as belief and intention is likely to raise some eyebrows, especially
in certain Anglo-American and European philosophical circles. The
dominant picture in these circles is that intentionality is a feature
of individual minds/brains. Prima facie, groups don't have minds or
brains. How could they have intentional states? Despite the initial
skepticism, there is a growing number of philosophers turning their
attention to the issue of collective intentionality. The focus of
these recent discussions has been primarily on the notions of
collective intention and belief. Philosophers of action theory have
been interested in collective intentions because of their interest in
understanding collective or group agency. Individual intentions shape
and inform individual actions. My intention guides my daily
activities, structures my desires in a variety of ways, and
facilitates coordination with both my future self and others around
me. But we do not always act alone and it is coordination with others
that raises interesting issues regarding the possibility of collective
intentions. Many philosophers believe that individual intentions alone
will not explain collective action and that joint action requires
joint (sometimes called shared or collective in the literature)
intentions. An exception to this trend is Seamus Miller who has argued
that collective or joint action can be understood in terms of
collective ends that are not intentions. Because his positive account
of joint action does not appeal to collective intentionality, his work
will not be highlighted in this article.
Interest in the notion of collective belief has been motivated, in
part, by concerns over how to understand our collective belief
ascriptions and the role they play in social scientific theory and
everyday contexts. We often attribute beliefs, desires, and other
propositional attitudes to groups like corporations. What do these
ascriptions mean? Are they to be taken literally?
1. Instrumentalism
A common response to the questions that arise concerning our practice
of ascribing intentional states to groups is to say that these
ascriptions are mere fictions. When we say, "The Federal Reserve
believes that interest rates ought to remain low," this does not mean
that the Federal Reserve literally has a belief. Rather, we are
speaking metaphorically. According to this account, our ascriptions of
intentional states to groups, though useful, are, strictly speaking,
false.
Although this account has common-sense appeal, it has not been
appealing to philosophers working in this area for a variety of
reasons. First, our practice of attributing responsibility to
organizations (consider, for instance, current tobacco lawsuits) seems
to presuppose that organizations literally have intentional states.
For we could not hold them legally and morally responsible for an
action unless they intended to commit the act. Since we do not hold
organizations metaphorically responsible (much to the dismay of
tobacco companies), the attributions on which our ascriptions of
responsibility rest should be, at least initially, considered
non-metaphorical.
Further, our ascriptions of intentional states to groups have a
surprising explanatory power. They allow us to predict and explain the
actions of groups. Although false ascriptions could be explanatorily
powerful (just as false theories are sometimes explanatorily
powerful), explanatory power is prima facie evidence that our
ascriptions are not simply false. We might also note that if the
instrumentalist about collective intentionality is correct, then we,
the media, social scientists, lawyers, political scientists, etc. are
continually disseminating falsehoods. This seems to be an odd result
and again, prima facie, evidence that our ascriptions are not mere
metaphors.
It should be noted that rejection of the metaphorical approach to our
collective intentional state ascriptions does not necessarily commit
one to the view that when we are ascribing intentional states to
groups those ascriptions are true in virtue of the fact that there is
a collective or group mind that is the bearer of these states. In
rejecting the metaphorical approach one need not also reject an
individualistic approach. As we shall see there are alternative
accounts that hold that these ascriptions are true, not in virtue of
there being a group mind, but in virtue of the fact that the
individuals within the group have certain intentional states.
Summative accounts are of this kind.
2. Summative Accounts
Summative accounts of collective attitude ascription argue that these
ascriptions are a short-hand way of referring to the fact that most
members have the attitude (and the content) ascribed to the group.
This is the view espoused by Anthony Quinton in 'Social Objects'
(1975). These accounts have been labeled summative by Margaret Gilbert
(1989) because they try to analyze group attitude ascriptions in terms
of the sum of individual attitudes with the same content as that
ascribed to the group.
There are a variety of summative accounts on offer. For the purposes
of this article I will focus on two types, simple summative account
(SSA) and the complex summative account (CSA), identified by Margaret
Gilbert in her (1987) article "Modelling Collective Belief." According
to the simple summative account:
Group G believes that p if and only if all or most of the members
believe that p.
A simple summative account of group intention would substitute
'intends' in the formulation above. Gilbert (1987, 1989, 1994) has
argued persuasively that this analysis is insufficient. Consider a
case in which every member of the philosophy department believes that
eating meat is immoral, but the members do not express this opinion
because they are afraid of the response they will receive from their
colleagues and students. In this context, it is unlikely that we would
attribute to the philosophy department the belief that eating meat is
immoral. It is possible, of course, to construct a context in which it
would be appropriate to attribute such a belief to the philosophy
department–perhaps, if the philosophy department were engaged in a
discussion of animal rights. But in such a context the beliefs of the
individuals would no longer be secret. Presumably, at least some of
the members would express their opinions.
This example suggests that group belief depends on certain epistemic
features of individuals. The complex summative account acknowledges
these epistemic features by introducing the notion of common
knowledge. CSA requires that members of the group recognize or know
that most of the members in the group believe that p. Thus, CSA is
committed to the conceptual truth of the following:
A group G believes that p if and only if (1) most of the members
of G believe that p, and (2) it is common knowledge in G that (1).
Gilbert (1989, 1994) has argued that the CSA is too weak. Consider the
following example: A company has formed two committees and
coincidently the committees have the same exact membership. One
committee has been formed in order to develop an office dress code.
Call this committee the Dress Code committee. The other committee has
been formed to assess the recently installed phone system. Call this
committee the Phone committee. Now imagine that (a) every member of
the Dress Code committee personally believes that spandex pants are
inappropriate apparel for the office and this is common knowledge
within the Dress Code committee, and (b) the same goes mutatis
mutandis for each member of the Phone committee. It seems compatible
with (a) and (b) that (c) the Dress Code committee believes spandex is
inappropriate, and (d) the Phone committee does not believe that
spandex is appropriate office apparel. Yet the conditions of the CSA
have been met for both. Gilbert provides a similar example in (1996,
199). The addition of common knowledge, according to Gilbert, does not
provide sufficient conditions for group belief. Although Angelo
Corlett (1996) has criticized examples of this sort and has provided a
defense of a simple summative account, most theorists agree with
Gilbert that the account is insufficient.
In addition to being too weak, many including Gilbert believe that
both the CSA and SSA are too strong. On summative accounts it is
conceptually necessary for most of the members of G to believe that p
in order for G to believe that p. This seems too strong. Indeed, there
seem to be contexts in which no group member has the attitude ascribed
to the group. Imagine a group of politicians who do not personally
believe that partial birth abortion should be outlawed, but because of
the pressure exerted by their constituents they vote to ban partial
birth abortion. Ascriptions of belief to the group of politicians
would probably be made on the basis of this vote and, thus, we would
ascribe the belief that partial birth abortion should be banned to the
group of politicians even though no individual politician personally
believes this proposition.
Group intentions, too, are not easily understood in terms of the
summation of individual intentions to perform some action. Consider
this example given by John Searle (1990, 403). Imagine a group of
people sitting on the grass enjoying a sunny afternoon. Suddenly it
grows dark and starts to rain. They all get up and run for shelter. In
this scenario each individual has the intention "I am running to
shelter" and these intentions are had independently of one another.
Now imagine a situation in which their running to the shelter is part
of a performance. Suppose they are a group of actors and this is part
of a scene in a play. Thus, at one point in the play they perform the
same actions done by the individuals in the above scenario. According
to Searle, the performance by the actors involves a collective
intention in the form "we intend to do x." This collective intention
is different from the individual intentions had by the individual
actors and it is not captured by summing up individual intentions in
the form "I intend to x."
The reason why collective intentions cannot be reduced to individual
intentions, argues Searle, is that no set of I-intentions even
supplemented with mutual beliefs will add up to a we-intend.
Collective intentions involve a sense of acting and willing something
together. Individual intentions involved in this enterprise are
derived from collective intentions and the individual intentions that
are derived from the collective intention will often have a different
content from that of the collective intention. Michael Bratman
(1999,111) also stresses the inadequacy of summative accounts of group
intentions. Consider a case in which you have an intention to paint
the house and I have an intention to paint the same house and this is
common knowledge between us. The set of intentional states is not
enough to guarantee that our actions are coordinated in any manner so
that we are painting the house together. Indeed, the complex summative
account does not rule out the possibility of our painting the same
house at the same time but independent of one another (avoiding the
other by chance). The set of individual intentional states identified
by the complex summative accounts is not going to play any role in
coordinating our behavior so that painting the house is something we
do together. Intentions, either collective or individual, do, by their
nature, play a role in planning and coordination. (Bratman, 1999,
1987) So, according to this line of reasoning, summative accounts,
even of the complex kind, cannot be an adequate account of the nature
of collective intention.
3. Non-Summative Accounts
a. Searle
In "Collective Intentions and Actions" (1990) and in The Construction
of Social Reality (1995) John Searle defends an account of collective
intentionality that is non-summative, but remains individualistic.
Searle specifies that anything we say about collective intention must
meet the following conditions of adequacy:
1. It must be consistent with the fact that society is nothing
over and above the individuals that comprise it. All consciousness and
intentionality is in the minds of individuals. Specifically,
individual brains.
2.It must be consistent with the fact that all intentionality
could be had by a brain in a vat.
Searle's first criterion of adequacy denies that groups themselves can
be intentional agents and advocates a form of individualism. The
second criterion is motivated by atomism. According to this condition,
all intentionality, individual or collective, is independent of what
the real world is like, since a radical mistake is possible. These two
conditions entail that collective intentions exist in individual
brains. Thus Searle's position allows for the possibility of a single
person having the collective intention "we intend to do x."
…I could have all the intentionality I do have even if I am
radically mistaken, even if the apparent presence and cooperation of
other people is an illusion, even if I am suffering a total
hallucination, even if I am a brain in a vat. (1990, 117)
How is it possible for an individual to have an intention of the form
"We intend to J"? Searle contends that this capacity is biologically
primitive. Indeed, he suggests that it is shared by a variety of other
species. This capacity presupposes other Background capacities (the
Background is a technical term for Searle referring to conditions
necessary for certain cognitive activities and language). In
particular, it presupposes a Background sense of the other as a
candidate for cooperative agency (1990, 414).
Collective intentionality plays a large role in Searle's overall
account of social reality. In The Construction of Social Reality
(1995) collective intentionality is that which confers a function on
artifacts and changes them into social facts. Pieces of paper function
as money because we intend them to do so. Just as individual
intentionality has the ability to change the world via speech acts,
collective intentionality has, according to Searle, the ability to
create social facts.
Searle's account of collective intention has been criticized for a
variety of reasons. First, Tollefsen (2002d) notes that it rests on
the controversial assumption that externalist theories of content
individuation are false. According to standard externalist reasoning,
if a brain in a vat is not in the proper water environment (either in
causal contact with water or able to theorize about water) then it
cannot have beliefs or intentions about water. The content of a belief
is determined by external rather than merely internal aspects. If this
is correct then a brain in a vat could not have we-intentions.
Further, there are some who argue that one could not even have a
concept of another agent if he or she is not part of a social practice
of interpretation (Davidson, for instance, 1992). If these views are
correct it would be difficult to say how a brain in a vat could have a
we-concept at all. One cannot simply assume that these theories are
false without a lengthy discussion and refutation. To the extent that
Searle's account rests on a controversial thesis in the philosophy of
mind and language it is problematic.
Others (Meijers 2001, Gilbert 1998) have argued that Searle's account
fails to capture the normative relations that are an integral part of
collective intentions. When we form a collective intention, we create
obligations and expectations among us. The football players in
Searle's example above are obligated to perform certain actions given
that they have formed a collective intention to execute a pass play.
As Gilbert notes (1989, 1994) if one of the players fails to do his or
her part the other players have a right to rebuke their teammate. This
rebuke is evidence of the normativity involved in joint action. When
we form a collective intention we make commitments and incur
obligations. Searle's account, because it essentially allows for
solipsistic we-intentions, fails to acknowledge the normativity
involved in collective intentionality. For Gilbert and Meijers, the
normativity of collective intentionality is essential to the
phenomenon.
Searle himself acknowledges that it is because of the special nature
of collective intentions that we are able to distinguish between the
two cases of individuals running for cover in the example above. There
is something about collective intentions that coordinates individual,
independent actions into a joint action. But isolated, perhaps even
solipsistic, we-intentions do not, in themselves, seem to be enough to
direct and coordinate the individual intentional actions of which the
joint action is comprised. Suppose, for instance, that none of the
actors knew of the other actor's we-intention. It would seem to be a
complete accident that they acted together. Indeed, it would seem as
fortuitous as a group of individuals that just happen to get up at the
same time and run for cover.
b. Bratman
The problems with Searle's account point to the fact that whatever
individual intentional states underlie collective intentions, they
should be interrelated in a significant way. Michael Bratman provides
an account of collective intention in terms of the intentions of the
individual participants and their interrelations. His analysis
provides a rational reconstruction of what it is for two people to
intend to do something together. We should note that Bratman uses the
term "shared intention" rather than collective intention.
We need to be careful with this phrase as there are several senses in
which one can "share" an intention. You and I, for instance, can both
intend to wash the dishes and thus we share, in some sense, the
intention to wash the dishes. But these intentions are consistent with
our washing the dishes independently of one another. Here is another
way to distinguish between the weak and the strong sense of sharing.
You and I each have a quarter in our pockets. In this case, one might
say that we share "quarter possession." This is the weak sense of
sharing. This sense of sharing is to be distinguished from a case in
which we share a quarter between us. The weak sense of sharing does
not aid us in understanding how people can perform actions together.
With this caution in mind, I will use collective intention and shared
intention interchangeably to refer to the type of intention that is
thought to be crucial for understanding collective actions. The weak
sense of shared intention noted above is not a candidate.
Bratman begins his discussion of collective intention by identifying
the role that collective or shared intentions play. First, shared
intentions help to coordinate our intentional actions. For instance,
our shared intention of washing the dishes will guide each of our
intentional actions towards satisfying the goal of washing the dishes.
Thus, someone will wash the dishes before rinsing them and someone
will rinse them before drying them. Second, our shared intention will
coordinate our actions by making sure that our own personal plans of
action meld together. If I plan to do the washing, then I will check
with your plan and see if there is any conflict. Third, shared
intentions act as a backdrop against which bargaining and negotiation
occur. Conflicts about who does the washing and who does the drying
will be resolved by considering the fact that we share the intention
to do the dishes. Thus, shared intention unifies and coordinates
individual intentional actions by tracking the goals accepted by each
individual.
Consider a case in which you and I intend to wash the dishes together.
If this intention is a shared intention then it is not a matter of you
having an intention to wash the dishes and me having an intention to
wash the dishes. Nor is it a matter of each of us having an
atomistically conceived we-intention to wash the dishes. Such
coincident intentions do not insure that each of us knows of the
other's intention and that we are committed to the joint action of
washing the dishes together. Further, an explicit promise made to each
other does not seem to insure that we share an intention either.
Because I might be lying to you and have no intention of washing the
dishes with you. Thus, explicit promises are not sufficient for shared
intention. Nor are they necessary for shared intention. Bratman
provides an example from Hume to highlight this. "Consider Hume's
example of two people in a row boat who row together 'tho they have
never given promises to each other.' Such rowers may well have a
shared intention to row the boat together"(Bratman, 1993, 98-99).
What do shared intentions consist in according to Bratman? Bratman
shares Searle's commitment to individualism in that he does not think
that shared intentions are the intentions of a plural agent, nor are
they to be understood solely in terms of individual intentional
states. Shared intentions, according to Bratman, are to be identified
with the state of affairs consisting of a set of interrelated
individual intentional states. What set of individual attitudes are
interrelated in appropriate ways such that the complex consisting of
such attitudes would, if functioning properly, do the jobs of shared
intention?
Here is a somewhat simplified version of Bratman's answer to this
question. We intend to wash the dishes if and only if:
1. a. I intend that we wash the dishes.
b. You intend that we wash the dishes.
2. I intend that we wash the dishes in accordance with and because
of 1a and 1b; you intend likewise.
3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us.
It should be noted that the focus in this article is on Bratman's
account of the shared intention that underlies joint intentional
action. In "Shared Cooperative activity" (1999) Bratman provides an
account of the shared intention that underlies more cooperative
ventures and it involves conditions 1-3 and some additional conditions
that rule out coercion.
As a first approximation, this complex of intentional attitudes above
seems plausible. But consider a case in which we each intend to wash
the dishes together and we each do so in part because of the other's
intention. However, I intend to wash the dishes with Palmolive and you
intend to wash them with Joy. All of this is common knowledge and we
will not compromise. Is there a collective intention present? It seems
not. In this case we do not have our subplans coordinated in the
appropriate way. Recall that one of the jobs that shared intention has
is to coordinate our individual plans and goals. In the example above
our individual subplans are in conflict and this would prevent us from
achieving our goal of getting the dishes washed.
Bratman avoids this counterexample by adding a clause about
participants' subplans. It is not necessary that our subplans match,
but they must mesh. So, if my subplan is to wash the dishes with
Palmolive, and your subplan is to wash them with hot water, and I have
no preference about the water temperature, then our subplans mesh
though they don't match exactly. But if we have subplans to wash the
dishes with completely different types of dish detergent then our
subplans do not mesh. Bratman reformulates the account in the
following way:
We intend to J if and only if:
1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J
2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a and 1b,
and meshing subplans of 1a and 1b; you intend the same.
3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge
This account of collective intentions rejects the atomism of Searle's
account. Because a shared intention is the complex of attitudes of
individuals and their interrelations, an individual cannot have a
shared intention. As we have seen, on Searle's account one can have a
shared intention, even if one is a brain in a vat. On Bratman's view
the intentions of individuals are interrelated and reflexive in a way
that makes solipsistic we-intentions impossible.
Bratman's account of collective or shared intentions has been
criticized in a variety of ways. Both Searle and Bratman attempt to
avoid the specter of the collective mind. Searle places we-intentions
in the mind of individuals. Bratman avoids positing a plural agent by
trying to explain collective intentions in terms of individual
attitudes with common contents that are distinctively social in the
sense that solitary individuals could not have them. But how is it
possible for me to have an intention with the form "we-intend" or with
the form "I intend that we do J"? There seem to be certain features of
intention itself that would rule out both Searle's and Bratman's ways
of understanding the notion of joint intention. This line of argument
has been developed, in slightly different ways, in recent papers by
Annette Baier (1997), Frederick Stoutland (1997), and J. David
Velleman (1997). Normally, when I intend to do something, the action I
intend to do is under my control. And in normal cases of shared
intention (cases where there is no coercion or where I am not in
control of your actions), the other agent is seen as being in control
of his or her own actions. Further, when I intend to do something,
this intention settles, in some sense, what I will do. In Bratman's
terms, I have set a plan or course of action for myself. But how,
then, can I intend that we do something? There is something in this
scenario that is out of my control. My intention that we J cannot
settle what we will do, because you have an equally important role in
settling what will be done. Thus, I cannot intend that we J.
Stoutland (1997) puts the problem a bit differently by emphasizing
that Bratman's attempt to identify a set of individual intentions with
common contents is impossible. Because intention makes an implicit
reference to the subject that fulfills the intention, there are no
intentions with common content. "Art can intend to go to a film and
Mary can intend to do the same; but their intentions do not have
common content, since Art's intention is his going to the film and
Mary's is her going to the film." (1997, 56). Likewise, it would seem
impossible for me to have a Searlian we-intention. Because intention
makes an implicit reference to the subject that is responsible for
fulfilling the intention and I am not a we, I cannot have a
we-intention. In cases of joint action I am not the subject that is
responsible for fulfilling the intention. In order to be responsible I
would have to have the actions of others under my direct control. But
I do not. Therefore, I cannot have a we-intention.
In "I intend that we J" (1999) Bratman alters his account of shared
intention in an attempt to meet this challenge. Basically, Bratman
introduces the technical notion of intending that. This is supposed to
be like ordinary intention except that it does not require that the
individual with the intention also be the individual who fulfills the
intention. I can intend that my children go to college, for instance.
On this understanding of intention it seems possible for an individual
to have the intention that we X. This way of avoiding the objection
has seemed to some to be problematic. First, to intend that my
children go to college is simply to intend to do something that brings
it about that my children go to college. And these actions (whatever
they might be) are under my direct control. This is not so in the case
of my intending that we X. Further, Bratman seems to have changed the
subject. Intentions are normally intentions to do something. It is
intentions to act that explain behavior at the individual level. If
collective actions presuppose intention in the way that individual
agency does, then it would seem to be the same sort of intention to
that is presupposed. But according to Stoutland and others, Bratman
doesn't give us an account of these intentions.
Like Searle, Bratman has been accused of ignoring the normativity of
collective intentions. For Gilbert and Meijers, there is a normativity
involved in collective intentionality that suggests that collective
intentions and other intentional states are essentially commitments of
a sort. Consider Gilbert's (1989) example of walking together. We form
an intention to walk together and begin our journey. Halfway through
the walk you veer off to the left and start walking away from me. If
we intended to walk together, this behavior is not only odd but
justifiably subject to rebuke. The behavior will be considered to be a
violation of some sort of commitment that we made. There seems to be a
sense in which you ought not to have done this and I have the right to
rebuke you. "Hey" I can say, "we are walking together. Where are you
going?" I can take offense at your behavior and, according to Gilbert,
my offense is justified and its justification derives from the
normative commitments that are inherent in the collective intention.
Bratman's account of collective or shared intentionality does not
involve a normative element. For him, cognitive attitudes and their
interrelations are enough to explain collective intentionality.
Although he admits that certain shared activities will involve
obligations, he stresses that it is possible to have a shared
intention that does not involve promises or obligations. That is,
there is nothing essentially normative about collective
intentionality. He does, however, make a further distinction between
weak and strong shared intentions, in which the latter involves
binding agreement. This normativity inherent in a binding agreement,
however, is explained in terms of additional moral principles like
Scanlon's (1998) "principle of fidelity."
c. Gilbert
Margaret Gilbert's account of collective intentions and other
intentional states like belief aims, in part, to explain the nature of
this normative phenomenon without having to postulate additional
normative principles. Her account of collective intentionality is also
part of a larger project to provide a conceptual analysis of certain
group concepts. In On Social Facts (1989), in addition to providing an
analysis of the concept of a group belief and intention, she also
provides an account of the concept of a social group and the concept
of social convention. In doing so, she claims to be uncovering the
"core" of such concepts and legitimizing the use of these "everyday"
concepts within the social sciences.
Gilbert's account of collective intentionality is closely linked to
her account of the concept of a social group. Briefly, our everyday
concept of a social group is, according to Gilbert, the concept of a
plural subject of belief or action. A plural subject is an entity, or
as Gilbert puts it, "a special kind of thing, a 'synthesis sui
generis'"(1996, 268) formed when individuals bond or unite in a
particular way. This "special kind of thing" can be the subject to
which intentional action and psychological attributes are attributed.
We can formulate the conceptually necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of plural subjects in the following way:
Individuals A1…..An….form a plural subject of X-ing (for some
action X or psychological attribute X) if and only if A1An form a
joint commitment to X-ing as a body.
It will be helpful to begin by considering what is involved in a joint
commitment to act as a body or as a single individual. We will then
consider the plural subject framework as it applies to psychological
states like belief.
A joint commitment to act as a body is a commitment made by a
collection of individuals to perform some present or future action as
would a single individual. Joint commitments are formed when each of a
number of people expresses his or her willingness to participate in
the relevant joint commitment with the others. Each person understands
that only when all of the relevant people have agreed to participate
in the joint commitment will the joint commitment be formed. Once
every one has agreed, a pool of wills is formed and individuals are
then jointly committed. Once the joint commitment is established, each
individual is individually obligated to do his or her part to make it
the case that he or she acts as a body.
Consider a case in which Joe's construction company agrees to build a
house for Mrs. Wilbur. The members of the company do not each
individually agree to build Mrs. Wilbur a house. This would lead to
the proliferation of Wilbur abodes. They each individually agree,
however, to make it the case that the house is built by the
construction company and express their willingness to do so on the
condition that every other member do the same. This expression of
willingness need not be simultaneous. The members may express their
willingness over time. Nor do they need to express their willingness
verbally. In many cases, silence is an adequate expression of
intention. They must, however, in order for the joint commitment to
come into existence, communicate in some way and at some point in time
their intention to do their part in building the house as a body with
others.
Because joint commitments are joint, they cannot simply be reduced to
an aggregate of individual commitments. A joint commitment gives rise
to certain obligations and entitlements. Members of the group have a
right to expect that other members will follow through on their
commitments. Sam and Tammy are entitled to expect that Joe will do his
part to make it the case that the construction company builds a house
for Mrs. Wilbur. If Joe is doing something to frustrate the building
process, Sam and Tammy are justified in rebuking him.
A joint commitment can only be rescinded if every member party to the
joint commitment agrees to rescind it. The existence of the joint
commitments in the face of an individual rescinding his or her
individual commitment explains why the members of the construction
company have a right to rebuke Joe when he is not doing his part. If
Joe says, "I've had enough of this mindless labor," and walks off the
site, the joint commitment remains in full force because there has
been no agreement among the members to rescind the joint commitment.
This does not mean, of course, that the individual commitment Joe
makes cannot be broken. It does mean, however, that if he breaks his
individual commitment, even for a good reason, this does not nullify
the joint commitment and its associated obligations.
According to Gilbert, the obligations which arise from a joint
commitment are of a special kind and they differ from other forms of
obligations in the following ways: First, although each individual in
the group must be "willing" to be jointly committed, this notion of
willingness does not, according to Gilbert, rule out coercion. A
person can be coerced into being part of a joint commitment and yet it
still remains a commitment to which a person is obligated. Gilbert
wants to show that joint commitments arise in various environments and
under various circumstances. Often joint commitments are coerced
because the person who is doing the coercion needs the commitment of
others in order to carry through with their actions.
A second aspect that distinguishes the obligations of a joint
commitment from other types of obligation is the interdependence of
the commitments makes it the case that no one member can rescind a
joint commitment. For example, Al's commitment to travel with Doris
cannot be dissolved by Al changing his mind. This feature was already
noted above.
Third, in becoming party to a joint commitment a person has a reason
to act. It is a reason that remains whether or not his or her beliefs
or external circumstances change. Joe is obligated to every other
member of Joe's construction company to act in accordance with the
joint commitment to building a house. This commitment acts as a reason
and, if reasons are causes, joint commitments can often explain why
individuals act in particular circumstances. It is a reason that
remains and will bind him to acting appropriately until the group as a
whole decides to release one another from this obligation.
Finally, the people party to a joint commitment are aware of the
obligations they have to one another. They could not be held
responsible for violation of such obligations unless they were aware
of these obligations. The fact that every other member has committed
herself to the joint commitment is common knowledge, and there is also
common knowledge of the obligations, expectations, and entitlements
that arise from such commitments.
Having discussed the notion of forming a joint commitment to act as a
body, we are now in a position to apply the plural subject schema to
belief:
Individuals A1…An… form a plural subject of believing that p if
and only if A1…An form a joint commitment to believe that p as a body.
Recall that joint commitments are commitments of groups, not
individuals. They arise, in the case of joint action, when each
individual expresses his willingness to do his part provided that
every other individual commits to doing her part to bring it about
that they perform some action as a body. Gilbert simply extends this
analysis of joint action to group belief. Individuals express their
willingness to do their part to make the case that they believe as a
body. These commitments and expectations are common knowledge. This
set of reciprocal intentions and commitments sets up the pool of wills
and certain obligations and entitlements then come into play. But what
is required in doing one's part to make it the case that they believe
that p as a body?
Gilbert makes it clear that members do not have to themselves believe
that p. This allows her to avoid the pitfalls of the summative
accounts. They also do not have to act as if they personally believe
that p. Doing one's part in the context of a joint belief, then, seems
to involve at least not saying anything contrary to the group belief
while speaking as a member of the group or acting contrary to the
group belief while acting in one's capacity as a group member. One who
participates in a joint commitment to believe that p thereby accepts
an obligation to do what he can to bring it about that any joint
endeavors among the members of the group be conducted on the
assumption that p is true. He is entitled to expect others' support in
bringing this about. Further, if one does believe something that is
inconsistent with p, one is required at least not to express that
belief baldly. The committee members would have a right to rebuke one
of their own if, in acting as a member of the committee, he or she
expressed views that were contrary to the group view without prefacing
his or her remarks with "I personally believe that…"
According to Gilbert, then, when individuals form a plural subject of
belief, (i.e., when they become party to a joint commitment to believe
that p as a body), there is group belief that p. Note that she
provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a
plural subject of belief. But Gilbert recognizes in later work (1994)
that there may be cases in which we want to say that a group has a
belief, yet they do not meet the existence conditions for a plural
subject of belief. This recognition leads her to say that what she is
giving is an analysis of the core notion of group belief and that
other cases of group belief will be extensions of this core notion.
Thus, we end up with the following statement of the conceptually
sufficient conditions for group belief:
There is a group belief that p if some persons constitute the
plural subject of a belief that p. Such persons collectively believe
that p.
Unique to Gilbert's account is the assertion that under certain
circumstances individuals form a plural subject and this subject is
the legitimate subject of intentional state ascriptions. Recall that
Bratman and Searle deny that there is a collective entity that is the
appropriate subject of intentional state ascription. Her account,
then, is less individualistic than Searle's and Bratman's.
Gilbert's account of collective intentionality has been criticized on
the following grounds. First, Tollefsen (2002) has argued that
Gilbert's analysis is circular. This can be seen if we consider what
it means to commit to doing one's part to make it the case that the
group believe as a body or act as a body. Gilbert claims that the
notion of a group of individuals acting together to constitute a body
is primitive and it guides the actions and thoughts of individuals in
the group. It is this notion that tells them what their part is and
what they are committed to doing. It is from this concept, for
instance, that one knows that she must not say p, without prefacing
her remarks appropriately, when she is acting as member of a group
that believes not p. To do so would be to disrupt the unity within the
group and break their semblance of being "one body."
But this notion seems to be just the notion of a plural subject. For a
collection of individuals to believe as a body or act as a body is for
them to act or believe as a subject, a subject constituted by a
plurality of individuals. Indeed Gilbert says as much in the following
passage:
I do, of course, posit a mechanism for the construction of social
groups (plural subjects of belief or action). And this mechanism can
only work if everyone involved has a grasp of a subtle conceptual
scheme, the conceptual scheme of plural subjects. Given that all have
this concept, then the basic means for bringing plural subject-hood
into being is at their disposal. All that anyone has to do is to
openly manifest his willingness to be part of a plural subject of some
particular attribute (1989, 416)
Plural subjects are formed when each of a set of individual agents
expresses willingness to constitute, with the others, the plural
subject of a goal, belief, principle of action, or other such thing,
in conditions of common knowledge. The conceptually necessary
conditions for plural subjecthood, then, contain the notion of plural
subjecthood. As a conceptual analysis of our core notion of group
belief -the belief of a plural subject-Gilbert's analysis seems
circular.
Gilbert (in correspondence) has responded to this charge by arguing
that for her the concept of a plural subject is a technical notion. It
is not, as Tollefsen suggests, simply the notion of a subject
comprised of individuals but of a subject formed on the basis of joint
commitments. So her analysis of plural subjecthood does not contain
the technical notion of a plural subject and her analysis is not
circular. The passage above, however, suggests that, at the very
least, the formation of plural subjects presupposes that the
participants have an understanding of the technical concept of plural
subjecthood and an understanding of joint commitments. Since both
notions are very technical, it seems psychologically implausible that
everyday folk have even an implicit understanding of these concepts.
Tuomela (1992) charges Gilbert with circularity, as well. Gilbert
argues that joint commitments are to be analyzed in terms of
individuals expressing their willingness to be jointly committed with
others. But this analysis leave the concept of joint commitment
unanalyzed. Gilbert does, however, say a great deal more about the
notion of joint commitment than this suggests. In particular, her most
recent work (2003) provides a more detailed explanation of joint
commitment. Expressions of willingness come in as conditions for the
formation of a joint commitment, not part of an analysis of the notion
of joint commitment. If Gilbert's analysis of joint commitment does
not appeal to the notion of a joint commitment then it seems she has
avoided Tuomela's objection.
Tuomela (1998) has also argued that Gilbert's account is somewhat
limited. Her account of group intentionality is an account of what we
mean when we say "We believe that p," where "we" is a small,
unstructured group like a reading club, poetry discussion group, and
committees with no formal decision method. She claims that she is
giving an analysis of our core meaning of group belief. But the
paradigm case of attribution of intentional states to groups seems to
be those in which the subject is an organization like a corporation.
This is particularly true when one reflects on our practice of
praising and blaming the actions of corporations, states, governments,
etc. Yet it is unclear how Gilbert's account extends to organizations.
It seems obvious that not every member of the organization (take, for
instance, IBM) would have to openly express their willingness to do
his or her part in bringing it about that IBM believes that profits
are lower this year than last as a body in order for it to be true
that IBM believe that. Does the person on the assembly line have to
express his willingness to be jointly committed in the way described?
It seems that not even an implicit expression of willingness (a
failure to speak up) would make sense of this. To the extent that
Gilbert's account does not seem to extend to a range of other types of
groups to which the intentional idiom extends, Tuomela argues that it
remains inadequate.
There may be ways, however, of extending Gilbert's analysis to account
for the beliefs of large organizations. Gilbert suggests that one
might explain corporate beliefs, for instance, by claiming that the
core notion of group belief applies to the board of directors and
there is a convention in place that makes the board's beliefs the
beliefs of the corporation. Gilbert has used the plural subject
framework to provide an account of convention (1989).
d. Tuomela
Raimo Tuomela (1992, 1995) develops an account of collective belief,
he calls the positional account of group beliefs. This account relies
on the notions of rule-based social positions and tasks that are
defined by the rules in force in a collective and emphasizes the role
of positional beliefs. "Positional beliefs are views that a
position-holder has qua a position-holder or has internalized and
accepted as a basis of his performances of aforementioned kinds of
social tasks" (1995, 312). Strictly speaking, positional beliefs are
not beliefs at all but acceptances. His account of collective belief
attempts to encompass not only the beliefs of small, organized, groups
but organizations as well. Tuomela also provides an analysis of shared
we-beliefs (called non-normative or merely factual group beliefs).
Shared we-beliefs are not, according to Tuomela, proper group
(collective) beliefs. Collective belief does not require that any
particular member actually believe that p. Whereas in the case of a
we-belief each member believes that p and it is common knowledge that
each member believes that p. In this respect shared we-beliefs are,
according to Tuomela, those characterized by the summative accounts.
They are able to capture certain social phenomena but cannot explain
collective belief in cases like corporations or groups where
individuals do not themselves believe the proposition in question. For
our purposes we will be focusing on Tuomela's account of group
(collective) belief proper.
In Chapter Seven of The Importance of Us (1995) and Group Beliefs
(1992) Synthese, 91: 285-318. Raimo Tuomela provides the following
analysis of our concept of collective belief.
(BG) G believes that p in the social and normative circumstances C
if and only if in C there are operative members A1……An in G with
respective positions P1…….Pn such that
(1) The agents A1….Am when they are performing their social tasks
in their positions P1….Pm and due to their exercising the relevant
authority system in G, (intentionally) jointly accept p as the view of
G, and because of this exercise of the authority system they ought to
continue to accept or positionally believe that p.
(2) there is a mutual belief among the operative members to the
effect that (1)
(3) because of (1) the full-fledged and adequately informed
non-operative members of G tend to tacitly accept-or at least ought to
accept–p as members of G.
(4) there is a mutual belief in G to the effect that (3)
This account relies heavily on a distinction between operative and
non-operative members, acceptance and belief, and the notion of
correct social and normative circumstances. I will consider each of
these features in turn.
Operative members are those members who are responsible for the group
belief having the content that it does. In the case of a corporation,
the board of directors may be the operative members. Whereas those who
work on the assembly line or in the credit department, for instance,
are non-operative members. Which members are operative is determined
by the rules and regulations of the corporation. Such rules and
regulations are part of the social and normative circumstances
referred to in Tuomela's analysis.
The relevant social and normative circumstances involve tasks and
social roles and rules, either formal (resembling laws or statutes) or
informal (based on informal group agreements). So, for instance,
corporations have certain rules that define the roles and tasks of its
members. The rules are formal in some cases and are to be found in the
corporate handbook or charter. These rules often specify which members
are operative and define the relation between operative members and
non-operative members. In addition, they make clear the chain of
authority and decision-making procedures. "Indeed, in the case of
typical formal collectives (like corporations), certain
position-holders are required by the constitutive rules of the
collective to set goals and accepts views for the collective" (1998,
308).
According to Tuomela's analysis, then, one of the necessary conditions
for our concept of group belief to apply is that operative members
have certain intentional states. In this respect he shares something
with Gilbert's view and individualism in general. It is a further
question whether Tuomela's account can be viewed as intentionalistic
and, if so, whether his analysis suffers from circularity. I consider
this issue below. For now we can note that, for Tuomela, the
intentional states of individuals must be embedded in the right social
and normative circumstances. So group belief statements are not
analyzed solely in terms of statements about individual intentional
states on Tuomela's view. Tuomela therefore breaks from strong
analytical individualism.
Tuomela's account also relies on the distinction between accepting a
proposition and believing it. Tuomela stresses the difference between
accepting and believing by noting that accepting is an action where
certain beliefs are "non-actional" or experiential. Perceptual beliefs
seem to be of this kind. The agent is in some way passive. He
concludes based on this that at least experiential believing is
different from accepting a proposition. As for non-perceptual beliefs,
Tuomela goes on to argue that they are also different from accepting a
proposition. Typically, when someone is said to believe that p, she
does so if and only if she accepts p as true (given a certain
disquotational account of truth). Tuomela points out, however, that
this need not always be the case. Someone might accept a proposition
but not believe it. "A person may, for instance, accept as true that
he (or his body) is a probabilistically fluctuating bunch of hadrons
and leptons without really believing it to be true in the experiential
sense, let alone having that conviction. His acceptance would then be
"cognitive" acceptance in the sense that he would be willing to
operate on the assumption in question, to concretely act on it and to
use it as a premise in his reasoning, and so on." (1995, 309)
As we have seen, traditional summative accounts that require all or
some of the members believe that p were too strong. Tuomela attempts
to avoid this problem by requiring that operative members accept that
p. No member actually has to believe that p. The operative members
have, in Tuomela's view, positional beliefs. Positional beliefs are
views a position-holder has accepted as a basis for his performance of
certain kinds of social tasks. These positional beliefs are different
from personal beliefs. For instance, the board of directors might
personally believe that it is wrong for the company to fire 10,000
employees yet a director accepts this proposition and acts on it given
the fact that he holds a position of authority in the company.
Positional views, then, need not be truth-related. We may accept false
beliefs and therefore adopt positional views that we know to be false.
Tollefsen (2002) has argued that Tuomela's account suffers from the
same problem of circularity from which Gilbert's account suffers.
Consider condition (1) of Tuomela's analysis.
(1) The agents A1….Am when they are performing their social tasks
in their positions P1….Pm, and due to their exercising the relevant
authority system in G, (intentionally) jointly accept p as the view of
G, and because of this exercise of the authority system they ought to
continue to accept or positionally believe that p.
The operative members must intentionally and jointly accept P as the
view of the group, where joint acceptance simply means that each
operative member accepts p as the view of the group and this is common
knowledge. But what are we to make of the reference to "the view of
the group"? On an ordinary understanding of what it is to have a view
on some issue is to have an opinion or a belief. The "view" of the
group, then, seems to be simply the belief of the group. If so, one of
the necessary and sufficient conditions for group belief appears to
make reference to the notion of a group belief. Tuomela's analysis,
then, is circular. There is a group belief that p if and only if
operative members accept p as the group belief. But group belief (the
view of the group rather than the view of its individual members) is
the concept that the analysis is supposed to illuminate by providing
necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. It is hard to
see how to make sense of the view of the group without appealing to
notions like the belief of the group, the goal of the group, what the
group intends, and so on.
The circularity issues raised by Gilbert's and Tuomela's account might
be avoided if we simply give up the methodology of conceptual
analysis. Indeed, Tuomela insists that he is not engaged in conceptual
analysis but is providing truth conditions for our ascriptions. Thus,
although his account is circular, it is not viciously so. We can view
these accounts, then, as offering us a sort of identity theory of
collective intentionality. Indeed, this is how Bratman viewed his
account of collective (shared) intention. Group belief and intention
plays a certain role. What these theorists have done is identify a
complex of interrelated intentional states of individuals that plays
that role. One could, then, conclude that collective belief and/or
intention is that complex of attitudes.
The problem with this approach is that one might wonder whether there
might not be other ways in which these roles could be realized. Might
there not be other combinations of individual attitudes and public
acts and conditions, combinations that even in our world would
function together in the ways that realize the roles of shared
intention? The problem is analogous to type identity theories in the
philosophy of mind. If mental states are multiply realized by
different sorts of physical states, then type identity is false.
Analogously, if collective intentional states are multiply realizable
then identifying them with the complex of individual states is also
problematic. Collective intentional states could plausibly be realized
by a variety of different configurations of individual intentional
states. Indeed, Tuomela's voluminous work on group intentionality
supports this. He provides different accounts of group intentional
states depending on the particular group in question (e.g. normative
vs. normative group belief). And we have also seen that Gilbert
acknowledges that the conditions she identifies for group intentional
states are sufficient but not necessary. This leaves open the
possibility that group beliefs and other attitudes could be realized
by other sets of individual intentional states. At the most, then,
these accounts provide us with accounts of ways in which group
attitudes can be realized but they do not provide us with an account
of what group attitudes are.
We are left with the same question that plagues token-token identity
theories in the philosophy of mind. The token identity thesis states
that for every token instance of a mental state, there will be some
token neuro-physiological event with which that token instance is
identical. But what is it about these token mental states that makes
them all tokens of the same type? If Sue and Eric both believe that
Columbus is the capital of Ohio, then what is it that they have in
common that makes their different neurophysiological states the same
belief?
We can formulate the same question with respect to group intentional
states. If GM and the Federal Reserve are both ascribed the belief
that interest rates should be cut, what do these two groups have in
common that makes it appropriate to ascribe to them the same belief?
Tuomela would point to the fact that they both meet the conditions he
specifies for proper group belief. But what if the members of GM meet
the conditions of normative group belief and the members of the
Federal Reserve Board meet the conditions for non-normative group
belief? Do they share the same belief? And we are left with the
further question of what is it about these particular configurations
of intentional states that makes it appropriate to call them beliefs
or intentions at all? Why is collective intentionality a species of
intentionality? The work of Pettit (2002), Tollefsen (2002c), and
Velleman (1997) attempt to fill this lacuna by showing that certain
groups count as intentional agents given standard accounts of
intentionality. Rather than analyze the concept of collective
intentions or beliefs, these theorists have attempted to show that our
everyday concept of belief and intention extends naturally to certain
groups. Gilbert (2002), also, has recently attempted to flesh out the
strong analogy between individual beliefs and group beliefs.
4. Internal Debates: Belief vs. Acceptance
Among those who acknowledge that collectives can be the subject of
intentional state ascription, there is a debate raging over which type
of intentional states are appropriately attributable to collectives.
There are some, like Margaret Gilbert and Tollefsen who argue that it
is appropriate to attribute to groups a wide range of intentional
states including beliefs. Others, like K. Brad Wray (2002), Raimo
Tuomela (2000), and Anthonie Meijers (1999), have argued that,
although groups may accept a proposition, they cannot believe. The
nature of belief, according to these philosophers, is such that groups
cannot be believers. The latter camp has been labeled by Gilbert as
the rejectionists because they reject the possibility of group belief.
For ease, I refer to the former camp as the believers.
In "Collective Belief and Acceptance" (2002), Wray identifies four
differences between acceptance and belief.
1. You can accept things that you do not believe but you cannot
believe what you do not accept. (Rejection of the entailment thesis)
2. "Acceptance often results from a consideration of one's goals,
and thus results from adopting a policy to pursue a particular goal."
(2002, p. 7).
3. Belief is a disposition to feel that something is true.
4. Belief is involuntary, whereas acceptance is voluntary.
Wray then proceeds to show that the examples that Gilbert gives of
group belief (1989), (1994), are actually instances of acceptance.
Because group attitudes are formed against the background of goals,
because they are formed voluntarily, and because their formation does
not entail that members believe the content of the attitude, group
views are more aptly described as instances of acceptance. Both Wray
(2000) and Meijers (1999) develop an acceptance-based account of
collective attitudes.
There have been various attempts to respond to this line of argument.
Much rests on the merits of the original distinction between
acceptance and belief and on exploring the analogy between groups and
individuals. Tollefsen (2003b), for instance, argues that the issue of
voluntarism concerning belief is not as clear cut as rejectionists
make it out to be. The assertion that we cannot will to believe is an
empirical assertion and not a conceptual assertion about the nature of
belief. Perhaps, then, individuals cannot will to believe because of
our epistemic limits, but this does not rule out the possibility that
collective agents can will to believe. Gilbert (2002) has argued that
rejectionists beg the question with respect to collective belief. They
assume that collective belief must have all the features of individual
belief in order for it to be genuine belief but this just privileges
individual belief without argument. It may be that collective belief,
although a species of belief, is unique in certain respects.
5. The Role of Collective Intentionality
We have already seen that some theorists focus on the role of
collective intentions in organizing and coordinating collective
action. And in Searle's account of social reality, collective
intentions confer status functions on artifacts and turn them into
social facts. Money is money because we accept it and intend it to be.
Others have explored the role that collective intentionality, either
collective intentions or beliefs, plays in jurisprudence, economics,
and politics, and moral theory. Gilbert (2001), for instance, argues
that her account of collective intentionality provides a better
account of social rules than H.L.A. Harts. Social rules are to be
understood as the joint commitments of a society. This explains why we
are justified in rebuking those who violate social rules. Maria
Cristina Redondo (2001) argues that Searle's account of social facts,
an account grounding in collective intentionality, supports a version
of legal positivism. Ota Weinberger (2001) develops the relationship
between discussions of collective intentionality and the notion of the
"general will" or the "will of the people." Weinberger argues that the
"general will" should be understood in terms of institutional
processes that are collectively accepted within the community.
6. References and Further Reading
* Bratman, M. 1987. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
* Bratman, M. 1992. "Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a
Context." Mind 101: 1-15.
* Bratman, M. 1993. "Shared Intention." Ethics 104: 97-113.
* Bratman, M. 1999. Faces of Intention. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
* Cohen, L.J. 1992. An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. Oxford,
U.K.: Clarendon Press.
* Corlett, A. 1996. Analyzing Social Knowledge. Maryland: Rowman
and Littlefield.
* Davidson, D. 1992. The Second Person. Midwest Studies in
Philosophy XVII: 255-265.
* Gilbert, M. 1987. Modelling Collective Belief. Synthese, vol.
73. Reprinted in (1996). Chapter 7.
* Gilbert, M. 1989. On Social Facts. New York: Routledge.
* Gilbert, M. 1993. "Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation."
Ethics. 103: 679-706
* Gilbert, M. 1994. "Remarks on collective belief" in Frederick
Schmitt ed. Socializing Epistemology. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
* Gilbert, M. 1996. Living Together. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
* Gilbert, M. 1996. "Concerning Sociality: The Plural Subject as
Paradigm" in J. Greenwood (ed.), The Mark of the Social. Maryland:
Rowman and Littlefield.
* Gilbert, M. (2000) Sociality and Responsibility. Blue Ridge
Summit: Rowman and Littlefield.
* Gilbert, M. 2001. "Social Rules as Plural Subject Phenomena" in
Lagerspetz et. al.
* Gilbert, M. 2002. "Belief and Acceptance as Features of Groups."
Protosociology, Volume 16, 35-69.
* Gilbert, M. 2003. "The Structure of the Social Atom: Joint
Commitment and the Foundation of Human Social Behavior" in Schmitt, F.
ed. Socializing Metaphysics. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
* Hindriks, F. 2002. "Social Groups, Collective Intentionality,
and Anti-Hegelian Skepticism," in Realism in Action: Essays in the
Philosophy of Social Science, Matti Sintonen, Petri Ylikoski, and
Kaarlo Miller (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
* Hindricks, F.A. (2002) "Social Ontology, Collective
Intentionality, and Ockhamian Skepticism" in Meggle (2002), 125-49.
* Lagerspetz, E. Heikki Ikaheimo, and Jussi Kotkavirta, eds. 2001
On the Nature of Social and Institutional Reality. Finland, SoPhi.
* Lewis, D. 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
* Meggle, G. (ed.) (2002) Social Facts and Collective
Intentionality, Frankfurt am Main: Hansel-Hohenhausen.
* Meijers, A. (1994). Speech Acts, Communication, and Collective
Intentionality:Beyond Searle's Individualism. Leiden.
* Meijers, A. (1999) Belief, Cognition, and the Will. Tilburg:
Tilburg University Press, 59-71.
* Meijers, A. (2003) "Can Collective Intentionality be
Individualized?" American Journal of Economics and Sociology 62,
167-93.
* Miller, S. 2001. Social Action, Cambridge University Press.
* Pettit, P. (2003) "Groups with Minds of their Own" in Schmitt F.
(ed) Socializing Metaphysics, Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 167-93.
* Quinton, A. 1975. "Social Objects." Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 75: 67-87.
* Redondo, M. 2001. "On Normativity in Legal Contexts," in Lagerspetz et al.
* Scanlon, T. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
* Schmitt, F. (ed). 2003. Socializing Metaphysics. Maryland:
Rowman and Littlefield.
* Searle, J. 1990. "Collective Intentions and Actions." In
Intentions in Communication, P.Cohen, J. Morgan, and M.E. Pollack,
eds. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT press.
* Searle, J. 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. New York,
N.Y.: Free Press.
* Stoutland, F. 1997. "Why Are Philosophers of Action so
Anti-Social?" in Alanen, Heinamaa, and Wallgreen eds. Commonality and
Particularity in Ethics. New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press.
* Tollefsen, D. 2002. "Collective Intentionality and the Social
Sciences." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1): 25-50.
* Tollefsen, D. 2002b. "Challenging Epistemic Individualism."
Protosociology, volume 16, pp. 86-117. June 2002.
* Tollefsen, D. 2002c. "Organizations as True Believers." Journal
of Social Philosophy, vol 33 (3): pp. 395-411.
* Tollefsen, D. 2002d. Interpreting Organizations. Dissertation.
Ohio State University.
* Tollefsen, D. 2003a. "Collective Epistemic Agency." Southwest
Philosophy Review, vol. 20 (1), pp. 55-66.v
* Tollefsen, D. 2003b. "Rejecting Rejectionism." Protosociology,
volume 18. pp. 389-408.
* Tollefsen, D. 2004. "Joint Action and Joint Attention." Under
review Philosophy of the Social Sciences
* Tuomela, R. 1992. Group Beliefs. Synthese 91: 285-318.
* Tuomela, R. 1993. "Corporate Intention and Corporate Action."
Analyse und Kritik 15: 11-21.
* Tuomela, R. 1995. The Importance of Us. Standford: Standford
University Press.
* Tuomela, R. 2000. Cooperation: A Philosophical Study.
Philosophical Studies Series, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
* Tuomela, R. 2002. The Philosophy of Social Practices. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
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