found in a collection of personal writings known as the Meditations.
These reflect the influence of Stoicism and, in particular, the
philosophy of Epictetus, the Stoic. The Meditations may be read as a
series of practical philosophical exercises, following Epictetus'
three topics of study, designed to digest and put into practice
philosophical theory. Central to these exercises is a concern with the
analysis of one's judgements and a desire to cultivate a "cosmic
perspective."
1. Life
Marcus Aurelius was born in AD 121. His early education was overseen
by the Emperor Hadrian, and he was later adopted by the Emperor
Antoninus Pius in AD 138. After an initial education in rhetoric
undertaken by Fronto, Marcus later abandoned it in favor of
philosophy. Marcus became Emperor himself in AD 161, initially
alongside Lucius Verus, becoming sole Emperor in AD 169. Continual
attacks meant that much of his reign was spent on campaign, especially
in central Europe. However, he did find time to establish four Chairs
of Philosophy in Athens, one for each of the principal philosophical
traditions (Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Epicurean). He died in
AD 180.
2. The Meditations
Marcus' reputation as a philosopher rests upon one work, the
Meditations. The Meditations take the form of a personal notebook and
were probably written while Marcus was on campaign in central Europe,
c. AD 171-175. The entries appear to be in no particular order and may
simply be in the original order of composition. The repetition of
themes and the occasional groups of quotations from other authors (see
e.g. Med. 4.46, 11.33-39) add to this impression. Book One, however,
is somewhat different from the rest of the text and may well have been
written separately (a plan for it may be discerned in Med. 6.48).
The first recorded mention of the Meditations is by Themistius in AD
364. The current Greek title – ta eis heauton ('to himself') – derives
from a manuscript now lost and may be a later addition (it is first
recorded c. AD 900 by Arethas). The modern text derives primarily from
two sources: a manuscript now in the Vatican and a lost manuscript
(mentioned above), upon which the first printed edition (1558) was
based.
Beyond the Meditations there also survives part of a correspondence
between Marcus and his rhetoric teacher Fronto, probably dating from
earlier in Marcus' life (c. AD 138-166), discovered as a palimpsest in
1815. However, although this interesting discovery sheds some light on
Marcus as an individual, it adds little to our understanding of his
philosophy.
3. Philosophy
a. Stoicism
According to tradition, Marcus was a Stoic. His ancient biographer,
Julius Capitolinus, describes him as such. Marcus also makes reference
to a number of Stoics by whom he was taught and, in particular,
mentions Rusticus from whom he borrowed a copy of the works of the
Stoic philosopher Epictetus (Med. 1.7). However, nowhere in the
Meditations does Marcus explicitly call himself a Stoic. This may
simply reflect the likelihood that Marcus was writing only for himself
rather than attempting to define himself to an audience. Yet it is
probably fair to admit that Marcus was at least open to ideas from
other philosophical traditions, being impressed by Stoic philosophy,
but not merely an unthinking disciple of Stoicism.
b. The Influence of Epictetus
As has been noted, Marcus was clearly familiar with the Discourses of
Epictetus, quoting them a number of times (see Med. 11.33-38).
Epictetus' fame in the second century is noted by a number of ancient
sources, being hailed as the greatest of the Stoics (Aulus Gellius
1.2.6) and more popular than Plato (Origen Contra Celsus 6.2). If
Marcus felt drawn towards Stoicism, then Epictetus would surely have
stood out as the most important Stoic of the time. It is perhaps
reasonable, then, to turn to Epictetus in order to explore the
philosophical background to the Meditations.
c. The Three topoi
Central to Epictetus' philosophy is his account of three topoi, or
areas of study. He suggests that the apprentice philosopher should be
trained in three distinct areas or topoi (see Epictetus Discourses
3.2.1-2):
1. Desires (orexeis) and aversions (ekkliseis);
2. Impulse to act (hormas) and not to act (aphormas);
3. Freedom from deception, hasty judgement, and anything else
related to assents (sunkatatheseis).
These three areas of training correspond to the three types of
philosophical discourse referred to by earlier Stoics; the physical,
the ethical, and the logical (see Diogenes Laertius 7.39). For
Epictetus, it is not enough merely to discourse about philosophy. The
student of philosophy should also engage in practical training
designed to digest philosophical principals, transforming them into
actions. Only this will enable the apprentice philosopher to transform
himself into the Stoic ideal of a wise person or sage (sophos). It is
to this end that the three topoi are directed.
The first topos, concerning desire (orexis), is devoted to physics. It
is not enough for the philosopher to know how Nature works; he must
train his desires in the light of that knowledge so that he only
desires what is in harmony with Nature. For the Stoic, Nature is a
complex inter-connected physical system, identified with God, of which
the individual is but one part. What might be called the practical
implication of this conception of Nature is that an individual will
inevitably become frustrated and unhappy if they desire things without
taking into account the operations of this larger physical system.
Thus, in order to become a Stoic sage – happy and in harmony with
Nature – one must train one's desires in the light of a study of Stoic
physical theory.
The second topos, concerning impulse (hormê), is devoted to ethics.
The study of ethical theory is of course valuable in its own right
but, for the Stoic training to be a sage, these theories must be
translated into ethical actions. In order to transform the way in
which one behaves, it is necessary to train the impulses that shape
one's behavior. By so doing the apprentice philosopher will be able
not merely to say how a sage should act but also to act as a sage
should act.
The third topos, concerning assent (sunkatathesis), is devoted to
logic. It is important to remember here that for the Stoics the term
'logic' included not only dialectic but also much of what one would
today call epistemology. According to Epictetus every impression
(phantasia) that an individual receives often includes a
value-judgement (hupolêpsis) made by the individual. When an
individual accepts or gives assent (sunkatathesis) to an impression,
assent is often given to the value-judgement as well. For instance,
when one sees someone drink a lot of wine, one often judges that they
are drinking too much wine (see e.g. Epictetus Handbook 45). Epictetus
suggests that, in the light of Stoic epistemological theory, the
apprentice philosopher should train himself to analyze his impressions
carefully and be on guard not to give assent to unwarranted
value-judgements.
For Epictetus, then, the student of philosophy must not only study the
three types of philosophical discourse but also engage in these three
types of philosophical training or exercise in order to translate that
theory into actions. Marcus may himself be seen as a student of
Epictetus, and so some scholars have suggested that the three topoi
form a key to understanding the Meditations. Indeed, the Meditations
may be approached as an example of a form of personal writing in which
the very act of writing constituted a philosophical exercise designed
to digest the three types of philosophical theory. In other words, the
Meditations are a text produced by someone engaged in the three topoi
outlined by Epictetus. This is hinted at in Med. 9.7 where Marcus
exhorts himself to 'wipe out impression (phantasia), check impulse
(hormê), and quench desire (orexis)'.
d. Philosophical Exercises
The Meditations certainly do not present philosophical theories
similar to those that one can find in, say, the surviving works of
Aristotle. Nor are they comparable to a theoretical treatise like the
Elements of Ethics by the Stoic Hierocles, possibly a contemporary of
Marcus. Nevertheless, the Meditations remain essentially a
philosophical text. As has already been noted, the Meditations are a
personal notebook, written by Marcus to himself and for his own use.
They do not form a theoretical treatise designed to argue for a
particular doctrine or conclusion; their function is different. In
order to understand this function it is necessary to introduce the
idea of a philosophical exercise (askêsis).
In the Meditations Marcus engages in a series of philosophical
exercises designed to digest philosophical theories, to transform his
character or 'dye his soul' in the light of those theories (see e.g.
Med. 5.16), and so to transform his behavior and his entire way of
life. By reflecting upon philosophical ideas and, perhaps more
importantly, writing them down, Marcus engages in a repetitive process
designed to habituate his mind into a new way of thinking. This
procedure is quite distinct from the construction of philosophical
arguments and has a quite different function. Whereas the former is
concerned with creating a particular philosophical doctrine, the
latter is a practical exercise or training designed to assimilate that
doctrine into one's habitual modes of behavior. Following the account
of three types of philosophical training outlined by Epictetus, Marcus
reflects in the Meditations upon a medley of physical, ethical, and
logical ideas. These written reflections constitute a second stage of
philosophical education necessary after one has studied the
philosophical theories (see e.g. Epictetus Discourses 1.26.3). By
engaging in such written philosophical exercises Marcus attempts to
transform his soul or inner disposition that will, in turn, alter his
behavior. Thus, this second stage of philosophical education is the
process by which a philosophical apprentice trains himself to put
theories into practice, and so make progress towards wisdom.
e. The Point of View of the Cosmos
Of all the philosophical exercises in the Meditations the most
prominent centers around what might be called 'the point of view of
the cosmos'. In a number of passages Marcus exhorts himself to
overcome the limited perspective of the individual and experience the
world from a cosmic perspective. For example:
You have the power to strip away many superfluous troubles located
wholly in your judgement, and to possess a large room for yourself
embracing in thought the whole cosmos, to consider everlasting time,
to think of the rapid change in the parts of each thing, of how short
it is from birth until dissolution, and how the void before birth and
that after dissolution are equally infinite. (Med. 9.32; see also
2.17, 5.23, 7.47, 12.32)
In passages such as this Marcus makes implicit reference to a number
of Stoic theories. Here, for instance, the Stoic physics of flux
inherited from Heraclitus is evoked. Perhaps more important though is
the reference to one's judgement and the claim that this is the source
of human unhappiness. Following Epictetus, Marcus claims that all
attributions of good or evil are the product of human judgements. As
Epictetus put it, what upsets people are not things themselves but
rather their judgements about things (see Handbook 5). According to
Epictetus' epistemological theory (to the extent that it can be
reconstructed) the impressions that an individual receives and that
appear to reflect the nature of things are in fact already composite.
They involve not only a perception of some external object but also an
almost involuntary and unconscious judgement about that perception.
This judgement will be a product of one's preconceptions and mental
habits. It is this composite impression to which an individual grants
or denies assent, creating a belief. The task for the philosopher is
to subject one's impressions to rigorous examination, making sure that
one does not give assent to (i.e. accept as true) impressions that
include any unwarranted value judgements.
Marcus' personal reflections in the Meditations may be read as a
series of written exercises aimed at analyzing his own impressions and
rejecting his own unwarranted value judgements. For instance, he
reminds himself:
Do not say more to yourself than the first impressions report. […]
Abide always by the first impressions and add nothing of your own from
within. (Med. 8.49)
These 'first impressions' are impressions before a value judgement has
been made. For Marcus, human well-being or happiness (eudaimonia) is
entirely dependent upon correctly examining one's impressions and
judgements. For once one has overcome false value-judgements – that
wealth and social standing are valuable and that one should compete
for them against others, for instance – one will experience the cosmos
as a single living being (identified with God) rather than a site of
conflict and destruction. As Cicero put it in his summary of Stoic
physics:
The various limited modes of being may encounter many external
obstacles to hinder their perfect realization, but there can be
nothing that can frustrate Nature as a whole, since she embraces and
contains within herself all modes of being. (On the Nature of the Gods
2.35)
It is to this end – cultivating an experience of the cosmos as a
unified living being identified with God – that the philosophical
exercises in the Meditations are directed.
4. Concluding Remarks
From a modern perspective Marcus Aurelius is certainly not in the
first rank of ancient philosophers. He is no Plato or Aristotle, nor
even a Sextus Empiricus or Alexander of Aphrodisias. To a certain
extent this judgement is perfectly fair and reasonable. However, in
order to assess the philosophical qualities that Marcus does have and
that are displayed in the Meditations it is necessary to emphasize
that in antiquity philosophy was not conceived merely as a matter of
theoretical arguments. Such arguments existed and were important, but
they were framed within a broader conception of philosophy as a way of
life. The aim was not merely to gain a rational understanding of the
world but to allow that rational understanding to inform the way in
which one lived. If one keeps this understanding of 'philosophy' in
mind, then one becomes able to appreciate the function and the
philosophical value of Marcus' Meditations.
5. References and Further Reading
1. Selected Editions and Translations of the Meditations
* CROSSLEY, H., The Fourth Book of the Meditations of Marcus
Aurelius Antoninus, A Revised Text with Translation and Commentary
(London: Macmillan, 1882) – an excellent commentary, sadly of only one
book.
* DALFEN, J., Marci Aurelii Antonini Ad Se Ipsum Libri XII,
Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Leipzig:
Teubner, 1979; 2nd edn 1987) – includes an invaluable word index.
* FARQUHARSON, A. S. L., The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus
Antoninus, Edited with Translation and Commentary, 2 vols (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1944) – arguably the definitive edition and essential
for any serious study of the Meditations.
* FARQUHARSON, A. S. L.,The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius
Antoninus, With Introduction and Notes by R. B. Rutherford (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989) – an edition reprinting only the
translation from Farquharson's 1944 edition, but supplemented with a
helpful introduction and a selection from the correspondence with
Fronto.
* GATAKER, T., Marci Antonini Imperatoris de rebus suis, sive de
eis qae ad se pertinere censebat, Libri XII (Cambridge: Thomas Buck,
1652) – a justly famous early edition of the Meditations containing a
substantial commentary.
* HAINES, C. R., The Communings with Himself of Marcus Aurelius
Antoninus, A Revised Text and a Translation into English, The Loeb
Classical Library (London: Heinemann, 1916; later reprints by Harvard
University Press) – probably the most readily available edition of the
Greek text, with a facing English translation. Haines also prepared a
two-volume edition of the correspondence with Fronto for the Loeb
Classical Library.
* LEOPOLD, I. H., M. Antoninus Imperator Ad Se Ipsum, Scriptorum
Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908) –
the OCT edition, now out of print.
* THEILER, W., Kaiser Marc Aurel, Wege Zu Sich Selbst (Zürich:
Artemis, 1951) – a widely praised edition of the Greek text, with a
facing German translation.
2. Selected Studies
* AFRICA, T. W., 'The Opium Addiction of Marcus Aurelius', Journal
of the History of Ideas 22 (1961), 97-102.
* ARNOLD, E. V., Roman Stoicism: Being Lectures on the History of
the Stoic Philosophy with Special Reference to its Development within
the Roman Empire (Cambridge, 1911; repr. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1958)
* ASMIS, E., 'The Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius', ANRW II 36.3
(1989), pp. 2228-2252.
* BIRLEY, A. R., Marcus Aurelius: A Biography (London: Batsford,
1966; new edn Routledge 2000)
* BRUNT, P. A., 'Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations', Journal of
Roman Studies 64 (1974), 1-20.
* CLARKE, M. L., The Roman Mind: Studies in the History of Thought
from Cicero to Marcus Aurelius (London: Cohen & West, 1956)
* HADOT, P., 'Une clé des Pensées de Marc Aurèle: les trois topoi
philosophiques selon Épictète', Les Études philosophiques 1 (1978),
65-83.
* HADOT, P., The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus
Aurelius, trans. M. Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1998); a translation of La Citadelle Intérieure (Paris, 1992)
* KRAYE, J., 'Ethnicorum omnium sanctissimus: Marcus Aurelius and
his Meditations from Xylander to Diderot', in J. Kraye & M. W. F.
Stones, eds, Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy (London: Routledge,
2000), pp. 107-134.
* LONG, A. A., 'Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius', in T. J. Luce, ed.,
Ancient Writers: Greece and Rome (New York: Scribner's, 1982), pp.
985-1002.
* MORFORD, M., The Roman Philosophers: From the Time of Cato the
Censor to the Death of Marcus Aurelius (London: Routledge, 2002)
* NEWMAN, R. J., 'Cotidie meditare: Theory and Practice of the
meditatio in Imperial Stoicism', ANRW II 36.3 (1989), pp. 1473-1517.
* RIST, J. M., 'Are You a Stoic? The Case of Marcus Aurelius', in
B. F. Meyers & E. P. Sanders, eds, Jewish and Christian
Self-Definition 3 (London: SCM, 1982), pp. 23-45.
* RUTHERFORD, R. B., The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius: A Study
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989)
* STANTON, G. R., 'The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetus and Marcus
Aurelius', Phronesis 13 (1968), 183-195.
* WICKHAM LEGG, J., 'A Bibliography of the Thoughts of Marcus
Aurelius Antoninus', Transactions of the Bibliographical Society 10
(1908-09, but publ. 1910), 15-81.
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