synthetic thinker, Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi) created the supreme synthesis of
Song-Ming dynasty (960-1628 CE) Neo-Confucianism. Moreover, by
selecting the essential classical Confucian texts–the Analects (Lunyu)
of Confucius, the Book of Mencius (Mengzi, the Great Learning (Daxue)
and the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong)—then editing and compiling
them, with commentary, as the Four Books (Sishu). In doing so, Zhu
redefined the Confucian tradition and outlook. He restored its
original focus on moral cultivation and realization from the more
bureaucratic stance of Confucians of the preceding Han and Tang
dynasty (206 BCE-905 CE) who concentrated on the Five Classics
(Wujing) of classical antiquity. The Four Books became required
reading for the imperial examination system from the Yuan dynasty
(1280-1341) until the system was abolished near the end of the Qing
dynasty (1644-1911) in 1908. In his philosophical work, Zhu fused the
concepts of the principal Northern Song (960-1126 CE) thinkers, Shao
Yong (1011-77), Zhou Dunyi (1017-73), Zhang Zai (Chang Tsai, 1020-77)
and the brothers Cheng Yi (1033-1107) and Cheng Hao (1032-85) into a
rich, grand synthesis. Zhu Xi's thought has been the starting point
for intellectual discourse and the focus of disputation for the last
800 years. His influence spread to Korea and Japan, which adopted
Confucianism and the imperial examination system and were enamored of
Zhu's intellectual achievements. To study traditional Chinese
philosophy, especially Confucian thought, one must engage the ideas
and works of Zhu Xi.
1. Life and Work
Zhu Xi was born in Youqi in Fujian province, China in 1130. A
precocious child, he asked what lay beyond Heaven at age five and
grasped the import of the Classic of Filiality (Xiaojing) at age
eight. After losing his father, Zhu Song (1097-1143), in his youth, he
was raised in the company of several eclectic scholars, including
Buddhists. A prodigy, he passed the top-level jinshi exam (the
"presented scholar" exam) at the young age of nineteen, drawing on
Chan Buddhist notions in his answers. He continued to nurture an
eclectic interest in Daoism and Buddhism until he became the student
of the Neo-Confucian master Li Tong (1093-1163) in 1160. Zhu's father
had recommended that he study under Li, but Zhu delayed seeing him
until age 30, when he had spiritual doubts. A master in the tradition
of the Cheng brothers, Li convinced Zhu of the superiority of the
Confucian Way and cultivation, to which Zhu devoted himself for the
next forty years. Having passed the jinshi examination, Zhu was
qualified to hold office and was assigned to several prefectural
administrative posts. But Zhu was critical of central court policy on
several key issues and preferred temple guardianships, which gave him
leisure to read, write and teach. (This also shielded him from the
cutthroat politics at court where his frankness would have been
literally fatal to him.) He thus became a productive scholar who made
lasting contributions to classicism, historiography, literary
criticism and philosophy. He was also a master of elegant prose and
poetry.
As a renowned teacher, Zhu taught the classics and Neo-Confucianism to
hundreds, if not thousands, of students. His oral teachings are
preserved in the Classified Dialogues of Master Zhu (Zhuzi yulei). He
also published critical, annotated editions of several classics,
including the Book of Change (Yijing) and the Book of Odes (Shijing),
of specific Neo-Confucianism works, including the works of Zhou Dunyi,
Zhang Zai and the Cheng brothers, and a more encompassing
Neo-Confucian anthology, Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsi lu).
Devoted to his work, he kept busy virtually to his last breath when he
was rethinking and discussing the Great Learning. Throughout life, he
sought to reestablish the fundamental principles and ideals of
Confucianism in order to restore the vitality of China's cultural and
political integrity as a Confucian society, since those seeking
spiritual guidance and solace were inclined to favor Daoism and
Buddhism over the spiritually impoverished alternative of bureaucratic
Confucianism. Moreover, he thought the empire needed the spiritual
élan of authentic Confucian values to meet the challenge of barbarian
encroachers. His patriotism, commitment to the tradition and devotion
to scholarship and education remain an inspiration to this day in East
Asia and throughout the world.
2. Philosophy of Human Nature and Approach to Self-Cultivation
Zhu's complex theory of human nature registered the possibility of
evil as well as that of sagehood. On his theory, while (following
Mencius, 372-289 BCE) people are fundamentally good (that is,
originally sensitive and well-disposed), how one manifests this
original nature will be conditioned by one's specificqi endowment
(one's native talents and gifts), and one's family and social
environment. These together yield one's empirical personality,
intelligence and potential for cultivation and success. Zhu thought
difference in individual disposition, character and aptitude for moral
self-realization are due to variations inqi endowments and
environments.
Preceding generations of Neo-Confucian scholars had tended not to
register the complexity of human nature and the wide range of
individual differences and advocated relatively straightforward
approaches to self-cultivation as purifying the mind to elicit the
natural responses of one's original goodness. They tended to
understand this process in itself to constitute self-realization. For
example, Zhu's teacher Li Tong had strongly advocated a form of
meditation called "quiet sitting," the efficacy of which the active
young Zhu had doubted from the outset, at least for himself. Several
years later, Zhu held discussions with Zhang Shi (1133-80), a follower
of Hu Hong (1106-61), who had advocated "introspection in action." Zhu
initially embraced this approach, but soon found that it was not
viable for himself. He found that such introspection in the heat of
action could not inform or guide action. It tended to impede the flow
of effective deliberate action by making one too self-conscious.
Zhu Xi's ingenious solution was a two-pronged approach to cultivation
that involved nurturing one's feeling of reverence (jing) while
investigating things to discern their defining patterns (li).
Reverence, a virtue taught by Confucius (551-479 BCE) and the
classics, serves to purify the mind, attune one to the promptings of
the original good nature and impel one to act with appropriateness
(yi). At the same time, by grasping the defining, interactive patterns
that constitute the world, society, people and upright conduct, one
gains the key to acting appropriately. The mind that is imbued with a
feeling of reverence and comprehends these patterns will develop into
a good will (zhuzai) dedicated to rectitude and appropriate conduct.
Interestingly, in later life, Zhu regarded this conception of
cultivation and realization as too complicated, gradual and difficult
to complete. Like Confucius, he came to accept that one must, on
embarking on moral self-cultivation, establish the resolve (lizhi) to
realize the Confucian virtues and become an exemplary person (junzi),
a master of appropriateness in human conduct and interpersonal
affairs.
3. Moral Cosmic Synthesis
In "A Treatise on Humanity" (Renshuo), Zhu Xi articulates and
systematizes the classical Confucian ideal of humanity (ren) in
simultaneously cosmic and human perspective. At the same time, he
effectively criticizes competing accounts of "humanity" on logical,
semantic and ethical grounds. Following early tradition, Zhu
associates humanity with cosmic creativity. At its root, humanity is
the impulse of "heaven and earth" (the cosmos) to produce things. It
is manifested vividly in the cycle of seasons and the fecundity of
nature. (The settled Chinese terrain and climate were moderate and
productive, supporting the view that nature generally was fecund and
afforded suitable conditions for human flourishing.) This impulse to
produce is instilled in all of the myriad creatures, but in man it is
sublimated into the virtue of "humanity" ("authoritative personhood"),
which, when fully realized, involves being caring and responsible to
others in due degree. Zhu Xi similarly correlates the four stages of
creativity and production in the cosmos and nature — origination,
growth, flourishing and firmness — that were first indicated in the
Book of Change, with the four cardinal virtues enunciated by Confucius
— humanity, appropriateness, ritual conduct and wisdom. He thus
portrays the realized person as both a vital participant in cosmic
creativity and a catalyst for the flourishing and self-realization of
others. On this basis, Zhu goes on to formulate the definitive
definition of ren (humanity, authoritative personhood) for the
subsequent tradition: "the essential character of mind" and "the
essential pattern of love." The virtue of ren grounds the disposition
of mind as commiserative and describes the core of moral
self-realization as love for others (other-directed concern),
appropriately manifested.
4. Metaphysical Synthesis
Zhu Xi erected a metaphysical synthesis that has been compared broadly
to the systems of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Whitehead.
These "Great Chain" systems are hierarchical and rooted in the
distinction between form and matter. Zhu advanced Zhou Dunyi's dynamic
conception of reality as shown in the "Diagram of the Supreme
Polarity" (Taiji tu), in order to conceive the Cheng brother's concept
of li (pattern, principle) and Zhang Zai's notion of qi (cosmic vapor)
as organically integrated in a holistic system. In Zhou's treatise,
Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taiji tu shuo),
Zhu discerned a viable account of the formation of the world in stages
from the original unformed qi, to yin and yang, the five phases —
earth, wood, fire, water and metal — and on to heaven, earth and the
ten thousand things. Zhu blended this conception with ideas from the
Book of Change and its commentaries in setting forth a comprehensive
philosophy of cosmic and human creativity, providing philosophical
grounds for the received Confucian concepts of human nature and
self-cultivation. Zhu's penchant for thinking in polarities—li and qi,
in particular—has continued to stir critics to regard him as a dualist
who used two concepts to explain reality. For his part, any viable
account of the complexity of phenomena must involve two or more facets
in order to register their complexity and changes.
5. Key Interpreters of Zhu Xi
Zhu Xi was an active scholar-intellectual who held discussions and
disputes with other scholars, both in correspondence and in person. He
can be known by contrast with others as well as through his positive
views. For example, his series of letters with Zhang Shi on the topic
of self-cultivation, preserved in theCollected Writings of Master Zhu
(Zhuzi wenji), provides an enlightening record of these dedicated
Confucians' quest for a well-grounded, effective approach to
self-cultivation. He debated with Lu Zuqian (1134-1181) on the nature
of education. Zhu focused on the Confucian Way and moral practice,
while Lu argued for a broader-based humanities approach. He held a
series of debates with Lu Jiuyuan (Xiangshan, 1139-93) on the nature
of realization and moral conduct. Whereas Zhu advocated regimens of
study, reflection, observation and practice, Lu spoke simply of
reflecting on the self and clarifying the mind, considering that once
the mind was clear one would know spontaneously what to do in any
situation. Zhu also corresponded with the "utilitarian" Confucian
scholar Chen Liang (1143-94), who disputed Zhu's focus on individual
moral realization and the received "Way" with a broader institutional
approach that was more sensitive to empirical facts and conditions.
Zhu generally eclipsed all of the other scholars of his day, partly
because he outlived them and had so many students, but mainly because
his system was so compelling. It was comprehensive yet nuanced,
tightly reasoned yet accommodating of individual differences. It
preserved the essential Confucian Way yet ramified it to meet the
challenges of Buddhism and Daoism as spiritual teachings. Zhu's
influence rose at the end of the Southern Song dynasty and became
decisive during the Yuan dynasty, which adopted his edition of the
Four Books as the basis of the imperial examination system arranged by
scholars trained in his approach.
While raising his standing in pedagogy, this focus on the Four Books
at the expense of Zhu's deeper, more nuanced texts and dialogues
opened the door to philosophic criticism. A schematic presentation of
Zhu's cosmic theory of pattern (li) and qi lay in the background of
his commentary to the Four Books, which easily opened him to charges
of dualism and of reading abstract categories into the essentially
practical ancient texts. Because his commentary was focused on reading
and understanding the meaning, intent and cultivation message of the
Four Books, critics generalized that Zhu and his method were
essentially scholastic and would be myopic and stilted in facing real
situations. Anyone who peruses the corpus of Zhu's writings and
dialogues, however, will find that his ontology is not a crude dualism
but a holism built of mutually implicative elements that never exist
in separation. Also, his reflections are always informed by knowledge
of history, current events and practical observation, as his method of
observation applies generally to objects (and self) and phenomena
while respecting but not privileging texts. Even his comments on
Confucius and Mencius often refer back to the person and the speech
context, and, thus, are not entirely scholastic. His method of
observation opened the door to breakthroughs beyond the "verities" of
the classics, though he was careful not to play up this fact because
most of his colleagues sought the truth in the texts, thinking
empirical facts were distractions from the essential
Heavenly-patterning (tianli) reflected more adequately in the
canonical texts.
Whereas early generations of Zhu's followers were acquainted with his
broader learning, style and spirit, Confucians of the Ming and Qing
dynasties knew him mostly through his edition of the Four Books,
through which they targeted their criticisms of his thought. Zhu's
most eminent critic was the Ming scholar-official Wang Yangming (Wang
Yang-ming, 1472-1529). In youth, Wang had admired Zhu's learning and
once even attempted to try out his approach to observation,
"investigate things to discern their defining patterns." But, after
diligently "observing" bamboo for several days, Wang became ill and
got no special insight into the pattern or meaning of bamboo or
anything else. He therefore rejected Zhu's approach to observation as
too objective, as outward rather than inward. In the twentieth
century, Qian Mu observed that Zhu would only make such observations
with guiding questions in mind, around which to focus his
observations; he never would have countenanced just looking, which
would turn up nothing that wasn't obvious. For example, having heard a
monk claim that bean sprouts grow faster by night than by day, Zhu
measured the growth of some bean plants after twelve hours of daylight
and of nocturnal darkness, respectively, and found that the plants
exhibited the same rate of growth day and night. (The monk's claim had
been based on Mencius' idea that the qi was more vital at night.) For
his part, Wang transformed Zhu's theory of observation into a
pragmatic theory, thereby gearing observation directly to discernment
and response—knowing how to act. Thus, Wang formulated a famous slogan
that "knowledge and action form a unity." Later, he argued that
knowledge is not essentially objective and factual, but rooted in an
inborn moral sensitivity (liangzhi), which is elicited by clarifying
the mind so that one becomes actively responsive to one's moral
impulses (liangneng). It could be said that, in his criticisms, Wang
was reacting more to the scholastic attitudes fostered by the
examination system than to Zhu Xi himself. Wang ultimately respected
Zhu and went on to compile a text attempting to show that in later
life Zhu had changed his approach in a subjective, practical way that
anticipated Wang's approach.
Scholars of the late Ming through early Qing period (mid-seventeenth
to early eighteenth century), notably, Wang Fuzhi (1619-92) and Dai
Zhen (Tai Chen, 1723-77), disputed Zhu on philosophical and textual
grounds. Whereas Zhu had insisted on the priority of "pattern" over
qi, (roughly, form over matter), Wang and Dai followed the Northern
Song thinker Zhang Zai in affirming the priority of qi, viewing
patterns as a posteriori evolutionary realizations of qi interactions.
They thought this account dissolved the threat of any hint of dualism
in cosmology, ontology and human nature. For his part, Zhu Xi would
have responded that, fundamentally, "pattern" is implicated in the
very make-up and possible configurations of qi; which is why the
regular a posteriori patterns can emerge. "Pattern" provides for the
standing orders and processes, based on the steady interactions of
yin-yang, five phases, etc., that give rise to the heaven-earth world
order, with its full complement of ten thousand things. The
fundamental a priori patterns are thus necessary to the world order
and provide the fecund context in which the a posteriori forms emerge
continuously. Wang and Dai's qi-based view could not account for
existence and the world order in this sense. At the same time, Zhu did
not think that "patterns" were absolutely determinative. They just set
certain "possibilities of order" that are realized when the necessary
qiconditions obtain. For the most part, he registered the range of
randomness and free flow in qi activity that is best exemplified in
the randomness of weather systems and seismic events.
As to textual grounds, Wang and Dai argued that Zhu was so enamored of
his metaphysics of pattern andqi that he constantly read them into the
classical texts. For example, Dai said Zhu blandly associated
Confucius' term tian (heaven) with his own notion of li (pattern;
principle), quoting Analects 11:9 where Confucius, in sorrow over the
death of his disciple Yan Hui, cried that "Heaven had forsaken" him.
Could Zhu reasonably claim that Confucius was crying that li had
forsaken him? Critics tend to find Dai's counter-intuitive example
against Zhu's approach compelling. However, consulting Zhu's original
commentary, we find that he noted that this phrase expressed
Confucius' utmost sorrow, that he felt Yan Hui's death as if it was
his own, without mentioning "pattern." This example does not prove
Wang and Dai's claim. It illustrates that Zhu's commentary was nuanced
and sensitive to pragmatic, situational usages despite his penchant to
see his own notion of "pattern" in some of Confucius' usages of
"heaven." Moreover, the classicist Daniel Gardner shows that Zhu's
commentary was not intended as simply a glossary with comments. It was
intended as a guide to self-cultivation. Hence, Zhu sometimes recast
passages in the Analects more generally to show their broader
implications for self-cultivation and realization, often with the
isolated countryside student in mind. Gardner shows that Zhu thus had
enriched the text as a vital tool for self-cultivation, whereas the
earlier commentaries of the Han and Tang dynasties had just given
glosses necessary for answering examination questions.
Known in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the West due to
the work of Jesuits in China, Zhu Xi's thought and texts were made
more widely available to western scholarship in the late nineteenth
century. Early in the twentieth century, a Chinese student of John
Dewey (1859-1951) at Cornell, Hu Shi (1891-1962), initially followed
the empirical, textual Qing scholars in viewing Zhu as a scholastic
metaphysician. But, after reading Zhu's Dialogues in old age, Hu
contended that Zhu's method of observation was not scholastic but
essentially scientific in nature. J.C. Bruce, who translated a book of
Zhu's collected writings in the 1920s, viewed Zhu's notion of li
(pattern; principle) in light of Stoic natural law. From the 1930s,
the eminent historian of Chinese philosophy, Feng Youlan, interpreted
li along the lines of platonic Forms making Zhu Xi appear to be an
idealist and abstract thinker. In the 1950s, Carsun Chang naturalized
the notion of li by aligning it with the Aristotelian "nature" or
"essence," thereby locking Zhu's thought into a sort of descriptive
metaphysics.
From the 1960s, Mou Zongsan interpreted and criticized Zhu's ontology
and ethics on Kantian grounds, saying he erected an a priori framework
but then illicitly sought to derive further a priori knowledge (of
patterns) by a posteriori means (observation). In the 1970s, the
intellectual historian, Qian Mu examined and explained Zhu Xi's
thought directly on its own terms, without reading western concepts
and logical patterns into his system. Scholars wanting to read Zhu Xi
on his own terms, unmediated by western thought, turn to the five
volume Zhu Xi anthology edited by Qian Mu as a rich starting point.
In 1956, Joseph Needham, a scientist, made a highly significant
breakthrough by interpreting Zhu's system in terms of a process
philosophy, Whitehead's organic naturalism. Needham successfully
recast much of Zhu's language in naturalistic rather than metaphysical
terms. The cultural, moral dimension of Needham's account has been
developed by Cheng-ying Cheng and John Berthrong, while the scientific
dimension has been examined by Yung Sik Kim. In the 1980s, A.C. Graham
offered the most insightful and apt account of Zhu's terminology and
pattern of thought in, "What Was New in the Ch'eng-Chu Theory of Human
Nature?" and other writings. Graham showed decisively that the term li
refers to an embedded contextual "pattern," rather than to any sort of
abstract form or principle. He reminded us that the term li never
figures in propositions or logical sequences, as would be natural for
"principle." Rather,li are always conceived as structuring, balancing,
modulating, guiding phenomena, processes, reflection and human
discernment and response. For example, one never finds moral
syllogisms in Zhu Xi's writings. Everything he says is about moral
emotional intelligence: attunement, sensitivity, discernment, and
response. Kirill Thompson has explored and extended Graham's
interpretation in a series of studies. Joseph Adler examines the roles
played by the Book of Change and Zhou Dunyi in Zhu's thought, while
Thomas Wilson and Hoyt Tillman have shown the extent to which Zhu Xi
re-visioned, revised and recast the Confucian Way. Wilson is
interested in Zhu's account of the Way as a sort of
educational-ideological revision, and Tillman is interested in how
Zhu's account of the Way eventually snuffed out other competing
versions that might have offered more practical and liberal openings
in late imperial China.
In summary, the depth and range of Zhu Xi's thought were unparalleled
in the tradition. Zhu Xi studies continue to be vital, wide-ranging
and contentious, drawing growing global, cross-cultural interest.
6. References and Further Reading
* Adler, Joseph (1998). "Response and Responsibility: Chou Tun-I
and Confucian Resources for Environmental Ethics" in Mary Tucker and
John Berthrong ed. Confucianism and Ecology: The Interpretation of
Heaven, Earth, and Humans, Cambridge: Harvard UP.
o Expansion and application of Zhou Tunyi and Zhu Xi's ideas
to frame a cogent environmental ethic. Clear and thoughtful.
* (1999). "Chu Hsi's Use of the I ching" in Kidder Smith, ed.,
Sung Dynasty Uses of the I ching, Princeton: Princeton UP.
o Readable and informative survey. Complements the following text.
* (2002). "Introduction to the Classic of Change" by Chu Hsi:
Translation with introduction and notes, Provo: Global Scholarly
Publications.
o Zhu Xi's guide to understanding and using the Book of
Change. Fascinating. Clear translation and commentary. A major
contribution to Zhu Xi and Book of Change studies.
* Berthrong, John H. (1994). Concerning Creativity: A Comparison
of Chu Hsi, Whitehead, and Neville, Albany: SUNY Press.
o Well-developed "process philosophy" interpretation of
Zhu's speculative thought; see Needham 1956a and 1956b.
* Bruce, J. Percy (1923). Chu Hsi and His Masters: An Introduction
to the Sung School of Chinese Philosophy, London: Probsthain.
o Pioneering historical study.
* Chan, Wing-tsit (1963). "The Great Synthesis in Chu Hsi," in A
Source Book In Chinese Philosophy,Princeton: Princeton UP, 605-63.
o Translations of Zhu's principal essays and statements on
key terms, drawn primarily from Zhuzi quanshu; clear and thoroughly
annotated.
* (1966). Reflections on Things at Hand: The Neo-Confucian
Anthology Compiled by Chu Hsi and Lu Tsu-ch'ien, New York: Columbia
UP.
o Zhu's compendium of important early Neo-Confucian
pronouncements; clear and well annotated.
* (ed.) (1986). Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism. Honolulu: Hawaii UP.
o Detailed studies of key issues in Zhu Xi scholarship; for
the specialist.
* (1987). Chu Hsi: Life and Thought. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP.
o (General essays; clear and accessible.)
* (1989). Chu Hsi: New Studies. Honolulu: Hawaii UP.
o Detailed studies of key issues in Zhu Xi scholarship; for
the specialist.
* Chang, Carsun (1957). "Chu Hsi, The Great Synthesizer," in The
Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, vol. 1, New York: Bookman,
243-332.
o Aristotelian account of Zhu's philosophy, viewed in
contrast to Zhu's rivals' opinions. Attempted corrective of Feng's
platonic reading of Zhu Xi; see next entry.
* Feng, Youlan (1953). "Chu Hsi," trans. D. Bodde in A History of
Chinese Philosophy, 2 vols., Princeton: Princeton UP, vol. 2, 533-71.
o Highly influential pioneering platonic account of Zhu's
thought in English; technical but clearly presented.
* Gardner, Daniel (1986). Chu Hsi and Ta-hsueh: Neo-Confucian
Reflection on the Confucian Canon,Cambridge: Harvard UP.
o Translation of Zhu's commentary on the "Great Learning," a
major classical cultivation text; with excellent commentary and
supporting essays.)
* (1990). Learning to Be a Sage: Selections from the Conversations
of Master Chu, Arranged Topically,Berkeley: California UP.
o (Zhu's teachings on learning and study as a method of
self-cultivation; very clear and accessible.
* (2003). Zhu Xi's Reading of the Analects: Canon, Commentary and
the Classical Tradition, New York: Columbia UP.
o Insightful, corrective study of Zhu's mission and
accomplishment in writing this commentary.
* Graham, A.C. (1986) "What was New in the Ch'eng-Chu Theory of
Human Nature?" in Wing-tsit Chan (ed) Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism,
Honolulu: Hawaii UP, 138-157.
o Ground-breaking study; corrective reinterpretation of
Zhu's main concepts and ethical thought.
* Kim, Yung Sik (2000). The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi
1130-1200, Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.
o Clear and multifaceted study of Zhu's proto-scientific
efforts and achievements; see Thompson 2002b for critical analysis.
* Lovejoy, Arthur O. (1936 & 1964) The Great Chain of Being: A
Study of the History of an Idea,Cambridge: Harvard UP.
o An account of hierarchical systems in the West, to which
Zhu's system is a distant cousin; see Thompson 1994 for discussion.
* Needham, Joseph (1956a). "The Neo-Confucians," in Science and
Civilisation in China, vol. 2,History of Scientific Thought,
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 455-95.
o Highly influential organismic account of Zhu's thought;
lucid and fascinating.
* Needham, Joseph (1956b). "Chu Hsi, Leibniz, and the Philosophy
of Organism," in the preceding book, 496-505.
o Highly influential organismic account of Zhu's thought;
lucid and fascinating.
* Schirokauer, Conrad (1962). "Chu Hsi's Political Career: A Study
in Ambivalence," in A. Wright and D. Twichert (eds) Confucian
Personalities, Stanford: Stanford UP, 162-88.
o Detailed but engaging account.
* Thompson, Kirill O. (1988) "Li and Yi as Immanent: Chu Hsi's
Thought in Practical Perspective,"Philosophy East and West 38 (1):
30-46.
o Corrective account of Zhu's ontology and ethical theory;
lucid and informative.
* Thompson, Kirill O. (1991). "How to Rejuvenate Ethics:
Suggestions from Chu Hsi," Philosophy East and West (41): 493-513.
o Examination of how Zhu Xi's thought could rejuvenate
contemporary western ethics.
* Thompson, Kirill O. (1994). "Hierarchy of Immanence: Chu Hsi's
Pattern of Thought," Humanitas Taiwanica (Wen-shih-che hsueh-pao,
National Taiwan University (42): 1-30.
o Examines parallels and differences between Zhu's
philosophy and Great Chain philosophies of the western tradition, in
order to reveal strengths and special features of Zhu's system.
* Thompson, Kirill O. (2002a). "Ethical Insights from Chu Hsi," in
M. Barnhart, ed., Varieties of Ethical Reflection, New York and
London: Lexington Books.
o Presentation of Zhu's method of ethical thinking, with
applications to some difficult issues in Western ethics.
* Thompson, Kirill O. (2002b). "Review article of "Yung Sik Kim,
The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi 1130-1200," China Review
International (9): 165-80.
o Critical examination of Kim's study of Zhu's
proto-scientific thought.
* Thompson, Kirill O. (2007). "The Archery of Wisdom in the Stream
of Life: Zhu Xi's Reflections on the Four Books,"Philosophy East and
West, vol. 56, no. 3 (July).
o Study of Confucius and Mencius' fascinating notion of
wisdom in the light of Zhu Xi's salient reflections.
* Tillman, Hoyt (1992). Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi's
Ascendancy, Honolulu: Hawaii UP.
o Detailed historical study that situates Zhu in the context
of the intellectual issues and debates of the day.
* Wilson, Thomas A. (1995) Genealogy of the Way: the construction
and uses of the Confucian tradition in late imperial China, Stanford:
Stanford UP.
o New approach that sees politics and ideology in the
competing accounts of the Confucian Way.
* Wittenborn, Allen (1991). Further Reflections at Hand: A Reader,
New York: University Press of America.
o Useful compendium of Zhu's philosophic pronouncements;
clear translation with detailed commentary.
* Zhu Xi (1130-1200). Zhuzi yulei (Classified Dialogues of Master
Zhu), trans. J.P. Bruce, The Philosophy of Human Nature, London:
Probstain, 1922.
o Compendium of Zhu's moral psychology drawn from Zhuzi
quanshu ("Complete" Works of Master Zhu), abstruse. Other translated
selections can be found in Chan 1963, 1966; Gardner 1986, 1990, 2003;
Wittenborn 1991.
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