are altruistic. If both theories can
be validly maintained, and if the choice between them becomes the flip
of a coin, then their soundness must be questioned.
A weak version of psychological egoism accepts the possibility of
altruistic or benevolent behavior, but maintains that, whenever a
choice is made by an agent to act, the action is by definition one
that the agent wants to do at that point. The action is self-serving,
and is therefore sufficiently explained by the theory of psychological
egoism. Let one assume that person A wants to help the poor;
therefore, A is acting egoistically by actually wanting to help;
again, if A ran into a burning building to save a kitten, it must be
the case that A wanted or desired to save the kitten. However,
defining all motivations as what an agent desires to do remains
problematic: logically, the theory becomes tautologous and therefore
unable to provide a useful, descriptive meaning of motivation because
one is essentially making an arguably philosophically uninteresting
claim that an agent is motivated to do what she is motivated to do.
Besides which, if helping others is what A desires to do, then to what
extent can A be continued to be called an egoist? A acts because that
is what A does, and consideration of the ethical "ought" becomes
immediately redundant. Consequently, opponents argue that
psychological egoism is philosophically inadequate because it
sidesteps the great nuances of motive. For example, one can argue that
the psychological egoist's notion of motive sidesteps the clashes that
her theory has with the notion of duty, and, related social virtues
such as honor, respect, and reputation, which fill the tomes of
history and literature.
David Hume, in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
(Appendix II—Of Self Love), offers six rebuttals of what he calls the
"selfish hypothesis," an arguably archaic relative of psychological
egoism. First, Hume argues that self-interest opposes moral sentiments
that may engage one in concern for others, and, may motivate one's
actions for others. These moral sentiments include love, friendship,
compassion, and gratitude. Second, psychological egoism attempts to
reduce human motivation to a single cause, which is a 'fruitless'
task—the "love of simplicity…has been the source of much false
reasoning in philosophy." Third, it is evident that animals act
benevolently towards one another, and, if it is admitted that animals
can act altruistically, then how can it be denied in humans? Fourth,
the concepts we use to describe benevolent behavior cannot be
meaningless; sometimes an agent obviously does not have a personal
interest in the fortune of another, yet will wish her well. Any
attempt to create an imaginary vested interest, as the psychological
egoist will attempt, proves futile. Fifth, Hume asserts that we have
prior motivations to self-interest; we may have, for example, a
predisposition towards vanity, fame, or vengeance that transcends any
benefit to the agent. Finally, Hume claims that even if the selfish
hypothesis were true, there are a sufficient number of dispositions to
generate a wide possibility of moral actions, allowing one person to
be called vicious and another humane; and he claims that the latter is
to be preferred over the former.
2. Normative Egoism
The second variant of egoism is normative in that it stipulates the
agent ought to promote the self above other values. Herbert Spencer
said, "Ethics has to recognize the truth, recognized in unethical
thought, that egoism comes before altruism. The acts required for
continued self-preservation, including the enjoyments of benefits
achieved by such arts, are the first requisites to universal welfare.
Unless each duly cares for himself, his care for all others is ended
in death, and if each thus dies there remain no others to be cared
for." He was echoing a long history of the importance of
self-regarding behavior that can be traced back to Aristotle's theory
of friendship in the Nichomachaean Ethics. In his theory, Aristotle
argues that a man must befriend himself before he can befriend others.
The general theory of normative egoism does not attempt to describe
human nature directly, but asserts how people ought to behave. It
comes in two general forms: rational egoism and ethical egoism.
a. Rational Egoism
Rational egoism claims that the promotion of one's own interests is
always in accordance with reason. The greatest and most provocative
proponent of rational egoism is Ayn Rand, whose The Virtue of
Selfishness outlines the logic and appeal of the theory. Rand argues
that: first, properly defined, selfishness rejects the sacrificial
ethics of the West's Judaic-Christian heritage on the grounds that it
is right for man to live his own life; and, Rand argues that, second,
selfishness is a proper virtue to pursue. That being said, she rejects
the "selfless selfishness" of irrationally acting individuals: "the
actor must always be the beneficiary of his action and that man must
act for his own rational self-interest." To be ethically selfish thus
entails a commitment to reason rather than to emotionally driven whims
and instincts.
In the strong version of rational egoism defended by Rand, not only is
it rational to pursue one's own interests, it is irrational not to
pursue them. In a weaker version, one may note that while it is
rational to pursue one's own interests, there may be occasions when
not pursuing them is not necessarily irrational.
Critics of rational egoism may claim that reason may dictate that
one's interests should not govern one's actions. The possibility of
conflicting reasons in a society need not be evoked in this matter;
one need only claim that reason may invoke an impartiality clause, in
other words, a clause that demands that in a certain situation one's
interests should not be furthered. For example, consider a free-rider
situation. In marking students' papers, a teacher may argue that to
offer inflated grades is to make her life easier, and, therefore, is
in her self-interest: marking otherwise would incur negative feedback
from students and having to spend time counseling on writing skills,
and so on. It is even arguably foreseeable that inflating grades may
never have negative consequences for anyone. The teacher could
conceivably free-ride on the tougher marking of the rest of the
department or university and not worry about the negative consequences
of a diminished reputation to either. However, impartiality
considerations demand an alternative course—it is not right to change
grades to make life easier. Here self-interest conflicts with reason.
Nonetheless, a Randian would reject the teacher's free-riding being
rational: since the teacher is employed to mark objectively and
impartially in the first place, to do otherwise is to commit a fraud
both against the employing institution and the student. (This is
indeed an analogous situation explored in Rand's The Fountainhead, in
which the hero architect regrets having propped up a friend's
inabilities).
A simpler scenario may also be considered. Suppose that two men seek
the hand of one woman, and they deduce that they should fight for her
love. A critic may reason that the two men rationally claim that if
one of them were vanquished, the other may enjoy the beloved. However,
the solution ignores the woman's right to choose between her suitors,
and thus the men's reasoning is flawed.
In a different scenario, game theory (emanating from John von
Neumann's and Oskar Morgenstern'sTheory of Games and Economic
Behaviour, 1944) points to another possible logical error in rational
egoism by offering an example in which the pursuit of self-interest
results in both agents being made worse off. This is famously
described in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Prisoner B
Confess
Don't confess
Prisoner A
Confess
5,5
½,10
Don't Confess
10,½
2,2
From the table, two suspects in a crime are individually offered
different sentences by their captors. A, for example, is offered 5
years in prison if he confesses, and he is told that if his partner
doesn't confess he will be given 6 months in jail and his partner 10
years. If he refuses to confess, then A faces 10 years in prison if
his partner does confess; however, both would only serve two years in
prison if they both do not confess.
A prior agreement between A and B not to confess would result in the
best solution for the two of them, but that is not allowed by the game
because they must make their decision by themselves without
communicating with the other person. The incentive that each
personally faces to avoid spending time in prison is to squeal in the
hope that the other does not confess. If each does this, then both
will end up serving the non-optimal solution of 5 years each.
The Prisoner's Dilemma offers a mathematical model as to why
self-interested action could lead to a socially non-optimal
equilibrium (in which the participants end up in the worst scenario).
Supporters identify a game "as any interaction between agents that is
governed by a set of rules specifying the possible moves for each
participant and a set of outcomes for each possible combination of
moves." They add: "One is hard put to find an example of social
phenomenon that cannot be so described." (Hargreaves-Heap and
Varoufakis, p.1). Nonetheless, it can be countered that the nature of
the game artificially pre-empts other possibilities: the sentences are
fixed, so the choices facing the agents are fixed; although this may
certainly be applied to the restricted choices facing the two
prisoners or contestants in a game, it is not obvious that every-day
life generates such limited and limiting choices.
Game theory introduces a variety of different outcomes and presents
other ethical dilemmas (e.g., in the 1980s, a "mutually assured
destruction" version was popular in which two superpowers face each
other with nuclear weapons and similar incentives to the prisoners
above), but the outcomes and hence restrictions on the agents remain
necessarily decided upon by the "game master." Typically the solutions
show self-interested behavior as reducing social welfare, and some
solutions may be so determined as to be non socially-optimal and
unstable, leaving us to believe that selfish behavior is
consequentially both bad and destabilizing. The implied conclusion in
such games is that either individuals ought to reject their own
interests in favor of collective gain and/or that individuals ought to
submit their choices to an overarching "game master" or Hobbesian
Leviathan – that is, the state and its experts, politicians,
committees, and possibly referenda, and so forth – who would then
choose the "correct" collective solution on their behalf. Since
egoists tend to disparage others' choosing for them as immoral, such
an implied solution is to be rejected (indeed, a third set of values
could be added to the game that reflect the captives' gross dismay at
having the decision made for them!); more importantly, the egoist may
reply that life is not a game of fixed values and that the solutions
are mere contrivances.
At a deeper level, some egoists may reject the possibility of fixed or
absolute values that individuals acting selfishly and caught up in
their own pursuits cannot see. Nietzsche, for instance, would counter
that values are created by the individual and thereby do not stand
independently of his or her self to be explained by another
"authority"; similarly, St. Augustine would say "love, and do as you
will"; neither of which may be helpful to the prisoners above but
which may be of greater guidance for individuals in normal life.
Rand exhorts the application of reason to ethical situations, but a
critic may reply that what is rational is not always the same as what
is reasonable. The critic may emphasize the historicity of choice,
that is, she may emphasize that one's apparent choice is demarcated
by, and dependent on, the particular language, culture of right and
consequence and environmental circumstance in which an individual
finds herself living: a Victorian English gentleman perceived a
different moral sphere and consequently horizon of goals than an
American frontiersman. This criticism may, however, turn on semantic
or contextual nuances. The Randian may counter that what is rational
is reasonable: for one can argue that rationality is governed as much
by understanding the context (Sartre's facticity is a highly useful
term!) as adhering to the laws of logic and of non-contradiction.
b. Ethical Egoism
Ethical egoism is the normative theory that the promotion of one's own
good is in accordance with morality. In the strong version, it is held
that it is always moral to promote one's own good, and it is never
moral not to promote it. In the weak version, it is said that although
it is always moral to promote one's own good, it is not necessarily
never moral to not. That is, there may be conditions in which the
avoidance of personal interest may be a moral action.
In an imaginary construction of a world inhabited by a single being,
it is possible that the pursuit of morality is the same as the pursuit
of self-interest in that what is good for the agent is the same as
what is in the agent's interests. Arguably, there could never arise an
occasion when the agent ought not to pursue self-interest in favor of
another morality, unless he produces an alternative ethical system in
which he ought to renounce his values in favor of an imaginary self,
or, other entity such as the universe, or the agent's God. Opponents
of ethical egoism may claim, however, that although it is possible for
this Robinson Crusoe type creature to lament previous choices as not
conducive to self-interest (enjoying the pleasures of swimming all
day, and not spending necessary time producing food), the mistake is
not a moral mistake but a mistake of identifying self-interest.
Presumably this lonely creature will begin to comprehend the
distinctions between short, and long-term interests, and, that
short-term pains can be countered by long-term gains.
In addition, opponents argue that even in a world inhabited by a
single being, duties would still apply; (Kantian) duties are those
actions that reason dictates ought to be pursued regardless of any
gain, or loss to self or others. Further, the deontologist asserts the
application of yet another moral sphere which ought to be pursued,
namely, that of impartial duties. The problem with complicating the
creature's world with impartial duties, however, is in defining an
impartial task in a purely subjective world. Impartiality, the ethical
egoist may retort, could only exist where there are competing selves:
otherwise, the attempt to be impartial in judging one's actions is a
redundant exercise. (However, the Cartesian rationalist could retort
that need not be so, that a sentient being should act rationally, and
reason will disclose what are the proper actions he should follow.)
If we move away from the imaginary construct of a single being's
world, ethical egoism comes under fire from more pertinent arguments.
In complying with ethical egoism, the individual aims at her own
greatest good. Ignoring a definition of the good for the present, it
may justly be argued that pursuing one's own greatest good can
conflict with another's pursuit, thus creating a situation of
conflict. In a typical example, a young person may see his greatest
good in murdering his rich uncle to inherit his millions. It is the
rich uncle's greatest good to continue enjoying his money, as he sees
fit. According to detractors, conflict is an inherent problem of
ethical egoism, and the model seemingly does not possess a conflict
resolution system. With the additional premise of living in society,
ethical egoism has much to respond to: obviously there are situations
when two people's greatest goods – the subjectively perceived working
of their own self-interest – will conflict, and, a solution to such
dilemmas is a necessary element of any theory attempting to provide an
ethical system.
The ethical egoist contends that her theory, in fact, has resolutions
to the conflict. The first resolution proceeds from a state of nature
examination. If, in the wilderness, two people simultaneously come
across the only source of drinkable water a potential dilemma arises
if both make a simultaneous claim to it. With no recourse to
arbitration they must either accept an equal share of the water, which
would comply with rational egoism. (In other words, it is in the
interest of both to share, for both may enjoy the water and each
other's company, and, if the water is inexhaustible, neither can gain
from monopolizing the source.) But a critic may maintain that this
solution is not necessarily in compliance with ethical egoism.
Arguably, the critic continues, the two have no possible resolution,
and must, therefore, fight for the water. This is often the line taken
against egoism generally: that it results in insoluble conflict that
implies, or necessitates a resort to force by one or both of the
parties concerned. For the critic, the proffered resolution is,
therefore, an acceptance of the ethical theory that "might is right;"
that is, the critic maintains that the resolution accepts that the
stronger will take possession and thereby gain proprietary rights.
However, ethical egoism does not have to logically result in a
Darwinian struggle between the strong and the weak in which strength
determines moral rectitude to resources or values. Indeed, the
"realist" position may strike one as philosophically inadequate as
that of psychological egoism, although popularly attractive. For
example, instead of succumbing to insoluble conflict, the two people
could cooperate (as rational egoism would require). Through
cooperation, both agents would, thereby, mutually benefit from
securing and sharing the resource. Against the critic's pessimistic
presumption that conflict is insoluble without recourse to victory,
the ethical egoist can retort that reasoning people can recognize that
their greatest interests are served more through cooperation than
conflict. War is inherently costly, and, even the fighting beasts of
the wild instinctively recognize its potential costs, and, have
evolved conflict-avoiding strategies.
On the other hand, the ethical egoist can argue less benevolently,
that in case one man reaches the desired resource first, he would then
be able to take rightful control and possession of it – the second
person cannot possess any right to it, except insofar as he may trade
with its present owner. Of course, charitable considerations may
motivate the owner to secure a share for the second comer, and
economic considerations may prompt both to trade in those products
that each can better produce or acquire: the one may guard the water
supply from animals while the other hunts. Such would be a classical
liberal reading of this situation, which considers the advance of
property rights to be the obvious solution to apparently intractable
conflicts over resources.
A second conflict-resolution stems from critics' fears that ethical
egoists could logically pursue their interests at the cost of others.
Specifically, a critic may contend that personal gain logically cannot
be in one's best interest if it entails doing harm to another: doing
harm to another would be to accept the principle that doing harm to
another is ethical (that is, one would be equating "doing harm" with
"one's own best interests"), whereas, reflection shows that principle
to be illogical on universalistic criteria. However, an ethical egoist
may respond that in the case of the rich uncle and greedy nephew, for
example, it is not the case that the nephew would be acting ethically
by killing his uncle, and that for a critic to contend otherwise is to
criticize personal gain from the separate ethical standpoint that
condemns murder. In addition, the ethical egoist may respond by saying
that these particular fears are based on a confusion resulting from
conflating ethics (that is, self-interest) with personal gain; The
ethical egoist may contend that if the nephew were to attempt to do
harm for personal gain, that he would find that his uncle or others
would or may be permitted to do harm in return. The argument that "I
have a right to harm those who get in my way" is foiled by the
argument that "others have a right to harm me should I get in the
way." That is, in the end, the nephew variously could see how harming
another for personal gain would not be in his self-interest at all.
The critics' fear is based on a misreading of ethical egoism, and is
an attempt to subtly reinsert the "might is right" premise.
Consequently, the ethical egoist is unfairly chastised on the basis of
a straw-man argument. Ultimately, however, one comes to the conclusion
reached in the discussion of the first resolution; that is, one must
either accept the principle that might is right (which in most cases
would be evidentially contrary to one's best interest), or accept that
cooperation with others is a more successful approach to improving
one's interests. Though interaction can either be violent or peaceful,
an ethical egoist rejects violence as undermining the pursuit of
self-interest.
A third conflict-resolution entails the insertion of rights as a
standard. This resolution incorporates the conclusions of the first
two resolutions by stating that there is an ethical framework that can
logically be extrapolated from ethical egoism. However, the logical
extrapolation is philosophically difficult (and, hence, intriguing)
because ethical egoism is the theory that the promotion of one's own
self-interest is in accordance with morality whereas rights
incorporate boundaries to behavior that reason or experience has shown
to be contrary to the pursuit of self-interest. Although it is facile
to argue that the greedy nephew does not have a right to claim his
uncle's money because it is not his but his uncle's, and to claim that
it is wrong to act aggressively against the person of another because
that person has a legitimate right to live in peace (thus providing
the substance of conflict-resolution for ethical egoism), the problem
of expounding this theory for the ethical egoist lies in the
intellectual arguments required to substantiate the claims for the
existence of rights and then, once substantiated, connecting them to
the pursuit of an individual's greatest good.
i. Conditional Egoism
A final type of ethical egoism is conditional egoism. This is the
theory that egoism is morally acceptable or right if it leads to
morally acceptable ends. For example, self-interested behavior can be
accepted and applauded if it leads to the betterment of society as a
whole; the ultimate test rests not on acting self-interestedly but on
whether society is improved as a result. A famous example of this kind
of thinking is from Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, in which Smith
outlines the public benefits resulting from self-interested behavior
(borrowing a theory from the earlier writer Bernard Mandeville and his
Fable of the Bees). Smith writes: "It is not from the benevolence of
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but
from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to
their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our
own necessities but of their advantages." Wealth of Nations, I.ii.2.
As Smith himself admits, if egoistic behavior lends itself to
society's detriment, then it ought to be stopped. The theory of
conditional egoism is thus dependent on a superior moral goal such as
an action being in the common interest, that is, the public good. The
grave problem facing conditional egoists is according to what standard
ought the limits on egoism be placed? In other words, who or what is
to define the nature of the public good? If it is a person who is set
up as the great arbitrator of the public, then it is uncertain if
there can be a guarantee that he or she is embodying or arguing for an
impartial standard of the good and not for his or her own particular
interest. If it is an impartial standard that sets the limit, one that
can be indicated by any reasonable person, then it behooves the
philosopher to explain the nature of that standard.
In most "public good" theories, the assumption is made that there
exists a collective entity over and above the individuals that
comprise it: race, nation, religion, and state being common examples.
Collectivists then attempt to explain what in particular should be
held as the interest of the group. Inevitably, however, conflict
arises, and resolutions have to be produced. Some seek refuge in
claiming the need for perpetual dialogue (rather than exchange), but
others return to the need for force to settle apparently insoluble
conflicts; nonetheless, the various shades of egoism pose a valid and
appealing criticism of collectivism: that individuals act; groups
don't. Karl Popper's works on methodological individualism are a
useful source in criticizing collectivist thinking (for example,
Popper's The Poverty of Historicism).
3. Conclusion
Although psychological egoism is fraught with the logical problem of
collapsing into a closed theory, and hence being a mere assumption
that could validly be accepted as describing human motivation and
morality, or be rejected in favor of a psychological altruism (or even
a psychological ecologism in which all actions necessarily benefit the
agent's environment), normative egoism engages in a philosophically
more intriguing dialogue with protractors. Normative egoists argue
from various positions that an individual ought to pursue his or her
own interest. These may be summarized as follows: the individual is
best placed to know what defines that interest, or it is thoroughly
the individual's right to pursue that interest. The latter dividing
into two sub-arguments: either because it is the reasonable/rational
course of action, or because it is the best guarantee of maximizing
social welfare. Egoists also stress that the implication of critics'
condemnation of self-serving or self-motivating action is the call to
renounce freedom in favor of control by others, who then are empowered
to choose on their behalf. This entails an acceptance of Aristotle's
political maxim that "some are born to rule and others are born to be
ruled," also read as "individuals are generally too stupid to act
either in their own best interests or in the interests of those who
would wish to command them." Rejecting both descriptions (the first as
being arrogant and empirically questionable and the second as
unmasking the truly immoral ambition lurking behind attacks on
selfishness), egoists ironically can be read as moral and political
egalitarians glorifying the dignity of each and every person to pursue
life as they see fit. Mistakes in securing the proper means and
appropriate ends will be made by individuals, but if they are morally
responsible for their actions they not only will bear the consequences
but also the opportunity for adapting and learning. When that
responsibility is removed and individuals are exhorted to live for an
alternative cause, their incentive and joy in improving their own
welfare is concomitantly diminished, which will, for many egoists,
ultimately foster an uncritical, unthinking mass of obedient bodies
vulnerable to political manipulation: when the ego is trammeled, so
too is freedom ensnared, and without freedom ethics is removed from
individual to collective or government responsibility. Egoists also
reject the insight into personal motivation that others – whether they
are psychological or sociological "experts" – declare they possess,
and which they may accordingly fine-tune or encourage to "better
ends." Why an individual acts remains an intrinsically personal and
private act that is the stuff of memoirs and literature, but how they
should act releases our investigations into ethics of what shall
define the good for the self-regarding agent.
4. References and Further Reading
Aristotle. Nichomachaean Ethics. Various translations available. Book
IX being most pertinent.
Baier, Kurt. "Egoisim" in A Companion to Ethics. Ed. Peter Singer.
Blackwell: Oxford. 1990.
Feinberg, Joel. "Psychological Egoism" in Ethics: History, Theory, and
Contemporary Issues. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 1998.
Garvin, Lucius. A Modern Introduction to Ethics. Houghton Mifflin:
Cambrirdge, MA, 1953.
Hargreaves-Heap, Shaun P. and Yanis Varoufakis. Game Theory: A
Critical Introduction. Routledge: London, 1995.
Holmes, S.J. Life and Morals. MacMillan: London, 1948.
Hospers, John. "Ethical Egoism," in An Introduction to Philosophical
Analysis. 2nd Edition. Routledge, Kegan Paul: London, 1967.
Hume, David. Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.
Peikoff, Leonard. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. Meridian:
London, 1993.
Popper, Karl. Poverty of Historicism. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1976.
Rachels, James. Elements of Moral Philosophy. Mcgraw-Hill: London, 1995.
Rand, Ayn. Virtue of Selfishness. Signet: New York, 1964.
Rand, Ayn. The Fountainhead. Harper Collins: New York. 1961.
Sidgwick, Henry. The Methods of Ethics. MacMillan: London, 1901.
Smith, Adam. Wealth of Nations.
Smith, Adam. Theory of Moral Sentiments.
No comments:
Post a Comment